Language and Science the Rational, Functional Language of Science and Technology

Author(s): Stanley Gerr

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1942), pp. 146-161
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/184424
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LANGUAGE AND SCIENCE

THE RATIONAL, FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

STANLEY GERR
INTRODUCTION: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

"Reason," said Lao Tze some twenty five hundred years ago, "is of all things
the emptiest. Yet its use is inexhaustible." With equal justice, he might have
said the same of language. But Lao Tze, whose profound metaphysical probing
appeared to carry him beyond the reach of linguistic aid, was led to insist that
"Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know." Yet the "Old
Philosopher," as he is known to the Chinese, might be said to admit, by the
very implications of his insistence, that language can exercise the greatest influence on thought, if only, in his viewpoint, to nullify it. Today we acknowledge this influence by reversing the great metaphysician's statement, those
without speech (i.e. language) in some form or other cannot know.
As to what language is, E. Sapir has given us an almost unimpeachable definition. "Language," says this scholar, "is a purely human and non-instinctive
method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system of
voluntarily produced symbols." If "communication" is conceived to include
self-communication or the forms of introspection, then it is indeed difficult to
find fault with Sapir's statement. But the essential nature of the relation between rational thought and language has never been clearly defined. There is,
in fact, a consensus of modern opinion in this field that the connection between
these two elements of a larger process is so intimate as to render impossible the
task of setting up definite physical (i.e. physiological) or psychological boundaries
delimiting speech (language) from ideation.
However, this statement, too, requires that the connotation of a term-this
time of the word "language"-be expanded. This extension of meaning, which
makes language practically synonymous with symbolism in general, is both
necessitated and justified by modern developments of symbolic technique.
Accordingly, language must be recognized as such not only when it appears in
its common, and possibly fundamental, spoken form, but also when found in any
one of a multitude of substitute and derivative forms it is able to assume or
develop. These may range all the way from highly socialized ideographies
like those used in mathematics, symbolic logic, and many branches of science
and engineering (e.g. chemistry, electricity, et.), through the conventional
written reproductions of spoken languages, down to many subtle, more or less
individualised types of physiological exchange or psychological transfer of
symbolic function which often remain unrecorded or even entirely concealed.
The latter would include the various forms of inner or silent speech, identified outright as thinking by the behaviourist school of psychology, as well as
most instances of metaphorical association of ideas in which concepts are them146

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selves symbols of further referents. In this extended sense of the word "language" is certainly inextricably interwoven with human thought patterns
and processes.
Moreover, the connection between symbol and concept, or on a larger scale
between language and thought, is neither passive nor accidental. Through its
unique history and function of coordinating and integrating the diverse behaviour, experience, desires, needs, and intentions of many human beings,
language has developed a host of 'operational techniques (syntactic relational
devices, schemes of categories, etc.) and absorbed a multitude of viewpoints
which remain latent in the body of speech. This has established it as the
collectivemind and memory of society. To the extent that society is far more
complex than the individuals composing it, language reveals itself as vastly
more retentive, flexible, suggestive, and dynamic than any individual mind.
In its written form it has made possible the operation of another great "law"
of conservation paralleling the universal "law of conservation" (of matter and
energy) which describes the functioning of the physical universe. This is the
"law" that no element of human experience, whether real or "imagined,"
which has received written linguistic formulation is ever totally lost. Language
binds into one vast, fluid, yet plastic whole the multitude of individual human
experiences.
Accordingly, as the most powerful and pervasive influence in the social environment, its effect on the mental processes of individual users of language is necessarily profound. For, in addition to making possible the primary integration
of the individual into society-which is to say inculcating him with a set of
mental habits (i.e. a specific psychological reaction pattern) characteristic of
the language group to which he belongs-language provides him with the most
potent stimulus to creative individual thinking. This it does in two ways.
In the first place, language activates ("energizes") the speaker as well as the
listener; or, more generally, the "symbolist" as well as the interpreter of symbols.
That is to say, language used in response to an external (e.g. linguistic) stimulus
or to an internal need is itself capable of exciting further mental (i.e. "linguistic")
or physical reactions which, in turn, may serve to continue the process. Through
inclusion in the sensitive network of language, particular symbols are spontaneously linked with any number of related ideas. The well known word game
of "associations" affords an excellent illustration of this fact. Accordingly, the
use of a readily duplicated symbol, which represents a distant, fleeting, or vanished experience, enables the symbolist to recall it at will, and to associate it
freely with other linguistically symbolised elements of experience. By providing
a convenient stimulus to memory, ready control over the association of ideas
through manipulative control over the signs which represent ideas, and relative
freedom from objective restrictions to the associative flow of ideas, language
enables the linguist to initiate, control, and develop imaginary or symbolical
experiences which the world of physical events might never yield, or could never
yield. In fact, this process of creative imagination through the association
of symbols in ideal or imaginary combinations is particularly suited to

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dealing with abstract, complex, and derivative concepts. It has, as we shall see,
extremely important implications for science.
In the second place, language enables an investigator to utilize the collective
experience and imagination of the entire social group with whose language he
happens to be familiar. For language, and especially recorded language, besides
presenting a host of integrations of individual experiences as so many "faits
accomplis", at the same time provides the means to effect such integrations of
human knowledge, experience, and imagination as the interests or needs of
the investigator may require. Language performs a multiple integration.
Through the operation of its "law of conservation," it enables one to range
through space, time, and the labyrinths of society in quest of knowledge, guidance, or inspiration.
Accordingly, in this double capacity of enabling the individual to tap the
unlimited reservoir of past and possible human experience for guidance in his
own activities, as well as suggesting innumerable permutations, combinations,
and recombinations of the elements of experience, language functions as the
most powerful stimulus to imagination. It exerts a decisive influence on the
development of any field of thought, and in its turn is strongly influenced by the
evolution of the ideas and conceptions which helps to stabilize or develop. At
the same time it should be noted that language, through its almost unlimited
power of suggestion, can exercise a retarding as well as a stimulating influence
on the development of fields of thought. For unless speculation (i.e. linguistic
analysis) is based on objectively or experimentally established criteria of relevance and consistency, it is bound to lose itself, sooner or later, in an uncharted
morass of infinitely extensible linguistic associations-"sound and fury, signifying nothing". The persistent, frequently ingenious, often profound, yet finally
ineffectual attempts of classical, medieval, and even renaissance scientists,
philosophers, and scholars to understand and explain the material universe are
at once proof of the great deal which can be accomplished by skillful exploitation
of purely linguistic methods, and warning of the ultimate futility of such an
approach if pursued "in vacuo."
Language reflects the structure and content of our thought. But it also
reflects the structure and composition of the world as we conceive it. In this
twofold capacity its salient features might be summed up as follows. It is
universally applicable, for there is no conceivable aspect of experience or imagination which cannot somehow or other be dealt with linguistically. It is capable
of elaborating description to any degree of approximation. It furnishes a
complete, accessible repository of symbols associated with all concepts and all
relations. It is capable of infinite accommodation to the infinity of variable
phenomena presented by the external world. It integrates and co-ordinates
the efforts of all people working towards the same goal. In short, because it is
the most flexible, suggestive, and adaptable, as well as the only universal instrument developed by man to deal (however inadequately) with the overwhelming
flux of natural events, in conjunction with systematic and controlled observation,
language constitutes the tool par excellence for the rational investigation of the

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world of nature. "Everything flows," said Heracleitus, and implied: "How is

it then possible to comprehend the universe?" Language provides a possible
answer: "By flowing along with it in thought"; which is to say, by making
speech, or symbolism in general, as flexible and as suggestive as experience
itself.
Now ordinary, everyday language is a universal instrument, applicable in
some measure to all phenomena, and catering to every point of view. But
science, while interested in the totality of events, nevertheless considers them
from a very special point of view. Occupied with evolving a rational, mechanistic conception of the universe, it is naturally impelled to use and assimilate
chiefly the rational and factual elements already present in the everyday language. It disregards almost completely the enormous linguistic residuelikewise an integral part of the common speech-developed to deal with all other
possible human approaches to the problems created by man's struggle with his
environment (e.g. economic, religious, esthetic, etc.), and fastens on that aspect
of the common language best suited to its purpose. At the same time it does
not entirely sever its connection with the other aspects of everyday language
because in its initial treatment of new and unexplored fields it requires the suggestive stimulation of many points of view for purposes of orientation.
In the course of time, however, the reciprocal stimulation of these two elements
-the rationale of the scientific approach and the parallel rationalisation of its
linguistic formulation-has led to the development of a peculiar linguistic style
characterised largely by the use of an essentially "scientific" or "functional"
vocabulary. At the same time it has stimulated the further development of
language along the lines of increasing rationality and economy of expression.
In an extreme form this has led to the growth of symbol systems, such as that
of mathematics, which, while linguistic in origin, have evolved to the point
where they no longer find an exact counterpart in ordinary speech. This type
of mathematical or purely symbolical expression is doubtless the final, logically
perfect form of rational linguistic formulation. It is particularly suited to
organising, recording, and communicating a completed body of knowledge. But
its universal application to the aggregate of scientific learning is practicallyand theoretically-impossible, because science, a "self-catalysing" or "selfactivating" process, can never be reduced to a completed, perfect, and selfsufficient body of knowledge.
Though particular branches of science and technology have from time to time
appeared to be completely investigated and definitively formulated, this has
always proved to be an illusion. Periodically revolutionary changes sweep
across the world of science, induced partly by the need to assimilate newly discovered facts incompatible with old theories, and partly by the achievement of
a more "perfect" (i.e. more useful) formulation of the assured body of knowledge.
For improved formulation of a group of facts or relations spontaneously sharpens
and clarifies the investigator's perception of these facts. At the same time it
suggests the way in which they are to be further tested in the laboratory or

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otherwise employed. Conversely, clearer perception of the facts, resulting

from successful experimentation, both necessitates and facilitates a more
rational formulation.
Science progresses by way of this double process of linguistic reformulation
(including mathematical analysis) and systematic observation. The first points
the way for the second, and the latter remoulds and reconditions the former.
As an electromagnetic disturbance advances by the reciprocal stimulation of its
varying electric and magnetic fields, so science is urged on by the reciprocal
action of its linguistic and laboratory analyses.
These linguistic analyses often take the form of "ideal" or "imaginary" experiments closely related to the "imaginary experiences" previously mentioned.
Like them, they depend largely on the ability of language to provide ready and
unimpeded association of linguistically symbolised elements of experience,
thereby turning to account the wealth of experience symbolically stored up in
language. At the same time they are susceptible to far greater control and ease
of manipulation than the physical events they represent. For these reasons
such "imaginary" experiments can be very radical in conception, and successful
in execution. But where "imaginary experiences" can be almost entirely unrestricted with respect to the association of experiential data-as in dreams-the
"imaginary experiments" of the scientist, engineer, and inventor are guided
largely by the conditions and limitations imposed by the criteria of objective
reality. Used in such circumstances, language may be said to function as an
instrument of conceptual analysis or synthesis.
It is worth noting at this point that such "symbolical solutions" of physical
problems closely resemble the methods of mathematical analysis. For in this
major branch of mathematics, which proceeds by continuously varying the conditions which define a problem, so that at every step a permissible operation
is performed, until finally the configuration of the problem has been completely
changed by a series of irreproachable transformations into a recognizable one,
which is to say a solution, or into a radically new one, which is to say a discovery, we have a precise analogy of the procedure followed in the "ideal experiments" under consideration.
As extremely fruitful examples of such linguistic analyses we may mention
the development of the atomic hypothesis, Galileo's extension of the concept
of inertia to uniform motion in a straight line, and perhaps the most brilliant of
all, Sadi Carnot's conception of the ideal cycle of operations defining the conditions of operation of any mechanism deriving its energy from a source of heat.
In each case familiar elements of experience were subjected to "imaginary"
extension or modification by way of a parallel linguistic manipulation of the
symbols representing the physical entities in question. The "yield," considering
the slight expenditure of mental and physical energy in each case, was enormous.
The first resulted in the development of the fundamental concepts of chemistry,
the second became one of the basic laws of mechanics, and the last gave rise to
the second law of thermodynamics, a cornerstone of modern science.
Even where such imaginary experiments prove to be inconclusive, they point

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the way to experimental investigation of the circumstances involved in that they

provide the hypotheses which must precede and prepare the way for purposive
physical experimentation. It is in this sense of being spurred on by the spontaneous, reciprocal stimulation of both aspects of its twofold approach to the
problems of the physical world that science must be regarded as a "self-activating" process.
Paradoxically enough, then, science which does not believe in perpetual
motion is itself "perpetually in motion". Science must evolve. Accordingly,
it requires not only an absolutely precise, purely symbolical language like
mathematics to deal with the more assured fields of knowledge, but also a more
flexible and more suggestive, as well as more "universal" language to keep pace
with its constant evolution. This is provided by what might be called the
everyday language of science and technology, which is, in essence, no more
than the common language with its rational structure and factual vocabulary
enormously developed.
In this account we shall limit ourselves to consideration of this non-mathematical, functional language which performs a triple function for science: it
acts as a guide in the execution of the "imaginary" experiments so vital to the
progress of science; it serves as a framework for rational formulation of scientific
knowledge; and it records and communicates the tentative results of scientific
procedure. It is the language in which the bulk of scientific and technical
literature is at present formulated; nor is it too much to say that it must always
be an important factor of expression in an evolving science. Moreover, mathematical formulations of fairly certain knowledge are themselves particularly
susceptible to significant revision-a process which often leads to fundamental
modification of scientific concepts and suggests fresh fields of experimental
investigation. These again require the "everyday" language of science for their
preliminary investigation. A classical example of this was Maxwell's mathematical analysis of the electrical knowledge of his time, which pointed the way
to so many important experimental researches and industrial developments.
The three main features of our evolving scientific language are:
1) increase in size and complexity of vocabulary to keep pace with a
growing body of knowledge;
2) rationalisation of this vocabulary through the multiplication of "functional" or "operational" terms;
3) rationalisation of linguistic formulation as a whole through progressive
reduction of syntactic complexity to the absolute minimum established by the
requirements of formal logical analysis and exposition, as well as through the
extended use of "functional" terms.
In our account we shall limit our consideration of the first feature. Not
only is size of vocabulary simply a necessary corollary of the development of
any (social) undertaking which enlists the support of language; but also the
many complex terms so frequently encountered in scientific and technical
literature illustrate no more than the ability of language in general to create
compound names for the representation of complex or derivative concepts.

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Moreover, complexity of linguistic formulation is not necessarily an accurate

indication of the degree of conceptual (psychological) unity achieved, as witness
the synonyms "radio" and "wireless telegraphy," "subway" and "underground
railroad," etc.
There are several principal methods of forming complex technical terms:
crystallisation of phrases and groups of words into fixed expressions, as in "instantaneous angular velocity", "copper zinc cell", "necessary and sufficient
conditions" (used in mathematics); creation of compound words, as "electromagnetism", "viscosimeter", "sulfanilamide"; and formation of derivative
terms, as "electrification", "polymerise", "ultraviolet". But they are all quite
as characteristic of common, everyday speech as they are of scientific language
(cf. "pot of gold", "teaparty", "gratify", etc.). Neither is the creation of technical terms through the metaphorical association of ideas peculiar to scientific
language as such. In technology we find expressions like "crane" (based on a
remote resemblance of the machine to a species of long-necked bird), the "teeth"
of certain types of gears, the "migrations" of ions, the "feeding" of networks,
"weeping" of rivets, "bleeding" of boilers, etc. But similar locutions, like
"bookworm", "social lion", "mainstay" (of a family), are as commonly encountered in everyday speech.
The essential characteristics of scientific language are to be found in the
second and third features enumerated above-that is, in its extensive use of
"functional" or "operational" names in factual contexts rationally formulated.
It is these aspects of "rationality" and "functionality" which particularly
interest us.
The word "rationality" is used here in two different though related senses.
In the first place, it is taken to mean that the data of science and technology are
linguistically formulated in accordance with the precepts established by traditional logic as proper to the method of formal exposition. Thus the broad
distinction made in logic between "conditional" and "categorical" propositions
(and syllogisms) is also recognized in the language of science. It is indicated
by the presence of expressions like 'if ... then . . . ", "since . .. therefore .. ",
"when . . .then. . . ", and "implies, includes, excludes, is equivalent to, etc".
(or their equivalents in more abstract scientific symbol systems). In a sense,
too, this dichotomy marks roughly the distinction between "pure" and "applied" science. "Pure" science emphasizes the conditional, "applied" science
(i.e. engineering or technology) the categorical type of statement, though the
distinction is by no means rigidly adhered to.
The following, taken from Prandtl and Tietjens' Fundamentals of Hydroand Aeromechanics, is a good example of a "pure" scientific statement: "If,
when a fluid is at rest, the circulation is zero for every closed curve, then it follows
that every motion developed in this liquid under the action of an irrotational
field of force has zero circulation along these lines." This stands in marked
contrast to the following, taken from the same authors' Applied Hydro- and
Aerodynamics: "Measurements have shown that the flow in the core is constant in cross sections only near to the entrance (where the boundary layer has

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not yet become too thick), while for sections farther away from it, the flow in
the core has first a slight and later a more profound curvature."
This formal, rational style of expression, common to both logic and the sciences, fixes the irreducible minimum of syntactic complexity in the language of
science and technology. The syntactic minimum is actually reached in the
mathematical formulation of well-established sciences like theoretical mechanics
and electromagnetic field theory. But even in less advanced fields of science,
where the bulk of the text still consists of ordinary technical terms and expressions rather than mathematical symbols and abbreviations, these syntactic
"joints" furnish the necessary indications of the scientist's progression towards
a rational linguistic synthesis of his data. The typical scientific passage is an
exercise in logical formulation. At the same time, it is, perhaps, worth noting
that the intimate connection between science and logic, which is indicated on the
one hand by the structural or syntactic identity of their linguistic formulations,
is also reflected in the names of so many sciences which end in "-ology". It is
quite conceivable that every science could be so named.
As the second meaning of "rationality" has reference to "functional" or
"operational" terms, its consideration will have to wait till these have been
further elucidated. Accordingly, we shall try to trace the development of such
expressions, and indicate their significance for a scientific language.
In its initial stages, our knowledge of an event is indefinite and incomplete.
It is about a vague "something or other", which "does something else", "looks
like this or that", "behaves in such and such a manner", "has this in common
with that but differs from it in the following ways", etc. Precisely because at
this point experience is so meager and understanding so rudimentary we are
forced-by the very inadequacy of our conception-to reinforce it with as many
and as varied linguistic props as we can muster. Far-fetched metaphors, crude
similes, and elaborate descriptions are all utilized for this purpose. Pliny, for
example, speaks of thunderbolts as being "heavenly fire spit forth by the planet
(Jupiter) as crackling charcoal flies from a burning log"; and Maxwell, in his
famous paper "On Physical Lines of Force," asserts that "the stress in the axis
of a line of magnetic force is a tension, like that of a rope".
The function of such linguistic artifices is to endow the investigator's first
fragile conception of the phenomenon under consideration with "structural
rigidity". That is, to enable it to "stand up" long enough for it to become the
object of a critical appraisal. Using a somewhat different metaphor, we might
say that the early investigator, seeking consciously or unconsciously to identify
and delimit the relevant concepts and underlying conditions of a vaguely
apprehended phenomenon, begins by spinning as large a linguistic "web" as he
can about it. He thereby "anchors" (relates) it, by every verbal means at his
command, to objects, operations, and relations with which he is already more or
less familiar, and which therefore appear to imbue the object of investigation
with heightened rationality, factuality, and conceptual clarity-i.e. "reality."
An excellent example of this procedure is to be found in this same paper of
Maxwell's, where he develops his famous mechanical model of the electro-

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magnetic ether: "The contiguous portions of consecutive (ether) vortices must

be moving in opposite directions.... The only conception which has at all aided
me in conceiving this kind of motion is that of the vortices being separated by a
layer of particles. ... In mechanism, when two wheels are intended to revolve in
the same direction, a wheel is placed between them so as to be in gear with both,
and this wheel is called the 'idle wheel.' The hypothesis about the vortices
which I have to suggest is that a layer of particles, acting as idle wheels, is interposed between each vortex and the next, so that each vortex has a tendency to
make the neighboring vortices revolve in the same direction as itself."
The extent and complexity of this linguistic "scaffolding" help us to organize
and communicate our few inadequate and unrelated thoughts about the matter
at hand. At the same time they reveal the utter insufficiency of our early conception. In this stage, with our scientific analysis still in an "embryonic" state,
our initial comprehension of an event is developed in terms of the vague or customary concepts of everyday life, and expressed in the correspondingly nebulous
terminology of the common, everyday language. Here our terms are as yet
hardly (scientifically) defined, and especially our substantives must be augmented by lengthy descriptions replete with syntactic complexities. Syntax,
with its emphasis on elaborate, independent verbal constructions, is the dominant
feature of the linguistic "landscape". Ernst Mach, in his book Die Mechanik
in iher Entwicklung cites the following passage from Aristotle's Quaestiones
Mechanicae as typical of the early stages of scientific development: "What
appears to be miraculous is nevertheless natural enough, though the cause thereof
is not manifest... Such is the case where the smaller overpowers the larger,
and smaller weights overcome heavy burdens, and indeed all those problems
which we call 'mechanical.' .. . Those concerning the lever, which belongs to
this class (of mechanical problems), are difficult to conceive. For it appears to
be contradictory that a heavy burden should be moved by a small force, even
when the former is attached to a still larger weight. For whoever is unable to
budge a weight, is able to move it readily when he applies a lever to the task.
The cause of all these lies in the essential nature of the circle, which is indeed
natural enough; for it is by no means contradictory that something wonderful
should proceed from something else quite wonderful. For the most wonderful
thing of all is the combination of contrary characteristics into a unity. But the
circle is precisely so constituted, being indeed generated by an element which
moves, and another which remains rigidly fixed in position".
However, the steady growth of organised, positive knowledge in a given field
or of a given event induces a continuous transformation of the corresponding
linguistic formulation. Simultaneously with the emergence of the fundamental
physical entities, their transformations and relations, and the operations performed on or with them, as distinct, relevant conceptual units, a parallel linguistic
evolution gives rise to a set of corresponding terms. As the former become continually more specific with regard to form, function, and behaviour, the latter
constantly acquire a more specific, and at the same time more comprehensive
connotation. For linguistic reformulation and conceptual revision are simply

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correlative phases of the same process of assimilating and systematizing a growing

body of knowledge.
The development of a branch of science or technology is thus seen to be intimately connected with the development of a suitable vocabulary. Only when
an idea has received an adequate or convenient name does it become familiar,
capable of ready assimilation or development. The truth of this is attested by
numerous examples from the history of science. For instance, in the early
stages of electrical investigation the word "conductivity" was never employed
in discussing the behaviour of electrical conductors. Rather, the complex
though equivalent concept "reciprocal of the resistance" (1/R) was used instead.
The result was almost complete neglect of the concept of conductivity. Upon
the introduction of the word into the electrotechnical vocabulary, however, the
corresponding idea received a great impetus to development, so that today it
occupies a prominent place in electrical science. On a larger scale there is the
example cited by L. Olschki in his Geschichte der Neusprachlichen Wissenschaftlichen Literatur, where it is pointed out that before the time of the
painter Albrecht Duerer, the study of geometry was completely neglected in
Germany because of the insufficiency of the German vocabulary in this respect,
notwithstanding that Germany was at that time one of the most active centers
for the study of arithmetic and algebra. "Only after Duerer was able, not
without considerable difficulty, to coin German expressions for the concepts of
geometry," says E. Wuester, citing the same source in his Internationale
Sprachnormung in der Technik, "was it possible to include the study of geometry in the mathematical curriculum of the German schools."
As we have already seen, a complete parallelism marks the progress of science
along the double path it pursues. Linguistically, the advance is signalised by
progressive rationalisation of the formulation of scientific knowledge. The
course of this rationalisation leads naturally to an extensive use of the "functional" or "operational" terms previously mentioned. To see why this must
be the case, we shall have to consider briefly some of the ontological postulates
implicit in the scientific analysis of the physical world.
The scientist, we have said, is concerned with evolving a rational, mechanistic
conception of the material universe. Necessarily, then, a cardinal article of his
"faith" must be that the physical world is so constituted as to be capable of receiving such an interpretation. This constitutes his "philosophical plane of
polarisation". The world may actually be constituted as a mechanical system.
Or the "rationality" of the world may be due, simply, to an inherent rationality
of the human mind itself which constantly impells the scientist to recognise the
same quality in the world of nature, so that he might be said to impress the
rational aspect of his own personality on the material universe. In either case,
however, the fundamental "prejudice" of the scientist-the conviction which
"polarises" all his activity as scientist, and which he cannot surrender without
giving up the pursuit of science altogether-is that the world and its workings
constitute a rational, mechanical system, the proper comprehension of which
requires a rational, mechanistic approach.

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The fundamental characteristic of such a mechanical universe is that its

transformations and processes take place in compliance with the criteria of rational laws. That is, the manner of its functioning is a consistent process
necessarily indicative of an underlying structural pattern. A given physicochemical structure is thus assumed to imply and to be revealed by a specific
type of "behaviour"; a specific structural design to imply a fixed manner of
functioning or reacting to physico-chemical influences. In all the activity of
the scientist as scientist there is implicit the dictum that in a physical system a
given structural pattern is invariably associated with a fixed reaction pattern
("cause" and "effect" in an earlier scientific vocabulary).
In a sense the whole endeavour of science can be interpreted as an effort to
verify this fundamental assumption of a rational, mechanistic universe. Accordingly, the work of the scientist may be conceived as that of discovering the
basic reaction-patterns of material systems, correlating them with the structural
patterns invariably associated with them, and formulating this knowledge (i.e.
organising it linguistically) by means of the smallest number of independent
concepts (symbols) necessary and sufficient for their explanation.
In the last analysis, then, science tends to identify structure with behaviour,
form with function, and finally, matter with energy (energy the "mode of reaction" of matter). Moreover, the same basic postulate of invariant relation
between structural design and fixed, correlative reaction pattern is likewise
implicit in the application of scientific knowledge to the design and fabrication
of experimental apparatus and engineering structures. Accordingly, when
science and technology have reached an advanced stage of development, we find
that the constant application of this point of view has resulted in the evolution
of a corollary which may be formulated as follows: an operation is acceptable to
technological science only when a device (tool, mechanism, instrument, apparatus) exists for carrying it out, and a process or physical property only when
it can be measured; which is to say, only when a device exists for measuring it.
The operation and its mechanical means of realisation, and the process and
its means of measurement are conceived to be "scientifically" or "technologically" identical. A tool, which is to say any instrument in the broadest sense
of the word, is thus equivalent to or identical with its particular function, and
an experimental set-up to a particular process or property. From this point of
view, no operation can be conceived apart from the mechanism with which it is
executed, and no physical or chemical characteristic can be separated from the
type of apparatus by means of which it is measured.
This attitude has a profound effect on the language of science and technology.
Inevitably, the tendency to identify things and their functions-that is, to conceive things "dynamically", or "in operation"-gives rise to the corresponding
tendency to consider the names of things as being indicative at the same time
of their manner of functioning, and the names of properties and processes as
symbolical of the apparatus used to detect or produce them. So to the expert
the term "milling" must conjure up an image of a "milling machine" in operation, for it is hardly possible to form an accurate or even adequate conception of

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the process except in terms of the corresponding mechanism. Again, the use
of a word like "turn" to describe the operation or function of a lathe will, in time
to come, be felt to be too vague, perhaps even contradictory, for expert use.
The word "lathe" itself will be regarded as the proper name of either the machine
or the work it performs. Similarly, a shovel "shovels," a plough "ploughs," a
mould "moulds," and a saw "saws." In mathematics it is not necessary to
"find" a derivative or integral; one simply "differentiates" or "integrates".
Take, again, processes like electric or magnetic induction, optical dispersion,
mechanical acceleration, etc., and properties like inductance, capacitance, and
resistance in electricity. The same tendency operates to make these names
indicative not only of the process or attribute in question, but also of its measurement, and even of the object characterised by possession of the property in
question. For example, in electricity, words like "inductance", "capacitance",
and "resistance" refer equally to the attribute, to its measurement, or to the coils,
condensers, and rheostats which introduce these factors into electrical circuits.
In general, it is possible to express ideas more accurately and more precisely
by means of substantives than by means of verbs. The former can more readily
refer to concrete objects which are capable of closer and more fruitful examination
than the vague and abstract changes symbolised by purely verbal forms. In
its later stages, when it is felt that a particular field of knowledge has been
sufficiently developed and adequately formulated to form part of the body of
technological science, we find that the terminology used to deal with it comprises many of these "functional" substantives or substantival constructs. At
the same time that these possess very specific nominal reference, they are also
capable of indicating or suggesting equally specific verbal significance. Accordingly, at this level of development, where a physico-chemical or mechanical
process, property, or operation is most adequately conceived and formulated in
terms of the apparatus or device by means of which it is realised, detected, or
produced, language has gone far towards becoming a "functional symbol system". That is to say, the significant words, the names of things and processes
pertinent to the field in question, now serve to symbolise "things in operation",
or "things as they function".
It is perhaps even conceivable that the language of science and technology
might ultimately dispense with all verbal forms except a general "operator"
symbol which would serve to set any substantive (i.e. "mechanism") in motion.
This would resemble the English use of several Greek and Latin suffixes for a
similar purpose; cf. words like "liquefy", "solidify", "macadamise", "symbolise",
etc. It would bear a still closer resemblance to the Japanese technique of
suffixing the verb "suru" ("to make", "to do") to Chinese nouns for the purpose
of verbalising them. But the best analogy of this is, perhaps, the example afforded by motion pictures, where a;single, elementary operation, that of unwinding the film before a projector, which is to say setting it in simple, linear motion,
is sufficient to "release" or "realise" an infinity of dynamic changes, processes,
functions, operations, attributes and activities implicit in the "substantival" or
static film.

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In the final stages of this development, then, we arrive at the conception of a

scientific language in which vocabulary, in the form of a sort of generalised
"functional" or "operational" substantive, almost completely usurps the early
function of syntactic elaboration in expanding and specifying the meaning of
terms. Here the "functional" or "operational" significance of a material entity,
ordinarily expressed by means of a separate verbform, is subsumed in the name
of the thing itself. Thus a single symbol (term) connotes "the thing as it functions", and, by immediate inference, "the thing" and "its function(s)". The
mention of the name of a mechanism or apparatus is tantamount to naming its
function, or manner of operating. Things are conceived operationally, and
language responds by charging its symbols with added significance till they, too,
become "functional".
The final impression of the scientific language now outlined is that of an instrument particularly suited to the rational formulation of scientific knowledge
in a precise and efficient manner. This is largely the result of an extensive use
of "functional" terms in rationally constructed syntactic formulations. By
making every noun a possible "verbal metaphor", the scientist makes verbal
connotation dependent upon nominal bases which have much more specific and
dependable objective reference. Accordingly, through the coalescence of verbal
and nominal significance in a single basic symbol, he causes each aspect of the
universe he deals with to support the other, and thereby materially improves
the expression of both. The verb, which expresses the functioning or operation
(the "work significance") of a physical or mechanical system, overcomes its
customary vagueness by borrowing the concreteness of the noun from which it
is derived; the latter, indicative of the structure or composition of the mechanism
or system in question, overcomes its "lifeless" rigidity by borrowing the dynamic
flexibility of the associated verbal connotation.
At the same time that it greatly enhances the accuracy, convenience, and
precision of technical language, the use of these functional terms represents a
great saving in the amount of labor expended on the linguistic formulation of
scientific knowledge. This constitutes the second aspect of rationality or economy of expression in the scientist's language to which we have already referred.
Thus he rejoices in a double rationalisation of his language tool; rationalisation
of expression as a whole through the employment of logical syntactic formulation, and rationalisation of individual expressions through the use of functional
terms. This conception of a rational, functional language is at the same time a
constant remainder of the fundamental scientific assumption of a rational,
mechanistic universe.
Strangely enough, the Indo-European languages, in which the bulk of scientific
and technical work has been recorded, are not as well adapted in some important
respects to the needs of scientific language work as others which are far less important in the actual history of science and technology. For example, in the
matter of a functional vocabulary they are far inferior to the Semitic languages,
in which an underlying language-pattern causes one to see a noun in every verb,
and a verb in every noun. They are still further behind the remarkable written

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language of the Chinese in both aspects of language rationalisation. It should

be noted, however, that English, which has the best developed scientific and
technical vocabulary among the European languages, is in the process of developing the use of functional terms to a noticeable degree. For example, in
addition to many instances of functional terms found in the scientific vocabulary,
isolated instances of such "generalised" names occur also in everyday English:
e.g. "to water" flowers, cattle, etc., to "ship" goods, "hammer" nails, "button"
clothes, "star" as an actress, and so on, though these, too, would appear to be
more or less "technical" terms. Remarkably enough, English also reveals a
strong tendency in its development to approximate to the type of language structure represented by Chinese.
But Chinese has carried the process of rational, functional symbolisation to a
far greater degree of completion than any other language; for in it almost any
word (i.e. Chinese character) may acquire verbal or "functional" significance,
depending largely on context and its position in the sentence. This applies not
only to substantives, but also to words ordinarily used as adjectives, adverbs,
etc.; and not only to scientific and technical language, but equally to the vocabulary of every day speech! For example, Lao Tze says: "The good, I good
them; the bad, I also good them". That is: "I return good for good; but I
also return good for evil". Or again: "The beginning foundations," meaning
"the beginning is the foundation of what follows"; "the ten thousand families
enemy me", meaning "all the 'clans' are hostile towards me", etc. Chinese
names (substantives) are conceived "in action". They signify not only what a
thing is, but also what it does, and how it behaves. In this respect, as well as
in respect of the amazing economy of expression it has achieved, Chinese must
be acknowledged to rank very high as a scientific language. At the same time,
the fact that it makes extensive use of a functional vocabulary which is symbolised (recorded) by means of an ideographic written system whose syntax has
been pared down to a "logical minimum", makes it possible to conceive written
Chinese as a sort of crude but universal "mathematics", standing somewhere
between ordinary language and mathematics as regards structure and function.
In fact, failure to appreciate this aspect of Chinese has resulted in an entirely
inadequate conception of the language and its potentialities. It is even quite
possible that Chinese might provide the same stimulus to theoretical language
studies that Sanscrit furnished European scholars a century and more ago;
indeed, perhaps a much more powerful and suggestive force than Sanscrit since
it represents a much more radical departure from the customary European
concept of language. Remarkably enough, a pervading obscurity and uncertainty in the language, which seriously curtail its use as a scientific language,
appear, nevertheless, to spring from its greatest virtues: rational economy of
expression, and the almost universal use of "functional" terms.
As for Japanese, it is in the unique position of having incorporated the whole
vocabulary of an entirely unrelated language (Chinese) into its own without
modifying its underlying grammatical pattern in any important respects. Its
vocabulary has thereby been made highly functional. But the hopeless com-

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16Q

STANLEY GERR

plexity of its syntax appears to render it incapable of achieving a rational

linguistic formulation of scientific knowledge in the sense of convenient and
economical exposition based on the reduction of syntactic elaboration to a logical
minimum. Both Chinese and Japanese also suffer greatly from the needless
complexity of their systems of writing, though the use of ideographic symbols
is certainly in agreement with the spirit of scientific formulation.
This last point deserves elaboration. For it is surely one of the most extraordinary things in modern science that in the search for a concise, accurate, economical and "universal" formulation it has reverted to the use of the same type of
symbol system that the Chinese evolved several thousand years ago. In organic
chemistry, in electrical and radio engineering, surveying, in fact, in practically
every branch of science and technology there is in use an important and growing
system of ideographic symbols whose origin and function is quite similar to the
origin and use of the system of Sino-Japanese characters. Thus pictographs
like the benzene hexagon

j_

used in chemistry, the many electrical and

radio circuit symbols like ( for a triode (vacuum tube), -0-- for an oil circuit
breaker, -1- for a battery, many symbols used in mathematics, engineering,
as highway signs, etc.-all these are ideograms entirely analogous in many important respects to the Chinese characters. The great question is whether
they will undergo an evolution similar to that of the Chinese characters, so
that in time they may come to form the basis of a complete scientific script
manipulated with the help of a simplified "grammatical" system in very much
the same way as is now done with the characters. I believe it is safe to assert
that this will happen; in fact, it is already happening, as a search of the literature
will show that these modern scientific "characters" are frequently used as nouns,
and occasionally even as verbs-though quite unconsciously, so far as the
technologists are concerned!
SUMMARY

A dynamic, reciprocally stimulating relation subsists between an idea and its

linguistic formulation; on a larger scale, between physical science and its special,
"functional" language. Because of this, the development of a particular branch
of science or technology is necessarily associated with a corresponding evolution
of the language used to describe and explore that field. In the course of its
evolution technical language reveals a double tendency towards rationalisation:
1) rationalisation of expression as a whole through progressive reduction of
syntactic complexity (elaboration) to the logical minimum required for mathematical formulation;
2) rationalisation of individual expressions through the use of "generalised,
functional terms".
Functional terms unite the representation of verbal and nominal significance
in a single basic symbol. They constitute a direct expression of one of the most
characteristic features of the scientific formulation of knowledge for use. This

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is the fundamental tendency to identify an operation or process with its mechanical (or physico-chemical) means of realisation, and a physical or chemical
property with its means of measurement, or with the entity characterised by
possession of the quality in question.
Used in conjunction with the special "ideographic" symbols widely employed
in many branches of science and technology (mathematics, electricity, etc.)
for the purpose of formulating, recording, or communicating scientific knowledge,
the functional language of science reveals itself as a "tool" capable of satisfying
to a high degree the general engineering requirement of efficient operation.
That is, it provides a precise, convenient, and economical representation of the
facts.

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