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Contemporary Buddhism: An
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Wisdom beyond words?

Ineffability in yogcra and
madhyamaka buddhism
David Burton

Keble College , Oxford

Published online: 09 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: David Burton (2000) Wisdom beyond words? Ineffability
in yogcra and madhyamaka buddhism, Contemporary Buddhism: An
Interdisciplinary Journal, 1:1, 53-76, DOI: 10.1080/14639940008573721
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639940008573721

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Wisdom Beyond Words?

Ineffability in Yogcra and
Madhyamaka Buddhism

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David Burton
Keble College, Oxford
Yogacara Buddhism is often interpreted to be a form of ontological idealism. It is
claimed that for the Yogacarins what really exists is non-dual (advaya)
consciousness (citta/vyana) which, in that it is envisaged as a causally connected
process, is called the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva). In the state of
unenlightened ignorance (avidy) this dependent nature is concealed by the
imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhva) of dualities, including most fundamentally
the duality 'subject-object' (grahaka-grahya, literally meaning 'grasper-grasped').
Contrary to the modern scientific paradigm, according to which consciousness (if
its distinct nature is admitted at all) evolves out o/matter, the ordinary world of
(supposedly) external objects is for the Yogacarin a mental fabrication, a creation
o/deluded consciousness.
The shared experience of the external world is a collective hallucination. Your
world is similar to my world because we both fabricate similar worlds. Our
common perceptions of entities are actually perceptions of similarly fabricated
entities. We fabricate similar entities, according to the Yogacarin, as the similar
results (vJpka) of our similar skilful (kus'ala) or unskilful (ahia/a) actions
(karmari) in past lives. (These results are said to exist in potential as seeds (b/'a)
in one's substratum consciousness (alayavijana) until they ripen). The hungry
ghost (jpreta), by contrast, as a result of his very different and ethically inferior
past actions, fabricates a very different and much more unpleasant world (the
common example given is that whereas we fabricate a river flowing with water,
the hungry ghost fabricates a river flowing with pus). But, of course, the hungry
ghost's fabricated world is similar to the fabricated world of other hungry ghosts!1
Enlightenment (bodhi) occurs when the perfected nature {parinispannasvabhva) - the absence (emptiness (s'nyat)) of the imagined nature in the
dependent nature - is perceived.
The dependent nature is seen to be not really
constituted by, it is empty (sny) of, the adventitious imagined dualities by which
it is ordinarily concealed. The enlightened being thus sees through the concealing
imagined nature and perceives unobstructed the pure non-dual flow of
consciousness. Ultimate reality is, therefore, consciousness-only (cfttamtm) or
cognition-only (yijaptimatra) in the sense that behind the veil of imagined
dualisms lies only the non-dual flow of consciousness. As this ultimate reality can
be accurately described as 'consciousness', the Yogacara philosophy is clearly a

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2

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species of ontological idealism.

It may be objected, however, that Yogacara philosophy is not actually ontological

idealism. Yogacara texts say that realitythe dependent nature when it is seen as
it really is, empty of the imagined natureis not in fact describable. It is
ineffable. All descriptions of the dependent nature are superimpositions. That is,
they constitute the imagined nature. The Samdhinirmocanastra (a seminal source
for Yogacara philosophy), for instance, says that the imagined nature (kun brtags
pa) is 'the characteristic/aspect which is established as names and signs' (ming
dang brdar rnampargshagpa 'imtshan nyidyin)} Language always pre-supposes
a dualistic framework, 'x-not x'. Language imposes categoriesx (as opposed to
not x) or not x (as opposed to x)on a reality (the dependent nature), the pristine
nature of which actually escapes such categorization. Descriptions of the
dependent nature thus always entail falsification/distortion of the dependent
4
nature. The enlightened being who apprehends the dependent nature in an
undistorted way sees a reality which is inexpressible.
Thus, a central theme of the Tattvrtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhmi'is the
inexpressible intrinsic nature (nirabhilapyasvabhavata) of all dharma-s, which the
text equates with suchness (tathata), reality (tattva), and emptiness (snyat).s
And in the Madhyantavibhaga, Asaga (along with Vasubandhu in the
commentary) declares that the signless (animitta)as well as suchness (tathata),
reality-limit (bhtakoti), the ultimate (paramarthata), and the sphere of reality
(dharmadhtu)is a synonym for emptiness (s'unyata).6 This statement appears to
mean that emptinessunderstood as the dependent nature empty of the dualisms
of the imagined natureis signless, i.e. inexpressible. Furthermore, in the
commentary to the Vimatik Vasubandhu says that, though dharma-s are without
self (nairatmya) in their imagined naturewhere they are fabricated as dualisms
such as subject and object {grhaka and grahya)dharma-s nevertheless have an
inexpressible (anabhilapya) nature (atinan) which is not selfless7, which I take to
mean that this inexpressible nature is really there, i.e. it is not a product of
fabrication. And the Sardhinirmocanastia clearly and often refers to the
inexpressible (brjodmed) nature of reality. For example, there is the declaration
of the bodhisattva Gambhrrthasardhinirmocana at the end of the first chapter:
zab mo byis pa'i spyod yul ma yin pa/
brjod med gnyis min rgyal bas bstan mdzad kyang/
byis pa gti mug rmongs pa 'di dag ni/
smra ba'i spros la dga' zhing gnis la gnas//8
The conqueror [i.e. the Buddha] taught that the profoundinexpressible
[and] non-dualis not the sphere of fools [i.e. the unenlightened] but these
foolsconfounded by ignorancedelight in verbal diffusion and abide in
duality.

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David Burton: Wisdom Beyond Words?

Reality is experienced by unenlightened beings as if it is constituted by
consciousnesses and objects of consciousnesses. However, as reality is ineffable,
it cannot in fact be accurately described in terms of either consciousnesses ortheir
objects.
Thus, for instance, in the Trisvabhvanirdesa Vasubandhu seems to
refute citta just as much as the objects of dttar.
cittamatropalambhenajeyarthanupalambhata/
jeyrthanupalambhena syac cittnupalambhat//9

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Through the apprehension of cittamtra there is non-apprehension of the

object to be known. Through the non-apprehension of the object to be
known, there should be non-apprehension of citta.
Consciousness itself must be denied as one half of the dualism 'consciousnessobject of consciousness'.
Object of consciousness and consciousness are
correlative notions. Without the object of consciousness, there can be no
consciousness. Thus, the Madhyantavibhaga says that 'its [consciousness's]
object does not existon account of the non-existence of that [object], it
[consciousness] also does not exist' (nsti casyarthas tadabhvt tad apy asai)}0
And Asanga's Mahynastrlamkra declares that:
nstti cittt param etya buddhya cittasya nstitvam upaiti tasmt/
dvayasya nstitvam upetya dhmn samtisthate 'tadgatidharmadhtau//11
Having discerned that [objects which are] different from citta do not exist,
one thus understands the non-existence of citta. Having understood the nonexistence of duality, the wise man abides in the dharmadhtu which is not
the domain of that [duality].
So, it may be concluded, it is inappropriate to call Yogacara philosophy
'ontological idealism' because the identification of the indescribable reality as
'consciousness' is already a distortion of this reality. Having negated the entire
imagined world of consciousnesses and their objects, the ineffable reality which
lies behind, and is ordinarily concealed by, this fabricated world becomes evident
for the enlightened person, like a mirror from which dust has been removed. One
is left then, in enlightenment, with simply an ineffable reality, not finally
describable either in terms of objects of consciousness or consciousness itself.
Understood in this way, Yogacarins are proponents of what I will call 'the
ineffability thesis'.
Interpreters who see Yogacara as advocating the ineffability thesis rather than
ontological idealism include J. Willis and T. Kochumuttom.12 In her study of
Asanga's Tattvrtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhmi, Willis (1979: 132-133)
comments that,

55

Contemporary Buddhism
far from advocating the superiority of thought over objects, Asa{ga's
explication of 09nyat2 and the Middle Path involves the cessation of both
subject and object, both apprehender and things apprehended. Only
knowledge freed completely of discursive thought knows an object as it
really is... Hence, not idealism, but a state of intimate, inexpressible
knowledge of reality is aimed at.

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And Kochumuttom (1982: 213) remarks that Vasubandhu's philosophy of

vijnaptimtrat,
is not an ontological theory worthy of the name idealism: It does not say
that reality in its ultimate form is in [sic] the nature of consciousness. On
the contrary, for the most part it is an epistemological theory, which says
that one's (empirical) experience of objects is determined by one's psychic
dispositions, especially the idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, and
that, therefore, one in the state of samsra does not at all come to know the
things in their suchness (tathat). Things in their suchness are ineffable, and
as such are known only to the enlightened ones (buddhas).
The frequent Yogacara assertions of consciousness-only (cittamtra) and
cognition-only {vijnaptimtra) are not to be understood as claims that
consciousness/cognition alone really exists. Rather, they are statements of the
Yogacara position that the world as it is perceived by the unenlightenedin terms
of dualities such as 'consciousness-object of consciousness'is a web of mere
fabrications superimposed on the ineffable reality. That is, the world apprehended
by unenlightened beings is cittamtraAijnaptimtra in the sense that it is merely
imaginationnothing more than a mental fabrication. This dualistic world is
unreal, a mere product of consciousness/cognition. Unenlightened beings see only
the fabricated dualisms, and not the underlying ineffable reality. Enlightenment in
fact consists in seeing through these fabricated dualisms to the ineffable reality
which lies behind them. The enlightened being achieves supramundane
knowledge okottarajnna)n which sees reality in its true nature, free of
superimposition. He is freed from the cittamtra/vijnaptimtra world which
ordinarily conceals the ineffable reality. Thus I. Harris (1991: 83) claims that
Vasubandhu,
distinguishes between an unenlightened state in which one may be justified
in saying that mind only [i.e. cittamtra] or representation only [i.e.
vijnaptimtra] operates, and an enlightened state which is equivalent to a
radical transformation of the mind which has now been freed to see reality
as it is. There is no hint of idealism here. For Vasubandhu enlightenment is
the realisation that, in the unenlightened state, one has been deluded into
taking the representations of consciousness to be real. This is the true
interpretation of the term vijnaptimtrat.4

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David Burton: Wisdom Beyond Words?

The notion that the Yogacarin upholds the ineffability thesis is very attractive to
syncretists who envisage that the Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosophies are
fundamentally saying the same thing. That is, the syncretist here will want to
stress that there is no disagreement between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara
philosophies about the nature of reality. The syncretist will argue that the
Madhyamika and Yogacarin are alike in claiming that reality transcends language,
being accessible only to a wisdom beyond words.15
Such a syncretic view has been advanced, for example, by S. Anacker (1998:
184-185) for whom the ineffability of reality 'is the fundamental point of contact
between the philosophies of Ngrjuna and Vasubandhu'. And I. Harris (1991: 2,
176) writes that, 'the axioms of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are found to be
held fundamentally in common' (the italics are Harris's) and that for both the
Madhyamika and the Yogacarin,
there is an ontological existence realm which is not amenable to predication.
. Any attempt to describe it is doomed to failure since, by definition,
description is intimately associated with a dichotomised world view based
on the abstractive tendencies of a mind infected by ignorance. Since the
structure of language itself is so infected it will be impossible to state the
precise state of reality.
Hence the frequent claims in Madhyamaka texts that the Madhyamika has no
view (dsti), position (paksa) or thesis (praty).16 The Madhyamika, according to
this interpretation, holds no position at all about the nature of reality, but simply
refutes all other positions, knowing that reality is finally quite indescribable. As
R. Olson (1974: 410) says, for the Madhyamika17 'no positive statement
whatsoever can have final meaning; the Dharma, from the standpoint of ultimate
truth, is after all incapable of any expression in verbal terms.' Thus, for example,
Ngrjuna seems to declare the ineffability of reality in the Lokttastava:
animittam anagamya mokso nsti tvamuktavn/
atas tvay mahayane tat sakalyena deitam//
yad avptam maya punyam stutv tvm stutibhjanam/
nimittabandhanpetam bhyat tenkhilam jagat//18
You [the Buddha] have said that without entering into the signless there is
not liberation. Therefore you comprehensively taught it in the Mahayana.
May the whole world become free from the bond of signs, by means of the
merit obtained by me, having praised you, the worthy recipient of praise!
And the Madhyamikas often say that reality is not describable in terms of
existence or non-existence.19 This claim may be interpreted by the syncretist to
mean that reality transcends all predicationeither as 'reality is x' or 'reality is
not x'. The Madhyamika agrees with the Yogacarin that all descriptions of reality
57

Contemporary Buddhism
are valid only insofar as they are taken as provisional, conventional expressions of
a reality which in the final analysis is inexpressible. Hence in the Prasannapada
Candrakrti cites with approval the following passage (without naming the
source), which he says is stated by the Buddha (bnagavan):
anaksarasya dharmasya rutih k ca deana ca k/
20
rayate deyate cpi samropd anaksarah//

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What hearing and what teaching [can there be] of the unutterable dhaimal
And yet, the unutterable [dharma] is heard and taught through
superimposition.
It may be that reality is for the Yogacarin/Madhyamika (understood as proponents
of the ineffability thesis) a pure flow of causally connected change which has not
been divided up into describable entitiessuch as consciousnesses and objects of
consciousness. This would certainly be in accord with the general Buddhist
emphasis on transiency and dependent origination. The reality which exists prior
to and independent of the superimposition of names and labels is a process of
indescribable events (dharma-s) which are only categorized as 'this or that' by the
falsifying dualistic mind. (One thinks here especially of Dignga's and
Dharmakirti's distinction between inexpressible momentary particulars
(svalaksaa-s)which are reality as it actually isand the superimposed
conceptualization and labelling of these inexpressible momentary particulars,
which inevitably entail distortion/falsification of this reality).21
But if this is the case the Yogacarin/Madhyamika is surely inconsistent. For
the Yogacarin/Madhyamika, while having eschewed the 'consciousness-object of
consciousness' duality, has still described the non-dual reality as being the 'flow
of causally connected change'. Complete consistency must surely require the
Yogacarin/Madhyamika to renounce even this description, which seems to favour
one side of the duality 'change-stasis'. Indeed, even the notion that reality is nondual seems to favour one side of the duality 'duality-non-duality'! It seems that
the entirely consistent Yogacarin/Madhyamika, if understood as a proponent of
the ineffability thesis, would have to remain, like the eponymous bodhisartva of
the Vimalakrtinirdesastra22, entirely silent about the nature of reality. For to say
anything at all about reality is to to become embroiled in the web of dualities.
One might of course object here that the Yogacarin/Madhyamika, understood
as a consistent advocate of the ineffability thesis, is caught in a paradox, for he
surely cannot consistently deny that the ineffable reality can be correctly described
as ineffable. But if he descubes reality as ineffable, then reality is not in fact
ineffable. That is, if the statement 'reality is ineffable' is true, it is false.
The Yogacarin/Madhyamika is not necessarily defeated by this objection,
however. He might try to avoid the apparent paradox of ineffability by arguing
that the assertion 'reality is ineffable' is a statement about the inability of language
to describe reality, rather than a statement which describes reality itself. In other

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David Burton: Wisdom Beyond Words?

words, 'ineffability' is not in fact a predicate of reality, just like my inability to

name the capital of Arkansas is not a predicate of Arkansas. There is thus no
paradox in the statement that reality is ineffable.
Alternatively, the Yogacarin/Mdhyamika might I suppose accept the paradox
of ineffability as itself a symptom of the difficulties by which the ordinary mind is
defeated when confronted by the notion of an ineffable reality. He might, in this
case, embrace the paradox as a challenge to transcend ordinary dualistic thinking,
bound by the principle of non-contradiction. The paradox does not disprove that
there is an ineffable reality. It does prove, however, that ordinary dualistic
thinking ties itself in knots when attempting to apprehend an ineffable reality.
But the ineffability thesis presents some further philosophical difficulties. The
notion of an ineffable reality is, it can be objected, a concept without any positive
content. It seems difficult to make any sense of a reality the knowledge of which
is not convertible into language. How does such a reality differ from mere
nothingness, and how is the supposed knowledge of it different from total
blankness?
What I am questioning here is the notion of a form of knowledge which has an
inexpressible content, this content being inexpressible in principle?* (It is not just
that the knower is having trouble expressing the content because he does not as of
yet have the ability to say what the content is, because of lack of linguistic skill,
etc.). Something is known, but what is known cannot be communicated verbally.
The ineffability thesis says such knowledge is possible, but I am not at all sure that
this is correct.24
At any rate, if there is such knowledge of an ineffable reality, then it certainly
falls outside of the rationalist philosopher's purview. For an ineffable reality is
not accessible finally to articulation in various views and theories, and it is the
examination, explication, and evaluation of theories about reality which is the
philosopher's concern. Without the theories, the philosopher's subject matter has
been taken away. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the philosopher tends to
cry foul. He is searching for the ultimate truth yet the ineffability thesis says that
the final discovery of this truth is not within the philosopher's domain at all.
The ineffability thesis is thus an attack on the final efficacy of the philosophical
project. The philosopher is here accused of a myopic disregard for the nonrational. The philosopher's methods cannot detect the ineffable reality. Like a
blind man, who might deny the existence of the visual world because he does not
have visual capacity, the philosopher, adept only at rational argument, denies the
ineffable reality because he has not developed the (non-rational) capacity to
apprehend such a reality. The philosopher is here envisaged as a pitiful figure,
trapped in the mundane, rational world. His eyes have not been opened to the
reality which transcends rationality and language.
The philosopher may fight back, however. He may say that the appeal to an
ineffable reality is in fact a capitulation to irrationality. The ineffability thesis,
which masquerades as a final solution to the quest for ultimate truth, is in fact
merely a premature termination of the search. The appeal to the ineffability thesis
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Contemporary Buddhism

may be seen as a sign simply of intellectual fatigue, inability, or cowardice.

The philosopher may argue that a knowledge-claim which cannot be shared
(via language), discussed and assessed is vacuous. Indeed, what meaning can be
given to a knowledge-claim which cannot be made publicly accessible? And how
without the possibility of any public assessment can the possessor of such an
ineffable knowledge-claim know that what he supposedly knows is indeed a case
of knowledge rather than a private fantasy?
Of course, the Yogacarin/Madhyamika may object that he has the evidence of
his meditative experience on his side. (It is often argued by modern commentators
that the insights of the Yogacarin/Madhyamika are derived from his meditations).
The fact that the Yogacarin/Madhyamika has realized the ineffable reality in
meditation is the proof that there is such a reality.
But such an appeal to special experience simply will not do. People have all
sorts of special experiences (of God, of themselves as the messiah, of messages
from the deceased, and so forth). These experiences may be correct or incorrect,
but the experience itself cannot be used as proof of the correctness of the
experience. The experience may be a delusion, no matter how strongly it is felt to
be correct.
Furthermore, what the Yogacarin/Madhyamika experiences in his meditations
may well be a function of the training which he has undergone. A
Yogacarin/Madhyamika, fully indoctrinated into the view that reality is ineffable,
might well find that his meditation confirms his view. This is hardly surprising,
given that he has been taught to experience reality as ineffable! His meditation is
not necessarily a direct apprehension of 'things as they actually are'. It may
simply be that the Yogcrin's/Madhyamika's training predisposes him to see
reality in this way. If, by contrast, one were indoctrinated into the view that God
can speak to one in meditationfor examplethen it is not unlikely that one
might start to have meditative experiences of what one takes to be conversations
with God. Meditative experiences may well be a result of the conceptual system
one has adopted, rather than an apprehension of the real nature of things.25
One may also wonder how a (supposedly) enlightened being, who achieves the
supramundane knowledge in meditation of the ineffable reality unconcealed by
the fabricated entities of unenlightened experience, subsequently is able to engage
with the fabricated world. The Yogacarin/Madhyamika might explain that such
an enlightened being for pragmatic purposes (and, no doubt, in order to fulfil his
bodhisattva vow) acquiesces in the fabricated world of unenlightened people, but
in the full knowledge that it is a fabrication. But would the enlightened
Yogacarin/Madhyamika actually be able to re-build the world of fabricated
entities which he had totally deconstructed? If not, the enlightenment of the
Yogacarin/Madhyamika might in fact be indistinguishablefor the observer at
leastfrom insanity, the enlightened Yogacarin/Madhyamika being locked into
his incommunicable vision of reality, and unable to participate in the fabricated
world of unenlightened people.

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Of course, to point out the philosophical difficulties with the ineffability thesis is
no refutation of the syncretist's claim that the Yogacarins/Madhyamikas are
united in their claim that reality is ineffable. (After all, throughout history thinkers
have advocated philosophically problematic positions). It is simply to say that, if
indeed the Yogacarins/Madhyamikas uphold the ineffability thesis, they are
confronted by the philosophical difficulties which I have described. So, perhaps,
it might be thought, the syncretist is right that Yogacara and Madhyamaka have a
fundamentally similar view of reality as ineffable.
The syncretist is, however, confronted by an awkward historical fact. Indian
Madhyamaka texts from about the sixth century onwardsmost notably the
26
Bodhicittavivama, Bhvaviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakarik (and Tarkajvla),
2
Prajnpradpa, Karatalaratna and Madhyamakaratnapradipa '', and Candrakrti's
Madhyamakavatara (along with the Bhasyaf*offer strident and sustained
critiques of Yogacara philosophy. In addition, Sntideva in the Bodhicaiyavatara
29
confronts a Yogacarin opponent , and Sntaraksita also criticizes the Yogacara in
30
his Madhyamakalamkara.
In these critiques, the Madhyamikas say that both consciousness and its objects
lack intrinsic existence (svabhva). For example, the Madhyamakavatara declares
that 'just as the object of cognition does not exist, likewise the mind also does not
exist' (Jiltarshes bya medde bzhin bloyangmedf1, and the Bhasya explains that
what is meant is that neither the object of cognition nor the mind have intrinsic
existence {rang bzhin) (also referred to by the Bhasya as 'intrinsic nature' (ranggi
bdagnyid))?1
One must appreciate here that for Madhyamaka 'intrinsic existence' means
real, substantial existence (dravyasat)that is, existence which is not simply the
result of mental fabrication. An entity which exists but without intrinsic existence
is simply a mental fabrication, like a dream-object or an illusion. It exists insofar
as it appears, yet it has no more substance than a mere appearance.33 Thus, the
Madhyamikas' assertion that consciousnesses and objects of consciousness lack
intrinsic existence means that both consciousnesses and objects of consciousness
are simply mental fabrications and have no more reality than dreams.
The Madhyamikas in their critiques contrast their position with that of the
Yogacarins, whom they depict as advocating the intrinsic existence of
consciousness. Although the Yogacarins admit that objects of consciousness lack
intrinsic existence, they say, according to the Madhyamikas, that the causally
connected flow of consciousnessthe dependent natureis not a fabrication; it
exists in a real, substantial way.34 Consciousness is for the Yogacarins, according
to these Madhyamikas, the intrinsically existing reality which still exists when all
false imaginings have been abolished.
In other words, these Madhyamikas
represent the Yogacara philosophy as a form of ontological idealism. But the
Madhyamikas protest that there is no such intrinsically existing consciousness.
As the Bodhicittavivaraa declares, 'from the very beginning consciousness has
never had intrinsic existence' (thog ma nyid nas sems kyi ni rang bzhin rtag tu
medpar 'gyur).35

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The syncretist might want to advocate the essential philosophical identity of

Madhyamaka and Yogacara thought, but these Madhyamikas do not appear to
share his view. In other words, the syncretist might be accused of ignoring the
historical evidence that Madhyamikas themselves did not claim that their
philosophical position was in essence the same as that of the Yogacarins. If the
Madhyamikas themselves thought that they had a philosophical position different
from (and, in their eyes, superior to) the Yogacara philosophical position, then
surely the syncretist is wrong to assert the basic identity of the Yogacara and
Madhyamaka philosophies. The syncretist, according to this powerful objection,
is guilty of artificially unifying the Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosophies.
The syncretist might, however, reply that the Madhyamaka critiques are based on
a misunderstanding of the Yogacara position. The Madhyamikas think that the
Yogacarin asserts that consciousness has intrinsic existence. In fact, however, the
Yogacarin says that consciousness is one half of the fabricated duality
'consciousness-object of consciousness'. Contrary to the Madhyamikas'
impression, the Yogacarin actually agrees with the Madhyamaka position that
consciousness lacks intrinsic existence.
But it seems very unlikely that the Madhyamikas would make such a
fundamental mistake about the philosophical position of their rivals. In which
case the syncretist might argue that the Madhyamikas are engaged in a wilful
misreading of the Yogacara position. Maybe in an environment of competing
schools, the Madhyamikas were prone to misrepresent, even to caricature, their
rivals in order to exaggerate or fabricate differences between themselves and their
political opponents, and to cast these opponents in a bad light. One should not
expect a disinterested, neutral account by the Madhyamikas of the doctrines of
their adversaries.
Indeed, the Madhyamika attacks sometimes seem rather churlish. As Harris
(1991: 77) notes, Bhvaviveka, throws insults at his Yogacarin opponentsin the
Madhyamakaratnapradlpa he accuses them of having 'mediocre minds',36 and in
the Madhyamakahrdayakarika he becomes quite vitriolic, saying that the
Yogacara criticisms of Madhyamaka are 'the stench of hatred's putrid meat' and
this proves the Yogacarins' 'undigested conceit'.37 Candrakrti, I might add, in
the Yuktisastikavrtti, compares the Vijnnavdins (i.e. the Yogacarins) to a wild
horse (ra dmurgod) which imitates the behaviour of an ass (bongbii)\3S
One might surmise that the Madhyamaka critiques are the result of insecurity,
and may originate from a group which felt threatened and marginalized. Perhaps
it was the very ascendancy of Yogacara thought which led to such sustained and
rather bitter attacks on the part of the Madhyamikas. (It is interesting that, despite
the various lengthy critiques by the Madhyamikas of the Yogacara, there is no
record of any extensive reply by the Yogacarins. One possible explanation is that
the Madhyamikas, though voluminous writers, were not sufficiently numerous or
influential to warrant a serious response).
Maybe, then, what is at issue in the Madhyamaka critiques of Yogacara is
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political power and influence/status more than fundamental philosophical
differences. As S. Anacker (1984: 3) comments about the Indian controversies
between the Madhyamikas and Yogacarins:

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These are really the disagreements of sixth-century followers of Ngrjuna

and Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism had become an
academic subject at places such as the University of Nland. They may
have disagreed because they were academics fighting for posts and
recognition.
So, perhaps the Madhyamaka attacks on Yogacara philosophy are examples of
rhetoric used in order to establish authority, legitimacy (and hence power) rather
than a genuine philosophical criticism of Yogacara. The Madhyamika attempts to
discredit his Yogacarin opponent, not because the Madhyamika really thinks that
the Yogacara philosophy is wrong, but because the Yogacara school is a different
and rival groupthe 'competition', to put the point bluntly. The dispute is one
about power, masquerading in the form of a disagreement about the nature of
ultimate truth. A good strategy, surely, in a power struggle with a rival group is to
concoct an artificial distinction between the two groups to show that one's own
group is actually different from the group one opposes, and then to argue that the
position of one's own group is superior to that of the rival group.
I am not convinced by this argument, however. I am quite sure that the
Yogacarins and the Madhyamikas would have been engaged in battles for
prestige, etc. and would no doubt have sometimes succumbed to the tactic of
misrepresenting one another. But the Madhyamikas' claims that the Yogacarins'
position is that consciousness has intrinsic existence are very frequent and are
making a fundamental point about the Yogacara philosophy.
That the
Madhyamikas would consistently misrepresent the Yogacarins so fundamentally
and crudely seems an improbable, not to mention cynical, suggestion. Such a
misrepresentation would surely have been too obvious to be sustainable. It is far
more likely, I think, that the Madhyamikas thought that they had a genuine and
basic philosophical disagreement with the Yogacarins.
Perhaps, however, the syncretist may be saved by an appeal to a pristine
Yogacara teaching, later adulterated. R. King (1995: 266-267), inspired by the
work of Y. Ueda (1967), argues that there are two philosophical traditions within
the Yogacara school. The first and original tradition is that of Asaga and
Vasubandhu whereas the second and later tradition, which 'differs from the
works of the early Yogacarins in upholding the ultimate reality of consciousness',
is most fully expressed by Hsan-tsang as well as, in the Ch'eng weishin lun, by
Dharmapla.
The syncretist may thus argue that the Madhyamika critiques are to be
understood as chastising only the later idealistic Yogacara tradition. Harris (1991:
83), for example, argues that it is likely that the Madhyamaka critiques are of the
later, deviant Yogacara tradition and are thus 'taking issue with a point of view

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which was never held by exponents of the classical interpretation.' (Perhaps also
the Madhyamika critics of Yogacarainfluenced by their contact with the later
idealistic Yogacara traditionmisread as idealism the earlier non-idealistic
Yogacara tradition).
The later Yogacara tradition, by asserting the ultimate truth of consciousness,
deviates from the classical Yogacara positionwhich says that consciousnesses,
as well as objects of consciousness, lack intrinsic existence. For the classical
Yogacarins, only the ineffable reality has unfabricated, i.e. intrinsic, existence.
The syncretist may conclude, then, that what really exists for the classical
Yogacarin and the Madhyamika alike is the ineffable reality which is, for
unenlightened people, obscured by the imagined nature, i.e. the proliferation of
entitiesconsciousnesses and their objectswhich lack intrinsic existence.
Obviously, a crucial question here is whether there actually is such a classical
non-idealistic form of Yogacara. Is it really the case that, unlike later Yogacarins,
Asaga and Vasubandhu did not claim that the reality which remains when the
imagined nature is eliminated is describable as 'consciousness'? One cannot
entirely discount this possibility, given the assertions of both Asaga and
Vasubandhu that reality is inexpressible and is neither citta nor the objects of citta.
Nevertheless, I have reservations about this interpretation. There is evidence, I
think, that even Asaga and Vasubandhu claim (at least sometimes) that reality is
describable as 'consciousness '.
For instance, the Madhyintavibhga(bhsya) says that emptiness (s'nyat) is
neither afflicted (lista) nor unafflicted (aklisti), neither pure (uddha) nor impure
(as'uddhi). The text says that this emptiness, on account of the luminousness
(prabhsvaratva) of citta, is by nature (prakrti) neither afflicted nor impure and
that, on account of the adventitiousness (gantukatva) of the afflictions, it is
neither unafflicted nor pure.39
This passage appears to mean that emptinesshere a synonym for reality,
called 'emptiness' because it is in fact empty of the imagined naturecan be
described as a citta which is unafflicted and pure (i.e. luminous) in its essential
nature, and yet is nevertheless afflicted and impure insofar as it is tainted or
concealed by adventitious defilements (i.e. the imagined nature). Here at least
there seems to be a willingness by Asaga (as the author of the verse) and
Vasubandhu (as the author of the commentary to the verse) to describe reality as
'consciousness'.
Furthermore, in the Mahayanastralamkra Asaga declares that consciousness
(citta) is always (sada) luminous by nature (praktiprabhsvara) but that it is
contaminated by adventitious faults (gantukadosa). This luminous consciousness
is declared to be,the dharmatcitta.40 The commentary (which may be by either
Asaga or Vasubandhu) identifies this luminous consciousness, which it too calls
the dharmatcitta, with the sphere of reality (dharmadhtii), and with suchness
(tathat).41 Dharmat, dharmadhtu and tathat are common epithets for things
as they really are. Clearly, then, reality is here equated with the luminous
consciousness, purged of its adventitious defilements.

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Such passages provide some evidence that there is no discontinuity between
the classical Yogacarins and the later tradition. Asaga and Vasubandhu, it
appears, were sometimes willing to describe reality as 'consciousness'.
But it can be objected that these passages contradict the statements (which I
have already cited) by Asaga and Vasubandhu that citta is to be refuted as part of
the dualism 'consciousness-object of consciousness' and also their claims that
reality is inexpressible. This apparent contradiction can be resolved, however.
Perhaps Asaga and Vasubandhu are saying, when they deny that reality is citta,
only that reality is not the ordinary dualistic (defiled) consciousness. And their
claims that reality is inexpressible might be read as not ruling out the description
of this otherwise indescribable reality as non-dual, luminous consciousness. In
other words, they are not strict proponents of the ineffability of reality. Perhaps,
then, even the early Yogacarins are best read as ontological idealists after all.
Indeed, Asaga and Vasubandhu (and the later Yogacarins) surely have a
compelling philosophical reason for claiming that reality, as understood by them,
is describable as 'consciousness'. Let me explain.
As I have shown already, the Yogacarins say that enlightenment occurs when
the imagined nature is removed and reality is seen as it actually is. Reality is seen
devoid of the fabricated dualisms by which it is normally obscured. Reality is
here perceived by an undistorted supramundane knowledge okottarajnna), a
knowledge without mental construction (nirvikalpajna).
The question arises, who or what is doing the knowing? Who or what is
enlightened? As all that remains when the fabricated dualisms which are the
imagined nature have been dispelled is reality itself, it must surely be the case that
it is reality itself which is doing the knowing, and reality itself which is
enlightened.
Enlightenment is, one might say, the knowledge by reality of
reality. The ultimate reality has here come to full self-knowledge.
As reality has this capacity for self-knowledge for the Yogacarins, it seems
irresistable to call this reality 'consciousness'. Only conscious entities have the
capacity for knowledge. No non-conscious entities have the capacity for
knowledge. To claim that ultimate reality is both capable of self-knowledge and
is not describable as consciousness would be non-sensical. If reality is not capable
of consciousness then the Yogacarins must deny that it can know itself. They
must, in this case, deny that enlightenment is possible. But the Yogacarins clearly
want to uphold that enlightenment is possible and thus they must admit that
ultimate reality can be described as 'consciousness'.
Granted, this consciousness cannot be dualistic in form. It is not a
consciousness that apprehends an object. It cannot be consciousness of a reality
separate from the apprehending consciousness. The 'consciousness-object of
consciousness' duality is, according to the Yogacara, a fabrication and in
enlightenment all fabrications have ceased. Reality knows itself in enlightenment
without functioning within the dualistic framework of 'consciousness-object of
consciousness'.
One is reminded here of the notionprevalent in Yogacara philosophy at least
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from the time of Dignga and Dharmakrtiof svasamvedana the 'selfluminous', reflexive nature of consciousness. In mundane terms, this 'selfluminous' reflexivity means that consciousness knows itself in the very act of
knowing its object, just like (to employ the commonly used analogy) a light, in
illuminating an object, automatically illuminates itself. There is no need for a
separate consciousness of consciousness of an object, just like there is no need for
a separate light to illuminate the light which illuminates an object. It is simply the
nature of consciousness to be aware of itself in this non-intentional way. The final
spiritual significance of this Yogacara notion of svasamvedana may well be that,
when in enlightenment consciousness occurs in its pristine state, no longer
concealed by dualistic imaginings, this consciousness (identifiable with ultimate
42
reality) is self-luminous, i.e. knows itself without taking itself as an object.
Whether it is correct to say that there is in fact such a non-dual enlightened
consciousness is of course debatable. What seems clear, however, is that if the
Yogacarin were to be philosophically consistent he would have to uphold a
mitigated version of the ineffability thesis. Given that, when the imagined nature
is extinguished, there is knowledge by reality of reality, he would have to say that,
though reality is in many respects inexpressible, ultimate reality nevertheless can
be described accurately as '(non-dual) consciousness'.
However, this is not to deny that the words 'non-dual consciousness' are
impossible for ordinary, unenlightened people to understand fully, as they have
not had the experience to which the words refer. Ordinary, unenlightened people
certainly have the experience of consciousness, but only in its dualistic form.
Their attempt to understand the words 'non-dual consciousness' will therefore
meet only with limited success, like the colour-blind person who, though
understanding what a traffic-light is, cannot fully appreciate the words 'red trafficlight', insofar as he does not have the experience of the colour to which the word
'red' refers. But this does not mean that the Yogacarins' understanding of reality
cannot be accurately described as 'non-dual consciousness'; this just means that
the words 'non-dual consciousness' refer to a phenomenon (assuming, of course,
that such a phenomenon actually exists) to which ordinary, unenlightened people
have not had access. It is not that reality is indescribable as 'non-dual
consciousness'. It is rather that the description has limited significance for those
who have yet to experience this reality.
But the syncretist, who claims that Yogacara and Madhyamaka are united in their
advocacy of an ineffable reality, has another problem. Even if there were a
distinctive classical Yogacara positionadhering strictly to the ineffability thesis
unlike the later Yogacara idealistsit is far from clear that the Madhyamikas
actually claim that there is an ineffable reality which underlies the mentally
fabricated world.
On the contrary, it seems quite likely that the Madhyamikas in fact claim that
everything whatsoever completely lacks intrinsic existence. The whole world is
mere mental fabrication, and there is no reality beyond or beneath this fabrication.

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The ultimate truth is here understood to be simply the absence of any unfabricated
existence anywhere at all. Everything has the ontological status of a dream-object
or an illusion. There is no further, deeper ineffable reality. As Ngrjuna says in
the Acintyastava:
etat tat paramam tattvam nihsvabhvrthadesan/
bhvagrahaghtnm cikitseyam anuttar//43

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This is the ultimate truth: The teaching that objects are without intrinsic
existence. This is the best medicine for those trapped through grasping at
entities.
The Madhyamaka denial of views/positions/theses, in this case, may be
understood as a rejection of all views/positions/theses which assert intrinsic
existence. Madhyamikas actually accept the position that the ultimate truth is the
absence of intrinsic existence of all entities. And the Madhyamaka assertions that
the ultimate truth cannot be described in terms of existence or non-existence may
be interpreted as meaning that the ultimate truth is neither that entities do not exist
at all nor that entities exist with intrinsic existence. The ultimate truth is that
entities exist but without intrinsic existence.
The only state beyond words admitted by the Madhyamika in this case is the
stilling of verbal diffusion (prapaca)the absence of fabricationwhich might
occur (perhaps in meditation) through deep insight into the merely fabricated
nature of all entities. One becomes focused on the ultimate truth which is the
emptiness of all entities, and one thus stops perceiving the manifold fabricated
entities of ordinary experience. 'The calming of all perceiving', Ngrjuna says in
the Mulamadhyamakakarika 'is the fortunate calming of verbal diffusion'
{sarvopalambhopasah prapancopaamah ivaH).u But the 'fortunate calming of
verbal diffusion' is here arguably simply the cessation of the proliferation of
fabricated entities rather than a gnosis of an ineffable reality.
This cessation of fabication would certainly be 'signless' (animitta) and
'unutterable' (anaksari), as some Madhyamaka texts (such as the Lokttastava
d- and Prasamapad t cited above) say. No entities occur, because all
entities are entirely fabrications, i.e. empty, and there is for the meditator, having
realized this emptiness of all entities, no such fabrication taking place. Thus, there
is nothing to be signified and nothing to be described. Given that for the
meditator who is focused on emptiness the entire fabricated world of entities
comes to a stop, there is for this meditator, as Ngrjuna declares in the dedicatory
verses of the Mulamadhyamakakarika,
anirodham anutpdam anucchedam assvatam/
anekrtham annrtham angamam anirgamam//45
no cessation, no origination, no destruction, no permanence, no identity, no
difference, no coming, no going.
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This interpretation of Madhyamaka poses a real problem for the syncretist who is
committed to the essential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara.
As the Yogacarin advocates a realitybe it strictly ineffable or describable as
non-dual consciousnesswhich intrinsically exists, i.e. is not simply a mental
fabrication, he is in a fundamental sense diverging from the Madhyamika about
how things actually are. The fundamental issue at stake is whether or not the
world of appearancesof mere imaginationis all that there really is. The
Yogacarin says that the imagined world has an intrinsically existing basis or
substratum (adhisthna/vastu) which continues to exist even when all false
imagining is eliminated. The Madhyamika denies that there is any such
intrinsically existing basis. The fabricated world is all that exists, there is no
unfabricated reality behind or beyond it. Whereas for the Madhyamika emptiness
means that everything entirely lacks intrinsic existence, for the Yogacarin
emptiness means that everything except the basis of the imagined world lacks
intrinsic existence and also that this intrinsically existing basis, as it really is, is
empty of the imagined world.
Such an anti-syncretic interpretation is advocated, for instance, by mKhas grub rje
('Kay drup jay', 1385-1438), an important disciple of Tsong kha pa ('Dzong ka
ba', 1357-1419).45 He argues that for Madhyamaka (which mKhas grub rje
himself, despite his very sympathetic presentation of Yogacara, considers to be
the highest philosophical position) everything has an existence which is merely
conceptually constructed (btagspa tsamsprajaptimatr) whereas the Yogacarins
claim that entities with conceptual constructed existence have a basis or
substratum (gzhi) which has real existence (yang dag par yod pa), i.e. existence
which is not the result of conceptual construction.47
mKhas grub rje also claims that for the Yogacarins this real basis is
consciousness. He cites as evidence a passage from Sthiramati's Trimsikvttr.
yang na rnam par shes pa bzhin du shes bya yang rdzas nyid du kha cig
sems pa dang/gzhan dag shes bya bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang kun rdzob
nyid du yod kyi don dam par yod pa ma yin no snam du sems pa mtha' gcig
tu smra ba 'di rnam pa gnyis dgag par bya ba'i phyir rab tu byed pa 'di
brtsams so/
Some people consider objects of consciousness to be substances (dravya)
just as consciousness is.
Other people think consciousness exists
conventionally [i.e. without intrinsic existence] but not ultimately [i.e. with
intrinsic existence] just as objects of consciousness do. This treatise was
composed in order to refute both varieties of this asserting one extreme.
mKhas grub rje comments that this passage 'clearly explains that [for the
Yogacarins] external objects do not exist [intrinsically] and consciousness exists
ultimately [i.e. intrinsically]' [phyi don medpa dang rnam shes don dam du yod
pa gsal bar bsnad).4* In other words, mKhas grub rje sees Yogacarins as
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ontological idealists, rather than as proponents of a strictly ineffable reality.
Curiously, however, mKhas grub rje himself at one point in his discussion of
the Yogacara philosophy quotes a passage (in Tibetan translation) from the
Bodhisattvabhmi, an important Yogacara text, which describes the ultimately
existing reality (don dam par yod pa yang dag pa'i
dngos
posparamarthasadbhta)which is the basis (gzhisadhisthna) or support
(rtenssamnisraya) for conceptually constructed entities (which the text calls 'the
signs which are conceptual designations' (btags pa'i tshig gi mtshan
masprajaptvadanimitta))as having a nature which is inexpressible (bijod du
medpa V bdag nyidsnirabhilapyatmakata).49 mKhas grub rje does not comment,
however, on the apparent contradiction between this passage (and, indeed, the
many other passages like it in the Yogacara texts) and his claim (which is
supported by some passages in Yogacara texts) that for the Yogacara reality is
describableas 'consciousness'.
Be this as it may, in the present context, whether for the Yogacarins the real
basis of fabricated entities is describable as consciousness or is strictly ineffable is
not actually of primary importance. Insofar as the Yogacarins posit a real basis
be it strictly ineffable or describable as consciousnessfor fabricated entities they
are advocating a very different philosophical position from the Madhyamikas who
are committed to the merely fabricated existence of everything whatsoever.
It is intriguing that mKhas grub rje refers to an unnamed opponent (whom he
refers to pejoratively as 'someone without training' (ma bslabspa kha cig)) who
claims that the Yogacara Abhidharmasamuccaya (by Asaga) is saying the same
thing as the Madhyamaka corpus of reasoning (dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogs), i.e. the
Mulamadhyamakakarika, and so forth.30 mKhas grub rje (with characteristic
arrogance) accuses this opponent of 'non-sensical blithering'.51 mKhas grub rje
thinks that it is simply not true that Yogacara, like Madhyamaka, asserts the
absence of intrinsic existence (ngo bo nyidmed) of all entities whatsoever. Thus,
mKhas grub rje says that Yogacara textssuch as the Samdhinirmocanastra, the
Bodhisattvabhmi, the Samuccaya-s, the Mahayanasamgraha, and the
Nimayasamgrahaby contrast with Madhyamaka writings do not take literally
scriptural passages which seem to assert the universal absence of intrinsic
existence.52 mKhas grub rje's comments here seem to indicate that there was
someone (or some people) in Tibet at or before his time who advocated the
essential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. It seems clear
that the debate about whether or not the Yogacara and Madhyamaka have an
essentially similar philosophical position was alive and well in classical Tibetan
Buddhism. It is not an issue which has pre-occupied modern scholars alone!
However, the syncretist to whom mKhas grub rje refers does not seem to argue
that the essential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara consists in
their assertion of an ineffable reality. This classical Tibetan syncretism does not
claim, it seems, that the Yogacarin and the Madhyamika posit an unfabricated
reality behind or beyond the fabricated world of expressible entities. On the
contrary, this classical Tibetan syncretism appears to advocate that the
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Yogacarins, like the Madhyamikas, say that everything whatsoever lacks intrinsic
existence. mKhas grub rje's opponent thinks that the Yogacarins agree with the
Madhyamaka position that there is no unfabricated reality at all.
In support of his anti-syncretic reading, mKhas grub rje points out that the
Bodhisattvabhmi and the Samdhinhmocanastra, both early Yogacara texts,
refer to opponents whose position is that entities are all merely conceptually
constructed {btags pa tsamsprajnaptimtra), i.e. they are all entirely fabrications.
There is for these opponents nothing whatsoever with intrinsic existence. There is
53
no unfabricated reality on which fabricated entities are founded.
These early Yogacara texts say, as mKhas grub rje explains, that the
opponents' position entails nihilism {medparta ba). A merely fabricated entity
must have some unfabricated stuff out of which it is fabricated. Otherwise the
fabrication would not be possible, and nothing at all would exist. Nihilism cannot
be avoided if everything is said to have existence which is conceptually
constructed (prajnaptimtra).
The opponents' view, and the Yogacarins' response, is represented succinctly
in a passage from the Bodhisattvabhmi, quoted (in Tibetan translation) by
mKhas grub rje:
de bas na gang zag kha cig shes par dka' ba'i mdo sde theg pa chen po dang
ldan pa/zab mo stong pa nyid dang ldan pa'i dgongs pa'i don bstan pa dag
thos nas/bshad pa'i don yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du ma shes nas tshul
bzhin ma yin par rnam par btags te/ rigs pa ma yin pas skye pa'i rtog pa
tsam gyis 'di thams cad ni btags pa tsam du zad do/ 'di ni de kho na yin
no/su 'di ltar lta ba de ni yang dag par lta ba yin no zhes de ltar lta zhing
de skad smra'o/de'i ltar na 'dogs pa'i gzhi'i dngos po tsam yang med
pas/'dogs pa nyid kyang thams cad kyis thams cad du med par 'gyur
na/gdags pa tsam gyi de kho na yod par lta ga la 'gyur te/de bas na rnam
grangs des na de dag gis ni de kho na dang btags pa de gnyi ga la yang skur
ba btab par 'gyur te/
Hence, some peoplehaving heard the abstruse teachings with a nondefinitive meaning of the stra-s associated with the Mahayana and
associated with profound emptiness, not understanding the meaning of the
exposition as it actually is, conceiving [of it] incorrectlywith mere
conjecture which arises because of error think that 'all this is only
conceptual construction. This is reality. He who sees in this way sees
correctly.'
[The Yogacarin responds:] If this were so, on account of the nonexistence of even the mere substratum which is the basis of conceptual
construction even the conceptual construction itself would not exist at all.
How could the reality which is mere conceptual construction be considered
to exist? Therefore, in this manner these [people] negate both reality and
conceptual construction.54

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The Bodhisattvabhmi'goes on to accuse these opponents of being the principal or
most important (gtso bc&pradhna) nihilists (medparta basnstika).55 Given
the text's statement that these people come to their nihilistic view as a result of
their misunderstanding of the Mahyna teaching of emptiness, it is quite likely
that these principal or most important nihilists are the Madhyamikas (though they
are not named as such). mKhas grub rje, at any rate, is sure about the identity of
the opponents. He says that this passage from the Bodhisattvabhmi teaches that
the Madhyamikas (dbumapa) commit the fault (nodpa) of nihilism by asserting
that all entities are only conceptual constructions.56
The Madhyamika, understood in this way as a proponent of prajaptimatra,
will perhaps claim that he is not a nihilist because he denies only the unfabricated,
i.e. intrinsic, existence of entities, and not their existence perse. Entities exist, but
they do not have intrinsic existence. The Madhyamika treads, he contends, the
famous Buddhist Middle Path, understood here as the Middle Path between the
extremes of total non-existence and intrinsic existence. He furthermore regards
the Yogacarin as deficient in failing to negate the intrinsic existence of everything
whatsoever. The Yogacarins thus stray from the Middle Path.
But the Yogacarin thinks that universal lack of intrinsic existence is tantamount
to the extreme of universal non-existence. The Yogacarin thinks that fabricated
entities cannot exist without some unfabricated reality (the dependent nature) on
the basis of which, in unenlightened ignorance, the fabricated world is created and
which remains when the fabricated worldthrough the enlightened vision of the
perfected nature (the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature)is
eliminated. Madhyamikas certainly claim to tread the Middle Path but they are
mistaken. The true Middle Path, according to the Yogacara, is the position which
denies the intrinsic existence of the dualistic entities which are the imagined
nature, but which does not deny the intrinsic existence of the real basis for this
fabrication. This position thus avoids both the extreme of asserting the intrinsic
existence of entities which are actually fabrications and also the extreme of
asserting the lack of intrinsic existence of everything whatsoever.
It is debatable whether the Madhyamika or the Yogacarin is right . (It is of
course quite possible that both the Madhyamika and the Yogacarin are wrong,
insofar as they both claim that the ordinary dualistic world lacks intrinsic
existence, i.e. is a fabrication). What is clear, however, is that there appears to be
a fundamental philosophical disagreement between the two schools. There is here
no room for a syncretism which asserts the essential philosophical identity of
Madhyamaka and Yogacara thought. There is here no place for the interpretation
which asserts that Madhyamaka and Yogacara are essentially philosophically
united, in that they both posit an ineffable reality, accessible only to a wisdom
beyond words.
References
Anacker, S. 1998 (corrected ed). Seven Works of Vasubartdhu. Motilal Banarsidass:
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Delhi.
Bhattacharya, K. 1990 (3rd ed.). The Dialectical Method of Nguna. Motilal
Banarsidass: Delhi.
Burton, D. 1999. Emptiness Appraised. Curzon: Richmond.
Cabezn, J. (trans.) 1992. A Dose of Emptiness. State University of New York Press:
Albany.
Dutt,N. 1966. Bodhisattvabhmi. K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute: Patna.
Forman, R. (ed.) 1990. The Problem of Pure Consciousness. Oxford University Press:
Oxford.
Harris, I. 1991. The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogcra in Indian Mahyna
Buddhism. Brill: Leiden.
Ichigo M. (trans.) 1989. Madhyamaklatnkra. In Gomez, L.O. and Silk, J.A. (eds.)
1989. Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahyna Buddhist Texts.
University of Michigan: Ann Arbour, 141-240.
mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang. sTong thun chen mo. In gSungs 'bum, volume Ka.
King, R. 1995. Early AdvaitaVednta and Buddhism. State Univesity of New York Press:
Albany.
Kochumuttom, T. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
Lamotte, . (trans.) 1976. The Teaching of Vimalaklrti. (Trans, from the French by S.
Boin), P21i Text Society: Oxford.
La Valle Poussin, L. 1970 (reprint). Madhyamakvatra par Candrakrti. Bibliotheca
BuddhicalX. Biblio Verlag: Osnabruck.
Limaye, S.V. 1992. Mahynastrlarnkra. Indian Books Centre: Delhi.
Lindtner, C. 1982. Nagarjuniana. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
Lindtner, C. 1986a. 'Bhavya's Critique of Yogcra in the Madhyamaka-ratnapradlpa,
Chapter IV.' In Matilal, B. and Evans, R. (eds.) 1986. Buddhist Logic and
Epistemology. D. Riedel: Dordrecht. 239-263.
Lindtner, C.
1986b.
'Materials for the Study of Bhavya.' In E. Kahrs (ed.),
Kalyamitrgaam. Essays in Honour of Nils Simonsson. Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 179-202.
Olson, R. 1974. 'Candrakrti's Critique of Vijnnavda', Philosophy East and West 24,
405-411.
Pandeya,R. 1988. Madhyamakastram of' Nguna. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
Powers,J. (trans.) 1995. Wisdom of Buddha. The Samdhinirmocana Mahyna Stra.
Dharma Publishing: Berkeley.
Scherrer-Schaub, C.A. (ed.) 1991. Yuktisastikwtti. Institu Beige Des Hautes Etudes
Chinoises: Bruxelles.
Sharma,P. 1990. ntideva's Bodhicaryvatra. Aditya Prakashan: New Delhi.
Thurman, R. 1984. Tsong Kha Pa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence.
Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
Ueda, Y. 1967. 'Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogcra Philosophy'. Philosophy
East and West, 17.
Vaidya, PL. 1960. Madhyamakastra of Nguna with the Commentary: Prasannapad
by Candrakrti. The Mithila Institute: Darbhanga.
Ward.K. 1994. Religion and Revelation. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Williams, P. 1989. Mahyna Buddhism. Routledge: London.
Williams, P. 1998. The Reflexive Nature of Awareness. Curzon: Richmond.
Willis, J. 1979. On Knowing Reality. Columbia University Press: New York.

Notes
1 See Vimatika(vrtti), Anacker (ed.) 1998: 413-421.
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2 See, for example, P. Williams 1989: 82-90 for a presentation of Yogcra as
ontological idealism.
3 Samdhinirmocanastra, Powers (ed.) 1995:98.
4 The Yogcrin understood in this way displays what might be described as a
pathological distrust of dualisms and language. It is in fact far from self-evident and
seems to be counter-intuitive that all dualisms are simply fabrications and that all
language is always distorting of things as they actually are.
5 See Bodhisattvabhmi, Dutt (ed.) 1966: 26, bodhisattvnm buddhnr ca
bhagavatm
dharmanairtmyapravesya
pravistena
suvisuddhena
ca
sarvadharmnmnirabhilpyasvabhvatmrabhyaprajfiaptivdasvabhvanirvikalpaj
eyasamena jnena yo gocaravisayah
ssau param tathat niruttar
jeyaparyantagat yasyh sarva samyagdharmapravicay nivartante nbhivartante/.
See also Bodhisattvabhmi, Dutt (ed.) 1966: 32, yathbhtam ca tathatrn
nirabhilpyasvabhvatam yathbhutam prajnti/iyam ucyate sught unyat
samyakprajay supratividdheti/iyam tvad upapattisdhanayuktir nulomikl yaya
nirabhilpyasvabhvat sarvadharmm pratyavagantavy/.
6 Madhyntavibhga I, 14, tathat bhutakoti cnimittam paramrthat/dharmadhtu
ca paryyh unyatyh samsatah//. Madhyntavibhgabhsya I, 14, nimittanirodhrthennimittamsarvanimittbhvt/. Anacker(ed.) 1998: 428.
7 Vimsatikvttil, yo blair dharmm svabhvo grhyagrhakdih parikalpitas tena
kalpitentman tsm nairtmyam na tvan abhilpyentman yo buddhnr visaya
iti/. Anacker (ed.)' 1998: 416.
8 Satdhinirmocanastra, Powers (ed.) 1995: 20.
9 Trisvabhvanirdesa 36, Anacker (ed.) 1998:466.
10 Madhyntavibhga I, 3, Anacker (ed.) 1998:425.
11 MahynastrlamkraV\, 8, Limaye (ed.) 1992: 72.
12 See also Harris 1991.
13 See, for instance Trimik 29, Anacker (ed.) 1998:423.
14 See also Willis 1979: 26.
15 I note in passing that the appeal to the ineffability thesis is a favourite tactic of
syncretists who want to assert the fundamental unity ofnot just Yogcra and
Madhyamakabut also all the seemingly disparate traditions of Buddhism. All
Buddhists, the syncretist will argue, agree that reality is finally ineffable. (This is,
however, a highly contentious point. It is not clear in fact that all Buddhists claim
that reality is ineffable). For such a syncretist, the apparently divergent teachings of
the Buddhist traditions are simply different conceptual formulations of the same
finally ineffable reality. The same strategy is sometimes employed in the field of
comparative religion, when it is argued that the vast variety of religious teachings
present in the world point towards the same ineffable reality. All religions are thus
united in their common advocacy of a reality beyond words. Note, however, that such
apparently irenic syncretism, even if tolerant of most religions, certainly cannot
tolerate any religionincluding, arguably, some forms of Buddhismwhich does not
accept that reality is ineffable.
16 See Mlamadhyamakakrk XIII., 8, Pandeya (ed.) 1988: 240-241; Yuktisastik 50,
Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 114; Vigrahavyvartani 29, Johnston, E.H. and Kunst A. (eds.)
in Bhattacharya 1990: 61-62.
17 Actually, Olson says the 'Prsagika Mdhyamika'. This is an allusion to the
taxonomy (popular in Tibet and of uncertain provenance) which divides the Indian
Madhyamaka tradition into 'Svtantrikas' and 'Prsangikas'. According to one
(disputed) interpretation of this taxonomywhich Olson is evidently followingthe
Prsangikas maintain that there can be no correct statements from the standpoint of
ultimate truth whereas the Svtantrikas maintain that there can be correct statements

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18
19
20

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21
22
23

24

25
26
27
28
29
30

from the standpoint of the ultimate truth. But this is a controversy into which I do
not want to enter here.
Lokttastava 27-28, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 138.
See for example, Acintyastava 22-23, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 146,148.
Prasannapad, Vaidya (ed.) 1960: 264. Candrakirti cites the same passage (again
without giving the source) in the Madhyamakvatrabhsya, yi ge med pa'i chos la
ni/ nyan pa gang dang ston pa gang/'gyur ba med la sgro btags pas/ 'on kyang nyan
zhing ston pa yin//. La Valle Poussin (ed.) 1970:178.
See Matilal 1986: 357-378, Dreyfus 1997: 67 ff.
VimalakrtinirdesastraVlll, 33, Lamotte (trans.): 1976: 202-203.
Such knowledge with an ineffable content must be distinguished from the disputed
phenomenon known in recent literature as the 'pure consciousness event', understood
as a wakeful but contentless state of consciousness. See Forman 1990. It is a moot
point whether a pure consciousness event can exist (can one be awake without one's
consciousness having some content?). However, what is clear is that, as the pure
consciousness event is said to be contentless, it would not involve knowledge of
anything.
I am not here doubting that the experience of reality may be in a sense
incommunicable. I am simply making the point that the reality which is experienced
must be in principle describable. It may plausibly be argued that experiences,
including the experience of reality (assuming that such an experience is possible),
have an inalienably first-person character. Even if I describe accurately my
experience to you, the description will not enable you to have my experience.
Experiences qua first-person events are not publicly accessible objects like
mountains, trees, and so forth. There is an irrevocably private dimension to one's
experience. Other people cannot have a direct perception of my experience. My
experience is never directly accessible to others. No matter how well I might describe
my experience to you, you will never know quite what it is like for me to have the
experience. But, granted this incommunicability of experience qua first-person event,
what is known in an experience must nevertheless be in principle expressible. If, for
instance, I have an experience of a red car, the experience qua first-person event (as
my experience) is perhaps inexpressible, but this in no way inhibits my ability to
describe the red car which is known in the experience.
Similarly, if I have an
experience of reality, the experience qua first-person event is inexpressible, but this in
no way inhibits my ability to describe the reality which is known in the experience.
For a useful discussion of this point, see Ward 1994:164-165.
Bodhicittavivaranald ff. Lindtner (ed.) 1982:193 ff.
See Lindtner 1986a.
Madhyamakvatra(bhsya) VI, 45-97, La Valle Poussin (ed.) 1970: 136-193.
Bodhicaryvatra IX, 11 ff. Sharma(ed.) 1990.
See Madhyamaklamkra 44 ff, Ichigo (ed.) 1989. It is true that Sntaraksita effects a
famous synthesis of Yogcra and Madhyamaka but he does this, not by asserting the
identity of the two philosophies, but by making the Yogcra a non-definitive
(neyrthi) teaching (an upya) by contrast with which the Madhyamaka philosophy is
the final, definitive (ntrtha) teaching. See Madhyamaklarnkra 92-93, Ichigo (ed.)
1989. In fact, the other Mdhyamika critics of the Yogcra also admit that the
doctrine of cittamtra has value as a non-definitive teaching. (See, for example,
Bodhicittavivarana 25, 27, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 192; Madhyamakvatra VI, 84-97,
La Valle Poussin (ed.) 1970: 182-199 and Madhyamakaratnapradlpa IV, 1-2,
Lindtner (ed.) 1986b: 192-193). No doubt this strategy was in part necessitated by
the fact that various stra-s, such as the Lankvatrastra and the Dasabhmikastra,
do teach cittamtra. Such buddhavacana cannot of course be wrong according to the

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Mdhyamikas, but it can be accommodated by them as having a provisional, as
opposed to a final, meaning.
31 MadhyamakvatraV\,l\, La Valle Poussin (ed.) 1970: 164.
32 Madhyamakvatrabhsya, La Valle Poussin (ed.) 1970: 164, shes bya rang bzhin
med pa ji lta ba de bzhin du shes bya'i rnam pa can gyi blo yang rang gi bdag nyid
kyis ma skyes par rig par bya'o/
33 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Burton 1999:87-121.
34 See, for example, Madhyamakvatr(bhsya) VI, 45-47, La Valle Poussin (ed.)
1970: 135-140; Bodhicittavivaraa 26, 30, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 192, 194.
35 Bodhicittavivaraa 55, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 200.
36 The translation here is by Lindtner 1986a: 252. The Tibetan textreads 'blo gros 'bring
dag'. See Lindtner (ed.) 1986b: 195.
37 The translation is by Lindtner 1986a: 241.
38 See Yuktisastikvrtti 40-41. Scherrer-Schaub (ed.) 1991.
39 Madhyntavibhga(bhsya)
I, 22 (verse in italics), na klist npi cklisti
suddhsuddh na caiva s katham na klist npi csuddh prakrtyaiva
prabhsvaratvc cittasya katham nklist na suddhklesasyigntukatvatahll evar
unyaty uddistah prabhedah sdhito bhavati. Anacker(ed.) 1998: 431.
40 Mahynastrlamkra XIII, 19, matam ca cittarn praktiprabhsvarar sad tad
gantukadosadsitam/ na dharmatcittam te 'nyacetasah prabhsvaratvam praktau
vidhiyate//. Limaye(ed.) 1992:253.
41 Mahynastrlamkrabhsya XIII, 19, dharmbhvas ca dharmopalabdhi ceti
trsasthnam nihsamklest ca dharmadhtoh prakrty visuddhat ca pascd iti
trsasthnam blnr...yath toyam prakrty prasannam gantukena tu klusyena
lutitar bhavaty evam cittarn prakrty prabhsvaram matam gantukais tu dosair
dsitam iti/ na ca dharmatcittd te
'nyasya cetasah paratantralaksanasya
praktiprabhsvaratvam vidhyate/tasmc cittatathataivtra cittarn veditavyam//.
Limaye (ed.) 1992:253.
42 On the Yogcra notion of svasamvedana, see Williams 1998.
43 Acintyastava 52, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 156.
44 Mulamadhyamakakrik XXV, 24, Pandeya(ed.) 1988: 242.
45 Mulamadhyamakakrik, Pandeya(ed.) 1988:1.
46 mKhas grub rje's anti-syncretic interpretation seems to be inspired by that of his
teacher Tsong kha pa as found, for instance, in the Legs bshad snying po. R.
Thurman (1984: 259) notes that Tsong kha pa thinks that Asaga himself was a
Mdhyamika who explained the Yogcra system 'in adaptation to the needs of the
period and people.' However, this is not to say, as one might be inclined to think, that
Tsong kha pa is therefore a syncretist for whom Yogcra and Madhyamaka share the
same philosophical view about reality. On the contrary, Tsong kha pa is claiming
(rightly or wrongly) that Asaga, though often understood to be a Yogcrin, was in
the final analysis a Mdhyamika who used the Yogcra doctrine as a skilful means
to be finally replaced by the Madhyamaka perspective. Tsong kha pa says, according
to Thurman, that Asanga's advocacy of Madhayamaka is evident especially in the
Ratnagotravibhgavykhy
(a text normally associated with tathgatagarbha
teachings). Note, however, that the traditional Tibetan attribution of this text to
Asaga is not shared by the Chinese (for whom the author is someone named
'Sramati') and is certainly questionable. See Williams 1989: 103.
47 See mKhas grub rje's sTong thun chert mo 30-31.
48 sTong thun chen mo 31.
49 sTong thun chen moll, byang sa las/ btags pa'i tshig gi mtshan ma'i gzhi/btags pa'i
tshig gi mtshan ma'i rten du gyur pa/brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis don dam par
yod pa yang dag pa'i dngos po la.... In Sanskrit, this passage from the
Bodhisattvabhmi
reads:
...prajnaptivdanimittdhisthnam

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51
52

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53
54

55

56

prajaptivdanimittasamhisrayam nirabhilpytrhakatay paramrthasadbhtar... .

Dutt (ed.) 1966: 30-31.
sTong thun chen mo 32, ma bslabs pa kha cig/kun las btus dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogs
dang mthun par smra ba ni/
I borrow here the translation of Cabezn (1992: 47), as the manuscript from which I
am working is illegible at this point.
sTong thun chen mo 32, gzhan yang mdo dgongs 'grel dang/gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba
dang/byang dang/theg bsdus dang/kun las btus rnams las/mdo las/chos thams cad ma
skyes pa ma 'gags pa gzod ma nas zhi ba rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das
pa zhes gsungs pa dgongs pa can dang Idem pa po'i dag tu gsungs'i phyir/ngo bo nyid
med par smra ba'i dbu ma'i lugs su ji ltar 'gyur/
sTong thun chen mo 27-28.
In Sanskrit, this passage from the Bodhisattvabhmireads: ato ya ekaty durvijeyn
strn
mahynapratisarnyuktn
gambhrn
chnyatpratisaryuktn
bhipryikrthanirpitn chrutv yathbhtam bhsitasyrtham anabhijyyoniso
vikalpyyogavihitena
tarkamtrakeaivam
drstayo
bhavanty
evatm
vdinah/prajnaptimtram eva sarvam etat tattvam/ya caivam payati sa samyak
payatiti/tesm prajapty adhisthnasya vastumtrasybhvt saiva prajaptih sarvea
sarvam na bhavati/kutah punah prajfiaptimtram tattvam bhavisyati/tad anena
paryyea tais tattvam api prajaptir api tadubhayam apy apavditam bhavati/. See
Dutt (ed.) 1966: 31.
The Tibetan, quoted at sTong thun chen mo 28, reads: btags pa dang de kho na la
skur ba btab pa na/med par lta ba'i gtso bo yin par rig par bya'o/. In Sanskrit, this
passage from the Bodhisattvabhmi reads: prajnaptitattvpavdc ca pradhno
nstiko veditavyah/. See Dutt (ed.) 1966:31.
sTong thun chen mo 28, zhes dbu ma pa chos thams cad btags pa tsam du smra ba pa
med par lta bar 'gyur ba'i gnod pa bstan.

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