Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Gimenez
Phils.
Inc.
vs.
Hon.
FACTS:
The
petitioner
Colgate-Palmolive
Philippines imported from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated
calcium
carbonate
and
dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers
and flavoring of the dental cream it
manufactures. For every importation made
of these materials, the petitioner paid to
the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17%
special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges incident
thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601,
as amended, commonly known as the
Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with
the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had
paid. The auditor of the Central Bank,
refused to pass in audit its claims for
refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are
not exempt under section 2 of the
Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General,
but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining
that the term stabilizer and flavors
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax
Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food
products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to the Supreme Court
thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used
by petitioner for the importation of dental
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed
by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No.
601).
HELD:
YES. The
reversed.
decision
under
review
was
RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of
the Auditor General that the term
stabilizer and flavors as used in the law
refers only to those materials actually used
in the preparation or manufacture of food
and food products is based, apparently, on
share tenant.
Juridical consequences
coming from thus are security of tenure of
the tenant and the tenants right to
continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or
the sale or transfer of the land to third
persons, and the farmers pre-emptive
right to buy the land he cultivates as well
as the right to redeem the land if sold to a
third person without his knowledge.
Whether
or
not
Judge
Aujero
is
administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law.
Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is
ignorance of the law.
guilty
of
gross
Issue:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are bona
fide occupants of the lot in question.
Held:
No, Enrique does not come under the
description of bona fide tenant or occupant
employed in the statute. The term "bona
fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not
a tenant) has been defined as "one who
supposes he has a good title and knows of
no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17
Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly
supposes himself to be vested with true
title but is ignorant that the title is
contested by any other person claiming a
superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to
that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil
Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil
Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona
fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest
belief in the validity of one's right,
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). He was suspended from
office but he died during his incumbency,
and while the case was pending. The case
was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner
sought the payment of the Mayor's salary
during his period of suspension pursuant to
Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides should a public officer be convicted by final
judgement he shall lose all retirement or
gravity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted
he
shall
be
entitled
to
reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits to which he failed to receive
during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to
declare illegal the disbursement made by
Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of
the suspended officer being "acquitted". It
means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him
the court is of the opinion that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because
dismissal does not amount to acquittal.