WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Uson vs. del Rosario (Inheritance vs. Succession)

Jan. 29, 1953
Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del
Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Maria Uson and her
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate
as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of
land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may
be left by her husband upon his death. The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to
restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted.
HELD: YES. Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code.
With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land
he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had
relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation
they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot
be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall
have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or
acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for
the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives
rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already
stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

Ledesma vs. McLachlin

Nov. 23, 1938
Villa-Real, J.
FACTS: Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of
which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco
Ledesma. It seems that the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an
end, but the latter executed a deed, acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural
daughter. Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four
children, who are the other defendants. The court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the
intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among
the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying the said
petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to
this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather
by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who
died without leaving any property.
HELD: YES. The trial court erred in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from
their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations
of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property, while it is true that under the
provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who
died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation
does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or
mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to
partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the
heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein
defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not
bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.
Judgement Reversed.

M.A.

Rabadilla vs. CA
June 29, 2000
Purisima, J.
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee. Pursuant to the same Codicil, a lot was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
a Transfer Certificate of Title thereto issued in Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived
by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla his name. Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, before
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil. The Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision, dismissing the complaint. The CA reversed the decision and ordered the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over the lot, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
ISSUE: Whether or not whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
HELD: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. The petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petition Dismissed.

M.A.

Atty. Ferrer vs. Sps. Diaz (Transmission of Successional Rights)

April 23, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint the Diazes, as represented by their daughter
Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan of
P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second
mortgage over the TCT. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure
payment of said loan. The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents
still failed and refused to settle the loan. In her Answer to petitioners original complaint,
Comandante alleged that petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ
Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a
bank of her parents lot covered by a TCT. She also sought financial accommodations from the
couple on several occasions. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans were secured by
chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks she issued in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above-mentioned secured
loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided). The lower court ordered the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City that the rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the
back of the TCT. The CA declared Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights null and void.
However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents as
binding between the parties thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights is null and void.
HELD: YES. Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the
source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second
paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code. Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners
adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a
right or interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise
subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from
Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the
registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis
and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

In Re Petition For Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago

Aug. 9, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS: Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana Lopez, the
second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two
offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion,
Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. After Basilio died testate his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan a
petition for the probate of Basilios will. After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, the probate court approved the
will. The CA annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of
the Complaint-in-Intervention and its Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata.
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to petitioners Ma.
Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the motion. The CA affirmed the
probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of the last will and testament will constitute res judicata.
HELD: NO. While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, conclusiveness of
judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve
as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime,
which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present petition.
At is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot actually be partitioned
until after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that
something more has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action
can only be filed after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of action accrues only from the said
date and for which no prescription of action has set in.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house and lot in
Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that the
property be owned by the heirs in common, thus: Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang
ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may
tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang
bahay at lupang itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila
at katabing mga lunsod x x x
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory
limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than twenty
years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly
mandated by the Civil Code.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

Coja vs. CA
Dec. 10, 2007
Azcuna, J.
FACTS: Luz Aquillo Victor (hereafter Luz) and Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. (hereafter Feliciano Jr.), both
deceased, were the legitimate children of the late spouses Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. (hereafter
Feliciano Sr.) and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo (hereafter Lorenza). During their marriage, Feliciano
Sr. and Lorenza acquired a 120-square meter lot located at Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, upon
which they built their conjugal home. After the death of Lorenza, Feliciano Sr. cohabited with Paz
Lachica and lived at the aforesaid house. However, after Lorenzas death, her heirs failed to
partition their hereditary shares in their inheritance. After Feliciano Sr. died, his heirs also failed to
partition among themselves their hereditary shares in their inheritance. Charlito Coja filed an
application for the issuance of title with the RTC. Luz, being one of the heirs of Feliciano Sr.,
opposed the application for registration. Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
opposed the application. The OSG alleged, among other things, that the applicant or his
predecessors-in- interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject land within the period required by law; and that the documents attached to or alleged in
the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
land or of an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of an owner. During the pendency of the case, Luz died. She was substituted by her
spouse, Quinciano Victor, Sr., and her children. The RTC opined that since the land in question is
registered in the name of Paz Lachica alone, it is assumed that it is not part of the conjugal
partnership properties of Feliciano Sr., and Lorenza, for if it was their conjugal property, it should
have been registered in their names. The CA reversed the decision, concluding that the property
formerly covered by Tax Declaration No. 1151, with an area of 120 square meters, is the conjugal
property of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza having been acquired during their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is conjugal property of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenzana.
HELD: YES. All properties acquired during the marriage are thus disputably presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. As a condition for the operation of above article, in favor of
the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage. The presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. Upon the
death of Lorenza, the conjugal partnership was terminated. As a result, one half of the property
was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Feliciano Sr. as his share in the
conjugal partnership. The other half, which is the share of Lorenza, was transmitted to Lorenzas
heirs, Feliciano Jr., Luz, and her husband Feliciano Sr., who is entitled to the same share as that of
a legitimate child. It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common
is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is
effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
CA decision partly Affirmed.

M.A.

Reyes et al vs. CA (Elements and Characteristics of a Will)

Oct. 30, 1997
Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS: Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament. The recognized natural children of
Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and
the deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an
opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not
executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle
exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The
opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion
Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to
Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can
not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals. The
trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never
married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. The will of
Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared
null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence
that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation
with Torcuato Reyes. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void.
HELD: NO. In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations
by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead
and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. . . . All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said. (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil.
209).
The trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married
to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were
merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the
supposed husband of Asuncion.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

Nepomuceno vs. CA
Oct. 30, 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: Martin Jugo died. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she
is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her. The lower court
denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
Petition Dismissed.

M.A.

In re: Enriquez vs. Abadia (Extrinsic validity of Wills)

Aug. 9, 1954
Montemayor, J.
FACTS: Father Sancho Abadia (died 1943), parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the
estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. The learned trial court found and declared
Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at
the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the
new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills,
under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is
the controlling factor and may override any defect in form.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void.
HELD: YES. There is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of
the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent
statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force
at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested
right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for
failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon
his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements
or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

Jimenez vs. Fernandez

April 6, 1990
Paras, J.
FACTS: The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to
Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This
Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez.
After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a
result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title was issued in the names of Carlos
Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso. Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936
and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession
of the eastern portion of the property. Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the
property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to
the latter, who has been in occupation since. Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating
unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that
she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the
present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property. The lower court held that
Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question, the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the old civil code will govern the will.
HELD: NO. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent. Since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso
portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of title, died on July 9, 1936
(Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights
pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this
Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court. Since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land
then covered by Original Certificate of title, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his
estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

10

Aznar vs. Garcia

Jan. 31, 1963
Labrador, J.
FACTS: Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The
legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the
case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed
for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth. The court below ruled that as Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed
by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of the Philippines can govern Christiansens successional rights.
HELD: YES. There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time
of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. The citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
The subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of
which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

Decision Reversed.

M.A.

11

Miciano vs. Brimo

Nov. 1, 1924
Romualdez, J.
FACTS: The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code. But
the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of Brimo was violated in the testamentary disposition.
HELD: NO. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions
in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid
and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

M.A.

12

Llorente vs. CA
Nov. 23, 2000
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. Lorenzo and
petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married. Before the outbreak of
the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home.
Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in
his favor by the United States District Court. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American
Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he
visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive
Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce. The divorce
decree became final. Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children. The RTC found that the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and
as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then
one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname Llorente, for
them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of Lorenzo is void.
HELD: NO. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and
at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and
who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a
guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

13

Dorotheo vs. CA
Dec. 8, 1999
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In
1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The
lower court found that Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other.
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
granted. This dismissal became final and executory. An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ
of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
in an order that has become final and executory can still be given effect.
HELD: A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the
trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled
that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that
a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order
of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not
bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator,
the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise
that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also
occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear
from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed
according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

14

Bagtas vs. Paguio (Sound Mind)

March 14, 1912
Trent, J.
FACTS: The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator
was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity
necessary to execute a valid will. The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some
fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his
body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of
speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his
mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through
the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his
family.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator is of sound mind.
HELD: YES. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid
will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the
question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated
as insanity and idiocy.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

15

Baltazar vs. Laxa

April 11, 2012
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled
Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala in the Pampango dialect. Lorenzo is
Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and
treated Paciencia as his own mother. More than four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo
filed a petition for the probate of the Will of Paciencia. Antonio Baltazar averred that the properties
subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. The RTC issued an Order denying the
requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen
and resident of the USA while the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will
has not yet been established. The RTC disallowed the will. The CA reversed the RTC Decision and
granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs
conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that
the state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render
[Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will. Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were
not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete
circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced
into signing the Will.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paciencia was of sound mind.
HELD: YES. We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before
the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son,
Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself
due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate.
For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had
to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even
remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father
could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners
neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on
cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to
satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary
public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the
basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on
the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be
disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither
does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in
favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it,
not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required by law.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

16

Azuela vs. CA (Notarial Will)

April 12, 2006
Tinga, J.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS: The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of
both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate petition adverted
to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one
Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be
allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. The
petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is
a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in
several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and
usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the
decedent. It also asserted that contrary to the representaations of petitioner, the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.
Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who
died in 1965, and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her
mother by three (3) months. Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are
among the central matters to this petition. The RTC admitted the will to probate. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. The Court of
Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus
rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a jurat is sufficient for the validity of a will.
HELD: NO. The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of
the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for
the indulgent admission of wills to probate. Even if we consider what was affixed by the notary
public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article
806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not
present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious
wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty
meaningless act.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

17

Ortega vs. Valmonte

Dec. 16, 2005
Panganiban, J.
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.
FACTS: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in a house
where he lived in the house and lot, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed
at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and
again on the left hand margin. The RTC disallowed the probate of the will. Reversing the trial court,
the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility
of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the
will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of
the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways did not
make him a person of unsound mind. Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the
formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are
indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators
wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in
deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution
and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will.
HELD: YES. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived
as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made. We stress that the party
challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.
The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of
some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing
it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty
years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the
ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years. Moreover, as
correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will
does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial]
will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. According to Article 799, the
three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as
follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators
bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we
find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of his will.

M.A.

18

Petition Denied.
Jaboneta vs. Gustilo
Jan. 19, 1906
Carson, J.
FACTS: Probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, because
the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana,
one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another
of the witnesses. Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in
question, which has been presented for probate as his will. Being in the house of Arcadio
Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be written, and calling
Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as
his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when
he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his
presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a
witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as
witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room.
As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to
sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after
Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator
and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena.
HELD: NO. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and
pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will,
convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act
of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being
written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at
the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically
present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical
obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in
fact signed before he finally left the room.
It is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will,
and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are many
cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the testator actually
saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and
physical condition and position at the time of the subscription.
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the testator and the
witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the witnesses signed the instrument in the
presence of each other, as required by the statute, and applying them to the facts proven in these
proceedings we are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument
were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the ground
stated in the ruling appealed from.
Judgement Reversed.

M.A.

19

Caeda vs. CA
May 28, 1993
Regalado, J.
FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his
life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator
was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos,
in the preparation of that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was
leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola,
Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all
of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition,
seeking the probate of his last will and testament. Petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected
to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the
same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the
testator therein. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will
and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause
is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
HELD: YES. The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that
the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be
specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of
in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned
attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear
witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

20

Echavez vs. Dozen Construction, et. al.

Oct. 11, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS: Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and
Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicentes nephew,
filed a petition for the settlement of Vicentes intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a
petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the
contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.
The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente
had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel
was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have
been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and
was therefore void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is a donation mortis cause and thus should comply with the
formalities for a will.
HELD: YES. The purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not
contain the number of pages on which the deed was written.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions
of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two
distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a
deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the
other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of
its execution.
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental
witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An attestation must state all the details the third
paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed
of Donation Mortis Causa.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

21

Garcia vs. Gatchalian (Acknowledgement of Wills)

Nov. 25, 1947
Dizon, J.
FACTS: Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca,
Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did
not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; and that the deceased was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will. After due trial,
the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last
will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
Article 806 of the New Civil Code that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also
by the witnesses
HELD: YES. An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same was
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the
Clerk of Court.
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal
provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No.
L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the document under consideration does not comply with this
requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

22

Cruz vs. Villasor

Nov. 26, 1973
Esguerra, J.
FACTS: Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing
the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N.
Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"),
alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that
the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content
thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and
testament was not executed in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court
allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was
given due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at
least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.
HELD: NO. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as
the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before"
means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in
front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so
that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the
will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement. That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and
the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

23

Garcia vs. Vasquez (Additional requirements for Deaf-Mute and Blind Testators)
April 30, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother
or sister. Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs. The Court issued an order
admitting to probate the 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario. The records of the probate proceeding
fully establish the fact that the testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two
wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew
and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and
acknowledged before notary public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting
of 1 page and written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena, and
Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad. Dr. Jesus V.
Tamesis, whose expertise was admitted by both parties, testified, among other things, that when
Doa Gliceria del Rosario saw him for consultation on 11 March 1960 he found her left eye to have
cataract (opaque lens), 15 and that it was "above normal in pressure", denoting a possible
glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness 16 As to the conditions of her right eye.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decedent was blind, given her defective eye sight and Article 808
should govern.
HELD: YES. That Doa Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday, arrange
flowers and attend to kitchen tasks shortly prior to the alleged execution of the testament,
as appears from the photographs, in no way proves; that she was able to read a closely
typed page, since the acts shown do not require vision at close range. It must be
remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her eyes had lost the power of adjustment to
near vision, the substituted glass lenses being rigid and uncontrollable by her. Neither is the
signing of checks by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading distances. Writing or signing
of ones name, when sufficiently practiced, becomes automatic, so that one need only to have a
rough indication of the place where the signature is to be affixed in order to be able to write it.
Indeed, a close examination of the checks, amplified in the photograph, et seq., reinforces the
contention of oppositors that the alleged testatrix could not see at normal reading distance: the
signatures in the checks are written far above the printed base, lines, and the names of the payees
as well as the amounts written do not appear to be in the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, being
in a much firmer and more fluid hand than hers.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly
communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly
reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the
latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act
within the range of his (the testators) other senses.
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the above
requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated
suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.
The order of the court below allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is
hereby reversed and set aside.

M.A.

24

Alvarado vs. Gaviola

Sept. 14, 1993
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: The 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein
he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC. As testified to by the three
instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the
execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as
the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the
testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. Kaasulatan ng Pagbabago sa
Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was
then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As
in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil.
Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed
the reading using their own copies. When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the
grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued. The Court of Appeals rendered
the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time
his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art.
808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with
each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808
was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known
to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.
ISSUE: Whether or not the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 can be substantially
complied with.
HELD: YES. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is
blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind
testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)."
Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the
separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can
be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term
"blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential
that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with. Substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy
the testamentary privilege. Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and
unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast
these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not
followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the
purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his
will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the
purpose has been served.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

25

Ajero vs. CA (Formal Requirements for Holographic Wills)

Sept. 15, 1994
Puno, J.
FACTS: In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand,
Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. Private respondent opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the
will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. Notwithstanding
the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. Considering
then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its
due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at
all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor
for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . .
are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the
question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to
have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the
evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will
submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix. On appeal,
said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity. It
held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will cannot be admitted to probate because it was not written in the
handwriting of the testatrix.
HELD: NO. In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether
said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4)
whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity
of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Ordinarily,
when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic
Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but
at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Unless the
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

26

Kalaw vs. Relova

Sept. 28, 1984
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K.
Kalaw, filed a petition before the CFI for the probate of her holographic will. The holographic Will,
as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. ROSA's position
was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could
be the sole heir thereunder. The lower court denied the probate of the will. As the court held, the
petitioner contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the
ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR
EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that
the oppositors would be in estoppel. ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole
legal question of whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will was altered and thus became void.
HELD: YES. The holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that
the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy
is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature, the ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of
the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with
the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot
be determined with certitude.
Petition Dismissed.

M.A.

27

Rodelas vs. Aranza

Dec. 7, 1982
Relova, J.
FACTS: Appellant filed a petition with the CFI for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, was opposed by the
appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla. Among the grounds raised was that; the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The appellees moved again to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will, arguing that the alleged holographic was not a last will but
merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded
by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. The lower court found that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
The motion to dismissed was denied, the CA likewise dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.
HELD: YES. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance
of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested
or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available,
experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available,
the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of
the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it
shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But,
in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.
Decision Set Aside.

M.A.

28

Roxas vs. de Jesus

Jan. 28, 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, a special
proceeding was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus. Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of Administration had been
granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his
appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus
and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely
written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written
by a lawyer. The lower court allowed the probate of the will. Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law
requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should
be strictly complied with. The lower court reconsidered the order and disallowed the probate of the
will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD: YES. The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will and
testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that which the law
can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition based upon the
presumed will of the decedent.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

29

Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee

Jan 15, 2010
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, a petition for mandamus with
damages, before the RTC, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for
the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother
to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. On motion for
reconsideration, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence. Again, after motion for
reconsideration, the CA issued the writ and held that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules of Court, however, does not prevent the petitioner from instituting
probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
HELD: YES. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public
or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it
be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the
original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in
a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production
of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that
respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

30

Codoy vs. Calugay

Aug. 12, 1999
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the RTC a petition
for probate of the holographic will of the deceased. Respondents claimed that the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will, that
there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and the
will was written voluntarily. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even
illegible. This gives an impression that a third hand of an interested party other than the true
hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued that the
repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If
the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature
should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through
fraud and trickery. The lower court granted the demurrer to evidence. The Court of Appeals allowed
the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely
directory and not mandatory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive and not
mandatory.
HELD: NO. In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws
on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will
of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three
witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Decision Set Aside.

M.A.

31

dela Cerna vs. Rebaca-Potot (Joint Wills)

Dec. 23, 1964
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: The spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our
marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece,
whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the testators is yet living,
he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed. The CFI ordered the petition heard and declared the testament
null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code. On
appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of
probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution
of the testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void for being a joint will.
HELD: NO. The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939
by the CFI (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will
and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old
Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have
been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the
conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition
for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world; and public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium. Petitioners, as heirs and
successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to
probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate
decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with
finality when the will was probated in 1939.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered
a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu
that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our
decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs.
Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267. The undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to
her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her
favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
CA decision Affirmed.

M.A.

32

Gonzales vs. CA (Qualifications / Disqualifications)

May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J.
FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue at the age of eightyfive (85). The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the
document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds: 1. that the same is
not genuine; and in the alternative; 2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by
law; 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative; 4. that, at the
time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due
to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative. The lower court disallowed the probate of
the will. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties,
rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the
deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allowed probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was not executed and attested as required by law.
HELD: NO. Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially
or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded
to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or competently
proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read
and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article
821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record
the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness
unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party. We also reject as without merit
petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same
meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for
naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing
in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said
execution.
The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the
statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that
said witness is telling the truth.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

33

Unson vs. Abella (Codicils)

June 2, 1922
Villamor, J.
FACTS: Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the municipality
of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory
of her properties, in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said
documents. Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance of Laguna on the 19th of January of
the same year an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of
administration in his favor. To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella,
Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the deceased
Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not
paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the
testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other. The lower court ordered the probate of
the will. In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not signed by the
testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of the will. The trial court found that the
evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of the two attesting witnesses
and the other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of the preparation of the
will and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1, was sufficient.
ISSUE: Whether or not the addition to the inventory is a valid codicil.
HELD: YES. The attestation clause is as follows: The foregoing will composed of ten folios
including this one whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory of the
properties of Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the
latter affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory composed of
ten folios in our presence; and she declared this to be her last will and testament and at her
request we have affixed hereunto our respective signatures in her presence and in the presence of
each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna,
P.I.
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, we find
that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which
requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other
attestation clause at the end of the inventory. We see no reason why the same rule should not
be applied where the paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in
question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan,
and followed in Aldava vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will.
Judgement Affirmed.

M.A.

34

Testate Estate of Maloto vs. CA

Feb. 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners. Believing
that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. Atty. Palma claimed to have found a
testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer
formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court
of First Instance. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of
Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had
earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the
petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Aldina and
Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and
for the allowance of the will. The trial court denied the motion, the SC likewise denied the petition
for mandamus. The appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the
document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de
Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the
will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the
destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its
finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the
testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For
reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even considered collectively, as
sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was validly revoked.
HELD: NO. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document
destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke,
may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with
these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was
not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another,
the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And
then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one
in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in
the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
The last will and testament was Allowed.

M.A.

35

De Molo vs. De Molo

Sept 21, 1951
Bautista, Angelo, J.
FACTS: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or
ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of
the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills. There being no opposition, the will was
probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties
presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law. The
petitioners that filed a petition for the probate of the second will. The court issued an order
admitting the will to probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid
and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.
HELD: NO. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. The theory
on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this
intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his
wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after
the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this
theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer
necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say
that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief
that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given
effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate
under the principle of "dependent relative revocation. This doctrine is known as that of
dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys
a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a
new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not
made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is not limited to the existence
of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law. The rule is established that where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant
the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be
substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative,
the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. This is the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the
revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the
place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. Even in the supposition that the
destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the
prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of
1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect.

M.A.

36

Decision Affirmed.
Mercado vs. Santos (Allowance and Disallowance of Wills)
Sept. 22, 1938
Laurel, J.
FACTS: The petitioner herein filed in the CFI of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of
his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F.
Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, admitted the will to probate. Almost three
years later, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of
jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the
motion was denied. Sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario
Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint
against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated. The
petitioner was arrested. The complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the complainant
herself. The same intervenor charged the petitioner for the second time with the same offense,
presenting the complaint this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. This
second complaint, after investigation, was also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant
herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health. The same intervenor accused the same
petitioner for the third time of the same offense. The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, it was also dismissed. The provincial fiscal,
moved in the CFI for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted, and, for the fourth time,
the petitioner was arrested. The motion for reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied.
The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that
the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order
probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The motion was
overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in the matter. The injunction was issued
and thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will.
HELD: YES. The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question as to
whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probate
will. We have examined some important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed
standard maybe adopted or drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of
statutory provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. The court of chancery has no capacity, as
the authorities have settled, to judge or decide whether a will is or is not a forgery; and hence there
would be an incongruity in its assuming to set aside a probate decree establishing a will, on the
ground that the decree was procured by fraud, when it can only arrive at the fact of such fraud by
first deciding that the will was a forgery. There seems, therefore, to be a substantial reason, so
long as a court of chancery is not allowed to judge of the validity of a will, except as shown by the
probate, for the exception of probate decrees from the jurisdiction which courts of chancery
exercise in setting aside other judgments obtained by fraud. But whether the exception be founded
in good reason or otherwise, it has become too firmly established to be disregarded. At the present
day, it would not be a greater assumption to deny the general rule that courts of chancery may set
aside judgments procured by fraud, than to deny the exception to that rule in the case of probate
decrees. We must acquiesce in the principle established by the authorities, if we are unable to
approve of the reason. Criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a
will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal
proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed,
without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

M.A.

37

Revilla vs. CA
Jan. 27, 1993
Gri0-Aquino, J.
FACTS: Don Cayetano Revilla owned two valuable pieces of land with buildings on Calle
Azcarraga (now C.M. Recto Street) in the City of Manila, and six (6) parcels of land in his
hometown of San Miguel, Bulacan. These properties, now worth some P30 million. Don Cayetano
Revilla, a bachelor, without issue nor any surviving ascendants, executed a last will and testament
bequeathing all his properties to his nine (9) nephews and nieces, the parties herein, who are full
blood brothers and sisters, including the petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each of them, he
bequeathed an undivided one-tenth (1/10) of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be
said after his death, and for the care of the religious images which he kept in a chapel in San
Miguel, Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano had himself sought the probate of his will, the
CFI admitted the will to probate. Heracio Revilla, the oldest nephew, filed a petition for probate of
another will, allegedly executed by Don Cayetano, wherein he (Heracio) was instituted as sole heir
of his uncle's estate and executor of the will. The probate of the second will was opposed by
Heracio's eight (8) brothers and sisters, the private respondents. The trial court rendered a
decision disallowing the second will and, accordingly, dismissed the case with costs against the
petitioner, the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second will was correctly disallowed.
HELD: YES. Don Cayetano's assertion that he did not execute another will, was not negative
evidence. Evidence is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence
of a fact, and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur. Since the execution
of the second will could not have occurred on the date appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was
admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a
virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was
not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim was a second will
revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a
second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it.
He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first
will.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

38

Reyes vs. Reyes

Nov. 22, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of
land situated in Cubao. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia,
Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to
his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax
deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, QC. Oscar Reyes
availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property. Cesar Reyes, brother
of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the RTC. Oscar Reyes
filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part
of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or
purchase. The respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate courts
order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes is provisional in character
and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper
court on the issue of ownership of the properties; that the provisional character of the inclusion of
the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of
intestate court. It further stated that although the general rule that question of title to property
cannot be passed upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for adjudication, such has no application in the instant case since
petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the only parties with legal interest in the subject
property as they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it was never shown that all parties
interested in the subject property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of
the question of ownership to the intestate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within
the probate courts competence.
HELD: YES. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and
removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a
rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title. The Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited
jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all
other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court
allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining
whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the
probate courts competence.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

39

Ortega vs. Valmonte

Dec. 16, 2005
Panganiban, J.
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed.
FACTS: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot
located in Makati. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. Two
years after the marriage, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of two (2) pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page
by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia. The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not
inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are
just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that
at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no
longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati
residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him.Reversing the trial
court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the
credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due
execution of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Placid should be allowed probate.
HELD: YES. The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and
requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states
the instances when a will may be disallowed. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement,
or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he
executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have
made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at
the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only
upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was
not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years
his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones
who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

40

Dy Yieng Seangio vs. Judge Reyes

Nov. 27, 2006
Azcuna, J.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio, praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng,
Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. A petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that
the probate proceedings should take precedence over the special proceeding because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Private respondents
moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. The
RTC dismissed the petition for probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as
its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir.
HELD: NO. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document,
although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

41

Maloles II vs. Philips

Jan. 31, 2000
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of
his will. Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. Judge
Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was
directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a
basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the
examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting
on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and
Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any
other person in signing it. The RTC allowed the will. Petitioner sought to intervene and to set aside
the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. Judge Abad Santos granted
petitioners motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion
was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which,
on, rendered a decision setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not
shown any right or interest to intervene. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in
Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr.
De Santos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right
to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
HELD: NO. After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make
a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a
chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death would
be in order. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one
who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of
the Civil Code provides: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs. Compulsory heirs are
limited to the testators - Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators - (1) Legitimate children and
descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the
foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. Petitioner,
as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators
will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation
that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will,
it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

42

Pecson vs. Coronel (Institution of Heir)

Oct. 11, 1923
Romualdez, J.
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament of
Dolores Coronel. The probate of this will is impugned on the following grounds: (a) That the proof
does not that the document Exhibit A above copied contains the last will of Dolores Coronel, and
(b) that the attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645. The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it
be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely exclude
her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by
affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of
Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid relatives who had helped
her in the management and direction of her lands. It appears, however, from the testimony of
Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript of the stenographic notes) that Dolores Coronel revealed to
him her suspicion against some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery of which
she had been a victim. The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very
strongly knit and that the exclusion of relative one's estate an exceptional case. It is true that ties of
relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of
relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The appellants find in the testament Exhibit B something
to support their contention that the intention of Dolores Coronel was to institute the said Pecson not
as sole beneficiary, but simply as executor and distributor of all her estate among her heirs, for
while Lorenzo Pecson's contention that he was appointed sold beneficiary is based on the fact that
he enjoyed the confidence of Dolores Coronel in 1918 and administered all her property, he did not
exclusively have this confidence and administration in the year 1912.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is something strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of
her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary.
HELD: NO. It is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute the estate, which in estate
succession, such as the instant case, has to be distributed with the intervention of the court. All
executor has, besides, other duties and general and special powers intended for the preservation,
defense, and liquidation of the estate so long as the same has not reached, by order of the court,
the hands of those entitled thereto. The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity of an
executor does not imply a negation of her desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It
is to be noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that her body be given a burial in
accordance with her social standing and she had a perfect right to designate a person who should
see to it that this order was complied with. One of the functions of an executor is the fulfillment of
what is ordained in the will. As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and witnesses signed
the document Exhibit A in accordance with the provisions of law on the matter, that is, whether or
not the testatrix signed the will, or caused it to be signed, in the presence of the witnesses, and the
latter in turn signed in her presence and that of each other, the court, after observing the demeanor
of the witnesses for both parties, is of the opinion that those for the petitioner spoke the truth. It is
neither probable nor likely that a man versed in the law, such as Attorney Francisco, who was
present at the execution of the will in question, and to whose conscientiousness in the matter of
compliance with all the extrinsic formalities of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was due
the fact that the testatrix had cancelled her former will (Exhibit B) and had new one (Exhibit A)
prepared and executed, should have consented the omission of formality compliance with which
would have required little or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix and the attesting
witnesses were all present when their respective signatures were affixed to the will." And the
record does not furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and findings of the
trial judge.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

43

Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Rigor

April 30, 1979
Aquino, J.
FACTS: The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to
this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court
declaring that the said devise was inoperative. Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died, leaving a will which was probated by the CFI in its order. Named as devisees in the will were
the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina RigorManaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda. The administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix
and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending. About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954,
the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor),
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof
be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new
administrator was appointed. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying
that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said
ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the
testator "has ever studied for the priesthood. That petition was opposed by the parish priest of
Victoria.Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order on the
ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first
cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The
administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. The CA
reversed the order, holding that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years
because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bequest inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male
relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust.
HELD: YES. The said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper. The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or
reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative
at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the
wilt was likewise inoperative. It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could
become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case
because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became
a priest.

M.A.

44

Austria vs. Reyes (Statement of a False Cause in the Institution of Heir)

Feb. 27, 1970
Castro, J.
FACTS: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This
opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the
estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita
Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. More than two years after her will was allowed to
probate, Basilia died. A petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of
kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto
Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of
the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the
heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur
of duly conducted probate proceedings. The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to
the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath onehalf of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further
contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the
respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof
therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the
estate wide to intestacy. The lower court barred the claim of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of the heirs was based on a false cause.
HELD: NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The
petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and
"sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that
succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not
have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of
the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even
this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when
she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific
or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of
guesswork or uncertain implications. The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on
this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe
the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication
that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she
was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children,
and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to
the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with
the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the
petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the
other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would
subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Petition Denied.

M.A.

45

Naguid vs. Naguid (Preterition)

June 23, 1966
Sanchez, J.
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and
six (6) brothers and sisters. Remedios Nuguid filed in the CFI a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted
to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void. The Court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the
petition without costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of the decedent were illegally preterited.
HELD: YES. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were
they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition referring to
the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. Preterition "consists in the omission in the
testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share
in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the
testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be
labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This
annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form
of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the
Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before
us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is
the same. The entire will is null.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

46

Acain vs. IAC

Oct. 27, 1987
Paras, J.
FACTS: Constantino Acain, filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and
for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, on the premise that Nemesio Acain
died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters
Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain was written in Bisaya with a translation in English. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the
executor of the testament. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo
who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. The oppositors (respondents
herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow
Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision. After the
denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution. The Intermediate
Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain.
ISSUE: Whether or not the preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to
preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who
are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.
HELD: YES. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The
universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

47

Neri vs. Akutin

May 21, 1943
Moran, J.
FACTS: Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six
children. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage died, that is, a little less than eight years before the
death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven children named Remedios,
Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which was
admitted to probate, he willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any
participation in his estate, as they had already received their corresponding shares during his
lifetime. The trial court found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his will, that all his
children by the first and second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to onehalf of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal
partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the
testator could freely dispose of.
ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the
children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator.
HELD: NO. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the
children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the
hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition
as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary
or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least
manifest. Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious, preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. n the
will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second
marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available
for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon
the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares.
Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will,
would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

48

Viado Non vs. CA

Feb. 15, 2000
Vitug, J.
FACTS: The spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property.
Virginia P. Viado died, Julian C. Viado died three years later. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and
Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole
heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides
Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog
property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca
Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided
between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed
absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion
occupied by the latter. Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his
one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial
settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo
Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over
their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Petitioners, in their action for partition,
attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed
forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to
procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her
retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that
should warrant its annulment. The trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and
her children as being the true owners of the disputed property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Delia Viado was preterited in the extrajudicial settlement.
HELD: YES. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the
Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs --- her husband Julian and their
children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested
from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the
heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a
donation or an extrajudicial settlement. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a
retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind
of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral
attack on the TCT. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead
rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended
by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be
paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

49

Perez vs. Garchitorena (Substitution of Heirs)

Feb. 13, 1930
Romualdez, J.
FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known
as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara,
deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena. Mariano Garchitorena held a
judgment against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said
amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that
the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The
court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary
heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a fideicommissary substitution.
HELD: YES. It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy
but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may
dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Clause X
expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the death of the
heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it
appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the
heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my
heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix
tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending
the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions
shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree. Another clear and outstanding
indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall
pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the
whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.
This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to
our quotation from Manresa inserted above. Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die
after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die
after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. The foregoing leads us to the
conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from
Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit: 1.
At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was
instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the
will. 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;"
thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving
the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the
estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case
she should die after the testatrix. 3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

50

Ramirez vs. Ramirez

Feb. 15, 1982
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI. The administratrix submitted a project
of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall
go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion"
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the
free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct
in favor of Wanda. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's
usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related
to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil
Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d)
the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is
this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court. The Court held that It may be
useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into
the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are
several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the
fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a fideicommissary substitution.
HELD: NO. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in
their claim that it is void for the following reasons: (a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil
Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted. (b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to
transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners. The appellants claim that the usufruct
over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

M.A.

51

Kilayko et al vs. Tengco

March 27, 1992
Romero, J.
FACTS: The late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a Testamento. Maria Lizares y Alunan died
without any issue leaving said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia
Lizares. Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by the probate court.
Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in
the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate;
adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and every one of them. Eustaquia
filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria
Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion
and correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares
of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or
personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will
and testament. The Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings
and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment
therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants
knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did
they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said order was
erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by
a regular appeal. The joint administrators aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios,
sisters of Maria Lizares, over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had
inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will
on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary
substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under
Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an imposition go substitution in the last will and testament.
HELD: NO. Where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that
the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition
barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.
While the allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will
and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is
also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the
estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as
providing for a vulgar or simple substitution. It should be remembered that when a testator
merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also
designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should
then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it
shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. In this case, the instituted heir,
Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for,
upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under
the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by
operation of the law of intestacy.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

52

Nieva vs. Alcala (Reserva Troncal)

Oct. 17, 1920
Johnson, J.
FACTS: Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Julian Nieva died intestate, and her said son, Alfeo
Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in the complaint. Alfeo Deocampo
died intestate and without issue. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father,
Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein
defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the
parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had
inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father. The plaintiff herein, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of
recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question. The lower court held that, even granting,
without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not
entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the
reserva troncal.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal.
HELD: NO. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in
the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles
807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to
legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938,
which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in
favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession
of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do
not allude directly or indirectly to that provision. The principle which underlies the exception which article 811
creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to
the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which
they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether
the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is
intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants
do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent
marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede
the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants
does article 811 impose the duty to reserve. It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions
on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is
established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor
the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this
article intends to prevent. It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a
legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the
properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation
established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate
family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate
parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural
parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a
barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to
the natural family.
Judgement Affirmed.

M.A.

53

De Papa vs. Camacho

Sept. 24, 1986
Narvasa, J.
FACTS: Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles. Plaintiffs and
defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister
by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. Romana Tioco during
her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs). Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho)
and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal
pro-indiviso shares. Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. Faustino Dizon
died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels
of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the
parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko. Eustacio
Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as
her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims,
upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio
Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. The lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half
of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute.
HELD: NO. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such. Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that
of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate
collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. The reserva troncal merely determines the
group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the
individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate
succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

54

Sumaya vs. IAC

Sept. 21, 1991
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of
this case. Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda.
de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned. Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo sold the property disputed to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The same property was subsequently sold by
Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. Villa Honorio Development Corporation
transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
Also, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in
favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any
annotation of its reservable character. Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. The brothers in full blood
of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of
deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned
civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject
to a reserva troncal in their favor. The court rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos. The
appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto. Petitioners would want this Court to
reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent
purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor
(also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their
family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title
coveting the properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the buyers was in bad faith, having derived their title from a reservable property.
HELD: YES. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of
want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and
useless litigation.
The Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the
Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative
Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties
litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother,
and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul. The purpose of the
notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any, due
protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective. The cause of action of the
reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon
the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in
whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved
property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will
the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree. The
reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the
part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised
within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure
Petition Denied.

M.A.

55

Mendoza vs. delos Santos

March 20, 2013
Reyes, J.
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

FACTS: The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land. Petitioners are grandchildren of
Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children:
Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia,
Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and
Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of
Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to
Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed
that after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties
as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have
been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal. Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as
these did not originate from petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga.
According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos
in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties. The RTC
gction for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties are subject to reserve troncal.
HELD: NO. There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous
title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained
the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree
from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/
brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. A collateral line is that constituted by
the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor. Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the
degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners
are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. They cannot even claim representation of their
predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives
up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came.

M.A.

56

Petition Denied.

Rabadilla vs. CA (Conditional Testamentary Dispositions)

June 29, 2000
Purisima, J.
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee. Pursuant to the same Codicil, a lot was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
a Transfer Certificate of Title thereto issued in Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived
by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla his name. Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, before
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil. The Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision, dismissing the complaint. The CA reversed the decision and ordered the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over the lot, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
ISSUE: Whether or not whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
HELD: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. The petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petition Dismissed.

M.A.

57

Natividad vs. Gabino (Modal Institution)

March 31, 1915
Torres, J.
FACTS: The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in 1868,
leaving a daughter named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913, survived by two
children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador disposed of all his property in
the manner recorded in the will executed in legal form, instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion,
both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In the sixth clause of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy
mentioned therein. Literally, this clause is as follows: I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of
the urban property, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and
designated by No. 520, and in addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on Calle
Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the
said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this house, together with the lot on which it stands,
to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000),
Philippine currency. Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth
clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in favor of Doa Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520 Calle Lavezares,
and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die; but that the
ownership of the property upon which this right and legacy are established belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by
the express will of the testator, had been made liable for these encumbrances. Counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino
opposed the approval of the proposed partition with regard to the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the
property at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the dominion and
ownership of the same. The judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, interpreting the true wishes of the testator,
expressed the opinion that the ownership and dominion of the property mentioned in clause 6 of the will should be
awarded to Basilia Gabino, subject to the reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad.
Therefore the trial court ordered an amendment made to the fourth basis for the proposed partition of the decedent's
estate, presented by the testamentary executor, and, as soon as such be made, a day set for the hearing and approval of
the proposed amended partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of the property.
HELD: NO. In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to Basilia
Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on
condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's
grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter. The condition imposed by the testator in the
double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the
legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition. It cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of
the property because the plain and literal meaning of the words employed by the testator in the said clause sixth clearly
shows beyond all doubt the express wished of the testator who, establishing a voluntary reservation of the ulterior and
final disposition of the bequeathed property, ordered that the legatee's right of dominion should end at her death, and that
on this occurrence his wish was that the ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in
turn delivered said P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee Gabino. IIf the provisions of
article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the testator meant to bequeath to
Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in the said sixth
clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property language which expresses without the
slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in
matters of last wills and testaments the testator's will is the law. It is true that the legatee could not make any
disposal of the bequeathed real property to be effective after her death, nor could the property be acquired from
her by her heir through testate or intestate succession; but if we take into account that the institution of
donations and legacies depends on the full free will of the testator, and that if the testator intended no more than
that Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of the property during her lifetime, this testamentary provisions
is not contrary to law or to public morals, inasmuch as the testator thereby intended that the property should
revert to its lawful heir, the latter being obliged to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who
appears to be the successor of the legatee Gabino.

Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

58

Morente vs. dela Santa (Condition Not To Contract Marriage)

Dec. 19, 1907
Willard, J.
FACTS: The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses: 1. I hereby order that all real estate
which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa. 2, That my said husband shall
not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have
children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part
thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any. 3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which
is one of the properties belonging to me. Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four
months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the
proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked
that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband
to the procedure followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper
and from that holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner,
Elena Morente, appealed. The court denied the petition. The court said, that the husband having married, he
had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to
Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix intended to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained
in the first clauses of the will
HELD: NO. No one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose
the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the
testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the
property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur
such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property
contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, twothirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix. We are bound to construe the will
with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding
circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not say that it was
the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above
mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to
the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will.
Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate children we
do not decide, for no such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not
having arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the husband he
did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

59

Noble vs. Noble (Legitime)

Dec. 17, 1966
Barrera, J.
FACTS: The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by Juan Noble who
was named executor therein and who had expressed willingness to assume the trust. This was opposed by
Maria S. Noble, who claimed to be an illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased, born out of an illicit
relation between the latter and Lucia Sinag. It was alleged that the will sought to be probated, dated August
25, 1957, was not the last will and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; that from all indications as
shown by a perusal of the alleged last will of the deceased, the same was not executed in accordance with
the law, and that the said will was executed through undue influence, mistake and improper pressure on the
part of one or some of the beneficiaries, and that petitioner Juan Noble, as then incumbent Assistant General
Manager of the NAMARCO, a government corporation could not properly execute the trust of his office in the
estate of the deceased, which consists of real and personal properties located in several provinces.
Furthermore, oppositor contended that petitioner has an adverse interest against those immediately
interested in the estate, like her. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present
evidence of her alleged filiation with the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
HELD: YES. There are cogent reasons, both legal and moral, which require that such filiation must be
acknowledged by the presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is all that
need be proved, that construction of the law would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking
advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in a position to deny the allegations,
to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting his character.
The law could not have demanded anything less than proof of an acknowledged filiation. In Paulino vs.
Paulino the court held that: It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have
admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural, child of the deceased Marcos Paulino.
Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to
allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is
essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment
the action becomes one to compel recognition which can not be brought after the death of the
putative father. This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right of a
spurious child to enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and 887 of the new Civil Code.
There being no allegation of her recognition or acknowledgment by the alleged father in the petition
to establish her filiation, the same, therefore, states no cause of action and the dismissal thereof by
the lower court was proper.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

60

Vizconde vs.CA (Collation)

Feb. 11, 1998
Francisco, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela
and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud
Gonzales-Nicolas. Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land. Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes,
Inc., a parcel of land with improvements. The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed, an incident popularly known as the
Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead
of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the
subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters.
Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial
settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner
and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property.
Ramon, through a motion, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the
Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
be collated. The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially
incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael
Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for
support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto
separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent
deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters. The court held that the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in
favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased
out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is
subject to collation. The CA held that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the
Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased
ISSUE: Whether or not there properties left to Lauro Vizconde by his family is collation able property.
HELD: NO. Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the
division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received
from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only
required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The attendant facts
herein do no make a case of collation. Petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is
considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the
said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. Even on the assumption that collation
is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of
the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the
Paraaque property has no statutory basis. Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir in the Paraaque property. Finally, it is futile for the
probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it
should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more
than the value of the Valenzuela property.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

61

Arellano vs. Pascual

Dec. 15, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings. Respondents alleged, inter alia, that
a parcel of land (the donated property), which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to
petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime"
of petitioner. Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court found the Deed of
Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is
subject to collation. The CA held that bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule
on equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject
to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the
circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error
when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.
ISSUE: Whether or not collateral relatives can invoke collation.
HELD: NO. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is
the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation
takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the
free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show
that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived
by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other
compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed
together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving
spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to
any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however,
the donated property is not subject to collation.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

62

Pecson vs. Mediavillo (Disinheritance)

Sept. 29, 1914
Johnson, J.
FACTS: The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on
the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Judge, found that the will had been
signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law. Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following: That the said granddaughter,
Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according
to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her
hand against him; that the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to
the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in
periodical attacks. The lower court held that: This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not
have been disinherited by her grandfather.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid disinheritance.
HELD: NO. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the
person disinherited. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she
had received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said
young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown
to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that
very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them,
except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender
years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the
conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her
grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.

M.A.

63

Dy Tieng Seangio vs. Judge Amor Reyes

Nov. 27, 2006
Azcuna, J.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in
the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not
meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally
the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the
will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. The lower court
dismissed the probate proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
HELD: NO. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and
while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition
of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

64

Rodriguez vs. Borja (Concept of Intestate Succession)

June 21, 1966
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963,
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel
filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the
Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners
filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate;
and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the
probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez
was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from
the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other
hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon
delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore
has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. The Court of First Instance denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference
over the other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix
the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices.
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
1. If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
2. When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator.
In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the
testator has not disposed;
3. If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled,
or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution,
and no right of accretion takes place;
4. When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code.
As ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution
of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez is pending.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

65

delos Santos vs. dela Cruz (Right of Representation)

Feb. 22, 1971
Villamor, J.
FACTS: Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz,
alleging, among others, that she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial
partition agreement over a certain portion of land. The defendant admitted the due execution of the
extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not
an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition
agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless
the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The court
a quo held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from
raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide
by the terms of the agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the decedent.
HELD: NO. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the
latter by right of representation. ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. Much less could plaintiffappellee inherit in her own right. ART. 962.In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. In an intestate
succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the
latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of
representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have
been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
Judgement Reversed.

M.A.

66

Sayson vs. CA (Descending Direct Line)

Jan. 23, 1992
Cruz, J.
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel
Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a
complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in a Civil Case, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled
to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. Judge Rafael P. Santelices
declared: that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue
of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her
birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno
and Rafaela by right of representation. Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate. The CA consolidated and affirmed both decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
HELD: NO. On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by
the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is
one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. The evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate
estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct,
however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents'
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

67

Spouses Zaragosa vs. CA

Sept. 29, 2000
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria,
Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and
was survived by his four children. Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share. She
further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children.
The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without
valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of
deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was
prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal
deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime. The RTC
found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales;
that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his properties among his
children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent. The CA
reversed the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and
Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943.
ISSUE: Whether or not the simulated deeds of sale is equivalent to a donation.
HELD: YES. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It
is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are
not prejudiced.
Collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only
impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to
the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful
determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the
fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the
real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the Court decided that the
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security
in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The
issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

68

Pedrosa vs. CA
March 5, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: The spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of
Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. The CFI granted the
petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. Miguel died intestate.
Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private respondents filed an action to annul the
adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as
defendants. The CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. While said appeal was
pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition
of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein. Petitioner sent her daughter,
Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that
Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina.
HELD: YES. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private
respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even
filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the
adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The
complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of
adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive
parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that
private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

69

de Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon

Oct. 2, 2001
Vitug, J.
FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the
former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan
G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and
Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of
the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. The lower court decreed that the declaration of heirship could only
be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
ISSUE: Whether or not recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic
writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
HELD: YES. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance.
This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

70

Adlawan vs. Adlawan

Jan. 20, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS: The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over a lot and the house built thereon,
registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who died without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon. Out of
respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the
subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in
January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed
instead an action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC. Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively, denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and
stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth. They alleged
that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the
ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The
spouses had nine children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and
Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property.
Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.
Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226. The MTC dismissed the
complaint holding that the establishment of petitioners filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador
are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. It added that since Dominador
was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their
share in Lot 7226. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of Dominador over Lot
7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted
lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The Court of Appeals
set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and
the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the
property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
HELD: NO. A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper. In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over
the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such
co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters
siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties.
The respondent failed to comply with the rule. Because petitioners action operates as a complete repudiation
of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint
is therefore proper.
Indeed, respondents not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house
and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite
personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now
in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral property where their parents and
siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

71

Santos vs. Alana

Aug. 16, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-blood siblings both
asserting their claim over a lot. It was registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos. Gregorio
donated the lot to petitioner which the latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation (Pagsasalin
ng Karapatan at Pag-aari) was annotated on Gregorios title. On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to
petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute Sale. Constancia Santos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 15, a complaint for partition and reconveyance against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime,
her father Gregorio denied having sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that
the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. In his answer, petitioner countered that
respondents suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in possession of
the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence,
respondent can no longer claim her legitime. The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any
other property, the donation to petitioner is inofficious because it impaired respondents legitime. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not prescription should be reckoned from the death of the descendent.
HELD: YES. The validity of the Deed of Donation was never assailed by the defendant. In fact, it was
impliedly recognized as valid by defendant by registering the same to the Registry of Deeds. It has been
undisputedly shown that the subject property was the only property of the deceased Gregorio Santos at the
time of his death on March 10, 1986 (Exhibit K, Original Record, p. 163); and that he made no reservation for
the legitime of the plaintiff-appellee, his daughter (See paragraph 2, Complaint and paragraph 2, Answer,
Ibid., at pp 1 and 12) and compulsory heir. Clearly, the rule on officiousness applies. The ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article
771 of the Civil Code,[8] to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so,
since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

72

Montero vs. Septimo

Mar. 11, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: On August 12, 1943, Jose Balilo died intestate. Sometime in 1948, Niniana Balilo, the sister of Jose
Balilo, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga, for the guardianship of the property
and the person of Jovencio Balilo whom she alleged to be the son of her brother, Jose Balilo; hence, her
nephew. Niniana executed the deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of Jose Septimo who,
thereafter, declared the property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes thereon. Jose
Septimo failed to register the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and, consequently, to secure a
torrens title over the property in his name. Jovencio Balilo filed a complaint against Jose Septimo in the CFI
of Occidental Mindoro, to compel the latter to resell the property to him. Jovencio alleged therein that he was
the only legitimate child of the spouses Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, and that the latter died on August
30, 1946. The CFI ruled that Jovencio had no right to repurchase the property, the five-year period under
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 having long expired. Jovencio failed to appeal the decision. The
CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The CA applied the Old Civil Code on testate
succession, and ruled that the property was registered in the name of Jose Balilo whose civil status was
stated as single.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the law on testate succession under the Old Civil Code is
correct.
HELD: YES. The appellate court should have applied the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate
succession considering that Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943, before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code.
When Jose Balilo died intestate on August 12, 1943, he was survived by his daughter, the petitioner herein,
his son Jovencio Balilo, and Gertrudes Nicdao and Juana Villarama. Conformably to Article 939 of the Old
Civil Code, only the petitioner and Jovencio Balilo inherited the property in equal shares, to the exclusion of
Juana Villarama and Gertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was the lawful wife of Jose Balilo. Besides, under
Article 946 of the Old Civil Code, the surviving spouse shall inherit only in default of the persons enumerated
in the three sections next preceding.
When Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian Niniana Balilo, executed the deed of absolute sale over the
entire property on May 26, 1948 in favor of Jose Septimo, the latter did not acquire title over the entire
property, but only to an undivided one-half portion thereof which Jovencio Balilo had inherited from Jose
Balilo. Jose Septimo could not have purchased and acquired the other half of the property from Jovencio
Balilo because the latter was not the owner thereof. Hence, the CA erred in holding that Jovencio Balilo
inherited an undivided two-thirds portion of the property, and that Jose Septimo acquired title over the said
two-thirds undivided portion.
Petition Granted.

M.A.

73

Bagunu vs. Piedad

Dec. 8, 2000
Vitug, J.
FACTS: Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in a Special Proceedings entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the RTC. Asserting entitlement to
a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial
court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted
with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal
notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the
administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the
Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on
appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all
appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree.
HELD: NO. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a
first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The rule on proximity is a concept
that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

74

Fernandez vs. Fernandez

Aug. 28, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: In 1981, when Policarpo was already 74 years old, the task of working on the tenanted land fell on
his son, respondent Siegfredo, who was the only member of the household then living with Policarpo. For
close to 15 years and even while his father was still alive, Siegfredo cultivated the land, harvested the
coconuts, and sold the copra to buyers in Tangub City. During those years, the pesadas were placed in
Siegfredos name and the latter observed the same 1/3-2/3 sharing arrangement of the copra produce with
the landowners, as his father previously did. After Policarpo passed away on August 31, 1995, the Felizardos
and Adalidschildren of the landowners and acting as attorneys-in-fact of the Adalids who were then already
residing in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A sought to eject Siegfredo from the land he was tilling. The
Felizardos refused to recognize Siegfredo as the lawful successor to Policarpos tenancy rights and instead,
appointed Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, Siegfredos 65-year old elder sister, as tenant. Siegfredo then filed
this present case before the Regional Adjudication Board (Region 10) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) against the Adalids and Felizardos. Siegfredo alleged that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he
is the lawful tenant of the land. He pointed out that he substituted his father and assumed cultivation of the
land for 15 long years without objection from the landowners. Therefore, he became a bona fide tenant and
could not be ejected because he is the lawful tenant.
ISSUE: Whether or not Siegfredo succeeded to his fathers tenancy.
HELD: YES. While it is true that Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landowner the right to choose a
tenant successor in case of death or incapacity of the original tenant, in this case we agree that said right
could no longer be exercised by petitioners. Not only have they allowed the lapse of a long period of time
before attempting to exercise said right, it was also found that the successor they had allegedly chosen,
Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, was not qualified to succeed Policarpo because (a) she was no longer a
member of the latters immediate farm household; and (b) she could not and did not, at any time, personally
cultivate the land as shown by her unexplained absence during the harvests subsequent to respondents
dispossession. Note also that in 1995, she was already 65 years old. In the present case, allowing
petitioners to dispossess respondent would clearly prejudice the tiller, who poured time and energy to ensure
that his fathers leasehold remained productive not merely for respondents advantage, but for petitioners as
well. For almost 15 years, petitioners did not object to respondents farm work which accrued to their own
benefit. It would thus be utterly unfair for petitioners now to eject respondent from the land he has been tilling
for 15 years, simply because of petitioners choice of respondents sister, Asuncion, as Policarpos successor.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

75

Abellana Bocayo vs. Borromeo

Aug. 31, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila.
She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22,
1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her
whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known
to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing
her estate among her heirs. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant,
or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and
half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood,
Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will
the former be excluded by the latter.
HELD: YES. The trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in
connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction
of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship.
Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long
as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

76

GSIS vs. Custodio

Jan. 27, 1969
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Proceedings were initiated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, by the Government Service
Insurance System by a complaint in interpleader for the determination of who, among the several
defendants, is entitled to the retirement benefits, in the amount of P8,339.36, that fell due to a deceased
member of the System, one Simeon Custodio. Defendant-cross-claimant-appellee Susana Custodio, a
surviving sister of the decedent and the aunt of the other defendants, claims to be the sole beneficiary
thereof; but her nephews and nieces contest her recognition as such and claim to be entitled to share in the
proceeds by right of representation of their deceased fathers, who are three (3) brothers of the late Simeon.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of appellee Susana Custodio, holding that her designation as
beneficiary in the unsigned application form for retirement benefits, which was not filed with the Government
Service Insurance System prior to the death of the employee, as required by regulations, was invalid; but
that, nonetheless, she is entitled to the retirement benefit to the exclusion of the appellants nephews and
nieces because the latter had recognized her as sole beneficiary in the deed of extrajudicial settlement,
which is to be presumed regular in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake attending its execution.
Finding no question of fact involved in the case, but only questions of law, said appellate court certified the
appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Susana Custodio is entitled to the benefit given the weight of the extrajudicial
settlement.
HELD: YES. We affirm the action taken by the Court of Appeals in certifying the appeal to us. Even if the
five (5) circumstances stated by the appellant be held to be indicative of fraud or mistake, and
infirming the deed of extrajudicial settlement, the stark fact is that the existence of fraud or mistake
was not stipulated (Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil. 526). Appellants' raising the issue of fraud or
mistake without having specifically stipulated or pleaded the same, constitutes and unfair surprise upon their
adversary, besides being in violation of the rule that fraud be specifically pleaded (Rule 9, Section 9, Rules of
Court). Therefore, this plea of fraud or error is not allowable, being deemed waived by the lack of proper
averment.
At any rate, the circumstances now stressed by the heirs who have actually signed the deed of partition, and
who have been allocated properties therein, fall short of evidencing fraud or mistake. The failure to secure
the signatures of Luisa, David, and Macario Custodio could not have escaped their co-heirs, now appellants,
and it is unfair to lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The intervention of Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law,
is without particular significance, since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was the deed notarized by him.
As to the appellants' having repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving act, more indicative of a
belated intention to squirm out of a disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it with open eyes, which
is no ground for setting the same aside (Noble vs. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1). Certainly, it should take much
weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument (cf. Mendezona vs. Phil. Sugar Estates, 41 Phil. 493; Bank
of the Phil. Is. vs. Fidelity Surety Co., 51 Phil. 57).
Judgment Affirmed.

M.A.

77

Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximo Briones

March 10, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died
on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate. The CFI would
subsequently issue an Order, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. Donata
died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the
RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda
claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land. Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed
a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially
granted by the RTC. The RTC ruled in favour of Maximino. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Maximino left no will at the time of his death, on 1 May 1952, and his estate was to be settled in accordance
with the rules on legal or intestate succession. The heirs of Maximino, respondents in the Petition at bar,
claimed the right to inherit, together with Donata, from the estate of Maximino, based on the Articles 995 and
1001 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to question the transfer to the name of the late Donata Ortiz
Briones the titles of the said lots any action of that effect has definitely prescribed for more than 30 years
have already occurred when the titles to said lots were transferred to the name of the late Donata Ortiz
Briones.
HELD: NO. The proceeding for probate is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all
persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any
order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.
A co-owner may not acquire exclusive ownership of common property thru prescription.
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her
name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino
under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not
through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate
of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased
husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
same should have been dismissed.
Decision Reversed.

M.A.

78

Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximo Briones

Feb. 5, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving sister,
Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and
nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed away. Respondents, on the
other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces,
and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino. Maximino was
married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance
(CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued
Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximinos estate. In summary, the SC
held that the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her
name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino
under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not
through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate
of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased
husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
same should have been dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can raise prescription.
HELD: NO. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would
impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain
respondents contention that their right to recover their shares in Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is
already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to
prescription and laches.
Other than prescription of action, respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based
on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting
a claim to be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is
statutory; laches is equitable.
MR Denied.

M.A.

79

Diaz vs. IAC (The Iron Barrier)

June 17, 1987
Paras, J.
FACTS: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother
Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa. Judge Jose Raval in his Order declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further
taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well
as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The CA reversed the decision and held that the petitioner as the
sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
ISSUE: Whether or not the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin
or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero).
HELD: Her niece. Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Article 992 of the New Civil
Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
Petition Dismissed.

M.A.

80

Cacho vs. Uldan

April 30, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: One Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported
will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the CFI. After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John
G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix
was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of
their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan.
HELD: NO. We find that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death
Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is
clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines. These legal provisions
decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or
widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children,
legitimate or illegitimate. The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the
situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at
law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided
by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

81

dela Merced vs. dela Merced

Feb. 25, 1999
Purisima, J.
FACTS: Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land. At the time of
her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate
brother ; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister
who died in 1943) ; and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of
Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all
surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza. The three sets of heirs of the
decedent, Evarista M. dela Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P.
Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial settlement, entitled
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced adjudicating the properties of
Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso. Private respondent Joselito P. Dela
Merced , illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order, alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully
aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito prayed
that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate
of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. The trial court dismissed the petition, lifted
the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of
title covering the real properties of the deceased Evarista. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court of origin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the iron barrier applies.
HELD: NO. Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a situation
where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is
prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child
inherits from his father, the latters share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the
deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article
777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of
the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his
spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his
(Franciscos) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of
Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the
latters share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

82

Arbolario vs. Colinco

April 22, 2003
Panganiban, J.
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is
presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a
presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be
convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
FACTS: The original owners of the controverted lot are now dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was
survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and [respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco
predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth of
only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Records disclose
moreover that decedent Purificacions father, Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of
Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario
Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as Arbolarios). It is
significant to note, at this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners] were born well before the year 1951.
The Colincos filed a Civil Case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to
recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses. The RTC ruled in
favor of the Arbolarios. The CA rejected the contention of petitioners that the cohabitation of their father with
their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid marriage. The appellate court observed that
the Arbolarios had all been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of
Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal union
with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in
1951 when Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister
Purificacion Arbolario.
HELD: YES. In the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina
Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas,
it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios]
was extra-marital. And consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan Arbolario.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New Civil Code);
and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior
marriage or the separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or her
allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the x x x Arbolarios, claiming to be born
under a validly contracted subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this, they have
miserably failed to do.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

83

In Re: Intestate Estate of Josefa Delgado and Guillerma Rustia

Jan. 27, 2006
Corona, J.
FACTS: The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the
alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,his nephews and nieces, his
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. The question of whether Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives. Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of
the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. Guillermo Rustia proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. The oppositors (respondents here), on
the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired.
They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie
Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia. With the further modification of the CA, the assailed decision was
RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married;
2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred
to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S.
Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the children considered as ampun-ampunan are legal heirs.
HELD: NO. Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof
that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo
Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that
he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado, more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth
of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should
be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons.
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all,
but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
by the person claiming its existence.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

84

Santillon vs. Miranda (Surviving Spouse)

June 30, 1965
Bengzon, C.J.,
FACTS: Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son,
Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land
located in that province. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the
spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties
enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed
to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed
3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses
Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta
Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate. The court held that in the
intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall
inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty.
Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal
properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a
provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as
in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular child."
HELD: NO. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article
applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as
having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one
legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes
as follows: One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half
goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule
in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is
applicable in this case.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

85

Verdad vs. CA
April 29, 1996
Vitug, J.
FACTS: The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot
(identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along Magallanes Street, now
Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to
exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late
Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956. During her lifetime,
Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the
latters death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the
first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales,
Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who
himself, some time after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue. In an instrument, dated
14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and
children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed
lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. The trial court handed down its decision holding, in fine,
that private respondents right to redeem the property had already lapsed. The CA reversed,
declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Article
1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share.
HELD: YES. We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter,
a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorros right
to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macarias estate but that
she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mothers inheritance. The thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private
respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of David
Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.
Socorros right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macarias estate
but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mothers inheritance. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria
died her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon
became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which
included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow
Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession. Socorro and herein private
respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the
property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of
redemption arose in favor of private respondents. This right of redemption was timely exercised by
private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs
(vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. The thirty-day period of
redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of
redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial
court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice
from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

86

Armas vs. Calisterio

April 6, 2000
Vitug, J.
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William
Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11
February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958,
without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia,
the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta stated
that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second
marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in
the administration of the estate of the decedent. The trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively,
of the intestate estate of Teodorico. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary
as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
HELD: YES. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the
explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The
prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two
years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in the FC.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she
entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second
marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

87

Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso

March 8, 2001
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses
Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other
hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with
whom he begot seven (7) children. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the
certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them
on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued
TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. Aida filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.
The lower court upheld the sale. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate
children.
HELD: NO. We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash
for the land. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land
involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her
share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only
legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate
or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of
her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
Petition Denied.

M.A.

88

City of Manila vs. Archbishop

Aug. 30, 1917
Johnson, J.
FACTS: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 15th
day of February, 1913. Its purpose was to have declared escheated to the city of Manila certain
property situated in and around said city; that said property consists of five parcels of land located
ion the districts of Malate and Paco of the city of Manila, as shown in a plan, in the office of the
Department of Engineering and Public Works of said city of Manila, No. B-10-27. The theory of the
plaintiff is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without
leaving "her or person entitled to the same. The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die
intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as
well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without
persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a
person by law entitled to inherit her property. In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question
cannot be declared escheated as of the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property
may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana
Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property should be escheated in favor of the government.
HELD: NO. The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition
shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its
terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the
record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit
of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original owner.
Decision Affirmed.

M.A.

89

Republic vs. Guzman

Feb. 18, 2000
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon
Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968
Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of
land located in Bulacan. Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the
estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds. Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her
son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to
have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another document, a
Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying
the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines. David executed a Special
Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject
of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen. Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the
Solicitor General and furnished it with documents showing that Davids ownership of the one-half
(1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half
(1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. David
maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way of
donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helens intention to renounce her share in
the property and not an intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there was indeed a
donation, it never took effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed does not indicate
acceptance of the alleged donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other half of Davids claim should be escheated.
HELD: NO. There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to
do an act of liberality or animus donandi. Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable
property are present in the instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of
Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helens intention to perform an
act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in
the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a
waiver and renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of
quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the
lands in favor of David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further
supported by her deposition which indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of
land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement. It appears that
foremost in Helens mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon
from where they originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her
renunciation. The element of animus donandi therefore was missing. Likewise, the two (2) deeds
of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a public document but they
lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to make the
donation valid. The Special Power of Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property
referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation,
expressly or impliedly, that Davids acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helens possible
donation to him and we cannot look beyond the language of the document to make a contrary
construction as this would be inconsistent with the parol evidence rule.

M.A.

90

Decision Affirmed.
Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Rigor (Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy)
April 30, 1979
Aquino, J.
FACTS: The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to
this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court
declaring that the said devise was inoperative. Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died, leaving a will which was probated by the CFI in its order. Named as devisees in the will were
the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina RigorManaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda. The administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix
and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending. About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954,
the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor),
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof
be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new
administrator was appointed. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying
that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said
ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the
testator "has ever studied for the priesthood. That petition was opposed by the parish priest of
Victoria.Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order on the
ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first
cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The
administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. The CA
reversed the order, holding that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years
because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bequest inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male
relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust.
HELD: YES. The said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper. The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or
reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative
at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the
wilt was likewise inoperative. It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could
become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case
because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became
a priest.

-end-

M.A.

91