Statutory Construction Ch7 AIDS Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases
G.R. No. L-26100

February 28, 1969
CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act
931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose
reopening. The three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year
period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as
lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211,
Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the
land here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in
that case on November 13, 1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to
the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his
predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots without
personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within the
statutory period.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz
registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of
Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for
14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the case because
of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of
Baguio] which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not bind
them, for they were not parties to that action.
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the
witnesses of respondent Lutes.
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On
October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider was
rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was
adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil
Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964,
private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss
made by private petitioners.
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
1
preliminary injunction. They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's
order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
upon a P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not bound by
the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no
right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us. On
August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.
The title of the Act reads

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 thereof provides
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at
the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file
their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
within five years 2 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial
proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with
respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance,
upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the
parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes,
interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day
when the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on
3
such parcels.
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were
"foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land Registration
4
Act, "apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ...
nevertheless ... the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all
5
subordinate to, the rights of the Government." The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be
predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon
the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically
dependent upon it."
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different
footing. It involves a special statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"
or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made to
cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
6
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." The lessee's right is thus impliedly
recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva.
So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer
prosper.
This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed was
opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued by the government.
We struck down the petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by the
government to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But
we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of
7
Lands can here properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be
left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by
the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this
situation should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to
R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when we take stock of their
averment that they have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that lesseesinsofar as R.A. 931
8
is concerned, come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, may intervene in an action. For, they
9
are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties." In the event herein
private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it is
sufficient that it be proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond
10
the reach of a petition for reopening.
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruled
on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases on the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and
petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court.
We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene in
and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have been published in
accordance with the Cadastral Act.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving
exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In

sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was already embraced
in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired
jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break away from
such conclusion.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite
Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue
with respondent Lutes on this point of fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in
this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings
upon the application of respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was
rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain
conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1,
speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming
inconsistency between title and body.
It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been made hero or
in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the
title thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts
11
unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." At any rate it cannot be seriously disputed that
the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.
This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.
Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of
construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a
moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation
12
is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." In varying language, "the,
13
purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." They "are only valuable when
14
15
they subserve this purpose." In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." A statute "should
16
be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." By this, we do not
17
"correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent.
18
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law or where exact or
19
literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, the title thereof may be resorted to in the
ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or
20
clue or guide to legislative intention. This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutional
precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
21
the bill." In such case, courts "are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at
22
the legislative intention."
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take another look at the title of
R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT."
23
Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. It expresses in language clear the very
substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid from which surfaces a seeming
inconsistency between the title and the body attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That
prior law used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the
legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a chance to do so in the
reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it
did not.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself,
24
and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation." The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute
must be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact of
25
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the
title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a formal
26
part." These considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional
27
28
debate in the House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, and in the Senate.
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedings
of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be

29
classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature speaking." Accordingly, it is not hard
to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" was but
inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In
line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions
30
expressed in the body. At the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in
equal importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must give to the statute does not
need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted that remedial
31
legislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction. And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A.
931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal
means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads:
This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land which
has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to present his claim
within the time prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity to
answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of
sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said
persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with meritorious claims
or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants
their day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for
legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by
legislation.
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace
those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to
reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.nt
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963,
November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to
admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part..

G.R. No. L-16197
March 12, 1920
CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation, petitioner,
vs.
ANA RAMIREZ, respondent.
Williams and Ferrier for petitioner.
Cohn, Fisher and Dewit for respondent.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation and application of the intent,
purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects
agricultural lands, privately owned.
The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands
which are privately owned.
There is not dispute about the facts. They are admitted. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1,
1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in remand recorded in the Registry of
Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all future owners of the same. In the interim the
execution of said contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's property, said Act No. 2874 became
effective. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto,
bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned by
persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land which is held and owned by the
respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.
The defendant answered the petition. To the defendant's answer the petitioner demurred. From an examination of the
petition, the answer and the demurrer, it appears that the real issue presented is, whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited in
its application to agricultural lands of the public domain, or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held in
private ownership.
Inasmuch as the wording of certain sections of said Act (secs. 23, 24, 121 and 122) give rise to a possible construction that
private lands are included within its terms, and inasmuch as said Act specifically provides that any land coming within its
purview cannot be encumbered, alienated or transferred to corporations in which at least 61 per cent of the capital stock does
not belong wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, the respondent, while not desiring to evade her
contract, fears to assume the risk of giving effect to her said contract in view of the drastic penalty prescribed, should her
action prove unlawful. The penalty provided in section 122 of said Act includes not only a nullity of the contract but also a
reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government.
On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued, first, that the intent of the Legislature, gathered from a reading of Act No. 2874 in its
entirety, is to provide simply for the sale, lease and other disposition of lands of the public domain; that lands held in private
ownership are not affected thereby; and, second, that even had the Legislature intended to include private as well as public
land within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitledsuch attempt would be in direct violation of
section three of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little question but that it was intended to apply to and regulate the sale, lease
and other disposition of public lands only. The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend
and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes." Section one of such act provides: "That
short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act.' " Section two, wherein the purpose of the Act is expressly stated, reads: "
The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain." Section three provides:
While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the Director of
Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the provisions of the Act," were intended to exercise
authority and control over the sale or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership.
To the same effect are sections four, five, and eighty-seven of the Act, wherein executive control is vested in the Director of
Lands with respect to the survey, appraisal, classification, etc., of lands of the public domain, with authority to prepare rules
and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, and to receive all applications filed pursuant thereto, etc.
Sections 105 contains another indication that said Act does not apply to privately owned agricultural lands. Said section
provides: "All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act . . . shall issue in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources." The Legislature certainly did not intend that all sales, leases, etc. of privately owned agricultural lands should
hereafter be "issued in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General," etc.
Section 23, after describing the persons and corporations authorized to purchase any tract of public agricultural
lands "disposable under this Act," proceeds:

Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right
to acquire public lands as to their own citizens, may, while such laws are in force, but not thereafter . . .
purchase any parcel of agricultural land . . . available under this Act.
In other words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the right to acquire "public
lands," in order that their citizens may have the right to acquire any land available under this Act. This provision would be
altogether anomalous had it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in private ownership.
Referring again to section two of said Act, we find the following:
That nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the government and
disposition of the lands commonly known as "friar lands" and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or
become the property of the Philippine Government, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the
laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted by the Legislature.
The purpose of said provision is obvious. Inasmuch as these friar estates and other real property purchased or owned by the
Government are subject to its control and disposition equally with lands of the public domain, it could be reasonably argued
that they should be subject to and governed by the laws applicable to public lands. Through the insertion of the provision
above quoted, however, this construction of the Act is avoided. If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply to
lands privately owned by the Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act applicable
to lands held in private ownership by individuals.
The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The doubts of
defendant in that regard are caused by inferences drawn from the language used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first
paragraph of section 24 provides:
No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or ownagricultural public
land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the
time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any
real right on such land and improvement.
Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents come question as to the character of land sought to be included
therein. This doubt is dispelled, however, when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same chapter.
Chapter five, in which section 24 is found, deals with "Sales," and section 25 thereof specifically provides that: "Lands sold
under the provisions of this chapter must be appraised in accordance with section 114 of this Act." Section 114 confers
authority upon the Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to appraise
lands or improvements subject to concession or disposition under the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch as the Legislature
cannot vest authority in the Director of Lands to "appraise" or "sell" lands held in private ownership, it is not presumed it was
the intention to include private lands in the Act or subject them in the manner indicated to any such authority. The same
observations and the same conclusions apply to section 121 of the Act, where much the same language is used as found in
section 24 above quoted.
Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is clear they cannot prevail against the
general intent of the Act, derived not only from the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its
provisions. (See secs. 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, and 115.)
We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of
the public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby.
Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it would not affect the final outcome of the case.
Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of private
ownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore, null and void.
It is provided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916): "That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Identical provisions to the above are contained in most of the State Constitutions, and have been repeatedly construed. In the
States of Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, identical provisions are found in the Constitution.
The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied thereby, are clearly stated by Surtherland in his
valuable work on Statutory Construction. In Section 111 he says that:
In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the correction
of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative
bodies where no such restrictions existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to
each other or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention.
Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the
legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to
the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with
a title appropriate to the first section, "and for other purposes."
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in
members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved; and not only were

legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were steadily pushed through in the closing
hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion
and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is
intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each
act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed
in the title.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as follows citing and
quoting from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; p. 143:
The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known.
Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring them to be
read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if real character had been disclosed, would not have
commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was
intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject
or contents.
An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such
things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus
often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr.
Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may therefore be
assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or
otherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.)
To the same effect, in the case of Lindsay vs. U. S. Say. & Loan Ass'n. (120 Ala., 156 [42 L. R. A., N. S., 783]), the court
said:
The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind when it becomes necessary to
determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley is
accepted, we believe, in all the states in which alike limitation prevails. (Then follows quotation from Cooley, supra.)
In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) where, in the body of an act, provision was made for something not included in
the title, the Supreme Court of California said:
At least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title, and
they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the act.
It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the
Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. 'The
practice,' says the Supreme Court of Missouri, 'of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antogonistic nature,
in order to combine in their support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which could
command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself,
but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious
practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodies
of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their
passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a
constitutional provision.' (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) This provision has been framed in the constitutions
of may of the States of the Union; and courts, whenever it has come before the, have liberally construed it as the will
of the people in the interests of honest legislation.
The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, section 112, states the rule correctly as follows:
The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends on
judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential
to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might
be expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional
injunction if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them and only directory. It would in a general sense be a
dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the
mere will or pleasure of the legislature unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers
of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends
to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this:
That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the
legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn.], 504) Nicholson, C. J., referring to the provision that "No bill shall become
a law which embraces more than one subject," said:

This is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the legislature. It matters not that a bill has
passed through three readings in each house on three different days and has received the approval of the governor,
still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) supra, the court said:
It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable that this provision of the
constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and
it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it.
Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that our courts have held, without exception,
that such constitutional provision is mandatory.
As heretofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here under constructions, reads: "An Act to amend and compile laws relative to
lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."
In our interpretation of said Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent.
Under all the authorities wherein the requirement "That no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill" has been considered, the words "and for other purposes" when found in the title, have
been held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act.
Upon this point, Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 173 - 173, states as follows:
One thing, however, is very plain: That the use of the words "other purposes," which has heretofore been so common
in the title to acts, with a view to cover any and everything whether connect with the main purpose indicated by the
title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New
York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: "The words "for other
purposes" must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with this
constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid."
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 122 says:
The phrase "and for other purposes" expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different from
that which precedes it in the title. It is, therefore, universally rejected as having no force or effect wherever this
constitutional restriction operates. (Citing numerous cases).
In the case of Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269), an Act was construed by the court reading: "An Act to provide for the
preservation of the Muskegon river improvements, and for other purposes." Cooley, C. J., who wrote the opinion, said:
The Constitution (of Michigan) provides that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title. We have heretofore had occasion to consider this section, and have said of it that it ought to be construed
reasonably and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation. But the only object
mentioned in the title of this Act is the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvements, for which purpose the act
authorizes tools to be levied and expended.
The payment of Beard's claim is in no way connected with this object and the title to the act would apprise neither the
legislature nor the public that it covered provisions under which a large sum was to be collected and disbursed to pay
for the original construction of the work. The words "other purposes" in the title can have no force whatever under the
constitutional provision which has been quoted.
In the case of Board of Education vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232) the title of the Act under consideration read: "An Act to establish a
permanent Board of Education for the City of Americus and to incorporate the same, and for other purposes." The State
constitution prohibited any law which referred to more than one subject, or contained matter different from that expressed in
the title of the act. The court said:
Does this not close the door to any force and effect being given the words "for other purposes?" If these words were
once necessary to permit the introduction of matter in the bill, different from what was expressed in the order portion
of the title, would not that every thing show now that the bill would thereby become obnoxious to the other clause
prohibiting more than one subject matter? The necessity of such words under the provision as it formerly stood to
prevent the bill from containing matter different from the title could only arise because such matter is something
different from what had already been expressed. It shows that something more than one subject-matter is intended. If
so, although it was allowed under the clause as it was formerly, it cannot now be done.
Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the addition of the words "and for other
purposes," contained in its title, can only be explained on the theory that something different was to be included therein from
that previously expressed, i. e., "lands of the public domain."
Another case where the same conclusion is forcibly expressed is that of Spier vs. Baker, (120 Ca., 370). There the court
construed an Act reading: "An Act providing for general primary elections within the State of California and to promote the
purity thereof by regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privileges of free suffrage thereat, by prohibiting certain
acts and practices in relation thereto, and providing for the punishment thereof, and for other purposes." the California State
Constitution provides: "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any subject shall
be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not
be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said:
Let us test the title of this act in the crucible furnished by the foregoing provision of the constitution. The legislature, in
framing this title, was above all things candid. Upon its very face the law-making power challenged the sound policy
of this provision of the constitution, and avowedly disregarding it, declared that the purpose of the act was the

creation of a primary election law and "other purposes." Under the cloak of "other purposes," all and every
conceivable kind of legislation could hide and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision be set
at naught. In this state, when these words "for other purposes" are found in the title of an act of the state legislature
they accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to them. We then have before us, tested by its
title, an act dealing solely with general primary elections, and providing penalties for violating the law relating thereto.
Any matters of legislation contained in the body of the act not bearing upon primary elections must go out; the
constitutional provision quoted so declares. Weighing and measuring the legislation found in the act by this test, very
many provisions have no place there. It would seem that the legislature, in using the words "for other purposes" in
the title, used those words advisedly, and in good faith lived up to them fully. For the legislation found in section after
section of the act can find no justification in its title, save under these words of boundless meaning, "for other
purposes."
The court, after referring to various matters included in the bill but not specified in the title, said:
Many of these things are totally foreign to any question relating to primary elections, and others are so remotely
connected with that subject as to clearly come within the prohibition of the constitutional provision. These matters of
legislation, not being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the ground.
Applying the doctrine of the above cases to the Act before us for interpretation, its title must be considered and treated as
though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain."
Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership, under fee title, constitute no part of "the
public domain." they cannot come within the purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled.
The words "public land" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale or other disposal under
general laws.
In the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498 [10 L. ed., 264]) the court, in dealing with the matter of public lands, stated:
Whensoever a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose, from that moment the land
thus appropriated becomes severed from the mass of public lands; and no subsequent law, or proclamation, or sale,
would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it, although no reservation were made of it.
The above case is quoted and applied in the case of United States vs. Blendoner (122 Feb. Rep., 703, 708). In U.
S. vs. Garreston (42 Feb., 22), the court said:
Such lands comprise the general public domain; unappropriated lands; lands not held back or reserved for any
special governmental or public purpose.
In the case of Yakima County vs. Tuller (3 Wash., T., 393), the court said that the term "public lands" in a grant of public
lands for roads, etc., shall be construed to mean strictly public lands, such as are open to entry and settlement, and not those
in which the rights of the public have passed and which have become subject to some individual right of a settler.
In the case of Bardon vs. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. (145 U. S., 535), the court said:
. . . It has long been settled . . . that all land to which any claims or rights of others have attached does not fall within
the designation of public lands.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, in a very elucidated opinion in which the Attorney-General of the United
States agreed, held that "friar lands" purchased by the Insular Government formed no part of the "public domain" and were
not affected by nor subject to the restrictions of the Act relating to public lands.
Section 2 of the Act before us exempts not only "friar lands" from its operation but also all lands which have reverted to, or
become the property of, the Philippine Government.
It is clearly evident, therefore, that under no possible construction of the law can the words "lands of the public domain," used
in the title of Act No. 2874, be held to include, or be authorized to include, lands held in freehold. While this is true generally,
it is peculiarly applicable to lands held and owned under Torrens title as are the lands of the defendant herein in which
all interest of the Government is expressly eliminated. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496) provides that such
registered title "shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may
concern.' "
The judicial department of the government hesitates to pronounce invalid the Acts of the legislative department, and will not
do so until and unless it is shown that the same exceed the authority conferred upon said department or contravene some
express or necessarily implied provision of the Organic Law of the state. (Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250;
U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs. Pearanda, 37 Phil., 155.)
In the interpretation and construction of statutes the court should give them the meaning and effect which the legislature
intended, unless that meaning and effect is in conflict with the organic law of the land. The question of the validity of the
statutes is first determined by the legislative department of the government, and the courts will resolved every presumption in
its favor. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is within the constitutional powers of the legislature, it will be
sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers a subject not authorized by
the fundamental laws of the state, or by the constitution, then the courts are not only authorized but are justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficent such legislation may seem to be. The courts are
not justified in measuring their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department of the government, as expressed in
statutes, upon the question of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. The courts have no right to dictate what

law shall be adopted by the legislative department of the government, so long as a well defined public policy or an organic act
is not violated. (Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)
Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are:
1. That it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisions of the Jones Law and to limit the
application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain;
2. That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874), by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to any
lands not public;
3. That eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated as
though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain;"
4. That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly
come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in
nay manner in the title of the Act.
5. That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts interpreting the phrase "public
lands," that once such lands have been "legally appropriated" by the Government or by individuals, they become segregated
from the mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands" operate upon
them.
6. That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may have had at any time to assert any right,
title, or interest in and to the lands involved in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, was
absolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after such lands were registered in the court of
land registration under the Torrens system.
7. That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled any provisions or provisions in the body thereof applicable to lands held under
fee title is null and void and of no effect.
8. That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to, nor include, lands held in fee title, the penal
provisions thereof cannot be held to apply to leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders.
9. That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general jurisprudence upon that subject our conclusions
herein shall not be held to affect any of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to private
agricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of the public domain.
Therefore, having demonstrated that said Act No. 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there being no
objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., concurring:
Inasmuch as it does not appear what action or remedy is prayed for and the petition is only concerned with the interpretation
of Act No. 2874, I concur with the foregoing decision.
Araullo, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO
ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY
FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF
PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971,
seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC
XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 471, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of
certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary restraining orders directing the respondents (in
both petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question until further orders from the Court. At the same
time, we gave due course to the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the
respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as
well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents, conspiring and confabulating together,
allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that
it was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and
contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking
Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated and the papers on the same were
falsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the private secretary of respondent Bienvenido
Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given wholly unwarranted
advantage and preference by means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are hereby also charged
with interest for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly irregular and grossly unlawful
because the same was facilitated and committed by means of falsification of official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by respondent Cesar
Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his trucking contract in the under his trucking contract in the
amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in
view of the then subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire on November 2,
1969; that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was made to appear that it was collected by Tecson
Trucking Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter and the voucher was never indorsed or
signed by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and consummating the aforecited
collection, respondent officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to the great prejudice and
damage of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, another
proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol
Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of respondents cited
hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage
and preference in favor of the, supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and

managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that
respondent official is interested for personal gain because he is responsible for the approval of the manifestly
irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore, respondent, being a Member of
the Bidding Committee, also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making it appear in the very
abstract of bids that another interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it
2
was not so.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of
Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified falsely under oath in Cadastral
Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during the hearing and reception of
evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner,
when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is owned by the provincial Government
of Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial jail building is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of respondent in said Cadastral case were
made knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur in
3
violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an
action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and
the rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the so-called "bidding"
for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga del Sur; that said
respondents, without any valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the bid of one
Jesus Teoson that was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registered duly
qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his compliance with all
the rules and requirements on public bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondents illegally
and irregularly awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent
Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and papers were falsified
or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly
unwarranted advantage, preference and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that
there is a statutory presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and
4
award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same having been denied, he went
to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on
prohibition and mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
further proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft League
filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft
League's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No.
33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971,
filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article
171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third
degree by consanguinity.
5
CONTRARY TO LAW.

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLEMONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity.
6
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS,
husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree affinity.
7
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal
against the petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son
of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in
the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latter is related
with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY ABABONwho
was then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
with his nephew-in-law TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, in
violation of the Civil Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his administrative
function through manifest partiality against said complaining employee.
Third Count:
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an
appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and said appointment is
in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD,
JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an
appointment as Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well know that the latter is related with him in the third degree of consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga
del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave TERESITO MONTESCLAROS,
husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third degree, an appointment as
Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew then
that the latter was not qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service Law, thereby
knowingly granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference in the discharge of his administrative
function through manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019

That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking
advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular
and felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot
2645 of the Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case, failed to
establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration law and the Public Land
Act, it appearing that the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse
possession of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate,
to wit:
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS,
husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of affinity
and is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLEMONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and is in
8
violation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws.
xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitioner
with further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity
within the second civil degree, an appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although
he well knew that the latter is related to him in the second degree by affinity and is not qualified under the
Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial
Engineer's Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the third
civil degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL
ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina
Codinera is related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil
Service Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for immediate preliminary
investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in the
9
paramount interest of good government.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani
presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The
respondent Court issued a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the case
itself dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case.

On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to
comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft
League to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (in
G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No.
33628), which he claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a
candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto:
MALACAANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the procedure provided
by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and
prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to observe the form.91
requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and particularity the charges or offenses being aired
or denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the
Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of law and regulations on the matter are duly observed by the parties
concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it is equally compelling
that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded them by the constitution and law to defend
themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the
complainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead of
generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the Office of the President or the
Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper department or agency
head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in case of provincial and
city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local board of investigators
headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the President which
should be filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the
officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials
or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in
like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the
interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:

(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The
Order itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal
"offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well
referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the public "of the procedure provided by law and regulations
by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the
"procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation
of administrative charges against erring government officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements
thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of
the long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the
other hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act
(of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to
investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization
Act of 1967, providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city officials shall be preferred before the President of
the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board of
Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the
matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial
(like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure,
but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " 17 but that does
not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior administrative course of action. It
will indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ...
removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such
technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it
is here material in construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted. For Executive
Order No. 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress.
The regime of Presidential lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the Executive Order
law, we would be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations then
in effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit is
equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the
Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been
that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
20
investigation purposes, by any competent person. The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in
21
court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself.
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of
a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint"
filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the
complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 refer invariably to
violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not, however, make such charges Identical to one
another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019;
exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of
land in his favor, over which the provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019; and making untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his office. On the
other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and
sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with respect to the
construction of the capitol building; testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in

which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised
Penal Code; and simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major differences. When, therefore, we restrained further
proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not consequently stay the proceedings in
CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same proceedings we did restrain in
G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in question are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent
22
Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions. The rule is subject
to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
23
and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or otherwise void. We cannot perceive any of the exceptions
applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of complaints commenced by
the private respondent below, but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question we are not in a
position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he
wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A.
LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L.
DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO
BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y
AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ
Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial
Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in
this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII,
presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon.
Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1
Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued
in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession
of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve
and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential
Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an

overall length of 11- inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not
being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the
crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April
1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to
wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or
implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime
of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of
the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao,
Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon
called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or
instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No.
9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. The Orders of dismissal
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential
element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a
bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence
may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of
bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant
criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No.
1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in
P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than

ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a
most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to
ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even
that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a
sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet
five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be
assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of
the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to
apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of
law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing
premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made
unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one thatabets subversion, insurrection or rebellion,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of
similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and
if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal
Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and
punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such
weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a
person happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that
said person had just bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the
meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment
from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him
to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the
manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating
this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool
of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to
make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and
public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or
there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a
state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties
widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and
to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying
firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is
from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition
of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol,
carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement
but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp.
18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case
before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the
Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless
held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation
of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed
under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended
by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of their official
functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in
the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in
violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No.
1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms,
companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives,
including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary
device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or
other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by
concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such
a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing
destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person
convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife,"
"spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as
necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any
person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of
or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its
maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be
committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventytwo.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President

Republic of the Philippines
D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on
the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be
related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public
1
policy.
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act
is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the
carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in
general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
2
provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and
3
cause of the accusation against him.
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be
sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
4
defense accordingly.
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for
the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a
specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the
carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26
of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn
penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of
the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of
firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place.Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law
violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D.
9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9
5
6
(3). P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle
holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
7
liberally in favor of the accused. In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a
prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes
more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged
against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action
a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such
dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information
with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in
question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed
weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was
either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute
or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the
presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence
any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases
into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views
which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true
meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally
in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is
to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this
Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute,
8
and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081
dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are
particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives
and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an
essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-4205066); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail
over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of
the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or,
whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be
remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber
v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous
and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does
not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must
be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
9
associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions.
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to
Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and
against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion
consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting,
arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian
lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order
and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and
disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly
constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the
unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits,
coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and
being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not
stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate

purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly
constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the aforequoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp.
604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055,
1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to
the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were
never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
9
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. -a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to
10
impose hardship on another, and so on.
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than
ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a
most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to
ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even
that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a
sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet
five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his
example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house
remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street
meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a
violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and
insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
11
limited." The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
12
definition of forbidden acts.
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not
clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute.
(U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation
of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
13
therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in
order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information
when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be
14
unjust, is fatal.

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court
affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense
15
as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145.
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies
below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court
may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain
so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made another information
is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good
cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some
other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second
element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an
16
opportunity to amend the Information.
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted
earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the
cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the
motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been
extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should new
complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath
of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a
case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said
decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the
offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October
15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed
weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly
17
indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and
prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual
guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an
unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure
an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or
quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this
Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree
No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the
information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine
Commission or of the ordinance.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the
information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine
Commission or of the ordinance.

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA
SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO,
GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents.
AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter
against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment
ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand
pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is
omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against
sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario
Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of
Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically
occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant
Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and
is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and
cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the
pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicantpossessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the
accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839,
respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977
dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and
strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not
apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with
threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked
that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include
agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent
class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that
it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made
by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October
2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare
and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and
Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and
those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands
belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious
practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health,
safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is
punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or
occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted
to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public
agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the
notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural
or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See
People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the
intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.
The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is
uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

G.R. No. L-14526
March 31, 1965
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; CARLOS A. GO THONG & COMPANY; CEBU NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC.;
CEBU-BOHOL FERRY CO., INC.; COROMINAS, RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO., INC.; HIJOS DE F. ESCANO, INC.;
PACIFIC LINES, INC.; ROYAL LINES, INC.; SOUTHERN ISLAND SHIPPING CORPORATION; SWEET LINES
SHIPPING; VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.; PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.; COMPAIA MARITIMA;
and GENERAL SHIPPING CO., INC., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY OF CEBU; FELIPE PAREJA, as City Treasurer of Cebu; THE HON. SERGIO OSMEA, JR., as Mayor of the
City of Cebu, defendants-appellees.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cebu City Fiscal and Quirico del Mar for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The principal question here is whether or not under its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 58, the City of Cebu may provide by
ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in
said city but owned by the National Government. The ordinance, No. 207, was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board
on August 14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27. Plaintiffs paid the wharfage charges under
protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957 filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said
ordinance declared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and other landing places belonging to the
National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint after trial and the case has come to us on appeal by plaintiffs.
Appellants have raised some questions of fact, and in particular point out certain events and circumstances to show that
ordinance No. 207 was not and could not have been enacted, as alleged by appellees, on August 14, 1956. This case,
however, may be decided solely on the legal issue presented by the parties.1wph1.t
The Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by appellees under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City
of Cebu, which states:
SECTION 17. General powers and duties of the Board.Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the
conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing
places.
The lower court ruled upholding appellees' contention in this respect, that in using the terms "public wharves, docks, levees,
or landing places," the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and those owned
by the City of Cebu and that consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted. Appellants assail this construction
as erroneous, first in the light of the generally accepted meaning of "public wharf" as it may have a bearing on the right or
authority to charge wharfage and, secondly, in view of other related provisions of the same city charter.
The word "public", as employed to describe a wharf, does not refer to its ownership either by the National Government or by
a province or municipality. It denotes rather the nature of its use. Thus public wharves have been held to be those used
generally by the public, free of charge or for compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive
enjoyment or use thereof (Hamilton v. Portland State Pier Site District, 112 A. 836). Piers, or landing places and wharves
may be private or they may be in their nature, public, although the property may be in an individual owner, where the latter is
under obligation to concede to others the privilege of landing their goods or of mooring their vessels there, upon payment of a
reasonable compensation as wharfage (Dutton v. Strong, 17 Law Ed. 29, 1 Black 35, 66 U.S. 339). So a wharf may be public
whether it belongs to the National Government, to a municipal corporation or to a private individual or concern.
Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use, the right to impose wharfage dues rests
on a different basis that of ownership. For wharfage is a charge against the vessel by way of rent or compensation for its
being allowed to lie alongside a wharf for the purpose of loading or unloading freight (Phil. Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular
Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, citing Parkersburg and Ohio River Transportation Co. vs. City of Parkersburg, 27 Law Ed.
584) and, of course, for the use of the artificial facilities offered for that purpose (City of Shreveport vs. Red River and Coast
Line, 55 Am. Rep. 504). That the right to charge wharfage is based on ownership has been impliedly recognized by this Court
in Province of Mindoro v. Cruz, 74 Phil. 108, as follows: "... the subsequent classification of the port of Calapan as a national
port did not, and was not intended to, divest the province of Mindoro of its part ownership of the wharf and, accordingly, of its
right to collect wharfage for its use as it had theretofore done"; and "not until its complete ownership has become vested in
the National Government by the mode of transfer provided by law may the province of Mindoro be divested of this right."
Under the foregoing test the right to collect the wharfage in question here belongs to the National Government, as in fact it
has always collected the same from appellants. It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it
employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect
wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such ownership
to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants,
with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with
other provisions.
Section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a case in point. It authorizes the Municipal Board to fix the charges to be
paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. There is indeed no distinction
therein between public wharves owned by the National Government and those owned by the city itself. But the subsection
immediately preceding (v) impliedly establishes such a distinction. It empowers the Municipal Board "to provide for the
construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers, docks and levees." It seems
fairly evident that when the lawmaking body used the term "public wharves, etc." in subsection 2, it meant to refer to those
mentioned in the preceding subsection, namely, the "public wharves, etc." constructed and therefore owned by the City of
Cebu. Section 30 of the charter has a similar bearing on the question, in granting to the City Engineer "the care and custody
of all public docks, wharves, piers, levees, and landing places, when erected" undoubtedly referring to those constructed
and owned by the city. For in so far as those belonging to the National Government are concerned they remain under the
exclusive control, direction and management of the Bureau of Customs, according to section 1142 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And appellants have accordingly been paying to the National Government fees for the use of its
wharves in Cebu, pursuant to law, particularly Republic Act No. 1371 which took effect on July 1, 1955 and was later on
embodied in the new Tariff and Customs Code.
The court a quo ruled that Section 17 (w) of the city charter is "plainly evincive of the power to tax for revenue purposes," and
therefore the wharfage charges imposed by ordinance pursuant thereto are proper even if the amounts actually collected are
much more than what may be justified as license fees under the police power of regulation of "shipping offices" granted under
section 17 (1) of the same charter. The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and for it to be exercised by a municipal
corporation requires a clear delegation of the power by means of charter grant or by a general enabling statute. The power is
not inherent in a municipal corporation (Saldaa vs. City of Iloilo, 55 O.G. 10267), and if there is any doubt as to whether or
not such power has been delegated to it the doubt must be resolved negatively (We Wa Yu vs. City of Lipa, 54 O.G. 4055).
But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section 17(w) be considered as taxes for revenue, such authority
nevertheless is limited to public wharves, docks, levees and other landing places belonging to the City of Cebu and not to
those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is reversed; Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is declared
null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making
such collection. Costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration
of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of
deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case
to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire
residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should
have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a
court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we
believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we
choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We
cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue.
Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after
the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been
prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal
stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court,
came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of
residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular,
as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the
Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his
case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was
pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the
Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether
or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the
constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or
misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that
the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may
never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of
their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the
possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today
might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of
the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings,
with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the
public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization
of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes

mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said
three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions
in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning
that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several
sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for
timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government,
12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to
residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as
agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be
included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture,
but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of
Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact
remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and
jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to
those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that
what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in
use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used
such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3
Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a
word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been
employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E,
581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which
they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to
the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the
words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as
including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the
Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted,
such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59
C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same
"public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for
other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under
its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes
of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes;
lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or
disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as
public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens
could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section
23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in
pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874,
land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the

Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and
the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act
is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term
"public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the
phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include
residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystalclear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term
'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public
lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has
been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more
of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as
agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of
the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words,
it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person
if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this
Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in
the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And
the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it
was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have always
maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands
include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that
section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens'
hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely
so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated,
section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of
"agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated
in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the
latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections,
and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of
whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to
the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of
private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition
as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private
residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will

come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the
residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into
"no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued
that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to
land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no
other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word
"agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never
be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in
harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral
lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private
ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft
is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of
ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the
result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire
subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the
report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional
Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino
nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2
Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural
lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred
per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs
of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time
we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our
country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days
of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the
natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of
the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr.
Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small
jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon
after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there
were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of
reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in
the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are
in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any
other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands
with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may
acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose
charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own
citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter:Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason

of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements
acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes:Provided, further, That in the
event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section
being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the
same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said
lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such
property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in
said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to
acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed,
sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized
in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do
so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of
the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being
transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to
the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in
the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the
absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional
Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there
being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however,
diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the
public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of
any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property"
of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of
such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are
strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of
any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional
prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no
legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also
permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the
Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the
constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and
not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines
from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt
to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by
the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may
be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain
here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations always
with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have
amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly,
allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our
people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations.
We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could
not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their
fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the
resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered
heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for
justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success,
saving our people from a looming catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The case was
initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for
title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The
Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not
qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed. In the
brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of
Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised
but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as follows:
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who, according to
his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos who, while Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal
question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici
curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is, six years
ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in
the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle
for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this
Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final
adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal question as
to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But
when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our
efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the
uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our
opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the
majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main
and only legal question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost
exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in
the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated on the
constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question was decided
against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court.
Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10, 1947,
appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the
majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may
acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to the
withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court
permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?

Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court should
abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more
than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has
failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr.
Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr.
Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock
resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that
"where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied."
And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting his
vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court were
already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have
resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes
were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the register
of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by
controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the
Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or association
for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1,
Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or any
right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may
be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in
section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those who
are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of
1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the
Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the
Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens are
deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled
by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private
ownership or pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN
OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is transferred,
assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, the
registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by
a final decision or order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he
could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative
Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense
deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in
relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice
Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,.
Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had,
with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break
the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to
three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is considered
denied.

Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of seven
against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once on
the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present at
any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4.
Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of
Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority to
agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for
withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to withdraw
the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant
and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules, the petition should
have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were
granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the
same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present.
The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice
Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month
afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was
absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his
mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a
previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to
believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he
was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion
to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked
before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and why it
became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became moot in
view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or
unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional question,
submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction
to the promulgation of our decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Suprem e
Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the
members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from
acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on
February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The uncertainty
in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct
answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of
unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and
should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and
Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their
guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished
treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain
of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of
history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of
Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its
iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his
daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to defend the
national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the
Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land.
Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed
whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable
religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people
who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of
persons still immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious

orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other
means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation or by will the
lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their
property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes,
leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under the system
unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under the moral
leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under
which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the
fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a
world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars,
thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the
guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety
and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and our people
may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to
neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it "shall
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our
government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as
to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important
of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they should
decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession the only exception allowed by the Constitution
no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming
sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the
Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the
Committee on Style the drafter of the final text has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified
in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized. If
we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of alien
purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create
complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we can
mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we
quote the following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock
example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795
legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the
greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature
repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the deal and
unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their title was in
issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could
they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution
as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had bought
fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a
friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it
appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his
diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall
rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A
weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may
be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial
diffidence on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities
the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands
and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into
foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our
Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty
bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid

down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which may have taken
place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen, could not
acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc.
being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.
HILADO, J., concurring:
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee,
indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion after the
matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under
Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the
exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the
appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under the
principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered
is the decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the
resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion
"shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I have
always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the
constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should
be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and
uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be striven for and
kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very
usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency
in this direction with respect to this Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was issued in good
faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already
amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed
included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the
self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court refrain from
deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an attitude
an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous
transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will
naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of
us the other governmental departments included would desire such a situation to ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented, namely,
"whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or
acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice, I have
signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede aadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y compacta
elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones, particularmente sobre
ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se
puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este ao, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En
algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un
nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del
patrimonio nacional se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose
votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del ao.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora en el
presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los metodos de
trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta
Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como
el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se
discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto
hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se
reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario incidente
que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de
Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es
que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas
sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.

Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con tanta
energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo
presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante
esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un
alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y
agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el
Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia, pues
trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte
sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los
Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos
desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las
disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud
de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra
manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a
favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion
a titulo dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e industriales.)
Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico
y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria
de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad
adquisitiva de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al
presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso la interdiccion constitucional ; por
tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono
de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que la retirada
no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin
nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del
Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de
retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la
concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular
reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la
prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en
virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier
derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras
palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14
del mismo Departamento la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos
y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o
documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos
publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales,
comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no esuna mera
imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular
num. 14 prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto venia practicamente a
escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente,
el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte, anticipandose a
resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los
Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida insolitamentepor el
Procurador General. Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? No estaba ya esa
circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por
eso no es extrao quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la
reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la
cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador
Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No. 14 by
expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor
General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties
1
and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los
tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la
administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y
sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a
manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de

Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y
competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo tradicioninviolada e inviolable
maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto
ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de
un litigio, civil o criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era
tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se
queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian
absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraa. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper;
estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el
pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia
hechura. No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque caen
bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega
la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter
semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la
circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los registradores de
titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales
oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial.
Cuando una determinada circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los
tribunales, ora por fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene
que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone
terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de
consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento
deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella
puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. When the
register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of
any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with
the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth
branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds
stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon
said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands,
after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be
made.
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad
de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. Que hizo
Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue
presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto
confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es
esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo
contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, unless and /or until otherwise specifically
directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial,
so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas
peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos
2
actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales. Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas
disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los
poderes del Estado, es usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si esa intromision se ha
realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive
angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar
con otropoder del Estado. En casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa
suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que
3
hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante. Tenemos, portanto, un caso de
verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato
de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin
ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por dosrazones:
(a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional
envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de
la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto

en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le
confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:
Rule 52, SEC. 4 An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief.After that
brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una delas partes.
Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno
afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha
transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y
significacion el pueblo filipino ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional
que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver la
cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad
o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra maera. Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en
el pleito que nos ocupa? Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o
inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente
que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido
apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el
recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela
Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como
fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el
caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las disidencias, es
completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el
que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo
pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos
Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que
bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el
terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso,
acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte,
muchomenos los disidentes, consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los
caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir
la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que
puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee
Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es
evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de
iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony
prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley
pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la
cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver deotra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional
para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria
unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se
insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha
habido algo, ha sido un poco de parsimonia, lentitud.
Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la formidablecuestion
constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? Habia alguna razon de interespublico para justificar
una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar
inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y
conveniencia de todos del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en
estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre.
Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta
Corte una provee la interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen
Febrero de este ao (8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de
retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto,
nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia,
desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema
naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de
centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de suplir una
deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de
la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte
vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno
de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a

losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino
que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo
Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las
cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales
cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para resolver el
asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues
Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta
trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia
votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la
expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de
la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones
quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse
entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna
porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir queel
solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las
funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume
que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion
por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion queculmino
en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2,
Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban
presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La
rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la
Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se
conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony
resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada.
Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como ndamentoel hecho
de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y
por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la
cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez: donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr.
Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene, sin
embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la
confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la
propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma estanacabadamente
tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica
legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi
experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel articulo XIII,
seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la
mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como untodo
homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un
mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un
articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente.
Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico, y la
segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado y
disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por
ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public
agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw the size
of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior

4
to the enactment of such law" ;y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas
secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende
terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres.
Magistradosdisidentes. Y por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa
terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque
en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente
de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra
"agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos
publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales, comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto
5
forestales yminerales. Es decir, que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional,
embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado y lo tiene
porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas
lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra
"agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? Donde esta esa definicion? O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion
opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de
terrenopublico o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun significado
distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la
Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque
contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la
palabra con relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion de la
jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante;
podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas
elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor de
partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo
que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en
cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho
constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la
Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba
tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en
nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el exSenador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea
Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte
Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de
Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un
vocablo el vocablo "agricultural" tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a
terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision
de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico.
Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas logico
pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo
hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una
sola comun definicin la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares
(supra); es decir, que la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales,
comerciales, e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict
literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno particular,
dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente
insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla
popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria
unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely
autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces
como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?

Ahora mismo no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? Hay acaso uniformidad en la definicionde lo que
es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su
definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural
connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia
el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate agricultural land
means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da
ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken of as
`agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for
another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a
farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina
la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los
autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos
immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones
multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los
pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les
aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y
denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de losdiccionarios, asi
sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados que normas claras, concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian
establecerse? Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e
industrial? Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de
diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo que
esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto,
cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo
muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la
adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. Que terrenos son
agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaa mas
pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur.
Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard aade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare
solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay
dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por
su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado
Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y el
paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta
misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes preciso
tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a
situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria
Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice
aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para poner
envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros,
ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque el articulo
XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el
criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de
Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a
confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr.
Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo determinarpor ley l;a
eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous, corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer,
sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural
land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian
excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. Entoncesun
individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueos de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy
posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada
consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde la
Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la
seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se aadio la palabra calificativa agricola"private
agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no

podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a
los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso equivale a
excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo
que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene
una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo
terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo
elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno
publico. Ahora bien; que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de
agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al
titulo dominical en que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque los
conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la
misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas
estan por encima del conceptovulgar una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar
la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es
unafuncion de minoria los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para
6
que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado espaol? Asi que
cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia,
por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple
vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto se
aadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue
por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public
agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la aadidura, tal
como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis
mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la motivacion y
finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la
letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica
constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado
sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be
accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed
the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and
satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much
reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo de los
terrenos naturales? Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del
sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que
organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante entodos ellos era
un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan
unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para
la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es
dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes de la
ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el
proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal
bein por el papel particula que desempeaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros
Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro patrimonio
nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como
tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo
puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente,
inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la Asamblea
que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueos de
propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para
mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag.
593.)

Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la Asamblea
Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion
filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y
para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Sus mienbros
que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la
Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor
benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall enbody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and
their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es
de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica
que advendria despues de10 aos. Querianos, puesd asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. Que cosa
major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual parodiando al Delegado Montilla la
tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento
dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos debamos
perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por
ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas
centenares de milliones economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del
Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su
delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de
Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra,
instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la
integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima
con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y otraspaises del Mar
Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la
enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se haciancargo
tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de
los filipinos.
Que de extrao habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo
rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el
patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y
de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico
dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c)
prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales comercialese
industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la
politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra. Por que se iba a temer,
verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que
estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que, noobstante el
natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en
relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como
que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional la llmada reforma sobre laparidad para equipararlos a los
filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the
legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to
be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as
to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to
express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation
of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
IV. Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre terrenos
residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el
Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente
dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes
problemassobre la tierra.

Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel pueblo
puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio.
Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus
miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman gastos
para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del
patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del
Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos
en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the
terms "private agricultural land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually
used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the Constitution,
have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion which is at once absurd and anomalous
that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It
is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of
the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to the State," and
limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This
constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the
State, merely proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after
the approval of the Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral
lands theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that
lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the
Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the
Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cario vs.
Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper
title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely
no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands, why did the framers of the
Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in
section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or
associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or
associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive
classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there may be
private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the
size of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and the term
"agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to
agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said provision. It is
noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to
included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution prohibits the
alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas
of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment
of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional
prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as
may from time to time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The
power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or

ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms "private
land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts
and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to
transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of
expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in
contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the
majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also
private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's
contention that there cannot be any private timber or mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the
Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same
refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of
another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard
to the agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Seor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer
inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de
misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por
Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, seores. Parece
que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como siempre suelo
hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion
y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya
reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes
despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome las
medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres
tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos
pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra
parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La
primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos
particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de
propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en las
regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los
pequeos propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion
de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que
en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir
transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre
doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si
queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera
merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez demostrado
ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este
laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daos a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura
puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que
todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los
opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el
temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado
ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que
efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la
ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan
imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de
recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o medidas
imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en
que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por
desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque
el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar
desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de
la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra
revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura,
si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La
Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida,
primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea
Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion.

Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo autorizar a la
Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta maana y digo con exito
porque he oidoalgunos aplausos se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan unissue de esta
disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten
las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas
natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha
puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas.
Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que
viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla a los votos de
los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque
prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes
propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de
que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la
luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio
haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a
propiedad.
Por estas razones, seor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso
agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands,
private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President,
extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If
the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed
discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I
do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already
yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does not
embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms "private
agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the
framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the
exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural
resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real
estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the principle of
"ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the
Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural
lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more
specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we
bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of
the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not controlling,
because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands," the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a
carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition
adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the only
definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
(Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the
Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this
Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order,
royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.) They
hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently
overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto
land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the
public domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they

are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private,
said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this
sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us, however,
there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions
contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No. 2874
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public
Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens,
but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to
aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of
the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the
approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public
residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation
against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the
Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government Judicial, Legislative and
Executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and
that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the
construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private
residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize in
somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,
supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming
that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed,
the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated
September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural
lands is applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of Deeds
of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in
its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1,
Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or industrial lots
for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a
residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of
the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural
lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot
is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article
XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain
are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not
agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands,
the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the
phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor of
alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the
Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that
private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese
occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section
5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a
Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings
and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless
authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the
Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force
because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the
question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered

in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of private
residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus
be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential
lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be blinded by any
sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not
justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over
the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and
in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the appellee,
had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs.
Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties,
and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the
present case, that course of action was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had
been opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that
after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion
should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to teh denial
of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and
four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again
submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that
the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality provided in Rule of
Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and
could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real
explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who
originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of
the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was
an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the
withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by
the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness
thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that
the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to
interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any
circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. What
is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as
patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said
of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private residential lots in
favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866),
wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and
register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien
applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a
decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant
and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question
resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the
withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of
Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial
of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the
Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and
enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator
Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by
the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this
Court to pass upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee
Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in
view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those
who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties having
agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice to

other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity
of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It must be
remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising
in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established,
nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to seize
any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to
the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise
before the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy
to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected like heirs or
or creditors of the seller may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly
contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough
that briefs as in this case have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for
reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly
considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject to the
final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances,
might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet
sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned
their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting politicoeconomic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could
also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of its
adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of the
7
Constitution;
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United Nations
Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United States and
Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so,
did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for
withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that the
organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood not including residential, commercial,
industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and
Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if erroneous
or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if
erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for residence may
be alienated or sold to an alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the term
"private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private
ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens,
the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of
the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the
inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification
made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act,
lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence,
which was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The
susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in
the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be susceptible of
cultivation (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same come under the
classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence
are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution
intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical
meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874. Under this
Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations described in section 23
thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the
public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No.
2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may
acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or
residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any
permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement:Provided, however, That persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold agricultural
public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally,
really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such
lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such
acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or
partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the
same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except
by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . .Provided further, That any
person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes
under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes referred
to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with
regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may
acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . .Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable
to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor
mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or
lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar
with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified
persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for
townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the
nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to
exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted
the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the
mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in
the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the
policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of the
public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that
the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial
or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public
domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in the prohibition
found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar
with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the
journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a
departure from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable
or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition
found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear
indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or
intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the

raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence
purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural.
Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded, because these lands could not and can never
become private lands. From the land grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under
the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the
Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The
repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No.
2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and
understood by the people that adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of
Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant whether
it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never been a part of the
public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the
latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands,terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act
or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it violates
section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capizvs. Ramirez, 40 Phil.,
883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared
unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed
upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to
foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending against the constitutional provision
referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case, despite the
withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not
exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such
questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional
question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the
courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their
jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be
deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come
from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a
constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such
provision by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers
had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express
its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or
a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its
prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the
interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be justified, but when some members of the
Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The
interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the
other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and
against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the Constitution a costly process would have to be proposed and
adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion
upon the constitutional provision in question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to
their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive
possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried
out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or
repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by the
appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review
should be reversed.
TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as we see it
and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name
of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As
it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble
understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result. The denial by this
Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity collides with the professed
sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before
answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as
expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect to
the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent
meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead to
absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or
logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise
of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the common
business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings.
The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common
sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const.
sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words in their
natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction where
the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the
provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the
instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty to
declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of the
words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could not
have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign.
And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which
no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by
necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one thing excludes
all others of the same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands do not
fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as "of or
pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc."
According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or used
for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either residential,
commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential, commercial and industrial
sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention
considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all
doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee on
nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the
Constitution of the following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the
owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by
persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold
lands in the Philippine Islands.

In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven embodied the
following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural development, national
defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General
Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with President Quezon.
The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the
phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution all
proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use,
but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word
"land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural
lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the
word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended.
In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision are
erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the provision. It
says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and obscuring
the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of
the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to
accomplish as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough
alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one
of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is
absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and
experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the
President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the
framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone,
32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with
intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences.
The theory is against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed
themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as
little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no
concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the prohibition
was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired.
The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional
Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is
from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation
often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land, or
both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be residential,
commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the
owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be
decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building are
considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be
considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind
when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical
meaning then prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of public lands
was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made
clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not

forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the
question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for construction, will bring into
relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest
reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands agricultural can find their way into the hands
of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is
possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or
titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution
which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view. Classification of
public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold
from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the
public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end
that natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may be
disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are
important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural
resources. Natural resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The
United States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic law
and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar
with local conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a
comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The
United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration, exploitation, and
disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the
enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of public
lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention
separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that
were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be
regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this
Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and residential lands are the
same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential,
commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court is not now
confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question of determining the
character of public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is
forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to
public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands, agricultural lands. When it
comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines
and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no
private timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section
5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different
standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective.
When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural?
We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special considerations
which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but to take the term
"agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves
no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified
in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice Story and
Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution.
Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well
observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the
Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This
would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses
and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the Constitution
to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in
language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it,
have made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it,

as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it,
when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought
only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National
Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as
one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the
instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution has
employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the
term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are
resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in
the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the rule is limited to
the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them." To give an
example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the
meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is
not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the
general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical sense in
these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional
history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied to
public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that
public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural
lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments expressed in
those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first
stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for
reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the
intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII
wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers itself
as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something
real and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified
language. This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings,
always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles
underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all
lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the
statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that "lies but
does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one knows we don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a
particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for
other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in
favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and
under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is that there is
no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the
foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence
of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies disposable
lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is entitled
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same
footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources.
But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense these words
convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted the
elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy, economics
and politics.

From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to
the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a
piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious
Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is
the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-officer of the
government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but which I doubt, as representing the
true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor
General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is as the decision also suggests but which, I
think, is still more incorrect both in theory and in practice then this Court should have given heed to the motion for
withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of
the head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons
that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141
should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that have been
acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be
well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are
synonymous, be they public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not
agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII.
Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the
provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with
regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the
majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the
Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jeepney for
hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude between
owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is
forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor
cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney
for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be
within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a
vital function in the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental
for communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to
some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The importance
of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not
be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of
the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is to be
construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses and
purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place where there is no
ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply
because its enforcement would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have
nothing to do with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and
is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we should not
overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the
menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private nonagricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to
define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may be
dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses,
cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I
may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by
the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute
prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The
Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No.
141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr.
Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional

legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the
opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by
the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to represent
the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that "many members
of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I
add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and
influential member of the Constitutional Convention?

G.R. No. 83736 January 15, 1992
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
TMX SALES, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
F.R. Quiogue for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a case involving corporate quarterly income tax, does the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously
collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the
date the quarterly income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner, or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment
Return (final payment), as claimed by the private respondent?
Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code provides:
Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of
payment of that tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981,
declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981.
During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual
Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions
of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00 (CTA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 45-46).
Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the Appellate Division of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. (Rollo, p. 30)
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a petition
for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, praying that the petitioner, as
private respondent therein, be ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of P247,010.00, representing overpaid
income tax for the taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
In his answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue averred that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is
refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2)
years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in Court (March 14, 1984).
(Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended)."
On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales, Inc. and ordering the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the amount claimed.
The Tax Court, in granting the petition, viewed the quarterly income tax paid as a portion or installment of the total annual
income tax due. Said the Tax Court in its assailed decision:
xxx xxx xxx
When a tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years provided in Section 306 (now Section
292) of the Revenue Code should be counted from the date of the final payment or last installment. . . . This
rule proceeds from the theory that in contemplation of tax laws, there is no payment until the whole or entire
tax liability is completely paid. Thus, a payment of a part or portion thereof, cannot operate to start the
commencement of the statute of limitations. In this regard the word "tax" or words "the tax" in statutory
provisions comparable to section 306 of our Revenue Code have been uniformly held to refer to the entire
tax and not a portion thereof (Clark v. U.S., 69 F. 2d 748; A.S. Kriedner Co. v. U.S., 30 F Supp. 274; Hills v.
U.S., 50 F 2d 302, 55 F 2d 1001), and the vocable "payment of tax" within statutes requiring refund claim,
refer to the date when all the tax was paid, not when a portion was paid (Braun v. U.S., 8 F supp. 860, 863;
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Prieto, 2 SCRA 1007; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Palanca, 18
SCRA 496).
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the above decision. Thru the
Solicitor General, he contends that the basis in computing the two-year period of prescription provided for in Section 292
(now Section 230) of the Tax Code, should be May 15, 1981, the date when the quarterly income tax was paid and not April
15, 1982, when the Final Adjustment Return for the year ended December 31, 1981 was filed.
He cites the case of Pacific Procon Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 68013, November 12, 1984)
involving a similar set of facts, wherein this Court in a minute resolution affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision denying the
claim for refund of the petitioner therein for being barred by prescription.

A re-examination of the aforesaid minute resolution of the Court in the Pacific Procon case is warranted under the
circumstances to lay down a categorical pronouncement on the question as to when the two-year prescriptive period in cases
of quarterly corporate income tax commences to run. A full-blown decision in this regard is rendered more imperative in the
light of the reversal by the Court of Tax Appeals in the instant case of its previous ruling in the Pacific Procon case.
Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions
of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to
inconvenience and absurdity. In the case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court stated that statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET
ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four
corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof,
should be considered. (Manila Lodge No. 761, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 73 SCRA 162 [1976]) Every section, provision
or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view. (Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 [1921]; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249, cited in Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu, 13 SCRA 449 [1965]).
Thus, in resolving the instant case, it is necessary that we consider not only Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National
Internal Revenue Code but also the other provisions of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 84, 85 (now both incorporated as
Section 68), Section 86 (now Section 70) and Section 87 (now Section 69) on Quarterly Corporate Income Tax Payment and
Section 321 (now Section 232) on keeping of books of accounts. All these provisions of the Tax Code should be harmonized
with each other.
Section 292 (now Section 230) provides a two-year prescriptive period to file a suit for a refund of a tax erroneously or
illegally paid, counted from the tile the tax was paid. But a literal application of this provision in the case at bar which involves
quarterly income tax payments may lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
Section 85 (now Section 68) provides for the method of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on a cumulative
basis, to wit:
Sec. 85. Method of computing corporate quarterly income tax. Every corporation shall file in duplicate
a quarterly summary declaration of its gross income and deductions on a cumulative basisfor the
preceding quarter or quarters upon which the income tax, as provided in Title II of this Code shall be levied,
collected and paid. The tax so computed shall be decreased by the amount of tax previously paid or
assessed during the preceding quarters and shall be paid not later than sixty (60) days from the close of
each of the first three (3) quarters of the taxable year, whether calendar or fiscal year. (Emphasis supplied)
while Section 87 (now Section 69) requires the filing of an adjustment returns and final payment of income tax, thus:
Sec. 87. Filing of adjustment returns final payment of income tax. On or before the fifteenth day of April or
on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year, every taxpayer
covered by this Chapter shall file an Adjustment Return covering the total net taxable income of the
preceding calendar or fiscal year and if the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during that year is not
equal to the tax due on the entire net taxable income of that year the corporation shall either (a) pay the
excess tax still due or (b) be refunded the excess amount paid as the case may be. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment
Return required in Section 87 (now Section 69), is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of
Section 292 (now Section 230) would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the
quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot
be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 (Section 230) would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
The following application of Section 85 (now Section 68) clearly illustrates this point:
FIRST QUARTER:
Gross Income 100,000.00
Less: Deductions 50,000.00
Net Taxable Income 50,000.00

=========
Tax Due & Paid [Sec. 24 NIRC (25%)] 12,500.00
=========
SECOND QUARTER:
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00 150,000.00
Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00

2nd Quarter 75,000.00 125,000.00

=========
Tax Due Thereon 6,250.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
Creditable Income Tax (6,250.00)
THIRD QUARTER:
2nd Quarter 50,000.00
3rd Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00

3rd Quarter 25,000.00 150,000.00

100,000.00
=========
=========
FOURTH QUARTER: (Adjustment Return required in Sec. 87)
3rd Quarter 100,000.00
4th Quarter 75,000.00 325,000.00

3rd Quarter 25,000.00
4th Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00

=========
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter 12,500.00 25,000.00

Creditable Income Tax (to be REFUNDED) (6,250.00)
=========
Based on the above hypothetical data appearing in the Final Adjustment Return, the taxpayer is entitled under Section 87
(now Section 69) of the Tax Code to a refund of P6,250.00. If Section 292 (now Section 230) is literally applied, what then is
the reckoning date in computing the two-year prescriptive period? Will it be the 1st quarter when the taxpayer paid
P12,500.00 or the 3rd quarter when the taxpayer also paid P12,500.00? Obviously, the most reasonable and logical
application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or
the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he
is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.
Furthermore, Section 321 (now Section 232) of the National Internal Revenue Code requires that the books of accounts of
companies or persons with gross quarterly sales or earnings exceeding Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) be
audited and examined yearly by an independent Certified Public Accountant and their income tax returns be accompanied by
certified balance sheets, profit and loss statements, schedules listing income producing properties and the corresponding
incomes therefrom and other related statements.

It is generally recognized that before an accountant can make a certification on the financial statements or render an auditor's
opinion, an audit of the books of accounts has to be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Since the audit, as required by Section 321 (now Section 232) of the Tax Code is to be conducted yearly, then it is the Final
Adjustment Return, where the figures of the gross receipts and deductions have been audited and adjusted, that is truly
reflective of the results of the operations of a business enterprise. Thus, it is only when the Adjustment Return covering the
whole year is filed that the taxpayer would know whether a tax is still due or a refund can be claimed based on the adjusted
and audited figures.
Therefore, the filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and implemented per BIR Form
1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due. These
quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to
arrive at a net taxable income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the
end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is reinforced by Section 87 (now Section 69) which provides for the filing of adjustment
returns and final payment of income tax. Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292 (now
Section 230) of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax.
In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Prieto (2 SCRA 1007 [1961]), this Court held that when a tax is paid in
installments, the prescriptive period of two years provided in Section 306 (Section 292) of the National internal Revenue
Code should be counted from the date of the final payment. This ruling is reiterated inCommission of Internal Revenue
v. Carlos Palanca (18 SCRA 496 [1966]), wherein this Court stated that where the tax account was paid on installment, the
computation of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 306 (Section 292) of the Tax Code, should be from the date of
the last installment.
In the instant case, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a refund on March 14, 1984. Since the two-year prescriptive period should
be counted from the filing of the Adjustment Return on April 15, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. is not yet barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Nocon, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-8782
April 28, 1956
MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee.
Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants.
Ramon de los Reyes for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus against respondent
and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino
issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P6,800
secured by real estate mortgage on certain properties.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which reads as follows:
Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the following facts:
1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, the same having
been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954;.
2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties;.
3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6,
1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953; and.
4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay
certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept petitioner's offer to pay the said
indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate;
The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides:
SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred, is
further amended to read:
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof and
within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as
provided in section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state
the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government
of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application
and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of
indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or
wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such
certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1)
obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable
to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the
Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.
The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement" refers to all antecedents
"the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or
only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.
The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.
Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 879 was to include veterans of the Philippine Army
and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay Law, Republic Act No. 304, in recognition of their great
sacrifices in the resistance movement. as shown by the following quotation from the Congressional Record:
. . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by this public servant for three objectives: First, to serve
as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives or orphans.
Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have
given their all for the cause of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the discrimination that has been committed either
through oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, and guerrillas
or the so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the resistance movement. (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd
Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74; quoted in Appellant's brief, pages 13-14.).
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the
words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones.
But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent and powerful reasons why
the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance of the backpay

certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled
by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of
the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with
interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one.
The other reason is found in the Congressional Record, which says:
Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and "act", insert the word "amendatory".
Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?.
Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the provision of section 2. I believe, gentleman from Cebu,
that section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations
and indebtedness in favor of the government. (Congressional Record No. 64, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session
May 11, 1953 page 41; quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.).
As there would have been no need to permit by law the use of backpay certificates in payment of debts to private persons, if
they are willing to accept them, the permission necessarily refers to the Government of the Philippines, its agencies or other
instrumentalities, etc.
Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who
had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment
of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.
The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different from the present one. In
the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was incurred on January 27, 1950. He brought the action
on November 10, 1950, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which was approved on June 18, 1948; that
is, one year and almost eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 304,
because said section provides that the application for recognition of backpay must have been filed within one year after the
approval of said Act No. 304, and the debt must be subsisting at the time of said approval, Diokno having incurred the debt
on January 27, 1950, and brought action on November 10, 1950. It was, therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to accept or not his backpay certificate in payment.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, held that the phrase "who may be willing to accept the same
for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its agencies.
The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice, in his letter of June 19, 1953, remarked that the clause "who
may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all antecedents, including the Government and its agencies. We are not
impressed with this observation of the Secretary, for we believe that his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, correct for the
reasons we have stated above.
In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his debt to the Philippine National Bank on January 2, 1953; hence, the
obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely
under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to accept the backpay certificate
above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment of his above cited debt to the appellee, without
interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he offered said backpay certificate in payment. Without pronouncement as
to costs. It is ordered.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for plaintiff-appellee. Estanislao A. Fernandez for
defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041, entitled
People of the Philippines versus Abelardo Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the cancellation of his appeal
bond and declaring him to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine and indemnity.
From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three
(3) months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00)
pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said judgment in the
following tenor:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant
case, we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of the case that the imposition of the
corresponding penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason, we impose upon
accused-appellant a fine of P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's costs.
In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment.
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion with the trial court praying that (1) the court enter of record that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant
argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could
not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did
not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party the lower court issued a writ of execution of its judgment.
However, the writ was returned unsatisfied.
On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever rights,
interests, or participation, if any, defendant Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building situated at No. 2313 Suter,
Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. However, it turned
out that the property levied upon be the sheriff was registered in the name of Agapito Subido who, upon learning of the levy,
immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriff's office and instituted an action in the lower court (Civil Case No. 41731)
to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his property. In the meantime the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of property levied upon by the sheriff.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal
bond and asked the lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared that in
accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accused-appellant moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied on December 26, 1959.
Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of December 19 and 26.
In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower court erred
I
IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IS LIABLE TO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY.
II
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN SATISFIED WITH
1
THE ATTACHMENT SECURED BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph,

paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in
its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the
penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the
accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of
P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for in the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant
case, we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of the same, that the imposition of the
corresponding penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason we impose the accused a
fine of P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's cost.
To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion of its decision:
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's costs
the alluded modifications could mean no less than the elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the reduction of
the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest of the punishment
remains including the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court wanted to do away with the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine and the indemnity it would have so expressly
provided.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency"
is separated by a comma (,) from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio
Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to
make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to nonpayment of the fine.
If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to non-payment of
indemnity only and not to the non-payment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,), after the phrase "to indemnify the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00 pesos," so that the decision of the lower court would
read:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three
(3) months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party,
Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt that the lower court would want to make accused-appellant serve
the subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court would want accused-appellant to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency to pay the indemnity only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine.
Accordingly if according to the lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the fine and the indemnity and the only modifications made by the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the
three (3) months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00
to P5,000.00, then by force of logic and reason, the fine of P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency should stand.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to
2
pay his civil liability.
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and
3
liberally in favor of the accused. In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to
4
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to him. It is so provided in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.

Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to
serve his civil liability to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer
required by the aforesaid article.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability has been
satisfied with the attachment secured by the offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, wherein he is supposed to
have an interest. He therefore argues that until the final determinations of Civil Case No. 71731 which Agapito Subido filed to
enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his property, accused-appellant's liability for subsidiary
imprisonment cannot attach as the determination of whether the accused is solvent or not is a prejudicial question which
must first be determined before subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed.
We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the accused must suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offender is insolvent as
shown in the present case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary imprisonment may attach, there must be prior
determination of the question of solvency of the accused. The moment he cannot pay the fine, that means he is insolvent and
he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment. So accused-appellant has to choose to pay the fine or serve in
jail.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the modification that accused-appellant may no longer be required to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the judgment below, the Orders of the
lower court dated December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendant-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and
sentencing him to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed by said judgment, are
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14787
January 28, 1961
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged
in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium
phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used
for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as
amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had
paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides
that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into
the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon
satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that
official advised, the petitioner that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13
representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and
precipitated calcium carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its
claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the
theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central
Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those
used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court
thru the present petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act
No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and
beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate,
fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks
and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the
publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the
printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under
contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing;
anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and
pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to
this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor;
drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the
Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be
refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials
actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory
construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited
by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p.
324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in
an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is
preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items
immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the
category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin
concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those
enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle",
which is among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for
breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic

Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the items
grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained
that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those
used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos
distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer
and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general
and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black,
p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)
Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners
applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount
of P23,958.13.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., reserves his vote.

[G.R. No. 112212. March 2, 1998]
GREGORIO FULE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NINEVETCH CRUZ and JUAN BELARMINO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
[1]
This petition for review on certiorari questions the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 30, dismissing the complaint that prayed for the nullification of a contract of sale of a
10-hectare property in Tanay, Rizal in consideration of the amount of P40,000.00 and a 2.5 carat emerald-cut diamond (Civil
Case No. SP-2455). The lower courts decision disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and
ordering plaintiff to pay:
1. Defendant Dra. Ninevetch M. Cruz the sum of P300,000.00 as and for moral damages and the sum of P100,000.00 as and
for exemplary damages;
2. Defendant Atty. Juan Belarmino the sum of P250,000.00 as and for moral damages and the sum of P150,000.00 as and
for exemplary damages;
3. Defendant Dra. Cruz and Atty. Belarmino the sum of P25,000.00 each as and for attorneys fees and litigation expenses;
and
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the lower court, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Gregorio Fule, a banker by profession and a jeweler at the same time, acquired a 10-hectare property in Tanay,
Rizal (hereinafter Tanay property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 320725 which used to be under the name of
Fr. Antonio Jacobe. The latter had mortgaged it earlier to the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank), Laguna, Inc. to secure a
loan in the amount of P10,000.00, but the mortgage was later foreclosed and the property offered for public auction upon his
default.
In July 1984, petitioner, as corporate secretary of the bank, asked Remelia Dichoso and Oliva Mendoza to look for a
buyer who might be interested in the Tanay property. The two found one in the person of herein private respondent Dr.
Ninevetch Cruz. It so happened that at the time, petitioner had shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond
earrings owned by Dr. Cruz which he had seen in January of the same year when his mother examined and appraised them
as genuine. Dr. Cruz, however, declined petitioners offer to buy the jewelry for P100,000.00. Petitioner then made another
bid to buy them for US$6,000.00 at the exchange rate of $1.00 to P25.00. At this point, petitioner inspected said jewelry at
the lobby of the Prudential Bank branch in San Pablo City and then made a sketch thereof. Having sketched the jewelry for
twenty to thirty minutes, petitioner gave them back to Dr. Cruz who again refused to sell them since the exchange rate of the
peso at the time appreciated to P19.00 to a dollar.
Subsequently, however, negotiations for the barter of the jewelry and the Tanay property ensued. Dr. Cruz requested
herein private respondent Atty. Juan Belarmino to check the property who, in turn, found out that no sale or barter was
feasible because the one-year period for redemption of the said property had not yet expired at the time.
In an effort to cut through any legal impediment, petitioner executed on October 19, 1984, a deed of redemption on
behalf of Fr. Jacobe purportedly in the amount of P15,987.78, and on even date, Fr. Jacobe sold the property to petitioner
for P75,000.00. The haste with which the two deeds were executed is shown by the fact that the deed of sale was notarized
ahead of the deed of redemption. As Dr. Cruz had already agreed to the proposed barter, petitioner went to Prudential Bank
once again to take a look at the jewelry.
In the afternoon of October 23, 1984, petitioner met Atty. Belarmino at the latters residence to prepare the documents of
[2]
sale. Dr. Cruz herself was not around but Atty. Belarmino was aware that she and petitioner had previously agreed to
exchange a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings for the Tanay property. Atty. Belarmino accordingly caused the preparation
of a deed of absolute sale while petitioner and Dr. Cruz attended to the safekeeping of the jewelry.
The following day, petitioner, together with Dichoso and Mendoza, arrived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino to finally
execute a deed of absolute sale. Petitioner signed the deed and gave Atty. Belarmino the amount of P13,700.00 for
necessary expenses in the transfer of title over the Tanay property. Petitioner also issued a certification to the effect that the
actual consideration of the sale was P200,000.00 and not P80,000.00 as indicated in the deed of absolute sale. The disparity
between the actual contract price and the one indicated on the deed of absolute sale was purportedly aimed at minimizing
the amount of the capital gains tax that petitioner would have to shoulder. Since the jewelry was appraised only
at P160,000.00, the parties agreed that the balance of P40,000.00 would just be paid later in cash.
As pre-arranged, petitioner left Atty. Belarminos residence with Dichoso and Mendoza and headed for the bank, arriving
there at past 5:00 p.m. Dr. Cruz also arrived shortly thereafter, but the cashier who kept the other key to the deposit box had
already left the bank. Dr. Cruz and Dichoso, therefore, looked for said cashier and found him having a haircut. As soon as his
haircut was finished, the cashier returned to the bank and arrived there at 5:48 p.m., ahead of Dr. Cruz and Dichoso who
arrived at 5:55 p.m. Dr. Cruz and the cashier then opened the safety deposit box, the former retrieving a transparent plastic
or cellophane bag with the jewelry inside and handing over the same to petitioner. The latter took the jewelry from the bag,

went near the electric light at the banks lobby, held the jewelry against the light and examined it for ten to
fifteen minutes. After a while, Dr. Cruz asked, Okay na ba iyan? Petitioner expressed his satisfaction by nodding his head.
For services rendered, petitioner paid the agents, Dichoso and Mendoza, the amount of US$300.00 and some pieces of
jewelry. He did not, however, give them half of the pair of earrings in question which he had earlier promised.
Later, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, petitioner arrived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino
complaining that the jewelry given to him was fake. He then used a tester to prove the alleged fakery. Meanwhile, at 8:30
p.m., Dichoso and Mendoza went to the residence of Dr. Cruz to borrow her car so that, with Atty. Belarmino, they could
register the Tanay property. After Dr. Cruz had agreed to lend her car, Dichoso called up Atty. Belarmino. The latter,
however, instructed Dichoso to proceed immediately to his residence because petitioner was there. Believing that petitioner
had finally agreed to give them half of the pair of earrings, Dichoso went posthaste to the residence of Atty. Belarmino only to
find petitioner already demonstrating with a tester that the earrings were fake. Petitioner then accused Dichoso and Mendoza
of deceiving him which they, however, denied. They countered that petitioner could not have been fooled because he had
vast experience regarding jewelry. Petitioner nonetheless took back the US$300.00 and jewelry he had given them.
Thereafter, the group decided to go to the house of a certain Macario Dimayuga, a jeweler, to have the earrings
tested. Dimayuga, after taking one look at the earrings, immediately declared them counterfeit. At around 9:30 p.m.,
petitioner went to one Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara residing at Lakeside Subdivision in San Pablo City, complaining about the
fake jewelry.Upon being advised by the latter, petitioner reported the matter to the police station where Dichoso and
Mendoza likewise executed sworn statements.
On October 26, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City against private
respondents praying, among other things, that the contract of sale over the Tanay property be declared null and void on the
ground of fraud and deceit.
On October 30, 1984, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
refrain from acting on the pertinent documents involved in the transaction. On November 20, 1984, however, the same court
lifted its previous order and denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on March 7, 1989. Confronting the issue of whether or not the genuine
pair of earrings used as consideration for the sale was delivered by Dr. Cruz to petitioner, the lower court said:
The Court finds that the answer is definitely in the affirmative. Indeed, Dra. Cruz delivered (the) subject jewelries (sic) into the
hands of plaintiff who even raised the same nearer to the lights of the lobby of the bank near the door. When asked by Dra.
Cruz if everything was in order, plaintiff even nodded his satisfaction (Hearing of Feb. 24, 1988). At that instance, plaintiff did
not protest, complain or beg for additional time to examine further the jewelries (sic). Being a professional banker and
engaged in the jewelry business plaintiff is conversant and competent to detect a fake diamond from the real thing. Plaintiff
was accorded the reasonable time and opportunity to ascertain and inspect the jewelries (sic) in accordance with Article 1584
of the Civil Code. Plaintiff took delivery of the subject jewelries (sic) before 6:00 p.m. of October 24, 1984. When he went at
8:00 p.m. that same day to the residence of Atty. Belarmino already with a tester complaining about some fake jewelries (sic),
there was already undue delay because of the lapse of a considerable length of time since he got hold of subject jewelries
[3]
(sic). The lapse of two (2) hours more or less before plaintiff complained is considered by the Court as unreasonable delay.
The lower court further ruled that all the elements of a valid contract under Article 1458 of the Civil Code were present,
namely: (a) consent or meeting of the minds; (b) determinate subject matter, and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent.
The same elements, according to the lower court, were present despite the fact that the agreement between petitioner and
Dr. Cruz was principally a barter contract. The lower court explained thus:
x x x. Plaintiffs ownership over the Tanay property passed unto Dra. Cruz upon the constructive delivery thereof by virtue of
the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. D). On the other hand, the ownership of Dra. Cruz over the subject jewelries (sic) transferred
to the plaintiff upon her actual personal delivery to him at the lobby of the Prudential Bank. It is expressly provided by law that
the thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee (Art. 1497, Civil
Code; Kuenzle & Straff vs. Watson & Co. 13 Phil. 26). The ownership and/or title over the jewelries (sic) was transmitted
immediately before 6:00 p.m. of October 24, 1984. Plaintiff signified his approval by nodding his head. Delivery or tradition, is
one of the modes of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, Civil Code).
Similarly, when Exhibit D was executed, it was equivalent to the delivery of the Tanay property in favor of Dra. Cruz. The
execution of the public instrument (Exh. D) operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the Tanay property and authorizes
the buyer, Dra. Cruz to use the document as proof of ownership (Florendo v. Foz, 20 Phil. 399). More so, since Exhibit D
does not contain any proviso or stipulation to the effect that title to the property is reserved with the vendor until full payment
of the purchase price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the
vendee fails to pay within a fixed period (Taguba v. Vda. De Leon, 132 SCRA 722; Luzon Brokerage Co. Inc. vs. Maritime
[4]
Building Co. Inc. 86 SCRA 305; Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. et al. 12 SCRA 276).
Aside from concluding that the contract of barter or sale had in fact been consummated when petitioner and Dr. Cruz
parted ways at the bank, the trial court likewise dwelt on the unexplained delay with which petitioner complained about the
alleged fakery. Thus:
x x x. Verily, plaintiff is already estopped to come back after the lapse of considerable length of time to claim that what
he got was fake. He is a Business Management graduate of La Salle University, Class 1978-79, a professional banker as
well as a jeweler in his own right. Two hours is more than enough time to make a switch of a Russian diamond with the real
diamond. It must be remembered that in July 1984 plaintiff made a sketch of the subject jewelries (sic) at the Prudential
Bank. Plaintiff had a tester at 8:00 p.m. at the residence of Atty. Belarmino. Why then did he not bring it out when he was

examining the subject jewelries (sic) at about 6:00 p.m. in the banks lobby? Obviously, he had no need for it after being
satisfied of the genuineness of the subject jewelries (sic). When Dra. Cruz and plaintiff left the bank both of them had fully
performed their respective prestations. Once a contract is shown to have been consummated or fully performed by the
parties thereto, its existence and binding effect can no longer be disputed. It is irrelevant and immaterial to dispute the due
execution of a contract if both of them have in fact performed their obligations thereunder and their respective signatures and
those of their witnesses appear upon the face of the document (Weldon Construction v. CA G.R. No. L-35721, Oct. 12,
[5]
1987).
Finally, in awarding damages to the defendants, the lower court remarked:
The Court finds that plaintiff acted in wanton bad faith. Exhibit 2-Belarmino purports to show that the Tanay property is
worth P25,000.00. However, also on that same day it was executed, the propertys worth was magnified at P75,000.00 (Exh.
3-Belarmino). How could in less than a day (Oct. 19, 1984) the value would (sic) triple under normal circumstances? Plaintiff,
with the assistance of his agents, was able to exchange the Tanay property which his bank valued only at P25,000.00 in
exchange for a genuine pair of emerald cut diamond worth P200,000.00 belonging to Dra. Cruz. He also retrieved the
US$300.00 and jewelries (sic) from his agents. But he was not satisfied in being able to get subject jewelries for a song. He
had to file a malicious and unfounded case against Dra. Cruz and Atty. Belarmino who are well known, respected and held in
high esteem in San Pablo City where everybody practically knows everybody. Plaintiff came to Court with unclean hands
dragging the defendants and soiling their clean and good name in the process. Both of them are near the twilight of their lives
after maintaining and nurturing their good reputation in the community only to be stunned with a court case. Since the filing of
this case on October 26, 1984 up to the present they were living under a pall of doubt. Surely, this affected not only their
earning capacity in their practice of their respective professions, but also they suffered besmirched reputations. Dra. Cruz
runs her own hospital and defendant Belarmino is a well respected legal practitioner.
The length of time this case dragged on during which period their reputation were (sic) tarnished and their names
maligned by the pendency of the case, the Court is of the belief that some of the damages they prayed for in their answers to
the complaint are reasonably proportionate to the sufferings they underwent (Art. 2219, New Civil Code). Moreover, because
of the falsity, malice and baseless nature of the complaint defendants were compelled to litigate. Hence, the award of
[6]
attorneys fees is warranted under the circumstances (Art. 2208, New Civil Code).
From the trial courts adverse decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On October 20, 1992, the
[7]
Court of Appeals, however, rendered a decision affirming in toto the lower courts decision. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied on October 19, 1993, petitioner now files the instant petition alleging that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT AND IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF ACTUALLY RECEIVED A GENUINE PAIR OF EMERALD CUT DIAMOND EARRING(S) FROM
DEFENDANT CRUZ x x x;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE; and
III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DEED OF SALE OF THE TANAY PROPERTY (EXH.
`D) AS NULL AND VOID OR IN NOT ANNULLING THE SAME, AND IN FAILING TO GRANT REASONABLE
[8]
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
As to the first allegation, the Court observes that petitioner is essentially raising a factual issue as it invites us to
examine and weigh anew the facts regarding the genuineness of the earrings bartered in exchange for the Tanay
property. This, of course, we cannot do without unduly transcending the limits of our review power in petitions of this nature
which are confined merely to pure questions of law. We accord, as a general rule, conclusiveness to a lower courts findings
of fact unless it is shown, inter alia, that: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admission of both
[9]
parties. We find nothing, however, that warrants the application of any of these exceptions.
Consequently, this Court upholds the appellate courts findings of fact especially because these concur with those of the
[10]
trial court which, upon a thorough scrutiny of the records, are firmly grounded on evidence presented at the trial. To
reiterate, this Courts jurisdiction is only limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
[11]
discretion.
Nonetheless, this Court has to closely delve into petitioners allegation that the lower courts decision of March 7, 1989 is
[12]
a ready-made one because it was handed down a day after the last date of the trial of the case. Petitioner, in this
regard, finds it incredible that Judge J. Ausberto Jaramillo was able to write a 12-page single-spaced decision, type it and
release it on March 7, 1989, less than a day after the last hearing on March 6, 1989. He stressed that Judge Jaramillo
replaced Judge Salvador de Guzman and heard only his rebuttal testimony.
This allegation is obviously no more than a desperate effort on the part of petitioner to disparage the lower courts
findings of fact in order to convince this Court to review the same. It is noteworthy that Atty. Belarmino clarified that Judge
Jaramillo had issued the first order in the case as early as March 9, 1987 or two years before the rendition of the decision. In
fact, Atty. Belarmino terminated presentation of evidence on October 13, 1987, while Dr. Cruz finished hers on February 4,
1989, or more than a month prior to the rendition of the judgment. The March 6, 1989 hearing was conducted solely for the

[13]
presentation of petitioner's rebuttal testimony. In other words, Judge Jaramillo had ample time to study the case and write
the decision because the rebuttal evidence would only serve to confirm or verify the facts already presented by the parties.
The Court finds nothing anomalous in the said situation. No proof has been adduced that Judge Jaramillo was motivated
by a malicious or sinister intent in disposing of the case with dispatch. Neither is there proof that someone else wrote the
decision for him. The immediate rendition of the decision was no more than Judge Jaramillos compliance with his duty as a
[14]
judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The two-year period within
which Judge Jaramillo handled the case provided him with all the time to study it and even write down its facts as soon as
these were presented to court. In fact, this Court does not see anything wrong in the practice of writing a decision days
before the scheduled promulgation of judgment and leaving the dispositive portion for typing at a time close to the date of
[15]
promulgation, provided that no malice or any wrongful conduct attends its adoption. The practice serves the dual purposes
of safeguarding the confidentiality of draft decisions and rendering decisions with promptness. Neither can Judge Jaramillo
be made administratively answerable for the immediate rendition of the decision. The acts of a judge which pertain to his
judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
[16]
faith. Hence, in the absence of sufficient proof to the contrary, Judge Jaramillo is presumed to have performed his job in
accordance with law and should instead be commended for his close attention to duty.
Having disposed of petitioners first contention, we now come to the core issue of this petition which is whether the Court
of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the contract of barter or sale under the circumstances of this case.
The Civil Code provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent. From this moment, the parties are bound not only
to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may
[17]
be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds
[18]
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of sale has the force of
law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual
commitments. Article 1358 of the Civil Code which requires the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument, is only
[19]
[20]
for convenience, and registration of the instrument only adversely affects third parties. Formal requirements are,
therefore, for the benefit of third parties. Non-compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of the contract nor
the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder.
It is evident from the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner and Dr. Cruz. As such,
they are bound by the contract unless there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its nullification. Hence, the problem
that should be addressed in this case is whether or not under the facts duly established herein, the contract can be voided in
accordance with law so as to compel the parties to restore to each other the things that have been the subject of the contract
[21]
with their fruits, and the price with interest.
Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties are:
(1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; and (2) those where the consent is vitiated by
[22]
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. Accordingly, petitioner now stresses before this Court that he
entered into the contract in the belief that the pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings was genuine. On the pretext that those
pieces of jewelry turned out to be counterfeit, however, petitioner subsequently sought the nullification of said contract on the
[23]
ground that it was, in fact, tainted with fraud such that his consent was vitiated.
There is fraud when, through the insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced
[24]
to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. The records, however, are bare of any evidence
manifesting that private respondents employed such insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner into entering the
contract of barter. Neither is there any evidence showing that Dr. Cruz induced petitioner to sell his Tanay property or that
she cajoled him to take the earrings in exchange for said property.On the contrary, Dr. Cruz did not initially accede to
petitioners proposal to buy the said jewelry. Rather, it appears that it was petitioner, through his agents, who led Dr. Cruz to
believe that the Tanay property was worth exchanging for her jewelry as he represented that its value was P400,000.00 or
more than double that of the jewelry which was valued only at P160,000.00. If indeed petitioners property was truly worth that
much, it was certainly contrary to the nature of a businessman-banker like him to have parted with his real estate for half its
price. In short, it was in fact petitioner who resorted to machinations to convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the
Tanay property.
Moreover, petitioner did not clearly allege mistake as a ground for nullification of the contract of sale. Even assuming
that he did, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the same. To invalidate a contract, mistake must refer to the substance of
the thing that is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter
[25]
into the contract. An example of mistake as to the object of the contract is the substitution of a specific thing contemplated
[26]
by the parties with another. In his allegations in the complaint, petitioner insinuated that an inferior one or one that had only
Russian diamonds was substituted for the jewelry he wanted to exchange with his 10-hectare land. He, however, failed to
prove the fact that prior to the delivery of the jewelry to him, private respondents endeavored to make such substitution.
Likewise, the facts as proven do not support the allegation that petitioner himself could be excused for the mistake. On
account of his work as a banker-jeweler, it can be rightfully assumed that he was an expert on matters regarding gems. He
had the intellectual capacity and the business acumen as a banker to take precautionary measures to avert such a mistake,
considering the value of both the jewelry and his land. The fact that he had seen the jewelry before October 24, 1984 should
not have precluded him from having its genuineness tested in the presence of Dr. Cruz. Had he done so, he could have
avoided the present situation that he himself brought about. Indeed, the finger of suspicion of switching the genuine jewelry
[27]
for a fake inevitably points to him. Such a mistake caused by manifest negligence cannot invalidate a juridical act. As the

Civil Code provides, (t)here is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk affecting the object of the
[28]
contract.
Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within which to
[29]
examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied with the same. By taking the
jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which was more consistent with his exercise of ownership over it. This
gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing his
signature to the contract of sale. That after two hours he later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in
exchange for his Tanay property, could not sever the juridical tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and value of
the thing he had taken preclude its return after that supervening period within which anything could have happened, not
excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its being switched with an inferior kind.
Both the trial and appellate courts, therefore, correctly ruled that there were no legal bases for the nullification of the
contract of sale. Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings had been transferred to Dr.
[30]
Cruz and petitioner, respectively, upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. Said contract of sale being absolute in
nature, title passed to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since there was no stipulation in the contract that title to the
property sold has been reserved in the seller until full payment of the price or that the vendor has the right to unilaterally
[31]
resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Such stipulations are not manifest in the
contract of sale.
While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable to petitioner, its
nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the transfer of ownership and possession of
[32]
the things exchanged considering the fact that their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and demandable.
Neither may such failure to pay the balance of the purchase price result in the payment of interest thereon. Article 1589
of the Civil Code prescribes the payment of interest by the vendee for the period between the delivery of the thing and the
payment of the price in the following cases:
(1) Should it have been so stipulated;
(2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce fruits or income;
(3) Should he be in default, from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand for the payment of the price.
[33]
Not one of these cases obtains here. This case should, of course, be distinguished from De la Cruz v. Legaspi, where the
court held that failure to pay the consideration after the notarization of the contract as previously promised resulted in the
vendees liability for payment of interest. In the case at bar, there is no stipulation for the payment of interest in the contract of
sale nor proof that the Tanay property produced fruits or income. Neither did petitioner demand payment of the price as in
fact he filed an action to nullify the contract of sale.
All told, petitioner appears to have elevated this case to this Court for the principal reason of mitigating the amount of
damages awarded to both private respondents which petitioner considers as exorbitant. He contends that private
respondents do not deserve at all the award of damages. In fact, he pleads for the total deletion of the award as regards
private respondent Belarmino whom he considers a mere nominal party because no specific claim for damages against him
was alleged in the complaint. When he filed the case, all that petitioner wanted was that Atty. Belarmino should return to him
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 320725, the deed of sale executed by Fr. Antonio Jacobe, the deed of redemption and
the check alloted for expenses. Petitioner alleges further that Atty. Belarmino should not have delivered all those documents
to Dr. Cruz because as the lawyer for both the seller and the buyer in the sale contract, he should have protected the rights of
both parties. Moreover, petitioner asserts that there was no firm basis for damages except for Atty. Belarminos
[34]
uncorroborated testimony.
Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the court
[35]
shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion. To warrant
the award of damages, it must be shown that the person to whom these are awarded has sustained injury. He must likewise
[36]
establish sufficient data upon which the court can properly base its estimate of the amount of damages. Statements of
[37]
facts should establish such data rather than mere conclusions or opinions of witnesses. Thus:
x x x. For moral damages to be awarded, it is essential that the claimant must have satisfactorily proved during the
trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection with the adverse partys acts. If the
court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not
be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be
[38]
shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
In this regard, the lower court appeared to have awarded damages on a ground analogous to malicious prosecution
[39]
under Article 2219(8) of the Civil Code as shown by (1) petitioners wanton bad faith in bloating the value of the Tanay
property which he exchanged for a genuine pair of emerald-cut diamond worth P200,000.00; and (2) his filing of a malicious
and unfounded case against private respondents who were well known, respected and held in high esteem in San Pablo City
where everybody practically knows everybody and whose good names in the twilight of their lives were soiled by petitioners
coming to court with unclean hands, thereby affecting their earning capacity in the exercise of their respective professions
and besmirching their reputation.
For its part, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award of damages to private respondents for these reasons:
The malice with which Fule filed this case is apparent. Having taken possession of the genuine jewelry of Dra. Cruz,
Fule now wishes to return a fake jewelry to Dra. Cruz and, more than that, get back the real property, which his

bank owns. Fule has obtained a genuine jewelry which he could sell anytime, anywhere and to anybody, without the
[40]
same being traced to the original owner for practically nothing. This is plain and simple, unjust enrichment.
While, as a rule, moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good
[41]
faith because it is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate, the same, however, cannot apply in the case
at bar. The factual findings of the courts a quo to the effect that petitioner filed this case because he was the victim of fraud;
that he could not have been such a victim because he should have examined the jewelry in question before accepting
delivery thereof, considering his exposure to the banking and jewelry businesses; and that he filed the action for the
nullification of the contract of sale with unclean hands, all deserve full faith and credit to support the conclusion that petitioner
was motivated more by ill will than a sincere attempt to protect his rights in commencing suit against respondents.
As pointed out earlier, a closer scrutiny of the chain of events immediately prior to and on October 24, 1984 itself would
amply demonstrate that petitioner was not simply negligent in failing to exercise due diligence to assure himself that what he
was taking in exchange for his property were genuine diamonds. He had rather placed himself in a situation from which it
preponderantly appears that his seeming ignorance was actually just a ruse. Indeed, he had unnecessarily dragged
respondents to face the travails of litigation in speculating at the possible favorable outcome of his complaint when he should
have realized that his supposed predicament was his own making. We, therefore, see here no semblance of an honest and
sincere belief on his part that he was swindled by respondents which would entitle him to redress in court. It must be noted
that before petitioner was able to convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay property, petitioner took pains to
thoroughly examine said jewelry, even going to the extent of sketching their appearance. Why at the precise moment when
he was about to take physical possession thereof he failed to exert extra efforts to check their genuineness despite the large
consideration involved has never been explained at all by petitioner. His acts thus failed to accord with what an ordinary
prudent man would have done in the same situation. Being an experienced banker and a businessman himself who
deliberately skirted a legal impediment in the sale of the Tanay property and to minimize the capital gains tax for its
exchange, it was actually gross recklessness for him to have merely conducted a cursory examination of the jewelry when
every opportunity for doing so was not denied him. Apparently, he carried on his person a tester which he later used to prove
the alleged fakery but which he did not use at the time when it was most needed. Furthermore, it took him two more hours of
unexplained delay before he complained that the jewelry he received were counterfeit. Hence, we stated earlier that anything
could have happened during all the time that petitioner was in complete possession and control of the jewelry, including the
possibility of substituting them with fake ones, against which respondents would have a great deal of difficulty defending
themselves. The truth is that petitioner even failed to successfully prove during trial that the jewelry he received from Dr. Cruz
were not genuine. Add to that the fact that he had been shrewd enough to bloat the Tanay propertys price only a few days
after he purchased it at a much lower value. Thus, it is our considered view that if this slew of circumstances were connected,
like pieces of fabric sewn into a quilt, they would sufficiently demonstrate that his acts were not merely negligent but rather
studied and deliberate.
We do not have here, therefore, a situation where petitioners complaint was simply found later to be based on an
erroneous ground which, under settled jurisprudence, would not have been a reason for awarding moral and exemplary
[42]
damages. Instead, the cause of action of the instant case appears to have been contrived by petitioner himself. In other
words, he was placed in a situation where he could not honestly evaluate whether his cause of action has a semblance of
merit, such that it would require the expertise of the courts to put it to a test. His insistent pursuit of such case then coupled
with circumstances showing that he himself was guilty in bringing about the supposed wrongdoing on which he anchored his
cause of action would render him answerable for all damages the defendant may suffer because of it. This is precisely what
took place in the petition at bar and we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the courts below that respondents in
this case suffered considerable damages due to petitioners unwarranted action.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Dr. Cruz,
however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of P40,000.00 within ten (10) days from the finality of
this decision. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ. (Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular
barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
[1]
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of
the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however,
deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial
court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order,
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
[2]
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13,
1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the
petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC,
[3]
the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808
on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
[4]
the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his
term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
[5]
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
[6]
nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
[7]
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a
case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
[8]
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according
to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned.The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code
considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
[9]
having been scheduled on May 1997.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority and separate concurring
opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.

G.R. No. 39085
September 27, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
ANTONIO YABUT, defendant-appellant.
Felipe S. Abeleda for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the appellant of the crime of murder
and assessing the death penalty.
The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of murder upon the following
information:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Antonio Yabut,
then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another
prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly
from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting
upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the death of the latter about
twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.
That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been
convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered
by competent tribunals.
Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following findings of fact which, from an
independent examination of the entire testimony, we are convinced, are supported by the evidence beyond reasonable
doubt:
La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1. de agosto de 1932, estaba compuesta de unos 150
o mas penados, de largas condenas, al mando del preso Jose Villafuerte, como Chief Squad Leader, y del preso
Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman parte de esta brigada el occiso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, el acusado Antonio
Yabut y los presos llamados Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro, Mateo Bailon y los moros Taladie y
Hasan.
Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya cerrado el pabellon de la brigada, pues se
aproximaba la hora del descanso y silencio dentro de la prision, mientras el jefe bastonero Villafuerte se hallaba
sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la brigada, vio al preso Carreon cerca de el, y en aquel instante el acusado Yabut,
dirigiendose a Carreon, le dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el (Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe bastonero
Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que se apaciguaran; pero, entre tanto, el preso
Carreon se encaro con el otro preso Saulo cobrandole dos cajetillas de cigarillos de diez centimos cada una que le
debia. Saulo contesto que ya le pagaria, pero Carreon, por toda contestacion, pego en la cara a saulo y este quedo
desvanecido. En vista de esto, el jefe bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que estaba autorizado a
llevar. Simultaneamente Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut pegaba con un palo (Exhibit C) al otro preso Sabas Aseo,
o Asayo, primeramente en la nuca y despues en la cabeza, mientras estaba de espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien,
al recibir el golpe en la nuca, se inclino hacia delante, como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado Yabut dio
un paso hacia delante y con el palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en la cabeza a Sabas Aseo, quien cayo al
suelo.
El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle, pero este le dijo: "No te acerques; de otro
modo, moriras." No obstante la actitud amenazadora de Yabut, Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso darle un golpe
que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la porra que Ilevaba. Los dos lucharon y Ilegaron a
abrazarse hasta que se le deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron luchando ambos y el acusado
Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a Villafuerte y habia malherido al preso Sabas Aseo.
Despues de aquello, Yabut consiguio zafarse de Villafuerte y se dirigio al otro extremo de la brigada, escondiendose
dentro del bao y alli fue cogido inmediatamente despues del suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que
desempenaba el cargo de sargento de los policias de la prision.
We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who gave the fatal blow to the
deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of
the Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by
subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They
further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind.
On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:
1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not corroborated.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.

4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, in the Spanish text, which is
decisive:
Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior Pena. Los que comentieren
algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por sentencia firme no empezada a cumpir, o durante el tiempo de
su condena, seran castigados con la pena sealada por la ley para el nuevo delito, en su grado maximo, sin
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la regla 5.a del articulo 62.
El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un delincuente habitual sera indultado a los setenta aos, si
hubiere ya cumplido la condena primitiva, o cuando llegare a cumplirla despues de la edad sobredicha, a no ser que
por su conducta a por otras circunstancias no fuere digno de la gracia.
The English translation of article 160 is as follows:
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense Penalty. Besides
the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of
seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching
said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article 160
and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is
committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as
the appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article
160 in the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not concede that the appellant
is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no
such deduction could be drawn from the caption. Apart from this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction
(and we do not understand the appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the
new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such
epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that
follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code
will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently
suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of
the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text.
Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.
The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion, after a thorough examination of
the record, that the findings of the court below are amply sustained by the evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of
treachery (alevosia). As some members of the court entertain a reasonable doubt that the existence of treachery (alevosia)
was established, it results that the penalty assessed by the court below must be modified. We find the defendant guilty of
homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with article 160 of the same, we sentence the
defendant- appellant to the maximum degree ofreclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo (alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000. Costs de oficio.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 191002
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
JAIME N. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 191032
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC),

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA),
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 191057

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15,
ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY,
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
x-----------------------x
JOHN G. PERALTA,
Petitioner,
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC).
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PETER IRVING CORVERA;
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM;
ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.;
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS;
MARLOU B. UBANO;
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINESDAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by
its Immediate Past President, ATTY.
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in
his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
G.R. No. 191149

the PHILIPPINE BAR;
MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER;
BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN)
CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO;
BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M.
REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE)
CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN
NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY)
SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA
ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN
KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAGASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN
JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON;
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN
RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF
THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP)
CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA
GUEVARRA;
WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES;
WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
YOLANDA QUISUMBINGJAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO
DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCOOLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAGVILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA;
LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE
DE LEON.
Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP
GovernorSouthern Luzon), and ATTY.
ROLAND B. INTING
(IBP GovernorEastern Visayas),
Petitioners,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER

EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191342
G.R. No. 191420

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 17, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the
incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1),
Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice
Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII? Doesmandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Precs of the Consolidated Cases

[1]
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149 as special civil actions for certiorari andmandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent
President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.
[2]
[3]
In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting
its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
[4]
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to
appointments in the Executive Department.
[5]
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the
Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary.
[6]
In G.R. No. 191342, which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern
Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
to the President for appointment during the period provided for in Section 15, Article VII.
All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance
to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
[7]
respectively (Valenzuela), by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the
power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries one
side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the
coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that
the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount
national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the
[8]
decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor. He
opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution,
which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to finally resolve
constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court under the Constitution. As such, he contends
that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that
a final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal
[9]
community that would go a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system.
In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selection
process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing authority for the position of
Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the Presidents authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the
Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless a nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme
[10]
Court.
For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. 191057 that unorthodox and exceptional circumstances
spawned by the discordant interpretations, due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to
Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution have bred a frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional
provisions mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar and the general public as well, because of its dimensional
impact to the nation and the people, thereby fashioning transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBCs proper
exercise of its principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary by submitting only to the President (not to the
next President) a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy from which the

[11]
members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be appointed. PHILCONSA further believes and
[12]
submits that now is the time to revisit and review Valenzuela, the strange and exotic Decision of the Court en banc.
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC to immediately transmit to the
President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the event that the Court resolves
[13]
that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that the JBC has initiated
the process of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the
applications to the position, and is perilously near completing the nomination process and coming up with a list of nominees
for submission to the President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010, which only
highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting
[14]
the list, especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments.
Antecedents
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to
the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution,
[15]
which reads:
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.
It will publish the opening of the position for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of
candidates; publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications; conduct
public interviews of candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.
As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the matter.
18 January 2010.
(sgd.)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court &
Ex-Officio Secretary
Judicial and Bar Council
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose
[16]
its announcement dated January 20, 2010, viz:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or recommendation, of the
position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO.
Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than 4 February
2010 (Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat xxx:
[17]
The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
[18]
25, 2010, respectively.
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, applied, but later
formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their
nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro;
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted
their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
[19]
Morales. Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of
the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the
[20]
JBC onFebruary 8, 2010).
The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards set by the JBC
rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of
[21]
the Ombudsman).
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,
2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice
Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in
[22]
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010.
Issues
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its
rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the
controversy now before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick step towards May 17,
2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal luminaries, but also among non-legal
quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or
not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments of two judges of the Regional Trial Court,
the Court addressed this issue now before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible polemics concerning the
matter, but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela would be miniscule [sic] compared to the polemics that have
now erupted in regard to the current controversy, and that unless put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a ruling from
the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may
[23]
irreparably be impaired.
Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of their petitions.
G.R. No. 191002
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional question of whether the
incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the
successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May
17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191032

a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en banc?
G.R. No. 191057

a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
applicable only to positions in the Executive Department?
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution also applies to members of
the Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted because they are impressed with public interest or
are demanded by the exigencies of public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the
period of prohibition?
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to include and submit the names of nominees
who manifested interest to be nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the understanding that
his/her nomination will be submitted to the next President in view of the prohibition against presidential
appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary under
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution?
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010,
including that for the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191149
a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo?
G.R. No. 191342
a.
Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President without
committing a grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President
from making midnight appointments two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections
until the end of her term?
b.
Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the candidates for the position of Chief Justice,
constitutionally invalid in view of the JBCs illegal composition allowing each member from the Senate
and the House of Representatives to have one vote each?
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
consolidated petitions, except that filed in G.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that the next stage of the process for the
selection of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice would be the public interview of the candidates and the preparation
[24]
[25]
of the short list of candidates, including the interview of the constitutional experts, as may be needed. It stated:
Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper
appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that
vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof,
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments two
(2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term and
Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by
its decision in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter.
On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by May 17, 2010.
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the JBCs function to recommend is a continuing
process, which does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is to submit the list of
[26]
nominees to Malacaang on the very day the vacancy arises; the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it
commenced and set in motion the process of selecting the nominees to be submitted to the President for the position of Chief
[27]
Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno; (c) petitioner Sorianos theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the President,
who has the power to appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation of the phrase members
of the Supreme Court found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the
[28]
exclusion of the Chief Justice;
(d) a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the
President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list
is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose
principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice
[29]
and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the President;
and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees, considering that there is no imperative duty on its
part to include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBCs determination of who it
[30]
nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
[31]
Constitution;
that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the
framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice
[32]
versa; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
[33]
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment
of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized
that there might be the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban, like when the membership of the
Supreme Court should be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question
[34]
requiring expeditious resolution be divided; and that Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary
is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the
[35]
appointments during the period of the prohibition.
Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the
[36]
next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is quite expected; (b) the Court acts as
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as such, has the power to correct manifest errors on the
[37]
statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC); (c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief
Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution,
there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice
[38]
Puno; and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the
[39]
vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit:
(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera);
(b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim);
(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan);
[40]
(d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1, 2010 of the National Union of Peoples Lawyers
(NUPL);
(e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty. Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano);
(f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur
Chapter and its Immediate Past President, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao del Sur);
(g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of Atty. Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser);
(h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr.
Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite;
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa ng
Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken Leonard
Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-asa Convenor Alvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman James
Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) Chairman Einstein
Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) Chairman Vijae Alquisola; and Student
Christian Movement of the Philippines (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et al.);
(i)
The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales
(Bello et al.); and
(j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 4, 2010 of the Women Trial Lawyers
Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty. Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana; Atty.
Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty.
Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty. Guinevere de Leon (WTLOP).
Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De Castros petition
was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making
any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice
Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the
constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by the
Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the
President to fill the vacancies within 90 days from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the
submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional prohibition.
Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence
that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances
warrant the appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an
Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They
insist that even without the successor of Chief Justice Puno being appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed
to sit and adjudge en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court
is not necessary; that petitioner De Castros fears are unfounded and baseless, being based on a mere possibility, the
occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a crisis in the judicial system and will worsen an
already vulnerable political situation.
ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation in the country when the election-related
questions reach the Court as false, because there is an existing law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the
office of Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not been repealed by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other law; that a temporaryor an acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence;
that the designation of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by practical necessity; that
the practicewas intended to be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the
Constitution on account of the settled practice; that the practice was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at
the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting
Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice
was acknowledged and even used by analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections,

perBrillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court has shown that this rule of succession has
been repeatedly observed and has become a part of its tradition.
Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as an
election offense the act of any government official who appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or
privilege to any government official or employee during the period of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision
covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President;
that for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the
period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the next
Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because there can be no appointment until a
vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17, 2010.
Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castros prayer to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the incumbent
President is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a
submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed advance appointment by the
incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the
JBC if there is no vacancy.
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds of appointments
made by the President; and that the Court, inValenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judges
during the prohibition period were void.
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the appointments
in the Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15
does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Sorianos contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is
vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the
Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term members was interpreted
in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court; that PHILCONSAs prayer that the Court pass a resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest
as nominees, but with conditions, shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in
the body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief prayed for highlights
the lack of merit of PHILCONSAs petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition on
the President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only to
the next duly elected President after the period of the constitutional ban against midnight appointments has expired.
Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body has no duty
under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the
period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict limitations under
Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but
simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article
VII to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an exception.
Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBCs act of nominating appointees to the Supreme
Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the JBC
in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call for applications only begins from the occurrence
of the vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill the
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no
definite legal basis for any party to claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by the
JBC is a matter of right under law.
The main question presented in all the filings herein because it involves two seemingly conflicting provisions of the
Constitution imperatively demands the attention and resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve the question
definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the ever-present need, first, to safeguard the independence,
reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged into
the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle once and for all the doubt about an outgoing Presidents
power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period starting two months before the presidential elections until the end of
the presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its primary office of
screening and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the Judiciary.
Thus, we resolve.
Ruling of the Court

Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
[41]
Black defines locus standi as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In public or
constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the
ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to
avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that
the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
[42]
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
[43]
constitutional questions. Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
[44]
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
[45]
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether
a petitioner in a public action had locus standi.There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
[46]
result. Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la
[47]
[48]
[49]
Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived
[50]
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the
approach when the cases had transcendental importance. Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass
[51]
the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
[52]
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition
due to their far-reaching implications, even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino
v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens,legislators, and civic
[53]
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional
executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner
may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently
demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not
surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the
[54]
petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
[55]
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
[56]
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
[57]
grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen
and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
[58]
injury cannot be denied.
Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert their
right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the
next Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he is affected by
[59]
the continuing proceedings in the JBC, which involve unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds.
PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit organization existing under the law for the purpose of
defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering. It also alleges that the Court
[60]
has recognized its legal standing to file cases on constitutional issues in several cases.
In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he is a citizen of the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar
engaged in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former Minister of Justice, former Member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former member of the Faculty of the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for Southern
Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by
the JBC to the President, for [a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation and application of the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments with regard to respondent JBCs function in submitting the list of nominees is well within the concern of
petitioners, who are duty bound to ensure that obedience and respect for the Constitution is upheld, most especially by
government offices, such as respondent JBC, who are specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole scheme of
our democratic institution. They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest in the
process of selecting the members of the Supreme Court, and in the selection of the Chief Justice, considering that the person
appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional supervision and authority over them and other members of
[61]
the legal profession.
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as
to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole,
and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal
interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from
a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any
petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
[62]
requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any
obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v.Philippine
[63]
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
[64]
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Justiciability
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication,
considering that although the selection process commenced by the JBC is going on, there is yet no final list of nominees;
hence, there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list must be submitted to the incumbent President, or reserved
for submission to the incoming President.
Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination, pointing out
that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has already completed its selection process and is now ready to
submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner De Castro is merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is
clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castros petition rests on an overbroad and vague allegation of
political tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere advisory opinion on what the JBC and the
President should do, and are not invoking any issues that are justiciable in nature.
Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal claims in
any of the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action taken by the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional
manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or
associations of lawyers and law students on the issues published in the daily newspapers are matters of paramount and
transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general public; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal duty or
allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does
not even attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should rule for
the guidance of the JBC; that the fact that the Court supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court can rule
on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, because supervision involves oversight, which means that the subordinate
officer or body must first act, and if such action is not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and only then, may the
person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does
not allege that the JBC has performed a specific act susceptible to correction for being illegal or unconstitutional; and that the
Mendoza petition asks the Court to issue an advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a wrong act by
the JBC, but to declare the state of the law in the absence of an actual case or controversy.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is
that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice.
Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of the
JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the
insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent
President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent
President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that the
incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the
Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so
prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,
considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs byMay 17, 2010. The outcome
will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the
nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial
determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional
interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
[65]
intelligently adjudicate the issues. Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground
that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made
to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government
among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments
(Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political
structure, as Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the Court) explained in his
sponsorship speech:
We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in government
because we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and divide the awesome
powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, executive
[66]
and judicial departments.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by
the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the
Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can
only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

[67]
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed
that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the
confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
V . Intent of the Constitutional Commission
The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that the original
proposal was to have an eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase
the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any
appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that any vacancy must be filled
within two months from the date that the vacancy occurs. His proposal to have a 15-member Court was not
initially adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be
decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision
(anent the Courts membership) of the same mandate that IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL
BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF. He later agreed to suggestions to
make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it turned
out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was that the section
fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any vacancy
therein within 90 days from its occurrence.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language - that a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of
this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph: WITH RESPECT TO
LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM
THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide
stated that his purpose was to provide a uniform rule for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day period
should be counted from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that the
President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the President of his appointing
power two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end ofhis term - was approved
[68]
without discussion.
However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the result in Valenzuela.
Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative
of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
[69]
occurrence, which even Valenzuela conceded. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was
a true mandate for the President, viz:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief
Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom
[70]
has the Court had a complete complement.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may
[71]
be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish adefinite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the
Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on statutory
[72]
construction:
xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to
harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any
other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears
to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was
inserted for a definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its
face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored over one which
leaves some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect,
if to do so gives the statute a meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect
cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the
provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may
be that two provisions are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers should
control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the
latest expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom
applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different sections of the same
act, and after all other means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted. Where the
conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rules application, largely because of the
principle of implied repeal.
In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and
appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article
VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions
had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to
[73]
unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII
extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to
[74]
last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the
result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves
to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to
eliminate midnight appointments from being made by anoutgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with
[75]
in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo. In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made
for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made

within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
xxx
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the socalled midnight appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado
Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection,
became no more than a caretaker administrator whose duty was to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President. Said the Court:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them
in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other
conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which
have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they
are few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of
the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be made by the outgoing
President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been
well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be
deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons
as shown by their number and the time of their making but also appointments presumed made for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allowing appointments to be
made during the period of the ban therein provided is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a general proposition, in
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some
cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out,
comes to exist only once in every six years.Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They
may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is
[76]
considered an election offense.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not
need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting
the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer bemidnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold
of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his
[77]
administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the
Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior
processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the
enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than
[78]
to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the
purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the
time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people
influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President,
because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC
was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.
This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed
by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by
some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential
elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to
[79]
appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President
[80]
for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice
Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the Presidents power to appoint during
the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998,
had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission like Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing
powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting
[81]
President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in
the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their
[82]
being revocable at will. The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the
books that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation,
judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after
the requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement
[83]
did not include appointments to the Judiciary.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
[84]
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that
the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds
of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further
undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and
Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of
political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by
the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will
end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint
during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because
anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos
retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day period under
Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections
fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there
are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day
mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have
intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against
midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to,
because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all
for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member
of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those
who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by
the JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when
circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate
President Juan Ponce Enriles statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of
the Court even without a JBC list.
II
The Judiciary Act of 1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno,
considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office
of Chief Justice.
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or in the
event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and
powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence until a new Chief
Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby resolved the
question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront the matter now.
We cannot agree with the posture.
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate
Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every
vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief
Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The
express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the
membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely
on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is
to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting
or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief
Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted
because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are
popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments.
However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because
the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of
the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the
Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor
of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and the resignation
of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and assumption of office of his successor, on the other
hand. As summarized in the comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession is as follows:
1.
When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap was
appointed on the same day;
2.
When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan was appointed on the
same day;
3.
When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was
appointed the following day, December 8, 1991;
4.
When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn
into office the following early morning of November 30, 1998;
5.
When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban was
appointed the next day, December 20, 2005; and
6.
When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno took his
[85]
oath as Chief Justice at midnight of December 6, 2006.
III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
[86]
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it
is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a
[87]
judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act
demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary;
and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President
for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary.
xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower
courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the
candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens
the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be
unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time
granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies
within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the
President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there
[88]
must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If thelaw imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
[89]
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the
JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest,
within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno.

IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice.
Hence, Sorianos petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the
process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted
against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex
officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for
nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the
petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some
vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition
for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno byMay 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and
submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. L-7011 October 30, 1912
TRANQUILINO ROA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,Respondent-Appellee.

C. W. Ney and M.M. Levering, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino Roa, to the
custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to China as being a
subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and reside in the Philippine Islands. There is no dispute as to the
facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant, Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father
was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents
were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the appellant went to China about the year
1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his
mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on
the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the
Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of
age.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject of the
Emperor of China and not entitled to land. On appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings remanded the appellant to the Collector of
Customs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On appeal the appellant, through his counsel, assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands upon his claim that he is a
native inhabitant who has on attaining his majority exercised his right of election as between the jus sanguinisand jus
soli.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. That the board of special inquiry at Cebu abused its authority and discretion in ignoring the declaration of the appellant of
his election to be and of his being a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
The question presented is whether a child born in the Philippine Island in July, 1889, of parents, one of whom (the father)
was a Chinaman and the other a Filipina, who at the time of his birth were permanently domiciled and resided in the
Philippine Islands and were not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes, at the
time of his birth, a citizen of the Philippine Islands by virtue of law, and whether he can, on reaching his majority, elect to
become a citizen of the country of his birth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The pertinent part of the decision of the board of special inquiry reads:
In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock, he takes the nationality of his father, and his
father was not a subject of the King of Spain on April 11, 1899, the applicant, acquiring the nationality of his father, becomes
a subject of the Emperor of China and not a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
Upon appeal the Insular Collector of Customs in his decision dated February 17, 1911, said:
Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality of their
parents. Therefore, the legitimate children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of China are Chinese
subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty. Therefore, the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and of the
Philippine Bill with reference to Spanish subjects have no application in determining the citizenship or nationality of the
children of Chinese subjects in the Philippine Islands. Under the Chinese Exclusion Laws, a person of the Chinese race and
descent is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands except under the terms and conditions expressly provided for. No abuse
of authority or discretion on the part of the members of the board of special inquiry having been claimed or appearing, their
decision in this matter is sustained as being correct and proper on the showing made and in accordance with the law. The
said Tranquilino Roa is therefore refused landing.
In the Chinese and Immigration Circular No. 288, issued July 19, 1909, the Insular Collector of Customs said:
In the Wong Kim Ark case (169 U.S., 649), it was held that the Constitution of the United States must be interpreted in the
light of the common law. It would seem reasonable therefore that the Acts of Congress should be construed in the same light
and it would necessarily follow that the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, should, as far as possible, have applied to its
construction and enforcement the common law doctrine of citizenship by birth, and useless such Act clearly excludes from its
terms persons born within the Philippine Islands, such persons should be considered as citizens
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Attention is also invited to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Civil Rights Act of
1866, both of which set forth in the most explicit and comprehensive terms the principle of citizenship by birth, and to the fact
that the courts have construed both of these to be but a reiteration of the common law doctrine on the subject of citizenship.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. . . .
The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on this subject which were in force in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899, are
as follows:

ART. 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those who, without said papers may have acquired a domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
ART. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority, have the nationality of their parents.
In order that the children born of foreign parents in Spanish territory may enjoy the benefits granted them by paragraph 1 of
article 17, it shall be an indespensable requisite that the parents declare, in the manner and before the officials specified in
article 19, that they choose, in the name of their children, the Spanish nationality, renouncing any other.
ART. 19. Children of foreign parentage born in Spanish domains must state, within the year following their majority or
emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the Spanish nationality granted them by article 17.
Those who are in the kingdom shall make this declaration before the official in charge of the civil registry of the town in which
they reside; those who reside abroad, before one of the Consular or Diplomatic Agents of the Spanish Government, . . .
The second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provides:
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress.
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
All admit (1) that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself and according to its own
constitution and laws what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship; and (2) that if the appellant is a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, the Chinese Exclusion Acts do not and cannot apply to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The interpretation and construction of the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
were involved in the leading case of United States vs. Wong Kim Ark (169 U.S., 649.) The facts in the case were: Wong Kim
Ark was born in 1873 in the city of San Francisco and was a laborer. His father and mother were persons of Chinese
descent, and subjects of the Emperor of China; they were, at the time of his birth, domiciled residents of the United States;
and they continued to reside and remain there until 1890, when they departed for China. During all the time of their residence
in the United States they were engaged in business and were never employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the
Emperor of China. Wong Kim Ark ever since his birth had but one residence, to wit, in California; and had there resided,
claimed to be a citizen of the United States, and had never lost or changed the residence or gained or acquired another; and
neither he nor his parents acting for him ever renounced his allegiance to the United States or did or committed any act or
thing to exclude him therefrom. In 1890 when he was still a minor he departed for China on a temporary visit and returned in
the same year and was permitted by the Collector of Customs to enter the United States upon the ground that he was a
native-born citizen of that country. After such return he remained in the United States claiming to be a citizen thereof until
1894, when he again departed for China on a temporary visit and with the intention of returning. He did return in August,
1895, and applied to the Collector of Customs for permission to land and was denied such permission upon the sole ground
that he was not a citizen of the United States. It was conceded that if he was a citizen of the United States the Acts of
Congress known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, prohibiting persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers,
from entering the United States, did not and could not apply to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wong Kim Ark filed a petition in the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was a citizen of
the United entitled to enter that country as such , and that he was illegally detained by the Collector of Customs. The writ was
issued, and after hearing the petitioner was directed to be discharged from custody. The respondent appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. That court, after a very exhaustive examination of the questions presented, affirmed the
judgment of the district court, saying:
The fourteenth amendment (to the Constitution of the United States) affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship
by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all or qualifications (as old as
the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and
during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the
Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. the amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the
children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the
United States.
The questions presented in this case were definitely settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. According to the
doctrine here enunciated, it is quite clear that if the appellant in the case at bar had been born in the United States and was
now trying to reenter that country, he would be entitled to land upon the ground that he was a citizen of the United States. By
the laws of the United States, citizenship depends generally upon the place of birth. This is the doctrine of jus soli, and
predominates. Consequently, any person born in the United States (with certain specific exceptions) is a citizen of that
country, owes it allegiance, and is entitled to its protection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"The right of the expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people." (Act of Congress, July 27, 1868.) Expatriation is the
voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. The Act of Congress of 1868 does not define what steps
must be taken by a citizen before it can be held that he has become denationalized. In fact, there is no mode of renunciation
of citizenship prescribed by law in the United States. Whether expatriation has taken place in any instance in that country
must be determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. No general rule that will apply to all cases can be
laid down. Once a person becomes an American citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen of the United States, and this assumption stands until the contrary is shown by some voluntary act on
his part. But when he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself, he then becomes an alien to the United States, and
can regain his lost citizenship only by virtue of the same laws, and the same formalities, and by the same process by which
other aliens are enabled to become citizens. The result is that a child born in the United States of Chines parents, as in the
case of Wong Kim Ark, supra, he is a citizen of that country and continues to be such until his parents during his minority,
expatriate him, or he, after becoming of age, by some voluntary overt act or acts, expatriates himself. If this is done by his
parents during his minority it might be (a question we do not decide) that he could, on becoming of age, elect the nationality
of his birth (the United States).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A reading of article 17 of the Civil Code, above copied, is sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms and recognizes the
principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli. The second, that of jus sangguinis; and the last two that of free selection,
with the first predominating. Article 18 provides that children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality
of their parents. A married woman follows the condition and nationality of her husband. (Article 22.) Consequently, according
to those provisions, the children, during their minority and while they are under parental authority, have, as general rule, the
nationality of their father. In order that children born of foreign parents in Spanish territory might enjoy the benefits
appertaining to Spanish nationality, it was necessary for their parents, if they were minors, to make a formal declaration
before the proper authorities to the effect that they choose for their children that nationality and renounce all others. The
children, within one year after becoming of age or after emancipation, could elect the nationality of their birth and enjoy the
benefits pertaining thereto by making the declaration required in article 19 and in the manner set forth therein. In either
instance a positive, over act was essential. In the absence of any such acts, it was not assumed that the children or their
parents for them elected the nationality of the country of their birth. The contrary rule prevails in the United
States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the second paragraph of article 22 of the Civil Code, a Spanish woman who married a foreigner could, upon the
dissolution of the marriage, recover her Spanish nationality by complying with the requisites mentioned in article 21. This
latter article provided that a Spaniard who had lost his citizenship by acquiring the nationality of a foreign country would
recover it upon returning to the Spanish Kingdom by indicating before the proper official the domicile which he elected as his
residence and by renouncing the protection of the flag of said country. As a general rule under Spanish law there was no
question about the nationality of a married woman following that of her husband. There might have been cases of marriage,
however, where neither the nationality of the wife nor that of the children would follow that of the husband and father. Such,
for instance, would be the case if the laws governing citizenship of the country of the father prohibited the nationalizing of the
wife and children. It would there necessarily follow that the wife did not lose her nationality upon marriage, nor would the
nationality of the children follow that of the father. But with this class, if there be such, we are not now
dealing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the United States, and who might hereafter be lawfully nationalized, shall be deemed a citizen." The phrase
"shall be deemed a citizen" in said section, or as it was in the Act of 1855, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen," while
it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way,
as by the judgment of a competent court upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on
that account any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever
an Act of Congress requires to be deemed or taken as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When Congress declared that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be deemed an American citizen, the effect, when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
nationalized directly by an Act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Leonard vs. Grant, 6 Sawy., 603; 5
Fed., 16.)chanrobles virtual law library
The Supreme court of the United States said in Kelley vs. Owen, 7 Wall., 496, that the object of the Act was to allow the
citizenship of the wife "to follow that of her husband without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her
part."chanrobles virtual law library
Under statute and these decisions, an alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States is "deemed" a citizen. Is the
converse of this rule true? Does an American woman become an alien by marriage to a foreigner? There is no statutory
declaration to that effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This question is one which has not been definitely solved, and the contrariety of opinion upon it shows it to be difficult of
solution the doubt arises as to what effect should be given to modern statutes on naturalization and expatriation. In the case
of Shanks vs. Dupont (28 U.S., 242), decided in 1830, the Supreme Court of the United States said:
Neither did the marriage with Shanks produce that effect; because with an alien, whether a friend or an enemy, produces no
dissolution of the native allegiance of the wife. It may change her civil rights. but it does not affect her political rights or
privileges. The general doctrine is, that no persons can, by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put
off their allegiance and become aliens. If it were otherwise, then a feme alien would by her marriage become,ipso facto, a
citizen, and would be dowable of the estate of her husband; which are clearly contrary to law.

In Pequignot vs. Detroit (16 Fed., 211) it was decided (in 1883) by the United States Circuit Court than an alien woman who
has once become an American citizen by marriage which is subsequently dissolved, may resume her alienage by marriage to
a native of her own country. In this case, Judge Brown (later associate justice of the United States Supreme Court)
expressed doubt as to the binding force of Shanks vs. Dupont ( supra), because, as he said, the two reasons given for that
decision have ceased to exist, viz.: (1) that the general doctrine is "that no persons can by any act of their own without
consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens;" (2) that "if it were otherwise, then a feme alien would
by marriage become ipso facto a citizen and would be dowable of the estate of her husband, which are clearly contrary to
law." In view of the Act of July 27, 1868, expressly recognizing the right of expatriation, and the Act of February 10, 1855,
declaring that any woman married to an American citizen shall be "deemed" a citizen, Judge Brown continued by saying it
seemed to him "that we ought to apply the maxim, Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipse lex, to this case, and are not bound
to treat as controlling authority the case of Shanks vs. Dupont. We should regard the sections above mentioned as
announcing the views of Congress upon this branch of international law, and ought to apply the same rule of decision to a
case where a female American citizen marries an alien husband that we should to a case where an alien woman marries an
American citizen."chanrobles virtual law library
In Ruckgaber vs. Moore (104 Fed., 947) of the United State Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the
political status of a native born American woman who married a citizen of France, and removed with him to that country
followed that of her husband. The woman having died in France, the court declared that she must be regarded as having
been a non-resident alien at the time of her death. Upon this point the court said:
By the several statutes of America, France, and Great Britain, the marriage of a citizen of such country with an alien wife
confers upon the latter the citizenship of the husband; and this policy of the three great powers, in connection with section
1999 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which proclaims that expatriation is an inherent right, establishes that the
political status of the wife follows that of her husband with the modification that there must be withdrawal from her native
country, or equivalent act expressive of her election to renounce her former citizenship as a consequence of her marriage.
Some serious objections to this, or even the opposite conclusion, exist, but it has been reached after due consideration of the
subject, and pertinent authorities, including Shanks vs. Dupont ( supra), Pequignot vs. Detroit ( supra), and Comitis vs.
Parkerson (56 Fed., 556).
In Comitis vs. Parkerson ( supra), decided in 1893, the plaintiff, a native citizen of Louisiana, married a native born subject of
Italy who had come to Louisiana and engaged in business without intending to ever return to Italy. He never became
naturalized. After the marriage, the woman and her husband, until his death, lived together in Louisiana with no intention on
the part of either to depart from the United States. After the husband's death the widow continued to reside in Louisiana. The
court held that expatriation must be effected by removal from that country and that in the absence of any Act of Congress
authorizing it, there can be no implied renunciation of citizenship by an American woman marrying an
alien.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Jenn vs. Landes (85 Fed., 801) it appears that the complainant was born in the State of Washington, lived with her father
until the year 1896, when she permanently removed from the State of Washington, and was married to a British subject. That
she and her husband resided in Canada and had their domicile in the city of Victoria. The Canadian statute of 1886 declared
that " a married woman shall within Canada be deemed to be a subject of the state of which her husband is, for the time
being a subject." The court held that the complainant became an alien as respects the United States, so as to enable her sue
in a federal court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Secretary Fish, in a letter to the President, dated August 25, 1873, said:
Chief Justice Marshall (Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 119) says that when a citizen by his own act has made
himself the subject of a foreign power, his status is completely changed, and the act certainly places him out of the protection
of the United States while within the territory of the sovereign to whom he has sworn allegiance. Hence, it would seem that
the marriage of a female citizen of the United States with a free subject of a country by whose laws marriage confers
citizenship upon the wife of its subject, and her removal to and residence in the country of her husband's citizenship, would
divest her of her native character of an American citizen. (Van Dyne on Citizenship of the United States, 134.)
In 1886 Mr. Bayard, in the case of Mrs. Zografo, held that a native-born American woman who marries a Turkish subject and
takes up her residence in Turkey becomes a Turkish subject. Upon the death of her husband, in order to revive her American
nationality, she must leave Turkey and take up an American residence. ( Idem, 136.)chanrobles virtual law library
In February, 1890, in the case of Carl Heisinger, Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, said that the Department had several
times taken the view that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not completely divest of her original
nationality; that her American citizenship was held for most purposes to be in abeyance during coverture, but to be
susceptible to revival on her return to the jurisdiction and allegiance to the United States. ( Idem, 137.)chanrobles virtual law
library
In an instruction to the United States consul at Sagua la Grande, June 7, 1895, Acting Secretary Uhl said:chanrobles virtual
law library
The view has been taken by this Department in several cases that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does
not completely divest her of her American citizenship, but that the same is only suspended during coverture, and reverts
upon the death of her husband, if she is residing in the United States, or upon her returning to this country if she is resid ing
abroad. ( Idem, 137.)chanrobles virtual law library
Secretary Sherman, in an instruction to the United States minister at St. Petersburg, march 15, 1897, said:

By our statute, an alien wife of an American citizen shares his citizenship. By the usual rules of continental private
international law a woman marrying an alien shares his status, certainly during his life, but thereafter, on widowhood, reverts
to her original status unless she abandons the country of her origin and returns to that of her late husband. ( Idem, 138.)
From the foregoing it appears that the decided weight of authority is to the effect that the marriage of an American woman to
an alien confers upon her the nationality of her husband during coverture; but that thereafter on the dissolution of the
marriage by death, she reverts ipso facto to her original status unless her conduct or acts show that she elects the nationality
of her deceased husband. The rule under the Spanish law was to the effect that the widow must not only return to the
kingdom but she must also make declaration before the proper officials that she renounced the protection of the flag of the
country of her deceased husband, and desired to resume Spanish citizenship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The result is that both the United States and Spain have recognized, affirmed, and adopted the doctrine or principle of
citizenship by place of birth, by blood, and election, with the first predominating. Children born in the United States of foreign
parents, are citizens of that country, and it is assumed that they and their parents desire that such citizenship continue; and
this assumption stands until the contrary is shown. Under Spanish law, the contrary rule prevails. In both countries, the
nationality of the wife follows that of the husband. In the United States, the wife, on the dissolution of the marriage by
death, ipso facto, reacquires her original status unless she elects otherwise. In Spain, the widow must regain her Spanish
citizenship in the manner prescribed by law. In the United States, the nationality of the children does not, by operation of law,
follow that of our parents, while in Spain the converse is true. In both countries, the parents may elect the nationality of their
children while they are under parental authority, and after the children are released from such authority they may elect for
themselves their nationality. The mode of making that election in both countries is materially different. What changes in these
matters have taken place in the Philippine Islands by reason of the acquisition of the territory by the United
States?chanrobles virtual law library
Articles 17 to 27 , inclusive of the Civil Code deal entirely with the subject of Spanish citizenship. When these provisions were
enacted, Spain was and is now the sole and exclusive judge as to who shall and who shall not be subjects of her kingdom,
including her territories. Consequently, the said articles, being political laws (laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the former sovereign), must be held to have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States.
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, . . .
those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease
upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899.)
While the municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force
without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chapter, 34 par.
14.) However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U. S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142.) In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo
any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those
who remain in it; and the law which may de dominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-created power of the State.
Again, said articles of the Civil Code were laws which pertained to the prerogatives of the Crown of Spain.
It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal
prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they (the United States) have capacity to receive or power to exercise
them." (Pollard's Lessee vs. Hagan, 3 How. (44 U.S.), 212, 225, 11 L. Ed., 565, 571.)
And again, we now have no governmental machinery by means of which the provisions of the second paragraph of article 18
can be enforced. The only express provisions of law now in force contained in the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress
of July 1, 1902, and of March 23, 1912, the latter being reenactment of section 4 of the former, with the addition of a proviso
reading as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
An American citizen of Spanish subject means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the United States or Spain.
Permanent allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of an American citizen or Spanish subject from the allegiance of
an alien who, because he is domiciled within the domains of either of one of these countries, owes a qualified temporary
allegiance to that country. A natural born American citizen or Spanish subject means an American citizen or Spanish subject
who has become such at the moment of his birth. Citizenship, says Moore on International Law, strictly speaking, is a term of
municipal law and denotes the possession within the particular state of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications, such as minority, sex, etc. The conditions on which citizenship are acquired are regulated by municipal law.
There is no such thing as international citizenship nor international law (aside from that which might be contained in treaties)

by which citizenship may be acquired. It therefore follows that the only law applicable to the questions presented in the case
at bar is the Treaty of Paris and Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The relations which the inhabitants of ceded territory shall bear to the acquiring state are generally determined by the treaty
of cession. Every treaty of cession to which the United States has been a party, with the exception of the Treaty of Peace of
1898 with Spain, ceding Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands that the inhabitants of the territory ceded may in whole or in
part become citizens of the United States either immediately or under certain conditions agreed that the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands shall be determined by the Congress of the United States.
The contracting parties further agreed that all Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, who were residing in the Philippine
Islands at the time Spain relinquished her sovereignty over this country may continue to reside here and preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by so declaring within the time and in the manner set forth in article 9. In conformity with the
provisions of this Treaty Congress, by the Act of July 1, 1902, providing for the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, enacted section 4, above quoted. Here Congress declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Island continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th of April, 1899, and then resided in this
country, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of this country. According to
those provisions it is not necessary for such person to do anything whatsoever in order that they may acquire full citizenship.
The same is true with reference to Spanish subjects who were born in Spain proper and who had not elected to retain their
allegiance to the crown. By section 4 of the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United
States was extended to the Philippine Islands, but with limitations. In the United States every person, with certain specific
exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that country. Under section 4 every person born after the 11th of April,
1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of
their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. From the reading of section 4 and taking into consideration the Act of
March 23, 1912, it is clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the Philippine Islands who did not come
within the provisions of said section, and also that Congress did not then by express legislation determine the political status
of such persons. Therefore, the inquiry is - Did Congress intend to say that all of the inhabitants who were not included in
section 4 are to be "deemed and held to be" aliens to the Philippine Islands?chanrobles virtual law library
Congress by the Act of April 12, 1900, establishing civil government for Porto Rico provided that:
All inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in
Porto Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain on or before the 11th day of April, 1900, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain entered into on the 11th day of April, 1899; and they, together with such citizens of the United States as
may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of The People of Porto Rico, with governmental
powers as hereinafter conferred, and with power to sue and be sued as such.
The treaty provisions and the Act of Congress of April 12, 1900, were construed by the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York in October, 1902, in the case of Gonzales (118 Fed., 941) upon a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The facts in this case were as follows: The petitioner, un unmarried woman, a native of Porto Rico, 20 years
of age, arrived in the bay of New York by steamer from the island of Porto Rico on August 24, 1902. she was detained at the
immigrant station, was duly examined by a board of special inquiry, and was excluded from admission into the United States
upon the ground that she was liable to become a public charge. The court said that the only question open for discussion on
that application was whether or not the petitioner was an alien. After examining the law applicable to the case the court
concluded by saying: "This legislation (Act of April 12, 1900) has certainly not operated to effect a naturalization of the
petitioner as a citizen of the United States. Being foreign born and not naturalized, she remains an alien, and subject to the
provisions of law regulating the admission of aliens who come to the United States."chanrobles virtual law library
The writ was dismissed. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and
held that Miss Gonzales was not alien to the United States within the meaning of the laws governing the subject. (192 U.S.,
1.)chanrobles virtual law library
It will be noted that section 7 of the Act of April 12, 1900, provided that "all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th of April, 1899, andthen resided in Porto Rico" shall be deemed to be citizens of that country. It
was contended by some that all native Porto Ricans who were not actually residing in the Island of Porto Rico on the 11th
day of April, 1899, do not come within the provisions of the Act and cannot be "deemed and held to be citizens" of Porto Rico.
The State Department has held otherwise. In the case of Marrero, a native of Porto Rico, who had resided in Chile Since
1884, and who proposed in 1901 to return to Porto Rico to perform the duties of citizenship there, it was held by Acting
Secretary Hill that the language of section 7 of the Act of April 12, 1900, was to be construed in its general legal sense, in
which continued personal presence is not necessary to constitute continuos residence, and that a native of Porto Rico, who
makes it his permanent domicile does not therefore lose the benefits of this law because he was temporarily abiding
elsewhere when it went into effect. (Acting Secretary Hill to Mr. Lenderick, April 29, 1901.) And Attorney-General Knox (24
Opinions Attorney-General, 40) held that a native Porto Rican temporarily living in France who was not in Porto Rico on April
11, 1899, is under section 7 of Act of April 12, 1900, a citizen of Porto Rico.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The cession of the Philippine Islands definitely transferred the allegiance of the native inhabitants from Spain to the United
States (articles 3 and 9 of Treaty of Paris). Filipinos remaining in this country who were not natives of the Peninsula could
not, according to the terms of the treaty, elect to retain their allegiance to Spain. By the cession their allegiance became due

to the United States and they became entitled to its protection. The nationality of the Islands American instead of
Spanish.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Philippine Islands prior to April 11, 1899, had been for many months under military occupation by the United States as a
conquered country when by the third article of the Treaty of Paris the whole archipelago was ceded to the United States. The
President, in the exercise of his war power, proceeded to establish a civil government and for that purpose appointed the
Philippine Commission, consisting at first of a president and four members. This Commission, acting under instructions of the
Secretary of War, established the three independent and coordinate department of the government - executive, legislative
and judicial - and provided means for carrying on of a complete civil government. A governor-general and vice-governorgeneral were appointed and qualified. Positions of secretaries of the various departments were made and filled. Courts were
provided for, with power to hear and determine all cases arising in the Philippine Islands. In fact, a complete government was
established with all the necessary departments for the protection of the life, liberty and property of all inhabitants. The
government thus established was administered through American and Filipino officials and classified civil service employees,
all of whom before entering upon the duties of their office took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Thereupon
Congress by the Act of July 1, 1902, approved, ratified and affirmed the acts of the President in establishing the civil
government. Provisions were made in this act for bringing into existence of the Philippine Assembly and for the election of
Resident Commissioners who would receive their salary from the United States. Other provisions were made for the
disposition of public lands, both agricultural and mineral, and the Act sets forth the bill of rights for this country. The Philippine
Islands is and has been since the passage of said Act completely under control of the Congress of the United States and all
the inhabitants owe complete and full allegiance or a qualified temporary allegiance, as the case may be, to the United
States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant was, as we have stated, born in the Philippine Islands in 1889. His father was a domiciled alien and his mother
a native of this country. His father died in China about the year 1900 while he was still a minor. His mother sent him to China
for the sole purpose of studying and on reaching his majority he returned to the country of his birth and sought admission.
From the date of his birth to the time he returned to this country he had never in a legal sense changed his domicile. A minor
cannot change his own domicile. As minors have the domicile. As minors have the domicile of their father he may change
their domicile by changing his own, and after his death the mother, while she remains a widow, may likewise by changing her
domicile change the domicile of the minor. The domicile of the children in either case as follows the domicile of their parent.
(Lamar vs. Miccu, 112 U.S., 452.) After the death of the father the widowed mother became the natural guardian of the
appellant. The mother before she married was a Spanish subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities
pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her husband, which occurred after the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United
States, she, under the rule prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the Philippine Islands, being
that of her native country. When she reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth the appellant was a minor and
neither he nor his mother had ever left this country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Again, it is insisted that as the appellant was born in the Philippine Islands he under Spanish law became a Spanish subject
by reason of the place of his birth, but that the rights and privileges incident thereto could not be exercised during his minority
unless the father made the declaration required by law. Taking this view of the case, the Spanish nationality of the appellant
was suspended during his minority in the absence of a declaration on the part of his father. If this were not true (a question
which we do not decide) the appellant, by reason of the place of his birth, acquired at least an inchoate right to Spanish
nationality. He could have within one year after reaching his majority become a Spanish subject, but conditions have so
changed (not true any act on the part of the appellant) that he can not now acquire Spanish nationality. Under these
circumstances can it be said that Congress in enacting section 4 of the Philippine Bill intended to prohibit the appellant who
happened to be temporarily absent from the Philippine Islands from reentering this country? Surely, such could not have
been the intention of Congress. To so hold would have the effect of excluding the appellant from his native country, from
home and all that home means, from his mother, brothers, and sisters, and compel him to live in practically a strange country
and among strange people. If he had actually remained in the Islands, no one would ever have the thought of deporting him
as being a subject of the Chinese Empire.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And again, "no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly
acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with
approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Would it be in conflict with the provisions of the Act of July 1, 1902, any other Act of Congress, any provision of the
Constitution, any doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States or the general policy of the United States, to
now declare that the appellant is, by reason of the place of his birth, the death of his father, the present nationality of his
widowed mother, and his election, a citizen of the Philippine Islands? Section 4 of the Philippine Bill must be read according
to its spirit and intent, for a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a civil statute is which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmaker. The intent of the law-makers is the law. The
congressional meaning of section 4 is to be ascertained from the Act as a whole. This section cannot be segregated, but
every part of the Act must be construed with reference to every other part. It should be construed to conform to the wellsettled governmental policy of the United States on the subject of citizenship. It is to be given that construction which best
comports with the principles of reason and justice. This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of
the Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other inhabitants shall not be citizens. Neither does it declare that other
inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare that a person situated as
is the appellant shall not be nor shall not elect to be a citizen of the country of his birth. The appellant could, as we have said,
elect to become a citizen of the United States had he been born in that country under the same circumstances which now

surround him. All the laws and the rulings of the courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the
United States. While, it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of Congress do not apply ex propio vigore to this
country, but that they must be expressly extended by Congress, nevertheless, some of the basic principles upon which the
government of the United States rests and the greater part of the Bill of Rights, which protects the citizens of that country,
have been extended to the Philippine Islands by the instructions of the President to the first Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Bill. The Act of July 1, 1902, a part of which is section 4, quoted supra, as before stated, ratified and affirmed the
civil government established in the Philippine Islands by the President. It extended the Bill of Rights to the inhabitants of this
country. It provided means for the disposition of the public lands and enacted mining laws. In fact, it approved of, and
extended the powers of a republican form of government modelled after that of the United States. Then to hold, after all of
this has been done, that Congress intended by section 4 to declare that the appellant is an alien and not entitled, under the
circumstances, to reenter the land of his birth and become a citizen thereof, would be a holding contrary to the manifest intent
of that body. That Congress did not so intend is irresitably inferred from these facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Was the appellant a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902? If so, the Act of Congress of that date did not
denationalize him. At the time this country was ceded to the United States, Basilio Roa, father of the appellant, was, let us
say, a subject of the Emperor of China, and the nationality of the appellant, let us further say, followed absolutely that of his
father. Basilio Roa died in China in 1900. Tranquilino was then a minor and living with his mother in this country. His mother,
before her marriage, was, as we have said, a Spanish subject. On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the
nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that country and had never left it. She was then the natural
guardian of Tranquilino. The question now arises, did the nationality of the appellant follow that of his mother, admitting that
before the death of his father he was a Chinese subject? If his nationality that of his mother, it must have been not by reason
of the Spanish law, as there was none in force in this country at the time on the subject, but by means of analogous principles
of citizenship in America. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a female citizen of the United States and a foreigner,
she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the United States. There is no statutory
declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children
were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of which their father
(and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country until the death of their father.
But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she
having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such
minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people,
the nationality of the country of their birth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July
1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and entitled to land. The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the appellant is ordered released from custody, with costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 4963
September 15, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and Gale for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as
follows:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall
expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem,
or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion
against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies
of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan
Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for
more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing
the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment
to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the
time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the
defendant appealed to this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows
and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the
faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the
late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On
the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the
4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in
so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant
of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The
facts above stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used
during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes,
made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is
necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of
execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to
avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the
person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used
particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions
and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most
corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large
class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the
corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in
the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged
intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if
the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even
though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he
becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so.
With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental
does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon
the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent
of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been
innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the
intention of the legislature.
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a
statute reading as follows:
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain
a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the
objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go
the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally
immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may
have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health
and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to
increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that
repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to
deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation
which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to
know and certain.
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector of
elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be
removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person
who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was
removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the
statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was written
upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:
In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence
offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts
offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any
intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of
prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala
prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
xxx
xxx
xxx
The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that
the act was knowingly and intentionally done.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector,
although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act would have
been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law
permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.
xxx
xxx
xxx
If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof
of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall
constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to
secure.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:
In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in
which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands
the facts that give character to his act.
In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the
legislative prohibition.

xxx
xxx
xxx
Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the
enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in
interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an
essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is
prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.
In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a
statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other body shall
disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons
constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations
in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the quotation is taken was written
upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:
When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation
of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from
pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or
motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to
find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking
over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the
judicial guide.
In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one
piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any
fraudulent intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose
or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory
offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies
conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates.
When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and
purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a
judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be
liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell,"
oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence,
that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of his customers
any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court
refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.
The court says:
The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or
willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is
plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of
the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456);
Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent
should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the
prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the
interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate
the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are
inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit
the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical banners,
etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in the
insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance.
In the case before us, to say that the display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is
to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To give the
interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed rebellion against
the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This
description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other wa y
of describing that type of flag. While different words might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method
of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly
described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no
characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great
and the only characteristic which it had upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and
identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the
Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that
the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They
were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army a flag under
which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It
is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were
describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it
was used.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this
is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the
intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of
the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed
as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487;
State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S.vs. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore
R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)
The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to
control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning
is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the
enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)
Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.
The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in
the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than
one meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be
used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48;
Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South
Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs.Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass.,
310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y.,
547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)
The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be
construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect
substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs.Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U.
S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)
It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers
must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule
which subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are
to be construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. (U.
S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person
could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative
and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity,
the construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)
In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should
place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then
give such construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be
ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)
We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the
position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving
all of the clauses located as they now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary
meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.
The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42935
February 15, 1935
FELIPE REGALADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
JUAN G. LESACA, Judge of First Instance of Albay,
and ESTEBAN T. VILLAR, respondents.
L.R. Pea for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondents.
Respondent Villar in his own behalf.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action of quo warranto originally brought in this court to determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe
Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. The issue in
the case is whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, the
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the last mentioned Act who
reached the age of sixty-five years after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of sixty-five
years.
The facts as stipulated are principally the following: Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao,
Albay, on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934, Regalado became sixty-five years of age. As a consequence, shortly
thereafter, the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance with instructions from the Secretary of Justice, designated
Esteban T. Villar, justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay, to act as justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado
surrendered the office to Villar under protest. On December 17, 1934, Villar qualified as justice of the peace of Malinao,
Albay, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office.
The text of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, reads in Spanish, the language in which
this Act was enacted by the Philippine Legislature, as follows:
ART. 203. Nombramiento y distribucion de jueces de paz. El Gobernador General nombrara, con el consejo y
consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, un juez de paz y un juez de paz auxilizr para la Ciudad de Baguio y para
cada municipio, township, y distrito municipal da las Islas Filipinas y si el interes publico asi lo exigiere para cualquier
otra division politica de menos importancia y territorio no organizado en dichas Islas: Entendiendose, Que los jueces
de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares seran nombrados para servir cumplir sesenta y cinco aos de
edad: Entendiendose, ademas, Que los actuales jueces de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares que al tiempo de la
vigencia de esta Ley hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco aos de edad, cesaran el primero de enero de mil novecientos
treinta y tres en sus cargos; y el Gobernador General, con el consejo y consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, hara
nuevos nombramientos para cubrir las vacantes que habran de ocurir por ministerio de esta Ley.
The English version of the same codal section, as amended, reads as follows:
SEC. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. One justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice
of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advise and consent of the Philippine Senate, for
the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the
public interests shall so require, for any other minor political division or unorganized territory in said
Islands: Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years: Provided, further, That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall automatically cease to hold
office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three; and the Governor-General, with the advise and consent of
the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies occurring by operation of this Act.
Petitioner Regalado insists that the law is clear and accordingly needs no interpretation. The meaning of the law according to
him is that only those justice of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace ceased to hold office who had completed sixtyfive years of age on or before November 16, 1931, when Act No. 3899 took effect. On the other hand, the Solicitor-General,
as attorney for the respondents, admits that the provisions of the second proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative
Code by Act No. 3899, are not very specific, but that according to the real intention of the law the only sensible and proper
construction that could be place on the proviso in question in that under its provisions all justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace, whether appointed prior to the approval of the Act or subsequent thereto, who had completed the age
of sixty-five years of age at the time of the approval of the Act, and those who shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease
to hold office, the former on January 1, 1933, and the latter at the time they complete that age.
All are agreed that the language which should prevail in the interpretation of Act No. 3899 is Spanish, but that the English text
may be consulted to explain the Spanish. The English text is deficient in that it includes the word "automatically", the
equivalent of which does not appear in the Spanish. Also, in the Administrative Code containing a compilation of section 203,
as amended, the word "office" was omitted after the word "hold". Finally, the spanish uses the term "al teimpo de la vigencia
de esta ley", translated into English as "at the time this Act takes effect". But the Solicitor-General insists that the equivalent
of the term "al" is "at" and that "at" can be construed as equivalent to "during".
The Solicitor-General properly invites attention to the history of the law and from that history would deduce the legislative
intention to be effectuated. Let us briefly notice this point. Originally judges of first instance and justices of the peace had no
age limits on their tenures of office. Eventually, however, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2347. That law not only

provided that judges of first instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided that
"... the present judges of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the GovernorGeneral, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of the Courts of
First Instance ... ." This law was held valid. (Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) Subsequently section 203 of the
Administrative Code, relating to justices of the peace, was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107 by adding at the end
thereof the following proviso: "... Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of sixty-five years." It was held that the law should be given prospective effect only and was not
applicable to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before it went into effect. (Segovia vs. Noel [1925], 47
Phil., 543.) Thereafter the matter again came before the Philippine Legislature and apparently it was in the mind of certain
members of the Legislature to make the law fixing the age limit for justices of the peace retroactive in nature. At least the bill
as introduced in the Senate, and providing: "Entendiendose, ademas, Que los actuales jueces de paz y jueces de paz
auxiliares que al tiempo de la vigencia de esta Ley hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco aos de edad, cesaran automaticamente
en sus cargos; y el Gobernador General, con el consejo y consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, hara nuevos
nombramientos para cubrir las vacantes que habran de ocurrir por ministerio de esta ley," appears to have had this
purpose both because of the langage used and because of what can be gleaned from the debates on the bill while it was
under consideration in the Senate. But when the bill left the Philippine Legislature it was in a different form, for the word
"automaticamente" had been omitted and instead there was to be found the words "el primero de enero de mil novecientos
treinta y tres".
The Solicitor-General finally points out that the Secretary of Justice has consistently interpreted the proviso in question as
meaning, that all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace no matter when appointed who had completed the
age of sixty-five years prior to the approval of the law and those who shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease to hold
office upon their attaining that age. It is of course a cardinal rule that the practical construction of a statute by the department
whose duty it is to carry it into execution is entitled to great weight. Nevertheless the court is not bound by such construction
and the rule does not apply in cases where the construction is not doubtful.
The fundamental purpose in enacting Act No. 3899, it is argued, was to correct the phraseology of the first proviso to section
203 of the Administrative Code added thereto by Act No. 3107, and to place justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace on the same footing as regards their cessation from office by reason of age. We are asked for effectuate this
legislative purpose. We would accede if that result was obtainable by any logical construction of the law whether strict or
liberal. But we cannot reach that result when to do so compels us to rewrite a law and to insert words or phrases not found in
it. If the court should do that it would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative power.
The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. If legislative
intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply
a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way
expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed intention.
Delving a little more deeply into the meaning of the law as applied to the case of the petitioner, at the time Act No. 3899 took
effect he was one of the "actuales jueces de paz" (present justices of the peace). Giving the term "al tiempo de la vigencia de
la ley" the ordinary meaning of "at the time this Act takes effect," which was on November 16, 1931, on that date the
petitioner was not sixty-five years of age. Proceeding further, the phrase "hayan cumplido se senta cinco aos de edad",
appearing in English as "have completed sixty-five years of age", is of the past tense and could not regularly be taken to
contemplate the future. Finally the phrase "el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres", in English "on January first
nineteen hundred and thirty-three", is also a date in the past, for on that date the petitioner had not yet reached the age of
sixty-five.
Before we conclude, let us again return to the consideration of the law and see if it would be possible under any logical
interpretation, to give the law the meaning which the Government insists it should have. Supposing we give to the phrase "al
tiempo de la vigencia de esta ley" the unusual meaning of "within the time this Act is effective", but having done so, we then
reach the barrier that the petitioner within the time this Act is effective must have completed sixty-five years of age and cease
to hold office on January 1, 1933. The petitioner having become sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, could not be
included under a law which required justices of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.
For the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899
leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who
completed sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November
16, 1931, and who by the law was required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.
Accordingly it is our judgment that the respondent Esteban T. Villar be ousted from the office of justice of the peace of
Malinao, Albay, and that the petitioner Felipe Regalado be placed in possession of the same. So ordered, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996]
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE. REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO
PALMIANO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on
installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior tothe enactment of P.D. 957, The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree? This is the major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the
Decision of the respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the
respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his co-owner/ developer
Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village
Homeowners Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering
petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case
No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution,
he suspended payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in
whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his payments
because of petitioners failure to develop the village. Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo
spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with private
respondent and dismissed private respondents complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to
complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondents purchase contract over one lot, and as to the
other, it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been issued to x x x spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina
Relevo x x x, the management of E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant
(herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof
until fully paid.
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office of the
President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x. However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was
deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the
interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in
concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private respondents non-payment of his
amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D.
957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory construction stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law x x x. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself and must be
enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act x x x. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent
1
policy and objects of the legislature. (italics supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged,
including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to
provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers, and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide
them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and
lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free
from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different
2
innocent purchasers for value; (italics supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative intent must have been to
remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the
time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State
will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in
connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious
prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative
authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well
into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its provisions, viz., Sections 20,
21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and
transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957s enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated
in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or
such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity
of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete
compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with
Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a
violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for
the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the
owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may,
at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (italics supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in
question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves, which expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the entire area covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions
of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide by all
laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for residential purposes as may be presently
in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the
Bureau of Lands, the General Registration Office and other government agencies. (italics supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been
properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioners failure
to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
(Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on
the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the
respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due
weight to the following matters: although private respondent started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975,
so that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the
petitioner, who had the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely
fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land
purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any
event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments
incurred by private respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latters tolerance of the
defaults for a long period of time.)

Likewise, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the
refund of private respondents payments on Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of nondevelopment justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on
said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioners motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretarys) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was
filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that (d)ecisions/ resolutions! orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof x x x , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED due course and is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-39743. September 24, 1983.]
JUSTINIANO CAJIUAT, MARCIAL LARA, JOSE NUEZ, LEONOR AMACIO, ETERIO SOTIANGCO, OTILIO DE
GUZMAN, OSCAR INDUCTIVO, DONATO ABELLARDO, CECILIO CUNANAN, CONSTANTE QUITORIANO,
RAYMUNDO QUIONES, ABDON LAMSIN, FERNANDO BANAAG, FERNANDO PINEDA, LORENZO GERONIMO,
ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA, DELFIN ESPINO, WILSON ALBANA, VALERIO ARELLANO, ESTRELLA BAYAWA, PEDRO
CORPUZ, MELITON CRUZ, ERNESTO RAMIREZ, LEONARDO SANTOS, ALBERT ARCE, SATURNINO LARIN,
IGNACIO FONTE, ROBERTO TORRES, SEVERINO BAUTISTA, FELICIANO BAUTISTA, PEDRO GOLPEO, ARSENIO
TORRES, DOMINGO MAO, BIENVENIDO VALMONTE, SALVADOR SANTIAGO, ANDRES ASLARONA, RICARDO
TOBIAS, AGAPITO VILLAROMAN, CONRADO PAULINO, MAURICIO BELTRAN, JOSE MARAVILLA, and CARMELO
BARBER, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE ISMAEL MATHAY, SR., in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Audit,Respondent.
Bautista & Zafra Law Office, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; RETIREMENT GRATUITY; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 4; DOUBLE
PENSION NOT ALLOWED UNLESS CLEARLY PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. There must be a provision, clear and
unequivocal, to justify a double pension. The general language employed in paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 4 falls to meet that test. All that it states is that permanent employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who are
retirable are entitled to gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but in no case more than twenty-four
months salary in addition to other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations. To grant double
gratuity then is unwarranted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECEIPT OF "OTHER BENEFITS" CONSTRUED. No reliance can be placed to the use of the term
"other benefits" found in the paragraph relied upon. As clearly stated in the memorandum of the Solicitor General, they refer
to "those receivable by a retiree under the general retirement laws, like the refund of contributions to the retirement fund and
the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official employee. The clause in addition to all other
benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations," was inserted to insure the payment to the retiree of
the refund of the contributions to the retirement fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of
said official or employee.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AGAINST DOUBLE COMPENSATION WELL- SETTLED. The rule against double compensation is
nothing new. It was so held in Peralta v. Auditor General, 100 Phil. 1951(1957). While the question involved is not identical,
its ratio decidendi applies to the instant situation, namely, to allow what petitioners seek "would be a clear disregard of the
prohibition to receive both the compensation and the pension, annuity, or gratuity." Peralta was cited with approval in a later
case, San Diego v. Auditor General, 119 Phil. 335 (1964), and a recent decision Chavez v. Auditor General, L-29311,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 776.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The claim of petitioners, which was denied by the then Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Ismael Mathay, Sr., is
based on par. 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4. It reads as follows: "Permanent officials and employees of the Rice
and Corn Administration . . . who prefer to retire, if qualified for retirement, shall be given gratuity equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service but in no case more than twenty-four months salary, in addition to all other benefits to which
they are entitled under existing laws and regulations." 1 There is no dispute that petitioners were, prior to their retirement,
permanent officials and employees of the then Rice and Corn Administration abolished under Presidential Decree No. 4.
They being retirable, they exercised the option to do so under the Optional Retirement Law. 2 They had, therefore, by virtue
thereof, received the gratuity under such law. With the issuance of the aforesaid Presidential Decree, however, they were led
to hope that a claim for separation gratuity would likewise be justified. Respondent, the then Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit was of a different mind. For him, there was no legal basis for allowing them double gratuity. He

rendered such a decision. In view of such refusal to give due course to their plea, they filed this petition before this
Court.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
It is their submission that to deny them separation gratuity "would render the clause under consideration meaningless as if it
is (sic) never written in the decree. This would be contrary to the rules on statutory construction and interpretation that every
part of the statute should be carried into effect." 3 The Solicitor General, in his memorandum for respondent, rejected such
an argument. Thus: "It is respectfully submitted that since the petitioners herein have already retired and were paid the
gratuity under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, they are no longer entitled to the gratuity
provided under paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4." 4 After referring to the gratuity as "a free gift, a
present, or any benefits of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration," 5 he pointed out
that from its very nature, "there seems to be no apparent reason for granting to the herein petitioners the gratuity provided for
under paragraph 3, Section 26, of Presidential Decree No. 4, in addition to the gratuity which they have already received
under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616. This is so because to assume otherwise would
not only be an act of "over-liberality" on the part of the State but likewise inconsistent with its policy against double pension or
gratuity for the same service."
To bolster his submission, he cited the ruling in Borromeo v. Government Service Insurance System: 7 "The gratuity received
by petitioner under Act 2589 was obviously in consideration of his services to the government as of his retirement in
December 15, 1949. It is similarly obvious that the retirement benefits he was found to be entitled to receive under the
provisions of Act 910, as amended, were in consideration of the same services to the government. Therefore, for petitioner to
receive full benefits under the law, in addition to the gratuity he had already received under Act 2589, would amount to
allowing him to receive double pension for exactly the same services as consideration. The rule in construing or applying
pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to
prevent any person from receiving double compensation." 8 It was further stressed that the enactment of later legislations
after the retirement of a public official "is not a circumstance of sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the general policy of the
State expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in Act 910 against double pensions for the same services. To the contrary,
the fact that even after petitioners retirement under Act 2589 another pension law was enacted under which he could claim
greater benefits affords a greater reason for the application of the general policy against double pensions, unless the contrary
was expressly and clearly provided in the later enactment."
This Court, after a careful consideration, arrives at the same conclusion. There must be a provision, clear and unequivocal, to
justify a double pension. The general language employed in paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4 fails to
meet that test. All that it states is that permanent employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who are retirable are
entitled to gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but in no case more than twenty-four months
salary in addition to other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations. To grant double gratuity
then is unwarranted. No reliance can he placed to the use of the term "other benefits" found in the paragraph relied upon. As
clearly stated in the memorandum of the Solicitor General, they refer to "those receivable by a retiree under the general
retirement laws, like the refund of contributions to the retirement fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation and
sick leaves of said official employee. The clause in addition to all other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws
and regulations, was inserted to insure the payment to the retiree of the refund of the contributions to the retirement fund and
the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official or employee."
That is all it can plausibly signify. To go further would make it a fruitful parent of injustice. It would set at naught a state policy
dictated by reason and fairness alike. Petitioners seek to claim the status of an exempt class. The burden of proof is on them.
That they failed to meet, relying as they do on words hardly indicative of their being accorded a favored status. To justify such
a result, it is imperative that the language employed be of the clearest and most satisfactory character. The paragraph relied
upon in Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4, to repeat, cannot be so characterized.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
One last word. It is to be added that the rule against double compensation is nothing new. It was so held in Peralta v. Auditor
General. 11 While the question involved is not identical, its ratio decidendi applies to the instant situation, namely, to allow
what petitioners seek "would be a clear disregard of the prohibition to receive both the compensation and the pension,
annuity, or gratuity." 12 Peralta was cited with approval in a later case, San Diego v. Auditor General. 13 A recent decision,
Chavez v. Auditor General, 14 puts the matter tersely but emphatically. Thus: "Appeal from a decision of the Auditor General,
in which we reaffirm the Courts doctrine against the payment to retirees from the government service of double pension for
exactly the same services." 15 We do so again.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit and the decision of respondent, the then Auditor General,
denying due course to the claim of petitioner for double gratuity affirmed. No costs.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.

De Castro, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-7747, Tinio et al. v. Frances et al., 98 Phil. 32
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
November 29, 1955
G.R. No. L-7747
NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and appellees.
Pedro D. Maldia for appellants.
Godofredo V. Salamanca for appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul the sale of a homestead which had been
inherited by them from said decedent. Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land containing an area of 10.0709 hectares,
more or less, in San Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija in the year 1917. His application was approved on June 22, 1917.
He filed the corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on June 15, 1943 the said final proof was
approved by the Director of Lands, who thereupon ordered the issuance of a patent in his favor. (Exhibit A.) At the time of the
issuance of the above order, Sergio Nicolas had already died, so the order directs the issuance of the patent to his heirs,
represented by his widow. In or about the year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the defendants.
The above transfers were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the
defendants secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 has been issued
also in their favor, covering the said parcel of land.
The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the conveyances executed by plaintiffs to defendants and to
recover the land, together with the fruits of the land received by the defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged the
execution of the sales in their favor. After the issues had been joined the parties presented an agreed statement of facts, the
most pertinent parts of which have already been set forth above. The trial court held that the transfer or conveyance of the
homestead made by the heirs of the original homesteader was a mere transfer of the rights of the original homesteader to the
land authorized under the provisions of Section 20 of the Public Land Act (A. A. 141); therefore, as it was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the conveyance was valid. It held that section 118 of the Public Land Act is not
applicable; that both Section 20 and Section 118 being apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled subh that the
prohibition contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20
would be absolutely useless. Against this judgment the appeal was prosecuted in this Court.The provisions which affect the
conveyance sought to be annulled are as follows:
SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before patent is issued the applicant shall prove to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his
homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant
on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally
qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to
the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the
approval of said application of the purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not agan apply for a new
homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null
and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent. (C. A. 141).
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patentor
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and
for a term of five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crop on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title
shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except
on constitutional and legal grounds. (Id.)
The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired under the Public Land Law, as
above stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strone and consistent that the original period of five years from
the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited
(section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
secured. (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted authorizing the
repurchase of the homestead when properly sold by the homesteader within five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119,
C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from the fact

that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands
that the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a
previous permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be obtained, as it is also expressly
provided that any transfer made without such previous approval is null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the
entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A. 141). As the conveyances now in question are claimed to have been and were
evidently made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be determined is whether
said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section 20 of the Act.
The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows:
That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas executed in or about 1947 a transfer of homestead rights over the land in question in favor of
the defendants, which transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the
approval of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the
title being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land records of Nueva Ecija.
The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands had, after investigation, been satisfied that the
applicant or homesteader "has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through
no fault of his own." Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made with with previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. So neither of the requirements of section 20 has been complied with.
But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of official acts the Director of Lands must have
recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at
least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because the homesteader could not continue with
his homestead through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on this necessary requirements,
because the order for the issuance of the patent states just the opposite. The order for the issuance of the patent states
expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation,
possession and otherwise, thus:
(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements contained in the final proof papers was conducted by a
representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the residence and cultivation
requirements of the law; and
xxx xxx xxx
. . ., the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance
of patent to the land applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.)
The order for the issuance of a patent as well as the statements of fact therein contained, as above-quoted, conclusively
disprove the existence of the requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead through no fault of his
own.
In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order for the issuance of a patent, after the approval of
the final proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the
corresponding officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a
patent is the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 499). And if the law (section 118,
C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the prohibition should be
extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued,
which in this case is June 13, 1943.
Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the
defendants heren in the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section 20 of the Public Land Act that the
Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue with his
homestead through no fault of his own, and with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a
homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so
far as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be
avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent.
In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants are hereby declared null and void, the
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija)
ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts
received as price for the sale. No damages or costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12495
July 26, 1960
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO LIDRES, defendant-appellant.
Santos L. Migallos for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
Dionisio Lidres was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Criminal Case No. V-4137) with the crime of usurpation of
official functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10, under the following information:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1954, in the municipality of Balamban, province of Cebu, Philippines, with
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and without pretense of official position
did, then and there wilfully, and feloniously perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the
Biasong Elementary School of the aforementioned municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by Miss Joseta
Diutay who had been duly appointed to said position.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and was, thereafter tried. After trial, he was found guilty to the crime charged and
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 3 years to 5 years, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, he
appealed to us directly assigning as sole error the trial court's finding that under the information and facts of the case, he was
guilty of the crime formation and facts of the case, he was guilty of the crime of usurpation of the official functions.
The records disclose that Magdalena P. Echavez, a public school teacher Biasong Elementary School, at Balamban, Cebu,
applied, for and was granted maternity leave beginning the first school day of January, 1954 and ending on March of the
same year. To fill up the vacancy expected to be created by said leave of Echavez, Josita Diotay and defendant Lidres filed
their respective applications as substitute teachers. On December 30, 1953, Diotay was recommended by the supervising
teacher of the aforementioned school Hilario Laspias, to fill up the position of Echavez. Laspias, however, requested
Diotay to sign agreement take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the period from January, 1954 would be
equally divided between them. Thereafter, Diotay received her appointment (Exh. B) as substitute teacher, vice Echavez,
effective January 4, 1954. Diotay then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade class in said
school.
On February 12, 1954, apparently on the strength of the agreement (Exh. 1), defendant appeared at Biasong Elementary
School, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of Diotay. When the defendant asked Diotay to sign said
letter of resignation, the latter refused. Subsequently, defendant made known to Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he
would take over her class on Monday, (date February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay was conducting her classes,
and insisted to take over the same, but Diotay tried to hold on. As a consequence, both held classes, Diotay on 2 rows of
pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2 rows. In order to assert his authority, defendant also erased Diotay's named from
the attendance chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant's actuation, Diotay, left the classroom, and reported the
matter to the principal teacher, Exequiel Tecson, at Balamban. The latter advised her to return to her post, which she did.
When she arrived at her classroom in the afternoon of the same day (February 22), defendant was still there, holding the
class until 4:00 o'clock. In view of this, Diotay went back to inform said principal about defendant's insistence in taking over
her class.
On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were summoned by the supervising teacher (Laspias)
for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said supervising teacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant
was advised not to go back to school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24, 1954, without any
authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay's class, against the latter's will.
Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at the beginning of this opinion.
In regard to the offense of usurpation of official functions, the law, as originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815
(Revised Penal Code), provides:
ART. 177. Usurpation of official functions. Any person who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any
act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis supplied.)
Any person who, with or without pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or
to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than ten years. (Sec. 1; Emphasis supplied.)
Still later on, or on June 14, 1949, Republic Act 379 was adopted, amending Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, to reads
as follows:
ART. 177. Usurpation of Authority or official functions. Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent
himself to be of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretenseof official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of any
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On May 31, 1954, appellant was, as already stated, prosecuted and later tried and convicted under Republic Act No. 10.
Appellant now contends in his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to his case because this law is an emergency
measure and intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations.
Examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became Republic Act No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act
was really intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of
seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of
official position required under Article 177 above-quoted of the Revised Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty
from prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (under the latter provision) to not less 2 years nor more than 10
years (under Rep. Act No. 10).
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. SUMULONG. Now, if the gentlemen will allow me to add something to that because I do not want to have any
possibility of misunderstanding when I say that this proposed measure is intended to supplant the provision of the
Penal Code, I want to make it clearly understood that this is going to replace the Penal Code provision only so long
as the situation which we intend to correct with this measure continues to exist, and we like to believe that this
situation will not be permanent but only transient and ephemeral.
MR. ROY. I should like that to made clear on the records. Do I understand from the gentleman from Rizal that this is
a sort of an emergency measure?
MR. SUMULONG. Exactly.
MR. ROY. And, if so, will the gentleman explain the justification for the existence of that emergency?
MR. SUMULONG. This is an emergency measure because the situation which we propose to correct this bill, we
believe, has its origin during the Japanese occupation. It is a situation which was created on account of psychology
which arose during that extraordinary period in our history.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. ROY. Now referring to present conditions, does the gentleman have in mind the reported activities of some
organizations in the Central Plains of Luzon to the effect that those organizations are levying or collecting taxes and
performing marriages?
MR. SUMULONG. I think those are intended to be corrected by this measure, if the newspaper reports and the
information contained in official reports are true, which I cannot definitely state one way or the other.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. I, No. 16, June 18, 1946, p. 309; emphasis supplied.).
The explanatory note of said bill, states:
In some provinces of the Philippines, the rule of the law and order has been impaired or replaced by before and
terrorism. Using economic injustice as a rallying cry, unscrupulous agitators have succeeded in destroying public
faith and confidence in the orderly processes of government and in imposing extralegal rule over the inhabitants
therein. That faith and confidence must be restored and constituted authority respected. The Government must resist
with all the forces at its command any attempt to subvert public authority. The accompanying bill seeks to remedy the
situation and approval thereof by this body is, therefore, hereby urged. (Id., at p. 307; emphasis supplied.)
Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations, it would create an absurd
situation where a lesser offense performing official functions without pretense it penalized with a higher penalty, that of
imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than 10 years, insteads of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. And since it is neither alleged in the information aforequoted, nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member
of said seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under said
provision of Republic Act. No. 10.
Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and not merely an
implementation thereof (2 Padilla, Revised Penal Code Annotated [1958 Ed.] 267), or an emergency measure as stated, the
subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379 effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by restoring
the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177
prior to its amendment by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in force at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense by defendant, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official
functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense "without pretense of official position".
Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of
usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as
amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government , inasmuch as the information does not
charge the same.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed; the accused acquitted, with costs de oficio, and the bond given
for his provisional liberty cancelled. So ordered.
Paras, C. J. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 87416
April 8, 1991
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and
ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision* of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z.
Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a
Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the
total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment which check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or
to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That
no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:
Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in
the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though
drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks
drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated
September 6, 1988, and which reads:
Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by the prosecution, is
denied for lack of merit.1wphi1
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency
(Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now
Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo,
Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6,
1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank,
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over
dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction between
petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate
Republic Act No. 529; and
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not
enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes
that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6)
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding
cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action
(De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information."
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and
therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in
court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of
People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check."
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People
vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the place where
the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is
of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The Law
on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12,
October-December, 1983, p. 14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent
at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a
foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled
in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in
the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.1wphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA
520 [1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA
318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully
sustains this view, as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check
may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S.
dollar checks, checks, in our currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in whatever
currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or
Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21258
October 31, 1967
FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Josue H. Gustilo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The issue posed in this appeal is whether domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies are entitled to return only
25 per cent of their income from dividends under the 1957 amendment of section 24 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
Sec. 24. Rate of Tax on Corporations. (A) In general there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually
upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation organized in,
or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly registered
general copartnerships (companias colectivas), domestic life insurance companies and foreign life insurance
companies doing business in the Philippines, a tax upon such income equal to the sum of the following:
Twenty per centum upon the amount by which such total net income does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos;
and
Twenty-eight per centum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds one hundred thousand pesos;
and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
preceding taxable year from all sources within the Philippines by every corporation organized, authorized or existing
under the laws of any foreign country: . . . And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic
or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter or from a domestic
corporation engaged in a new and necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred and
one, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(B) Rate of Tax on Life Insurance Companies. There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually from
every insurance company organized in or existing under the laws of the Philippines, or foreign life insurance
company authorized to carry on business in the Philippines, but not including purely cooperative companies or
associations as defined in section two hundred and fifty-five of this Code, on the total investment income received by
such company during the preceding taxable year from interest, dividends and rents from all sources whether from or
within the Philippines, a tax of six and one-half per centum upon such income: Provided, however, That foreign life
insurance companies not doing business in the Philippines shall, on any investment income received by them from
the Philippines, be subject to tax as any other foreign corporation. . . .
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that life insurance companies should report in full their income from dividends because, while
they are treated in subsection (B), the proviso regarding dividend exclusion is found in subsection (A) which treats of
corporations in general. The petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, on the basis of the history of the proviso, that the
benefits of dividend exclusion are available to all domestic and resident foreign corporations regardless of the business in
which they may be engaged.
We agree with the petitioner.
The petitioner is a domestic life insurance company. On March 18, 1959, it filed an income tax return for 1958 showing the
following data:
GROSS INCOME
From interest
P 5,186.44
From dividends
57,105.29
TOTAL
INCOME
GROSS
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS
Net income
P62,202.36
10,317.47
P51,974.89
Tax assessable:
Life
Companies
Insurance
TOTAL TAX DUE
P 3,378.00
P 3,378.00

Later, however, it filed an amended return, as follows:
GROSS INCOME
From interest
P 5,186.44
From dividends
15,242.55
TOTAL
INCOME
GROSS
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS
Net income
P20,186.44
10,317.47
P10,111.52
Tax assessable:
Life
Companies
Insurance
TOTAL TAX DUE
P657.00
P657.00
This was accompanied with a claim for the refund of P2,721 representing the difference between P3,378, which the petitioner
had paid as income tax under its original return, and P657, which it now averred was the correct amount due from it. The
difference is due to the fact that, whereas in its original income tax return the petitioner reported in full its income from
1
2
dividends amounting to P57,105.29, in its amended return it reported only 25 per cent, or P15,242.55, of the dividends from
domestic corporations.
The claim for refund was filed with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue but, as he had not been heard from,
the petitioner, to avoid prescription of its action, took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals. The Tax Court, with two
members voting and another one reserving his vote, upheld the propriety of the action against the claim of the respondent
that it was filed prematurely. It however denied the claim of the petitioner for refund on the ground that the proviso allowing
the return of only 25 per cent of the income from dividends is found in subsection (A) of section 24 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, while life insurance companies are dealt with in another subsection, although of the same section. The Tax
Court's ratio decidendi reads:
As a general rule of statutory construction a proviso is deemed to apply only to the immediately preceding clause or
provision. Where, as in the case at bar, there is no clear legislative intention to apply it to the subse-clause or
provision (Section 24[B]), we are constrained to interpret the proviso as affecting only the preceding clause or
provision. (See Collector, et al. vs. Servando de los Angeles, et al. G.R. No. L-9899, August 13, 1957).
Consequently, we are of the opinion that the proviso relative to the returnability of only 25% of such dividends applies
only to corporations organized in or existing under the laws of the Philippines . . ., but not including duly registered
copartnerships (companias colectivas), domestic life insurance companies and foreign life insurance companies
doing business in the Philippines.
But a purely syntactical approach is hardly a safe guide to the meaning of a statute. The position of a proviso, for instance,
although possessed of considerable influence, is not necessarily controlling. The proviso may apply to sections or portions
3
thereof which follow it or even to the entire statute. Position, after all, cannot override intention, in the ascertainment of which
4
the legislative history of a statute is extremely more important.
A resort to legislative history should prove particularly helpful in the case of section 24 of the Code as this section has gone
through a miscellany of amendments, with the result that its basic outlines are now only vaguely discernible. From a oneparagraph section it has grown into a multi-paragraph one, with lengthy sentences qualified at every turn by exceptions and
5
provisos. The readability expert, who once complained of a provision of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code as a "nightmare" of
a writing, would be at a loss for words to describe section 24 of our Code.
The following table shows the changes which section 24 has undergone at each of the eight different stages of its
amendment.
6
CORPORATE INCOME TAX: A COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMENDMENTS
(1) As originally enacted on June 15, 1939:
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporations. There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net
income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation organized in, or existing under the laws
of, the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly registered general copartnerships (compaias
colectivas), a tax of eight per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually
upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources within the Philippines by every corporation
organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of any foreign country: Provided, however, That in the case of dividends

received by a domestic or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter, only
twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(2) As amended by Republic Act 82, 1 Laws & Res. 250 (1946):
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporation. There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total
net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation organized in, or existing
under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly registered general
copartnerships (compaias colectivas), a tax of TWELVE per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be
levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from
all sources within the Philippines by every corporation organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of any
foreign country: Provided, however, THAT BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS OPERATING AS SUCH IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE TO ONE HUNDRED NINETY OF THE
CORPORATION LAW, AS AMENDED, SHALL PAY A TAX OF SIX PER CENTUM ON THEIR TOTAL NET
INCOME: AND PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic or resident foreign
corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be
returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporations. There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total
copartnerships (compaias colectivas), a tax [of] SIXTEEN per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be
levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from
foreign country; Provided, however, That Building and Loan Associations operating as such in accordance with
sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation Law, as amended, shall pay a
tax of NINE per centum on their total net income: And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a
domestic or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter, only twentyfive per centumthereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
7
copartnerships (compaias colectivas), a tax UPON SUCH INCOME EQUAL TO THE SUM OF THE FOLLOWING:
TWENTY PER CENTUM UPON THE AMOUNT BY WHICH SUCH TOTAL NET INCOME DOES NOT EXCEED
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS; AND
TWENTY-EIGHT PER CENTUM UPON THE AMOUNT BY WHICH SUCH TOTAL NET INCOME EXCEEDS ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total
net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources within the Philippines by every corporation
organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of any foreign country: Provided, however, That Building and Loan
Associations operating as such in accordance with sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety
of the Corporation Law, AS WELL AS PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, shall pay a tax of TWELVE per
centum AND TEN PER CENTUM, RESPECTIVELY, on their total net income: And provided, further, That in the case
of dividends received by a domestic or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under
this Chapter, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
copartnerships (compaias colectivas), a tax upon such income equal to the sum of the following:
and
and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
under the laws of any foreign country: Provided, That Building and Loan Associations operating as such in
accordance with sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation Law, as
amended, as well as private educational institutions, shall pay a tax of twelve per centum and ten per
centum respectively, on their total net income: And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a
domestic or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter or FROM A
DOMESTIC CORPORARION ENGAGED IN NEW AND NECESSARY INDUSTRY AS DEFINED UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED NINE HUNDRED AND ONE, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable
for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.

8
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on Corporations. (A) IN GENERAL there shall be levied, [assessed,] collected, and paid
annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation
organized in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly
registered general copartnerships (compaias colectivas), DOMESTIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, a tax upon such income
equal to the sum of the following:
and
and a like tax shall be levied, [assessed,] collected and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
under the laws of any foreign country: Provided, however, That Building and Loan Associations operating as such in
accordance with sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation Law, as
amended, as well as private educational institutions, shall pay a tax of twelve per centum and ten per centum,
respectively, on their total net income: And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic or
resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter or from a domestic
corporation engaged in a new and necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred and
9
one, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(B) RATE OF TAX ON LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES. THERE SHALL BE LEVIED, ASSESSED, COLLECTED
AND PAID ANNUALLY FROM EVERY INSURANCE COMPANY ORGANIZED IN OR EXISTING UNDER THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, OR FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ON
BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, BUT NOT INCLUDING PURELY COOPERATIVE COMPANIES OR
ASSOCIATIONS AS DEFINED IN SECTION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE OF THIS CODE, ON THE TOTAL
INVESTMENT INCOME RECEIVED BY SUCH COMPANY DURING THE PRECEDING TAXABLE YEAR FROM
INTEREST, DIVIDENDS AND RENTS FROM ALL SOURCES WHETHER FROM OR WITHOUT THE PHILIPPINES,
A TAX OF SIX AND ONE-HALF PER CENTUM UPON SUCH INCOME: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES NOT DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES SHALL, ON ANY INVESTMENT
INCOME RECEIVED BY THEM FROM THE PHILIPPINES, BE SUBJECT TO TAX AS ANY OTHER FOREIGN
CORPORATION.
THE TOTAL NET INVESTMENT INCOME OF DOMESTIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES IS THE GROSS
INVESTMENT INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE TAXABLE YEAR FROM RENTS, DIVIDENDS, AND INTEREST
LESS DEDUCTIONS FOR REAL ESTATE EXPENSES, DEPRECIATION, INTEREST PAID WITHIN THE TAXABLE
YEAR ON ITS INDEBTEDNESS, EXCEPT ON INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED TO PURCHASE OR CARRY
OBLIGATION THE INTEREST UPON WHICH IS WHOLLY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION UNDER EXISTING LAWS,
AND SUCH INVESTMENT EXPENSES PAID DURING THE TAXABLE YEAR AS ARE ORDINARY AND
NECESSARY IN THE CONDUCT OF THE INVESTMENTS: AND THE TOTAL NET INVESTMENT INCOME OF
FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES IS THAT PORTION OF
THEIR CROSS WORLD INVESTMENT INCOME WHICH BEARS THE SAME RATIO TO SUCH EXPENSES AS
THEIR TOTAL PHILIPPINE RESERVE BEARS TO THEIR TOTAL WORLD RESERVE LESS THAT PORTION OF
THEIR TOTAL WORLD INVESTMENT EXPENSES WHICH BEARS THE SAME RATIO TO SUCH EXPENSES AS
THEIR TOTAL PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT INCOME BEARS TO THEIR TOTAL WORLD INVESTMENT INCOME.
(7) As amended by Republic Act 2343, 14 Laws & Res. 423 (1959);
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporations. (a) TAX ON DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS. In general there shall be
levied, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources
by every corporation organized in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized,
but not including duly registered general copartnerships (compaias colectivas), domestic life insurance companies
and foreign life insurance companies doing business in the Philippines, a tax upon such income equal to the sum of
the following:
TWENTY-TWO per centum upon the amount by which such total net income does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos; and
THIRTY per centum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds one hundred thousand pesos; and a
like tax shall be levied, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year
from all sources within the Philippines by every corporation organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of any
foreign country: Provided, however, That building and loan associations operating as such in accordance with
sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation law, as amended, as well as
private educational institutions, shall pay a tax of twelve per centum and ten per centum, respectively, on their total
net income: And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic or resident foreign
corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter or from a domestic corporation engaged in a
new and necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred and one, only twenty-five per
centum thereof, shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(b) TAX ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. (1) NON-RESIDENT CORPORATIONS. THERE SHALL BE
LEVIED, COLLECTED AND PAID FOR EACH TAXABLE YEAR, IN LIEU OF THE TAX IMPOSED BY THE

PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, UPON THE AMOUNT RECEIVED BY EVERY FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT
ENGAGED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS WITHIN THE PHILIPPINES, FROM ALL SOURCES WITHIN THE
PHILIPPINES, AS INTEREST, DIVIDENDS, RENTS, SALARIES, WAGES, PREMIUMS, ANNUITIES,
COMPENSATIONS, REMUNERATIONS, EMOLUMENTS, OR, OTHER FIXED OR DETERMINABLE ANNUAL OR
PERIODICAL GAINS, PROFITS, AND INCOME, A TAX EQUAL TO THIRTY PER CENTUM OF SUCH AMOUNT.
(2) RESIDENT CORPORATIONS. A FOREIGN CORPORATION ENGAGED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS WITHIN
THE PHILIPPINES (EXCEPT FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES) SHALL BE TAXABLE AS PROVIDED IN
SECTION (a) OF THIS SECTION.
10
(c) Rate of tax on life insurance companies. There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually from
every life insurance company organized in or existing under the laws of the Philippines, or foreign life insurance
company authorized to carry on business in the Philippines but not including purely cooperative companies or
associations as defined in section two hundred fifty-five of this Code, on the total investment income received by
such company during the preceding taxable year from interest, dividends, and rents from all sources, whether from or
without the Philippines, a tax of six and one-half per centumupon such income: Provided, however, That foreign life
the Philippines, be subject to tax as any other foreign corporation.
The total net investment income of domestic life insurance companies is the gross investment income received
during the taxable year from rents, dividends, and interest less deductions for real estate expenses, depreciation,
interest paid within the taxable year on its indebtedness, except on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry
obligation the interest upon which is wholly exempt from taxation under existing laws, and such investment expenses
paid during the taxable year as are ordinary and necessary in the conduct of the investments; and the total net
investment income of foreign life insurance companies doing business in the Philippines is that portion of their gross
world investment income which bears the same ratio to such income as their total Philippine reserve bears to their
total world reserve less that portion of their total world investment expenses which bear the same ratio to such
expenses as their total Philippine investment income bears to their total world investment income.
(8) As amended by Republic Act 3825, 60 O.G. 780 (1963):
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporations. (a) Tax on domestic corporations. In general there shall be levied,
collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by
every corporation organized in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but
not including duly registered general copartnerships (compaias colectivas), domestic life insurance companies and
foreign life insurance companies doing business in the Philippines, a tax upon such income equal to the sum of the
following:
Twenty-two per centum upon the amount by which such total net income does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos; and
Thirty per centum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds one hundred thousand pesos; and a like
tax shall be levied, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from
foreign country: Provided, however, That building and loan associations operating as such in accordance with
sections one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation Law, as amended, as well as
private educational institutions, shall pay a tax of twelve per centum and ten per centum respectively, on their total
net income: And provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic or resident foreign
corporation from a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Charter or from a domestic corporation engaged in a
new and necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred and one, only twenty-five per
centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(b) Tax on foreign corporations. (1) Non-resident corporations. There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each
taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by every foreign
corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines from all sources within the Philippines, as
interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensating, remunerations, emoluments, or other
fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a tax equal to thirty per centum of such
amount: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT PREMIUMS SHALL NOT INCLUDE REINSURANCE PREMIUMS.
(2) Resident corporations. A foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines (except
foreign life insurance companies) shall be taxable as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
11
every life insurance company organized or existing under the laws of the Philippines, or foreign life insurance
such company during the preceding taxable year from interest, dividends, and rents from all sources, whether from or
without the Philippines, a tax of six and one-half per centumupon such income: Provided, however, That foreign life
the Philippines, but subject to tax as any other foreign corporation.

interest paid within the taxable year on its indebtedness, except on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry
(9) As amended by Republic Act 3841, 60 O.G. 1095 (1963):
Sec. 24. Rate of tax on corporations. (a) Tax on domestic corporations. In general there shall be levied,
collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from all sources by
every corporation organized in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or organized, but
not including duly registered general copartnership (compaias colectivas), domestic life insurance companies and
foreign life insurance compaties doing business in the Philippines, a tax upon such income equal to the sum of the
following:
Twenty-two per centum upon the amount by which such total net income does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos; and
Thirty per centum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds one hundred thousand pesos; and a like
tax shall be levied, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding taxable year from
all sources within the Philippines by every corporation organized, authorized or existing under the laws of any foreign
country: Provided, however, That building and loan associations operating as such in accordance with sections one
hundred and seventy-one to one hundred and ninety of the Corporation Law, as amended, as well as private
educational institutions, shall pay a tax of twelve per centum and ten per centum, respectively, on their total net
income: And, provided, further, That in the case of dividends received by a domestic or resident foreign corporation
from domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter or from a domestic corporation engaged in a new and
12
necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred and one, only twenty-five per
centum thereof shall be returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
(b) Tax on foreign corporations. (1) Non-resident corporations. There shall be levied, collected and paid for
each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by every foreign
corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from all sources within the Philippines as
interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensatinig, remunerations, emoluments, or other
fixed or determinable annual or periodical OR CASUAL gains, profits and income, AND CAPITAL GAINS, a tax equal
13
to thirty per centum of such amount:Provided, however, That premiums shall not include reinsurance premiums.
(2) Resident corporations. A foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines (except
foreign life insurance companies) shall be taxable as provided in sub-section (a) of this section.
every life insurance company organized in or existing under the laws of the Philippines, or foreign life insurance
such company during the preceding taxable year from interest, dividends, and rents from all sources whether from or
without the Philippines, a tax of six and one-half per centum upon such income: Provided, however, That foreign life
the Philippines, be subject to tax as any other foreign corporation.
interest, paid within the taxable year on its indebtedness, except on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry
It will thus be seen that dividend exclusion has always been a dominant feature of corporate income tax. It is a device for
reducing extra or double taxation of distributed earnings. Since a corporation cannot deduct from its gross income the
amount of dividends distributed to its corporation-shareholders during the taxable year, any distributed earnings are
necessarily taxed twice; initially at the corporate level when they are included in the corporation's taxable income, and again,
at the corporation-shareholder level when they are received as dividend. Thus, without exclusion the successive taxation of
the dividend as it passes from corporation to corporation would result in repeated taxation of the same income and would
leave very little for the ultimate individual shareholder. At the same time the decision to tax a part (e.g., 25 per cent of such
dividends reflects the policy of discouraging complicated corporate structures as well as corporate divisions in the form of
14
parent-subsidiary arrangements adopted to achieve a lower effective corporate income tax rate.
Until 1957 there had been no question that the proviso on dividend exclusion applied to all domestic and resident foreign life
insurance companies. The question arose when, by virtue of Republic Act 1855 (1957), the original provisions of section 24,

with slight modifications, were made sub-section (A) while a new sub-section (B), entitled "Rate of Tax on Life Insurance
Companies," was added. The result is that the proviso on dividend exclusion now appears to qualify only a part of section 24,
making it doubtful whether after 1957 the income from dividends of domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies
15
still enjoys exemption, although, as noted in passing, the proviso continues to speak of "the tax imposed by this section" (not
sub-section).
However, a review of the circumstances, which prompted the amendment of section 24 in 1957 shows no intention to
withdraw from life insurance companies the exemption which theretofore had been enjoyed by them along with non-life
insurance companies. To be sure, the 1957 amendment was intended for a two-fold purpose: first, to change the tax base
from premium income to investment income and, second, to lower the tax on life insurance companies, in order to encourage
their growth as well as their investment in the development of the national economy.
Prior to 1957, life insurance companies were required, for income tax purposes, to include premium, receipts in gross
income. It became generally recognized, however, that the inclusion of premium receipts in the gross taxable income of life
insurance companies was unsound because premium receipts do not constitute income in the sense of gain or profit. They
are really savings deposits of the individual policyholders, a large portion of which goes directly to reserve funds required by
law for the payment of their claims for death benefits, cash surrender values and maturity values. Therefore, to tax an
insurance company on account of these "deposits" or "savings" is actually to tax the policyholder for being provident. What
16
constitutes true income for a life insurance company is rather its investment income from interest, dividends and rents.
Besides, the premiums which a life insurance company receives are already subject to a tax of 3 per cent under section 255
17
of the Code. To require their inclusion in gross income for purposes of section 24 is to subject them to double taxation.
The rate of tax was lowered in recognition of the fact that a life insurance company derives profit from its investment income
18
only to the extent that such income exceeds the rate of interest at which the reserve must be maintained.
In sum, as the then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos described the bill which became Republic Act 1855, "It is a bill which
places [life] insurance companies in the same class as other companies. And the rate is lower than in ordinary companies
19
because it is six and one half per cent."
If the purpose of the 1957 amendment was to place life insurance companies at par with other companies by taking them on
their true income, then the legislature could not have intended to withdraw from them a privilege which they had then been
enjoying in common with non-life insurance companies. Indeed, by no rule of logic can the decision to exclude premium
receipts from gross income be considered a decision to include all of dividend income in gross income.
Nor could it have been the intention of the legislature to discriminate against domestic life insurance companies in favor of
resident foreign corporations engaged in other business. And yet this is just the implication of the interpretation urged on us
by the respondents. For, indeed, to require life insurance companies to report in full their income from dividends would be not
only to treat them differently from other companies, contrary to the first aim of the amendment, but also to impose on them a
tax burden heavier than that imposed on resident foreign companies not engaged in life insurance. Thus, following the
interpretation of the respondents, a resident foreign corporation with an income of P100,000 from dividends would be
required to return only 25 per cent of it, or P25,000 the tax on which would be P5,000 (20% under Republic Act 1855). In
contrast, a domestic life insurance company, required to report all its income from dividends, would have to pay a tax of
P6,500 (6-1/2%), or P1,500 more, despite the fact that the rate of tax on it is much lower. It seems rather clear that these
discriminatory and lopsided results could not have been intended by Congress.
That Congress intended to accord preferential tax treatment to domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies is
abundantly clear not only from the history of the 1957 amendment but also from the Comparative Table (supra) which shows
that while the rate of tax on corporations in general has been raised, that on domestic and resident foreign life insurance
companies has remained at 6-1/2 per cent the lowest among those imposed on various types of corporations.
20
The truth is that section 24 has undergone amendments through a process which, in Cardozo's phrase, is no more
intellectual than the use of paste pot and scissors. Consequently, reliance cannot be placed on its grammatical construction
in order to arrive at its meaning. As the Comparative Table shows, after the amendment of section 24 in 1957, sub-section
(A) thereof did not have a title, compared to sub-section (B), entitled "Rate of Tax on Life Insurance Companies" which was
added. It took another amendment in 1959 to correct the deficiency, only to commit another error. Thus while the word
"assessed" was deleted from sub-section (a) in consequence of the adoption of the "pay-as-you-file" system, the same word
has remained in sub-section (c) even to this date. Again, within the same year, 1963, Section 24 was amended twice but in
the process more errors were committed. For while Republic Act 3841 was passed ostensibly to add certain words
overlooked in the amendment of the section by Republic Act 3825, the proviso on reinsurance premium (which was the
reason for the enactment of Republic Act 3825) was inadvertently omitted in the text of section 24 (b) (1).
The reference to domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies in the excepting clause of sub-section (a) is even
more awkward because the exception relates to the coverage of the entire section 24 and not simply to a sub-section thereof.
Thus, registered general copartnerships are excepted from the coverage of section 24 because they are not subject to tax as
an entity. By express provision of section 26 of the Code persons doing business as a general copartnership duly registered
in the mercantile registry are subject to income tax "only in their individual capacity." On the other hand, by including
domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies in the excepting clause it was never the intention to exempt them
from the payment of corporate income tax, which is the subject of section 24 as a whole. Furthermore, the exclusion of
registered general copartnerships from the coverage of section 24 is justified because by statutory definition they are not
anyway considered "corporations." On the other hand, life insurance companies are deemed "corporations" for purposes of
21
the Code.

Thus, the haphazard amendment of section 24 by several legislative acts as a result of which the proviso on dividend
exclusion is now found in sub-section (a) makes reliance on its grammatical construction highly unsafe and unsound in
22
arriving at its meaning. Since nothing in the history of the 1957 amendment or in the rationale of dividend exclusion
indicates the contrary, we hold that domestic and resident foreign life insurance companies are entitled to the benefits of
dividend exclusion, the position of the proviso allowing it notwithstanding.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered
to refund to the petitioner company the amount of P2,721 as excess income tax for 1958. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,concur.

[G.R. No. L-9669. January 31, 1956.]
NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, Acting Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRED
RUIZ CASTRO, Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines, HONORABLE WENCESLAO
PASCUAL, Provincial Governor of Rizal, and DOCTOR BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO, Respondents.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts in this case are not disputed. Briefly stated, they are as follows. Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of
September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges
filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that in case of temporary disability of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the ViceMayor. On September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of ViceMayor under the provisions of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, as a consequence of which he no longer had
authority to continue acting as Mayor, the Office of the President of the Philippines on September 12, 1955 designated
Braulio Sto. Domingo acting Municipal Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal. On the same date Salaysay was advised
byRespondent Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal that in view of his (Salaysays) automatic cessation as ViceMayor due to his having filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, and in view of the appointment of Sto.
Domingo, as acting Vice-Mayor by the President of the Philippines, and because he Pascual) had directed Sto. Domingo to
assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor Santos, he (Salaysay) should turn over the office of Mayor to Sto.
Domingo. On September 13, 1955, Salaysay was also advised by Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro to turn over the
office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo immediately, otherwise he might be prosecuted for violation of Article 237 of the Revised
Penal Code for prolonging performance of duties.
Salaysay refused to turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo and brought this action of Prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Executive Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto. Domingo, to declare invalid, illegal and
unauthorized the designation of Sto. Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte as well as his designation by
Governor Pascual to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor Santos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto
order Respondents to desist and refrain from molesting, interfering or in any way preventing Petitioner from performing his
duties as acting Municipal Mayor and prohibiting Sto. Domingo from performing or attempting to perform any of those powers
and duties belonging to Petitioner. Acting upon a prayer contained in the petition, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner contends that his case does not come under section 27 of the Election Code for the reason that when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he was actually holding said office. The Respondents, however, maintain that
the office Petitioner was actually holding when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor was that of ViceMayor, the one to which he had been duly elected; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he was not actually holding the office of
Mayor but merely discharging the duties thereof and was merely acting as Mayor during the temporary disability of the
regular incumbent. Elaborating, Respondents claim that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor merely discharges the duties of the
office but does not exercise the powers thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat his tenure is provisional, lasting only during
the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.Petitioner counters with the argument that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor
does not only discharge the duties of the office of Mayor but also exercises the powers thereof; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that while acting as Mayor, he actually holds the office of Mayor for all legal purposes.
It is clear that Petitioners stand is taken from the point of view of his acting as Mayor and not of his office of Vice-Mayor,
while Respondents position is taken from the point of view of Petitioneractually holding the office of Vice-Mayor though
incidentally and temporarily discharging the duties of the office of Mayor.
We have given the case considerable study and thought because we find no precedents to aid and guide us. The parties
have ably adduced pertinent and extensive citations and arguments not only at the original hearing but also at the re-hearing.
As to whether a Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor may be regarded as actually holding the office of Mayor, there are plausible
arguments and good reasons for either side. We are inclined to agree with Petitioner that one acting as Mayor not only
discharges the duties of the office but also exercises the powers of said office, and that in one sense and literally, he may
legitimately be considered as actually holding the office of Mayor. But there is also force and logic in the argument
of Respondents that inasmuch as a Vice-Mayor takes over the duties of the Mayor only temporarily and in an acting capacity,
he may not be regarded as actually holding the office, because the duly elected Mayor incumbent though actually under
temporary disability such as suspension, illness or absence (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code) could and should
be considered as retaining his right to the office of Mayor and actually holding the same; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise
there would be a situation where two officials at the same time would be having a right to the same office and actually holding
the same. In view of the possible uncertainty and doubt as to whether or not a Vice-Mayor by acting as Mayor can be
regarded as actually holding said office of Mayor, we have to go back and resort to the legislative proceedings had,
particularly the discussions and interpellations in both houses of Congress leading to the enactment of section 27 of the
Revised Election Code, with a view to ascertaining the intention of that body. After all, in interpreting a law, the primary
consideration is the ascertainment of the intent and the purpose of the legislature promulgating the same.
Statute law is the will of the legislature; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the object of all judicial interpretation of it is to
determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by implication, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for

determining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it. (Black, Handbook on the
Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2nd ed., p. 11.)
HISTORY OR BACKGROUND OF SECTION 27
REVISED ELECTION CODE
Before the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, the law in force covering the point or question in
controversy was section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666. Its burden was to allow an elective provincial, municipal, or city
official such as Mayor, running for the same office to continue in office until the expiration of his term. The legislative intention
as we see it was to favor reelection of the incumbent by allowing him to continue in his office and use the prerogatives and
influence thereof in his campaign for reelection and to avoid a break in or interruption of his incumbency during his current
term and provide for continuity thereof with the next term of office if re-elected.
But section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 had reference only to provincial and municipal officials duly elected to their offices
and who were occupying the same by reason of said election at the time that they filed their certificates of candidacy for the
same position. It did not include officials who hold or occupy elective provincial and municipal offices not by election but by
appointment. We quote section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office other than the one for which he has been lastly elected,
shall be considered resigned from his once from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
However, this was exactly the situation facing the Legislature in the year 1947 after the late President Roxas had assumed
office as President and before the elections coming up that year. The last national elections for provincial and municipal
officials were held in 1940, those elected therein to serve up to December, 1943. Because of the war and the occupation by
the Japanese, no elections for provincial and municipal officials could be held in 1943. Those elected in 1940 could not holdover beyond 1943 after the expiration of their term of office because according to the views of the Executive department as
later confirmed by this Court in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, through Commonwealth Act No. 357,
Congress had intended to suppress the doctrine or rule of holdover. So, those provincial and municipal officials elected in
1940 ceased in 1943 and their offices became vacant, and this was the situation when after liberation, President Osmea
took over as Chief Executive. He filled these vacant positions by appointment. When President Roxas was elected in 1946
and assumed office in 1947 he replaced many of these Osmea appointees with his own men. Naturally, his Liberal Party
followers wanted to extend to these appointees the same privilege of office retention thereto given by section 2,
Commonwealth Act No. 666 to local elective officials. It could not be done because section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
had reference only to officials who had been elected. So, it was decided by President Roxas and his party to amend said
section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 by substituting the phrase which he is actually holding, for the phrase for which he
has been lastly elected found in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666. The amendment is now found in section 27 of the
Revised Election Code which we quote below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The purpose of the Legislature in making the amendment, in our opinion, was to give the benefit or privilege of retaining
office not only to those who have been elected thereto but also to those who have been appointed; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarystated differently, to extend the privilege and benefit to the regular incumbents having the right and title
to the office either by election or by appointment. There can be no doubt, in our opinion, about this intention. We have
carefully examined the proceedings in both Houses of the Legislature. The minority Nacionalista members of Congress
bitterly attacked this amendment, realizing that it was partisan legislation intended to favor those officials appointed by
President Roxas; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut despite their opposition the amendment was passed.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
We repeat that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code was to allow an official to
continue occupying an elective provincial, municipal or city office to which he had been appointed or elected, while
campaigning for his election as long as he runs for the same office. He may keep said office continuously without any break,
through the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office. By continuing in office, the office holder was allowed
and expected to use the prerogatives, authority and influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the
office he was holding. Another intention of the Legislature as we have hitherto adverted to was to provide for continuity of his
incumbency so that there would be no interruption or break, which would happen if he were required to resign because of his
filing his certificate of candidacy. Bearing this intention of the Legislature in this regard in mind, can it be said that a ViceMayor like the Petitioner herein, merely acting as Mayor because of the temporary disability of the regular incumbent, comes
under the provision and exception of section 27 of the Election Code? The answer must necessarily be in the negative. A
Vice Mayor acts as Mayor only in a temporary, provisional capacity. This tenure is indefinite, uncertain and precarious. He
may act for a few days, for a week or a month or even longer. But surely there, ordinarily, is no assurance or expectation that
he could continue acting as Mayor, long, indefinitely, through the elections and up to the end of the term of the office because
the temporary disability of the regular, incumbent Mayor may end any time and he may resume his duties.
VICE-MAYOR ACTING AS MAYOR, OUTSIDE
LEGAL CONTEMPLATION
The case of a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor could not have been within the contemplation and the intent of the Legislature
because as we have already stated, that lawmaking body or at least the majority thereof intended to give the benefits and the
privilege of section 27 to those officials holding their offices by their own right and by a valid title either by election or by

appointment, permanently continuously and up to the end of the term of the office, not to an official neither elected nor
appointed to that office but merely acting provisionally in said office because of the temporary disability of the regular
incumbent. In drafting and enacting section 27, how could the Legislature have possibly had in mind a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor, and include him in its scope, and accord him the benefits of retaining the office of Mayor and utilizing its authority and
influence in his election campaign, when his tenure in the office of Mayor is so uncertain, indefinite and precarious that there
may be no opportunity or occasion for him to enjoy said benefits, and how could Congress have contemplated his continuing
in the office in which he is acting, when the very idea of continuity is necessarily in conflict and incompatible with the
uncertainty, precariousness and temporary character of his tenure in the office of Mayor?
ACTUALLY HOLDING OFFICE EQUIVALENT
TO INCUMBENT
All these doubts about the meaning and application of the phrase actually holding office could perhaps have been avoided
had the intention of this Legislature been phrased differently. It could perhaps have more happily used the term incumbent
to refer to those provincial and municipal officials who were holding office either by election or by appointment, and so had a
legal title and right thereto. As a matter of fact, this term incumbent was actually used by Congressman Laurel in explaining
the idea of the committee that drafted this amendment to section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666, of which committee he was
the Chairman. The deliberations of the lower House as quoted by the very counsel for Petitioner reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Mr. ROY. What must be the reason, then, Mr. Chairman of the Committee for deleting the words has been lastly elected?
Mr. LAUREL. The idea is to cover the present incumbents of the local offices. (II Congressional Record 1143.)
In this connection, a happier phraseology of another portion of section 27 could have been used for purposes of precision.
For instance, the first part of said section reads thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, and yet as we have already said, the Legislature intended said section to refer to officials who
were appointed by President Roxas to fill vacancies in provincial, municipal and city elective offices. In other words, those
officials were not really elected or elective officials but they were officials occupying or holding local elective offices by
appointment. All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of a
law or statute but at times may interpret, nay, even disregard loose or inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real
meaning and spirit of a statute intended and breathed into it by the law-making body.
MEANING OF PHRASE RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 in providing that a local elective official running for an office other than the one he is
actually holding, is considered resigned from his office, must necessarily refer to an office which said official can resign, or
from which he could be considered resigned, even against his will. For instance, an incumbent Mayor running for the office of
Provincial Governor must be considered as having resigned from his office of Mayor. He must resign voluntarily or be
compelled to resign. It has to be an office which is subject to resignation by the one occupying it. Can we say this of a ViceMayor acting as Mayor? Can he or could he resign from the office of Mayor or could he be made to resign therefrom No. As
long as he holds the office of Vice-Mayor to which he has a right and legal title, he, cannot resign or be made to resign from
the office of Mayor because the law itself requires that as Vice- Mayor he must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of
the regular or incumbent Mayor. If he cannot voluntarily resign the office of Mayor in which he is acting temporarily, or could
not be made to resign therefrom, then the provision of section 27 of the Code about resignation, to him, would be useless,
futile and a dead letter. In interpreting a law, we should always avoid a construction that would have this result, for it would
violate the fundamental rule that every legislative act should be interpreted in order to give force and effect to every provision
thereof because the Legislature is not presumed to have done a useless act.
A statute is a solemn enactment of the state acting through its legislature and it must be assumed that this process achieve
result. It cannot be presumed that the legislature would do a futile thing. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 237.)
EXAMPLE
To emphasize and illustrate this inapplicability of section 27 to a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, let us consider an example. A
Vice-Mayor while acting as Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the office of Vice-Mayor. In other words, he wants to
run for re-election. The Provincial Governor, especially if belonging to a different political party wants to keep him out of the
office of Mayor, especially during the electoral campaign, and instead have his party man, the councilor who obtained the
highest number of votes in the last elections, act as Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code). So, he hastens to
the Municipal building and enters the Mayors office where the Vice-Mayor has installed himself. Using the same argument of
herein Petitioner, he tells the Vice-Mayor that inasmuch as while acting as Mayor, he was actually holding said office of
Mayor, and because while thus holding it, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor which is a different office, he
must be considered resigned from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he even asks him to leave the Mayors
room and office. The Vice-Mayor, a law abiding citizen acquiesces and obeys, he reluctantly, leaves and abandons the office
of the Mayor and repairs to his own room as Vice-Mayor. But he has a happy inspiration and remembers the law (section
2195, Revised Administrative Code); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe rushes back to the office of the Mayor and tells the
Governor and the authorities that he is still the Vice-Mayor because when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor,
he was also actually holding said office, and so did not lose it; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat as such Vice-Mayor, he can act
and must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the incumbent, because he cannot resign and no one can make him
resign from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he defies the Governor to oust him from the office and room of
the Mayor. The Governor is helpless for the Vice-Mayor is right, that is, if we apply section 27 of the Election Code to him.

This possible, undesirable and anomalous situation is another reason why section 27 may not be applied to the case of a
Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.
In the above given example, the Governor might contend that when the Vice-Mayor filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor, he was actually holding only the office of Mayor and not that of Vice-Mayor and so he lost his office of Vice-Mayor.
But that contention of the Governor is untenable. Even counsel for herein Petitioner in his memorandum admits that a ViceMayor while acting as Mayor, also actually holds his office of Vice-Mayor. And it has to be that way. A Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor does not cease to be Vice-Mayor. In fact, that is his real, principal and basic office or function. Acting as Mayor is only
an incident, an accessory. Let him cease holding the office of Vice-Mayor even for an instant, and he automatically also
ceases acting as Mayor. Furthermore, a Vice-Mayor has administrative duties to perform. He is an ex-officio member of the
Municipal Council and he is in charge of the barrio or district where the town offices are located (section 2204, Revised
Administrative Code). While acting as Mayor he may not say that he ceases to hold the office of Vice- Mayor and so cannot
look after the needs of the residents of his district and present them to the town council.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE
The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then he goes on leave of
absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for
the same office of Mayor. Then the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, the councilor who at the last
general elections received the highest number of votes, acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate of candidacy while acting as
Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using the same argument, the councilor who had previously acted
as Mayor also campaigns for his election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct offices, running for the same
office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices, and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and
Councilor) are different from the office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet that would happen if the
contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of actually holding office is to prevail.
CONGRESS CONTEMPLATED ONLY ONE OFFICE
ACTUALLY HELD
Another argument against the contention that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds the office of Mayor, occurs to us.
For purposes of ready reference we again quote section 27 in its entirety:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 27. Candidate holdings office. Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
It will readily be noticed from the quoted section, especially the words underlined by us that the Legislature contemplated only
one office, not two or more. To us, this is significant as well as important. As we have previously stated, there is no question
that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor still holds the office of Vice-Mayor. Petitioner himself admits this in his written argument
and even contends that there is nothing wrong or illegal in an official holding two offices at the same time provided there is no
incompatibility between them. If the Legislature believed that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds the office of Mayor
and that he would thus be actually holding two offices, then it would have provided in section 27 for offices in the plural
instead of employing the words office, his office, and the one which it used in the singular. Besides this clear expression of
legislative intent for only one office being actually held and to be resigned from, to say that the Vice-Mayor when acting as
Mayor is actually holding two offices would create confusion and uncertainty because we would not know which office he
would be considered resigned from.
TWO OFFICIALS ACTUALLY HOLDING THE SAME
ELECTIVE OFFICE
We have already said that a Mayor under temporary disability continues to be Mayor (Gamalinda vs. Yap * No. L-6121, May
30, 1953) and actually holds the office despite his temporary disability to discharge the duties of the office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryhe receives full salary corresponding to his office, which payment may not be legal if he were not
actually holding the office, while the Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not receive said salary but is paid only a sum
equivalent to it (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code). Now, if a Mayor under temporary disability actually holds the
office of Mayor and the Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor, according to his claim is also actually holding the office of Mayor, then
we would have the anomalous and embarrassing situation of two officials actually holding the very same local elective office.
Considered from this view point, and to avoid the anomaly, it is to us clear that the Vice-Mayor should not be regarded as
holding the office of Mayor but merely acting for the regular incumbent, a duty or right as an incident to his office of ViceMayor and not as an independent right or absolute title to the office by reason of election or appointment.
ACTING MAYOR AND ACTING AS MAYOR, DISTINGUISHED
Petitioner claims that he is the acting Mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and
profitable, at least in the present case, to make a distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.
When a vacancy occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21(a) or the President under section
21(b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting Mayor. In that case the person designated or
appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds the office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21 [f]) because when

he was appointed there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor, there is no
vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly
and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily,
provisionally and during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball
parlance, Petitioner is only a pinch hitter, pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an emergency. As a mere pinch hitter his
name does not grace the regular line up, he is not the pitcher, does not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive
all the benefits and privileges of the regular pitcher.
Ordinarily, this apparently fine and subtle distinction would seem unimportant and unnecessary. When a Vice-Mayor acts as
Mayor we usually call him Mayor or Acting Mayor and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut there are times and occasions like the present when it is necessary to make these distinction and
use correct and precise language in order to determine whether or not under section 27 of the Election Code a Vice-Mayor
acting as Mayor like the Petitioner herein comes within the phrase actually holding office used in that section.
EXCEPTION TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
Section 26 of the Revised Election Code provides that every person holding an appointive office shall ipso facto cease in his
office on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Then we have section 27 of the same Code as well as section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 666 which it amended, both providing that local elective officials running for office shall be
considered resigned from their posts, except when they run for the same office they are occupying or holding. It is evident
that the general rule is that all Government officials running for office must resign. The authority or privilege to keep ones
office when running for the same office is the exception. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that an exception or a
proviso must be strictly construed specially when considered in an attempt to ascertain the legislative intent.
Exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythey extend only so
far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the
latter by implication, and it is a general rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of this rule, to inquire whether, in the particular case, it accords with reason and justice cralaw .
(Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., section 643, pp. 1092-1093; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics
supplied.)
As in all other cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative intent. Where the proviso itself must be
considered. In an attempt to determine the intent of the Legislature, it should be strictly construed. This is true because the
legislative purpose set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy and only those subjects expressly
exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol.
2, pp. 471-472.)
Applying this rule, inasmuch as Petitioner herein claimed the right to retain his office under the exception above referred to,
said claim must have to be judged strictly, whether or not his mere acting in the office of Mayor may be legally interpreted
as actually holding the same so as to come within the exception. As we have already observed, literally and generally
speaking, since he is discharging the duties and exercising the powers of the office of Mayor he might be regarded as
actually holding the office; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut strictly speaking and considering the purpose and intention of the
Legislature behind section 27 of the Revised Election Code, he may not and cannot legitimately be considered as actually
holding the office of Mayor.
RETENTION OF OFFICE
We have, heretofore discussed the case as regards the resignation of an office holder from his office by reason of his running
for an office different from it; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand our conclusion is that it must be an office that he can or may
resign or be considered resigned from; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the office of Mayor is not such an office from the
stand point of a Vice-Mayor. Let us now consider the case from the point of view of retaining his office because he is running
for the same office, namely retention of his office. As we have already said, the Legislature intended to allow an office
holder and incumbent to retain his office provided that he runs for the same. In other words, he is supposed to retain the
office before and throughout the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office, without interruption. Can a ViceMayor acting as Mayor be allowed or expected to retain the office of Mayor ? The incumbent Mayor running for the same
office can and has a right to keep and retain said office up to the end of his term. But a Vice-Mayor merely acting as Mayor
and running for said office of Mayor, may not and cannot be expected to keep the office up to the end of the term, even
assuming that by acting as Mayor he is actually holding the office of Mayor, for the simple reason that his holding of the same
is temporary, provisional and precarious and may end any time when the incumbent Mayor returns to duty. Naturally, his
temporary holding of the office of Mayor cannot be the retention or right to keep the office intended by the Legislature in
section 27 of Republic Act No. 180. So that, neither from the point of view of resignation from the office of Mayor nor the
standpoint of retention of said office, may a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, like herein Petitioner, come within the provisions
and meaning of section 27 of the Election Code, particularly the exception in it.
SUPPOSED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICE-MAYOR
ACTING AS MAYOR
During the hearing and oral argument of this case, the suggestion was made, which suggestion was also used as an
argument during the deliberations among the members of this Tribunal, that to include in section 27 particularly the phrase
actually holding office one who has been appointed as acting official such as Acting Mayor and at the same time exclude a
Vice-Mayor who acts as Mayor, would be discriminating against an official (Vice-Mayor) who by statutory provision and

sanction is required to act as Mayor, and give more importance to one merely appointed to said office. We fail to see any
discrimination for the reason that an appointee to the office of Mayor fills a vacancy and serves until the end of the term of the
office, whereas a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor fills no vacancy because there is none and he serves only temporarily until the
disability of the incumbent, such as suspension, absence, illness, etc. is removed. Now, if a vacancy is created in the office of
Mayor by removal, resignation, death or cessation of the incumbent, then the Vice-Mayor automatically fills the vacancy,
becomes Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code), and serves until the end of the term (section 21[f], Revised
Election Code). That is the time when he may invoke section 27 because he would then be actually holding the office of
Mayor.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we believe and hold that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not actually hold the office of Mayor within the
meaning of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is considered resigned from the office of Vice-Mayor for the
reason that is the only office that he actually holds within the contemplation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code and
the office he is running for (Mayor) is naturally other than the one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as Mayor.
A word of explanation. This decision should have been promulgated long before now. In truth, this Tribunal was anxious and
determined to decide this case before the last November elections, at least before the newly elected local officials assumed
office. However, after long, careful deliberations the court was deadlocked, the vote standing five to five. The rehearing
ordered by us as decreed by law failed to break the deadlock. It was only when the new addition to the membership of the
Tribunal, Mr. Justice Endencia studied the case, weighed the arguments and considered the authorities on either side, that
the tie vote could be broken. He voted for and signed the present opinion which now becomes the majority opinion.
The question involved in the present case may in a way be regarded as moot. Just the same, we doomed it advisable to
proceed with its final determination, even elaborate on the discussion of its different aspects, by reason of its importance and
for the information and guidance of local elective officials, and perchance so that the Legislature, apprised of the judicial
interpretation and meaning given to section 27 of the Revised Election Code, may be in a better position to decide whether to
continue and leave it as it stands on the statute books, or amend or change it before the next general elections.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for prohibition is denied, with costs. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
hereby dissolved.
Padilla, Jugo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, A., J., concurring:
The chief function of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker and, that intention has been
ascertained, to give effect thereto. By reference to legislative record Mr. Justice Montemayor has, I think, arrived at the true
legislative intent and has therefore fashioned his opinion 50 as to give effect to that intent. I readily subscribe to that opinion
as the correct judicial solution to the present controversy.
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I fully concur with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Concepcion, but would only add that I fail to see how the majority can
hold that the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, cannot be considered resigned from the mayoralty, because it has to be an office
which is subject to resignation by the one occupying it. That conclusion would only be true if the law required the candidate
to resign voluntarily from his office. But the law does not require him to resign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit considers him
resigned, treats him as if he had resigned; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that is altogether a different thing. In order that an
official can be considered resigned all that is needed is that the office be one that he could forfeit or loss. And the mayoralty
is certainly an office that can be lost or forfeited by Petitioner, even if he could not resign from it. The trouble, I suppose, is
that the structure of our language is such that (as semanticists have pointed out) it enables us not only to use words about
realities but also to use words about words.
And it is precisely because the law here involved decrees a forfeiture that restrictive interpretation becomes imperative and
doubts should be resolved against the Petitioners forfeiting his office.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This case hinges on the interpretation of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code),
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall
be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Italics supplied.)
The main issue is whether Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is actually holding the office of municipal mayor of San Juan del
Monte, Province of Rizal.
ORDINARY AND LEGAL MEANING OF THE PHRASE
ACTUALLY HOLDING
Actual implies

Real, in opposition to constructive or speculative, something existing in act. State vs. Wells, 31 Conn. 213; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryreal as opposed to nominal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAstor vs. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 4 Sup. Ct. 413,
28 L. Ed. 401. (Bouviers Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 130.) (Italics supplied.)
That which exists in fact, a reality. (Websters New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 27.) (Italics supplied.)
According to Ballantine Law Dictionary (1948 ed., p. 28):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which
is presumptive or constructive. See Steen vs. Modern Woodmen of America, 296, 111, 104, 17 A. L. R. 406, 412, 129 N. E.
Rep. 546. (Italics supplied.)
Hence, actually means in act or fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryin reality; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarytruly as, he was
actually there. (Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary, 1952 ed., p. 31.) In other words, actually is opposed to
seemingly, pretendedly, or feignedly as actually engaged in farming means really, truly, in fact. (In re Strawbridge & Mays, 39
Ala. 367) (Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 130.)
Upon the other hand, to hold is to possess; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto occupy; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto be in
possession and administration of; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryas to hold office. (Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 897.)
Consequently, to actually hold is to possess in fact or in reality, that is to say, physically or materially.
A public office, however, is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period either
fixed by law or induring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. (Mechem, Public Officers, section 1.) Being
intangible, it is incapable of physical or material occupation. As a consequence, the actually holding of an office is determined
by its physical, external or tangible manifestations, namely, the exercise of the powers and performance of the duties
appurtenant thereto. For this reason, it has been held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Actually holds office within statute regulating tax commissions salaries, means discharge of duties after due appointment
and qualification. (Acts 1923, p. 14, section 1; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryp 184, section 85.) (Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p.
266) (Italics supplied.)
Actually holds office means the discharge of the duties thereof after due appointment and qualification, as required by law,
subject to removal at the will of the appointing power. Touart vs. State ex rel. Callaghan, 173 Ala. 453, 56 So. 211; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryWilliams, Judge vs. Schwarz, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 869; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryNolens case, 118 Ala. 154, 24 So. 251. (Brussel vs. Brandon, 136 So. 577.) (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that, being the vice-mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal,Petitioner Salaysay is, and has
been, discharging the duties of mayor of said municipality, since the suspension of its mayor, Engracio E. Santos.
Consequently, the former is actually holding the office of the mayor.
PETITIONER DISCHARGES ALL OF THE DUTIES AND
HAS ALL THE POWERS OF THE MAYOR
Although maintaining that Petitioner merely performs said duties, without the powers vested in said office, the Solicitor
General has been unable to name a single power of the mayor which may not be legally exercised by the vice-mayor, during
the formers suspension. That Petitionerpossesses all the powers attached to the office of the mayor is conceded in the very
opinion of the majority. Indeed, in the case of Eraa vs. Vergel de Dios (47 Off. Gaz., 2303, 2307), it was held that
appointments or other official acts made by the Undersecretary of Health when acting as Department Head, have the same
efficacy and legal effect as the acts of the regular incumbent, who was then absent. Inasmuch as Petitioner is clothed with
all the duties and powers of the municipal mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and this by operation of law (section 2196,
Revised Administrative Code) we cannot escape the conclusion that he is actually holding said office.
PETITIONER IS THE ACTING MAYOR
In fact, while performing said duties and exercising said powers, Petitioner acts as mayor, or is the acting mayor. This is
admitted (1) in the majority opinion, which states that Petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of the
mayor while acting as mayor (pp. 1, 2, 8 and 16); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) in the very letter of the Provincial
Governor of Rizal (Annex C), to Petitioner herein, advising him of the appointment of Respondent Sto. Domingo as Acting
Municipal Vice-Mayor, which letter is addressed to said Petitioner as Acting Municipal Mayor. This is in conformity with our
view, in Eraa vs. Vergel de Dios (supra), to the effect that the Undersecretary of Health who, during the absence of the
Secretary of Health, performs the duties of the latter pursuant to section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code is the
Acting Secretary of Health, and that his acts, as such, have the same efficacy or legal effect as those of the Secretary of
Health.
Now, then, acting, according to Ballentine Law Dictionary (p. 19) is substituting, taking the place of another officer
temporarily, as an acting Judge. Since an acting mayor, therefore, temporarily takes the place of the regularly elected
mayor, who, prior thereto, was actually holding said office, it follows that the same is actually in the possession of, and,
hence, actually holding the former, upon the aforementioned substitution.
Said majority opinion states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner claims that he is the acting mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and
profitable, at least in the present case, to make a distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.
When a vacancy occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21 (a) or the President under section 21
(b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting Mayor. In that case the person designated or appointed
becomes the Mayor and actually holds the office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21[f]) because when he was

appointed there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor, there is no vacancy in
the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and
correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily, provisionally
and during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball parlance, Petitioner is only
a pinch hitter, pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an emergency. As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular
line up, he is not the pitcher, does not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and privileges of
the regular pitcher (pp. 17-18).
To begin with, when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of municipal mayor, under section 21 (b) of Republic Act No.
180, no appointment or designation is made by the President, for the vice- mayor becomes the mayor. Upon the other hand,
section 21(d) and (e) of said Act provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a local officer-elect dies before assumption of office, or fails to qualify for any reason, the President may in his
discretion either call a special election or fill the office by appointment.
In case a special election has been called and held and shall have resulted in a failure to elect, the President shall fill the
office by appointment.
The appointments made by the President under either paragraph may be temporary or permanent in nature. If permanent,
the appointee is the mayor, not acting mayor. If temporary, the appointee is an acting mayor who, said opinion impliedly
admits, holds actually the office of mayor.
Secondly, there is no legal distinction between the phrases acting mayor and acting as mayor. The distinction in these
expressions is imposed merely by the rules of grammar. When availed of as a gerund of the verb to act, for the purpose of
indicating the capacity in which an act has been performed, the word acting must be followed by the preposition as, which
is improper when said word is used as a noun, to describe the status of an officer. Thus, the Undersecretary of Health,
acting as Secretary of Health, during the absence of the latter, is acting Secretary of Health. (Eraa vs. Vergel de Dios,
supra.) Similarly, the vice-mayor acting as mayor during the suspension of the mayor, is the acting mayor, and, this is
confirmed by the aforementioned letter of the Provincial Governor of Rizal (Annex C) and by the established practice
referred to in the aforesaid majority opinion of addressing the vice-mayor discharging the duties of the Mayor, either as
Mayor or as acting mayor.
Thirdly, the word acting, when preceding the title of an office, simply connotes, in legal parlance, the temporary nature with
which said office is held (Austria vs. Amante, 45 Off. Gaz., 2829). What is more, it indicates that the acting officer is
physically in possession of the office, or actually holding it.
Fourthly, although a pinch hitter may not be the regular pitcher, when he pitches or bats, is he not the actual pitcher or
batter? When he strikes out a batter or connects a hit, or commits an error, is the strike out, hit, or error not counted
actually, as a real one?
Fifthly, the vice-mayor acting as mayor, during the suspension of the mayor, is in a better position than a pinch-hitter, who, it
is said, does not receive all the benefits and privileges of the regular pitcher. Said acting mayor has all the powers and
duties of the suspended mayor, who, in turn, cannot discharge the functions of his office or even receive the emoluments
attached thereto, until exonerated or reinstated.
PETITIONER HAS ASSUMED THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
When a vice-mayor discharges the duties of a suspended mayor, the former assumes the office of the latter. This was
acknowledged, expressly, in Laxamana vs. Baltazar (48 Off. Gaz., 3869), and by implication in said case of Eraa vs. Vergel
de Dios (supra). Thus, in the aforementioned communication of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, Petitioner was informed
that Respondent Sto. Domingo, who has been appointed Acting Vice-Mayor, was to assume the office of mayor during the
suspension of Mayor Engracio E. Santos. Considering that to assume an office is to take possession thereof, it is obvious to
us that a vice-mayor performing the functions of the mayor who has been suspended, actually holds the office of the latter.
PETITIONERS POSSESSION OF THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
Again, said Provincial Governor and the Executive Secretary have directed and advised Petitionerto turn over the office of
mayor to Respondent Sto. Domingo, thus implicitly, but, clearly, conceding that Petitioner herein is the actual holder of said
office. Otherwise, how could he turn it over, even if he wanted to, to said Respondent?
This is so patent that the majority opinion accepts the fact that one acting as mayor not only discharges the duties of the
office, but, also exercises the powers of said office cralaw so that in one sense and literally, he may be legitimately
considered as actually holding the office of the mayor, and that when a vice-mayor acts as mayor we usually call him mayor
or acting mayor and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent (p. 18). These views, we believe, must,
however, be qualified. Petitioner is the actual holder of the mayors office, not in one sense and literally, but in every
sense, namely, literally and legally, in ordinary parlance, as well as from the viewpoint of the law on Public Officers. Similarly,
although Petitioner is not the regular incumbent of the office of mayor, he is its actual and legal incumbent, for he holds office
and, accordingly, he is its actual incumbent pursuant to law, which legalizes his status.
ACTUAL HOLDING AND CONSTRUCTIVE HOLDING
DISTINGUISHED
The issues would, perhaps, be clearer if we considered at closer range, the nature of a public office, the essence of which is
the right, authority and duty, forming part of the sovereign functions of the government, delegated by operation of law. Insofar

as public officers are concerned, two other elements are material, namely, (1) title to the office, and (2) authority to exercise
its powers and discharge its duties. The former is usually acquired either by appointment or by popular election, although, in
some instances, it may be secured by legislative enactment. Thus, by statutory provision, a vice-mayor becomes ipso facto
the mayor upon the death, removal, resignation or permanent disqualification of the regularly elected mayor (section 21[b],
Republic Act No. 180). The latter, in general, exists when the possessor of the former assumes office. At times, however, the
regular incumbent cannot exercise the functions of his office, as when he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(1) is ousted by another,
who enters upon the discharge of said functions; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor (2) absent or becomes temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor (3) is suspended from office by competent authority.
If, in the first case, the person who effected the ouster, and assumed the office in question, has color of title, which is
defective, and the people, unaware of the defect, submit to, or invoke, his action, supposing him to be the officer he claims to
be, he is legally considered a de facto officer, the one ousted being regarded a de jure officer. It should be noted that the
status of a de facto officer requires the concurrence of the following conditions, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) there
must be a de jure office; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) there must be actual possession of the office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) this must be coupled with color of title. In such event, the de facto officer is actually holding
the office. The person vested with a valid title thereto, or the de jure officer, is not in material possession of the office. Hence
he is not actually holding the same. Yet, he is deemed to hold the office, in the sense only that there is no vacancy which
may be filled by appointment or election, as the case may be. As a consequence, the office is held by two individuals, in
different capacities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the de facto officer actually holds the office, whereas the de jure officer retains
possession thereof by legal fiction. This distinction between the actual and the constructive possession of a public office is
vitally important in the case at bar.
If the office involved in the second and third cases is that of a municipal mayor, the law (section 2195, Revised administrative
Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLaxamana vs. Baltazar, supra) requires the vice-mayor to discharge the duties of the
mayor. In compliance with such requirement, the vice- mayor assumes the office of mayor, wields its powers, performs its
duties, and, as a consequence, actually holds said office. The regular incumbent does not exercise said power or perform
said duties, because he cannot do so, owing, in the second case, to his absence or disability, and, in the third case, to the
order of suspension, which temporarily divests him of said powers and duties. The suspended officer is legally deprived of
the authority to exercise those powers and perform said duties. Should he do so, in violation of the order of suspension, his
acts would be null and void, for, in the eyes of the law, the mayor is, not he, but the vice-mayor acting as mayor. In short, said
order oust the mayor, for the time being, from physical possession of the office, thus resulting in its temporary vacancy
(Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra), which is actually filled by the vice- mayor acting as mayor, in compliance with section 2195
of the Revised Administrative Code. The suspended mayor merely hold the legal title to the office, and, in this sense, only he
is in constructive possession thereof. His condition is comparable to the holder of the naked title to a property, the usufruct of
which is vested in another, who is in the material possession and enjoyment of said property. The latter is physically occupied
by the usufructuary, in the same manner as Petitioner is actually holding the office of mayor, unlike the suspended mayor
who, though actually holding the title to the office, does not hold the office itself, except constructively, or by legal fiction.
AS ACTING MAYOR, PETITIONER RECEIVES THE COMPENSATION FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
Pursuant to section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code, the mayor shall receive full salary when absent from the
municipality on official business or cralaw when he is absent from his office because of illness contracted through no fault
of his own, provided the absence in the latter case does not exceed thirty days during the year cralaw; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand if during such authorized or justified absence the vice-mayor cralaw temporarily discharge the local
duties of the mayor, said vice-mayor may receive compensation in an amount to be fixed by the council cralaw which shall
not be in excess of the salary of the mayor for the same period. However, section 2192 provides that a municipal officer
suspended from duty pending an investigation of charges against him shall receive no pay during such suspension; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut upon subsequent exoneration or reinstatement, the Department Head may order the payment of the
whole or part of the salary accruing during such suspension. The vice-mayor, acting as mayor during the suspension of the
mayor, shall receive compensation equivalent to the salary of the mayor. (Section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.)
In line with a practice established as early as 1916 when the first Administrative Code was adopted and followed, then,
by the Department of the Interior, now, by the Division of Local Governments in the Office of the President, as well as by the
Department of Finance and the Office of the Auditor General (before, the Insular Auditor), said compensation of the vicemayor, acting as mayor, in lieu of the suspended mayor, is paid from the appropriation for salary of the mayor. Should the
suspended mayor be eventually exonerated or reinstated with pay, as provided in section 2192, the municipal council
approves a new appropriation therefor, the original appropriation for salary of the mayor having been applied to the payment
of the emoluments of the acting mayor.
The distinction between the case of a mayor who is absent on official business or is sick, without his fault, for not more than 1
month a year, and the mayor who is suspended, as regards the right to compensation for both the mayor and the vicemayor acting in his place and the appropriation from which payment shall be made, constitutes another tangible and
significant evidence that, when the mayor is suspended, the vice-mayor, who discharges the duties of the mayor, is regarded
by law as the actual holder of the office of mayor. This conclusion becomes even more imperative when we consider that, by
explicit legal provision, said vice-mayor may no longer receive his per diems as vice-mayor, for attendance of the sessions of
the council (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.) Thus, during his incumbency as acting mayor, by which name he
comes to be known, he is more a mayor than a vice-mayor.
In the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan (48 Off. Gaz., 3330), the Petitioner in an election protest, for the office of Senator, who won
said protest, was not allowed to recover the salary collected by the defeated protestee during the period of his incumbency,

despite the fact that the latter had actually held office merely as a de facto officer. Surely, Petitioner herein, who had, not only
the right, but, also, the duty, to act as mayor, even if temporarily, has a better status than a de facto officer and, like the latter,
at least, must be considered legally as the actual holder of the office of mayor.
THE SUSPENDED MAYOR DOES NOT ACTUALLY HOLD THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
As already adverted to, when a mayor is suspended his office becomes temporarily vacant (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,
supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysection 2195, Revised Administrative Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarySection 21[a],
Republic Act No. 180). This fact is absolutely inconsistent with the theory that he actually holds the office of mayor, during the
period of suspension.
Moreover, said mayor may be reinstated in office (section 2192, Revised Administrative Code). This means necessarily
that, during said suspension, the mayor does not actually hold his office, for reinstatement is restoration to a possession
formerly enjoyed, and thereafter lost. Such loss of actual possession is total. The suspended mayor retains nothing but the
naked title - he is completely stripped of the beneficial enjoyment of the powers appurtenant to the office. The forfeiture,
though temporary, of the official attributes save as to the naked title is such that the suspension ipso facto deprives the
mayor even of the right to compensation. (Section 2192, Revised Administrative Code). What is more, the emoluments
attached to his office become due, by operation of law (section 2187, do. do.), to the vice-mayor acting as mayor.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It is urged that the phrase actually holding, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was meant to refer only to permanent
incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a temporary character. We cannot accept this view, for the following
reasons, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any elective local official who runs
for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature of said possession, so long as, it is actual. It is irrelevant,
therefore, whether the office is held temporarily or permanently.
2. One of the purposes of Congress, it is claimed, in providing that the filing of the certificate of candidacy shall not operate
as a resignation, when a local elective officer runs for an office he is actually holding, is that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By continuing in office the office holder allowed and expected to use the prerogatives authority and influence of his office in
his campaign for his election or re-election to the office he was holding.
It is obvious, however, that as the one vested by law with the authority to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of
the mayor Petitioner is the person who could carry out said alleged intent of the law-maker. Upon the other hand, the
suspended mayor could not be so, even if he wanted to, for his suspension prevents him from availing himself, during the
election campaign, of the authority, influence and prerogatives of the office of mayor.
3. Admittedly, if the acting mayor had been appointed by the President, the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the office
of mayor would not operate as a resignation from said office. Said presidential appointee could have received, however,
either a regular or permanent appointment, or a designation or temporary appointment. We are unable to find any valid and
sufficient reason and none has been offered in the majority opinion why a discrimination should be made in favor of the
person so given, by the Executive, a temporary appointment and against one, likePetitioner herein, chosen by the law itself,
from which the Chief Magistrate of the land derives his power to make said appointment.
4. The last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No 666, the former election law, reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly
elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
This provision was amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, which eliminated the clause other than the one for which
he has been last elected, and substituted, in lieu thereof, the words other than the one which he is actually holding.
Explaining the purpose of the amendment, in reply to criticisms made by members of the Senate who belonged to the then
minority party, Senator Tirona, Chairman of the Committee sponsoring the measure on the floor of the Senate and, in effect,
majority spokesman in relation thereto, had the following to say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Precisamente, por el hecho de que una gran mayoria de los gobernadores provinciales, miembros de la Junta Provincial,
alcaldes, vice alcaldes y concejales municipales, son de nombramiento, queda justificada la disposicion del articulo 27,
porque si se aplicara a esos funcionarios la prohibicion de que no pueden ser candidatos a los cargos que ocupan a menos
que dimitan, se produciria un grave desbarajuste que podria perjudicar la administracion de los asuntos provinciales y
municipales. Por que? Porque el cambio de todos esos funcionarios provinciales no se podria hacer facilmente, Daria lugar a
muchos conflictos de grupos o facciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarya una infinidad de cuestiones. Congressional record of
the 1st Congress of the Republic, Vol. II, p. 108). (Italics supplied.)
It is apparent, from the foregoing, that the amendment merely sought to minimize the number of vacancies resulting from the
filing of certificate of candidacy by persons holding local elective offices. The reason was both administrative and political.
Administrative, because too many vacancies, it was feared, would gravely disrupt the administration of local governments.
Political, because every vacancy would create the difficult problem of filing the same precisely on the eve of elections.
Indeed, each vacancy is more likely to lead to political discontent than to political expediency, considering that, for every
appointment to fill a vacancy, there would generally be several disappointed and disillusioned candidates therefor, who might,
as a consequence work against the administration.
5. The journals of Congress contain ample evidence of the fact that, when section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 was
amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, the members of both Houses knew that there existed a sizeable number of

local officials holding elective positions by virtue of presidential appointments, some of which were temporary in nature. Yet,
Congress approved the amendment with the understanding that it would apply equally to the permanent and the temporary
appointees of the executive branch. Obviously, therefore, the phrase actually holding, in said section 27, does not refer
solely to permanent officers.
6. Although the aforementioned amendment was bitterly criticized by the minority members of Congress, by reason of its
favorable effects upon said presidential appointees and upon the political party then in power, nothing was said in the course
of the deliberations of the lawmaking body, to indicate, even if remotely, the intent to exclude, from the benefits of said
amendment, those who may be actually holding local elective offices by operation of law. Said journals are absolutely silent
on this point.
7. It is argued for the Respondents that section 27 contemplates an office from which its incumbent could resign, and that it
could not apply, therefore, to the office of mayor, whichPetitioner claims to hold actually, for, as vice-mayor acting as mayor
during the suspension of the mayor, said Petitioner cannot resign from the office of mayor. Let us examine carefully said
section 27, which, for convenience, we reproduce once more.
An elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
It will be noted that the word office is twice used therein; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryfirstly, in the expression running for an
office, other than the one which he is actually holding; and, secondly in the clause shall be considered resigned from his
office. Obviously, the latter refers to an office from which it is possible to resign. Does the former allude to an analogous
situation? We do not think so, for the office first mentioned is the one for which the candidate is running. Moreover, it
specifically refers to an office other than the one which he is actually holding. Even if the office actually held by the
candidate were one he could give up by resignation, he could not possibly do so as to the other office, for which he seeks
the popular mandate, because he does not hold that office as yet.
Must the office he is actually holding be one from which he could resign, if he so desired? One can resign from an office to
which he had been duly elected or appointed. If such were the office contemplated in section 27, the same would have used
only the word holding, without the qualification actually, it being clear particularly to the members of Congress, most of
whom are lawyers that an office may be held materially by one who has not been elected or appointed thereto, such as
the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, in compliance with Article 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, in view of the
suspension of the mayor.
The situation visualized in section 27 would be more apparent had Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
provincial governor. This being other than the offices he is actually holding those of vice-mayor and mayor he would be
deemed, by operation of said section 27, resigned from his office, namely that of vice-mayor. Having thus relinquished this
office, we would, necessarily, have no more authority to act as mayor. In other words, the office he is actually holding need
not be necessarily his office, and this is not unusual under the Law on Public Office. Otherwise, the word actually would be
not only unnecessary, but inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the law.
8. It is next said that, in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, Congress contemplated only one office actually held. This view
is based upon the clause an office other than the one which is based upon the clause an office other than the one which he
is actually holding, in said provision, with emphasis on the phrase the one. It will be recalled that said clause is only an
amendment of the last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly
elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Italics
supplied.)
In other words, the word one was not inserted by Republic Act No. 180. It was part of said section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 666, which referred to an elective local official running for an office other than the one for which he has been lastly
elected. Since, normally, a person is elected to only one office, it was only natural for said section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 666 to use the word one. But, let us suppose that, during the effectivity of Commonwealth Act No. 666, a law was
passed permitting an individual to run for, and hold, two offices, say, for instance, the positions of municipal mayor and
member of the provincial board, and that while holding both elective offices, the incumbent should, in a subsequent election,
file his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor only, would he not be entitled to continue in office, as mayor and as
member of the provincial board, despite the fact that he is not running for the last office? Obviously, the word one was used
in Commonwealth Act No. 666 (section 2) merely because it assumed that the person concerned had been elected only to
one office. This did not mean, however, that one legally elected to, and holding, two elective offices, was sought to be
excluded from the benefits of said enactment.
Similarly, section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 assumes in line with the ordinary course of events that one discharging
the duties of a given office does not hold any other office, without implying necessarily, that, otherwise, he would be denied
the benefits of said provision. As pointed out in the preceding pages, the purpose of said provision was to permit an
incumbent to remain in office if he did not seek to change the status quo, such as the case of Petitioner herein.
EXAMPLES ANALYZED
Several examples have been given to illustrate the alleged validity of Respondents pretense. Let us analyze said
examples:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first is, substantially, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A vice-mayor, while acting as mayor, filed his certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor. Thereupon, the provincial governor, alleging that said candidate is actually holding the office of
mayor and that he is not running for such office, asked him to vacate it. After giving up, reluctantly, the office of mayor, the

vice-mayor, asserts that he actually holds the office of vice-mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat, since he is running for reelection therefor, he is not deemed resigned as vice-mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, as vice- mayor, he is entitled
to act as mayor. Then, the assertion is made that this possible, undesirable and anomalous situation is another reason why
section 27 may not be applied to the case of a vice-mayor, acting as mayor. But, why should this situation be undesirable or
anomalous ? Is it not merely a natural and logical consequence of the fact that section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code requires the vice-mayor, in the event therein contemplated, to hold, at the same time, two offices, namely, the office of
vice-mayor and that of mayor? Is the holder of such offices not bound to discharge the duties of both? Is he, as a
consequence, not entitled, logically and by law, to all the privileges and prerogatives attached to said offices? Is the right to
run for election to an office actually held, without resigning therefrom, not one of such privileges or prerogatives? Is it not only
fair, just and reasonable that the increased responsibilities of the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, be coupled with a
corresponding increase in his powers, exemptions and immunities?
The second example is couched in the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then he goes on leave of
absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for
the same office of Mayor. Then the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, the councilor who at the last
general elections received the highest number of votes, acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate of candidacy while acting as
Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using the same argument the councilor who had previously acted
as Mayor also campaigns for his election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct offices, running for the same
office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices, and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and
Councilor) are different from the office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet that would happen if the
contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of actually holding office is to prevail. (pp. 14-15.)
The example is most ingenious, but, to our mind, not in point. In order that the mayor, the vice-mayor and the municipal
councilor alluded to could run for mayor, without resigning from their respective offices, pursuant to section 27 of Republic
Act No. 180, it would be necessary that each be actually holding the office of mayor. Inasmuch, however, as actual
holding is equivalent to material or physical possession, and possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities, except in cases of co-possession (Article 538, Code of Civil Procedure) it follows that it would be
necessary to determine which one, among the officers involved in the example, is actually holding the office of mayor, and
that the person declared to be in physical possession of such office should be the only one not deemed to have resigned in
consequence of the filing of his certificate of candidacy for mayor. Although not indispensable for the determination of the
case at bar, it would seem that said privilege belongs solely to the officer in fact discharging the duties of the office of mayor,
at the time of the expiration of the statutory period for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Indeed, until then, the other officers
could withdraw the certificates of candidacy already filed by them, and file other certificates of candidacy for the respective
offices actually held by them at such time, thus avoiding the implicit resignation which otherwise may result from the
application of said section 27.
EXCEPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
The rule of statutory construction to the effect that exceptions must be strictly construed, has been invoked in favor
of Respondents herein. It is claimed that, as a matter of general rule, a local elective official who runs for an elective office is,
pursuant to section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, deemed to have resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat such rule does not apply, when he runs for an office other than the
one he is actually holding; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, this is the exception which should be construed strictly.
The argument is logical, but its major premise is predicated upon the assumption that said section 27 establishes the general
rule. We believe, otherwise. To our mind, the general rule is that an elective official shall remain in office for the full term for
which he was elected, although he may have filed a certificate of candidacy. The exception is that he shall be deemed to
have resigned from his office, from the time of the filing of said certificate of candidacy, if (1) he is a provincial, municipal or
city official, and (2) the office for which he runs is other than the one he is actually holding. If he runs for the office he is
actually holding, the general rule applies he shall not be deemed to have resigned from his office. In other words, the
provision implying a resignation from the filing of the certificate of candidacy in the exception, which should be construed
strictly.
This interpretation is demanded, not merely by the fact that Republic Act No. 180 is a part of our law on Public Officers, and
should be construed jointly with the latter, but, also, by the fundamental principles underlying the democratic system of
government established in the Philippines. Indeed, petition was chosen by the direct vote of the people, in whom sovereignty
resides. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 180 was passed not by the people themselves, but by their representatives.
The people elected Petitioner herein for a term ending on December 31, 1955. In the absence of clear, positive and
unequivocal provision of law to the contrary, the member of Congress, as agents of the people, must be presumed to have
intended to respect said direct mandate of their principal.
In the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, who runs for mayor, the intention of Congress to oust him from both offices is far
from being patent or incontestible. In fact, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in section 27 of Republic Act

No. 180, in relation to sections 2187, 2192 and 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, connotes that Petitioner is actually
holding the office of mayor, for which he ran at the last general elections, and that, accordingly, he shall not be deemed to
have resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for said office. Indeed, it is admitted, in the majority opinion, that
the letter of said section 27 favors Petitioner herein - said opinion states that, literally, Petitioner is actually holding the office
of mayor. At any rate, the factors analyzed in the foregoing pages, the very efforts exerted in said opinion to bolster up the
stand therein taken and the conflicting views among the members of this Court, who are almost equally divided on the issue
under consideration, eloquently demonstrate that the law upon which Respondents rely is, at least, not free from ambiguities
or doubts. Hence, the same should resolved in favor of Petitioners continuance in office, for the full term for which he was
elected.
THE ACTUAL HOLDER OF AN OFFICE HAS PRESUMPTIVELY A BETTER RIGHT THERETO
Although a public office is not property, in the strict sense of the word, the right to a given person to hold a particular office
partakes of the nature of a property, in that he cannot be deprived of such right without due process of law, (42 Am. 886888; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryState vs. Wadhams, 67 N.W. 64, 64 Minn. 318, 324; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryChristy vs.
Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 1375, 13 Okl. 585; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryHamilton vs. Brennan. 119 N.Y.S. 2d 83 [20 Gen. Digest
p. 364]); chan roblesvirtualawlibrary11 O.S. 1951 Su 572 Laison vs. Bunch, 225 P. 2d. 486 (21 Gen. Digest p. 348)
1953; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryEmerson vs. Hughes, 90 A. 2d. 910, 117 Vt. 270 [19 Gen. Digest p. 287 1953; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryHanchey vs. State ex rel Roberts 52 So 2d. 429 [15 Gen. Digest p. 369, 1952]).
A person actually holding an office, pursuant to law, is, therefore, in a condition analogous to one in physical possession of a
property, under claim of ownership. Pursuant to Article 541 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, such possessor in the
concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it. He who wishes to recover the property from its possessor as owner must prove, therefore, a better title thereto.
Similarly, the actual holder of an office, under color of title, like Petitioner herein, must be respected and protected, in the
enjoyment of said possession, unless the party seeking to eject him therefrom shall establish satisfactorily that said title is
defective and that his (claimants) is the legitimate and stronger title. In other words, doubts must be resolved in favor of the
actual holder of the office.
At any rate, to our mind, the law is patently in favor of Petitioner herein. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
office of mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, he was actually discharging the duties and exercising the powers of said office.
The public and the very Government, as well as the law (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code), regarded him as the
acting mayor of said municipality. He received the emoluments appurtenant to the office. He had all of the responsibilities
attached thereto, including the civil and criminal liabilities which would accrue to the regularly elected mayor, in case of
nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office.
Upon the other hand, having been suspended as mayor of San Juan del Monte, Engracio Santos was stripped of his
functions as such, he could not, and did not, discharge the same. He was not entitled to collect the compensation
corresponding to said office, which compensation was paid to herein Petitioner. In other words, the latter was literally and
legally in actual physical possession of the office of mayor.
Moreover, the language of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 is too plain, simple and clear to admit of construction. It is well
settled that where the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute there can be no question as to
the meaning, there is no room for construction. (People ex rel. Wood vs. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 36 Pac. 404.)
Again, in ordinary, as well as in legal, parlance, to hold actually an office is to have physical or legal possession thereof, to
occupy the office in fact or really, as distinguished from, or opposed, to its presumptive or constructive possession. To
declare, therefore, that Engracio Santos who does not, and cannot, perform the functions of mayor of San Juan del Monte
not Petitioner herein who actually, really, materially and in fact discharges the same is the persons actually holding
said office, does not amount merely to a construction of the meaning of actually, holding, but to giving thereto its opposite
meaning, its exact antithesis. With due respect to the learned view of our distinguished colleagues to the contrary, we do not
feel that judicial power may go that far, consistently with the principle of separation of powers.
Wherefore, we are of the opinion that the petition should be granted and that the writ of preliminary injunction, issued upon
the institution of this case, should be made permanent.

G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA (represented by Gloria Ardona) ANASTACIO C. CABILAO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO
CABILAO (represented by Jose Cabilao) MODESTA CABILAO, HEIRS OF ROMAN CABUENAS (represented by
Alberto Cabuenas), AGRIPINO GABISAY and PRUDENCIA MABINI, ANTONIO LABRADOR and LUCIA GABISAY,
GERONIMO MABINI and MARCELINA SABAL, INOCENCIO MABINI and ARSENIA REYES, PATRICIO MABINI and
GREGORIA BORRES, ANICETO GADAPAN and MAXIMA GABISAY, BARTOLOME MAGNO and CALINECA E.
MAGNO, ALBERTO CABUENAS, NARCISO CABUENAS and VICTORIA CABUENAS, EUTIQUIOSENO, HEIRS OF
ESPERIDION CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas), MAXIMINA NAVARO, SULPICIO NAVARO, EDUARDO
NAVARO, MARTINIANO ROMA (in representation of Arcadio Mabini, deceased), MARTIN SENO, FAUSTO ARDA,
MAXIMA CABILAO, ESTRELLA SENO, EDUVEGIS S. CABILAO, ROSARIO CABILAO, MINORS DANILO, SOCORRO,
JOSEFINA and MARITES, all surnamed Cabilao, JUAN BORRES (represented by Francisca Borres), RAMON
JABADAN, JESUS ALIPAR and LEONILA KABAHAR, ANTONIO LABRADOR, HEIRS OF NICASIO GABISAY
(represented by Arsenio Gabisay), PACIFICO LABRADOR, DEMETRIO LABRADOR and FRUCTOSA TABURA,
VENANCIO DEL MAR, MARINO DEL MAR, HEIRS OF TEODORA ARCILLO (represented by Brigida Arcillo) DIONISIA
GABUNADA, HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO (represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), HEIRS OF
VICTORIA C. CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas) HEIRS OF CIPRIANO GABUNADA (represented by
Claudio Gabunada), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU, and
the PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, respondents.
George M. Baladjay, Mario G. dela Victoria, Olegario Sarmiento, Jr., and Democrito Barcenas for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Judge.
F.A. Sugue & Elino B. Lingas for Philippine Tourism Authoirity
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the
Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and
Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance of
Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4)
expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners: Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch 1).
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of
some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to
acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones"
for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. As
uniformly alleged in the complaints, the purposes of the expropriation are:
xxx xxx xxx
V
Plaintiff, in line with the policy of the government to promote tourism and development of tourism projects will
construct in Barangays Malubog, Busay and Babag, all of Cebu City, a sports complex (basketball courts,
tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools),
clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for the use
of the public.
The development plan, covering approximately 1,000 hectares, includes the establishment of an electric
power grid in the area by the National Power Corporation, thus assuring the supply of electricity therein for
the benefit of the whole community. Deep wells will also be constructed to generate water supply within the
area. Likewise, a complex sewerage and drainage system will be devised and constructed to protect the
tourists and nearby residents from the dangers of pollution.
Complimentary and support facilities for the project will be constructed, including public rest houses, lockers,
dressing rooms, coffee shops, shopping malls, etc. Said facilities will create and offer employment
opportunities to residents of the community and further generate income for the whole of Cebu City.
Plaintiff needs the property above described which is directly covered by the proposed golf court.
xxx xxx xxx
The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil
Case No. R-19864. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed
with public use under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the

intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of
compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is
the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge, The respondents have
correctly restated the grounds in the petition as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
A. The complaints for expropriation lack basis because the Constitution does not provide for the
expropriation of private property for tourism or other related purposes;
B. The writs of possession or orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession is premature because
the "public use" character of the taking has not been previously demonstrated;
C. The taking is not for public use in contemplation of eminent domain law;
D. The properties in question have been previously declared a land reform area; consequently, the
implementation of the social justice pro- ,vision of the Constitution on agrarian reform is paramount to the
right of the State to expropriate for the purposes intended;
E. Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain barangays in Cebu City, which include the lands subject of
expropriation as within a tourist zone, is unconstitutional for it impairs the obligation of contracts; "F. Since
the properties are within a land reform area, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations, not the lower court, that has
jurisdiction pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 946;
F. The forcible ejectment of defendants from the premises constitutes a criminal act under Pres. Decree No.
583;
In their memorandum, the petitioners have summarized the issues as follows:
I. Enforcement of the Writ of Possession is Premature:
II. Presidential Decree 564 Amending Presidential Decree l89 is Constitutionally Repugnant:
III. The Condemnation is not for Public Use, Therefore, Unconstitutional:
IV. The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program Violates the
Constitution:
V. Presidential Proclamation 2052 is Unconstitutional:
VI. Presidential Decree No 1533 is Unconstitutional:
VII. The Court of First Instance has no Jurisdiction:
VIII. The Filing of the Present Petition is not Premature.
The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions to expropriate their properties are
constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private
property for the promotion of tourism.
The petitioners' arguments in their pleadings in support of the above proposition are subsumed under the following headings:
1. Non-compliance with the "public use" requirement under the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights.
2. Disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated.
3. Impairment of the obligation of contracts.
There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section
2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV
allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided
into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned.
Section 6, Article II provides:
Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people.
Towards its end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 12, Article XIV provides:
See. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.

The equitable diffusion of property ownership in the promotion of social justice implies the exercise, whenever necessary, of
the power to expropriate private property. Likewise there can be no meaningful agrarian reform program unless the power to
expropriate is utilized.
We cite all the above provisions on the power to expropriate because of the petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision. The thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction.
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus (40 Phil. 550) categorized the restrictive view as wholly
erroneous and based on a misconception of fundamentals.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the search would be in vain. The policy
objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these
objectives vary from time to time and according to place, To freeze specific programs like Tourism into express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond
Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these
programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and
other development programs.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is
inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign
power. It is not a grant of authority The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is
inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The
provision found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be
without limit.
The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
Do the purposes of the taking in this case constitute "public use"?
The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means literally use by the public and that
"public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and much less "public convenience.
"
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public
welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination
that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and
public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for
public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State, And the
necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited
government resources.
Certain aspects of parliamentary government were introduced by the 1973 amendments to the Constitution with further
modifications in the 1976 and 1981 amendments. Insofar as the executive and legislative departments are concerned, the
traditional concept of checks and balances in a presidential form was considerably modified to remove some roadblocks in
the expeditious implementation of national policies. There was no such change for the judiciary. We remain as a checking
and balancing department even as all strive to maintain respect for constitutional boundaries. At the same time, the
philosophy of coordination in the pursuit of developmental goals implicit in the amendments also constrains in the judiciary to
defer to legislative discretion iii the judicial review of programs for economic development and social progress unless a clear
case of constitutional infirmity is established. We cannot stop the legitimate exercise of power on an invocation of grounds
better left interred in a bygone age and time.* As we review the efforts of the political departments to bring about selfsufficiency, if not eventual abundance, we continue to maintain the liberal approach because the primary responsibility and
the discretion belong to them.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports,
waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses,
parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public
use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use
by the public" has been discarded.
In the United States, the rule was enunciated in Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27) as follows:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the
public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L ed 469,
472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is

not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North River
Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L ed 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co.
160 US 668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
In an earlier American case, where a village was isolated from the rest of North Carolina because of the flooding of the
reservoir of a dam thus making the provision of police, school, and health services unjustifiably expensive, the government
decided to expropriate the private properties in the village and the entire area was made part of an adjoining national park.
The district court and the appellate court ruled against the expropriation or excess condemnation. The Court of Appeals
applied the "use by the public" test and stated that the only land needed for public use was the area directly flooded by the
reservoir. The village may have been cut off by the dam but to also condemn it was excess condemnation not valid under the
"Public use" requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court inUnited States ex rel TVA v. Welch (327 U.S, 546; 90 L. ed 843)
unanimously reversed the lower courts. It stated:
The Circuit Court of Appeals, without expressly relying on a compelling rule of construction that would give
the restrictive scope to the T.V.A. Act given it by the district court, also interpreted the statute narrowly. It first
analyzed the facts by segregating the total problem into distinct parts, and thus came to the conclusion that
T.V.A.'s purpose in condemning the land in question was only one to reduce its liability arising from the
destruction of the highway. The Court held that use of the lands for that purpose is a "private" and not a
"public use" or, at best, a "public use" not authorized by the statute. we are unable to agree with the
reasoning and conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use and that the
agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the still extent of its statutory authority, United States v.
Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. ...
xxx xxx xxx
... But whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what is a "public use" in Fourteenth
Amendment controversies, this Court has said that when Congress has spoken on this subject "Its decision
is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility." Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States,
269, US 55, 66, 70 L ed 162, 46 S Ct 39. Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of
their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other
fields. See Case v. Bowles decided February 4, 1946, 437 US 92, 101, ante, 552, 559, 66 S Ct 438. New
York v. United States, 326 US 572 ante 326, 66 S Ct 310). We hold that the T.V.A. took the tracts here
involved for a public purpose, if, as we think is the case, Congress authorized the Authority to acquire, hold,
and use the lands to carry out the purposes of the T.V.A. Act.
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should
be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of
this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed
to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less
merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways
do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering
exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners,
commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy
expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman u. Parker (supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might
mean taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as well as in the Philippines.
... Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for
Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of
the area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of
another businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been established. Selb Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. (US) supra;
cf. Highland v. Russel Car & Snow Plow Co. 279 US 253, 73 L ed 688, 49 S Ct 314. The public end may be

as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government-or
so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the
public purposes of community redevelopment projects. What we have said also disposes of any contention
concerning the fact that certain property owners in the area may be permitted to repurchase their properties
for redevelopment in harmony with the over-all plan. That, too, is a legitimate means which Congress and its
agencies may adopt, if they choose. (Berman v. Parker, 99 L ed 38, 348 US 33, 34)
An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil, 349)
and Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, earlier cited, shows that from the very start of constitutional government in our country
judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain proceedings.
The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree
No. 564:
WHEREAS, it is the avowed aim of the government to promote Philippine tourism and work for its
accelerated and balanced growth as well as for economy and expediency in the development of the tourism
plant of the country;
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote, encourage,
and develop Philippine tourism as an instrument in accelerating the development of the country, of
strengthening the country's foreign exchange reserve position, and of protecting Philippine culture, history,
traditions and natural beauty, internationally as well as domestically.
The power of eminent domain is expressly provided for under Section 5 B(2) as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following
reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation
in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed
areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under this
Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own name, which shall proceed
in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. The Authority may
use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners: Provided, That
in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Section 8 to 13
inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the government in raising their second argument. According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes
intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer" under the land reform program. Petitioners claim that
certificates of land transfer (CLT'S) and emancipation patents have already been issued to them thereby making the lands
expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2; that the agrarian reform program
occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical wellbeing of the people; and that property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use.
We have considered the above arguments with scrupulous and thorough circumspection. For indeed any claim of rights
under the social justice and land reform provisions of the Constitution deserves the most serious consideration. The
Petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected
persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of
which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive
land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares,
only 8,970 square meters-less than one hectare-is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have
emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. And this 8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even
within the sports complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others
similarly situated would be provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment, community centers, schools, and essential
services like water and electricity-which are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of
competing public interests. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970 square
meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development
of the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly, the human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectares
resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their compatriots.
The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of
police power and likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) "parties by entering into
contracts may not stop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."
The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato (69 SCRA 544) which involved the expropriation of land for a public
plaza. The Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx
... What is claimed is that there must be a showing of necessity for such condemnation and that it was not
done in this case in support of such a view, reliance is placed on City of Manila v. Arenano Law Colleges. (85
Phil. 663 [1950]) That doctrine itself is based on the earlier case of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila, (50 Phil. 349) also, like Camus, a 1919 decision. As could be discerned, however, in the Arellano
Law Colleges decision. it was the antiquarian view of Blackstone with its sanctification of the right to one's
estate on which such an observation was based. As did appear in his Commentaries: "So great is the regard
of the law for private property that it will not, authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good,
unless there exists a very great necessity thereof." Even the most , cursory glance at such well-nigh
absolutist concept of property would show its obsolete character at least for Philippine constitutional law. It
cannot survive the test of the 1935 Constitution with its mandates on social justice and protection to labor.
(Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution reads: "The promotion of social justice to unsure the well-being
and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State." Article XI, Section 6 of the same
Constitution provides: "The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors,
and shall regulate the relation between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.") What is more, the present Constitution
pays even less heed to the claims of property and rightly so. After stating that the State shall promote social
justice, it continues: "Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment,
and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." (That is the second
sentence of Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution) If there is any need for explicit confirmation of what was
set forth in Presidential Decree No. 42, the above provision supplies it. Moreover, that is merely to accord to
what of late has been the consistent course of decisions of this Court whenever property rights are pressed
unduly. (Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172; Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions, L-21484, Nov. 29, 1969, 30
SCRA 649; Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481; Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration v.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-32052, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 416) The statement therefore, that there
could be discerned a constitutional objection to a lower court applying a Presidential Decree, when it leaves
no doubt that a grantee of the power of eminent domain need not prove the necessity for the expropriation,
carries its own refutation.
xxx xxx xxx
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been
previously established, the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well
as the corresponding writs of possession was premature.
Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession, control and
disposition of the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues
before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property
expropriated. The issue of immediate possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato(supra). In answer to the issue:
... whether the order of respondent Judge in an expropriation case allowing the other respondent, ... to take
immediate possession of the parcel of land sought to be condemned for the beautification of its public plaza,
without a prior hearing to determine the necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is vitiated
by jurisdictional defect, ...
this Court held that:
... It is not disputed that in issuing such order, respondent Judge relied on Presidential Decree No. 42 issued
on the 9th of November, 1972. (Presidential Decree No. 42 is entitled "Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent
Domain Proceedings to Take Possession of the Property involved Upon Depositing the Assessed Value for
Purposes of Taxation.") The question as thus posed does not occasion any difficulty as to the answer to be
given. This petition for certiorari must fail, there being no showing that compliance with the Presidential
Decree, which under the Transitory Provisions is deemed a part of the law of the land, (According to Article
XVII, Section 3 par. (2) of the Constitution: "All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution,
unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations. orders, decrees instructions, or other
acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly") would be characterized as either an act in excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of
discretion. So we rule.
Likewise in Ramos v. Philippine Tourism Authority (G.R. Nos. 52449-50, June 9, 1980), this Court held:
... condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem wherein the fact
that the owner of the property is made a party is not essentially indispensable insofar was least as it
conncerns is the immediate taking of possession of the property and the preliminary determination of its
value, including the amount to be deposited.

In their last argument, the petitioners claim that a consequence of the expropriation proceedings would be their forcible
ejectment. They contend that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act under Presidential Decree No. 583. This contention is
not valid. Presidential Decree No. 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or implementation of orders designed to obstruct the
land reform program. It refers to the harassment of tenant- farmers who try to enforce emancipation rights. It has nothing to
do with the expropriation by the State of lands needed for public purposes. As a matter of fact, the expropriated area does
not appear in the master lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a teranted area. The petitioners' bare allegations have
not been supported with particulars pointing to specific parcels which are subject of tenancy contracts. The petitioners may
be owner-tillers or may have some form of possessory or ownership rights but there has been no showing of their being
tenants on the disputed lands.
The petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed
purpose is the legislative perception is the public good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut
the presumption of validity, the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the
petitioners and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities,
and better living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to
proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to
promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSE D for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J, concurs in the result.
De Castro, J, is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J, concurring and dissenting:
It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fall within the purview
of the Land Reform Code, the petition should be dismissed on that score alone.
There is no need to decide whether the power of the Philippine Tourism Authority to expropriate the land in question
predicated on the police power of the State shall take precedence over the social justice guarantee in favor of tenants and
the landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail over the right of the PTA to expropriate the
lands just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only. Such a position would increase the disenchanted
citizens and drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are
more poor people in this country than the rich The tourism industry is not essential to the existence of the government, but
the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should take precedence over the development of the tourism industry.
Teehankee and Abad Santos, JJ., dissent.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J, concurring and dissenting:
It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fall within the purview
of the Land Reform Code, the petition should be dismissed on that score alone.
There is no need to decide whether the power of the Philippine Tourism Authority to expropriate the land in question
predicated on the police power of the State shall take precedence over the social justice guarantee in favor of tenants and
the landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail over the right of the PTA to expropriate the
lands just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only. Such a position would increase the disenchanted
citizens and drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are
more poor people in this country than the rich The tourism industry is not essential to the existence of the government, but
the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should take precedence over the development of the tourism industry.
Teehankee and Abad Santos, JJ., dissent.

G.R. No. 91649
May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO
SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila
City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while
most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new
restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling
objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article
XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman
of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1,
1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in
the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential
source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for
PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following
objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate
entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance,
which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of
additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification,
sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such
other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the
country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and
corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing
clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended
or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a
total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share.

In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being
"contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the
equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the
Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs
to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We
need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be
valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its
authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending
statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain
in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does
not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660,
663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82
SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the
instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality
of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many
other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that
the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu
v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of

government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law
of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It
provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the
Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at
the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that
the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2)
of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise,
as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise
from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except
a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations
under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of
all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by
any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83
Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12
SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p.
445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v.
Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No.
9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and
was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local
governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog
race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and
other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is
no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned
or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all
the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating
entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the
affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except
only with respect to original incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should
be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation
of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC
Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the
States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254
US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way
as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of
them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive
to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless
argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis
supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by
law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution),
its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees.
It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First
Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the
Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization
of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is
the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary
to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to
enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden,
Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974,
22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized
PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of
the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained
in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by
RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name
must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of
those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule
laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and
crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify
P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to
recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should
be.1wphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state
must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy
for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not selfexecuting, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48
SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In
other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable.
But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for
Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption
of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not
undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some
provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question
the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to
this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the
political departments of government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is
excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also
on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material
fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable
to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences
could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree with the
decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly
pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that
should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for
such policy.
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political
departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except only when such policies pose a clear and present
danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual situation.
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human personality,
destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino
moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual
reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national
development.
Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the government out of
"legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral
values.
Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes
untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate.
One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling, which is
legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known asprostitution. Would
prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in
return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and
social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all
forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be
for the nation.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants, vs. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC.,Respondents-Appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (%) realty tax imposed by the City of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the annual
realty tax at one and one-half percent (1- %).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1,
1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real
property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centrum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax atthree percent. So, by means of
Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the
board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads: chanrobles virtual law library
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and % per this Ordinance) on the assessed
value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty tax for the third quarter
of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said amount. It
contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil
Case No. 88827).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the
said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42
of the Rules of Court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty
tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that Ordinance No.
7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real
properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total
of three percent realty tax on commercial properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this time it has
been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three
percent tax on its real properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which
took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of
one percent but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to the
basic two percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax Code. What is
in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972
up to the second quarter of 1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the additional
one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as
that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd
404).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special
Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to
the Special Education Fund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially,
that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the
questioned ordinance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education Fund Law
refers to a contingency where the application of the additional one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total
realty tax to more than three percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax beyond
the one percent fixed by the said law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains that the city charter fixed the
realty tax at 1-% and the later law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of
which one percent would be earmarked for the education fund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-half percent realty tax since the
contingency
referred
to
by
the
complaining
taxpayer
would
not
arise
in
the
City
of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly granted
and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is
the amount thereof, whether one and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)chanrobles
virtual law library
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in
prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing
one and one- half percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of
the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Justice Abad Santos is on leave.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December
1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January
1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse
1
by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989
pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with
the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular,
temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants,
experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and
Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations.
Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves,
compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
2
xxx xxx xxx
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the
date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not
contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is coterminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original
decision.
3
xxx xxx xxx
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled
to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires
an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions
of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683,
provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, PartTime, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for
optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No.
186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have
received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the
service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials
and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits
herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their
application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If
casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner
who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful,
continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the
4
law.
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act
No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the
head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP),
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which
petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to
the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand,
retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration
of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of office
(i.e., duration of project).
5
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but reorganization to
streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was
enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to
special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special
projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step
6
to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define the
different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded
the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated
on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular
employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in
7
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a
temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve
months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President,
such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
9
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing
agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency.
10
5. emergency and seasonal personnel.
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief
in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer
11
holdingemergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. From 24 March
1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1
September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January
1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems)
DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project)
retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to
personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the
12
completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper attached to the OSG's comment
lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are
considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered
at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is
charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national
government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an
officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered
creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or
casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual
status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for
retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said
services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity
date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the
service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual
personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of
13
denial characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in
nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991
(5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by
confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his
tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of
a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of
funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the
tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee,
in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the
appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the
position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is
guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why
the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683
expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not
14
the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned or casus omissus
pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
15
intentionally. Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
16
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired
continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no
proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
17
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain
respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly
situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable
maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an allembracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in
the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions
as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
18
expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman
Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year,
19
renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective
of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early
Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil
servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of
age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of
separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants
hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are
deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the
petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from
the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This,
incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of
early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting
early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no
abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the
positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in
the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as
long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14,
20
Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of
eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or noncareer service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractualor co-terminous including military and
21
police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for
the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the
22
coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" After all, coterminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with
the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early
retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an
application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the
application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on
her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years
in four (4) successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits
under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Nocon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Statutory Construction Ch7 AIDS Cases

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Statutory Construction Ch7 AIDS Cases

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

G.R. No. L-26100

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

TUASON, J., dissenting:

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases

Lee Statutory Construction Chapter 7 Cases