The Executive Department

Macalintal versus Comelec

FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions
of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners
right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that
the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented
an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino
people, considering that public funds are to be used and
appropriated for the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives, including the
President
and
the
Vice-President,
violates
the
constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President
and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by
Congress; and

(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress

(through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in the same section) to exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)
Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3)
Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1)
NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)
YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect
only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and
not to the votes of the Senators and party-list
representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution.
3)
YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only
to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing
Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate,
is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

REASONS:
1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act
Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following
disqualified from voting under this Act:

shall

be

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is

recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in
that it violates the requirement that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, as provided under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution which reads: Sec.
1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided

in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place

wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.
For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has
relied on, among others, the discussions of the members
of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of
absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in
connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which
reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as
a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions
that the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin,
which is in the Philippines. The Commission even
intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting
age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the
first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission
provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions, the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to
the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote

even though they do not satisfy the residency

requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in Section
1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No.
9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further
weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
2) Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas
absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president,
senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of
the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome
of the election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning
candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election
has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if
the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar
to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A.
No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates for President and

Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the

following provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:
Sec. 4.
The returns of every election for President and VicePresident, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of
the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate
canvassing of the certificates.

its

rules

for

the

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates,

in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency,
granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section
appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the

Constitution only insofar as said Section totally

disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of President and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident and the power to proclaim the winners for the
said positions.
3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of
the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7)
members to be designated by each House of Congress,
four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining
three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have
the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.

All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are

unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on
this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court
finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress
through the JCOC vis--vis the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, which reads Section 1. The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the
Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision
on the independence of constitutional commissions. The
Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that
the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be
independent from the other departments of the
Government.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions,
it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court
also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not

agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter,
and political questions must be dealt with realistically
not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission
on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its
contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge
derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to
decide complex political questions.

then act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified.

Brillantes versus Comelec

The Court has no general powers of supervision over
COMELEC which is an independent body except those
specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein,
it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rulemaking authority. In line with this, this Court holds that
Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must
therefore be stricken off from the said law.
SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, the
Vice-President shall become the President to serve
the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall

FACTS : On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted

Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of
voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections. It also
required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said
automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential
elections, particularly in counting the votes collected
from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly
read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted
that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating
the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in

time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10,

2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175
authorizing the release of a further supplemental P500
million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain
the old and manual voting and counting system for the
May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with
companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the
computerized
voting/counting
machines)
were
discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC
nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of
advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for
national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed
as an "unofficial quick count."
ARGUMENTS: Petitioner contends that the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of
Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that
its advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed
within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the
Omnibus Election Code that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest
technological and electronic devices, taking into account
the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission
shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited
political parties and candidates in areas affected by the
use or adoption of technological and electronic devices

not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use
of such devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April
28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use
of election funds in consolidating the election results for
the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it
is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said
Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the
Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for
the President and the Vice-President.

REASONS: Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution

Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the
Congress to canvass the votes for the election of
President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the
part of the respondent to have ignored the
misapprehensions addressed by Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos
during the 2004 saying that such act would be in
violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII): "any
quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said
positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes
of the President and Vice-President, which not only would
be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would
also be lacking of any constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act

No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No.

8436, the accredited citizens arm - in this case,
NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting
of the votes, whether for the national or the local
elections. No other entity, including the respondent
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the
election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial"
count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election
returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an
"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and
unsealed only when needed by to verify election results
in connection with resolving election disputes that may
be established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC
as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does
not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover,
the
COMELEC
failed
to
notify
the
authorized
representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty
days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices,
after failing to submit any document proving that it had
notified all political parties of the intended adoption of
Resolution No. 6712.

Estrada versus Desierto

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the
beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued
by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On
October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a
long time friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions
of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of
the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001,
by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose
Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst
of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter,
the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to
the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice
Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner
issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang

Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin

the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that
on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was
transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office and that by operation
of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to
Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on
the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously
filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were
set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily
unable to act as President
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that
he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid
resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the
cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write
any formal
letter of
resignation
before
leaving
Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not

petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts

and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or
by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. The Court had an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara
serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage
of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the
topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
During the second round of negotiation, the resignation
of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to
be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period. The Court held that the resignation of
the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic, but with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of the nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of the country;
and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner

that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a
President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the
Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as
President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming
the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and
duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.

Civil Liberties Union versus Executive Secretary

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order
No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other
appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2
positions
in
the
government
and
government
corporations and to receive additional compensation.
They find it unconstitutional against the provision

provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the

President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold
any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official
shall
hold
any
other
office
or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In
the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and
constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless
otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an
exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13,
such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally
allowed
to
become
a
cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an
exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the
legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple
positions in the government for self enrichment which a
betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in

Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad

exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to
the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions.
Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to
particular instances of allowing the VP to become
a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court
thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.

Estrada versus GMA

FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events
that happened prior and subsequent to the event we
know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E.
Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as
president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of
the Estrada administration began when For. Gov. Luis
Chavit Singson went to the media and released his
expos that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as
having received large sums of money. After this expose, a
lot of different groups and many personalities had asked
for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are
the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime
Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres.
Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the
supreme self-sacrifice. Respondent also resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4
senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and

then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47

representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as
Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21
senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial
with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment
trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal of well
known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by
the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not
open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence
showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account
under the name Jose Velarde containing P3.3 billion.
The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people
going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared
on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that
we are withdrawing our support to this government. PNP
Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some
Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM,
negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power.
But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the
14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner
and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following
Press Statement:
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001,
he signed the following letter:
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution

in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said
resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC
justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened
on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the
respondent as the new president of the Philippines. The
House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the
full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency Gloria MacapagalArroyo, President of the Philippines. It also approved
Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House
of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a
partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the
Constitution.
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto
Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated. Several cases were filed against the
petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-001629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000
for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 000-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture,
graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for government

Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the

Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24,
2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756
filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000
for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public
funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-001757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD
1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on
December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by
the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and
the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February
5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and
1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed
in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another

counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738

for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on
GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents to comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738
and the filing of the respondents comments on or
before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent
motion for copies of resolution and press statement for
Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel
for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who
are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective
immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from

resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending

investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from
news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph
E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at
bar moot and academic.
ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings
is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the
assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should
be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already
aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled to
immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by
the respondent Ombudsman.
RATIO/REASON:

1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political

question
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a
political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a
President through the People power revolution. Her
legitimacy as president was also accepted by other
nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall
serve as political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been
defined by our Court as those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo
administration should be treated similarly with the
Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the
situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are
similar. However, the Court finds otherwise.
The Court has made substantial distinctions which are
the following:
Aquino

Arroyo

Government was a result of a successful Government was a resu

revolution
revolution

Arroyo took the oath

In the Freedom constitution, it was stated Constitution. She is
that the Aquino government was instilled authority of the presiden

directly by the people in defiance of the

1973 Constitution as amended.
constitution.
It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But
this would not apply as the Court finds substantial
difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would
show that there are differences between the 2
governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further
explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA
Revolutions.

EDSA I

EDSA II

Extra-constitutional. Hence, Xxx IN DEFIANCE

OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED
cannot be subject of judicial review

exercise
of
the people
revolution whichoverthrew
government
Political question

power
of
the
whole

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and
not political.
1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written.
It is true that respondent never wrote a letter of
resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001.
In this issue, the Court would use the totality test or
the totality
of
prior,
contemporaneous
and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of

this test, includes
the Court rules that the petitioner had
the respondentUsing
as President
The Court
the protection resigned.
and upholding
of knows
the the amount of stress that the
petitioner
had
suffered.
1987 Constitution.resignation of the With just a blink of an eye, he
lostitthe
support
the legislative when then Manny Villar
President makes
subject
to ofjudicial
and
other
Representatives
had defected. AFP Chief of
review
Staff General Angelo Reyes had already gone to EDSA.
PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other
cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking
exercise of people
of freedom
into power
the Angara
diaries, it was pointed out that the
of speech andpetitioner
freedomhad
of assembly
suggested a snap election at May on which
to petition the
government
for
he would
not be a candidate.
Proposing a snap election in
redress of which
grievances
he is not a candidate means that he had intent to
affected the office
of the
President
resign.
When
the proposal for a dignified exit or
Legal Question resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but
listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had

reconciled himself to the reality that he had to

resign. His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace.
It was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a
peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied that
petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on
the following: (1) the transition period of five days after
the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the
safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the
name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara
diaries, The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako.
Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
dont want any more of this its too painful. Im
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will
go. The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear
evidence that he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the
consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by both
sides. The second round of negotiation cements the
reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be
noted
that
during
this
second
round
of
negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period.

When everything was already signed by the side of the

petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the
negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to
Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent to
have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang,
he made a last statement.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today,
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong
and
serious
doubts
about
the
legality
and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shrik from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved
people.
MABUHAY!
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms
the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the
respondent
as
President of
the

Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)

he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity
to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to
the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioners reference is to
afuture challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly,
the
national
spirit
of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary
leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter which
reads as follows:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use
this letter during the week long crisis. It would be very
easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he
was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving
Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of
the petitioner. If it was preparedbefore the press
release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation
from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as
a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press
release, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal
basis is RA 3019 which states:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or
retire
pending
an
investigation,
criminal
or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery.
During the amendments, another section was inserted
which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision
was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall
be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office
shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an
offense committed during his incumbency.

The original senate bill was rejected because of the

2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another similar
bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13.
There is another reason why petitioners contention
should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show
that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the
cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB
Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757
and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason
that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be
considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution
do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is
an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of
RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The Court holds
otherwise. The impeachment proceeding may be
arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding
is administrative, it cannot be considered pending
because the process had already broke down. There was
also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the
impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was
postponed
indefinitely.
In
fact,
there
was
no
impeachment case pending when he resigned.

1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only

temporarily unable to act as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was
addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate
President Pimentel. Petitioners contention is that he is a
president on leave and that the respondent is an acting
president. This contention is the centerpiece of
petitioners stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in
order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his

office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members

of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that
happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very clear
that the inability of the petitioner as president is not
temporary. The question is whether this Court has
jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The
Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a
political question, in which the matter has solely been left
to the legislative,

1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity

from suit. If yes, what is the extent of the
immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the
cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against
him; and second, he enjoysimmunity from all kinds of
suit, whether criminal or civil. The immunity the
petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief
executive may not be personally mulcted in civil
damages for the consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. He is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and
authority that he cannot be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right
to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts
within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and
judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words,
he is entitled to protection in determining the question of
his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which
two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of
authority to act is so plain that two such men could not
honestly differ over its determination.

The Court rejects the petitioners argument that before

he could be prosecuted, he should be first convicted of
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding
was already aborted because of the walking out of the
prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate
resolution (Resolution #83) which declared the
proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in
the Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment
proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed
against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal
in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold
that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it
means immunity from civil damages only covers official
acts.
1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman
should be stopped from conducting an investigation of

the cases filed against him for he has already developed

a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a
violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal
and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with
the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation
and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will
prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair
trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about
the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of
an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test
of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is
not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner
by
the
respondent
Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who
assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The petitioner
alleges that there were news reports which said that the
Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against
him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is
insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the

respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against

the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still
has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
Marcos versus Manglapus
FACTS:
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
the presidency via the non-violent people power
revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a
revolutionary government.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish
to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the

right to travel be impaired except in the interest of

national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
Furthermore, they contend that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do
so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international
law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD:
SC well-considered opinion that the President has a
residual power which justifies her act of banning the
return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the

present time and under present circumstances poses a

serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved
is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to ones country, a
totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat
the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the
right to enter ones country as separate and distinct
rights. The Declaration speaks of the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state [Art. 13(l)] separately from the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country.
[Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence [Art. 12(l)] and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. [Art. 12(2)] which
rights may be restricted by such laws as are necessary
to protect national security, public order, public health or
morals or enter qqqs own country of which one cannot
be arbitrarily deprived. [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore
be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to ones country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which

treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,

but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being arbitrarily deprived thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the
general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles
that [t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people and that [t]he maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy. [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the

Presidents powers as protector of the peace. The power
of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely
to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence.
The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making
the
President
commander-in-chief
the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-inChief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab
power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the
efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize

the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters

the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived
as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the peoples
sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution
and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk
from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is
only now beginning to recover from the hardships
brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed
to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives,
many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government
has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by
the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot
ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the
economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the
Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development
and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and
all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our
economy is of common knowledge and is easily within
the ambit of judicial notice.

Matibag versus Benipayo

FACTS:
COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting
Director IV of the EID. Such appointment was renewed in
temporary capacity twice, first by Chairperson
Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,
and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each
for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office
and assumed their positions. However, since the
Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments,
PGMA
renewed
the
ad
interim
appointments.

office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C.
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the
first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until

such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

RULING
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment. An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has qualified into

Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee. An ad interim

appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes
at that moment a government employee and therefore
part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution
protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil

...the term ad interim appointment means a

permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the
text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

service shall be removed or suspended except for cause

provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee
has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of
an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the moment he
qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee
has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which
is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after
notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of
due process. How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for
two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by
the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is
the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment. These two
causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by
the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These
resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No
one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution
itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads
of the ad interim appointees.
Ad
Interim
Appointment
vs.
Temporary
Appointment. While an ad interim appointment is
permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of

the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee

does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how
briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the
Constitution prohibits the President from making to the
three independent constitutional commissions, including
the COMELEC.
Was the renewal of appointment valid?
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval
is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in
the exercise of its checking power on the appointing
authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision
on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution
does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well
as on the appointing power. In this instance, the
President can no longer renew the appointment not
because
of
the
constitutional
prohibition
on
reappointment, but because of a final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to
the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is bypassed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another
matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not
been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission
on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the

appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such

decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment of a by-passed appointee. The prohibition
on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed
ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim
appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim
appointment because the disapproval is final under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving
beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Pimentel versus Ermita

Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the
appointments issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B.
Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C.
Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.

Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23

September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents
as
acting
secretaries
without
the
consent
of
the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive
in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with
the exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislatures interference in the executives power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose
on the President the duty to appoint any particular
person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers
is
executive
and
not
legislative.
The Commission on Appointments does not legislate
when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to
presidential appointments.

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have

appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in
case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting
Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in
an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such
as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the
obligation
to
appoint
automatically
the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant
while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may not
be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may

make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be

the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO
292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent
confirmation
by
the
Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is
a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important

offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of

circumventing
the
need
for
confirmation
by
the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines verus Zamora
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization
of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking
to
declare
the
deployment
of
the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the

constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the

military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation
or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3
powers and provided for their revocation and review
without
any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power
to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give

the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails
to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II
of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the
military.
Since
none
of the
Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.

People versus Patriarca

Facts: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of

the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime
of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC.
Accused-appellant applied
for amnesty
under
Proclamation
No.
724.
His application was
favorably granted by
the National Amnesty Board
concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his
political beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the
conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to
rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or
the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach,
the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty,
which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.

The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal.

Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime of murder.

Neri versus Senate Committee

FACTS
The Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290
(approx. P16 Billion). This was financed by the People's
Republic of China. Respondent Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(CAPO), Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security,
initiated an investigation to respective personalities and
cabinet officials in the NBN Project, of which petitioner
Romulo Neri was included. The petitioner testified and
mentioned that he was offered P200 Billion for his
approval for the NBN Project. But when asked further to
divulge what was discussed about the project, he refused
to answer and invoked "executive privilege," especially
with matters relating to the involvement of Pres. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He then refused to appear in
further hearings of the Committees. With this, the
Committees issued an Order, citing him in contempt and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the

Senate Sergeant-At-Arms. Neri petitioned to the Court for

citiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
show cause Letter and contempt Order. His petition was
granted and the in contempt Order of the respondents
and the instruction for his arrest and detention were
nullified. The respondent Committees filed for a motion
for reconsideration regarding the decision. They persisted
in knowing the petitioner's answers to the questions not
answered regarding the matters which involved the
President.
ISSUE
Can a cabinet member invoke executive privilege on
matters discussed with the President before legislative
investigations?
HELD
No.
The
phrase
"executive
privilege"
involves
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential
communications.
The
privilege
is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution, and
may be claimed by one executive official, the President.
But in the case of Senate v. Ermita, it was the President
herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an
executive agreement between the Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the 3 questions propounded by
petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees'
investigation. Ermita requested the Committees to
dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of

executive privilege. Thus, petitioner, an executive official

under the direct control and supervision of the Chief
Executive, only acted by the order of his superior, hence
cannot be held in contempt. The respondent Committees'
Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

Clinton versus Jones

Procedural Posture: Paula Corbin Jones filed suit in
federal district court in Arkansas against William Jefferson
Clinton and Arkansas state trooper Danny Ferguson over
an incident that was alleged to have occurred on May 8,
1991. Clinton filed motions asking the district court to
dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and
prohibit Jones from refiling the suit until after the end of
his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential
immunity argument but allowed that no trial would take
place until Clinton was no longer president. Both Clinton
and Jones appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.
Disposition: In a 9-0 decision, the court held in favor of
Jones, affirming the district courts right to decide this
case.
Facts: Bill Clinton was elected to the presidency in 1992
and reelected in 1996. Prior to the presidency, Clinton
held the office of governor of Arkansas. In 1994, Paula
Corbin Jones filed suit in federal district court in Arkansas
against Clinton and Arkansas state trooper Danny
Ferguson over an incident that was alleged to have
occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991, in Little

Rock. Jones, then an employee of the state, was working

at the registration desk of a conference in which
Governor Clinton delivered a speech. Jones alleges
Trooper Ferguson told her that Governor Clinton wanted
to see her in his room, and Ferguson escorted her to the
room. Once in the room, Clinton begins to make
unwanted sexual advances towards Jones. Clinton denies
the allegations and claims that the lawsuit is politically
motivated.
Relevant Provision of Constitution: Article II, specifically
separation of power principles.
Question: Whether the constitution protects a sitting
president from a lawsuit that seeks damages from an
unofficial act that occurred before becoming president?
Holding: The Federal Constitution did not require that
federal courts, in all but the most exceptional cases,
defer civil damages litigation against the President until
the Presidents term ended when such litigation was
based on actions allegedly taken before the Presidents
term began, in part because (a) a temporary immunity
from suit for unofficial acts, grounded purely in the
identity of the Presidents office, was unsupported by
precedent of the Supreme Court, and (b) the doctrine of
separation of powers did not require federal courts to
stay all private actions against the President until the
President left office; and (2) it was an abuse of discretion
for the District Court, which had jurisdiction to decide the
case at hand, to defer the trial until the President left
office, in part because (a) such a lengthy and categorical
stay took no account of the individuals interest in
bringing the case to trial, (b) the decision to postpone the

trial was premature, and (c) no impingement upon the

Presidents conduct of his office had been shown.
Reasoning: (Stevens) There is no support for immunity
for unofficial conduct. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all private
actions against the president until he leaves office. The
doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the
allocation of official power among the three co-equal
branches of government.

Concurrence: (Breyer) The constitution does not

automatically grant the president immunity from civil
lawsuits based upon his private conduct. The president
cannot simply rest upon the claim that a private civil
lawsuit
for
damages
will
interfere
with
the
constitutionally assigned duties of the executive branch
without detailing any specific responsibilities or
explaining how or degrees.