1. G.R. No.

144057

January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision 1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch
8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which
granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title
over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the
petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in
1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming
(Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She
constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany,
coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject
land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government
until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor
Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC
rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the
land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February
18, 1998.8
1awphi1.nt

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered
its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000. 10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. 11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable
or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under
a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative
and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release
the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." 15In that case, the
subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land,
compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of
the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone
in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it
was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell,
the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
1awphi1.nt

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes 19 the possession of which cannot ripen
into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. 22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership

going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim
of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 26 With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. 27 The inherent nature of the land
but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The
argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court
generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which
commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful
and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 176022

February 2, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG AMBROSE ROASA, as herein represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, JR.
and ALVIN B. ACAYEN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 13, 2006, in CAG.R. CV No. 85515 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case
No. TG-930.
1

The facts of the case are as follows:

The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of land filed by herein respondent, represented by her attorneys-in-fact,
Bernardo M. Nicolas, Jr. and Alvin B. Acayen. The application was filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of Tagaytay City. The subject lot was
denominated as Lot 2 of the consolidation/subdivision plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre.
In her application, respondent alleged, among others, that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject lot, having acquired the same by purchase as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994; that the said property is an agricultural land planted with corn, palay, bananas, coconut
and coffee by respondent's predecessors-in-interest; that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land under bona fideclaim of ownership since the 1930's and that they have declared the land for taxation
purposes. The application, likewise, stated the names and addresses of the adjoining owners.
Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application contending that the muniments of
title, such as tax declarations and tax payment receipts, did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied
for nor of the alleged open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondent and her predecessors-in-interest as owners for the period
required by law. The OSG also argued that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject
to private appropriation.
Thereafter, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her allegations. She, then, filed her formal offer of evidence. The Republic, on the other hand,
did not present any evidence to support its opposition to respondent's application for registration.
On June 21, 2004, the RTC admitted all the exhibits of respondent and considered the case submitted for decision.
On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying respondent's application. The trial court held:
xxxx
Perusal of the records show that the subject land x x x is not classified as forest land prior to March 15, 1982; x x x.
It bears stressing at this point in time that before one can register his title over a parcel ofland, the applicant must show that he, by himself or by his
predecessors-in-interest, had been in notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a "bona fide" claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier; and further, the land subject of application is alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. x x x
The evidence adduced by the applicant [herein respondent] particularly Exhibit "U" shows that the subject land applied for registration was declared as not
part of the forest land of the government before March 15, 1982, or short of moreor less seven (7) years of the required adverse possession of thirty (30)
years.
x x x x.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, herein respondent filed an appeal with the CA.

On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 8, 2004 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-930, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
issued, GRANTING the application for confirmation of imperfect title. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City is hereby DIRECTED to issue Title in the
name of applicant for Lot 2 of Consolidated Subdivision Plan CCs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lot 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,
consisting of 1.5 hectares.
SO ORDERED.

The CA held that:

xxxx
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fideclaim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. There are two parts to the requirements of the law. As to the first part, there is
no doubt that the subject property, irregardless of the date, was already made alienable and disposable agricultural land.
As to the second requirement, there is a specific cut-off date of possession: June 12, 1945. The cut-off date of possession of June 12, 1945 only applies to
the requirement of possession. It does not have any bearing as to when the land became alienable and disposable.
When the property was classified as alienable and disposable, specifically on March 15, 1982, does not have any bearing with the second requirement of
possession so that despitethe fact that the property became alienable and disposable only in 1982, the possession requirement since June 12, 1945
stands so that, as in this case at bench, when the possession was since 1930, which is before June 12, 1945, the requirement of possession has been
met.
xxxx

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole ground, to wit:

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED 30-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSION SINCE THE SUBJECT LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MARCH 15, 1982 PER CENRO CERTIFICATION, AND THE APPLICATION WAS FILED ONLY
ON DECEMBER 12, 2000. ANY PERIOD OF POSSESSION PRIOR TO THE DATE WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COMPUTATION OF THE 30-YEAR PERIOD OF POSSESSION.
5

Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides as follows:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In the same manner, Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain orclaiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate oftitle under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above provisions, an applicant for original registration of title based on a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must
show the existence of the following:
1. Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land;
2. The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land of public domain;
3. The possession or occupation was under a bona fideclaim of ownership;
4. Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In the instant case, petitioner's solecontention is that the possession of the subject lot by respondent and her predecessors-in-interest before the
establishment of alienability of the said land, should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession for purposes of registration. Petitioner
argues that respondent's possession of the disputed parcel of land, prior to its re-classification as alienable and disposable, cannot be credited as part of
the required period of possession because the same cannot be considered adverse.
The Court does not agree.
The Court's disquisition in the recent case of AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) v. Republic of the Philippines, as it retraces
the various rulings of this Court on the issue as to when an applicant's possession should be reckoned and the resulting prevailing doctrine, is instructive,
to wit:
7

xxxx

Republic v. Naguit [409 Phil. 405] involves the similar question. In that case, this court clarified that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the lands alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land
has already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands. This court also emphasized in that case the absurdity that would
result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the alienability ofpublic land should have already been established by June 12, 1945. Thus, this court
said in Naguit:
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative
and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release
the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
However, in the later case of Republic v. Herbieto [498 Phil. 227] that was cited by respondent, this court ruled that the period of possession before the
declaration that land is alienable and disposable cannot be included in the computation of the period of possession. This court said: Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public LandAct, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. This Court clarified the role of the date, June 12, 1945, in computing the
period of possession for purposes of registration in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines [605 Phil. 244].In that case, this court declared
that Naguit and not Herbieto should be followed. Herbieto "has [no] precedential value with respect to Section 14(1)." This court said:
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable
and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
1wphi1

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Thus, neither Herbietonor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fideclaim
of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguitor Herbietoprovides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
Moreover, in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration of this courts 2009 decision in Heirs of Malabanan, this Court explained that there was no
other legislative intent that could be associated with the date, June 12, 1945, as written in our registration laws except that it qualifies the requisite period of
possession and occupation. The law imposes no requirement that land should have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land as early as
June 12, 1945.
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the
application for registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of adverse possession prior to the
declaration that land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)
8

Although adverse, open,continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to
do with a persons belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is
alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the
property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.
9

10

11

Respondents right to the original registration of title over the subject property is, therefore, dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is
alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration and (b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or
through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
12

In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than eighteen (18)
years before respondent's application for registration, which was filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of
respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been inadverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the
concept ofan owner even before June 12, 1945.
13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85515 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby
we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. 2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property
involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be
counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in
fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of
the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to
convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration
on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application
had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of
the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. 17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. 20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands,
can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the
coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind
such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid
down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the
full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of
Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the
plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or
incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and occupation
of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title
be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens
by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind
that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject
to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or
the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is
no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided
the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent

declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.