Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

Case: US vs. Pons

Case No. 1

acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.

Facts:
1. Gabino Belise, Juan Pons and Jacinto Lasarte were
charged with illegal importation of opium in the country.
2. Beliso and Pons were tried separately. Pons questioned
the validity of Act. 2381 to which he will be punished if
found guilty. He claimed that the act was not passed or
approved on the 28th of February but on the 1st day of
March and therefore , the act is null and void.

(2) YES. The Court found in the journals no signs of

irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself from considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. The Court deemed it
unnecessary to decide the question whether the senators
and representatives who were ignored in the
computation of the necessary vote were members of
the Congress within the meaning of the Constitution.
Petition was dismissed. Astorga v. Villegas

Issue:
1. W/N the court can look to legislative journals as proof
of when the adjournment happened.
2. W/N the court can go behind the legislative journals to
determine the date of adjournment
Rulings:
1. Yes. Official documents may be proved through the
proceedings of the Phil. Commission or of any legislative
body that may be provided for the Philippines or of
congress by the journals of those bodies or of either
house thereof.
2. The court does not need to go behind the legislative
journals when such journals are already clear and
explicit. The journals say that the Legislative adjourned
at 12 midnight on Feb. 28, 1914.

MANABAG VS LOPEZ VITO

Case No. 2*
Facts:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The
senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities; and members of the House of
Representatives were not allowed to take their seat
except in the election of a house speaker. They argued
that some senators and house representatives were not
considered in determining the required vote from each
house to enact a Resolution (proposing amendments to
the constitution). The Resolution was passed and was
already considered an enrolled bill. But if petitioners
were counted, the vote would have been short of the
required vote.
Petitioners filed a case to prohibit the implementation of
a congressional resolution, claiming that it was not duly
enacted.
The respondents contend that the matter is beyond the
courts jurisdiction because according to the enrolled bill
doctrine, the court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled resolution.
Issue/s:
(1)WON the court can take cognizance of the issue at bar
(2)WON the resolution was duly enacted
Held:
(1) YES. The Court may render judgement based on
looking into the journals and would not violate the
enrolled bill doctrine because due enactment of law may
be proved in two ways as per Sec 313 of the Code of Civil
Procedure: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed in their order; and (2) in case of

Case No. 3
G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of
Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino
made substantial amendments which were approved by
the Senate. The House, without notice of said
amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the
presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to
the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon
became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody
the amendments introduced by him and approved by the
Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as
invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the
presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a
bills due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive
withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that
the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a
journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the
absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due
enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the
Congress to verify such.
Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment
were introduced and approved and were not incorporated
in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the
court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted
and did not become a law.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

Case No. 4
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16

FACTS:

Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the

respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly
weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
An order quashed the information because it did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the
crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of
the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners
argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum
penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not
be related to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of
a legislative measure
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of
the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of
the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 5
G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51

FACTS:
Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled
An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutional on the
ground that it includes barrios located in another
province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional
mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
This question was initially presented to the Respondents,
which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790,
prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE:
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.
HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase
in the Province of Lanao del Sur makes the title
misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the
members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law;
it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato
that were affected by the law, and the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

away from their towns and provinces and added to the

adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill. These are the pressures which
heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic
Act 4790.

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

FACTS:
The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason.
Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the Peoples
Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions
which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject
matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision
which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance;
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of
Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure
for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a
provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the Peoples Court Act was unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The Peoples Court was intended to be a full and
complete scheme with its own machinery for the
indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the
subject matter and purposes of the Peoples Court Act.
The Congress is not expected to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to
the subject expressed in its title.

Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co v. City of CDO

Case No. 7*
FACTS:
The City Council of CDO passed an ordinance imposing a
tax on the lease of electric and/or telecommunication
poles or towers.
CEPALCO assailed the validity of the ordinance before the
RTC on the ground that the tax imposed by the ordinance
is in reality, an income tax which the City Council of CDO
may not impose because it violates the Local
Government Code. And assuming that the City Council
may enact the ordinance, CEPALCO is exempted by
virtue of RA 9284 providing for its franchise.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the CDO ordinance is valid
(2) WON CEPALCO should be exempted from tax
(3) WON CEPALCOs action in barred for non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies and for prescription

HELD:
(1) Court held that the tax imposed by the ordinance is
not upon income but upon the privilege to engage in
business, and the city council is authorized by the Local
Government Code to impose such tax.
(2) CEPALCO shall not be exempted from the tax since
there is no provision in RA 9284 that provides for its
exemption.
(3) CEPALCOs action is barred as if failed to raise an
appeal within the 30 day period provided in the Sec187
of Local Government Code
Mirasol v Court of Appeals
Case No. 8*
FACTS:
The Mirasols are sugar land owners. PNB financed their
sugar production from 1973-1975.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in 1974, authorizing
PHILEX to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEXs purchases. The
decree directed that the profit of PHILEX was to be
remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to
pay for their obligations, the petitioners asked PNB for
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners
continued to avail other loans and make unfunded
withdrawals until they failed to settle their obligations
and PNB foreclosed their mortgaged properties.
PNB asked PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that
said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB argued that there was
nothing to account since under, all earnings from the
export sales of sugar are to be remitter to the
government.
Mirasols filed a suit against PNB for accounting and
damanges.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the solicitor general
(2) WON PD 579 is constitutional for violating due
process
HELD:
(1) The Constitution vests the power to all RTCs to
consider the constitutionality of statutes.
(2) As a rule, the courts will not resolve the
constitutionality of a law if the controversy can be settled
on other grounds. The CA ruled that PNBs obligation to
render an accounting is an issue, which can be
determined without having to rule on the
constitutionality of the PD.
The rule of statutory construction is that repeals by
implication are not favored. RA cannot be deemed to
have repealed by PD No. 579 because the former did not
expressly declared the repeal.
Victorias Milling Co. Inc v Social Security Commission
Case No. 9*

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

FACTS:
The SSC issued Circular No. 22 which provided that the
employees bonuses and overtime pay shall be included
in their remuneration for the computation of monthly
deductions.

The petitioner, through a counsel, protested against the

circular arguing that it is contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7 which expressly excluded overtime pay
and bonus in the computation of monthly contributions.
Petitioner further questioned the validity of the circular
for SSCs lack of authority to enact such without approval
from the president and publication in the Official Gazette.
The SSC objected by saying that Circular No. 22 is not a
rule but mere interpretation of the statute, a statement
or opinion on a general policy that needed the approval
of the president and publication.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this
Court on appeal.
ISSUE/s:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt,
amend and repeal subject to the approval of the
President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act."
HELD:
No. The Commissions Circular No. 22 is not a rule or
regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
should be construed. The Circular purports merely to
advise employers-members of the System of what, in the
light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based.
Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what
"compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this
Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by
deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act.
By virtue of this express substantial change in the
phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase
in question should give way to the clear mandate of the
new law.
Pelaez v Auditor General
Case No. 10*
FACTS:
The president issued executive orders to create 30
municipalities pursuant to Sec60 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Public funds were thereby disbursed
in the implementation of the said orders.
Pelaez filed a petition to restrain any expenditure of
public funds in the implementation of the
aforementioned executive orders. Petitioner argued that
said orders were null and void on the ground that the
president does not have the authority to create

municipalities as this power has been vested in the

legislative department.
ISSUE:
WON the executive orders were null and void.
HELD:
Sec10(1) o Article VII of the Constitution gives the
president authority to supervise over all local
governments as may be provided by law. The
constitution permits him to no more than check whether
the local government or officers are duly performing their
duties. The president cannot interfere with local
governments so long as the officers act within the scope
of their authority. The president may not enact, vote, set
aside or annul an ordinance passed by the municipal
council within the scope of its jurisdiction.
The Executive Orders are hereby declared null and void.
Alba v Evangelista
Case No. 11*
FACTS:
Alajar was appointed as Vice-Mayor of Roxas City by the
president. His appointment was duly confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Alajar remained in his
designated office until he received a communication from
that Alba was
ISSUE:
WON the alleged removal of the Alajar (Respondent) and
the designation in his place of Alba (Petitioner) as ViceMay of Roxas City is legal
HELD:
Sec 8 of RA603 empowers the President, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, to appoint
a person to hold office at his own pleasure.
Term time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right.
Tenure term during which the incumbent actually hold office.

The court held that since the term of the respondent was
fixed implicitly by the President in the exercise of the
Presidents authority, its expiration is also determined by
the President with the same authority. The respondent
was not removed but rather, merely lost his right to hold
office by the expiration of his term as determined by the
President.
Tanada v. Tuvera
Case No. 12
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159

FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in
demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise provided as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil
Code pertains to the necessity of publication.

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

HELD:
No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per
se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such
notice or publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat.
The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances
of general application which have not been published
shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that
the unpublished decrees be published in the Official
Gazette
immediately.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar
Case No. 13
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211

FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest
where participants have to estimate the actual number
of liters a hooded gas pump can dispenseduring a
specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration
required to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex
products to be made in order to join the contest.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and
communications, Caltex requested clearance for
Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing
said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a nonmailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the
term gift enterprise which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word
lottery is defined as a game of chance where the
elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and
(3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the
provision of the Postal Law making unmailable any
lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an
element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in
said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved.
Macondray & Co VS Eustaquio 64 PHIL 446
Definition, Nature and Purpose of Construction
Case No. 14*
FACTS:
The controversy arose from the contract of sale between
MACONDRAY & CO. (Plaintiff) and EUSTAQUIO (defendant)
involving a De Soto car, Sedan for the price of PHP 595
promising to pay the car in 12 monthly installments. The
contract was coupled with a mortgage on the car made
by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff to guarantee
payment. The defendant paid the initial installment of
PHP 43.75 and thereafter failed to pay any of the
remaining installments. The car was sold at a public
auction for PHP 250 prompting plaintiff to collect the
remaining balance and other stipulated fees in the
amount of PHP 342.20 from defendant.

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

ISSUE: WON Act 4122 (Installment Sales Law/ Recto

Law) is valid?
HELD:
YES. This question involves the interpretation of the
pertinent portion of the law, reading: "However, if the
vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall
have no further action against the purchaser for the
recovery of any unpaid balance owing by the same, and
any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void."
This paragraph, as its language shows, refers to the
mortgage contract executed by the parties, whereby the
purchaser mortgages the chattel sold to him on the
installment basis in order to guarantee the payment of
its price, and the words "any unpaid balance" should be
interpreted as having reference to the deficiency
judgment to which the mortgagee may be entitled
where, after the mortgaged chattel is sold at public
auction, the proceeds obtained therefrom are insufficient
to cover the full amount of the secured obligations which,
in the case at bar as shown by the note and by the
mortgage deed, include interest on the principal,
attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and the costs.
The fundamental rule which should govern the
interpretation of laws is to ascertain the intention and
meaning of the Legislature and to give effect thereto.
(Sec. 288, Code of Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Toribio, 15
Phil., 85; U. S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil., 134; De Jesus vs. City
of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.,
322; People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126.) Were it the
intention of the Legislature to limit its meaning to the
unpaid balance of the principal, it would have so stated.
We hold, therefore, that the assignment of error is
untenable.

General v Barrameda
Case No. 15*
FACTS:
The petitioners defaulted their loan obligation with DBP
and as a consequence, their mortgaged property was
foreclosed for sale and was bought by the defendant.
On September 2, 1963, the registration of
the sale and affidavit wherein the Transfer of
Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff was
cancelled and was issued to DBP. Moreover,
General and Gontang purchased land from DBP
and their sale was annotated in their Transfer of
Certificate of Title.
On August 12, 1964, plaintiff purchased the
land and was able to redeem it due to Court of
Appeals decision since the date when it was
purchased was still within a year of redemption
period, which is from the date of the registration of
the sale.
Now, petitioners (General) contended that
there is a great deal of difference in the legislative
intent in the use of the words auction sale and
sale. In Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 45, it
provides that the right to redeem property sold is
within the year from the date of the auction
sale and in Sec. 32 of Act 2938 (PNB Charter),

it provides that the right to redeem is within one

year after the sale of the real estate

The petitioners argued that the more applicable

law is the section 31 of Commonwealth Act 45.
Hence, the respondent should have not deemed the
property since the date when he purchased the
land was beyond the time of redemption.
ISSUE: W the rule to apply in determining the start of
one year redemption period is the date of the auction
sale OR the date of registration of sale in the registry of
deeds.
Whether or not the interpretation of Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act no. 459 that the period of
redemption should start from the date of auction
sale and not from the date of the registration of
sale should be followed?
HELD:
The court stated that a correct solution to the issue
must entail not merely trying to determine the
meaning of the words auction sale and sale
in different legislative enactments but more
importantly a determination of the legislative
intent which is quite a task to achieve as it
depends more on a determination of the purpose
and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a
period of redemption of their foreclosed properties.
The words sale and auction sale used
interchangeably in different laws referred to the sale at
public auction, required by law in the disposition of
foreclosed properties.
So that whether the legislators in different laws
used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no
moment, since the presumption is that when they
used those words "sale" and "auction sale"
interchangeable in different laws they really referred
to only one act the sale at public auction
indispensably necessary in the disposition of
mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay
civil obligations of their owners.
Wherefore, the decision of the respondent
Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 16
G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)
Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22

FACTS:
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor
Relations, required referendum election among
Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation
with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended
that there was no statutory authorization for the
Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
W/N the statute authorizing Respondents and giving
them jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
Art. 226 of the Labor Code states that: "The Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the
regional offices of the labor shall have and exclusive

authority to act, at their own initiation or upon request of

either both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe arising from
or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces, whether natural or non-agricultural, except
those arising from the implementation or interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the
subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration" Respondent and the Bureau were within
jurisdiction. Petition denied.

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

Case No. 17
No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960)
Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190

FACTS:
The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain
Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the
number of said days is an infringement of their right.
Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as
amended by RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may
be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by
the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502
increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but
without specifying the days on which they are to be run,
the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to
private individuals and entities by six.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.
HELD:
No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is
clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory.
The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the
use of such days. Petitioners claim that the intent of the
legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be
run on the same day are untenable. The words of
members of Congress are not representative of the entire
House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioners
claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and
property is deprivation of property is also untenable
because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO.
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a
statute, unlike in the interpretation of the an ordinary
written document, it is not enough to obtain information
as to the intention or meaning has been expressed in
such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short
the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the
author meant by the language he used, but also to see
that the language used sufficiently expresses the
meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two
elements- an internal and external one; it originates in
intention and is perfected by expression.

Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 18
G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30,
1976)
Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of
Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the
Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed
area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the
city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed
land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same.
Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the
reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the
land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the
City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court
found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No.
1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative
intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed
land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature.
Such grants have always been strictly construed against
the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public
money or resources, which resulted in an unfair
advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area
reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular
Government and without cost to the City of Manila.
Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to
exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the
policy of legislation.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation

G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007

TOPIC: Where Legislative Intent Is Ascertained
Case No. 19

FACTS
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation the petitioner engaged
in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless
steel products and of one its suppliers is the Ssangyong
Corporation the respondent.
The two corporations conducted business through
telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
The respondent would send the pro forma invoice of the
product order to petitioner and after confirmation the
petitioner would send it back affixing his signature.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to
breach of contract supported by the photocopies of the
pro forma invoices against the petitioner
The petitioner claims that under electronic commerce
of 2000 the electronic evidence by the respondent is
admissible. And the terms electronic document and data
message as rules of evidence, and it do not include a
facsimile transmission.
ISSUE
Whether or not the electronic evidence by the
respondent is admissible?

HELD
If a statute fails to indicate the legislative intent, the
court may look beyond the statute, such as history of the
statute in order to ascertain the intent of the legislative.
The court ruled that the international origin of the
statute could refer or consistent to model law on
electronic commerce adopted by the UNCITRAL to clear
out its ambiguity it is not just limited to electronic data
interchange. Therefore Data message and electronic
document is also the equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately.
Indeed the court proves that it was within the intention
of the framers of the law to consider that original
printout or the electronic data store in computer or
electronic gadget reduces in a readable form, will be
considered as written instrument provided that proper
authentication be made and proved, to which the
respondent managed to do so. Thus, the high court ruled
in favor of the respondent.
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
Case No 20
G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922)
Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12

FACTS:
Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which
fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he
sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law.
E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly
and hoarding of products under extraordinary
circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature
has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to
the discretion of the Governor General. Without leaving
the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances
to the Governor General are, Defendant will not be
charged.
ISSUE:
W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue
delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something
solid, permanent and substantial. As known, no nation
living under republican form of government can enact a
law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. That power can never be delegated
under a republican form of government. This power is
exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is
dealing with private property and private rights, which
are sacred under the Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM:
None
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89

FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms.
He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed
Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

sought to be acquitted as the case of People v.

Macarandang used the same defense providing
evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to
possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer.
The law does not contain any exception for secret agent
therefore holding this position would not constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the
conviction of the accused must stand. The
Courts ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c
Guevara v Inocentes
Case No. 22

FACTS:
The petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment
as Undersecretary of Labor and took his oath after such
appointment. The defendant questioned the appointment
on the ground that the petitioners appointment ceases to
be valid after the adjournment of Congress since there
was no COAppointments organized during the special
session which commenced on Jan17.
At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate
adjourned its session. The HOR merely suspended its
session and to be resumed on January 24. The petitioner
therefore concludes that Congress has been in
continuous session without interruption since Jan17.
ISSUE:
WON the ad interim appointment of the petitioner is vad
HELD:
Art VII, Sec10 of the 1935 Constitution: the President
shall have the power to make appointments [ad interim
appointment] during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until (1) disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or (2) the next
adjournment of Congress [whether special or regular
session].
The phrase until the next adjournment of the Congress
does not make any reference to specific session of
Congress, whether regular or special. Using the known
maxim in statcon stating that what the law does not
distinguish we should not distinguish, the court
concluded the authors used the word adjournment as
either regular or special.
The adjournment of one of the Houses of Congress is
considered as the adjournment of the Congress as a
whole. The petitioners ad interim appointment ceases to
be valid upon the adjournment of the Senate.
The contention that the COAppointments should be first
organized before the second mode of termination can be
made effective is invalid because they are two separate
modes.

United Christian Missionary Society et al vs. Social

Security Commission GR. No. L-26712-16 December 27,
1969
Case No. 23
Case Doctrine: Where language of the law is clear and
the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no
room for interpretation and construction of the statute.
Facts
The petitioners filed a petition praying for condonation of
assessed penalties against them for delayed social
security premium remittances. They alleged that they
had labored under the impression that as international
organizations, they were not subject to the coverage
under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon
advice by the SSS officials, they paid. Petitioners
claimed that the penalties assessed against them were
inequitable because of several past resolutions wherein
the commission permitted the condonation of such
penalties.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the SSS did not have the power or authority to condone
penalties for late premium remittance. The SSS argued
that in the absence of an express provision in the Social
Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, the commission cannot legally do so.
The petition was dismissed in favor of the respondent
Commission. Thus resulted to this appeal.

Issue
Whether or not SSS erred in ruling that it has no
authority under the Social Security Act to condone the
penalty prescribed by law for late remittances.
Ruling
No error was committed in the commission's action.
Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of
the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for
interpretation and construction of the statute. The court
is therefore bound to uphold the respondent's refusal to
claim unto itself the authority to condone penalties for
late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise,
we would be sanctioning the commission's reading into
law discretionary powers that are not actually provided
therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose
and intent of the legislature.

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

load. The loan was to be received by the petitioners in

several releases.
The first release of P4, 200.00 was made on April 29,
1954, and the other releases were made subsequent
thereafter. As of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation
of the petitioners of the respondent-bank, including
interests, was P13,983.59.
On July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano wrote the
respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount
of P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the
respondent-bank out of the proceeds of his back pay
pursuant to Republic Act No. 897 .
The respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised
the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his offer on the
ground that the loan was not incurred before or existing
on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act No. 897 was
approved.
Issue:

Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners

was existing at the time of the approval of RA 897.

Ruling:
NO. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction
of the law would enable to take advantage of their back
pay certificates. On the other hand, however, the Court
cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in
the clear and unambiguous language of the abovequoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental
duty is the application of the law according to its express
terms, interpretation being called for only when such
literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where
a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Appellants
availed of their approved loan only about nine (9) months
after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the
corresponding releases thereof were received by
appellants only after the execution of the mortgage
contract on March 23, 1954. Undoubtedly,
notwithstanding the approval by the appellee
Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants'
loan application on April 30, 1953, appellants did not
thereby incur any obligation to pay the same; only after
the corresponding amounts were released to appellants
after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach; and it
cannot, therefore, be said that the said loan was an
obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of
Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953.

Gedeon Quijano & Eujenia T. Quijano, petitioners-appellants Vs.

The Development Bank of the Philippines & The ex-officio

Sheriff of Misamis Occidental, respondents-appellees
Case No. 24

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs

Facts:
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan
with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC),
predecessor-in-interest of the respondent-bank, in the
amount of P19, 500.00. The loan was approved on April
30, 1953. The petitioners availed the loan much later and
the mortgage contract was executed on March 23, 1954.
The petitioner spouses mortgaged real properties with
the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage
dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak)
under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which
states: There shall be levied collected and paid on
products of the Philippines exported from the

Case No: 25
G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971)
Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a

fee for wharfage

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.

ISSUE:
W/N the words products of the Philippines excludes
bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat
grain, which is imported into the Philippines.
HELD:
No. It is quite obvious that as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the
above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The
Term product of the Philippines should be taken in its
usual signification to mean any product produced in the
country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced
from wheat imported into the country are products of
the Philippines.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The controversy started when the Philippine

Government through the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit disapproved the final release of the
funds to be used for reimbursement to the respondent,
LACAP on the ground that the contractors license of
respondent had expired at the time of the execution of
the contract even if the obligations (concreting of Sitio 5,
Bahay Pare) on the part of respondent have been fully
completed.
LACAP filed a complaint for Specific Performance. OSG
for petitioner invoked the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies based on the premise that
respondents claim is premature since he failed to appeal
to COA who has the administrative jurisdiction.

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma

ISSUE: Whether a contractor with an expired license is

entitled to be paid for completed projects?

Case No. 26
G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)

FACTS:
Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal
termination of their union leader and underpayment of
their monthly allowance. In the process, they blocked the
roads and prevented customers and suppliers from
entering the premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in
court for damages for obstruction of private property.
Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case
belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide.
ISSUE:
W/N courts may be labor arbiters (mediators) that can
pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it
the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC?
HELD:
Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with
original jurisdiction.
However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of
first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages
for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec.
217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters.
Additionally, BP 130 amended the same section, but
without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money
claims arising from employer-employee relations. Thus
the law is clear, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to
act on the case.

Republic v Lacap 517 SCRA 255, March 2, 2007

Austria- Martinez, J. Verba Legis Rule or Plain Meaning
Rule
Case No. 27
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est
(speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as

HELD: The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does

not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void the contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already
expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such
payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment
of the fine prescribed under the law.
Nota Bene:
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who
shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate
or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate
or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos
but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

Canet v Decena
Case No. 28
FACTS:
Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines
Sur while Julieta Decena was the mayor therein. In 1998,
Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to
operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl
Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing
Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof. This

ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but

she denied it because the said ordinance does not
contain rules and regulations as well as a separability
clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance
indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayors permit for the
operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canets

application on the ground that under the Local

Government Code of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the
authority to give licenses for the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the
regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of
gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as
there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued Decena on
the ground that he should be given a permit based on
the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as
by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which
generally provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for
the operation of businesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to
issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance which would
empower her to do so.
HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors permit
would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but
would also be an undue encroachment on Decenas
administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution
allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be
implemented without an ordinance allowing the
operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution).
It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 which provided for the
collection of application filing fees, ocular inspection
fees, mayors permit fees, filing fees for the institution of
complaints, entrance fees and special derby assessments
for the operation of cockpits.12 This Ordinance, however,
was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, since
there is no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit,
Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to
establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula,
Camarines Sur cannot be implemented.
It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed
in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius.14
Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied.15 The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a
statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply
the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by
judicial fiat.16 Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion.17 Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it
or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied
if its attention has been called to the omission.18
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law
to conform with what they think should be the law.19 Nor may
they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not
prescribe.20

LOZANO vs NOGRALES 16 June 2009

Case No. 29
FACTS

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

Petitioners prayed for the nullification of House

Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the
Members of the Congress. Petitioners seek to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definite
interpretation by this Court of Sec. 1, Art. XVII, which
provides for the procedure for amending or revising the
Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge
petitioners supplications.
ISSUE
W/NOT the Court may have a judicial review upon the
present case.
HELD
NONE. This Courts power of review is limited to actual
cases and controversies dealing with parties having
adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented. It is well settled that it is the duty of
the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of
the nature, scope and extent of the powers of
government is the exclusive province of judiciary, such
that any mediation on the part of the latter for the
allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not
to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its
solemn and sacred obligation under the Constitution.
The case-or-controversy requirement bans this Court
from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent
questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of
advice concerning legislative or executive action

Biraogo v Nograles
Case No. 30
FACTS:
The petitioners prayed to the nullification of house
Resolution No. 1109 on the ground that it contradicts the
procedure provided on the 1987 Constitution regarding
the amendment or revision of the same as separate
voting of the members of each House is deleted and
substituted with vote on all the members of the
Congress.
ISSUE:
WON the court has the power to review the case of
constitutional validity of the HR No. 1109.
HELD:
No. The SC cannot review the case because its power is
limited only to actual cases and controversies dealing
with parties having adversely legal claims.
The court is canned from deciding abstract, hypothetical
or contingent questions, unless it has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.
A party will be allowed to petition only if they can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the illegal conduct
of the government (2) the injury is fairy traceable to the
challenged action (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by the remedy being sought.

Locus Standi requires personal stake on the outcome of

the controversy. The possible consequence of the
resolution is yet unrealized and does not infuse
petitioners with locus standi.

FRANCISCO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

10 November 2003 Case No. 31
FACTS: In 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
In 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The House Committee on Justice
ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House.Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year." Respondent House of Representatives,
through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;"
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on
it.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent/s claim is tenable

HELD: To determine the merits of the issues raised in the
instant petitions, this Court turned to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction, to wit, first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second,
where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of its framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat- the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision is to be separated from the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the constitution and one section is not allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together. In other words, the court must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.