SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO
C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has
submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator,
respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the

mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as

judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack
of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCAIPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which
is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation,
since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a
resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the
part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be
dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to
prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,

Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued
by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned
joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death,
and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of

presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent

marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on
the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage
ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8
of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted
on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be

solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn

statement to that effect."

may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.[5]

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the

justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.[4]

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the

municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as
grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this

provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3,
one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary
to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross

ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not
experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply
the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern

warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando
C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Puno,

Mendoza, and Torres,

Jr.,

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit
dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic)
BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan
Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; xxx
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO
MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband
BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I
went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN,
MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, respondent.

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local

Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage
was not registered; xxx
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I
wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by

Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed
acts prejudicial to my interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his
jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering our marriage before the office of
the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge
for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso
and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his
territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar
due to the following and pressing
circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was
physically indisposed and unable to report to
his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon
of that date, without prior appointment,
complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of
respondent in said City, urgently requesting
the celebration of their marriage right then
and there, first, because complainants said

she must leave that same day to be able to

fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled;
second, that for the parties to go to another
town for the marriage would be expensive
and would entail serious problems of finding
a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former
Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot,Sangguniang
Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they
failed to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the country for
a long period and their marriage license
would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled
marriage, complainant feared it would
complicate her employment abroad; and,
last, all other alternatives as to date and
venue of marriage were considered
impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with
the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid
marriage, which respondent found all in
order.
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited
Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent
realized, deserved more than ordinary
official attention under present Government
policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in
question, he believed in good faith that by so doing
he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so

that it may be not be too expensive and complicated

for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the
failure of registration of the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was
also occasioned by the following circumstances
beyond the control of respondent:
3.1. After handing to the husband the first
copy of the marriage certificate, respondent
left the three remaining copies on top of the
desk in his private office where the marriage
ceremonies were held, intending later to
register the duplicate and triplicate copies
and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding,
respondent gathered all the papers relating
to the said marriage but notwithstanding
diligent search in the premises and private
files, all the three last copies of the
certificate were missing. Promptly,
respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr.
Yman to shed light on the missing
documents and he said he saw complainant
Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding
party. Unfortunately, it was too late to
contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr.
Ymans claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting
complainant now that she is out of the
country, a reasonable conclusion can be
drawn on the basis of the established facts
so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim

of complainant that after August 28, 1997

marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason xxx but
that said husband admitted "he had another
girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it
seems reasonably clear who of the two
marriage contracting parties probably
absconded with the missing copies of the
marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated,
respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all
possible means to recover custody of the
missing documents in some amicable way
during the expected hearing of the above
mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina,
failing to do which said respondent would
confer with the Civil Registrar General for
possible registration of reconstituted copies
of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report
dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge " committed
non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of
the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita
Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction.

Additionally, there are only three instances, as

provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at
the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a
remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the
instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge
neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article
23 of the Family Code which provides:
"It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificates not later than
fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the

marriage was solemnized. xxx"

(underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only
has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance
in office, he also undermined the very foundation of
marriage which is the basic social institution in our
society whose nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law. Granting that respondent
Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should
have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the
same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
expected to be conscientious in handling official
documents. His imputation that the missing copies of
the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito
Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not
deserve consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court
finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a
social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded
it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community
to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family
Code provides, among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized
by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the

courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted at the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics
ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held
outside the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
fiance Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his
chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in
question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married."

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law
but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not
only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also
be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to
degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondents
cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down
by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and
made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should
be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his
ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, Judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a

judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts

jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.[7]
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog.[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate
that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage
contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases,
the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than
those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics
supplied)

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA

that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling
official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after
all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions.[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is
hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage

license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated

December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code

which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It
was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3]However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)
[7]
in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. [11] This
is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least

five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is

required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is
the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal

union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the
5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x
x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall

request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The
Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
[19]
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was

actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses

cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party
as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality
to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment
of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place [21] and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can
never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-

ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its

effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent.
The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise
that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,

before a party can enter into a second marriage [27] and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

THIRD DIVISION

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted

Decision.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

The Facts

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he
had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court

in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken

down.[13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be

dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. [14] The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.
[16]
After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.[17]

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to

present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of
a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the
respondent

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and

Order.

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the

Family Code in this case.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11,
13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.

1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a
second marriage with the petitioner.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the
law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil
Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in

evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read
as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth
or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign

judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
[35]
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The
trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
[40]
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging
the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of
the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law
is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal

sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45]There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree
-- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow
a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; [52] (c) Exhibit C
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick
A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e) Exhibit
E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family
Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5
-- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. [60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient

evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or

at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage
to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February
4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January
31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province
of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have
any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to
her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed

that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because

she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.

Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan

pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on

March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting

the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,

separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family
Code.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony
E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set
forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the

disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.

28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and

set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January
31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions
as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. IbaySomera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny
what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and
effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the

Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under

Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that
the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit. Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province
"in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile
of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make
a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez

are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election

cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However,
for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters
of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject

petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between
a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest
in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Codecannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. IbaySomera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where
a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited

recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in
a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as
a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid
foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited
the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse

shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where
the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that

the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import
a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an

essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,

we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof
of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that
Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be

considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that

were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75 In the instant
case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce
and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 InSaguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the

cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family

Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union
of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x
x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch
CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay
City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983
and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States,
in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and

asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that

business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
"no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition
are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory
order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion
was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and
a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it
due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on
the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made
in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had
no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by
prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the

Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case,
Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated
in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP
& GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent
me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be

adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente
and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between

the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON.
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial

disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,

support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German
law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia
as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and
were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was

assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while

the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the
sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 8752434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases
to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 8752435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary
of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same
order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt,
she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained
until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action

for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground
that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery,
as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement
for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since
it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no

provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and

concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State,
as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only
the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for
adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by

petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes

that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where
such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution
of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a
party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of
a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that
the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,

proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce

subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced
except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of
defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense
is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the
state, in explaining the reason for this provision in
the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in
this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the
error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought

this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be
a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to
be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship
to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the

offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint
for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but
which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully

relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old
Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear
that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and
void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of
nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the
criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule
and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.

Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to

quash is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987
is hereby made permanent.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others.
A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to
have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet
of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one

of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then

two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved.
This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely
the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the
exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to
recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985])
cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can
with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be

considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others.
A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to
have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet
of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one
of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then
two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved.
This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely
the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the
exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to
recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985])
cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can

with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
CRASUS L. IYOY,
September 21, 2005
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30
July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus-

G.R. No. 152577

Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a

Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,
and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hottempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the
care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the

letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an

American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to
Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow
and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child,
Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live
with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time
the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in
his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05
June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and
having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made
by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was
no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had
been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was
because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant since the
family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for
abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and
what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines
was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her
children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently,

Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one,
Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did
file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall
be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another
woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present
their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr.
and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where
the
said
witnesses
reside.
Despite
the
Orders [12] and
[13]
Commissions issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New

York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses

upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever
submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a
year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued
an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14] considering Fely to have waived
her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The
ground
bearing
defendants
psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable
consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From
the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically abandoned
him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United
States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in
an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a
wife who is already married to another man in
another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have
been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of
the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an
irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low
regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of

marriage which is the foundation of human society

throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that
the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to
comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which
is defendants psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is
decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability.
That such incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by defendants
own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the

RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July
2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and
void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiffappellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiffappellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE
BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN
AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY,
THE
FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph
of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because
he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case
at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired
her American husbands citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why

the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be

extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under
these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the
former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and
to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated
to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this
Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March

2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondents
wife
do
not per
se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided
questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to
the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that

Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a fullblown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an
American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of
the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of
the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial

provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological

incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated[21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a)
Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage;
(b)
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)
Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were

handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves
to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert

evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and

clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-

complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in

the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there

is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented
by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis
for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent

Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put
into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which
Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to
convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article
36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her
hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not

identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina [30] that the root cause of
the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of

the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not

established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on
behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does
not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints
the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268

SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The
Solicitor
General
shall
discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor
vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is

authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court
or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case
is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts
when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical
that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein
to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.

Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement
in Republic
v.
Court
of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should

dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The
petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from
the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require
the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings
or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with
or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The
General and the
with copies of
registered mail.

parties, including the Solicitor

public prosecutor, shall be served
the decision personally or by
If the respondent summoned by

publication failed to appear in the action, the

dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any
of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or
the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to

those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in

Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property
she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that
they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman
of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued

in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of

New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He discovered that his
wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on
February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect
that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy
as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16,
1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented
by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State
of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. [11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. [12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced
three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. [16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively
my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing
therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at
Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the

Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,

Lorenzo died.[21]

(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties,

whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded,
sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold,
ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a

petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3)
that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and
her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.[23]

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor

of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of
the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
substitute should served (sic) without bond;

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding

(Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.[24]

(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or

testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate

proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp.
Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in

any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in
any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children
with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last
Will and Testament.[17]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in

the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial

Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. [19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed,
the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint

decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce
decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable
in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being
so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any
share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour
which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the

will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay
and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of
evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and
Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since
they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of
May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate. [30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of

Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, [34] denied the motion
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the
various arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to
inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of
the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)

marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.

follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when

determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are

necessarily governed by foreign law.

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national

law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
New York State law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court
of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion
was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice,
and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially
in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of

Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained
by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent)
are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a

foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount
of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works
of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial
court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception

at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same
room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the first night.
The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth
nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together
with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They
were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed
in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's

examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no

medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.

have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided

him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet

homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in
the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why

the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that
she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance
to overcome their differences.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.

His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate
to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found
out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one
(1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is
not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in
that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is

no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as

VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before
the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was
no sexual intercourse between the parties without making
any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the

parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-893141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in
her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no
other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.

What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before
the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such
evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated
by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling
a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this
Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated
to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a
review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any
physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly

indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind

of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that
the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent
to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an
in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches,
pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would not want
to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in
a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent
court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to
show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have

sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in

the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part
of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such
a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse
with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he
occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty
for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.

330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering

from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court
and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This
case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is
hard to believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband
if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity,
and which can be achieved "through proper motivation."
After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and
of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and

private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and

respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt
a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 158896

October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31
January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
("respondent Manuel").

On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life

together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He
alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated
by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly
complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him
like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her
liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in
his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect
or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge
of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him
and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before
marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness
for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own
parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve
time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and
loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is
still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to
marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was
respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family
obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real

happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated
in the complaint.

Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer 16 or that he had a

mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal
properties and obligations.18

In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took
the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition.
He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they
still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early
years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time
being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this
period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive
about cleanliness which became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during
that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were
engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became
busy with law school and with various community organizations, it
was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart. 9 He
then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly
embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled
with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and
remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a
trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his
table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened
while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs
and accused the tenant of having an affair with him; 13 and other
incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature.
Money matters continued to be a source of bitter
quarrels.14Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able
to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not
approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous
when it came to celebrations of their parish priest. 15 Respondent

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified

that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels
office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time,
witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the
latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita
could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter
that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel
room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita
to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived,
petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another
occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she
heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang
batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?" 22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA
GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were
admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric
evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There
is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity
to sustain the marital bond with love, support and
understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology
of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged
themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their

competence to maintain the love and respect that they

should give to each other.

after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel
implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both

partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve
their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and
obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and
suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his
masculine ego to cover up for his felt or imagined
inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects
of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage.
Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological
repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to
adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to
each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not
conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel
and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity
to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of
marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not
otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV
criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in
existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and
impervious to recovery.25

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was

admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were
embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels

allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had
their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he
had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would
wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported
respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to
serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present
case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that

Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the

psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria CaratingSiayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious
and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than
enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying
long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and
she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the
institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving,
nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of
enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu.
Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of
rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent
to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992
described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each
other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their
community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the
house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw
respondent Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita
holding in part that:

The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not

preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was]
happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was]
blest with a son. Their life together continued years
thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical,
depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the
parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the
defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is
playing footsy.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor

knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer
on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of
irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws
now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy
in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not
look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen
even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck. 37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order
dated 04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision,
relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both
Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff
and defendant. That is a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having

spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual

communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
"amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the
lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage
declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity,
not only of defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE
TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF
THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID
DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON

GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER

ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we
held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends
crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely
scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no
case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did
not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi
despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In
Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same
bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their
separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife
filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained
the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the
Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue
herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who
finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his
wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and
respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that

"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic
v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem

generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as

a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the
issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner
Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT
MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in
Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own
evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the
person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband
fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:

She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good

provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of
him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs
because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a
child with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl
in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it
was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She
feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit,"
but, that she still is willing to pursue it.

respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and
her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that
petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.54

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he

is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told
her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a
new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo
akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."48

The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia,

on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there
supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable
not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but
from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws
disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by
him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a
story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the
marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming
busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as
a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during
his direct examination.58

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as

from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only
essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state 51 and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point."52

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we

have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently
falling out of love and wanting a way out.

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.

Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting

personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we

stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery
respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled,
so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31
January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102
is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers
find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases.

In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage;
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household
and handle their finances.

The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were

stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on
April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her
and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for

damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that
"the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view

psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of
one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment
of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave
the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity

should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . .

. and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony
of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the

psychiatrist based on your

findings that it is better for the
Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the
marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is
also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the
psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they
psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no
more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of

antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows

love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should

also be decreed civilly void.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already

ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano
to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Psychological nature which renders them incapable of

performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36,
I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a
wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an
indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously,
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for
the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,

the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the
mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of
vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under
Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly
on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice

Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be

psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed
under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because
of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what
is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be

nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full

tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet
unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack
of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying

out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the

wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to
give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion
of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they
were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or
both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to
Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack
of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no
real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily
into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are,

experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at
the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of
someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered
into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of
the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return
home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for
more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36
is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,
after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus
with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her
husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic

end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of
the spouses.

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio

V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological
incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family
Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices
of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are
incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

VITUG, J., concurring:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of

judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are
unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that
the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along
with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing

precepts in our law on marriage. Thus

correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the

disorder, indicia of psychological

incapacity. 4

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for

then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

Section 12, Article II:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not

physical, in nature;

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the

inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge
the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the
marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as
another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also
put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language
its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development. (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but
for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that
the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not
been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions
Section 2, Article XV:
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice

Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia RosarioBedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36,
I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a
wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an
indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously,
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for
the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,
the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential

that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to

some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the
mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of
vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under
Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly
on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the

inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed
under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of

essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because
of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what
is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of

married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from

the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet
unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack
of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid

consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in

persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to
give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion
of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they
were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or
both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to
Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the

psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack
of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no
real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily
into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at
the time the marriage was entered into civil

divorce and breakup of the family almost is of

someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered
into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of
the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return
home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for
more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36
is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband,
after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus
with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her
husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage

tribunals attribute the causes to psychological

incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of
the spouses.

likewise be void even if such incapacity

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices
of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are
incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

VITUG, J., concurring:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio

V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological
incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family
Code. Thus

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of

judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,

at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall

3. who for causes of psychological nature are

unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that

the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent
whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along
with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the

most serious cases of personality disorders

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for
then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge
the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the

marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the
marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as
another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also
put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language
its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

promote its total development. (The 1987

Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but
for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that
the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not
been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 25-33.
2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino
G. Chua, ponente and chairman JJ., Serafin V.C.
Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

Section 12, Article II:

4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .

5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its

Decision a substantial portion of the RTC
Decision is follows:

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively

"To sustain her claim that respondent is

psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is
immature, irresponsible, dependent,
disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an
infidel. These characteristics of respondent are

based on petitioner's testimony that the former

failed to be gainfully employed after he was
relieved from the office of the Government
Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986.
leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the
family. Also when they were separated in fact,
respondent practically abandoned both
petitioner-mother and son except during the first
few months of separation when respondent
regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly
allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four
months. Respondent is likewise dependent on
his parents for financial aid and support as he
has no savings, preferring to spend his money
with his friends and peers. A year after their
marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque
for about a million pesos. They then transferred
there only for the petitioner to discover a few
months later that they were actually renting the
house with the respondent's parents responsible
for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this.
respondent would also lie about his salary and
ability. And that at present, respondent is living
with his mistress and their child. which fact he
does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look
at the background of their relationship. During
their college days, when they were still going
steady, respondent observed petitioner to be
conservative, homely, and intelligent causing
him to believe then that she would make an ideal
wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love
with respondent because of his thoughtfulness
and gentleness. After a year, however, they

decided to break their relationship because of

some differences in their personalities. Almost
five (5) years later, while they were working in
Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their
love affair. They became very close and
petitioner was glad to observe a more mature
respondent. Believing that they know each other
much better after two years of going steady, they
decided to settle down and get married. It would
seem. therefore, that petitioner and respondent
knew each other well and were then prepared for
married life.
During their marriage, however, the true
personalities of the parties cropped-up and
dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on
both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed
to respond properly to the situation. This failure
resulted in their frequent arguments and
fighting's. In fact, even with the intervention and
help of their parents who arranged for their
possible reconciliation, the parties could not
come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage
between the parties broke-up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities (sic).
Neither of them can accept and understand the
weakness of the other. No one gives in and
instead, blame each other for whatever problem
or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine,
respondent cannot be solely responsible for the
failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this
resulted because both parties cannot relate to
each other as husband and wife which is unique
and requisite in marriage.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent

union between a man and a woman with the
basic objective of establishing a conjugal and
family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique
element of permanency of union signifies a
continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship
between the parties. Towards this end, the
parties must fully understand and accept the
(implications and consequences of being
permanently) united in marriage. And the
maintenance of this relationship demands from
the parties, among others, determination to
succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt
understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and
support for each other. Thus, the Family Code
requires them to live together, to observe mutual
(love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. Failure to observe) and
perform these fundamental roles of a husband
and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of
the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in
this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records,
pp. 70-73).
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition,
1988.
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of
each archdiocese in the country. Aside from
heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz
is also incumbent president of the Catholic

Bishops' Conference of the Philippines,

Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the
degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of
Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also SecretaryGeneral of the Second Plenary Council of the
Philippines PCP II held from January 20,
1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough
equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional
convention in the Philippine Church, and where
the ponente, who was a Council member, had the
privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind
and prayerful discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the
Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice,
author, noted civil law professor and the law
practitioner.
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious connections and
the demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including

proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty.
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage
and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.

xxx xxx xxx

3. Who for causes of psychological nature are
unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that
in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact
that the original Canon is written in Latin and
both versions are differently-worded English
translations.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its

elderly members but the state may also do so
through just programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994.
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of
Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text
used in Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA
B.
MARCOS, petitioner,
MARCOS, respondent.

vs. WILSON

G.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of
a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos

and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art.
36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved
[sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the
legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the
National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent
with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in

1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge

from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned
at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he
as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702
Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she
acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still
single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in
1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not
however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so
that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the
family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence,
he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with
him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic
uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first
make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang.When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.

separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On
that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm
on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following
day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries
were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity

had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied
marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only
on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or
she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to
assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his
supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or
clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by
an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that
the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not
have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity
[was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." [4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's

consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition." [7]
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or

psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of
the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of

various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage
should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner
adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances,
she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order
to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred
to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were laid down by this Court as
follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time
of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must

show that the illness was existing when the parties

exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,

221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and

their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not

be resorted to.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence

presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[11]
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of
evidence
that
can
adequately
establish
the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently

convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond

one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided

under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce
law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed
them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and
ISABEL
LUCIA
SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and
ISABEL
LUCIA
SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July
12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended
his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. [1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into
between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant
Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null
and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in
the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary
damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the
date of this decision plus attorneys fees
of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of

litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving
and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12%
interest per annum from the date of this decision and
one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son
Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00
monthly, subject to modification as the necessity
arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh
Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the
use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry
and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a
motion to increase the P15,000 monthly supportpendente lite of their
son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto,
praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral
argument.[3]

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a

Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.
[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said
Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision
dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto
the trial courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support
for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these
two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the
Petition for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE
DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES
AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF

HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST

BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANTAPPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT
ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER
THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS
OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS
PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following
contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING.
[12]

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO

INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING
GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE
OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS

ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID

AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT
INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE
JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of
Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact
ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly
the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists,
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the
defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead
of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to
marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that
he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and
always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not
only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as
a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such
that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep
defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and
later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those
years the parties were together but also after and throughout their
separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that
unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages
arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it

is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme

Court where damages by reason of the performance or nonperformance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow
that no such award for damages may be made.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the
parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for

moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos.
The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. [16]

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on

Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
[17]

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of

the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may
be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It
must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful
and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have
assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based
were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a

party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .
[18]

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of
the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of
the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner
as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately

and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that
one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must
assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that
the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an
award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation
to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary
damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of
litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. [21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to
deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as

unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are

grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained
above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award
of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with
the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of
annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held
that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573,
586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was
ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore,
all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117
of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the

expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the
exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to
requiring an inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties and
what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first
as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank &
Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said bank
in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79
and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).
Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted
from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family
Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage
settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary
waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal
partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot
covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the
Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually
intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past

support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession

in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be
followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9).
Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was
ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child
as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by
way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful
and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same
being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of
said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. [22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the
trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the
conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In
the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that
henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no
steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the

separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from
Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as VicePresident of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued
from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years,
most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial
court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding
shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiffappellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter
is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
[23]

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a

bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that
in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of
equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,
this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on
the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
[24]

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife

without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages

and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses

through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent,
has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now
expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of]
his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the
other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit
his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement
of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare
the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own
the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set

up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the

conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code,
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by
a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted
void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to
ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It
must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the
obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home,"
i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.[25]
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo
were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have
been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one

of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said

distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a
quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership
and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing,

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child,

Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn
twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 [26] and has, therefore,
attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition
for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that
the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained
the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which
are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are
hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are
deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement
benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half
of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
Provident Group of Companies issustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and
not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of
said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358)
contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996
and November 13, 1996 which increased the supportpendente lite in
favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]

Ynares-

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.

BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with
one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been
annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January
25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an information
for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. [1] Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that
respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage,
inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of
the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of
the Family Code.[2]
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent
filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of

which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. [3] It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused.[4] It must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.[5] Consequently, the defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or
not the latter action may proceed.[6] Its two essential elements are:[7]
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a
single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground
of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of
celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.[8] Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a

license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial

declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully
be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the
first marriage.[9]
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the
Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage
license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:[10]
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was
void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand,
argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims
that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of
majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at

least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence of
a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the
validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that
the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be
submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always
be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a
"final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled
in Landicho v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held
that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy
since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
even be successfully invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. [17] The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the
previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage

before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,
[18]
but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense
raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he
entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was
only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The
obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the
civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been
discussed above, this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise
the second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of
a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated
December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of
Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is

ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q9875611.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the

decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution [3] of
the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as
follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a
period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17,
1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion
was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy
case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted

petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court
ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a
charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before
they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce,
has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties.
As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which
then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate
court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case.

A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code
and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a
foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a
foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion
for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed
that as the first marriage was validly declared voidab initio, then there
was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL.
817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good
faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in
good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights
the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just
like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala
in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as
a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.

Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a

second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy
excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling inMarbella-Bobis
v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of
the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law.
The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack
of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid
down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not
been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that
during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect
the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date
of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first
element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage
to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished

from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained afterthe second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated

September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary

before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was

actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and
the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970

OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late
ISIDRA GOMEZ Y AQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN P. LIPANA, defendant-appellant.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
Presentacion G. Santos for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted
two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the
second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however,
Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage
acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the
price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer

Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was
issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married
to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives.
On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the
husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate.
Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish
text of which provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse
el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de
la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes
gananciales.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied
the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed
property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the
trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the
second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became
effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two
marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any

person other than such first spouse shall be illegal

and void from its performance, unless;
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared
null and void by a competent court.
SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may
be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) That the former husband or wife of either was
living and the marriage with such former husband or
wife was then in force;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity.
The action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage,
for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must
be commenced within the periods and by the parties
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by

either party during the life of the other, or by the
former husband or wife.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that
his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in
an action for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be
filed only by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by
the former spouse.
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this
case, particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance." This is the general
rule, to which the only exceptions are those mentioned in
subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision.<re||an1w>
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to
Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he
married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so
under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on
the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and
the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence
whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he
contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first,
and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally
considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
The second error bears closer analysis. Is Article 1417 of the
Spanish Civil Code applicable under the facts of this case?
There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that
since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage

has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was
acquired during the second marriage, of which interest she would be
deprived if his share should be declared forfeited in favor of the
second wife.
There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as
to whether such resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the
contemplation of the Spanish Civil Code when it decrees in general
terms in Article 1417 that the spouse who in bad faith has given
cause for nullity (of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal
properties, considering that in the present case the first marriage has
not been terminated and therefore likewise impresses the conjugal
stamp of that marriage upon whatever properties are acquired during
its existence. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to resolve
that question here inasmuch as the facts do not call for the
application of Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article states
two causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1)
dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity. Under the
second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of the
partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse takes place. Now then, when did the conjugal partnership
formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased
Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was
dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was
no longer in force, having been eliminated in the new Civil Code,
which took effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from these facts
is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having
acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise,
just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she
was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, 1 no action lies under
Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband's share in her favor,
much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there are after

all no children, but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to

succeed.
It would not do to say that since the second marriage, in this case
was void ab initio the application of Article 1417 should be reckoned
as of the date it was celebrated in 1935. This article speaks from the
moment of the termination of the conjugal partnership (either by the
dissolution of the marriage or by the declaration of its nullity); and it
would be self-contradictory to consider that the conjugal partnership
was formed and terminated at the same time and by the same act,
that is, by the celebration itself of the marriage. Colin y
Capitant 2 comments on this provision as follows:
Disuelven matrimonio y, por tanto la sociedad de
gananciales, la muerte de uno de los conjuges y la
declaracion de nulidad.<re||an1w>
En caso de declaracion de nulidad, la sociedad de
gananciales se extingue al ser declarado nulo el
matrimonio, es decir, en el momento en que sea
firme la sentencia declarativa de la nulidad.

hence such spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal properties;

but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise
that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful
application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the
right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal
partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by
the husband during its existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

xxx xxx xxx

SECOND DIVISION
It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is
the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a
judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the
death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration
of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution by
death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil
Code was no longer in force.
There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa 3 that in case of nullity it
is presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that
neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and

G.R. No. 99357 January 27, 1992

MA. LOURDES VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLUE CROSS INSURANCE,
INC., respondents.
Aggabao, Fernandez, Arellano & Fule Law Offices for petitioner.

Samuel F. Baldado for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1991,
reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24120, entitled "Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross
Insurance, Inc."
Petitioner's plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October
12, 1989, she filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission
alleging, inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of
P7,535.00, private respondent executed a policy of sickness and
accident insurance; that on August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted
to a hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for
cholecystitis; that petitioner paid the hospital and doctor's bills in the
aggregate sum of P48,934.05, the same being the actual hospital
and professional fees charged to her; and that private respondent
wrongfully refused to pay petitioner the said amount which she is
entitled to recover under the policy.
Private respondent's answer raised the special and affirmative
defenses that under the insurance policy, definitions and exclusions
were clearly specified and among the exclusions are conditions
which pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which
the insured was aware or should reasonably be aware; and that
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence petitioner's sickness
is non-compensable.
On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its
decision in I.C. Case No. 3277 in favor of petitioner ordering private
respondent to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied,
plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. In the main, the Insurance

Commission, after a review of the evidence presented, concluded

that petitioner's illness, contrary to private respondent's defenses,
was not a pre-existing disease and therefore, is fully compensable.

According to respondent court, a copy of said decision was received

by private respondent on September 27, 1990. On October 15, 1990,
or more than the fifteen (15) days allowed by Section 2, Republic Act
No. 5434, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
petitioner opposed. On December 13, 1990, the Insurance
Commission denied said motion for reconsideration. 2 On December
17, 1990, private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the
Insurance Commission. 3
On March 15, 1991, the Third Division of respondent Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of
time and that private respondent did not duly file a copy of its notice
of appeal with respondent Court as mandated by Republic Act No.
5434. 4
Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 5434, private respondent had ten (10) days from its
receipt on December 14, 1990 of the aforesaid order denying its
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. While respondent
court, in its resolution of May 8, 1991, subsequently agreed that
private respondent filed its notice of appeal with the Insurance
Commission within the said 10-day period, no such notice was filed
with respondent court as required by Section 3, Republic Act No.
5434.
Private respondent then moved for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of its appeal. On May 8, 1991, the Special Third Division of
respondent court resolved to reconsider its original resolution and
ordered the reinstatement of the appeal "in keeping with the ends of
substantial justice." 5
Hence, the petition at bar with the following assignment of errors:

1. The respondent court committed an error in

reinstating the appeal when it has no jurisdiction to
do so, no notice of appeal having been filed with it.
2. The manner of appeal from quasi-judicial bodies
has been fixed with the solemnity of a statute; the
Court of Appeals erred in ignoring it. 6
We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in
reconsidering its previous resolution dismissing herein private
respondent's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120. The dismissal of said
appeal is proper and fully justified by private respondent's failure to
file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as required by
Republic Act No. 5434 for the perfection of its appeal from the
decision of the Insurance Commission.
The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During the period relevant to and
involved in the appeal from the Insurance Commission to respondent
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120, subject of the present review, the
appeal to the Court of Appeals from said quasi-judicial body was
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same are not inconsistent with the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. 7
As restated and clarified in the Lacsamana case, to perfect an
appeal under Republic Act No. 5434, the following rules must be
observed:
In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court
of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section
22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals
and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days

from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or

judgment; or in case a motion for reconsideration is
filed within said period, then within ten days from
notice of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434).
No extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is
needed, much less allowed. 8
It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be
filed both with the Court of Appeals and with the board, commission
or agency that made or rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a
notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the Insurance
Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The said failure of petitioner to comply with the
requirements of law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its
present remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance
Commission final and executory and the same can no longer be a
subject of review. 9
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional. 10 The failure to perfect an appeal as required
by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party
and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
case. 11
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 12 The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of
the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 13
It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed
where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. 14 In the case at bar,

however, the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of

liberality, nor has the private respondent advanced any compelling
reason to warrant the same. In fact, in its original
resolution, 15 respondent court itself expounded at length on the very
same doctrines enjoining strict compliance with the rules governing
appeals which we have set out herein and, on such considerations,
dismissed the appeal therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The challenged resolution of

respondent court dated May 8, 1991 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and its resolution of March 15, 1991 is REINSTATED. The
decision of the Insurance Commission in I.C. Case No. 3277, dated
September 21, 1990, is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.

Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues
raised are mainly factual. The decision of the Insurance Commission
was based on its findings that the illness of private respondent,
cholecystitis, was not a pre-existing ailment and is, therefore, fully
compensable. It further specifically found that private respondent
failed to prove petitioner's awareness of that pre-existing condition
which is excluded under the insurance policy. We find no reason to
disturb the said findings which are supported by the evidence on
record and the conclusions of experts.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are

accorded not only respect but finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals
from handling specific matters falling under their
jurisdiction. 16 Courts cannot take cognizance of such factual
issues. 17 In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court
cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. 18
It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless ENDING delays
and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 19 For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply
strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to
warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. 20 Otherwise, the rules
must strictly apply, as in this case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into

the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where
the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a
few days with his own parents.

VITUG, J.:

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial

provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance
of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of
Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent,
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the
J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with
the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,
that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity
of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the

complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its noncompliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of nonshopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity."
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at

the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed
that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking
in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to
read:
"That contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers

to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,

which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is
also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies
in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment
in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages
under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the

defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why
is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time
of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the

case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect
in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be
a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since
there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration
and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In
other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be
a defense in the action for annulment so that when

the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can

be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is
still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that
there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to

a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can

specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can
comply with the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration
of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later
on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically

incapacitated, to comply with the

essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental
and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not
a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the
matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word

"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since
there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by
the church on the ground of psychological incapacity
is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche
of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a

vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the

civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the

provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are
unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an
aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account
on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the
essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual

anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written
by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a

true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms.
This particular type of incapacity consists of a
realinability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does
not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a
person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person
is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment
of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although

the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of

drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,

merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise
in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in
our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as

the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.

Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the
facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job

contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in
the U.S.A.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be

psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential
marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband,
herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein
private respondent.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a

mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological

incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of
the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand
and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed
out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can
open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy
way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards
against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific
behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)

years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear
and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in
marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner,
bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts
with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner,

her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts

eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and
cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations, although these indications were
made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling
the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or
one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict
it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the
marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled
to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations.
The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a nofault divorce between the spouses after a number of
years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee

started holding joint meetings on the preparation of

the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an
inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided
by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue
the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law
of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for

celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to

avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds
similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or pleaded
only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article
34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man
who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses
to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological
anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code,
the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another
ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for
nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.
Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity
was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity

based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the

absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes
psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same
be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any
other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court
shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain
the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately.
Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to
their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the
provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappilymarried couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench
have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable,
each being separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.
Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the
facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential
marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband,
herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein
private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of
the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand
and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed
out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can
open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy
way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards
against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific
behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

b. Julia promised to return home after her job

contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in
the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a
mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)
years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear
and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in
marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner,
bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts
with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia

Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner,
her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and
cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations, although these indications were
made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling
the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or
one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict
it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the
marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent

Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the

Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled
to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations.
The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a nofault divorce between the spouses after a number of
years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code

Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of
the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an
inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided
by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue
the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law

of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to

again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds
similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or pleaded
only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article
34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for

the declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man
who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses
to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological
anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code,
the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another

ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for

nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.
Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity
was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity
based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the
absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes
psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same
be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any
other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court
shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain
the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately.
Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to
their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the
provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappilymarried couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench

have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable,

each being separate and distinct from the other.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168328

February 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN
JOSE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San Jose

(Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila was 19 years and 4
months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10 months old. 1
The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on
January 3, 1989,2 and Norman who was born on March 14, 1997.3
For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito
was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As for Laila, she
sold fish at the wet market of Taguig. 4
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her
parents house.5
On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,6 under Article 367 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig where it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the
National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the
psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she
found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.
Dr. Tayags May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition of
LAILA T. SAN JOSE8 was submitted in evidence. The pertinent
portions of the Report read:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
xxxx
. . . [Lailas] association with [Manolito] started with the game of
basketball. As a youngster, petitioner often spent her free time
seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to cast her

interests on basketball games and eventually became one of the avid

spectators when a minor league was staged at their place.
Respondent happened to be one of the cagers who, with his
hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter then became
a fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper hand,
respondent introduced himself personally to his admirers and their
initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a milestone for both of
their fates. Courtship followed and after a short period, they were
already steadies.
Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent decided to
formally seal their union. They entered marriage on June 12, 1989
under religious ceremonies held in Taguig. After the occasion, the
newlyweds then went on to lead a life of their own making. However,
contrary to what was expected, their marriage turned out to be rocky
right from the very start.
Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead, he spent
most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating
substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was left without much
choice but to flex her muscles and venture on several areas which
could be a source of income. She tried to endure the situation with
the hope that respondent would change for the better in no time.
Their first child, Joana Marie, was born of January 3, 1989. Petitioner
was apparently happy with the birth of their first born, thinking that
her presence would make a difference in the family, particularly on
the part of respondent.
Years had passed but no improvement was seen on respondents
behavior. He turned out to be worse instead and it was only later
that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he prefers to
be with his friends rather than his own family. He seemed oblivious to
the efforts rendered by petitioner just to make ends meet. She was
the breadwinner of the family and whenever an argument occurred
between her and respondent, she often received the brunt of her
husbands irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to
separate from respondent. The latter however pursued her and

pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would change his

behavior if only petitioner would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity
and unwilling to give up the marriage, petitioner agreed to the
compromise.
They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on March
of 1997. Respondent was happy but his show of good nature was
superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child, respondent
resumed his old ways and made them even worse.
Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn out right in
their union. However, with respondents continuing irresponsibility,
she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense to him. On August
20, 1998, respondent went out of their dwelling for his usual late
night stints but he never came back the following morning. They
never lived together since.
Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with last known
address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He is
unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his secondary
education. He was described to be a happy-go-lucky individual
spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to be
a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and
prohibited drugs as well.
xxxx
REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews
and description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of the
undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latters
psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and
obligations of a married man and a father.

His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant

irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of others, selfcentered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his
involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under
the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed]
within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the
later stage of life.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001, citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals10and Leouel Santos v.
CA, et al.11 denied Lailas petition in this wise:
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
and Roridel Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court,
reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of [Leouel] Santos vs. Court
of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the effect that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical
incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such
incapacity "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition must
necessarily be denied.
Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and
irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said in the
Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological (not physical) illness."

Petitioners case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological

evaluation and assessment done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as per
her Psychological Report (Exhs. "C" to "C-1"). Although the body of
the report mentions that the respondent is affected with "Anti-Social
Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this Court from its
above disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able
to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in order to
arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which
the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate.12 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Lailas motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was, by
Order of November 13, 2001,13 denied. Laila thus appealed to the
Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No. 73286,
faulting the trial court in holding that she failed to comply with the
guidelines enumerated in Molina.
By Decision dated February 15, 2005,14 the appellate court, finding
Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering "the totality
of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the appellate
court held:
. . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed that
the totality of the evidence presented in the present case including
the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain a finding that
Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the
contemplation of the Family Code. We believe that his (respondents)
defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. If being jobless (since the commencement of
the marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a
gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill
what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal
manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union
affirmed in church rites and subsequently having children, are proofs
that either of the spouses is mature and responsible enough to
assume marital responsibilities.1awphi1.net

Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave

and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. This
Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to declare
the marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent
herein dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code), however, what is there to
preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social
institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise
from the ashes and begin a new lifefreed from a marriage which, to
Us, was hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding could
not have been possible.
xxxx
While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina
case in arriving at Our present conclusion We have reason to
deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar circumstances
attendant in this case, We were constrained to take exception from
the Molina case. Note that the "(c) ommittee did not give any
example of psychological incapacity for the fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to apply the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals which although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law." (page 37, Handbook of the
Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence,
whether or not psychological incapacity exists is for Us to establish,
as there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what maybe
considered indicia of psychological incapacity. To Our mind there are
sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that indeed psychological

incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration of the marriage void ab

initio.15 (Italics and underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for

Reconsideration16 of the appellate courts decision which was denied,
by Resolution dated June 2, 2005,17 hence, its present Petition for
Review,18 positing that:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has

been succinctly expounded in the recent case ofMa. Armida PerezFerraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),20 thus:

I
IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED DEFECTS
ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS
GRAVE AND INCURABLE[, AND]
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE MOLINA CASE AND
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19
Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as
she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the
psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a
declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the
evidence presented does not show Manolitos psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing
that the "defects" of Manolito already existed at the inception of the
marriage or are incurable; and in any event, "belief" cannot substitute
for proof which the law and jurisprudence require.
Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is
not proper in the present case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As
all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for
this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for
its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion
about Manolitos psychological incapacity was based on the
information supplied by Laila which she found to be "factual." That
Laila supplied the basis of her conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the
witness stand:
Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere] your
findings with respect to the respondent?
A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila], which I
found the narration to be factual, regarding her marital relationship
with the petitioner (should have been respondent), I came up with a

conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. The one

which I found in him is his anti-social personality disorder because of
the following overt manipulations: the presence of drug, the absence
of remourse [sic], the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the
marital relationship, the lack of concern to his family, his selfcenteredness, lack of remourse, in addition to the womanizing,
respondent which clearly connotes the defiant of moral and
personality disorder, he is tantamount to a person under the level,
under our diagnostic criteria labeled as anti-social personality
disorder, sir.
Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your findings with
respect to this case were only base[d] on the information given to
you by [Laila], is that correct?
A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be
factual, sir.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the doctors conclusion is hearsay. It is "unscientific
and unreliable," so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa22 where the
assessment of the therein party sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the information
communicated to the doctor by the therein respondent-spouse:
. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely
on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor
never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did
he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion
began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife
Leni is true, . . ."
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he
testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side.

Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific

and unreliable.23(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even
show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was
already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable.
Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that "[s]uch
disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within
the system [and] continues to influence the individual until the later
stage of life."
There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
to arrive at such declaration.24 If it can be proven by independent
means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason
why the same should not be credited.
In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that
Manolito is psychologically incapacitated is the following testimony of
Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions propounded by the trial
court:
Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your husband is
a drug user and that he is jobless and was not able to support your
family, what other reasons do you have for saying that your husband
is psychologically incapacitated from performing his marital
obligations?
A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he is jobless,
your honor.
Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use or
possession of drugs and his inability to get a job and support his
family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of nullity of
your marriage?

A: Yes, your honor.25 (Underscoring supplied)

Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his
being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his
family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has
not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more
time with his friends than with his family, this Court found the same to
be more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.
In Ferraris,26 this Court held:
We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the- house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Underscoring supplied)
Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like
sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment, does not by itself
constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity.27 Neither is emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility.28 Or failure or refusal to meet duties and
responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.29
While Molina then is not set in stone,30 the facts and circumstances
attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation from it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005

Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 17,
2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC
Case No. 4862 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent

Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish
Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). [2] Three
children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3,
1982 (Exh. B),[3] Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C), [4] and Marian,
born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). [5]

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10,
1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner.

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of
her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their
marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent
failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to
the management of the household, devoting most of his time
engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that
private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs
with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent
was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a
married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family,
private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children
in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded
the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole
owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as
the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to
file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant
provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the
investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor
found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be
set for trial.[8]

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are

as follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine
Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five
years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of
teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They
became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer
private respondents teacher.On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more
years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided
his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came
from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine
Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling
Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of
coffee, rice andpolvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a
stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her
businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her
husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners
business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and
drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982,
after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters
written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew
Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi
Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted
having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded
with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not
keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned
petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back,
however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents
infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent

was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin,
Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was
employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of
the early retirement plan offered by the company. He
received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the
amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the
money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four
months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc.,
his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became
worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on
relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain
Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard
hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road
Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he
cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a
daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his
relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was
confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias,
Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). [11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result,
private
respondent
contracted
gonorrhea
and
infected
petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical
Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986
until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).[12]
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument,
private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year
old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was
never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh.

J)[13] with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from
the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I
in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment
of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount
of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a
deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)[14] was executed in her favor and TCT
No. T-221529 (Exh. M)[15] was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a
handwritten letter[16] to private respondent expressing her frustration
over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In
her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their
owner-type jeepney[17] and to divide the proceeds of the sale
between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of
her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to
petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner
and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents
whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the
Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the
petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the
formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private
respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private
respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus
friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of
the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted
to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because
she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he
was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long
thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends

and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim

that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging out with
his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized
because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first
year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent,
but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro
said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he
had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision[19] dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned
by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds
cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation
(Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the
same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which
mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of
the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated
circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same
would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor
of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of
the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted
to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)
years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in
1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law
should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the
same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law
would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners
marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved
in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January
30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial
court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of
Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More
so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of
prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity
of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to

prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her
respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was
admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who,
herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondenthusband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondenthusband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec.
8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant
happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same
have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to
constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH
HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT
EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY
OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN
ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of
petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground
of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioner failed to show that private respondents psychological
incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She
argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent
became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should
not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has

been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most

serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise
in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations,
petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As
the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital

obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was

really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at
the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive
to work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner
supported him through college.After his schooling, although he
eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan
offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on
himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was
out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He
indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned
his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is
incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the
very objectives of marriage.

principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra)

nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism,

sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and
not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious
feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed
out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent

Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding
with regard to the non-existence of private respondents
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to
great weight and even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such
findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be
overturned.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to

establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.[27]

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to

pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody
of children, the amount for their respective support, and the
declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real
property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a
separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,

JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON
L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a.
JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966. [1] The civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born
on September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971; [5] and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to
be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extramarital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and
later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for

treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner
bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner
to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that
she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him
to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants
all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts
his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was
suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions
and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.[8]

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of

which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the
parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without
prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
IS NULL AND VOID.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINACASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by
the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by
respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does
the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner
fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and

support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents
sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid

assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did

not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration,
later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment
do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 [17] of the Family Code. However,
we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and
respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present situation.Regrettably, there
are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
[19]
While we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first
and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
[20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Panganiban, and Carpio,

Azcuna, J., on official leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004]
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision[1] dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated
October 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107,
entitled, Adriana Chua, Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam,
Respondent-Appellant.
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against
Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married
on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John
Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity
was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and
future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28,
1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have
agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between
her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and
pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22,
1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after service of summons, no
responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an
Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio
Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination whether or not
there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report
thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his

Report stating that there seems to be no collusion between the

parties.[2]

Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly

support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20,000.00.

The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness
was Adriana herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was
arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her
married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home,
never worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her
to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending for all the
expenses of their only child, John Paul.[3] After her testimony, counsel
for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence
was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John
Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to ReOpen[4] on the ground that she was able to secure additional new
evidence which were significant, material and indispensable.On July
6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and
held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay
RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25,
1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage
Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,
[5]
showing that Jose had been married twice before he married
Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision [6] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam
null and void for being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Office of the Civil Registrar General are
hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and
Jose Lam celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.

On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[8] thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded
monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued
that there was already a provision for support of the child as
embodied in the decision[9] dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati
RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contributeP250,000.00 each
to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both
parties with respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the
Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation
rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual
arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that
the First Party and the Second Party shall initially
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as
required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their
son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the
Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches
majority age.[10]
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common
fund had even amounted to P500,000.00.
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying
Jose Lams motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the Makati
RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the
Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the
support ordered by the latter court.

Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of

Appeals, assigning only a single error of the trial court:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING
APPELLANT TO GIVE A MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P20,000.00 TO
HIS SON BECAUSE THIS WOULD, IN EFFECT, REQUIRE
APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR HIS
CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT HAS DULY ADMITTED
THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY ANOTHER
COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO CONTRIBUTE THE
AMOUNT OF P250,000.00 AS THE LATTERS SHARE IN THE
COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD, SUBJECT TO
PERIODIC ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY APPELLEE.
[11]

On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its

decision affirming the Pasay RTCs decision in all respects. Jose filed
a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but in a Resolution
dated October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewise raising a
single error of the appellate court, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING
LEGAL QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURTS RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY
BOUND THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) TO A
COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR CHILD DOES NOT
BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO AGAIN
AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD.
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct
insofar as they ruled that the amount of support is by no means

permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula,[12] we held that another action

for support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding
the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same
defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case that:
. . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support
is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for
during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his
or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. [13]
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise
agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati
RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the
case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a
bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John
Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child
John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between
herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot
be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support
is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the
child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.
Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to
award support for the child in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of the childs parents, this Court will now discuss the
propriety of the proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and the
decision it rendered, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of
the proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the
psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of
her child. Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support

of the petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12,
1994.[14] But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994,
the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on July 6,
1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two
previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove
that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for
being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent
Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in
open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by
the admission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for
nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological
incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose
with two different women with an additional claim for support of the
child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed
with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by
Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase And for
respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this
Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable [15] found at the
ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay
RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was
notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be
present on July 6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana
and to refute the same. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23,
1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the
record does not show that he received the notice in due time; neither
does the record show that he was notified of the subsequent hearing
held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented the marriage
certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the
presence of Jose.
Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of
the Order dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the
Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith

allowed her to present her evidence to prove that petitioner herein

contracted previous marriages with different women.
Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her
claim for support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be
made a valid basis upon which the Pasay RTC could have
determined the monthly amount of P20,000.00 for the support to be
given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of
substantially amended or supplemental pleadings. [16] Considering
that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of
marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of
the Revised Rules of Court[17] in relation to Article 48 of the Family
Code,[18] it is with more reason that petitioner should likewise be
entitled to notice of all proceedings.
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the
Court in Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar
Estates,[19] to wit:
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in
motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by
the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them
is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a
judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or
the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely
irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a
subject within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before
it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the
issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis
supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial

court to have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the
pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment
of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was,
therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the
issue of whether the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous
and the determination of the amount that should have been awarded
for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered judgment
beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision
rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having
been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that
Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed with the
Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with
us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay
RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous
marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition
filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the
Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the
marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is
an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at
any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has
supervened.[20]
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised
by Jose in the present petition for review on certiorari which is the
award of support for his child, John Paul.
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the
amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities

of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority.Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from
school, or to and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles
195[21] and 196,[22] shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article
shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support
on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the
capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family
Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation
of the child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana
regarding her claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is
quoted below in verbatim:
Atty. Lorbes:

Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two

valid marriages prior to your marriage, how do you
feel about it?

We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and

embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC, portions of which read
as follows:

A - I felt it is unfair to my life.

8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both

parties with respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the
Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation
rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual
arrangements.

Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your

husband with you, what do you want to request to the
Honorable Court?
A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be
ordered to support my little boy.
Court:
Q - How much support do you want?
A - P20,000.00 to P25,000.00
Q - Is there a prayer for support?
Atty. Lorbes:
A - None, Your Honor.
Court:
Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for
the support of the boy.
A - Yes, Your Honor.[23]
Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed
by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to
give.

9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that
the First Party and the Second Party shall initially
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as
required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their
son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the
Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches
majority age.
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order,
and not being contrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is
hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains
existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of
complete separation is established in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The parties are
hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the conditions of their
Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as
between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the
matters treated in the aforesaid settlement.
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be
recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property
at the expense of the herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the
Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.[24]

The matter of support is a question that may be raised and

threshed out before the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved
the Compromise Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In
the interest of orderly administration of justice, the Court deems it
proper that the issue on support should be resolved by the Pasay
RTC where the claim for support of the child was initiated by Adriana.
The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during
the July 6, 1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and
inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does not
constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose.
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of due process
when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to reopen and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice
and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount
of support awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and
without any basis.
Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar
as the award of support is concerned and order the remand of the
case to Pasay RTC for further proceedings as to the issue regarding
support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, dated June 11, 1997 and October 27,
1997, dismissing the
appeal
and denying the
motion
for
reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar
as the award of support in favor of John Paul Chua Lam is
concerned. The Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August 22,
1995, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void,
likewise only insofar as the matter on support is concerned.

Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the

Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED
to reopen the trial of Civil Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim
of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the support of John Paul Chua
Lam and conduct hearings for further reception of evidence for the
proper determination of the proper amount of support to be awarded
to the child John Paul Chua Lam.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.

(Acting

Chairman),

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.

Callejo,

Sr., and Tinga,

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141528

October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the

relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was
likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality,
petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition 5 for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part,
respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated August
13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents
motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits,
the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED.

AZCUNA, J.:
SO ORDERED.8
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment
denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise
known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological
incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a
decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an

order9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF
AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS
WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED

SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD

DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.

impugned on the ground of a partys psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code?

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE
TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND
MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND
CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE
OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of
marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present
case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single
cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was
the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and
separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity
as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains
that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000,
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different
ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage,
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the
rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner
violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this
petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the
matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an
essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be
raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted

upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers
to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of
the public tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section
47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of
a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific
thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the

administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in

respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res
judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior
judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment
as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c)
pertains to res judicatain its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment"
or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains
that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept
as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a

court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
is a judgment or an order onthe merits; and (4) there is -- between
the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites.
What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard,
the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first
case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions
brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are
anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the
purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action
is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is
the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the
pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy,
that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same
took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence
of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been

presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties
are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose
and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court
stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two
actions are not necessarily for different causes of action
simply because the theory of the second would not have
been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot
preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of
the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound
to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or
injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable,
must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his
demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only
a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a
second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to

litigation if such piecemeal presentation is

allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action
to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been
taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all
matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is
barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. 21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of
their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997
of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 434195.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,

JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162049

April 13, 2007

NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial
Courts declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner and
respondent. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution
dated February 4, 2004 denying reconsideration.
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr.
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they
got married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting
their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while
respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioners
parents, on whom they were financially dependent. Eventually, their
union bore four children.

Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he

didnt have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him
even before marriage when he could not give her the things she
wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even
marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they
quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to
look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their
marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, testified that when
petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and
unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner that the
marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out
of the question since he claims he would go insane if he were to go
back to his wife. Relying on the view of another expert, one Dr.
Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined that professionals
are per se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of their
profession and have very little time to spend with their family. She
concluded that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to
perform the marital obligations because she knew, from the start, that
her husband was going to be a doctor, yet she did not give him the
support and understanding that was expected of a doctors wife.
Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioners parents also testified that
petitioner and respondent were always quarreling because
respondent was always jealous of petitioners classmates.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric
test on petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a
perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable
when people do not meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only
after he got her pregnant. He had depressions and tended to
escapism when beset with problems. He was vocal about his marital
problems. He believed that the lack of communication, absence of

quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems

caused the failure of the marriage.

before the 5th day of each month, effective September,

1998;

For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric

examination asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only
when her defense requires it. She averred that she had no marital
problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr.
Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated
that early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila inside the Harana
Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After the incident,
petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his family
sometime in 1986. Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila
continued to see each other and had gone abroad together several
times. She explained that she uttered she would not make love with
her husband and dared him to look for other women only out of
frustration and anger upon discovery of the affair. She admitted hiring
someone to spy on petitioner, but added that she still loved her
husband.

2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from

each other by way of testate or intestate succession;

Cynthias friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that

Cynthia was a good, stable, and mature person; that she was a
loving and caring mother who gave up her career to take care of her
children; and that petitioner and respondent were happy during the
early days of the marriage.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and
respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their
marital obligations. The dispositive portion of the courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June
2, 1973 is hereby declared null and void with the following effects:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with
the Defendant in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be payable on or

3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the

other as beneficiary in a life insurance policy;
4. The parties children are hereby declared legitimate, and
the custody of the parties minor children is hereby awarded
to the Defendant with the Plaintiff exercising his right to visit
them at least once a week;
5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a
house and lot located at 15 Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon
City are hereby deemed as their advance legitime to their
children.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred
that the trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead of
decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling that petitioner was
the guilty spouse.
In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that
the constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the
spouses did not constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled that
petitioner failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either of
the two parties existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
that the marriage still subsists.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:

(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of

Appeals proper subject for review by the Honorable Court
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals
that the lower court (RTC) erred in finding the parties
(petitioner and respondent) both psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code correct
or not?
(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals
that the evidence failed to show that the parties (petitioner
and respondent) were completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage correct or not? and
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled
jurisprudence, the decision of the Court of Appeals or the
decision of the trial court?3
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on
the ground of the parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was wellfounded, based on the evidence indicating that the marriage was
beyond reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to subsist would
only prolong the spouses agony. Respondent counters that petitioner
failed to prove psychological incapacity, and that their psychological
incapacities existed as early as the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
We shall now resolve the issue.1a\^/phi1.net

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even

if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 4 we
categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. These
include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. 5
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7 the Court gave the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 which are as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision...

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time

of the celebration" of the marriage.

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage...

avowals and not on personal knowledge of the spouses relationship.

Hence, de Castros diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no
probative value.11

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

Further, de Castros statement that professionals are per

se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage
because their profession allows them little time for family life is highly
debatable.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition... 8
In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and
respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him
do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that
petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few
years of their marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations,9 it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests.
Witness de Castros diagnosis was based solely on petitioners

Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity,

on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their
marriage and respondents scandalous outbursts in public, at most,
show their immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute
psychological incapacity.12 Thus so far, both petitioner and
respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element in their personality structure that
effectively incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated January 8, 2003 and the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital

obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort
of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following
pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was

26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after
their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on
19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity
on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the

boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources

after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and
under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be
from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out
that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to
him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known
in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she
altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They
further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her
version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because
she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of
the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she
was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor
her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget ofP7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures
and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS)

he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not

psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses,
which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends,
were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation,
and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was
not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and
held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
othershad been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable
of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage
of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of
the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of
due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been

completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless

held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing
the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not
been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner
as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to
whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently
meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court
of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was
handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of

Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse

was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception
that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow,
insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and
the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of
nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of
nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of
laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time
of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage
parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental
capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at
the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage"
under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law
enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound
mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying

spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of
unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of
consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is
one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent.
Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code
revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that
the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36
as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45
(5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted
"[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would
amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though
were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein
the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to

understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish
psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that
psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent
of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee
was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field
of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not

on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations

but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied
since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a
unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent
mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and
indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as
well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was
derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as
a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the
Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine

in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and

the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is
hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36.
Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its
incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on
the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he
State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family
and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the
family. This has been accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the

family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the

limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage
as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation
of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Voidab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the
State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present
petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor

of the existence and continuation of the marriage and

against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be

perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have

attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family
Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to
the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals
participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the
records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of

Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be

considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony,
he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his
wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the
Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological
incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action
with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot
be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is
impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence,
any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate
such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has

been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further
linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field
of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department
of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to
me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which
is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent";
which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person,
and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and
what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But

then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are
expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do
you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is
the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has
been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the
petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that
her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel
jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological.
If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an
affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the
husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage?

A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological
capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required
for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient
basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision
in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of
make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning
and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and

constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic

tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust
and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by
petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she
only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was
so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondents inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent

allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded
much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be
improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who
is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse.
In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.

antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the

Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on
account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the
Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on
the part of the Petitioner.94

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of

Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at

not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must
clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage
in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion,
the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially
ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the
integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required
by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and
premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure
of adverse personality constracts that were markedly

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement

in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents
condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as
she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive
jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents
condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that

respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners
expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable.
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the
trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of
the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas
opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating
the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court
in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before
the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the

psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of

nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the
trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts
decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite
arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on
appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by
the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the
statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly
practical considerations. The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from
the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet
to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep
reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert
witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case
an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to
that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological

incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering

doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church
tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it
does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is
possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in
love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the
petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis
on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet
the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC
dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149498

May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20,
2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August
28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as
null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent
Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines
for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro
M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown
to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him
several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was

no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8,
1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service
of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July
12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation
giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file
a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case
to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion
on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated.
On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence
to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National
Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the
records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment
of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent

spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare
of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a
clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his
wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence
on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant
appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned
to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to
make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never
sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters
respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an

unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a
social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made
to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around
and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with
family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court
of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this
case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was
able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano
to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents
failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated
the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant
petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not

have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of

such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse

integral element in the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can

adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed,

if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care
for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his
marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all
to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that
his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a
rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would
have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an

adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of
human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to
her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22579

February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the
existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance
of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a
third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the
first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for
bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the
negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On
February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First

Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge,

with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that
petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the
Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff
respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and voidab initio because of the alleged
use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by
petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June
15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the
first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party
defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and
contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend
the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question
of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit.
Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack
of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence
this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent
Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary
injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with
the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the
answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the
amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the
Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such
amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of

that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was
admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed
upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged
as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that
"there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are
automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension
of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on
the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that
"parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty
provided for in this Article. . . ." 2
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in
authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in
issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be
determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action
can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We
have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second
marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil
action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The
question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a
prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the
second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede
the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court
then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the
second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid."
Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a

decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can

proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v.
Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have
heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question we further said must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the
same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are
present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the
second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue
involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.
. . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the
petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that
two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not
petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a thirdparty complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a

second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for

bigamy.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to

indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the
first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy
was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could
thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question.
The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude
a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused,
his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1wph1.t
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a
criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23,
1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal
Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to
Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private

respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was
docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on
the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the
marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had
no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a
certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's
answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's

consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent

or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by
a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant
to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No.
43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said
case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment
of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before
the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the
motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for
bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in
the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru
counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings
the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied
in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a
case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the

guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal

action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case. 5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at
bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent
was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage
should have been declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the
civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine
elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was obtained by

means of duress, force and intimidation to show that

his act in the second marriage must be involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact
that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that
petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging
that his marriage with her should be declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the
fact would not be material to the outcome of the
case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The lower court therefore, has not abused much less
gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend
the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his
consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of
De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the
one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the
case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was
accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed.
Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the
present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already
rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no
such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner
Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case
for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by
means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as
such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that
prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had
been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and
wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both
petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated

that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital
union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the
fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the
use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978,
when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen
that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no
pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be
undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the
order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City)
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private
respondent.

PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of
Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant
therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June
25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo
A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In
the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was
the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force
exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it
merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both
her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972
already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence
because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were
compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;"
and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to
allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit,

and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented
by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed
a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,

Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one

Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January
23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and
she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of
her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties
with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June
1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had
been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and
he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account
of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and
void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of
their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which
is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted

after a first marriage by a man with another woman
is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that
the second marriage contracted by respondent with
herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or
not the second marriage should first be judicially
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the
case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial
declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA
316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later
vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent
movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an
issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits. 1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous

application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil

action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in denying the motion to dismiss.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of

private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It

explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because
these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with
the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation
and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity
of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of
marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the
partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48,
50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be
raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void

marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People

v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family
Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the
petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private
respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute
nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon
by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,

bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex

Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That
judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, inGomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired
during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article
1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null
and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
13

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the

Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her

first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact
but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then
Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage
may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be

invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed
that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a
marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one
cannot determine for himself whether or not his
marriage is valid and that a court action is needed.
Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision
be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is
no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out
that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still
have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment declaring the marriage

invalid, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage
is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of
a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative.
Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a
void marriage and not annullable marriages, with
which the other members concurred. Judge Diy
added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other
members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this
is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the
phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in
the provision is the declaration that the marriage is
void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing
away with collateral defense as well as collateral
attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the
provision is that there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is
void, while the other members affirmed. Justice
Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to
avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista
stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then

asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the

defense that he has no liability because the basis of
the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they
cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be
taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision
to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for
purposes of remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity
of a subsequent marriage only on
the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the

validity of a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above
provision is too broad and will not solve the objection
of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a
subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may
only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring
the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested
that they go back to the original wording of the
provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18

remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of

petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there
is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause

denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous
one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity

of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only
if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose,
according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it
is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the
precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question,
as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in
which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such,
it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with

law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial

are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation
that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore,
the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this
so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery
and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only
would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment
to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be
gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be
included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40
of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal
of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in
fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to

"final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they

say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof.
Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In
such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere
special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that
there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits
that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's
money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that
"the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in
proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or

conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in

favor of the common children or, if there are none,
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;

likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions

regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain

valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision

of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution
dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation

of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent

marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower
court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe,
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the
following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code; viz.:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be

invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family
Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article
39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by
the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity,
albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the
majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or
born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages,
who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered
extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old
regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code
(absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as
a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of
a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void
marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard

facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is

so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is
made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also
as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.

# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe,
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the
following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family
Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article

39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by

the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity,
albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the
majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or
born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages,
who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered
extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old
regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code
(absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as
a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of
a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void
marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard
facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is
so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is
made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also
as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.

petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against

his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish
Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR.,
being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January
28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 983056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and
Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a
concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four

children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. [3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and
lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. [4] Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage [5] under
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a
Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and
ordered the filing of an Information[6] against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including
the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing
motion in the Order[7] dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the

concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated
August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes
and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [8] In an
Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued
another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage
and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court
might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the
possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court
rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason
of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has
never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted
in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil

action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue

raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the
civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import
of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas,
for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other
instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation
of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence

needs must be adduced, testimonial or

documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts

and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred
in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not
pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited

in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this Court held that:
"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the criminal
case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,

VINCENT
PAUL
G.
MERCADO
a.k.a.
VINCENT
G.
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July
14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) [1] in CA-GR CR No.
19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No.
13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G.
Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders]
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4)
months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial
courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the
parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before
MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of]
which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was
single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of
the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in
connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev.
Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the
Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a
church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva
bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired
by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod
City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case
before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on
March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case
was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein

complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time
he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having
been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused
posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially
declared null and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into
with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of
such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his
second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when
he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27,
1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife. [3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous
marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage,
but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already

tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of
any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in
order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to
Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner
married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City.While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this
time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the
Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable
marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent
court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all.[8] Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to
speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries [9] of former Justice
Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from
the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage

was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but
she points out that that declaration came only afterthe Information
had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry
for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized
as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a bigamy case involving an
accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no
need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a
second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first
wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then
charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the
second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted
while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage
was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no
need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did
not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling
was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved
substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose
Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was
still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the
proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half
to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest
nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of
the second wife, this Court observes that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity.

In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that

judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In
that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second
wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a
Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court
ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such
declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the
ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia
asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among
others, that her first husband had previously been married to another
woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the
Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs,
according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling
in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such
declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial
declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the
separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the
affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement

for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the

protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other
cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new
provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years
after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act
No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or the absentee being generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage as contracted being valid in either case until
declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly
makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages.[19]

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under

Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision,
expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment
declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code
and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel.Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has
observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is
need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can
marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void
(Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De
Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old
rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance,
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).[20]

the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule
was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code.
Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted
without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was
bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose
earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject
in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a
person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void
marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: [22]
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable
marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the
Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that
the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling

in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary
before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration,
we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage

although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while
the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement

in Terre v. Terre,[21] which involved an administrative Complaint
against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers
argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the

nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had
already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused

could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.

[would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her

personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her
reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25]

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the

charge against him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

the

assailed

Damages

SO ORDERED.

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside

the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of
damages and attorneys fees.[23]

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA
against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this
Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the
pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this
case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to
be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage
when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies
of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt
said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his
previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen
that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced
that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife
would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already
living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where
she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should
have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth

Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment for bigamy. The
majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed
prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against the
criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a
given but I have strong reservations on its application beyond what
appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant
petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and
the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G.
Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all

insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from
the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family
code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
before a subsequent marriage is contracted; without such
declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of the
subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article
53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I
would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of
a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer
merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in
my view, should still be deemed essential when the marriage, for
instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both
parties had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely
that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to
refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles
35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the
effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and related
jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void,
prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be, for instance, a
voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set
aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon, 1 this
Court has underscored:

xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the
rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that
effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if the second
marriage were contracted prior to the decree ofannulment), the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being
independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for
bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and
that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist
the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first,
that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have
his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and

that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar
in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980
after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of
San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman
and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter
from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to

his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission
to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November
1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38
Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He
also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no
news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and
later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as
to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to
refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He
also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of
life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried
to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her
son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she
gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on
22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no
information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the

Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order
No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares
as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that
his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court
on a Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica
Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
Court's declaration that the petition was a proper
case of the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether
or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article
41 of the Family Code which provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during

the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences emerge.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has
been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive;
or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites

for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a
search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
"well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died.
The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to
ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made

inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose
of securing information concerning her whereabouts.
He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first
wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been
absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When
he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose,
Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your
wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with
the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to
look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London

for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate
his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake,
to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily
know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio
the two places could mean one place in England,
the port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan
City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent
error in naming of places of destination does not
appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around
three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope
of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably
diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined
to give any information as to her personal background even after she
had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged
letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were
all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts,
considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his

testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed
to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility
is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted
as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment
contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain
the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly
asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally
reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even
try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet
Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it
very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead
a well-founded one.

In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion

between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the
marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son,
Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law
must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage
like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes
that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is
a relationship for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and
never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his
marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the

need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the
family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is
of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution there is set forth the following
basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and

strengthen the family as a basic

autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the
Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of
the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or
given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that
would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico
was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously
been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at
Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11
February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a
court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter
of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the
sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the
latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond,

of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated

to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

former to secure a decree of the presumptive death

of her first spouse.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her

first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she
sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent. Esmmis

"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the

property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal
property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso

On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing

jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta
administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate
of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in
favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby
herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is
declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, formulating that"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of
the Family Code in the instant case despite the fact
that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code
was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage
between oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the

"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositorappellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of
administration should be granted solely in favor of
oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision
appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and
a new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico
remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City,
belong to the conjugal partnership property with the
concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the
value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of the time
of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's
compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her
husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein

petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the

other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the
competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to act as
administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found
competent and willing, that she be appointed as
such; otherwise, to determine who among the
deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to
become the administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present
appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the
decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law
or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the
marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta,
that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving
spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that
time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only
on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle

"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by

any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab
initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved.
Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For
the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present(not the
absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done
so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the
nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these circumstances to be
here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are,

by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until

declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years,
or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to
ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to
Article 40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's
first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had
disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of
the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having
been adduced to indicate another property regime between the
spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the
death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two
equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional
right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate [11] of the
deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or

nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half

of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces,
being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can
only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and
aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed
in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude
nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of
their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in
paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of
petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the
inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said onehalf share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the
exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICONAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3,
convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on

November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22 nd day of April, 1996, in the

City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The couple was happy during the first three years of their
married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their
home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only
twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made

inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where
she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured
an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in
fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. [8]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo

was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.
[4]
He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards,
Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a
bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in
love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him.
Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he
noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned
her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that
his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first

week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was single.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his

first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned.
He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He
insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than
20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding

Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten
(10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and
directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.
[9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court
further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that
Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the
trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court
in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that

Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling
in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is

Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil
Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,
[14]
the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the
Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage; the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainants
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since
bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance
of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision

of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled
that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family
Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited
the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,

the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects,
that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as

maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other

respects.

presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death
with respect to succession.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, insisting that:

I
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41
OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS
MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the

second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under
the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been
absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the

absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
requirements: the specified period and the present spouses
reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and
that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was
still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of
bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences

provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal
presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390
of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial
declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would
apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and
appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even
knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care
of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she
had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their
house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision
of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law,
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim,
the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes
bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall

be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code,
to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin

hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser
castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and

ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.[20] The phrase
or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law
which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a

number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like

annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is

burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married;
and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated
on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.
[22]
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. [23] Viada
avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente)
which is an essential element of a felony bydolo.[24] On the other
hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of
bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such
marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of
competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same
view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of
bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3)
fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He explained
that:

This last element is not stated in Article 349,

because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the
principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one
of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where
there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no
willfulness
if
the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been
dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong

evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be

deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person
who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable
and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since
he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of
his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty
of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential
elements of the crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged

with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist
without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional
felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word voluntary.[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of

an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another
suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony
is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law
presumes it to have been intentional. [33] Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a

confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. [36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private
complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil

intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that

when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the wellgrounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not
heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he
could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared

presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could
be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit

of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance.
Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified
by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve
the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity
of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil

marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage,
the parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences
of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated
to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of
the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law.
One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men
readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of
the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence
of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts,
easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
subjective condition of individuals. [39] Only with such proof can
marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
[40]
Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief
of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate

judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death

of the absent spouse.

The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code

as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being

unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the

purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for

all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1)

A person on board a vessel lost

during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;

(2)

A person in the armed forces who

has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;

(3)

A person who has been in danger of

death under other circumstances and
his existence has not been known for
four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been

absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during

the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent

marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code, [44] the period of seven
years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court
in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in

order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided
in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family
Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement

of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed
to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court
and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.

Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It
held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumptionjuris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to
be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a
person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard
from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The
Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to
perform a superfluous and meaningless act. [50] The Court also took
note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court

declared that the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such
as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the
administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the

contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of
a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its
rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that

the provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the
proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not
written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior
marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse
has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains
that the supposition is not true. [53] A second marriage is bigamous
only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code are not present.[54]Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla
was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial
decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with
such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute
bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be
annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.[55]Former Justice Luis B.
Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an
absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of
bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage. [56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed

the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform
to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith
of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus,

even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the

absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As
explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the

Revised Penal Code providing that the present
spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not
to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries
again.

The above Article of the Family Code now

clearly provides that for the purpose of the present
spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she
must file a summary proceeding as provided in the
Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the latters
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect
the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for
bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the
present spouse in contracting a second marriage is
already established.[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now

Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified.
He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized
for purposes of remarriage. The present spouse must institute a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be
followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory
examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp
of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively

dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said

absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of

authority is that the clause before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of
Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a
need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an

eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an
absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in
the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. [60] Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is
bigamous even if done in good faith. [61] Justice Regalado opined that
there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears
to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which
requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a

declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247
of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and
the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the
appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where
an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case,

the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce

evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private

complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the
same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in
those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not
proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The
appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling
in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos,

ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219
del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de
daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos
lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de
bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal
para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are
based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that
the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical,

mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second,
there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended

party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs
1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical

injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,

fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
[65]
An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced,

abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.

elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[69]

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and

brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned
in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other

provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for
its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every
person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand,
Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter
provision is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental
anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out
of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have
been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article
2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling,
in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) [68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in

Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered
to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of

his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This
provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of
ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant

and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He
even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant
where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was
single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner,
who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She
lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years
or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private

complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another

before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the

petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting
not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day,
he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the
private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to
a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a
single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain
and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her
lawful husband.[72]

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud

and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is
not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v.
Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which

indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not
recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See
Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts,
1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that
where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and
proximate consequences though they consist of
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94,
186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99
A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38.
Here the defendants conduct was not merely
negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful.
It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result
did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See

Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v

Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because
of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed
and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt
eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of
weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference
with the jurys reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App.
Div.[74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of

the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral
damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent

representation of another to do an act which, in
consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes
to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact
a criminal offense, he has a right of action against
the person so inducing him for damages sustained
by him in consequence of his having done such act.
Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep.
721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave

her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have

been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be
no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a
ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the
plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a
wife to one who was not her husband and to assume
and act in a relation and condition that proved to be
false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury
were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson,
102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339,
343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not

base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself but upon the defendants
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which
followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
incidental results of the defendants fraud for which
damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently

inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation
have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A.
(N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P.
324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec.
747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A.
411. Considerations of public policy would not
prevent recovery where the circumstances are such
that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude,
that her illegal action was induced solely by the
defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not
base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself. Such considerations distinguish

this case from cases in which the court has refused

to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal
on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon
which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v.
Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L.
R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds

the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and
reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of
the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with

private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapulapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this
one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS,
which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes

from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he
denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to
enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his
work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother
to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record
of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent

reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of
the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented
was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between
Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen
on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev.
Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from

Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that

Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented
(1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents,
and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are
applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued
by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued
by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly
show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was
no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.

Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely

attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a
marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is
quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity
of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would
indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked
any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes
letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence
of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would
all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his
brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to
note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and
the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated
after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent
in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented
by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the
crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the

subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he
argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there
is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or

subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and

void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family
Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and
formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of
at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any
male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold

otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely

nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States
basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has
a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence,
the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court
which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the
crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate

penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab
initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should
be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior
union, which would have been binding were it not for its being
bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the
answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity.2As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has
underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not,
unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised
by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in)
its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict
interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage
which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a
defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted
prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage
is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40
of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that
the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the
basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil

Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge SempioDiy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a
prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were
contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a
later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 7 the Family
Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for
purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent
marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication
to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to
amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile
the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church
laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential
marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other
grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal
requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence
of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a
party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a
voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is
judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code
considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before
its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a
voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume,
that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a
voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared
void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a
newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family
Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a
valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of
marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license,
mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively
easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a

mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been

logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly
voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it
closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to
merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is
not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be
recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the
Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage
falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code,
could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family
Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription
seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages
falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that
a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all
intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially
declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been
declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage
could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of
the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same
way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid
until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution
of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of
cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has
explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even
as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the
essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting
first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage
has been contracted without the necessary license and thus
void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second
(voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can
attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the
elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the
requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and

voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability

for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not
relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal,
in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity
subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground,
without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for
bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies theeffects of
the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the
bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves
the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the
court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into
it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity
of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
SUSAN

NICDAO
CARIO, petitioner,
CARIO, respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

vs. SUSAN

YEE

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant

case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner)
received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-

ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,

prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who
introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action
for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of
the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license
number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of
the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who
are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License
number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario
for whatever legal purpose it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent,
Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in
the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago
S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs
of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant
petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
[8]

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,

settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal

case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. [10] In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. [11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case,
as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of

petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she
was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared
void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of
the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the

separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

said that she contributed money, property or industry in the

acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being
the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the

property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man,[17] -

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the

deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through

their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during
the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
xxxxxxxxx

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit

Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI,
are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant

share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the

absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party.In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed
death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System,[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other
half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to
the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is

need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the

conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved
before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her
husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.[21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is
premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said
case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and
separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same
rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the
parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored
on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that
the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the
Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24,
1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160,
declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also
ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for
their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29,
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.The church
wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to
Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on
April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the
time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He
stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of
his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4,
1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without
a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted
in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980,
which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to
said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were
submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are
therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that
the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null
and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April
4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its
decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the
appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants

counsel that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second marriage
may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a
marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting
marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a
marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for
himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to
proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues
a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be
disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment
of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the
appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein
private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendantappellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null
and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give
monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes
from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING

FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO
VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS
RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity
of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned
errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss
jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent null and void for lack of a
prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners
claim that People v. Mendoza[3] and People v. Aragon[4] are applicable
in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from
its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before
the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O

No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and

must be read into the provisions of law previously obtaining. [5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the
appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is
mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided by the High
Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the nowrepealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and
second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case
differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving a criminal case for
bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the
effectivity of the Family Code,[9] under which a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that
effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be
conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this
Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity
of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual
milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife,
accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the
second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second
marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the
first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two
subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice
Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez
v.
Lipana,[12] and Consuegra
v.
Consuegra,
[13]
however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered
into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and
in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still

subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such

nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband
supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the
second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of
justice and equity.[14]

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest
under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra,
and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted

to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of
court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to
Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same
year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino
v. Paras.[16]

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that

there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on
the ground of her previous valid marriage.The Court, expressly
relying on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the
second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus
reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez,

Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a
lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of
his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void
since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo
v. Court of Appeals (1993),[22] the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art.
40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). [23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the
peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24] the
first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering

into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was
void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he
got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the
second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were
born before the promulgation ofWiegel and the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza andAragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before
he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner
is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present
case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the
appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit and
perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from
her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the
church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent
using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents
allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage
license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was
the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the

appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and

salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during
trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She
adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of
marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of
the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to
the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify
but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons
for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below
which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was
not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now
persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and
perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and
attorneys fees. Although the appellate court admitted that they found
private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying
petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not
adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages
should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held
valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for
filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her
prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife

damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the

application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated
November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is
hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the
amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne
Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally
entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15853

July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which
dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with
respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955,
was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the
date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino,
on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she
was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about
four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,
defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a
quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the
State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither

appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made

by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at

the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate
was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after
the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud
sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents,
according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B")

admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law
and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before
and up to the time of their marriage;

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has
been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional
evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate
court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision
be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case
be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion,
plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brotherin-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living
at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with
whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from
her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he
is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino,

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew

Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and
wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess
Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the
second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-inlaw;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the
third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as
early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November,
1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy
which must have been almost four months old at the time the
picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant
Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was
representing the Government, to answer the motion for
reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until
after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal
failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of

Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat
vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having
been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull,
Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the
true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of
the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at

five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,

Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement,
however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in
the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the
new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced would,
in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion
praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as
evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been
ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such
collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better
served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15853

July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which
dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with
respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955,
was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the
date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino,
on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she
was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about
four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,

defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.

be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion,
plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:

At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a
quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the
State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither
appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made
by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brotherin-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living
at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with
whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from
her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he
is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino,
and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at
the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate
was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after
the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud
sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents,
according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has
been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional
evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate
court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision
be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B")

admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law
and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before
and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew
Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and
wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess
Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the
second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-inlaw;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the
third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as
early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November,
1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy

which must have been almost four months old at the time the
picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant
Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was
representing the Government, to answer the motion for
reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until
after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal
failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of
Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat
vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having
been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is

only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the

woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull,
Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the
true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of
the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at
five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,
Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement,
however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in
the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the
new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced would,
in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion
praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as
evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been
ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such
collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better
served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996]
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
DECISION

sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been

rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left
the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession,
one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left
the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family
and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs
from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a
spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership
by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with
banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without
private respondents consent; that attempts at reconciliation were
made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform. In
addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent
prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties
from further dissipation.[1]

PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set
aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioners appeal from an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio
R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and
petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot
two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent
fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner
inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to
file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner
used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As

affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were
a normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage
and actually begot two children during this period; that it was only in
1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his
wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but
treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the extreme
animosities between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for
a cooling-off period in 1984; that it is private respondent who had
been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another
man; that petitioners work as owner and operator of a radio and
television station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to
various women in media and the entertainment world; and that since
1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and was
compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the
conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner
petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and
continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.

After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30,

1990. Private respondent presented four witnesses, namely, herself;
Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of
both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close
friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F. Racela IV, private
respondents counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted
documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her
husbands relationship with other women, his apprehension by the
authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior
church annulment decree.[2] The parties marriage was clerically
annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was
affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. [3]
During presentation of private respondents evidence, petitioner,
on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondents petition
for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court
scheduled the reception of petitioners evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a
counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that
the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the
first week of June.[4] The court granted the motion and reset the
hearing to June 8, 1990.[5]
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of
private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his
right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the nullity of private respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by
Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is

declared null and void oh initio on the ground of psychological

incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family
Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry
of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted
and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is
annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and
the defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of
the other effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51
of the Family Code of the Philippines.[6]
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August
24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to
Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties.[7] Petitioner opposed the motion
on October 17, 1990[8]
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through
new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. [9]
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the
trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July 29,
1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order of the trial court.[10]
Hence this petition.

The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment

is warranted under the circumstances of the case.

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38,

Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong

Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police.[14] The records, however, show that the
former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this
confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same
counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became
final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. [15]

Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment

or other proceedings thereof. - When a judgment or order is entered,
or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a court of first
instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the

adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence
which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of
an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not
a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. [16]

Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the

Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner
must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and
meritorious defense or cause of action.[11] If the petition is granted,
the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein.[12]

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to

inform the trial court of petitioners confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled
hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former
counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of
this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners
counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion
for reconsideration.

We rule in the negative.

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to

private respondent had already become final and executory when
petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner
however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void
for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied
due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings,
the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present
evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for
private respondent.Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on
the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or
rehabilitation reasons.[13] In his affidavit of merit before the trial court,
he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the
Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on
March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due

process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he was
not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his
answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondents
witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondents
motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. [17]
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available
or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to

him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
[18]
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence.[19]
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious
defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer
should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by
default. He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer
to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance.[20]
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxxxxxxxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.[21]
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default
is fraught with the danger of collusion. [22] Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the
state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties
and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties.[23] The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.[24] Our Constitution is committed to the
policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. [25] Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the
family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application
of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action
alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining
the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every
stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest
and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of

marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the
petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents
witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as
biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able
to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated
by the fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent
lived together with their children as one normal and happy family,
that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal
dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and
television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a
good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various
women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the
ground for annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the
existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at
the time of the marriage is final and binding on us. [26]Petitioner has
not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-avis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous. [27]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision
dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
37925 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004]
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO
G. OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.,
On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the verified Complaint[1] of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs.
Macias) dated May 11, 2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias, partiality and
violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition of Civil
Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
entitled Mariano Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias.
The antecedents follow.

On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of

nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin
S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband and incumbent presiding judge
of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was
raffled to the respondents court. [2] On the same day
the Complaint was
filed,
the
respondent
immediately
issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.[3] However, the Summons was not
served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were
allegedly unknown.[4] Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to
serve summons by publication. The respondent granted the motion
in his Order[5] dated March 7, 2001, with the directive that Mrs.
Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter,
Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local
weekly newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in Dipolog City in its
March 11-17, 2001 issue.[6]
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication
of Summons during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on
April 10, 2001 or within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed
a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.
[7]
However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent
judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19,
2001, or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to
Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and
3, 2001.[8] After the scheduled hearings, the respondent judge
terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for
decision.[9]
In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various
motions and manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were
filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the
merits of the case before the respondent judge. [10] One was denied
while the rest were ignored. As previously stated, the respondent
proceeded with the hearing on April 30, 2001 without resolving the
other motions and manifestations.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that

the respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due
process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she
filed the instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). [11] Also in the Complaint is
her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte directing the respondent
judge to desist from taking any further action in the subject case and
imposing an administrative sanction against him.
Without waiting for the OCAs Indorsement, the respondent
judge submitted his Comment/Answer[12] on May 25, 2001.[13]
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally
defective because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who
have knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate
the allegations therein. Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and
the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had motivated
Mrs. Macias to file the saidComplaint.
The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias right to
due process. He argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity
to be heard but chose not to give her side, as shown by her failure to
appear during the trial despite prior notice. Furthermore, he points
out that the records of the case would show that the proceedings
was done in good faith and based on law and jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may
have committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of
judicial remedies and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative
action. He argues that it is only after the Supreme Court finds that a
judge had committed malice or gross ignorance that he should be
administratively sanctioned. Moreover, respondent claims that
a Petition[14] dated May 11, 2001, containing similar allegations as the
instant complaint, was filed before the Court of Appeals, a copy of
which he received on May 21, 2001.

Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision[15] is valid and

prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In her Reply[16] which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias
admits having filed a petition for certiorari [17] under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 64733 entitled Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge
Wilfredo G. Ochotorena on May 18, 2001.[18]
In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in her favor on July 13, 2001, finding
respondent judge blatantly transgressing her right to due process
and ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure.She notes that
the Decision[19] nullified the assailed proceedings and the
Decision[20] rendered by the respondent judge on May 15, 2001 in
Civil Case No. S-695.[21] And finally, Mrs. Macias stresses that the
instant charge against respondent judge may simply be verified by
checking the records of the case.

Mrs. Macias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on
the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to
Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was
still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: After
the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the
plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias Motion to
Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion
and then waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example
of railroading or procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion
to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr.
Macias evidence ex-parte.

On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the

service. However, pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No.
10597-Ret. dated 22 October 2001, the Court retained the amount of
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits, to
answer for whatever administrative sanction the Court may impose in
relation to the instant case.[22]

The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after

denying Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the
reception of Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of
the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for decision
despite Mrs. Macias filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case
up to its completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious
to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.

In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the
respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more
glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is
grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative
lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the

appellate court, even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the
complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent
judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its
merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases
involving declaration of nullity of marriage.[23]

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals

Decision which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded

In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to

Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified
by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.[24]
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If
the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor
is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the
case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M.
Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001[25] with the
respondent judges court, stating, among others, that he appeared in
behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of
plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his
witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no
objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating
public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the
parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial could
proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been
had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge
had ordered the termination of the case.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent
judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely
ignored the pertinent rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and
jurisprudence.[26] When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him
not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance.[27]

Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the

Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious
offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04,
2001, thus, dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer
possible. Nonetheless, a penalty of fine may still be imposed upon
him considering that under the Resolution of the First Division in A.M.
No. 10597-Ret. dated October 22, 2001,[28] the Court retained the
amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from his retirement
benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction the Court
may impose upon him with regard to this case. Considering that this
is the first time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty, [29] the
Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY
of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be
taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement
benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to
immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained
amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON
L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO
FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over
the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution,
dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable
to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing
of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the
case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Pasig submitted to the Court his report and recommendation, also
dated 3 December 1987.

It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to

respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are commonlaw husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners
Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who
took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)
weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by
herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon
on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed
by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987,
rendered a decision 2granting the petition. The child was then known
as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed
from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be,
for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes,
a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein
petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to
accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at
work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at
the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she
was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon
brought the child to her house in Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon
demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying
that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the
affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully
explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the
amount of P150,000.00.

Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case
study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case, testified on 27 October 1987
before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in
connection with the present petition. She declared that she had
interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection
with the contemplated adoption of the child. During the interview,
said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have
the child adopted by the petitioners. 4

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the
full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has
the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is
the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him. 9

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of

children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no
mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age,
will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of
the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as
well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this
Court deviated from this criterion. 6

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is
GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly
belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver
said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof This
resolution is immediately executory.

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to

a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship
with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord
the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and
develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides,
respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3)
years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is
not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of
said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married
appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the
natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only
jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can
most likely give her.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado,

JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship
which went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of
the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task
of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more
suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed
by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant
status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer,
the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its

liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a

common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986,
their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987,
while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and
Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince,
was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the breakup, stating he was always nagging her about money matters.
Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a
spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of
attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of
money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because
his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with
his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and
she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the
bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994.
(Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210222,Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines
and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this
Court.

On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with
Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial
court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the
main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in
speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion
that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody
over the children through an automatic and blind application of the
age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age unless
the parent chosen is unfit.

The decision under review is based on the report of the Code

Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years
still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can give and
which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure. The
commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court
of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family
Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a child
below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the
latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the
theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to
understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract
presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and
the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the
parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function
to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor
child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is
given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the
child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the
rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502
[1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as
against the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to
the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight
of the basic principle that "in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code

of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling

reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother (do). This is as it should
be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions,
the patria potestas has been transformed from
thejus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the
Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a
chattel of his parents into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and
doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme.
As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents)
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor."

Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly

intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the
parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been
made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility.

As a result, the right of parents to the company and

custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children
with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual
and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art.
356).

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at

least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation
she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in
court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and
welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her
small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One
cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.

(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again,
the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may
find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or
even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven
years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16,
1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995.

Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing

the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than
verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply
followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable
to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was
mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide
based on a strong presumption.

We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the

regional trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice of
Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on
the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a
child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of
uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying.
Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are

quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were

very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the
child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an
incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man
who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused
to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be
emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have
to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States
to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with
feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the
mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All
of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that
Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that
her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted
for the purpose of securing the travel clearance required before
minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada
Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United
States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and
uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did
everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for
travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age
reference in the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is
rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the
choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either
parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not
permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v.
Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests,
the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the

time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present

time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly
capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful
reunion in the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and
embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from her.
We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the
children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display
as described by Teresita in her pleadings could not have been
missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals
Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the
children and their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is
diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The
Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner
[Teresita] in similar light, or with more understanding,
especially as her conduct and demeanor in the
courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or
elsewhere (but in the presence of the undersigned
presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper
that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of
her physical punishment of the children (even if only
for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional
instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show
deference and respect to the Court and the other
parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality
of the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the
trial court should have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his
sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert
witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court
which stated that the allegations of bias and unfairness made by
Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not
substantiated.

The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence
of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were
unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony
remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by
the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the
filing by Teresita of the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992.
Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to support
petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an
impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in
the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in
which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must
be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor
of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of
the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations
were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on
matters within their respective knowledge and expertise. On this
matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert
examines certain contested documents, at the
request, not of a public officer or agency of the
Government, but of a private litigant, does not
necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its
purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of
its duty to settle correctly the issues relative to said
documents. Even a non-expert private individual
may examine the same, if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help, the court in the
determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert
private individual, does not, certainly become null
and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an
officer of the NBI.

(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight
they choose upon such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the
province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion,
his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
relative opportunities for study and observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which reserve to illuminate his statements.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion
may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 10561058). The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity
to assess the witnesses' character and to observe their respective
demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we
believe that the trial court was correct in its action.

Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez

stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when
they were off-loaded because there was no required clearance. They
were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also brought
along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker
Lopez in her job appears to be the interview of minors who leave for
abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for
purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do
with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social Worker
Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her
mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is
inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would
compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a
person of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely
testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude
graduate in Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in
Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate
for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo
may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos
services were secured because Assumption College wanted an
examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any
litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and to
render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to
fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her
services. In this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the
school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that
a professional of her potential and stature would compromise her
professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her
marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting
marriage with another man.

2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a

love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC
employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with
necessities and conveniences commensurate to
their social standing because she does not even
own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the
compelling reasons under the law which would justify depriving her of
custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are nonexistent and have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a
child under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother,
without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling
reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson
III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty
in not awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of
the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had
placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the
child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now
over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right
and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment characterized by
emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There
is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person
under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his
best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the
mother is not in a position to extend.

The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not
supported by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on
evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto
Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's
Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year
later, she had already driven across the continental United States to
commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in
Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to
dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to
picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo
about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped
by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC
lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given
credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this
Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against
privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is
not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to
the act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if
not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage
only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a
woman who had driven three days and three nights from California,
who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon
arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live
with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the
various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered
into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the
house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio
had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the
project in Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his coemployee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the daughter

Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic

effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their
house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the
conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When
Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita
followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying
in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant is that
letters and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were
submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither
meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for
the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become
final (pp. 210-222,Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform
the role of a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in
the United States while the children will be left behind with their aunt
in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in
Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee
the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment
needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once
the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there
anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo
informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of
his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The
children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From
all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two

requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family

Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article
no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming
that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only
one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the
statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not
to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in
their emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of
Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable
Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding
custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father,
Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125041

June 30, 2006

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor

children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL
DELGADO. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARASALONGA, Presiding Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149,
FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C.
DELGADO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming the
Order, dated 12 September 19952 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 149, Makati, granting support pendente lite to Rebecca
Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as
follows:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf

of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite
with the RTC Makati.3In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were
civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi
City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New
Civil Code,4 it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.5

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of

their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college
in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with
her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled
in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities,
Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is
about US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both
Rica and Rina
ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general maintenance
support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a
total of US$6,000 per year.

iii) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs

is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give
general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required
college educational support.
iv) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to
share in the general support and college education of Rica
and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own
daughter (also in college) to attend to.
v) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid
have been rejected by the U.S. Department of Education. 6
Petitioner likewise averred that demands7 were made upon Federico
and the latters father, Francisco,8 for general support and for the
payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin
sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning
these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco,
the latter being generally known to be financially well-off. 9 These
demands, however, remained unheeded. Considering the impending
deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes,
petitioner and her then minor children had no choice but to file the
petition before the trial court.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate
daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born
within seven months from the date of the annulment of her marriage
to respondent Federico. However, as respondent Federico failed to
sign the birth certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their
status as legitimate children of respondent Federico, and as
granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be judicially declared
pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code.10
As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are entitled
to general and educational support under Articles 174 11 and
195(b)12 in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)13 and 199(c)14 of the
Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in case

of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support

falls upon the grandparents of the children; thus, respondent
Federico, or in his default, respondent Francisco should be ordered
to provide general and educational support for Rica and Rina in the
amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek support
pendente lite from private respondents - who are millionaires with
extensive assets both here and abroad - in view of the imminent
opening of classes, the possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica
and Rinas lack of financial means to pursue their college education
in the USA.
15

In his Answer, respondent Francisco stated that as the birth

certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent
Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as
"there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial
declaration has been made as to the civil status of the
children."16 Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica and
Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was founded on pure acts
of Christian charity. He, likewise, averred that the order of liability for
support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such
that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the
recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility should rest
on the shoulders of petitioner and her second husband, the latter
having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a
natural father. Even assuming that he is responsible for support,
respondent Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer
beyond what petitioner and the father could afford.
On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant
(respondent herein) Federico in Default.17 This was favorably acted
upon by the trial court in the Order dated 16 June 1994. 18
On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the petition were
not served in his correct address.19 Attached thereto was his

Answer20 where he claimed that petitioner had no cause of action

against him. According to him, he left for abroad and stayed there for
a long time "[w]ithin the first one hundred twenty (120) days of the
three hundred days immediately preceding March 25, 1976" and that
he only came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina when the
twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. In order
not to antagonize the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not
tell them that he could not be their father. Even assuming that Rica
and Rina are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not
give them the support they were demanding as he was only
making P40,000.00 a month.
Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent Federico,
the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and admitted his
Answer.21
In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because
Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial resources for
their education.22 This Motion was opposed by respondent
Francisco.23 After both parties submitted supplemental pleadings to
bolster their respective positions, the trial court resolved the motion
in an Order dated 12 September 1995 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly support
(pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a total of P10,000.00 for the
education of Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel Delgado to be
delivered within the first five days of each month without need of
demand.24
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the
petition in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and

the Order of the lower court dated September 12, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED.25
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996. 26
Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals was tainted with the following errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
I.
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD OF
THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND RINAS PARENTS IN
DEFAULT OF WHOM THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT
DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.
II.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE
SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS UNDOUBTEDLY
CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.27
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that Rica
had already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget
of US$12,500.00 for academic year 1994-1995. She was able to

obtain a tuition fee grant of US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan

from the US government in the amount of US$2,615.00. 28 In order to
defray the remaining balance of Ricas education for said school
year, petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan under the
Federal Direct Student Loan Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University, where
she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the school year 19941995. She was given a financial grant of US$6,000.00, federal work
study assistance of US$2,000.00, and a Federal Stafford loan of
US$2,625.00.29 Again, petitioner obtained a loan to cover the
remainder of Rinas school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish
support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents.
She contends, however, that the records of this case demonstrate
her as well as respondent Federicos inability to give the support
needed for Rica and Rinas college education. Consequently, the
obligation to provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco
being the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the
financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rinas
schooling, the Court of Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial
courts Order directing respondent Federico to pay Rica and Rina the
amount of award P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court
correctly declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be
the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters
pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code. He also maintains that
aside from the financial package availed of by Rica and Rina in the
form of state tuition aid grant, work study program and federal
student loan program, petitioner herself was eligible for, and had
availed herself of, the federal parent loan program based on her
income and properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that
assuming he could be held liable for support, he has the option to

fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or receiving and

maintaining in the dwelling here in the Philippines the person
claiming support.30 As an additional point to be considered by this
Court, he posits the argument that because petitioner and her twin
daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code
provisions on support as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." 31
Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired
Rica and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised
before the trial court. Like his father, respondent Federico argues that
assuming he is indeed the father of the twin sisters, he has the
option under the law as to how he would provide support. Lastly, he
assents with the declaration of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the parents of a child should primarily bear the burden
of providing support to their offspring.
The petition is meritorious.
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the
essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion of the Rules
of Court on the matter provides:
Rule 61
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action
or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a
verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any
party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of
both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other
authentic documents in support thereof.
xxxx

SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent

facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require,
having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such
other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the
question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix the
amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of
support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of
the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party, and
the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the
application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as
early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente
lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits
of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a
court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record.32lavvphi1.net
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima
facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents
and the twins entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of
the trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot
be denied. They had maintained constant communication with their
grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco
admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and Rina (Exhs. A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G-30). In the said letters, particularly at the
bottom thereof, respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica and
Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that they bear the
surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as
either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." In his letter of October 13, 1989
(Exh. G-21), he said "as the grandfather, am extending a financial

help of US$1,000.00." On top of this, respondent Federico even gave

the twins a treat to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines.
Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond doubt
that the twins are the children of Federico.33
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant
of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question
is who should be made liable for said award.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give
support rests principally on those more closely related to the
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who
are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. 34
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
respondent Federico liable to provide monthly supportpendente lite in
the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his
supposed income of P30,000.00 toP40,000.00 per month. We are,
however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the

proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more stringent application
where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial
court; in such a situation, this Court, as the final arbiter, is generally
bound to adopt the facts as determined by the appellate and the
lower courts. This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of the
following recognized exceptions: "(1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion." 35 The case at bar
falls within the seventh and eleventh exceptions.
The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federicos allegation
in his Answer36 and his testimony37 as to the amount of his income.
We have, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them
bereft of evidence to support his assertions regarding his
employment and his earning. Notably, he was even required by
petitioners counsel to present to the court his income tax return and
yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of said
document.38 This, to our mind, severely undermines the truthfulness
of respondent Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status
and capacity to provide support to Rica and Rina.

In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand

that as far as he knew, his son, respondent Federico did not own
anything

Q: How about a car?

"Atty. Lopez:

Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no

property of his own, thus:

A: Well, his car is owned by my company.39

I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. & Mrs. Dany
Mangonon, dated October 19, 1991 addressed to Mr. Francisco
Delgado signed by "sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you
remember."

Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at Mayflower Building

and you further earlier testified that this building belongs to Citadel
Corporation. Do you confirm that?

xxxx

A: Yes, sir.

WITNESS:

Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?

A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated me so much

that I threw it away in a waste basket. It is a very demanding letter,
that is what I do not like at all.

A: I am driving a lancer, sir.

ATTY. LOPEZ:

A: In the corporation, sir.

Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to you and
not to your son, Rico, for reasons we both are aware of." Do you
know what reason that is?

Q: What corporation is that?

A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and
do not have fix salary and income and they want to depend on the
lolo.
x x x xlavvphi1.net
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and
lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.

Q: What car, that registered in the name of the corporation?

A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.

Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your name, do you have
any properties, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir."40 (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed
the capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she has gainful
employment in the USA. He even went as far as to state that
petitioners income abroad, when converted to Philippine peso, was
much higher than that received by a trial court judge here in the
Philippines. In addition, he claims that as she qualified for the federal

parent loan program, she could very well support the college studies
of her daughters.

petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for

supportpendente lite.

We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that

petitioner had the means to support her daughters education is
belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial
status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. If
petitioner were really making enough money abroad, she certainly
would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. The fact that
petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that
she did not have enough money to enable her to send her daughters
to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves
were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure
loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.

Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to
support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and
Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him,
is at par with that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of the
Family Code on this subject provides:

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and

respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent
Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent
Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked
to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It
bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations,
substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and
freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business
with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel
Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of
the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. 41 It
having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to
fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has
a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of
in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to
how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may
give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may
allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option
cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral,
which should be considered.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not
avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that
prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin
daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The
correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound
feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being.
The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits
presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these,
however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered

and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with

them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back
here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned
them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of
support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver
and to the necessities of the recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we
hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school
expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as well as the arrearages due
them in accordance with this Decision within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to proceed
with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the
same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149, Makati,
is further directed to submit a report of his compliance with the
directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days
from compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been
done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in
arrears43 to be computed from the time they entered college until
they had finished their respective studies.
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on
petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is
best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would
be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente
lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid
with legal interest from the dates of actual payment. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March
1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated
12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati,
fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca
Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in
the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this
Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court
for the determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for
annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431,
entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan,
defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that
plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4
December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for
annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action
was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case
No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of
the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph
IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to
settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several
months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that
definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail

even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which,

certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru
the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted
'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4
of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She
prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in
paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no
circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her
and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4
December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against
her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel,
for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the
marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted
her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the
suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the
complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral
damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein
she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953,
he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her
with love and affection not because he really felt so
but because she merely happened to be the first girl
available to marry so he could evade marrying the
close relative of his whose immediate members of
her family were threatening him to force him to marry
her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the
reason intimated by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not
to perform the marital duties and obligations

appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly

made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions
intimated by him were prematurely concretized for
him, when in order to placate and appease the
immediate members of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative) and to convince
them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried
on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after
gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several
children during the whole range of nine years that
Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between
them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the
case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter,
while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's
allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168,
holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription
as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take
cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a
decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy
of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why
her complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff
Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance
therewith, but the court found it inadequate and
thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for
the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied
reconsideration.

The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her

husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice
of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment,
comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife,
as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively
by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated
in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the
identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous
conviction of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and
the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the

fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can
constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing
three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of
nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special
treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and
voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would
have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already
mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also
enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the
specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a
previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear
that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To
stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds
was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such nondisclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law
does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for

upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and

not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the
rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she
alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the premarital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause
of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that
defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of
complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made
up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the
lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply
(pretended love and absence of intention to perform duties of
consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is
"apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the
Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were,
therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a
party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of
action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445),
there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and
additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of
pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out
that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his
marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the
marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should
have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since
appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this
ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already
barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby

affirmed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26435

March 4, 1927

JUANARIA FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LOPE TAYAO, defendant-appellee.
Roman Ozaeta for appellant.
The appellee in his own behalf.
MALCOLM, J.:
As rightly stated by counsel for the appellant in his well prepared
brief, the present appeal raises only a question of law, which is
whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
divorce in accordance with the Philippine Divorce Law. The related
question resolutory of the appeal is whether or not the wife can
secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been
convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for
which the husband was convicted of adultery may also constitute
concubinage.
Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant,
contracted marriage in the City of Manila in 1912. They separated in
1917. The husband then removed to Zamboanga. There he was later
prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman
named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose
instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that
proceeding, Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina

Medrano, was sentenced by the late Judge Ponciano Reyes to suffer

three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prision
correccional, and to pay the costs. (Exhibit A.)
On these facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against
Lope Tayao, the defendant, to have the bonds of matrimony between
them dissolved was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
and was there denied by Judge of First Instance Revilla. The trial
judge based his decision principally on the point that the plaintiff was
not an innocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the
Divorce Law. This findings, as well as the dismissal of the complaint,
is challenged by the plaintiff on appeal.
In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by
statute. (19 C. J.,36; Benedicto vs. De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34,
reversed by the United States Supreme Court for other reasons).
The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. (Villanueva, La Ley de
Divorcio, pp. 27, 46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No.
2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads:
"A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the
adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again
emphasized in section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The
divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8
providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the
defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"
that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in
a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716, amendatory of article 437
of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law except as it
clarifies the meaning of concubinage.
Counsel argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent
spouse and that acts for which the defendant was convicted of

adultery also constitute concubinage. But the undeniable fact

remains that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted
of, the crime of adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The
criminal case was instituted on the complaint of the injured husband.
It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential for the
proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage. (Albert, The Law
on Crimes, pp. 406, 407; 3 Viada Codigo Penal, pp. 144 et seq.;
U.S. vs. Rivera and Vitug [1914], 28 Phil., 13.)
In its last analysis, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as
a trial court to convict the defendant of the crime of concubinage,
although no prosecution for the same has been instituted by the
aggrieved wife and no hearing has been had or judgment rendered in
a lower court. This the appellate court cannot do. What counsel also
desires this court to do is to add a third cause for divorce to the law
and to insert two words in section 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will
read: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part
of the wife or husband or concubinage on the part of the husband."
This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial
amendment of the law.
For somewhat different reasons but with the same result, the
judgement appealed from must be affirmed without special
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Avancea C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de
Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to
annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 10 December
1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private
respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same
respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion
to suspend hearings in the action for legal separation filed against
him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent
Judge from further hearing and trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by

respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation,

on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment of damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against
petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986
as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application
for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private
respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent
judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The
payment of support pendente lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as,
application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private
respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec.
3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses.
Whenever the offended party shall have instituted
the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the
pending civil action arising from the same offense
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered. . . .
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on
concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action arises
from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so
that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the

criminal case. Authority for this position is this Court's decision in the
case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of
an action for legal separation would be proper if an allegation of
concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of
the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to
wit:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from
offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the
following rules shall he observed:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action
can not be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ...
(Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules
do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon the filing of a

criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by
the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:
The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon.
Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not
controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is
specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule
107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses
and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles
7 to 108, of the Civil Code." 2
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to
be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.
Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified,
as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute
divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds
for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement,
under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement
has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present
Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao. 5
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his
wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7
Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified
from hearing the case, as the grant of supportpendente lite and the
denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by
the petitioner as a disregard of applicable laws and existing

doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest

partiality to private respondent.
Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions
between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to
disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and
manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the
judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound and well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution 2 of the CA dated
April 26, 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G.
Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston,
and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct.5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,

vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

DECISION

Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and
William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being
inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang
ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her
hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever
he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William would also
scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the
buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9,
1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest
son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is
none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to
bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of
the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked
her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to

their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. 6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his
wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children
with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita
quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in
their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14,
1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house. 7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal
separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and
defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are
hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper
division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental
decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William)
had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which
made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no
day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had
regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her
wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him
about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)

These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical

violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against
the plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting
words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff
suffered and endured the mental and physical anguish of
these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had
reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty
years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by
the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of
love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also
suffering. As very well stated in plaintiffs memorandum, "it
would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years
of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be
separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists
no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the
testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the
ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family
Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed
against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses
were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzanos testimony
was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries
inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995,
she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left
eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish
discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on
her head. The presence of these injuries was established by
the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim.
The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the
evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctors
main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on
[sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma,
slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the
so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate

questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust

of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and
constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated
physical violence upon her during their marriage and that
she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he
constantly hurled invectives at her even in front of their
customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga",
"putang ina mo," tanga," and "you dont know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents
narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from
1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14,
1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on
the same date. She was a witness to the kind of relationship
her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived
with them. She observed that [William] has an "explosive
temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She
cited several instances which proved that William Ong
indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words
and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly
established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents
were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by
making a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between
an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be
accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the
instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious
invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its
entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough
to constitute grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate

behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly

abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA on April 26, 2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE
PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED
BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE
PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE
CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE
REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF
REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY
ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing
the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to
the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real
properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were
acquired during the marriage through his (Williams) sole efforts; the
only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are
Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him
as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will
taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese
community; substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that
factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the

findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical

violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently
established; what took place were disagreements regarding the
manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly
Charleston, Lucitas favorite son; marriage being a social contract
cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the
complaining party must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parents
doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with
relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has
not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation
to their marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to
receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who
abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and
instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and
her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by
the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and
not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the
Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly
proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the
spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the
issues raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both
lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records;
this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when
confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the
case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control
and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same
to Lucitas family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of
20 years and forego the companionship of William and her children
just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home
because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well
as a Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since

respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation

should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code.17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given
ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because
of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal
properties were placed in the administration of petitioners in-laws,
no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier
assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more
stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the
trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt
the facts as determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,

which, if properly considered, would justify a different

conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of
the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal,
especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on
substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were
affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that
there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely
duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children. 23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the
instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita and
their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at
Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter
insulting words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the
children;27pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost
strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and
moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and
threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their
business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table; 29 got
mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William
to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita
and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam,
tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December 9
and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the
conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14,
1995, were not the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you
sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious?

a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very

serious because before it is only on the arm and black eye,
but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my
body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and
attempts to downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general
denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former.
The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the
assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as
trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the
deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the
trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect
and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
Williams denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of
physical violence committed by him could not be given much
credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia
Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are
dependent upon defendant for their livelihood, their
testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be
considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with
Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon
him for support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are
not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a
witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence 37 and a
witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed
and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente

Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court,

the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for
legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of
the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his
reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and
her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The
Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would
Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents and siblings
financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more
probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a
cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As
aptly stated by the RTC,

Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state

protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42With the enactment
of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a
ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the
findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is
entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty

years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and
be separated from her children whom she loves, if there
exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance. 39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does
not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear
on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to
seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go
to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the
policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 41 The

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FELIX, J.:
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the case was
dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the
ground that there is absolutely no question of fact involved, the
motion being predicated on the assumption as true of the very facts
testified to by plaintiff-husband.
The facts of the case abridgedly stated are as follows: Benjamin
Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan,
Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their
marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila
Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband
by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to
study in a local college there.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10033

December 28, 1956

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Florencio Dumapias for appellant.
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. for appellee.

As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters

from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers(which were not produced at the hearing)
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not
even care to mention. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that
his wife also informed him by letter, which she claims to have
destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek the advice
of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation
between him and his wife on account of the latter's alleged acts of
infidelity, and he was directed to consult instead the navy legal
department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought
for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang,
defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both

proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiffhusband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and
again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second
day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila,
instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he
took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and
failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his
wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against
his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative
defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a
reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on
June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6
witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor,
counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that
effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following grounds: (1)
Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of
"acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if
any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same
assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiffhusband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action
sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment.

The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court,

considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i.
e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion
for reconsideration filed by plaintiff was denied, the case was taken
up for review to the Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel maintaining
that the lower court erred:
(a) In so prematurely dismissing the case;
(b) In finding that there were condonation on the part of
plaintiff-appellant; and
(c) In entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal
inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss.
As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the
Court of Appeals certified the case to Superiority.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage
for the part of the husband as defined on the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of
them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed

except within one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred.
As the only reason of the lower Court for dismissing the action was
the alleged condonation of the charges of adultery that the plaintiffhusband had preferred in the complaint against his wife, We will
disregard the other 2 grounds of the motion to dismiss, as anyway
they have not been raised in appellant's assignment of errors.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary,
p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a
husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer
she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of
infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight
to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the
chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the
averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the
facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the
charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank
infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant.
Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his
sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which must have been too vague
and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in
evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to
present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife
addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong,
whose identity was not established and which admission defendant
had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed
soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to
anything that can be relied upon.
But this is not a question at issue. In this appeal, We have to
consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really

believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of

mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife
and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2
nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from her
the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain
his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on the
matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected
to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in vain.
Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights
despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a
condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? In the
order appealed from, the Courta quo had the following to say on this
point:
In the hearing of the case, the plaintiff further testified as
follows:
Q. Now Mr. Bugayong, you have filed this action for legal
separation from your wife. Please tell this Hon. Court why
you want to separate from your wife? A. I came to know
that my wife is committing adultery, I consulted the chaplain
and he told me to consult the legal adviser. (p. 11, t.s.n.)
Q. Did you finally locate her?--A. Four days later or on the
fifth day since my arrival she went to the house of our godmother, and as a husband I went to her to come along with
me in our house but she refused. (p. 12, t.s.n.)lawphil.net
Q. What happened next? A. I persuaded her to come
along with me. She consented but I did not bring her home
but brought her to the house of my cousin Pedro Bugayong.
(p. 12, t.s.n.)
Q. How long did you remain in the house of your cousin
Pedro Bugayong? A. One day and one night. (p. 12. t.s.n.)

Q. That night when you stayed in the house of your cousin

Pedro Bugayong as husband and wife, did you slept
together? A. Yes, sir. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
Q. On the next night, when you slept in your own house, did
you sleep together also as husband and wife? A. Yes, sir.
(p. 19. t.s.n.)
Q. When was that? A. That was in August, 1952. (p. 19
t.s.n.)
Q. How many nights did you sleep together as husband and
wife? A. Only two nights. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
The New Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Art. 97, says:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on
the part of the husband as defined on the Penal Code.
and in its Art. 100 it says:lawphil.net
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses
are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiffhusband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the
husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting
to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the
sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery

were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was

effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in
persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she
went with him and consented to be brought to the house of
his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further
fact that in the second night they again slept together in their
house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have
no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was
a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the
acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it
has been held that "condonation is implied from sexual
intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts
necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with
reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual
intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's
guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong."
In Tiffany's Domestic and Family Relations, section 107
says:
Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to
a divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the
law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not
again commit the offense; and also that he shall
thereafter treat the other spouse with conjugal
kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the
original offense as a ground for divorce.
Condonation may be express or implied.
It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various
supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a

single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent

spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to
constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'.
(27 Corpus Juris Secundum, section 61 and cases cited
therein).
In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband,
of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various
decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that the
present action is untenable.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife,
We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband
above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful,
deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any
cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense,
and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but
this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute
condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and
where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that
they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S.,
section 6-d).
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the
parties continue to live together after it was known
(Land vs. Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or
there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery

(Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together

for a single night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing
Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154 Ga. 199;
Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many others. The
resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation
will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary,
from the fact of the living together as husband and wife,
especially as against the husband (Marsh vs. Marsh, 14 N. J.
Eq. 315).
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no
reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the
various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court
erred in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch
as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss,
because in the second ground of the motion to dismiss. It is true that
it was filed after the answer and after the hearing had been
commenced, yet that motion serves to supplement the averments of
defendant's answer and to adjust the issues to the testimony of
plaintiff himself (section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO
LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondentappellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

REYES J.B.L., J.:p

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review
by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387,
dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the
death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred
during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well

as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the
objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and
petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have
the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that
they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on
30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage;
and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and,
along with several other claims involving money and other properties,
counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with
one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed
(the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy
died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner
duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition
for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for
legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in

Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing
the case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the
question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived,
which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to
reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of
the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations
court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969.
The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by
respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S.
Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court
below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that
dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and
void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed
substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion for
substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by
the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity
of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the
proceedings?

The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed

conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity
of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted
that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his
counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition
for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the
self same marriage can stand independent and separate
adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage,
while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff
before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves
property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute
divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no
need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved.
The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death
of the spouse takes place during the course of the
suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely
dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req.,
May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created

under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce
is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a
dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a
personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the death of one of the parties to such
action abates the action, for the reason that death
has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction,
both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this
reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding
that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1
Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72;
Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall,
196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17
Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41
N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S.
W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am.
Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac.
667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris
208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between
spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it
occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code
provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have
the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately

from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be
severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute
conjugal community of property shall be dissolved
and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have
no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be
awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise
directed by the court in the interest of said minors,
for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as
well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a
claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under
Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of
the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the

claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the
actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule
87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not
be brought against executor or administrator. No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; but actions to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can
be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the
death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that

such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter,
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after
her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she
had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the
annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside
of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's
demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case
after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the
defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his
own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7,
1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month,
when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the
plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who
always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was
unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from
his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she
was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner

and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so
far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the
parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261
of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs.
Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes
of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a
mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations
of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and
obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the
parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this
relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties
is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and
controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy
for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object
of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these
principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law
touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine
Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to
78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula,
were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13,
1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of
this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other
and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife.
(The second paragraph deals with the management of the
wife's property.)

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and
follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph,
the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when
the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other
reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding
article.
1. The consorts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at

his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be
fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the
person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation
to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her
husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the
Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses
must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must
live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her
husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who
is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her
a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.
May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose
this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule
established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme
court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of

Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25,
1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants
the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying
the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house
the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to
prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this
right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right
or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the
maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as
being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave
rise to this appeal was whether there was any reason to
prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of
the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence,
to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is
entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been
alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of
Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it
having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his
child for the purpose of thus better attending to her
maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward
providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the
mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these
circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of
Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother
to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an
impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of
the option in the present case, without prejudice to such
decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other
questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion
should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus
vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid
down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is
insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of
these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to

support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was
the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than
the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already
been established by a final judgment in a criminal case.
Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the
proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may
not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the
decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In
this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses
and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to
administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave
her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in
accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large
amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and
being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted
this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for
support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in
reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her
answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not
legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily
conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be
canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the
defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after
due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action
upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that
high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial,
said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code,
providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide
each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the
other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated,
among which duties are those of their living together and
mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the
obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support
to the one who has no property and is in need of it for

subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case

where, in accordance with law, their separation has been
decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with
respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of
divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is
not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of
the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal
partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the
appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard
the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own
free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status
entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage
in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the
unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and
Doa Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty
to live together and afford each other help and support; and
for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of
support from his wife so that he may live apart from her
without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of
her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits
of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial
expenses and, consequently, those of his own support
without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment
appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for
support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and
the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of
the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it
appears quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in
accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are
strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the
doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each

other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein
enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the
spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife
seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from
the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In
this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband
who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode
without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the
judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for
divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don
Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he
claims, without however proving his contention, that the
person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she
turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it
results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the
husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he
consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to
support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in
article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article
143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground
that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of
the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates,
has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording
mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations,
so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court
of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did
hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under
consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the
other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final
judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the
other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in

this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every
particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated,
articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and
obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of
the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse
has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce,
such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part
of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results
therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults:
violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force
her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute
his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or
to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or
prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains
or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is
adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This
positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the
case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.
Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed,
the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in
reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since
the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December,
1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It
is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is
equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a
determination of the question whether the wife has a good and
sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the
instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that
the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the
other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the
spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part
of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so

much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as

on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that
the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment
for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages
or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term,
but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made
specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity
and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the
wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife
and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation
resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment
of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a
weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated
as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be
considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme
sole.

illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary circumstances

would produce the loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the
law will, whenever necessary to protect fully the rights or status of
the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts
created as not existing and will recur to and act upon the original
situation of the parties to determine their relative rights or the status
of the person adversely affected.
I do not believe, therefore, that the case is properly conceived by
defendant, when the consideration thereof proceeds solely on the
theory that the wife is outside the domicile fixed by the husband.
Under the facts alleged in the complainant the wife is legally still
within the conjugal domicile.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and
order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

EN BANC

MORELAND, J., concurring:

I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot,
by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal, and
unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him,
he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his duties thereunder.
In law and for all purposes within its purview, the wife still remains an
inmate of the conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law
universally recognized that where a person by his wrongful and

G.R. No. L-17014

August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.

STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in
the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that
date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived
together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when
the wife went away from their common home with the intention of
living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been
made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital
relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to
the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had
left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she
in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of
separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the
defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting
her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the
plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for
his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff
thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to
this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him,
reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his
wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have
carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and are of
the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The
evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are
chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have
attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to

pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a
reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to
record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of
the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has
given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any
person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the
wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no
more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the
spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become
involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be
recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was
without sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient
to dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the
obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife
is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly
expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement
of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned
upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the
existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined
that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to
live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him
to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos
Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses,
including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such
obligation, (Mercado vs.Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.)
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing
the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses
a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should
not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it

appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become

impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking
through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an
action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only
be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151).
That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a
proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in
Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South Carolina,
where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground,
the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have
provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to
continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has
more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate
maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or
ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct.
(Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec.,
597; Boyd vs.Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of
the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of
the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made
use of the following eloquent words, which are perhaps even more
applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction
where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single
ground of adultery and this, too, after the conviction of the guilty
spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one
of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is
cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to
be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily
injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper,
petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil

attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of

passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount
to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriagestate undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but
still they are not that cruelty against which the law can
relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it
may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the
suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences
of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent
resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be
done, both must suffer in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly
invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but
undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of
humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views
merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a
question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body
must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate
from each other, who cannot live together with any degree of
harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness;
but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings,
much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said
that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the
mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the
office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to
show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual
wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that real
humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For
though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to
dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may
operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be
carefully remembered that the general happiness of the
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people
understand that they must live together, except for a very few

reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual

accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off;
they become good husbands and good wives form the
necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is
a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the happiness
of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and
more general good. (Evans vs.Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161
Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the crosscomplaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein
can be granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the crosscomplaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has
done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and
that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the
common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here
arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be
properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of
conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the
complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with
him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of
course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the
defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she
should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware,
the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is
competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are

invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But

we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where
the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance
of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it
that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to
live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce
such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in
1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret
that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to
the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be
obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished
the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience
may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court,
so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory
order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was
in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her
husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans.
The decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article
56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and

the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears
to have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition
of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to
her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income,
rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does
not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital
domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use
and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to
the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without
special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

[i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy

of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the
xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name
marked as Annex "B";

FIRST DIVISION
G..R. No. 132424

May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M.

VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and
FRANCISCA FABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez,
seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision 1 and 30
January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No.
3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No.
2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents
Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of
residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at
Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal
which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever

occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot
thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession
thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein
defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but
the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully
occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the
Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the
former to surrender the lot peacefully;
6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein
defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay
Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to
File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court,
xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C";
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded
refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in
question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses
amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
representing acceptance fee and additional ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on
July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored,
(sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the

defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in
question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint
failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the
property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative,
private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground
that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession
thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection
report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme
Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum
shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property and
to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorneys
fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997,
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of
the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to
make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the
premises or that they had tolerated private respondents possession
of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It
added that the allegations in petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional

elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior

material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional
allegations that will support an action for ejectment are
conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material
possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is
deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there
appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private
respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the
right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been]
extinguished.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the
Municipal Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was filed
had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal
thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and
GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack
of jurisdiction.3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated 30 January 1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration 5:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE

COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO,
RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed
together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint
make out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private
respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the
property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case
for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another
occupies the land at the formers tolerance or permission without any
contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied
promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property
by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas
in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each
other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is
illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of
the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature,

lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the date
of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said
cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the
filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the
forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accionpubliciana. On the
other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start,
an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As
explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the
owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate
the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of
Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word

"tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior
court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be
speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to
seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in
the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then
the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set
in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines
the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If
the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.

When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected
or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper
regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners
filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they
were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession
which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners
as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or
not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court
ruled23:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that
possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their
mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they
had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private
respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to
leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action fails. The
appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion
that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal
at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then
built a house thereon without the permission and consent of
petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants
entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge
of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by

stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas,

cited in Muoz vs. Court ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance
must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v.
Cruz,24 petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained
the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the
subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises
was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged
tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance
must have been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent
Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1)
respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly
illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory
that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer.First, these arguments
advance the view that respondents occupation of the property was
unlawful at its inception.Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act
of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
possession that is later sought to be recovered.25
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain
any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that

they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by

respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land
in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how
respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties.
This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over
the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the
MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina
(Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz dated June 22, 1994
involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and private respondents legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949
when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as
a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A
few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in
Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia Palang, was born
on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the
Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his yearlong sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in
Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence
that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii.[1] When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with
private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.
PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION

On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel

contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda
Agapay, herein petitioner.[2] Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe,
Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said
rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise
purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in
her name.

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a

Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and
end a case filed by the latter.[3] The parties therein agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only
child, Herminia Palang.[4]
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A.
Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda
were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. [5] Two
years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia
Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at
bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents
sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at
Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the
riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their names
(Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property
to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot
covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the
same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded
from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on
June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that there
was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to
the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court
went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly
of Kristopher Palang, Miguels illegitimate son. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the
residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house
standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of
agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced
by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his
deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural
land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under
TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the
former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision
becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any
claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of
all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina
Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of
deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate
action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22,
1994 with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and another one entered:

1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in

question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties
in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu
thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.[7]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the
riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and
Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in
not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palangs illegitimate son
and thus entitled to inherit from Miguels estate. Third, respondent
court erred, according to petitioner, in not finding that there is
sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A. Palang or
Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in
Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No.
24199.[8]
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the
pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the
petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces
of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails the validity of the
deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no
dispute that the transfers of ownership from the original owners of
the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses
Cespedes, respectively, were valid.

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article
148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property
by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that
she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sarisari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on
the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around
twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it
is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no
proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months
before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an
afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their
case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of
the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation

not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the

riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In
any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought
before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and
proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously
agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter
Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision
adopting their compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses
and the termination of the conjugal partnership. [12] Separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is
an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. [13] The judgment
which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the
same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this
claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided
the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name
alone be placed as the vendee.[14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to
Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739

of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly

provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, [15] for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.[16]
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and
claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguels estate is here
resolved in favor of respondent courts correct assessment that the
trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristophers
heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs
of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession.[17]
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher
Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar
following the trial courts decision which expressly found that
Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized
that he had submitted to the courts jurisdiction through his
mother/guardian ad litem.[18] The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher,
not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at
bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he
was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no
need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the
illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.
[19]
Petitioners grave error has been discussed in the preceeding
paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the
settlement of Miguels estate and Kristophers successional rights has
been pointed out.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12707

August 10, 1918

MRS. HENRY E. HARDING, and her husband, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendantappellant.
Lawrence & Ross for appellant.
Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of
P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of

insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount
demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the
defendant appeals.
The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this
case, and its finding of fact, as follows:
It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that
plaintiffs are husband and wife and residents of the city of
Manila; that the defendant is a foreign corporation organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Great Britain
and duly registered in the Philippine Islands, and Smith, Bell
& Co. (limited), a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its principal domicile
in the city of Manila, is the agent in the Philippine Islands of
said defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff
Mrs. Henry E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker
automobile, registered number 2063, in the city of Manila;
that on said date; in consideration of the payment to the
defendant of the premium of P150, by said plaintiff, Mrs.
Henry E. Harding, with the consent of her husband, the
defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell &
Company (limited), made its policy of insurance in writing
upon said automobile was set forth in said policy to be
P3,000 that the value of said automobile was set forth in said
policy (Exhibit A) to be P3,000; that on March 24, 1916, said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that the loss
thereby to plaintiffs was the sum of P3,000; that thereafter,
within the period mentioned in the said policy of insurance,
the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, furnished the defendant
the proofs of her said loss and interest, and otherwise
performed all the conditions of said policy on her part, and
that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part
thereof, although due demand was made upon defendant
therefor.

The defendant, by its answer, admitted the allegations of the

residence and status of the parties and denied all the other
allegation of the said complaint, and for a separate and
affirmative defense alleged (1) that on February 17, 1916, at
the city of Manila, P.I. the defendant upon request of plaintiff,
Mrs. Henry E. Harding, issued to the said plaintiff the policy
of insurance on an automobile alleged by the said plaintiff to
be her property; that the said request for the issuance of said
policy of insurance was made by means of a proposal in
writing signed and delivered by said plaintiff to the
defendant, guaranteeing the truth of the statements
contained therein which said proposal is referred to in the
said policy of insurance made a part thereof; (2) that certain
of the statements and representations contained in said
proposal and warranted by said plaintiff to be true, to wit: (a)
the price paid by the proposer for the said automobile; (b)
the value of said automobile at the time of the execution and
delivery of the said proposal and (c) the ownership of said
automobile, were false and known to be false by the said
plaintiff at the time of signing and delivering the said
proposal and were made for the purpose of misleading and
deceiving the defendant, and inducing the defendant, relying
upon the warranties, statements, and representations
contained in the said proposal and believing the same to be
true, issued the said policy of insurance.
The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the
said policy of insurance to be null and void, and that plaintiffs
take nothing by this action; and for such further relief as to
the court may seem just and equitable.
The evidence in this case shows that some time in the year
1913 Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for the Studebaker
automobile, sold the automobile No. 2063 to John Canson
for P3,200 (testimony of Mr. Diehl); that under date of
October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said automobile to
Henry Harding for the sum of P1,500 (Exhibit 2); that under

date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold the
said automobile No. 2063 to J. Brannigan, of Los Baos,
Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of P2,000 (Exhibit 3);
that under date of December 20, 1915, J. C. Graham of Los
Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said automobile
No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the sum
of P2,800 (Exhibit 4 and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on
or about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the
said automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of
the plaintiffs, as a present; that said automobile was repaired
and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900
(testimony of Mr. Server); that while the said automobile was
at the Luneta Garage; the said Luneta Garage, acting as
agent for Smith, Bell & Company, (limited), solicited of the
plaintiff Mrs. Harding the insurance of said automobile by the
defendant Company (testimony of Mrs. Henry Harding and
Mr. Server); that a proposal was filled out by the said agent
and signed by the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding, and in said
proposal under the heading "Price paid by proposer," is the
amount of "3,500" and under another heading "Present
value" is the amount of "3,000" (Exhibit 1).
The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was
made a representative of the Manila agent of defendant went
to the Luneta Garage and examined said automobile No.
2063 and Mr. Server, the General Manager of the Luneta
Garage, an experienced automobile mechanic, testified that
at the time this automobile was insured it was worth about
P3,000, and the defendant, by and through its said agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter issued a policy of
insurance upon proposal in which policy the said automobile
was described as of the "present value" of P3,000 and the
said defendant charged the said plaintiff Mrs. Henry E.
Harding as premium on said policy the sum of P150, or 5 per
cent of the then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)

The "Schedule" in said policy of insurance describes the

automobile here in question, and provides in part of follows:
"Now it is hereby agreed as follows:
"That during the period above set forth and during
any period for which the company may agree to
renew this policy the company will subject to the
exception and conditions contained herein or
endorsed hereon indemnify the insured against loss
of or damage to any motor car described in the
schedule hereto (including accessories) by whatever
cause such loss or damage may be occasioned and
will further indemnify the insured up to the value of
the car or P3,000 whichever is the greater against
any claim at common law made by any person (not
being a person in the said motor car nor in the
insured's service) for loss of life or for accidental
bodily injury or damage to property caused by the
said motor car including law costs payable in
connection with such claim when incurred with the
consent of the company."
The evidence further shows that on March 24, 1916, the said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire, and that the iron
and steel portions of said automobile which did not burn
were taken into the possession of the defendant by and
through its agent Smith, Bell & Company (limited), and sold
by it for a small sum, which had never been tendered to the
plaintiff prior to the trial of this case, but in open court during
the trial the sum of P10 as the proceeds of such sale was
tendered to plaintiff and refused.
Upon the facts so found, which we hold are supported by the
evidence, the trial judge decided that there was no proof of fraud on
the part of plaintiff in her statement of the value of the automobile, or
with respect to its ownership; that she had an insurable interest

therein; and that defendant, having agreed to the estimated value,

P3,000, and having insured the automobile for that amount, upon the
basis of which the premium was paid, is bound by it and must pay
the loss in accordance with the stipulated insured value. The
assignments of error made on behalf of appellant put in issue the
correctness of those conclusions of law, and some others of minor
importance relating to the exclusion of evidence. Disposing of the
minor objections first, as we have reached the conclusion that the
trial court was right in holding that the defendant is bound by the
estimated value of the automobile upon which policy was issued, and
that the plaintiff was not guilty of fraud in regard thereto, the
exclusion of the testimony of the witness Diehl is without importance.
It merely tended to show the alleged actual value of the automobile,
and in the view we take of the case such evidence was irrelevant.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the
automobile at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore,
had no insurable interest in it. The court below found that the
automobile was given to plaintiff by her husband shortly after the
issuance of the policy here in question. Appellant does not dispute
the correctness of this finding, but contends that the gift was void,
citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides that "All gifts
between spouses during the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts
which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the
family are not included in this rule."
We are of the opinion that this contention is without merit. In the case
of Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil. Rep., 10), this court said:
It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from
plaintiff's husband to her was completely void under article
1458 of the Civil Code and that, therefore, the property still
remains the property of Edward Cook and subject to levy
under execution against him.
In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable.
They are not in a position to challenge the validity of the

transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no

relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it occurred
and had no rights or interests inchoate, present, remote, or
otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer
occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to wife or
from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to,
such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons
who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or
to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their
rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the
transfer cannot be attacked.
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a
defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question
does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say,
as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his
wife is not a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend
upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is
disclosed by the record.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the
automobile was a warranty, that the statement was false, and that,
therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion
that it has not been shown by the evidence that the statement was
false on the contrary we believe that it shows that the automobile
had in fact cost more than the amount mentioned. The court below
found, and the evidence shows, that the automobile was bought by
plaintiff's husband a few weeks before the issuance of the policy in
question for the sum of P2,800, and that between that time and the
issuance of the policy some P900 was spent upon it in repairs and
repainting. The witness Server, an expert automobile mechanic,
testified that the automobile was practically as good as new at the
time the insurance was effected. The form of proposal upon which
the policy was issued does not call for a statement regarding the
value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the applicant
for the insurance, but merely a statement of its cost. The amount
stated was less than the actual outlay which the automobile

represented to Mr. Harding, including repairs, when the insurance

policy was issued. It is true that the printed form calls for a statement
of the "price paid by the proposer," but we are of the opinion that it
would be unfair to hold the policy void simply because the outlay
represented by the automobile was made by the plaintiff's husband
and not by his wife, to whom he had given the automobile. It cannot
be assumed that defendant should not have issued the policy unless
it were strictly true that the price representing the cost of the machine
had been paid by the insured and by no other person that it would
no event insure an automobile acquired by gift, inheritance,
exchange, or any other title not requiring the owner to make a
specific cash outlay for its acquisition.
Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows, without
dispute, that the proposal upon which the policy in question was
issued was made out by defendant's agent by whom the insurance
was solicited, and that appellee simply signed the same. It also
appears that an examiner employed by the defendant made an
inspection of the automobile before the acceptance of the risk, and
that the sum after this examination. The trial court found that Mrs.
Harding, in fixing the value of the automobile at P3,000, acted upon
information given her by her husband and by Mr. Server, the
manager of the Luneta Garage. The Luneta Garage, it will be
remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation in the
solicitation of the insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state of her own
knowledge that the automobile originally cost P3,000, or that its
value at the time of the insurance was P3,000. She merely repeated
the information which had been given her by her husband, and at the
same time disclosed to defendant's agent the source of her
information. There is no evidence to sustain the contention that this
communication was made in bad faith. It appears that the statements
in the proposal as to the price paid for the automobile and as to its
value were written by Mr. Quimby who solicited the insurance on
behalf of defendant, in his capacity as an employee of the Luneta
Garage, and wrote out the proposal for Mrs. Harding to sign. Under
these circumstances, we do not think that the facts stated in the
proposal can be held as a warranty of the insured, even if it should

have been shown that they were incorrect in the absence of proof of
willful misstatement. Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be
regarded as the act of the insurer and not of the insured. This
question was considered in the case of the Union Insurance
Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in which the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
This question has been decided differently by courts of the
highest respectability in cases precisely analogous to the
present. It is not to be denied that the application logically
considered, is the work of the assured, and if left to himself
or to such assistance as he might select, the person so
selected would be his agent, and he alone would be
responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known, so well that
no court would be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that
insurance companies organized under the laws of one State,
and having in that State their principal business office, send
these agents all over the land, with directions to solicit and
procure applications for policies furnishing them with printed
arguments in favor of the value and necessity of life
insurance, and of the special advantages of the corporation
which the agent represents. They pay these agents large
commissions on the premiums thus obtained, and the
policies are delivered at their hands to the assured. The
agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to activity in
procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner
induced to take out a policy, rarely sees or knows anything
about the company or its officers by whom it is issued, but
looks to and relies upon the agent who has persuaded him to
effect insurance as the full and complete representative of
the company, in all that is said or done in making the
contract. Has he not a right to so regard him? It is quite true
that the reports of judicial decisions are filled with the efforts
of these companies, by their counsel, to establish the
doctrine for the acts of these agents to the simple receipt of
the premium and delivery of the policy, the argument being
that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the agent of the

assured. This proposition is not without support in some of

the earlier decision on the subject; and, at a time when
insurance companies waited for parties to come to them to
seek assurance, or to forward applications on their own
motion, the doctrine had a reasonable foundation to rest
upon. But to apply such a doctrine, in its full force, to the
system of selling policies through agents, which we have
described, would be a snare and a delusion, leading, as it
has done in numerous instances, to the grossest frauds, of
which the insurance corporations receive the benefits, and
the parties supposing themselves insured are the victims.
The tendency of the modern decisions in this country is
steadily in the opposite direction. The powers of the agent
are, prima facie, co-extensive with the business intrusted to
his care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not
communicated to the person with whom he deals.
(Bebee vs. Ins. Co., 25 Conn., 51; Lycoming Ins.
Co. vs. Schoolenberger, 44 Pa., 259; Beal vs. Ins. Co., 16
Wis., 241; Davenportvs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276.) An
insurance company, establishing a local agency, must be
held responsible to the parties with whom they transact
business, for the acts and declarations of the agent, within
the scope of his employment, as if they proceeded from the
principal. (Sav. Bk. vs. Ins. Co., 31 Conn., 517;
Hortwitz vs.Ins. Co., 40 Mo., 557; Ayres vs. Ins. Co., 17
Iowa, 176; Howard Ins. Co. vs. Bruner, 23 Pa., 50.)
In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a
full consideration of the authorities, it is said:
"By the interested or officious zeal of the agents
employed by the insurance companies in the wish to
outbid each other and procure customers, they not
unfrequently mislead the insured, by a false or
erroneous statement of what the application should
contain; or, taking the preparation of it into their own
hands, procure his signature by an assurance that it

is properly drawn, and will meet the requirements of

the policy. The better opinion seems to be that, when
this course is pursued, the description of the risk
should, though nominally proceeding from the
insured, be regarded as the act of the insurers."
(Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y., 550.)
The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and they
seem to us founded on reason and justice, and meet our
entire approval. This principle does not admit oral testimony
to vary or contradict that which is in writing, but it goes upon
the idea that the writing offered in evidence was not the
instrument of the party whose name is signed to it; that it
was procured under such circumstances by the other side as
estops that side from using it or relying on its contents; not
that it may be contradicted by oral testimony, but that it may
be shown by such testimony that it cannot be lawfully used
against the party whose name is signed to it. (See also Am.
Life Ins. Co. vs. Mahone, 21 Wallace, 152.)
The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an
inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it
was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud
on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to
a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold
that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute
correctness of such estimated value. As was said by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of the First National
Bank vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (5 Otto, 673; 24 L. ed., 563), at.
p. 565 of the Lawyers Edition:
The ordinary test of the value of property is the price it will
commend in the market if offered for sale. But that test
cannot, in the very nature of the case, be applied at the time
application is made for insurance. Men may honestly differ
about the value of property, or as to what it will bring in the
market; and such differences are often very marked among

those whose special business it is to buy and sell property of

all kinds. The assured could do no more than estimate such
value; and that, it seems, was all that he was required to do
in this case. His duty was to deal fairly with the Company in
making such estimate. The special finding shows that he
discharged that duty and observed good faith. We shall not
presume that the Company, after requiring the assured in his
application to give the "estimated value," and then to
covenant that he had stated all material facts in regard to
such value, so far as known to him, and after carrying that
covenant, by express words, into the written contract,
intended to abandon the theory upon which it sought the
contract, and make the absolute correctness of such
estimated value a condition precedent to any insurance
whatever. The application, with its covenant and stipulations,
having been made a part of the policy, that presumption
cannot be indulged without imputing to the Company a
purpose, by studied intricacy or an ingenious framing of the
policy, to entrap the assured into incurring obligations which,
perhaps, he had no thought of assuming.
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the
effect of a valuation in a policy of fire insurance is the same as in a
policy of marine insurance."
By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy
of marine insurance is conclusive if the insured had an insurable
interest and was not guilty of fraud.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner
of the automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein;
that there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that
the valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is
binding upon the defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the
court below is, therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with interest,
the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez,

widower with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo,
Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez. There was
no issue in this second marriage.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23002

July 31, 1967

CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino
for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No.
2565, which she commenced on May 28, 1962, to secure
declaration, of nullity of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934
and for recovery of certain properties.
The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:
Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with
whom she had one living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a

Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the

registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babagad,
municipality of Bulacan, Bulacan province. with a total area of
557,711 square meters covered by OCT Nos. 605 and 807. Under
date of January 24, 1934, Concepcion Felix appeared to have
executed a deed of sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid
properties to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for the sum of
P2,500.00, which the latter in turn appeared to have transferred to
her mother and stepfather by means of a document dated January
27, 1934. Both deeds, notarized by Notary Public Jose D. Mendoza,
were registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
January 29, 1934, as a consequence of which, the original titles were
cancelled and TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names
of the spouses Domingo Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.
On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by
the widow, Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo Esmeragdo and
Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed
Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.
On March 16, 1953, the above-named widow, children and
grandchildren of the deceased entered into an extra-judicial
settlement of his (Domingo's) estate, consisting of one-half of the
properties allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. Among
the properties listed as conjugal were the two parcels of land in
Bulacan, Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property,
were divided among the heirs in this manner:
WHEREAS, the parties have furthermore agreed that the
fishpond covered by TCT Nos. 13815, 13816 and 24109 of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an
area of 557,971 sq. m., which is likewise the conjugal

property of the deceased and his surviving spouse; 1/2 of the

same or 278,985.5 sq. m. belongs to said Concepcion Felix
Vda. de Rodriguez, as her share in the conjugal property;
and 3/4 of the remaining half or 209,239.125 sq. m. are
transferred in full ownership to Geronimo Rodriguez,
Esmeragdo Rodriguez and Mauricio Rodriguez, share and
share alike, while the other 1/4 or 69,746.375 sq. m. of the
said remaining half goes in equal shares to Oscar
Rodriguez, Juan Rodriguez and Ana Rodriguez.
As a result of this partition, TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were
cancelled and TCT Nos. T-11431 and T-14432 were issued in the
names of the said heirs of the deceased.
On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children
and grandchildren of Domingo Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez was named their attorney in-fact, authorized to manage
their shares in the fishponds (Exh. 4).
On July 2, 1954, the heirs ended their co-ownership by executing a
deed of partition, dividing and segregating their respective shares in
the properties, pursuant to a consolidation and subdivision plan
(PCS-3702), in accordance with which, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez obtained TCT No. T-12910, for the portion pertaining to
her (Exh. L), while TCT No. T-12911 was issued to the other heirs,
for their shares. This latter title was subsequently replaced by TCT
No. 16660 (Exh. M).
On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed another
document granting unto the widow lifetime usufruct over one-third of
the fishpond which they received as hereditary share in the estate of
Domingo Rodriguez, which grant was accepted by Concepcion Felix
Vda. de Rodriguez.
Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared
to have leased from the Rodriguez children and grandchildren the
fishpond (covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5 years

commencing August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37

(Exh. 5).1wph1.t
At about this time, it seemed that the relationship between the widow
and her stepchildren had turned for the worse. Thus, when she failed
to deliver to them the balance of the earnings of the fishponds, in the
amount of P3,000.00, her stepchildren endorsed the matter to their
lawyer who, on May 16, 1962, sent a letter of demand to the widow
for payment thereof. On, May 28, 1962, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila naming as defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo
Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion Bautista Vda. de
Rodriguez, as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and
Antonio Diaz de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera, as guardians of
the minors Maria Ana, Mercedes, Margarita, Mauricio, Jr. and
Domingo (Children of Mauricio Rodriguez who had also died).
The action to declare null and void the deeds of transfer of plaintiff's
properties to the conjugal partnership was based on the alleged
employment or exercise by plaintiff's deceased husband of force and
pressure on her; that the conveyances of the properties from
plaintiff to her daughter and then to the conjugal partnership of
plaintiff and her husband are both without consideration; that
plaintiff participated in the extrajudicial settlement of estate (of the
deceased Domingo Rodriguez) and in other subsequent deeds or
instruments involving the properties in dispute, on the false
assumption that the said properties had become conjugal by reason
of the execution of the deeds of transfer in 1934; that laboring under
the same false assumption, plaintiff delivered to defendants, as
income of the properties from 1956 to 1961, the total amount of
P56,976.58. As alternative cause of action, she contended that she
would claim for her share, as surviving widow, of 1/5 of the properties
in controversy, should such properties be adjudged as belonging to
the conjugal partnership. Thus, plaintiff prayed that the deeds of
transfer mentioned in the complaint be declared fictitious and
simulated; that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" be also
declared null and void; that TCT No. 16660 of the Registry of Deeds

of Bulacan be cancelled and another one be issued in the name of

plaintiff, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Felix; that defendants be ordered
to pay plaintiff the sum of P56,976.58, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint, and for appropriate relief
in connection with her alternative cause of action.
In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the material
allegations of the complaint, but also set up as affirmative defenses
lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches. As
counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid
balance of the earnings of the land up to August 15, 1962 in the sum
of P3,000.00, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On October 5, 1963, judgment was rendered for the defendants. In
upholding the validity of the contracts, the court found that although
the two documents, Exhibits A and B, were executed for the purpose
of converting plaintiff's separate properties into conjugal assets of the
marriage with Domingo Rodriguez, the consent of the parties thereto
was voluntary, contrary to the allegations of plaintiff and her witness.
The court also ruled that having taken part in the questioned
transactions, plaintiff was not the proper party to plead lack of
consideration to avoid the transfers; that contracts without
consideration are not inexistent, but are only voidable, following the
ruling in the case ofConcepcion vs. Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); that there
was ratification or confirmation by the plaintiff of the transfer of her
property, by her execution (with the other heirs) of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate; that being a voluntary party to the contracts,
Exhibits A and B, plaintiff cannot recover the properties she gave
thereunder. Plaintiff's alternative cause of action was also rejected on
the ground that action for rescission of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement should have been filed within 4 years from its execution
(on March 16, 1953).
From the decision of the Court of First Instance, plaintiff duly
appealed to this Court, insisting that the conveyances in issue were
obtained through duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and
without consideration.

We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that
the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and
from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through
violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the
improbable and biased testimony of appellant's daughter,
Concepcion C. Martelino, whom the trial court, refused to believe,
considering that her version of violence and harassment was
contradicted by Bartolome Gualberto who had lived with the
Rodriguez spouses from 1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of
Rodriguez threatening his stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public
who ratified her signature. Furthermore, as pointed out by the
appealed decision, the charge of duress should be treated with
caution considering that Rodriguez had already died when the suit
was brought, for duress, like fraud, is not to be lightly paid at the door
of men already dead. (Cf. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.] 481,
498; Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).
What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of
consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years
after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in
1962, twenty eight (28) years after the intimidation is claimed to have
occurred, and no less than nine (9) years after the supposed culprit
died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of
subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts
that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is
clearly barred.
Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is
that they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent for lack of
consideration. We shall examine each purported defect separately.
The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of
simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired
or intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it
to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and

control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But
appellant contends that the sale by her to her daughter, and the
subsequent sale by the latter to appellant and her husband, the late
Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the
property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest
in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations from one
spouse to another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If
this is true, then the appellant and her daughter must have intended
the two conveyance to be real and effective; for appellant could not
intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time
vest half of them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then
could not have been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully
operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.
Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts
the law against donations between spouses make them simulated
ones.
Ferrara, in his classic book, "La Simulacion de los Negocios
Juridicos" (Sp. trans, 1926), pp. 95, 105, clearly explains the
difference between simulated transactions and transactions
in fraudem legis:
Otra figura que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el fraus
legis. Tambien aqui se da una gran confusion que persiste
aun en la jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguos
errores. Se debe a Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la
antitesis teorica que existe entre negocio fingido y negocio
fraudulento y haber atacado la doctrina comun que hacia
una mescolanza con los dos conceptos.
Se confunde dice (2) , el negocio in fraudem legis con
el negocio simulado; aunque la naturaleza de ambos sea
totalmente diversa. El negocio fraudulento no es, en
absolute, un negocio aparente. Es perfectamente serio: se
quiere realmente. Es mas, se quiere tal como se ha
realizado, con todas las consecuencias que correspondent a

la forma juridica elegida. Muchas veces, estas

consecuencias con incomodas para una u otra de las partes,
aunque serian mucho mas incomodas las consecuencias
que lievaria consigo el acto prohibido.
xxx

xxx

xxx

El resultado de las precedentes investigaciones es el

siguiente el negocio simulado quiere producir una
apariencia; el negocio fraudulente, una realidad; los
negocios simulados son ficticios, no queridos; los
negocios in fraudem son serios, reales, y realizados en tal
forma por las partes para consequir un resultado prohibido:
la simulacion nunca es un medio para eludir la ley sino para
ocultar su violation. La transgresion del contenido verbal e
inmediato de la norma se encubre bajo el manto de un
negocio licito, lo cual no altera el caracter del contra legem
agere. Tan verdad es, que si se ha redactado una contraescritura que documentary y declara la verdadera naturaleza
del negocio realizado, no queda mas que aplicar pura y
simplementela prohibicion.
Tambien el fraude quiere perjudicar la ley, pero emplea para
ello medios diversos y sigue distintos caminus. No oculta el
acto exterior, sino que lo deja claro y visible, tratando de huir
sesgadamente de la aplicacion de la ley merced a una
artistica y sabia combinacion de varios medios juridicos no
reprobados.
Appellant invokes our decision in Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490,
but to no purpose. The mortgage and foreclosure sale involved in
that case were typical simulations merely apparent but not really
intended to produce legal effects, as approved by the Court's finding
that the alleged creditor and buyer at the foreclosure sale "Porta
himself ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the doctor
(alleged mortgagor debtor) to exercise dominical power thereon
without any protest on his part." (cas. cit., p. 495). Not only this, but

the mortgagor's wife, when her husband died, "found among his
papers Porta's cancellation of the mortgage in his favor and the draft
of the complaint for foreclosure." Plainly, the precedent cited is here
inapplicable.
Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from
the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack
of consideration? We do not find them to be so. In the first
transaction, the price of P2,500.00 is recited in the deed itself (Exh.
A); in the second (Exh. B), the consideration set forth is P3,000.00.
Now, Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when the deeds
were executed) provided that
In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each
contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or
service by the other. (emphasis supplied.)
Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a
definite price in money, such undertaking constituted in themselves
actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the fishponds.
That the prices were not paid (assuming ad arguendo that
Concepcion Martelino's testimony, to this effect is true) does not
make the sales inexistent for want of causa. As ruled in Enriquez de
la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982, "the consideration (causa) need not
pass from one (party) to the other at the time the contract is entered
into x x x . The consideration need not be paid at the time of the
promise. The one promise is a consideration for the other."
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the
fact that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal
prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article
1334, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That
illegal purpose tainted the contracts, for as held by the Spanish
Tribunal Supreme in its decision of 2 April 1941.
ha de ser reputado ineficaz, por exigencias includibles del
caracter social y moral del Derecho, todo contrato que

persiga un fin ilicito o immoral, sea cualquiera el medio

empleado por los contratantes para lograr esa finalidad, no
justificada por un interes digno de ser socialmente protegido.
The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the
old Civil Code, for as declared by the same Spanish Court in its
decision of 14 December 1940
toda vez que lo que caracteriza fundamentalmente la ilicitud
de la causa es la lesion de un interos general juridica 6
moral.
a ruling reiterated in the decision of 2 April 1941 when the Court
ruled:
El concepto de la causa ilicita, tal como la desenvuelve y
aplica con gran amplitud y flexibilidad la doctrina moderna,
permite cobijar, no solo las convenciones ilicitas por razon
de su objeto o de su motivo ... sino tambien multiples
convenciones que no encerrando en si ningun elemento de
directa antijuricidad son ilicitas por el matiz immoral que
reviste la operation en su conjunto x x x .
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal
subject matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil
Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur
action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And
appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade
the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already cited.
Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed
properties was correctly repulsed by the Court below.
Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration
is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor, the following rules
shall be observed:

1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover

what he may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce
the performance of the undertaking of the other party;
xxx

xxx

xxx

That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the
illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract was
expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 449-450.2
Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of
the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934,
because she was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action
was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of friendly
relations between her and defendants-appellees. Appellant's inaction
to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame
excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of
the effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the
exercise of diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of inexcusable
negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches. (Go Chi Gun,
etc., et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., G.R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955). Even
assuming for the sake of argument that appellant held her peace,
during the lifetime of her husband, out of legitimate fear for her life,
there is no justification for her future to bring the proper action after
his death in 1953. Instead, she entered into a series of agreements
with herein appellees, the children of her husband by a prior
marriage, of partition, usufruct and lease of their share in the
fishponds, transactions that necessarily assumed that Rodriguez had
acquired one-half of the litigated fishponds. In the circumstances,
appellant's cause has become a stale demand and her conduct
placed her in estoppel to question the Validity of the transfer of her
properties. (Manila, et al. vs. Galvan, et al., G.R. No. L-23507, May
24, 1967; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695-696).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Costs against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez. So
ordered.
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.

DE
C.
C.
A.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a
deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T.
Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution [3] denying
reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle
Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del
Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters. [4] After the
death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-inlaw, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share
consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.[5] On June
27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry
of Deeds.[6]
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,[7] the latters cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow,
to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. [9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,
[10]
while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco, claimed
that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress. [12] On the other
hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the masters
bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in
any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only
Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.[14] Cirila testified that she was
a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower
when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with
her assistance at that time;[15] and that his health eventually
deteriorated and he became bedridden.[16] Erlinda Tabancura testified
that Franciscos sole source of income consisted of rentals from his
lot near the public streets.[17] He did not pay Cirila a regular cash

wage as a househelper, though he provided her family with food and

lodging.[18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco
executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,
in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square
meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation
in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268
square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was
being made in consideration of the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba]
had rendered over the past ten (10) years. The deed was notarized
by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.[19] and later registered by Cirila as its
absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In
1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a market value
of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of the
Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the
testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of one Cirila Comille. The documents were (1) an

application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor,

dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila
Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with
a health certificate showing the signature Cirila Comille in black ink;
[23]
and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature
Cirila A. Comille written in black ink. [24] The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V;
Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya
(Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot
subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after
finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on
June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As already stated,
the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based
on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of
documents purportedly showing Cirilas use of Franciscos surname;
(3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to
Cirila as Franciscos common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did
not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been
committed by the Court of Appeals:

(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the
common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct and is a
reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts,
and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality
of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent
or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture
or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases;
cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed.,
p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence
from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v.
Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584. [26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only
to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court

of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed

by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals based
its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule
should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or
living together as husband and wife means not only residing under
one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation,
of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one
of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man
and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if
often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are
merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered
as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
between the parties,[30]a conviction of concubinage,[31] or the
existence of illegitimate children.[32]
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship,
since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said
they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public
conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver
and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her
that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and
Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname
Comille. As previously stated, these are an application for a business
permit to operate as a real estate lessor,[33] a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, [34] and the
death certificate of Francisco.[35] These documents show that Cirila

saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise, she would

not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by
Franciscos lessees in Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico
Sy and Antonio Sy, RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of
rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse
of Francisco. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from
Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law
spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the
law.[36] It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and
served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead
to the conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence
that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY
YULO (doing business under the name and style of A & L
INDUSTRIES), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint instituted by the
petitioner and ordering it to pay damages on the basis of the private
respondent's counterclaim.
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan
from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as representative of
the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who
manages A & L Industries and under whose name the said business
is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the
loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their
children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay
the same.

On October 7, 1975, the petitioner filed its amended complaint

against the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo on the basis of the
promissory note. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attatchment alleging that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt upon which the action was brought and that the
fraud consisted of the spouses' inducing the petitioner to enter into a
contract with them by executing a Deed of Assignment in favor of the
petitioner, assigning all their rights, titles and interests over a
construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A.
Soriano Corporation on June 19, 1974 for a consideration of
P615,732.50 when, in truth, the spouses did not have any intention
of remitting the proceeds of the said construction contract to the
petitioner because despite the provisions in the Deed of Assignment
that the spouses shall, without compensation or costs, collect and
receive in trust for the petitioner all payments made upon the
construction contract and shall remit to the petitioner all collections
therefrom, the said spouses failed and refuse to remit the collections
and instead, misappropriated the proceeds for their own use and
benefit, without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby
enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries.
Apparently not contented with the order, the petitioner filed another
motion for the examination of attachment debtor, alleging that the
properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by it in the case.
This was likewise granted by the court.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim,
alleging that although Augusta Yulo and she are husband and wife,
the former had abandoned her and their children five (5) months
before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated
when the promissory note was executed; that her signature in the
special power of attorney was forged because she had never
authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for
and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by her as a single
proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of

the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the
illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of
the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was taken over
by the new owner.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitioner's complaint against the private respondent Lily Yulo and A
& L Industries and ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent Lily
Yulo P660,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as unrealized
profits; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision except for the exemplary damages which it reduced
from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00 and the attorney's fees which
were reduced from P30,000.00 to P20,000.00.
In resolving the question of whether or not the trial court erred in
holding that the signature of respondent Lily Yulo in the special
power of attorney was forged, the Court of Appeals said:
The crucial issue to be determined is whether or not
the signatures of the appellee Lily Yulo in Exhibits B
and B-1 are forged. Atty. Crispin Ordoa, the Notary
Public, admitted in open court that the parties in the
subject documents did not sign their signatures in
his presence. The same were already signed by the
supposed parties and their supposed witnesses at
the time they were brought to him for ratification. We
quote from the records the pertinent testimony of
Atty. Ordoa, thus:

Q. This document marked as Exhibit

B-1, when this was presented to you
by that common friend, June
Enriquez, it was already typewritten,
it was already accomplished, all
typewritten.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And the parties had already
affixed their signatures in this
document?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In this document marked as
Exhibit B although it appears here
that this is an acknowledgment, you
have not stated here that the
principal actually acknowledged this
document to be her voluntary act
and deed?
A This in one of those things that
escaped my attention. Actually I
have not gone over the second
page. I believed it was in order I
signed it. (TSN pp. 13-14, Hearing
of Nov. 26, 1976).
The glaring admission by the Notary Public that he
failed to state in the acknowledgment portion of
Exhibit B-1 that the appellee Lily Yulo acknowledged
the said document to be her own voluntary act and
deed, is a very strong and commanding
circumstance to show that she did not appear

personally before the said Notary Public and did not

sign the document.
Additionally, the Notary Public admitted that, while
June Enriquez is admittedly a mutual friend of his
and the defendant Augusta Yulo, and who is also an
instrumental witness in said Exhibit B-1., he could
not recognize or tell which of the two signatures
appearing therein, was the signature of this June
Enriquez.
Furthermore, as the issue is one of credibility of a
witness, the findings and conclusions of the trial
court before whom said witness, Atty. Crispin
Ordoa, the Notary Public before whom the
questioned document was supposedly ratified and
acknowledged, deserve great respect and are
seldom disturbed on appeal by appellate tribunals,
since it is in the best and peculiar advantage of
determining and observing the conduct, demeanor
and deportment of a particular witness while he is
testifying in court, an opportunity not enjoyed by the
appellate courts who merely have to rely on the
recorded proceedings which transpired in the court
below, and the records are bare of any circumstance
of weight, which the trial court had overlooked and
which if duly considered, may radically affect the
outcome of the case.
On the other hand, the appellee Lily Yulo, to back up
her claim of forgery of her signature in Exhibit B-1,
presented in court a handwriting expert witness in
the person of Police Captain Yakal Giron of the
Integrated National Police Training Command, and
who is also a Document Examiner of the same
Command's Crime Laboratory at Fort Bonifacio,
Metro Manila. His experience as an examiner of

questioned and disputed documents, in our mind, is

quite impressive. To qualify him as a handwriting
expert, he declared that he underwent extensive and
actual studies and examination of disputed or
questioned document, both at the National Bureau of
Investigation Academy and National Bureau of
Investigation Questioned Document Laboratory,
respectively, from July 1964, up to his appointment
as Document Examiner in June, 1975, and, to
further his experience along this line, he attended
the 297th Annual Conference of the American
Society of Questioned Docurnent Examiners held at
Seattle, Washington, in August 1971, as a
representative of the Philippines, and likewise
conducted an observation of the present and
modern trends of crime laboratories in the West
Coast, U.S.A., in 1971; that he likewise had
conducted actual tests and examination of about
100,000 documents, as requested by the different
courts, administrative, and governmental agencies of
the Government, substantial portions of which relate
to actual court cases.
In concluding that the signatures of the appellee Lily
Yulo, in the disputed document in question (Exh. B1), were all forgeries, and not her genuine signature,
the expert witness categorically recited and specified
in open court what he observed to be about twelve
(12) glaring and material significant differences, in
his comparison of the signatures appearing in the
genuine specimen signatures of the said appellee
and with those appearing in the questioned
document (Exhibit B-1). Indeed, we have likewise
seen the supposed notable differences, found in the
standard or genuine signatures of the appellee
which were lifted and obtained in the official files of
the government, such as the Bureau of Internal

Revenue on her income tax returns, as compared to

the pretended signature of the appellee appearing in
Exhibits B, B-1. It is also noteworthy to mention that
the appellant did not even bother to conduct a crossexamination of the handwriting expert witness, Capt.
Giron, neither did the appellant present another
handwriting expert, at least to counter-act or balance
the appellee's handwriting expert.
Prescinding from the foregoing facts, we subscribe
fully to the lower court's observations that the
signatures of the appellee Lily Yulo in the questioned
document (Exh. B-1) were forged. Hence, we find no
factual basis to disagree. (pp. 28-30, Rollo)
As to the petitioner's contention that even if the signature of Lily Yulo
was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive
property, the same can be made answerable to the obligation
because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Yulo, the appellate court held that these contentions are
without merit because there is strong preponderant evidence to show
that A & L Industries belongs exclusively to respondent Lily Yulo,
namely: a) The Certificate of Registration of A & L Industries, issued
by the Bureau of Commerce, showing that said business is a single
proprietorship, and that the registered owner thereof is only Lily Yulo;
b) The Mayor's Permit issued in favor of A & L Industries, by the
Caloocan City Mayor's Office showing compliance by said single
proprietorship company with the City Ordinance governing business
establishments; and c) The Special Power of Attorney itself,
assuming but without admitting its due execution, is tangible proof
that Augusto Yulo has no interest whatsoever in the A & L Industries,
otherwise, there would have been no necessity for the Special Power
of Attorney if he is a part owner of said single proprietorship.
With regard to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the findings of the trial court that there was bad faith on the part of
the petitioner as to entitle the private respondent to damages as

shown not only by the fact that the petitioner did not present the
Deed of Assignment or the construction agreement or any evidence
whatsoever to support its claim of fraud on the part of the private
respondent and to justify the issuance of a preliminary attachment,
but also by the following findings:
Continuing and elaborating further on the
appellant's mala fide actuations in securing the writ
of attachment, the lower court stated as follows:
Plaintiff not satisfied with the instant
case where an order for attachment
has already been issued and
enforced, on the strength of the
same Promissory Note (Exhibit"A"),
utilizing the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage (Exhibit "4"), filed a
foreclosure proceedings before the
Office of the Sheriff of Caloocan
(Exhibit"6") foreclosing the
remaining properties found inside
the premises formerly occupied by
the A & L Industries. A minute
examination of Exhibit "4" will show
that the contracting parties thereto,
as appearing in par. 1 thereof, are
Augusto Yulo, doing business under
the style of A & L Industries (should
be A & L Glass Industries
Corporation), as mortgagor and BA
Finance Corporation as mortgagee,
thus the enforcement of the Chattel
Mortgage against the property of A &
L Industries exclusively owned by
Lily T. Yulo appears to be without
any factual or legal basis
whatsoever. The chattel mortgage,

Exhibit "4" and the Promissory Note,

Exhibit A, are based on one and the
same obligation. Plaintiff tried to
enforce as it did enforce its claim
into two different modes a single
obligation.
Aware that defendant Lily Yulo, filed
a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
by virtue of a complaint she filed
with the Court of First Instance of
Caloocan, seeking annulment of the
Promissory Note, the very basis of
the plaintiff in filing this complaint,
immediately after the day it filed a
Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Preliminary Attachment . .
.Yet, inspite of the knowledge and
the filing of this Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, the Plaintiff still filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment dated February 6, 1976
before this court. To add insult to
injury, plaintiff even filed a Motion for
Examination of the Attachment
Debtor, although aware that Lily
Yulo had already denied
participation in the execution of
Exhibits "A" and "B". These
incidents and actions taken by
plaintiff, to the thinking of the court,
are sufficient to prove and establish
the element of bad faith and malice
on the part of plaintiff which may
warrant the award of damages in
favor of defendant Lily Yulo. (Ibid.,
pp. 102-103).<re||an1w>

Indeed, the existence of evident bad

faith on the appellant's part in
proceeding against the appellee Lily
Yulo in the present case, may
likewise be distressed on the fact
that its officer Mr. Abraham Co, did
not even bother to demand the
production of at least the duplicate
original of the Special Power of
Attorney (Exhibit B) and merely
contended himself with a mere
xerox copy thereof, neither did he
require a more specific authority
from the A & L Industries to contract
the loan in question, since from the
very content and recitals of the
disputed document, no authority,
express or implied, has been
delegated or granted to August Yulo
to contract a loan, especially with
the appellant. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)
Concerning the actual damages, the appellate court ruled that the
petitioner should have presented evidence to disprove or rebut the
private respondent's claim but it remained quiet and chose not to
disturb the testimony and the evidence presented by the private
respondent to prove her claim.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner raises three issues. The
first issue deals with the appellate court's affirmance of the trial
court's findings that the signature of the private respondent on the
Special Power of Attorney was forged. According to the petitioner, the
Court of Appeals disregarded the direct mandate of Section 23, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which states in part that evidence of
handwriting by comparison may be made "with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge," and

that there is no evidence on record which proves or tends to prove

the genuineness of the standards used.
There is no merit in this contention.
The records show that the signatures which were used as
"standards" for comparison with the alleged signature of the private
respondent in the Special Power of Attorney were those from the
latter's residence certificates in the years 1973, 1974 and 1975, her
income tax returns for the years 1973 and 1975 and from a
document on long bond paper dated May 18, 1977. Not only were
the signatures in the foregoing documents admitted by the private
respondent as hers but most of the said documents were used by the
private respondent in her transactions with the government. As was
held in the case of Plymouth Saving & Loan Assn. No. 2 v.
Kassing (125 NE 488, 494):
We believe the true rule deduced from the
authorities to be that the genuineness of a
"standard" writing may be established (1) by the
admission of the person sought to be charged with
the disputed writing made at or for the purposes of
the trial or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who
saw the standards written or to whom or in whose
hearing the person sought to be charged
acknowledged the writing thereof; (3) by evidence
showing that the reputed writer of the standard has
acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has
been adopted and acted upon by him his business
transactions or other concerns....
Furthermore, the judge found such signatures to be sufficient as
standards. In the case of Taylor-Wharton Iron & Steel Co. v.
Earnshaw (156 N.E. 855, 856), it was held:
When a writing is offered as a standard of
comparison it is for the presiding judge to decide

whether it is the handwriting of the party to be

charged. Unless his finding is founded upon error of
law, or upon evidence which is, as matter of law,
insufficient to justify the finding, this court will not
revise it upon exceptions." (Costelo v. Crowell, 139
Mass. 588, 590, 2 N.E. 648; Nuez v. Perry, 113
Mass, 274, 276.)
We cannot find any error on the part of the trial judge in using the
above documents as standards and also in giving credence to the
expert witness presented by the private respondent whose testimony
the petitioner failed to rebut and whose credibility it likewise failed to
impeach. But more important is the fact that the unrebutted
handwriting expert's testimony noted twelve (12) glaring and material
differences in the alleged signature of the private respondent in the
Special Power of Attorney as compared with the specimen
signatures, something which the appellate court also took into
account. In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan (134 SCRA 105, 132), we ruled:
Mr. Maniwang pointed to other significant
divergences and distinctive characteristics between
the sample signatures and the signatures on the
questioned checks in his report which the court's
Presiding Justice kept mentioning during
Maniwang's testimony.
In the course of his cross-examination, NBI expert
Tabayoyong admitted that he saw the differences
between the exemplars used and the questioned
signatures but he dismissed the differences because
he did not consider them fundamental. We rule that
significant differences are more fundamental than a
few similarities. A forger always strives to master
some similarities.
The second issue raised by the petitioner is that while it is true that A
& L Industries is a single proprietorship and the registered owner

thereof is private respondent Lily Yulo, the said proprietorship was

established during the marriage and its assets were also acquired
during the same. Therefore, it is presumed that this property forms
part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo
and thus, could be held liable for the obligations contracted by
Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the
marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is
presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of
only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature (See
Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 161, 165). However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under
Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation
which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal
property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his
family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear
that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries,
to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L
Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to
the express provision of the Civil Code. As we have ruled in Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia (30 SCRA 111, 115-117):
As explained in the decision now under review: "It is
true that the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art.
163 of the new Civil Code. However, as such
administrator the only obligations incurred by the
husband that are chargeable against the conjugal
property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit
of his career, profession or business with the honest
belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the
family. This is not true in the case at bar for we
believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or

surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that

involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Such inference is more
emphatic in this case, when no proof is presented
that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor
received consideration therefore, which may
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(Ibid, pp. 46-47).
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In the most categorical language, a conjugal
partnership under that provision is liable only for
such "debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of
the spouses. There is none in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the
additional requirement in the present Civil Code that
a debt contracted by the husband to bind a conjugal
partnership must redound to its benefit. That is still
another provision indicative of the solicitude and
tender regard that the law manifests for the family as
a unit. Its interest is paramount; its welfare
uppermost in the minds of the codifiers and
legislators.
We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with
respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment
cannot issue against the said properties.

Finally, the third issue assails the award of actual damages

according to the petitioner, both the lower court and the appellate
court overlooked the fact that the properties referred to are still
subject to a levy on attachment. They are, therefore, still
under custodia legis and thus, the assailed decision should have
included a declaration as to who is entitled to the attached properties
and that assuming arguendo that the attachment was erroneous, the
lower court should have ordered the sheriff to return to the private
respondent the attached properties instead of condemning the
petitioner to pay the value thereof by way of actual damages.
In the case of Lazatin v. Twao (2 SCRA 842, 847), we ruled:

to actual damages, was the court justified in ordering the petitioner to

pay for the value of the attached properties instead of ordering the
return of the said properties to the private respondent Yulo ?
Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad faith on
the part of the petitioner in securing the writ of attachment. We do not
think so. "An attachment may be said to be wrongful when, for
instance, the plaintiff has no cause of action, or that there is no true
ground therefore, or that the plaintiff has a sufficient security other
than the property attached, which is tantamout to saying that the
plaintiff is not entitled to attachment because the requirements of
entitling him to the writ are wanting. (7 C.J.S., 664)" (p. 48, Section 4,
Rule 57, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

... It should be observed that Sec. 4 of Rule 59, does
not prescribed the remedies available to the
attachment defendant in case of a wrongful
attachment, but merely provides an action for
recovery upon the bond, based on the undertaking
therein made and not upon the liability arising from a
tortuous act, like the malicious suing out of an
attachment. Under the first, where malice is not
essential, the attachment defendant, is entitled to
recover only the actual damages sustained by him
by reason of the attachment. Under the second,
where the attachment is maliciously sued out, the
damages recoverable may include a compensation
for every injury to his credit, business or feed (Tyler
v. Mahoney, 168 NC 237, 84 SE 362; Pittsburg etc. 5
Wakefield, etc., 135 NC 73, 47 SE 234). ...
The question before us, therefore, is whether the attachment of the
properties of A & L Industries was wrongful so as to entitle the
petitioner to actual damages only or whether the said attachment
was made in bad faith and with malice to warrant the award of other
kinds of damages. Moreover, if the private respondent is entitled only

Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon for the
issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be equated with
bad faith or malicious intent. The steps which were taken by the
petitioner to ensure the security of its claim were premised, on the
firm belief that the properties involved could be made answerable for
the unpaid obligation due it. There is no question that a loan in the
amount of P591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual damages and
not for exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Respondent Lily
Yulo has manifested before this Court that she no longer desires the
return of the attached properties since the said attachment caused
her to close down the business. From that time she has become a
mere employee of the new owner of the premises. She has grave
doubts as to the running condition of the attached machineries and
equipments considering that the attachment was effected way back
in 1975. She states as a matter of fact that the petitioner has already
caused the sale of the machineries for fear that they might be
destroyed due to prolonged litigation. We, therefore, deem it just and
equitable to allow private respondent Lily Yulo to recover actual
damages based on the value of the attached properties as proven in
the trial court, in the amount of P660,000.00. In turn, if there are any

remaining attached properties, they should be permanently released

to herein petitioner.
We cannot, however, sustain the award of P500,000.00 representing
unrealized profits because this amount was not proved or justified
before the trial court. The basis of the alleged unearned profits is too
speculative and conjectural to show actual damages for a future
period. The private respondent failed to present reports on the
average actual profits earned by her business and other evidence of
profitability which are necessary to prove her claim for the said
amount (See G. A. Machineries, Inc. v. Yaptinchay, 126 SCRA 78,
88).
The judgment is therefore set aside insofar as it holds the petitioner
liable for P500,000.00 actual damages representing unrealized
profits, P150,000.00 for exemplary damages and P20,000.00 for
attorney's fees. As stated earlier, the attached properties, should be
released in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE and the petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent
Lily Yulo the amount of SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P660,000.00) as actual damages. The remaining properties subject
of the attachment are ordered released in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79734 December 8, 1988
MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
FEDERICO GUIANG, AURORA GUIANG, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Isagani M. Jungco for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:
The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the Decision
dated 9 December 1986 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
03299. The appellate court affirmed a Decision dated 31 May 1983
of Branch 83 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2896-C filed by petitioner company
against private respondent spouses.
On 2 May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed
between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont Resort Hotel
Enterprises, Inc. ("Marmont"), a corporation engaged in the hotel and
resort business with office and establishment at Olongapo City.
Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and
to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water
supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for a
stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its contract, Maris
Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a
parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, then occupied by
respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang.

Five (5) months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement was

executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang, with Federico
Guiang signing as witness. This second agreement in essential part
read: 1
That the First Party [Maris Trading] has dug, drilled
and tapped water source for Marmont Resort,
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in accordance
with their agreement executed on May 2, 1975 and
notarized before Isagani M. Jungco, Notary Public
and entered as Doc. No. 166; Page No. 135; Book
No. XV; Series of 1975.
That the First Party has erected, built and drilled for
the water source of Marmont Resort on the land
owned by the Second Party [Aurora Guiang] at the
corner of J. Montelibano Street and Maquinaya Drive
(Provincial Road) with the latter's permission.
That for and in consideration of the sum of
P1,500.00 the Second Party hereby Sell, Transfer
and Cede all possessory rights, interest and claims
over that portion of the lot wherein the water source
of Marmont Resort is located unto and in favor of
Maris Trading.
After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel
became inadequate to meet the hotel's water requirements.
Petitioner Marmont secured the services of another contractor (the
name of which was not disclosed), which suggested that in addition
to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be installed to
increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel.
Accordingly, Juan Montelibano, Jr., manager of the Marmont Resort
Hotel, sought permission from the Guiang spouses to inspect the
water pump which had been installed on the portion of the land
previously occupied by the spouses and to make the necessary

additional installations thereon. No such permission, however, was

granted.
On 13 May 1980, petitioner Marmont filed a Complaint 2 against the
Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their refusal to allow
representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry into
the water facility site. The claimed damages were broken down as
follows: (a) P10,000.00 representing the amount advanced in
payment to the second contractor; (b) P40,000.00 representing the
total project cost of the installation made by Maris Trading: (c)
P50,000.00 representing additional expenses incurred and incidental
losses resulting from failure of the original pump to cope with the
water requirements of the Marmont Resort Hotel; and (d) P10,000.00
for Attorney's fees.
In their Answer, 3 the Guiang spouses (defendants below) denied
having had any previous knowledge of the first Memorandum of
Agreement and asserted that the second Memorandum of
Agreement was invalid for not having been executed in accordance
with law. The spouses added a counterclaim for damages in the
amount of P200,000.00.
On 2 October 1980, at the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on
the following stipulation of facts and issues embodied in a Pre-Trial
Order: 4
III
In addition to the admission made elsewhere in their
respective pleadings, the parties entered into the
following stipulation of facts:
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines with office at
Montelibano Street, Barrio Barretto,
Olongapo City;

2. The contract referred to in

paragraph 2 of the complaint
between the plaintiff and Maris
Trading is contained in a document
captioned Memorandum Agreement
executed on May 2, 1975, a xerox
copy of which is Annex 'A' of
plaintiffs complaint;
3. On October 7, 1975, the Maris
Trading represented by Ceferino
Cabral and defendant Aurora
Guiang entered into a memorandum
agreement;
4. The portion sold under Annex 'A'
is still a part of the public domain.
IV
The plaintiff marked the following exhibits in
evidence:
Exhibit 'A'-Memorandum Agreement
dated May 2, 1975
Exhibit 'B-Memorandum Agreement
dated October 7, 1975
V
The issues left to be ventilated during the trial are
the following:
1. Whether defendants has actually
prohibited the plaintiff [from) making

repairs, [on] the pump constructed

by Maris Trading for the plaintiff
under the agreement Exhibit 'A,' if
so;
2. Whether defendants [have] the
right to prohibit the Maris Trading
from performing the repairs and if
not
3. Whether defendants are liable for
damages under the human relations
provision of the Civil Code.
On I January 1980, the Guiang spouses moved to dismiss the
Complaint. 5 The spouses there assailed the validity of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof
involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the
marital consent of her husband, Federico Guiang. Further, it was
alleged that the land upon which the hotel's water supply facility was
installed-and which the Guiang spouses occupied-formed part of the
public domain and was then still the subject of a Miscellaneous Sales
Application submitted by Federico Guiang. The Motion to Dismiss,
however, was denied by the trial court.
No evidence having been adduced by the Guiang spouses on their
behalf, the case was submitted for derision. On 31 May 1983, the
trial court rendered a decision, 6 dismissing the complaint. The trial
court found that Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over
the disputed portion of land to Maris Trading, but held that the
evidence failed to show that Maris Trading, in turn, had transferred
such rights to petitioner Marmont.
Petitioner Marmont appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. 7 The appellate court, citing Section 55, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, held that the first and second Memoranda of

Agreement could not legally be considered by the court as included

in the body of evidence of the case, as neither document had been
formally offered in evidence by either party. It also held that, in any
event, neither document showed that Marmont had in fact acquired
from Maris Trading whatever rights the latter had over the land in
dispute.
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner assigns the following
errors: 8
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the Memorandum of
Agreement of May 2, 1975 and 7
October 1975 as the same were
already admitted in the pre-trial
order; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in
deciding that ownership belongs to
Maris Trading hence, private
respondent Guiang can prohibit
Marmont Resort from entering the
land.
We find for the petitioner.
Both the trial and appellate courts held that the first and second
Memoranda of Agreement are not properly considered as forming
part of the record of this case, because neither had been formally
presented and offered in evidence at the trial of Civil Case No. 2896C. The record shows, however, as noted earlier, that at the pre-trial
conference held on 2 October 1980, both petitioner Marmont and
respondent spouses had agreed upon a stipulation of facts and
issues recognizing the existence of those same two (2) agreements.
Such stipulation of facts constitutes a judicial admission, the veracity
of which requires no further proof and which may be controverted
only upon a clear showing that such stipulation had been entered

into through "palpable mistake." On this point, Section 2, Rule 129 of

the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Judicial Admissions.-Admission made by the parties in
the pleadings, or in the course of the
trial or other proceedings do not
require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless previously
shown to have been made through
palpable mistake. (emphasis
supplied)
There has been no showing and respondent spouses do not claim
that "palpable mistake" had intervened here, in respect of the
formulation of the facts stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial
conference. Absent any such showing, that stipulation of facts is
incontrovertible, 9 and may be relied upon by the
courts. 10 Respondent spouses are estopped from raising as an issue
in this case the existence and admissibility in evidence of both the
first and second Memoranda of Agreement which, having been
marked as exhibits during pre-trial, properly form part of the record of
this case, even though not formally offered in evidence after trial. 11
We consider briefly respondent spouses' argument that the second
Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for having been executed by
Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of Federico, contrary to
Articles 165 and 172 of the Civil Code.
Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law,
that the wife may not validly bind the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In this particular case, however, as noted
earlier, the second Memorandum of Agreement, although ostensibly
contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also
signed by her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto.
This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was present

during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact,
given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora.
Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the
document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the
second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto
is sufficiently manifested in the document itself.
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no consequence here.
Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over
said land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights
over the same which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor
of third persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer
such rights (over the portion upon which the water pump was
installed) to Maris Trading, as evidenced by the fourth paragraph of
the second Memorandum of Agreement, quoted earlier. Furthermore,
assuming (though only for the sake of argument) that the alienation
to Maris Trading was legally objectionable, respondent spouses are
not the proper parties to raise the issue of invalidity, they and Maris
Trading being in pari delicto. Only the government may raise that
issue.
Finally, respondent spouses allege that dismissal of the complaint by
the trial court was not improper as petitioner Marmont was not privy
to the second Memorandum of Agreement, and that accordingly,
petitioner had no valid cause of action against respondents.
A closer scrutiny of the second and third paragraphs of the second
Memorandum of Agreement discloses that the first Memorandum of
Agreement, including the obligations imposed thereunder upon Maris
Trading, had been acknowledged therein:
That the First Party (i.e., Maris Trading) has dug,
drilled and tapped water source for Marmont Resort,
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in
accordance with their agreement executed on May
2, 1975and notarized before Isagani M. Jungco,

Notary Public and entered as Doc. No. 166; Page

No. 135; Book No. XV; Series of 1975.
That the First Party has erected, built and drilled for
the water source of Marmont Resort on the land
owned by the Second Party [respondent spouses] at
the corner of J. Montelibano Street and Maquinaya
Drive (Provincial Road) with the latter's permission;...
(Emphasis supplied)
The above paragraphs establish, among other things, that
construction work had been performed by Maris Trading on the land
occupied by respondent spouses; that such construction work had
been performed in accordance with terms and conditions stipulated
in the first Memorandum of Agreement and that the purpose of the
work was to build a water supply facility for petitioner Marmont. The
same excerpts also show that the work so performed was with the
knowledge and consent of the Guiang spouses, who were then
occupying the land.
It is clear from the foregoing stipulations that petitioner Marmont was
to benefit from the second Memorandum of Agreement. In fact, said
stipulations appear to have been designed precisely to benefit
petitioner and, thus, partake of the nature of stipulations pour
autrui, contemplated in Article 1311 of the Civil Code.
A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a third person
conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon him, which stipulation is
found in a contract entered into by parties neither of whom acted as
agent of the beneficiary. 12We believe and so hold that the purpose
and intent of the stipulating parties (Maris Trading and respondent
spouses) to benefit the third person (petitioner Marmont) is
sufficiently clear in the second Memorandum of Agreement. Marmont
was not of course a party to that second Agreement but, as correctly
pointed out by the trial court and the appellate court, the respondent
spouses could not have prevented Maris Trading from entering the
property possessory rights over which had thus been acquired by

Maris Trading. That respondent t spouses remained in physical

possession of that particular bit of land, is of no moment; they did so
simply upon the sufferance of Maris Trading. Had Maris Trading, and
not the respondent spouses, been in physical possession, we believe
that Marmont would have been similarly entitled to compel Maris
Trading to give it (Marmont) access to the site involved. The two (2)
courts below failed to take adequate account of the fact that the sole
purpose of Maris Trading in acquiring possessory rights over that
specific portion of the land where well and pump and piping had
been installed, was to supply the water requirements of petitioner's
hotel. That said purpose was known by respondent spouses, is made
explicit by the second Memorandum of Agreement. Maris Trading
itself had no need for a water supply facility; neither did the
respondent spouses. The water facility was intended solely for
Marmont Resort Hotel. The interest of Marmont cannot therefore be
regarded as merely "incidental ." 13 Finally, even if it be assumed (for
purposes of argument merely) that the second Memorandum of
Agreement did not constitute a stipulation pour autrui, still
respondent spouses, in the circumstances of this case, must be
regarded as having acted contrary to the principles of honesty, good
faith and fair dealing embodied in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
when they refused petitioner Marmont access to the water facility to
inspect and repair the same and to increase its capacity and thereby
to benefit from it. In so doing, respondent spouses forced petitioner
Marmont to locate an alternative source of water for its hotel which of
course involved expenditure of money and perhaps loss of hotel
revenues. We believe they should respond in damages.

31 May 1983 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil

Case No. 2896-C, are REVERSED. This case is REMANDED to the
trial court for determination, in further proceedings consistent with
this decision, of the amount of petitioner is entitled to receive from
respondent spouses.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 33174 July 4, 1991

The evidence on record, however, appears insufficient for
determination of the amount of damages for which respondent
spouses should be liable. For this reason, the Court is compelled to
remand this case to the trial court for determination of such damages
in appropriate further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 December 1986 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 03299, as well as the Decision dated

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Fourth
Division), LUZON SURETY CO., INC., and ESTANISLAO E.
DEPUSOY, trading under the style of E.E. DEPUSOY
CONSTRUCTION, respondents.

Domingo A. Santiago, Jr., Lucas R. Vidad, Nicolas C. Alino, Cesar T.

Basa and Roland A. Niedo for petitioner.
Tolentino, Cruz, Reyes, Lava & Manuel for respondent Luzon Surety
Co., Inc.
F.M. Ejercito for respondent E.E. Depusoy Construction.

The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the
defendant Depusoy shall pay 10% interest on the
amount of the judgment, the decision of the trial
court is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Without
pronouncement as to costs. 4
However, immediately preceding this is a paragraph reading:

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Before Us is a petition for the review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12 December 1970 in CA-G.R.
No. 36615-R 1 affirming, with modification, the decision of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, Branch
VII, dated 30 September 1959 in Civil Case No. 35163 2 an action for
collection of sum of money filed by petitioner against private
respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF:
1. The case against Luzon Surety Co. is dismissed
but its counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of
sufficient merit;
2. Defendant Estanislao Depusoy is condemned to
pay unto the Philippine National Bank the respective
sums as principal of P35,000.00, P30,000.00,
P10,000.00, and P25,000.00 together with the
interests as outlined in the statement of account set
forth in the body of this decision. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3

We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred

in not sentencing Estanislao Depusoy to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount due.
This is expressly provided for in the promissory
notes, and as it does not appear to be unreasonable,
the stipulations of the parties should be given effect.
As carefully summarized by the Court of Appeals, the relevant facts
in this case are as follows:
On August 6, 1955, Estanislao Depusoy, doing
business under the name of E.E. Depusoy
Construction, and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Public Works, entered
into a building contract, Exhibit 2-Luzon, for the
construction of the GSIS building at Arroceros
Street, Manila, Depusoy to furnish all materials,
labor, plans, and supplies needed in the
construction. Depusoy applied for credit
accommodation with the plaintiff. This was approved
by the Board of Directors in various resolutions
subject to the conditions that he would assign all
payments to be received from the Bureau of Public
Works of the GSIS to the bank, furnish a surety
bond, and the surety to deposit P10,000.00 to the
plaintiff. The total accommodation granted to

Depusoy was P100,000.00. This was later extended

by another P10,000.00 and P25,000.00, but in no
case should the loan exceed P100,000.00, Exhibits
K-1, K-2, K-3 and K-4. In compliance with these
conditions, Depusoy executed a Deed of Assignment
of all money to be received by him from the GSIS as
follows:
That I, Estanislao Depusoy, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Lourdes G.
Gonzales, doing business under the
style of E. E. San Beda Subdivision,
Manila, for and in consideration of
certain loans, overdrafts or other
credit accommodations to be
granted by the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Manila, have
assigned, transferred and conveyed
and by these presents do hereby
assign, transfer and convey unto the
said PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
its successors and assigns all
payment to be received from my
contract with the Bureau of Public
Works, Republic of the Philippines
date (sic) August 6, 1955.
By virtue of this assignment it is
hereby understood that the assignor
hereby acknowledges the monies,
sums or payments due from the
Bureau of Public Works, Republic of
the Philippines, and which are
hereby assigned to the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK as monies, sums
and payments belonging to the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, and

that any act or misappropriation or

conversion which the assignor or the
latter's representatives may commit
with respect to the said sums,
monies and payments will subject
the assignor or the latter's
representatives to the criminal
liabilities imposed by the Penal
Code and such other damages
which the Civil Code provides.
It is further understood that the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK can
collect and receive any and all
sums, monies and payments abovementioned from the Bureau of Public
Works, Republic of the Philippines,
and for that matter said bank is
hereby authorized to indorse for
deposit or for encashment any and
all checks, treasury warrants, money
orders, drafts and other kinds of
negotiable instruments that might be
issued in connection with the
payment herein assigned.
This assignment shall be irrevocable
subject to the terms and conditions
of the promissory notes, overdrafts
and any other kind of documents
which the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK have (sic) required or may
require the assignor to execute to
evidence the above-mentioned
obligation.

Luzon thereafter executed two surety bonds, one for

the sum of P40,000.00 Exhibit D, and the other for
P60,000.00, Exhibit E. Exhibit its D and E, except for
the amount, are expressed in the same words as
follows:
That we, E. E. DEPUSOY
CONSTRUCTION CO., of 32 2nd
Street, San Beda Subdv., Manila, as
principal and LUZON SURETY
COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
as surety, are held and firmly bound
unto the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK of Manila in the sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY
(P60,000.00), Philippine Currency,
for the payment of which sum, well
and truly to be made, we bind
ourselves, our heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, and
assigns, jointly and severally, firmly
by these presents:
The conditions of the obligation are
as follows:

WHEREAS, the above bounden

principal, on the . . . . day of
September, 1956 in consideration of
a certain loan of (P60,000.00)
executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of the Philippine National Bank
on all payments to be received by
him from the Bureau of Public
Works in connection with a contract
dated August 6, 1956.
WHEREAS, said PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, requires said
principal to give a good and
sufficient bond in the above stated
sum to secure the full and faithful
performance on his part of said
Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, if the principal
shall well and truly perform and fulfill
all the undertakings, covenants,
terms, conditions and agreement
stipulated in said Agreement then,
this obligation shall be null and void;
otherwise, it shall remain in full force
and effect.
The liability of LUZON SURETY
COMPANY, INC., under this bond
will expire January 31, 1957.
Furthermore, it is hereby agreed and
understood that the LUZON
SURETY COMPANY, INC. will not
be liable for any claim not
discovered and presented to the
company within THREE (3) months

from the expiration of this bond and

that the obligee hereby waives his
right to file any court action against
the surety after the termination of
the period of the three months
above mentioned.

bank. This amount was disposed off by the plaintiffs

Loans & Discounts Department as follows:
a) P795,976.64 were (sic) credited
to the current account of Depusoy
with the plaintiff;

With the consent of Luzon, the bond was extended

for another 6 months from January 31, 1957.

b) P20,000.00 were (sic) credited to

the plaintiffs Foreign Department;

Under the credit accommodation granted by the

plaintiff bank, Depusoy obtained several amounts
from the bank. On January 14, 1957, Depusoy
received P50,000.00 from the bank which he
promised to pay in installments on the dates therein
indicated, Exhibit A. On January 17, 1957, he
received another P50,000.00 under the same
conditions as the promissory note Exhibit A, except
with respect to the time of payment. Under this
arrangement all payments made by the GSIS were
payable to the Philippine National Bank. The
treasury warrants or checks, however, were not sent
directly to the plaintiff. They were received by
Depusoy, who in turn delivered them to the plaintiff
bank. The plaintiff then applied the money thus
received, first, to the payment of the amount due on
the promissory notes at the time of the receipt of the
treasury warrants or checks, and the balance was
credited to the current account of Depusoy with the
plaintiff bank. A total of P1,309,461.89 were (sic)
paid by the GSIS to the plaintiff bank for the account
of Estanislao Depusoy, Exhibit 1-Luzon. Of this
amount, P246,408.91 were (sic) paid according to
Exhibit 1 for the importation of construction
materials, and P1,063,408.91 were (sic) received by
the Loans and Discounts Department of the plaintiff

c) P2,552.94 were (sic) credited to

the payment of interest; and
d) P210,000.00 were (sic) applied to
the principal of indebtedness. (Exh.
N-1).
Depusoy defaulted in his building contract with the
Bureau of Public Works, and sometime in
September, 1957, the Bureau of Public Works
rescinded its contract with Depusoy. No further
amounts were thereafter paid by the GSIS to the
plaintiff bank. The amount of the loan of Depusoy
which remains unpaid, including interest, is over
P100,000.00. Demands for payment were made
upon Depusoy and Luzon, and as no payment was
made, . . . 5
herein petitioner filed with the trial court a complaint (Civil Case No.
35163) against Estanislao Depusoy and private respondent Luzon
Surety Co. Inc. (LSCI).
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which is above adverted to.
In dismissing the case as against LSCI, the trial court ruled that the
surety bonds it issued, Exhs. "D" and "E";

. . . guaranteed only the faithful performance of the

deed of assignments, Exhibit C, and nothing else.
That the bonds were extended by the letters Exhs. E
and I did not change their conditions. . . . 6
Petitioner appealed from said decision to the Court of Appeals, (C.A.G.R. No. 6615-R) relying on the following assigned errors:

III
The trial court erred in not construing the terms of
the bonds in favor of the plaintiff-appellant PNB and
against the defendant-appellee Luzon Surety
Company, Inc.
IV

I
The trial court erred in holding that defendantappellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. "guaranteed
only the faithful performance of the deed of
assignment, Exh. "C", and nothing else"; in holding
the defense of the appellee Luzon Surety Company,
Inc., that there has been no breach of the terms and
conditions of the bonds Exhs. "D" and "E"; in finding
that the "bonds" can only be therefore understood to
guarantee that the payment due from the GSIS to
Depusoy would be delivered unto the bank.
II
The trial court erred in not finding that the bonds
(Exhs. "D" and "E") should be read jointly with the
resolutions approving the loan (Exhs. "K" to "K-5"),
the promissory notes and the deed of assignment in
the determination of the true intent of the parties in
the execution of the bonds which are the basis of the
liability of the defendant-appellee Luzon Surety
Company, Inc., in not considering resolutions Exhs.
"K" to "K-5"; promissory notes Exhs. "B", "G", and
"H" and the deed of assignment, Exh. "C" as integral
parts of the surety bonds Exhs. "D" and "E" as
therein incorporated by reference in said surety
bonds as such necessarily bound the appellee
Luzon Surety Company to their terms.

The lower court erred in not holding that the bonds

Exhs. "D" and "E" and letters of extension Exhs. "F"
and "I" were compensated surety agreements
executed as required by PNB board resolution Exhs.
"K" to "K-5" for the purpose of securing the payment
to the PNB of the amount advanced by the said bank
to the appellee Estanislao Depusoy to finance the
construction of the GSIS building subject to the
construction contract Exh. "2-Luzon" or Exh. "OPNB"; in not finding that Exhs. "F" and "I" are
indubitable proofs that defendant-appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc., is liable for the repayment of
the P100,000.00 loan and the additional
accommodations granted to the defendant-appellee
Estanislao Depusoy; and in not finding and holding
that Exhs. "D" and "E" in the sense that they have
been extended so as to secure new
accommodations aside from the original obligation
mentioned in said bonds.
V
The trial court erred in finding that all payments due
from the GSIS construction to Depusoy were
actually delivered unto the bank; and in not finding
that Depusoy made diversions from these amounts
for which the surety should be bound to answer
under the terms of its bonds.

VI
The trial court erred in not finding that when appellee
Depusoy incurred breach (sic) in his construction
contract with the Bureau of Public Works said default
on the part of the principal in his contract resulted in
a consequent breach of his undertaking under the
deed of assignment; and that consequently any
breach in the undertaking of the principal in said
deed of assignment communicated liability to the
surety; in not finding likewise that breach on the part
of the appellee Depusoy in his undertaking under the
promissory notes meant breach of the terms of the
deed of assignment which incorporated said
promissory notes and that this breach in the deed of
assignment communicated liability to the surety
under the terms of the bonds; and that trial court
(sic) erred in not finding that there was a breach of
the bonds due to the failure of the appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc. to see to it that the full amount
of P1,309,461.89 remitted by the GSIS to the PNB
was actually received by the PNB; in not finding that
the PNB did not receive all the amounts still due to
the said institutions as remitted by the GSIS under
the terms of the deed of assignment.
VII
The trial court erred in not sentencing defendantappellee Estanislao Depusoy to pay the attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts due and the
costs of the suit.
VIII
The trial court erred in not admitting in the evidence
proof of the amount actually received by the foreign

department of the PNB and the letter of the GSIS to

the PNB as part of the rebuttal evidence of the
defendant-appellee (see evidences (sic) offered as
part of the record on appeal for purposes of review).
IX
The trial court erred in relying exclusively for its
decision on the relation of facts presented by the
appellee-Luzon Surety Company; disregarding
evidences (sic) presented by the PNB consist of
documentary evidences (sic) disclosing patent facts
appearing on the face of said documents and that
consequently the decision is not based on the real
facts and law of the case; and consequently
dismissing the case against the Luzon Surety. 7
In due course the Court of Appeals rendered the decision adverted to
above. In disposing of the assigned errors, it patiently examined and
analyzed the facts and made an extensive, exhaustive and wellreasoned disquisition thereon which We deem necessary to quote:
The assignment of error maybe (sic) reduced into
one single question, what is the obligation of
Luzon under the surety bonds, or, stated otherwise,
what obligation had been guaranteed by Luzon
under the terms of the surety bonds? It is the
contention of the plaintiff that the surety bonds,
Exhibits D and E, guaranteed the payment of the
loans or the debt of Depusoy to the plaintiff to the
extent of P100,000.00. Luzon, however, contends
that what it guaranteed was the performance of
Depusoy of his obligation under the Deed of
Assignment, Exhibit C, and not other agreements
between Depusoy and the bank. This contention was
upheld by the lower court. This, we believe is the
correct construction of the surety bonds. Under the

surety bonds, Depusoy and Luzon bound

themselves to the plaintiff in the sum of
P100,000.00. It recited that the principal, Depusoy,
and Luzon bound themselves jointly and severally to
the PNB under the following conditions: that "in
consideration of a certain loan, Depusoy executed a
Deed of Assignment in favor of the PNB on all
payments to be received by him from the Bureau of
Public Works in connection with a contract of August
6, 1956"; that the PNB required the principal to give
a good and sufficient bond to secure the full and
faithful performance on his part of said agreement;
and that, "if the principal shall well and truly perform
and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms and
conditions, and agreements stipulated in said
agreement, this obligation shall be null and void".
Now, what are the undertakings, covenants, terms,
conditions, and agreements stipulated in the said
agreement or Deed of Assignment? The
undertakings of the principal Depusoy, under the
Deed of Assignment, Exhibit C, were to assign,
transfer, and convey to the plaintiff bank all
payments to be received by Depusoy from the
Bureau of Public Works; that Depusoy
acknowledged that such sums assigned and
received by the plaintiff would belong to the PNB,
and if any conversion should be made by the
assignor or his representative, he would be
criminally liable; that the PNB could collect and
receive all sums and monies, and payments, and the
bank was authorized to endorse for deposit or for
encashment all checks or money orders, or
negotiable instruments that it might receive in
connection with the assignment. Nowhere in the
Deed of Assignment nor in the bonds did Luzon
guarantee that Depusoy would pay his indebtedness
to the plaintiff and that upon Depusoy's default,
Luzon would be liable. When the terms of the

agreement are clear, there can be no room for

construction. If the intention of the parties, and
particularly of Luzon, was to guarantee the payment
of the debt of Depusoy to the plaintiff, the bonds
would have recited in its preamble that the principal
was indebted to the PNB and that the PNB required
the principal to give a good and sufficient bond to
secure the faithful performance on his part of the
terms of the promissory notes. Instead of doing so, it
recited that in consideration of a certain loan, the
principal had executed a Deed of Assignment. The
recital of the loan in the amount of P40,000.00,
Exhibit D and P60,000.00, Exhibit E, is merely a
statement of the cause or consideration of the Deed
of Assignment and not a statement of the obligation.
The Deed of Assignment necessarily was executed
for a consideration, otherwise, it would be null and
void. The obligation recited in the surety bonds,
Exhibits D and E, is not the loan, but the Deed of
Assignment; and that precisely was what was
guaranteed by Luzon in the bonds, Exhibits D and E,
as shown by the following:
1) Contrary to the usual practice of
the plaintiff, Luzon did not sign the
promissory notes, Exhibits A and B;
2) Although the resolutions of the
Board of Directors required that the
surety should make a deposit of
P10,000.00, Luzon did not make
such a deposit, the verbal testimony
of Delfin Santiago, Manager of the
Loans and Discounts Department, to
the contrary notwithstanding. The
documentary evidence was
submitted to prove that was the fact;

3) Delfin Santiago finally admitted

that what was guaranteed was not
the loan but the Deed of
Assignment.
Delfin Santiago testified as follows:
Q Did you inform
the Luzon Surety
Company, Inc. of
your actuation on
this fact, that is in
your giving Mr.
Depusoy portions of
the payments made
by the GSIS to the
Philippine National
Bank pursuant to
the Deed of
Assignment?
A No, because I
understand that the
Luzon Surety
Company, Inc.
stands as surety on
that assignment on
which the full
payment of the
contract is assigned
to the payments.
(TSN, p. 54)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Usually Mr.
Santiago, it is the

practice of the
Philippine National
Bank in cases
where a surety
company
guarantees the
account of the
borrower, the
Philippine National
Bank requires the
surety company to
sign the promissory
note as a co-maker,
is it not?
A In case the
condition is
approved, the
surety I remember
very well, the last
accommodation
given to Mr.
Depusoy . . . that
was the condition,
but the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. did not want to
sign, so at the
request of the
Luzon Surety
Company, Inc. and
Mr. Depusoy, the
approved
accommodation
was modified in
such a way as only
to the surety bond.

ATTY. NERI: If Your

Honor please. We
object to the
question, it was not
covered by the
direct examination.

COURT: Answer.
A As usual, as at
the beginning, we
take it that your
bonding the Deed of
Assignment is the
understanding that
all payments for the
whole contract will
go to us. (TSN, pp.
55-57, July 21,
1958)

COURT: Answer.
A Well, apparently
that was the
intention because
you decided to sign
jointly and severally
the promissory
note.
Q And because that
was our intention
the Philippine
National Bank
agreed to that
desire of Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. by issuing only
a similar surety
bond and not
signing as comaker, and jointly
and severally on the
promissory note?
ATTY. NERI:
Objection Your
Honor, the contract
is the best
evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you read the
terms of the bond?
A Yes, sir, that's
right.
Q And you further
noted in the bond it
merely guaranteed
the deed of
assignment, is that
correct? of Mr.
Depusoy?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: And
not this particular
loan, is it not?

ATTY. NERI: We
refer to the
document, Your
Honor.
COURT: Sustained.
(TSN, pp. 9-10,
June 26, 1959)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. NERI: Now,
Mr. Depusoy in his
testimony stated
that when you
received these
amounts from the
GSIS and issued
credit memos . . . in
favor of Mr.
Depusoy, you did
not notify the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. of the fact of
the issuance of this
(sic) credit memos
in favor of Mr.
Depusoy will you
state to this
Honorable Court the
reason why is that
you did not give
notice to the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc.?

A I did not notify the

Luzon Surety
Company, Inc. of
this transaction
because the bond
filed by the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc., but the terms
of the bond filed by
Luzon Surety
Company is that
they understand the
transaction of Mr.
Depusoy with the
Philippine National
Bank.
COURT: They
understand the
transaction to be. . .
WITNESS: . . . The
nature of the
transaction with Mr.
Depusoy in the
sense that as
we . . . as appearing
in this bond Exhibit
D . . . all payments
to be received by
him from the
Bureau of Public
Works in connection
with the contract to
secure the full and
faithfully
performance on his

part of the said

agreement, the
agreement referred
to is the assignment
of payment in
connection with the
contract of Mr.
Depusoy with the
GSIS.
(TSN, pp. 27-29
June 1, 1959)
In support of his contention that the surety bond was
intended to guarantee the loan, the appellant gave
the following grounds or reasons:
1) The resolution of the Board of
Directors of the plaintiff approving
the loan or credit accommodation to
Depusoy required that Depusoy
should put up a bond executed by
the Luzon Surety Company, Inc.,
Exhibits K-3, K-4 and K-5. The
resolutions of the Board of Directors
were unilateral acts of the plaintiff
and were conditions imposed upon
the debtor, Depusoy, Luzon was not
a party to these resolutions and
under the rule of res inter alios acta,
they cannot bind or prejudice Luzon
in the absence of evidence that the
terms of the resolutions had been
brought to the attention of Luzon
and that it had acceded thereto. All
that the bond stated is that the PNB
required the principal to give a good

and sufficient bond. There can be no

other consideration for the execution
of the bonds other than stated
thereon in the absence of allegation
that they did not express the true
intention of the parties.
2) Appellant contends that the
promissory notes and the building
contract mentioned in the Deed of
Assignment became part and parcel
of the Deed of Assignment under the
principle of incorporation by
reference. We agree that the Deed
of Assignment became part and
parcel of the bond, but to say that all
promissory notes, overdrafts, and
any other kind of documents which
the PNB might require the assignor
to execute to evidence the
aforementioned obligation were also
incorporated by reference to the
surety bond and became obligation
of Luzon is to include in the
assignment, covenants and
obligations beyond the
contemplation of the parties. The
appellant relies on the last
paragraph of the Deed of
Assignment which reads: "This
assignment shall be irrevocable and
subject to the terms and conditions
of the promissory notes, overdrafts,
and any other kind of document
which the PNB can require or may
require the assignor to execute to

evidence the above-mentioned

obligation".
It is argued that under this stipulation, Luzon
guaranteed the payment of the promissory notes
which are the subject of this action and also the
building contract between Depusoy, its principal, and
the Bureau of Public Works. This is a very farfetched construction. This paragraph does not
impose any obligation upon Depusoy. All that was
required of Depusoy was to execute such
documents which might be required by the PNB to
evidence the Deed of Assignment. The words of the
phrase "subject to" are words of qualification and not
of contract (Cox vs. Vat 149, 110 pp. 96-148 CCH
147) and means subject to, meaning under the
control, power or dominion or subordinate to and not
being words of contract imposing upon defendant no
contractual obligation (40 Words & Phrases 386389). What was evidently intended is the Deed of
Assignment when it stated "subject to the terms and
conditions of the promissory notes and overdrafts"
was that any amount received by the PNB would be
applied to the payment of the promissory notes and
overdrafts in accordance with their terms and
conditions as they fell due because the Deed of
Assignment was executed not for the purpose of
making the PNB the owner of all the monies
received from the GSIS, but as a security for the
payment of the debt of Depusoy arising from the
credit accommodation granted to him by the
appellant. And that this was the intention is evident
from the fact that upon receipt of the treasury
warrants and checks from the GSIS, the appellant
applied the same to the payment of the debt of
Depusoy which was due with interest and the
remainder was credited to Depusoy's current

account. This balance was subject to the free

disposal of Depusoy. Hence, out of the over P1
million received by the Loans & Discounts
Department of the appellant, almost P800,000.00
were credited to the current account of Depusoy and
only a little over P200,000.00 was applied to his
debt. Appellant contends that since in the Deed of
Assignment, Depusoy undertook to assign, transfer,
and convey to PNB all payments to be received by
him from his contract with the Bureau of Public
Works, Luzon had thereby guaranteed the faithful
performance by Depusoy of his building contract
with the Bureau of Public Works, and Depusoy
having defaulted in his building contract by reason of
which the Bureau of Public Works rescinded the
building contract, the PNB did not receive from the
GSIS the full contract price of over P2 million. This
indeed is a very far-fetched construction of the
contract. What was transferred or assigned by
Depusoy to the PNB were all payments to be
received by him under the contract with the Bureau
of Public Works. Necessarily, what was to be
received by Depusoy depends upon his performance
under the contract. As long as he faithfully performed
the contract, he would receive from the GSIS the
amount due him. From the moment he defaulted and
failed to comply with the terms of the contract, he
would receive nothing and he could not assign what
he did not have. To argue that under the terms of the
Deed of Assignment, Luzon also guaranteed the
faithful performance of the building contract of
Depusoy with the Bureau of Public Works is fanciful
and wishful thinking.

3) Appellant also contends that under Exhibits F and

I, it can be seen that what was really intended to be
guaranteed by the surety agreement was the
payment of the loan. We quote Exhibits F and I.
Relative to our above-captioned
bonds in the amount of P40,000.00
dated May 28, 1956 and September
24, 1956, respectively, please be
advised that same is hereby
extended for a further period of six
(6) months from January 31, 1957.
All other terms and conditions of our
above-mentioned bonds shall
remain the same except the period
of expiration herein above
mentioned. These bonds also cover
the new accommodation given our
Principal.
Relative to the above numbered
bonds, in the amount of P40,000.00
and P60,000.00 dated May 28, 1956
and September 24, 1956,
respectively, the account secured
thereby having been reduced by
virtue of payments made by our
principal, which, according to him
has but a balance of P75,000.00 we
have the honor to inform you that we
are agreeable to the extension of
further credit to our principal to the
extent of the amount of the said
bonds, under the same terms and
conditions thereof.

At first glance, from the statement in Exhibit F, which

reads: "This bond also covers the new
accommodation given our principal", and in Exhibit I,
that "we are agreeable to the extension of further
credit to or principal to the extent of the amount of
the said bond", it would appear that Luzon was
referring to the obligation of Depusoy to pay the
loan. But particular attention must be paid to the
statement in Exhibit F that "all of the terms and
conditions of our above-mentioned bonds shall
remain the same except the period of expiration
herein below mentioned". What was really agreed by
Luzon was the extension of the duration of the
surety bond, for under the terms of the bonds they
expired six months from their respective dates. Any
statement in Exhibit I that may be construed as
referring to the debt of Depusoy was made only by
an Asst. Manager who evidently was not familiar with
the terms of the surety bond. It must be noted that
the surety bond was executed by CS Rodriguez,
General Manager. Moreover, it cannot prevail over
the testimony of Delfin Santiago, Manager of the
Loans & Discounts Department, that what was
guaranteed by the surety bond was the Deed of
Assignment.
It is also contended that if what was intended to be
guaranteed by Luzon is the Deed of Assignment, the
surety bond guaranteed nothing, because with the
execution of the Deed of Assignment, nothing
thereafter remained to be done. This is not true, for
the terms of the Deed of Assignment, Depusoy
authorized the PNB to receive all monies due from
the Bureau of Public Works and to endorse for
deposit all instruments of credit that might be issued
in connection with the payments therein assigned.
Under this stipulation, Luzon guaranteed that all the

monies due Depusoy under his building contract with

the Bureau of Public Works should be paid to the
PNB. It is true that all the checks and warrants
issued by the GSIS were to be made payable to the
PNB. But under the arrangement between the PNB,
GSIS, and the Bureau of Public Works, and
Depusoy, it was Depusoy who received the warrants
or checks either from the Bureau of Public Works or
from the GSIS, and Depusoy delivered the same to
the PNB. The PNB did not take the trouble of going
to the GSIS or the Bureau of Public Works to get the
checks. One reason because the PNB did not know
when any amount would be due. There is nothing
then that could prevent an arrangement thereafter
between Depusoy and the GSIS, or the Bureau of
Public Works to make the checks payable to
Depusoy, and Depusoy from forging the signature of
the PNB and appropriating the money. This would be
a violation of the Deed of Assignment for which
Luzon would be liable.
It is not disputed that no payment was made directly
to Depusoy after the Deed of Assignment. All
amounts due to Depusoy were paid to the PNB for
the account of Depusoy. It is true that in accordance
with Exhibit M, only P1,063,408.91 were received by
the Loans and Discounts Department of the plaintiff
bank, and that of the total amount of P1,309,461.89
paid by the GSIS, P246,062.98 were paid for the
importation of construction materials. As to the socalled 10% retention fund, there is no evidence that
the Bureau of Public Works had retained any
amount. In any case what was assigned was "all
payments to be received" under the building
contract, and the 10% retention was not to be
received by Depusoy until certain conditions had
been met.

In its eight assignment of error, the appellant

contends that the lower court in not admitting proof
of the amount actually received by the PNB and the
letter of the GSIS, Exhibit Q (sic). Aside from the
purely technical reason for their rejection, their
admission cannot affect the result. Exhibit Q is a
letter of the General Manager of the GSIS to plaintiff
advising plaintiff of the rescission of the building
contract. Exhibits Q, P, P-1 and P-2 are statements
of the amounts received by plaintiff's foreign
department. There is no evidence that the GSIS had
paid any amount to Depusoy in violation of the Deed
of Assignment. Not a single cent had been received
directly by Depusoy from the GSIS or the Bureau of
Public Works.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred
in not sentencing Estanislao Depusoy to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount due.
This is expressly provided for in the promissory
notes, and as it does not appear to be unreasonable,
the stipulation of the parties should be given effect. 8
Its motion for reconsideration 9 having been denied by the
respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 February
1971, 10 petitioner filed the instant petition on 3 March 1971 asserting
therein that:
. . . the Decision and the Resolution of respondent
COURT (Annexes A and B) are both not in accord
with the evidence, the law, and jurisprudence on the
matter.

I. THE SURETY BONDS COVER THE PRINCIPAL

LOANS, THE SURETY THEREBY BECOMING
LIABLE UPON DEFAULT OF THE LATTER.
II. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
BONDS SECURE ONLY THE DEED OF
ASSIGNMENT, STILL THE SURETY IS LIABLE
FOR FAILURE OF THE PRINCIPAL TO COMPLY
WITH THE TERMS OF SUCH DEED.
III. THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE
DECISION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO THE END
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT RESPONDENTS
BE ADJUDGED LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES. 11
In support of its petition, petitioner practically summoned the same
arguments which it relied upon before the Court of Appeals.
On 3 March 1971 private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition 12 on the following grounds:
1. That the petition is without merit;
2. That the question raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration; and
3. That the question raised are factual.
In the resolution of 8 March 1971 this Court dismissed the petition for
being factual and for lack of merit; 13 however, upon motion for
reconsideration 14 this Court reconsidered the resolution and gave
due course to the petition. 15 The petitioner was then required to
submit its Brief, 16 which it complied with on 12 July 1971 . 17 Private
respondent LSCI filed its brief on 10 August 1971. 18 Private
respondent Depusoy did not file any.

Except for the third assigned error, We find no merit in this petition.
The issues raised are factual.
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals can withstand the most
incisive scrutiny. They are sufficiently supported by the evidence on
record and the conclusions drawn therefrom do not justify a
departure from the deeply rooted and well settled doctrine that
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on this
Court, 19 considering that the recognized exceptions thereto 20 do not
come to the rescue of petitioner.
We are in full accord with the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the bonds executed by private respondent
LSCI were to guarantee the faithful performance of Depusoy of his
obligation under the Deed of Assignment and not to guarantee the
payment of the loans or the debt of Depusoy to petitioner to the
extent of P100,000.00. The language of the bonds is clear, explicit
and unequivocal. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 1370 of
the Civil Code provides:
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
Besides, even if there had been any doubt on the terms and
conditions of the surety agreement, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the surety. As concretely put in Article 2055 of the Civil Code,
"A guaranty is not presumed, it must be expressed and cannot
extend to more than what is stipulated therein."
In the recent case of Umali, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 We
reiterated the unrippled rule that the liability of the surety is measured
by the terms of the contract, and, while he is liable to the full extent
thereof, such liability is strictly limited to that assumed by its terms. 22
In La Insular vs. Machuca Go Tanco, et al., supra., this Court held:

It is undoubtedly true that the law looks upon the

contract of suretyship with a jealous eye, and the
rule is settled that the obligations of the surety
cannot be extended by implication beyond its
specified limits.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Article 1827 of the Civil Code so discloses (Uy Aloc

vs. Cho Jan Ling, 27 Phil. Rep., 427); and with this
doctrine the common law is accordant. As was said
by Justice Story in Miller vs. Stewart (9 Wheat. 680;
6 L. ed., 189):
Nothing can be clearer, both upon principles and
authority, than the doctrine that the liability of a
surety is not to be extended, by implication, beyond
the terms of his contract. To the extent and in the
manner, and under the circumstances pointed out in
his obligation, he is bound, and no farther.
As earlier adverted to, there is merit in the third assigned error. The
paragraph immediately preceding the decretal portion of the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals reads as follows:
We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred
in not sentencing Estanislao Depusoy to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount due.
This is expressly provided for in the promissory
notes, and as it does not appear to be unreasonable,
the stipulation of the parties should be given effect.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision should then be
modified in the sense that the "10% interest" indicated therein should
be considered and understood as and for attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 12 December 1970 in CA-G.R.No. 36615-R is
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19565

January 30, 1968

ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Estacion and Paltriguera for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel O. Soriano and Pio G. Villoso for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:

The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958

with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in
essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had
not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal
partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2)
monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3)
payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the plaintiff the
amount prayed for as alimony pendente lite, which however, upon
defendant's motion, was reduced to P2,000.
On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering
separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as attorney's
fees, with legal interest from the date of the original complaint, that
is, from July 22, 1958, until fully paid, plus costs. From this judgment
the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the
case to us, "it appearing that the total value of the conjugal assets is
over P500,000".
The basic facts are not controverted. The plaintiff and the defendant
were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. Six children were
born to them, namely, Zenia (1939), Ronnie (1942), Victoria (1944),
Jessie 1945), Bella (1946), and Felipe (1948). During their coverture
they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all
assessed at P45,429, and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre, all
assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are registered in their names.
The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net profit of
P3,390.49.
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets
valued as of December 31, 1956 at P496,006.92, from which they
obtained for that year a net profit of P75,655.78. The net gain of the
Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal business of the spouses,
was P90,454.48 for the year 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the
total assets of the various enterprises of the conjugal partnership

were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including those of the Top Service

Inc., of which firm the defendant has been the president since its
organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital of P50,000,
P10,000 of which was contributed by him. This corporation was the
Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the Golden Acres
Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Pias, Rizal,
and a lot and building located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for
P285,000, an amount borrowed from the Manufacturer's Bank and
Trust Company.
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure
which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the
Silay hacienda, their conjugal house, and all their parcels of land
located in Bacolod City.
The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine errors the
defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,
1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955 to the
rendition of the decision, made by the defendant to the
conjugal abode to see his wife was on June 15, 1955;
2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by one Nenita
Hernandez and that she and the defendant are living as
husband and wife;
3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between the
plaintiff and the defendant were far from cordial, and that it
was from 1948 that the former has been receiving an
allowance from the latter;
4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the plaintiff;
5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not discussed
with his wife the business activities of the partnership, and

that this silence constituted "abuse of administration of the

conjugal partnerships";
6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the conjugal
assets without the knowledge of the plaintiff and thru false
pretences to which the latter was prey;
7. In allowing the plaintiff, on the one hand, to testify on facts
not actually known by her, and, on the other hand, in not
allowing the defendant to establish his special defenses;
8. In ordering separation of the conjugal partnership
properties; and
9. In sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000, with interest at the
legal rate.1wph1.t
Two issues of law as well emerge, requiring resolution petition: (1)
Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
partnership properties? (2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal
to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such
an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant
started living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to
Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory
in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at 2nd Street,
Bacolod City. Since 1955 the defendant had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling, although in the said year he paid short visits during which
they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up to the time of the
trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode, and when
he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. He has
abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with his
concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect the

existence of illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. This

suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note
in a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirt which was written by
Nenita and in which she asked "Bering" to meet her near the church.
She confronted her husband who forthwith tore the note even as he
admitted his amorous liaison with Nenita. He then allayed her fears
by vowing to forsake his mistress. Subsequently, in November 1951,
she found in the iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also written
by Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed as "D") apologized for
her conduct, and expressed the hope that the addressee ("Darling")
could join her in Baguio as she was alone in the Patria Inn and lonely
in "a place for honeymooners". Immediately after her husband
departed for Manila the following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for
Baguio, where she learned that Nenita had actually stayed at the
Patria Inn, but had already left for Manila before her arrival. Later she
met her husband in the house of a relative in Manila from whence
they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where she again confronted him
about Nenita. He denied having further relations with this woman.
Celia Baez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was
employed as a cook in the home of the spouses from May 15, 1955
to August 15, 1958, and that during the entire period of her
employment she saw the defendant in the place only once. This
declaration is contradicted, however, by the plaintiff herself who
testified that in 1955 the defendant "used to have a short visit there,"
which statement implies more than one visit.
The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and
children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the
action, he started to live separately from his wife. When he
transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod
City, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife
and children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome
and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from
his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on
his work as she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he
could pass the nights in peace. Since 1953 he stayed in Manila for

some duration of time to manage their expanding business and look

for market outlets for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff
admitted in both her original and amended complaints that
"sometime in 1953, because of the expanding business of the herein
parties, the defendant established an office in the City of Manila,
wherein some of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured
or produced in the business enterprises of the parties were sold or
disposed of". From the time he started living separately in
Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself
furnished him food and took care of his laundry. This latter
declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his
wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single
month, to give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's
admission in her original and amended complaints as well as in open
court that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was
giving her around P500 a month for support. In point of fact, his wife
and children continued to draw allowances from his office of a total
ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the education
of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time of
the trial and were not living with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he
never failed to visit his family, particularly the children. His wife was
always in bad need of money because she playedmahjong, an
accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she
played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the infidelities of her
husband.
Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory,
corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the matter of the
support the latter gave to his family, by declaring in court that since
the start of his employment in 1950 as assistant general manager,
the plaintiff has been drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500
monthly, which amount was given personally by the defendant or, in
his absence, by the witness himself.

The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila.

He came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was barely 12 years
old, but had lost track of her thereafter. His constant presence in
Manila was required by the pressing demands of an expanding
business. He denied having destroyed the alleged note which the
plaintiff claimed to have come from Nenita, nor having seen, previous
to the trial, the letter exh. C. The allegation of his wife that he had a
concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always been faithful
to his wife, and not for a single instance had he been caught or
surprised by her with another woman.
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared that
the defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their
various business concerns. Although she did not allege, much less
prove, that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she
averred nevertheless that her husband might squander and dispose
of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine. Hence, the urgency
of separation of property.
The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that he
has applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his
time, to the management, maintenance and expansion of their
business concerns, even as his wife threw money away at
the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his endeavors is that from a
single cargo truck which he himself drove at the time of their
marriage, he had built up one business after another, the Speedway
Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press,
the Philippine Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business
enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the spouses now
own have been acquired through his diligence, intelligence and
industry; that he has steadily expanded the income and assets of
said business enterprises from year to year, contrary to the
allegations of the complainant, as proved by his balance sheet and
profit and loss statements for the year 1958 and 1959 (exhibits 1 and
2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he had purchased
additional equipment and machineries and has partially paid their

indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the Development

Bank of the Philippines.
It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The
evidence presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of the
defendant, while pertinent and material in the determination of the
merits of a petition for legal separation, must in this case be regarded
merely as an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had
abandoned her, which abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in
law, would justify separation of the conjugal assets under the
applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil Code which read:
"The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial
approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that . . . if
the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least
one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or
separation of property". In addition to abandonment as a ground, the
plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil Code in support of
her prayer for division of the matrimonial assets. This article provides
that "In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband, the courts, on the petition of the
wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or
separation of property". It behooves us, therefore, to inquire, in the
case at bar, whether there has been abandonment, in the legal
sense, by the defendant of the plaintiff, and/or whether the defendant
has abused his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property, so as to justify the plaintiff's plea for separation of property.
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our
considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of
his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when
she has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year are
the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of
the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of

these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment,

and not mere separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be
physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion.
Although an all-embracing definition of the term "abandonment " is
yet to be spelled out in explicit words, we nevertheless can
determine its meaning from the context of the Law as well as from its
ordinary usage. The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be
established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to the wife
when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely,
receivership, administration by her, or separation of property, all of
which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence
from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and
steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not
the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite
his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither
neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to
give support to his wife.
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely;
to forsake or renounce utterly. 2 The dictionaries trace this word to the
root idea of "putting under a bar". The emphasis is on the finality and
the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 3 When
referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been
defined as "the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with
intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to her, and never to
resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his marital rights;
such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common
necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the charity of
others." 4 The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one
consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife
who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of
causing per perpetual separation." 5 Giving to the word "abandoned",

as used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the definitions above
reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute abandonment of
the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation.
Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did
not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record
conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family
despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by
the complainant, although she minimized the amount of support
given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good reason to
believe, however, that she and the children received more than this
amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children continued
to draw from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially
corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were not
rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the
plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the
plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently
played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to
spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife
and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the
conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People
v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife,
continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and
that of their minor child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment",
which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
since contributing to their support negatived such intent. In re Hoss'
Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family
where the evidence disclosed that he almost always did give his wife
part of his earnings during the period of their separation and that he
gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a
concubine, we believe, contrary to the findings of the court a quo,

that the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favor of the

plaintiff's thesis. The proof that Nenita Hernandez was the concubine
of the defendant and that they were living as husband and wife in
Manila, is altogether too indefinite. Aside from the uncorroborated
statement of the plaintiff that she knew that Nenita Hernandez was
her husband's concubine, without demonstrating by credible
evidence the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and the
defendant, the only evidence on record offered to link the defendant
to his alleged mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however failed to
connect authorship of the said letter with Nenita, on the face whereof
the sender merely signed as "D" and the addressee was one
unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination,
hereunder quoted, underscores such failure:
Q. You personally never received any letter from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you received on any time until today from
1949 from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you written to her any letter yourself until
now?
A. Why should I write a letter to her.
Q. In that case, Mrs. De la Cruz, you are not familiar with the
handwriting of Nenita. Is that right?
A. I can say that Nenita writes very well.
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or not
but, my question is this: In view of the fact that you have

never received a letter from Nenita, you have ot sent any

letter to her, you are not familiar with her handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the
conjugal partnership property, the record presents a different picture.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the
conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his
industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had
increased to a value of over a million pesos.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure
of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform
the wife of the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of
administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband
perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that
he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the
result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes
willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership,
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions
prejudicial to the latter. 7
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing
more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but
the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the
same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation,
and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case
at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation
of property. This decision may appear to condone the husband's
separation from his wife; however, the remedies granted to the wife
by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of
the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal

partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a
denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the
husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a
cause of action.1wph1.t
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance
in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic
policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to
preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of
separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and
the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the
Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of
property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in
marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by
formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage
(Article 190, new Civil Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code):
and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for
causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. 8
Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets
where there has been no real abandonment, the separation not
being wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut the door for
possible reconciliation. The estranged spouses may drift irreversibly
further apart; the already broken family solidarity may be irretrievably
shattered; and any flickering hope for a new life together may be
completely and finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the
wife in 1958, long before the devaluation of the Philippine peso in
1962, should be increased to P3,000.
On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the
defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for the
plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask for adequate support,
an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff must be made. Ample

authority for such award is found in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article

2208 of the new Civil Code which empower courts to grant counsel's
fees "in actions for legal support" and in cases "where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be
recovered." However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion, is, under
the environmental circumstances, sufficient.
This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the plaintiff and
the defendant that the law enjoins husband and wife to live together,
and, secondly, exhort them to avail of mutually, earnestly and
steadfastly all opportunities for reconciliation to the end that their
marital differences may be happily resolved, and conjugal harmony
may return and, on the basis of mutual respect and understanding,
endure.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees
separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.
Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered
to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000
per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home,
which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased in the
discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of
attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without interest.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

fees and directing herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to
pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's
fees on a quantum meruit basis.
The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private
respondent handled the above-mentioned civil cases before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX
AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the
declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ
and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-08268 1affirming the order
of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's

The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are
undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as found by the trial court
and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A
certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10)
hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with
the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista
and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having
defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates
of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser
thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the
parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included
petitioner as defendant therein.
It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land
were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of
P600,000.00. On the same day, the properties were resold by the
latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for the
purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7,
1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for
P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that private respondent, did
not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service
Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution

of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on

August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the
aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its
attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and
oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the
same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the
attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases,
which had been consolidated and were pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints
therein, which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its
order dated September 5, 1983. On December 29, 1983, the same
court ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens
of private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to 453099 of the original seven (7)
parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its
attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated
an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984,
petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the
latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by
petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash
advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December
15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to
arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were
unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order
assailed on appeal before respondent court, granting payment of
attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive
portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby
granted and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Company (METROBANK) and Herby Commercial

and Construction Corporation 4 are hereby ordered
to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and Associates the
amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and
reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its
decision promulgated on February 11, 1988. A motion for
reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the
same was denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19,
1988, hence the present recourse.
The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present
petition may be formulated thus: (1) whether or not private
respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit
is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and (3) whether or not
private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruitbasis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no
enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil cases before the court
below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in
the words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the payment of
money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments. 6
We agree with petitioner.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have

caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his

client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as
security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a
condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the
attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees
by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in
which his services were rendered when something is due his client in
the action from which the fee is to be paid. 7
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the
initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their
claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money
judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in
favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so,
private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule,
without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to
generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an
ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.
In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its
position. In that case, movant-appellant attorney sought the payment
of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for
injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of
an agreement entered into by the litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage
by virtue of the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant
for damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no
amount having been awarded the defendant, herein
appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant,

could, by appropriate action, collect his fees as

attorney.
Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to
the "proceeds of a judgment of whatever nature," 10 relying on the
case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some
American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment
recovered by an attorney and the proceeds in whatever form they
may be. 12
The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is
true that there are some American cases holding that the lien
attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules
on which they are based and the factual situations involved therein
are neither explained nor may it be said that they are of continuing
validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid
that legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of
variegations or nuances upon adoption by other jurisdictions,
especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the
American cases it cited expressly declares that "in the absence of a
statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general
rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client,
notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the land in
question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his
client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by
such client, or defended successfully such client's right and title
against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the
situation in the case at bar. This is an inescapable recognition that a
contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in
doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated import.
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a
charging lien attaches only to judgments for money and executions in
pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec
verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and,
therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, barring any
necessity for elaborate interpretation. 14 Notably, the interpretation,

literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case

law despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case.
In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the Court had the occasion to
rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to
the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable
by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the
Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ."
Further, in Director of Lands vs.Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a)
charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for
the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the
instant case."

Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable

charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court
trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is
settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot
pass upon a petition to determine attorney's fees if the rule against
multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules,
however, apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable
under the rules.

Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted

as cited by private respondent, there was an express declaration that
"in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in
litigation."

A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil

suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be prosecuted and
the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The
persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the
right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or
amount. 23 Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon

money due his client from the adverse party in any action or
proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not
extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. 18 More
specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery against his client
as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an
attorney defending the client's title to property already in the client's
possession. 19
While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by
dismissing the case, terminating the services of his counsel, waiving
his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising
his action, 20 this rule cannot find application here as the termination
of the cases below was not at the instance of private respondent's
client but of the opposing party.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the
preceding discussion which amply demonstrates that private
respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.

On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as
not to preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility
of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.

Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services

rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements
to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject
matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3)
the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 These are aside from the
several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of
decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of
all these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a fullblown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence to
establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose
or refute the same.
Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as
imposing an unnecessary burden on private respondent in collecting
the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise
of any other right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should
be availed of and the procedural rules duly observed to forestall and
obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be

misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the

legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.
The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed
with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED
and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11,
1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as
may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to
attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3629

September 28, 1907

MATEA E. RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA CRUZ, AND
PROCESA DE LA CRUZ, defendants-appellees.
Chicote and Miranda, for appellant.
Leoncio Imperial and Carlos Imperial, for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 21st day of August, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys,
filed an amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of the

Province of Albay for the purpose of recovering from the defendant

certain pieces or parcels of land described in the complaint, alleging:
That she was the owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said
lands during her first marriage from her deceased father, Alejo
Rodriguez; that Hilarion de la Cruz was her second husband and that
she had permission from him to commence this action in her own
name against the said defendant; that she had been in possession of
said lands and enjoyed the fruits of the same, from the month of May,
1882, until the month of February, 1905; that the said Hilarion de la
Cruz had no interest or right in said property; that on or about the
20th of February 1905, the defendants in the cause commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay against
the said Hilarion de la Cruz for the partition of the lands described in
the present cause; that on the 29th day of March, 1905, the judge of
the said court adjudged in favor of the defendant Susana de la Cruz
in this action the ownership and possession of the lands described
under letter "B" in the complaint in this cause adjudging and
decreeing the ownership and possession of lands described in letter
"A" in this complaint to Escolastico de la Cruz; that the plaintiff in this
cause was not made a party in the action for partition between the
present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz.
To this petition the defendants filed a special denial, denying certain
parts of the facts set out in the complaint and admitting certain other
of the facts alleged in said complaint. As a special defense the
defendants set up the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay of the 29th of March, 1905.
The issue thus formed was duly submitted to the lower court, and
after hearing the evidence the lower court rendered a judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, dismissing the said
cause with costs to the plaintiff. The lower court found as a fact from
the evidence adduced during the trial that the lands described in the
complaint were acquired by Hilarion de la Cruz, the father of the
present defendants, "during his married life with his first wife, Andrea
de Leon," and that said lands were not inherited by the present
defendant from her father, Alejo Rodriguez.
From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court, alleging that
the lower court committed errors, in substance as follows:

1. That the lower court erred in considering the fact that the said
Matea E. Rodriguez did not intervene in said action for partition
between the said Hilarion de la Cruz and his children of the first
marriage as sufficient to show that she had no interest in the lands in
question.
2. That the court erred in declaring that the said Hilarion de la Cruz
was the owner of the lands in question, for simple fact that he had
been administering said lands during the entire period of his
marriage with the present plaintiff.
3. That the court erred in finding from the evidence that the said
Hilarion de la Cruz has acquired said lands during the existence of
his marriage relation with the said Andrea de Leon, his first wife, and
that said lands were not inherited by the present plaintiff from her
deceased father.
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that for the reason that the said Matea E.
Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for partition
between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, her
interest in said lands was in no way prejudiced by the decision of the
court in that cause.
Section 277 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions provides,
among other things, that proceedings in a cause against one person
can not affect the rights of another.
It is admitted by the parties in the present action that the said Matea
E. Rodriguez was not made a party in the former action for the
partition between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la
Cruz, neither is it shown that she had any knowledge or information
concerning the existence or pendency of said action.,
With reference of the second assignment of error above noted, it is
admitted that soon after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz
with the present plaintiff he commenced to administer the property in
question. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a
husband from administering the property of his wife, as her

representative, and certainly it can not be concluded that the

property which he administers for his wife is his for the mere reason
that he has administered the same for a long time.
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the
ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation.
It is true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the
management of the property, unless she was delivered the same to
her husband by means of a public document, providing that he may
administer said property; but it can not be claimed; from the mere
fact that she has permitted her husband to administer her property
without having his authority to do so evidenced by a public
document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same
has become the property of her husband. No such claim was made
in the court below on behalf of the defendants. Their claim was that
the said Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired said property during the
existence of his marriage with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.
With reference to the third assignment of error above noted, we are
of the opinion, and so hold, after an examination of the evidence
adduced during the trial of said cause, that the said lands in question
were acquired by Matea E. Rodriguez by inheritance during the
existence of her first marriage, from her deceased father, Alejo
Rodriguez.
Therefore, from all the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion that the
judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and it is hereby
ordered that the said cause be remanded to the lower court with
direction that a judgment be entered declaring that the said plaintiffs,
Matea E. Rodriguez, is the owner and is entitled to the possession,
as against the said defendants, of the lands described i the amended
complaint presented in this cause.
Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Promulgated:
MELKI E. PEREZ,
Respondent.

June 8, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SECOND DIVISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DAVID V.
PELAYO,

PELAYO

and

Petitioners,

LORENZA* B.

G.R. No. 141323

Present:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the

reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated

PUNO, Chairman

- versus -

on April 20, 1999 which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 91-46;
CALLEJO, SR.,
and the CA Resolution dated December 17, 1999 denying petitioners
TINGA, and
motion for reconsideration.
CHICO-NAZARIO,

The antecedent facts as aptly narrated by the CA are as

follows:

David Pelayo (Pelayo),by a Deed of

Absolute Sale executed on January 11, 1988,
conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of
agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao
which are portions of Lot 4192, Cad. 276 covered by
OCT P-16873.

Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and

another one whose signature is illegible witnessed
the execution of the deed.

Loreza, however, signed only on the third

page in the space provided for witnesses on account
of which Perez application for registration of the
deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Tagum, Davao was denied.

Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on

the first and second pages of the deed but she
refused, hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the
instant complaint for specific performance against
her and her husband Pelayo (defendants).

The defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of

action, citing Section 6 of RA 6656 otherwise known

as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
took effect on June 10, 1988 and which provides that
contracts executed prior thereto shall be valid only
when registered with the Register of Deeds within a
period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this
Act.

The questioned deed having been executed

on January 10, 1988, the defendants claimed that
Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988 within
which to register the same, but as they failed to, it is
not valid and, therefore, unenforceable.

The trial court thus dismissed the complaint.

On appeal to this Court, the dismissal was set aside
and the case was remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.

In their Answer, the defendants claimed that

as the lots were occupied illegally by some persons
against whom they filed an ejectment case, they and
Perez who is their friend and known at the time as
an activist/leftist, hence feared by many, just made it
appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him in
order to frighten said illegal occupants, with the
intentional omission of Lorezas signature so that the
deed could not be registered; and that the deed
being simulated and bereft of consideration is
void/inexistent.

Perez countered that the lots were given to

him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of his
services as his attorney-in-fact to make the
necessary representation and negotiation with the
illegal occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit;
and that after his relationship with defendant Pelayo
became sour, the latter sent a letter to the Register
of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not to entertain
any transaction concerning the lots title to which was
entrusted to Perez who misplaced and could [not]
locate it.

Defendant Pelayo claimed in any event, in

his Pre-trial brief filed on March 19, 1996, that the
deed was without his wife Lorezas consent, hence,
in light of Art. 166 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 166. Unless the wife

has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent . . .

it is null and void.

The trial court, finding, among others, that

Perez did not possess, nor pay the taxes on the lots,
that defendant Pelayo was indebted to Perez for
services rendered and, therefore, the deed could

only be considered as evidence of debt, and that in

any event, there was no marital consent to nor
actual consideration for the deed, held that the deed
was null and void and accordingly rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering and
directing the defendants to pay
plaintiff Melki Perez the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos as
principal with 12% interest per
annum starting from the date of filing
of the complaint on August 1, 1991
until plaintiff is fully paid.

The
defendants
shall
likewise pay to plaintiff the sum of
THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) as
attorneys fees.

The court further orders that

the Deed of Absolute Sale, (Annex
A) of the complaint and (Annex C) of
the plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is declared null and void
and without force and it is likewise
removed as a cloud over defendants
title and property in suit. . . .[2]

The RTC Decision was appealed by herein respondent

Perez to the CA. Petitioners failed to file their appellees brief. The CA

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the following

grounds:

then promulgated its Decision on April 20, 1999 whereby it ruled that
by Lorenzas signing as witness to the execution of the deed, she had
knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given her
consent to the same; that herein petitioners failed to adduce
sufficient proof to overthrow the presumption that there was
consideration for the deed, and that petitioner David Pelayo, being a
lawyer, is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed
the deed with full knowledge of its contents and import. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, declaring as valid and

1. The CA erred in ignoring the specific provision of Section

6, in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 which took effect on
June 15, 1988 and which provides that contracts executed prior
thereto shall be valid only when registered with the Register of
Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this
Act.

enforceable the questioned deed of sale and ordering herein

petitioner Lorenza Pelayo to affix her signature on all pages of said
document.

2. The CA erred in holding that the deed of sale was valid

and considering the P10,000.00 adjudged by the trial court as Perezs
remuneration as the consideration for the deed of sale, instead of

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the decision but the

same was denied per Resolution dated December 17, 1999. The CA
found said motion to have been filed out of time and ruled that even
putting aside technicality, petitioners failed to present any ground
bearing on the merits of the case to justify a reversal or setting aside
of the decision.

declaring the same as null and void for being fictitious or simulated
and on the basis of Art. 491, Par. 2 of the New Civil Code which
prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase properties from his
principal under his charge.

3. The CA made a novel ruling that there was implied marital

consent of the wife of petitioner David Pelayo.

unjustified refusal to sign two pages of the deed despite several

requests of respondent; and that therefore, the CA ruled that the
deed of sale subject of this case is valid under R.A. No. 6657.

4. Petitioners should have been allowed to file their

appellees brief to ventilate their side, considering the existence of

Respondent further maintains that the CA correctly held in its

peculiar circumstances which prevented petitioners from filing said

assailed Decision that there was consideration for the contract and

brief.

that Lorenza is deemed to have given her consent to the deed of

sale.
On the other hand, respondent points out that the CA, in

resolving

the

first

appeal

docketed

as

CA-G.R.

SP

No.

Respondent likewise opines that the CA was right in denying

38700[3] brought by respondent assailing the RTC Order granting

petitioners motion for reconsideration where they prayed that they be

herein petitioners motion to dismiss, already ruled that under R.A.

allowed to file their appellees brief as their counsel failed to file the

No. 6657, the sale or transfer of private agricultural land is allowed

same on account of said counsels failing health due to cancer of the

only when the area of the land being conveyed constitutes or is a

liver. Respondent emphasized that in petitioners motion for

part of, the landowner-seller retained area and when the total

reconsideration, they did not even cite any errors made by the CA in

landholding of the purchaser-transferee, including the property sold,

its Decision.

does not exceed five (5) hectares; that in this case, the land in
dispute is only 1.3 hectares and there is no proof that the transferees
(herein respondent) total landholding inclusive of the subject land will
exceed 5 hectares, the landholding ceiling prescribed by R.A. No.
6657; that the failure of respondent to register the instrument was not
due to his fault or negligence but can be attributed to Lorenzas

The issues boil down to the question of whether or not the

deed of sale was null and void on the following grounds: (a) for not
complying with the provision in R.A. No. 6657 that such document
must be registered with the Register of Deeds within three months

after the effectivity of said law; (b) for lack of marital consent; (c) for
being prohibited under Article 1491 (2) of the Civil Code; and (d) for
lack of consideration.
We rule against petitioners.

Aside from declaring that the failure of respondent to register the

deed was not of his own fault or negligence, the CA ruled that
respondents failure to register the deed of sale within three months
after effectivity of The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law did not

The issue of whether or not the deed of sale is null and void
under R.A. No. 6657, for respondents failure to register said

invalidate the deed of sale as the transaction over said property is

not proscribed by R.A. No. 6657.

document with the Register of Deeds within three months after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, had been resolved with finality by the CA
in its Decision dated November 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38700.
[4]

Herein petitioners no longer elevated said CA Decision to this

Court and the same became final and executory on January 7, 1995.

Thus, under the principle of law of the case, said ruling of the
CA is now binding on petitioners. Such principle was elucidated
in Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals,[6] to wit:

[5]

In said decision, the CA interpreted Section 4, in relation to

Section 70 of R.A. No. 6657, to mean thus:

. . . the proper interpretation of both sections

is that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale or transfer of a
private agricultural land is allowed only when said
land area constitutes or is a part of the landownerseller retained area and only when the total
landholdings of the purchaser-transferee, including
the property sold does not exceed five (5) hectares.

Law of the case has been defined as the

opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term
applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the case to
the lower court for further proceedings, the question
there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
or decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

In their Pre-Trial Brief,[9] petitioners admitted that even prior

Petitioners not having questioned the Decision of the CA dated

to 1988, they have been having serious problems, including threats

November 24, 1994 which then attained finality, the ruling that the

to the life of petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal

deed of sale subject of this case is not among the transactions

occupants of the property in question, so that respondent, whom

deemed as invalid under R.A. No. 6657, is now immutable.

many feared for being a leftist/activist, offered his help in driving out
said illegal occupants.

We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by

affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for

Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware

witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the

of serious problems such as threats to her husbands life and the

contract of sale.

reasons for such threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners

problems over the subject property had been going on for quite some
time, so it is highly improbable for Lorenza not to be aware of what

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere

[7]

consent, which may either be express or implied. A wifes consent to

the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have
to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is
shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed

her husband was doing to remedy such problems. Petitioners do not

deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present during the execution of the
deed of sale as her signature appears thereon. Neither do they claim
that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about the
contents of the subject document. Thus, it is quite

[8]

given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the

deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,
circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the
fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal
property and consented to the sale.

certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between
her husband and respondent.

Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person

takes ordinary care of his concerns.[10] Petitioners did not even
attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as no

husband
property
consent.
consent,
same.

cannot alienate or encumber any real

of the conjugal property without the wifes
If she refuses unreasonably to give her
the court may compel her to grant the

evidence was ever presented to show that Lorenza was in any way
lacking in her mental faculties and, hence, could not have fully

...

understood the ramifications of signing the deed of sale. Neither did

petitioners present any evidence that Lorenza had been defrauded,
forced, intimidated or threatened either by her own husband or by
respondent into affixing her signature on the subject document. If
Lorenza had any objections over the conveyance of the disputed
property, she could have totally refrained from having any part in the
execution of the deed of sale. Instead, Lorenza even affixed her
signature thereto.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage,

and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her
consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud
her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of

the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988
when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent
to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract
void ab initio but merely voidable. Said provisions of law provide:

Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the
court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife
whose consent was not obtained. [11] In the present case, despite
respondents repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on
all the pages of the deed of sale, showing respondents insistence on

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared

a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the

enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment
of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a complaint for

specific performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up

Lorenzas alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if

...

the transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenzas consent,

we find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years,
Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale

may have been entrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal has been given;

assailed contract.
...
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that
Lorenza knew of the full import of the transaction between
respondent and her

In Distajo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] a landowner, Iluminada

Abiertas, designated one of her sons as the administrator of several
parcels of her land. The landowner subsequently executed a Deed of

husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in

effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal
property.

With regard to petitioners asseveration that the deed of sale

is invalid under Article 1491, paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, we
find such argument unmeritorious. Article 1491 (2) provides:

Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by

purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another:

Certification of Sale of Unregistered Land, conveying some of said

land to her son/administrator. Therein, we held that:

Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the

prohibition against agents purchasing property in
their hands for sale or management is not absolute.
It does not apply if the principal consents to the sale
of the property in the hands of the agent or
administrator. In this case, the deeds of sale signed
by Iluminada Abiertas shows that she gave consent
to the sale of the properties in favor of her son, Rufo,
who was the administrator of the properties. Thus,
the consent of the principal Iluminada Abiertas
removes the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in Article 1491(2).[13]

respondents services, they executed the subject deed of sale. Aside

from such services rendered by respondent, petitioners also
acknowledged in the deed of sale that they received in full the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos. Evidently, the consideration for the
sale is respondents services plus the aforementioned cash money.

Petitioners contend that the consideration stated in the deed

of sale is excessively inadequate, indicating that the deed of sale

The above-quoted ruling is exactly in point with this case

before us. Petitioners, by signing the Deed of Sale in favor of

was merely simulated. We are not persuaded. Our ruling

in Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals[15] is pertinent, to wit:

respondent, are also deemed to have given their consent to the sale
of the subject property in favor of respondent, thereby making the
transaction an exception to the general rule that agents are

. . . Indeed, there is no requirement that the

price be equal to the exact value of the subject
matter of sale. . . . As we stated in Vales vs. Villa:

prohibited from purchasing the property of their principals.

Petitioners also argue that the CA erred in ruling that there

was consideration for the sale. We find no error in said appellate
courts ruling. The element of consideration for the sale is indeed
present. Petitioners, in adopting the trial courts narration of
antecedent facts in their petition, [14] thereby admitted that they
authorized respondent to represent them in negotiations with the
squatters occupying the disputed property and, in consideration of

Courts cannot follow one

every step of his life and extricate
him from bad bargains, protect him
from unwise investments, relieve
him from one-sided contracts, or
annul the effects of foolish acts.
Courts cannot constitute themselves
guardians of persons who are not
legally incompetent. Courts operate
not because one person has been
defeated or overcome by another,
but because he has been defeated
or overcome illegally. Men may do

foolish things, make ridiculous

contracts, use miserable judgment,
and lose money by them indeed, all
they have in the world; but not for
that alone can the law intervene and
restore. There must be, in addition,
a violation of
the
law,
the
commission of what the law knows
as an actionable wrong, before the
courts are authorized to lay hold of
the situation and remedy it.[16]

Such act is a clear indication that they intended to convey the subject
property to herein respondent and the deed of sale was not merely
simulated or fictitious.

Lastly, petitioners claim that they were not able to fully

ventilate their defense before the CA as their lawyer, who was then
suffering from cancer of the liver, failed to file their appellees brief.
Thus, in their motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, they
prayed that they be allowed to submit such appellees brief. The CA,

Verily, in the present case, petitioners have not presented proof that

in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, stated thus:

there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence exercised upon

them by respondent. It is highly unlikely and contrary to human
experience that a layman like respondent would be able to defraud,
exert undue influence, or in any way vitiate the consent of a lawyer
like petitioner David Pelayo who is expected to be more
knowledgeable in the ways of drafting contracts and other legal
transactions.

Furthermore, in their Reply to Respondents Memorandum,

[17]

petitioners adopted the CAs narration of fact that petitioners

stated in a letter they sent to the Register of Deeds of Tagum that

they have entrusted the titles over subject lots to herein respondent.

By
movant-defendant-appellees
own
information, his counsel received a copy of the
decision on May 5, 1999. He, therefore, had fifteen
(15) days from said date or up to May 20, 1999 to
file the motion. The motion, however, was sent
through a private courier and, therefore, considered
to have been filed on the date of actual receipt on
June 17, 1999 by the addressee Court of Appeals,
was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Technicality aside, movant has not proffered

any ground bearing on the merits of the case why
the decision should be set aside.

Petitioners never denied the CA finding that their motion for

reconsideration of the order or decision in question. [19] In this case,

reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period.

petitioners had the opportunity to fully expound on their defenses

On that point alone, the CA is correct in denying due course to said

through a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners did file such motion

motion. The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had

but they wasted such opportunity by failing to present therein

then attained finality. Thus, in Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation,

whatever errors they believed the CA had committed in its Decision.

[18]

Definitely,

we held that:

therefore,

the

denial

of

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration, praying that they be allowed to file appellees brief,

. . . Nothing is more settled in law than that
once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.

did not infringe petitioners right to due process as any issue that
petitioners wanted to raise could and should have been contained in
said motion for reconsideration.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and

the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 1999 and its
Resolution dated December 17, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Moreover, it is pointed out by the CA that said motion did not

present any defense or argument on the merits of the case that could
have convinced the CA to reverse or modify its Decision.

We have consistently held that a petitioners right to due

process is not violated where he was able to move for

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN

MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent.

BANK, petitioner, vs.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which
affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil
Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were
married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses
purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San
Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real
Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was

executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee

thereof to the exclusion of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house
and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained
a loan in the amount ofP300,000.00 from petitioner. As security
therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the
SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and
consent of respondent.[4]
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After
the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed,
petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership
thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[5]
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20,
1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean
its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because
Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature,
respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San
Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate
Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on

October 18, 1997. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of
evidence the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the
plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated
December 1, 1993 executed before Notary
Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register
entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book
No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public
Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
executed by the defendant over the residential
lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo
City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered
as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III,
Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M.
Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this
complaint to the plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00

representing the value of the car which was burned.

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE

LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS
CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.

ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION

1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as
attorneys fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject
property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to
their conjugal partnership.[7] The appellate court declared as void the
mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without
the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article
124 of the Family Code. Thus, it upheld the trial courts order to
reconvey the subject property to respondent. [8] With respect to the
damage to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to be
liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the
acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned
task.[9] All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial courtsDecision,
but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of
basis.[10]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts
consideration:

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE

FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.[11]
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to
the factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the
Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil
Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code
requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail
the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion

of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of coownership.[12] Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the
validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s
share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[13] it was held that the sale of a
conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
[14]
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that
the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale. The same principle
in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code
as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on
August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between respondent and her late husband. [15] With
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gainsin the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. [16]
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance.[17] Unlike the absolute community
of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner,[18] the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. [19] Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former

prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only

when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance
of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the
share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in
the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of
the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.[20] Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage
on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the
principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the
conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of
the family.[21]
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must
have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There
must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit.[22]
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such.[23] Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). [24] Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to

finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded

to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does
not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there
is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded
to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that
during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject
property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the
proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.[25] A party may change his legal theory on appeal
only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143382

November 29, 2006

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL
J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA,Respondents.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third
party?
This issue confronts us in this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the November 9, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48107.

On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its

president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for aP12,000,000 credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C.
Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the
payment of the loan.
On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and
increased to P14,000,000. Individual respondents correspondingly
executed a new indemnity agreement in favor of the bank to secure
the increased credit line.
On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation availed of its credit
line and received the sum of P9,952,000 which it undertook to pay on
or before November 30, 1981. It was able to pay P4,648,000 for the
principal loan andP2,729,195.56 for the interest and other charges.
However, respondent corporation was not able to pay the balance as
it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint
for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against
respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 66. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3947.

On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real
and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot
of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan,
Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
49158 was levied on.
The RTC rendered its decision3 on June 20, 1994. It held respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally
liable to petitioner for P5,304,000 plus 12% interest per annum and
5% penalty commencing on June 21, 1982 until fully paid,
plus P10,000 as attorneys fees. It, however, found that the obligation
contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on
the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner makes two basic assertions: (1) the RTC and CA erred in
finding that respondent corporation availed ofP9,952,000 only from
its credit line and not the entire P14,000,000 and (2) the RTC and CA
were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez
spouses could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by
individual respondent Martinez.
We uphold the CA.

Subsequently, however, petitioner had the case dismissed with

respect to individual respondents Lacson and Lopa, 2 leaving
Martinez as the remaining individual respondent.

Factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, will not
be disturbed on appeal but must be accorded great weight. 4 These
findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on this Court as
well.5
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the amount availed of by
respondent corporation from its credit line with petitioner was
only P9,952,000. Both courts correctly pointed out that petitioner

itself admitted this amount when it alleged in paragraph seven of its

complaint that respondent corporation "borrowed and received the
principal sum ofP9,952,000."6 Petitioner was therefore bound by the
factual finding of the appellate and trial courts, as well as by its own
judicial admission, on this particular point.

We now move on to the principal issue in this case.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another

person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.12 It is for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.13 In the absence of any
showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.14

Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code,8 the conjugal partnership is

liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the
benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the
said provision?

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of
the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit.
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.

We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de

Garcia9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the
husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as
the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to

the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect
the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. 15 The underlying
concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal
partnership.16 Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership
only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

At any rate, the issue of the amount actually availed of by respondent

corporation is factual. It is not within the ambit of this Courts
discretionary power of judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which is concerned solely with questions of law.7

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the
transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts
an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal
presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.11

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 99357 January 27, 1992

MA. LOURDES VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLUE CROSS INSURANCE,
INC., respondents.
Aggabao, Fernandez, Arellano & Fule Law Offices for petitioner.
Samuel F. Baldado for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1991,
reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24120, entitled "Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross
Insurance, Inc."
Petitioner's plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October
12, 1989, she filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission
alleging, inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of
P7,535.00, private respondent executed a policy of sickness and
accident insurance; that on August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted
to a hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for
cholecystitis; that petitioner paid the hospital and doctor's bills in the
aggregate sum of P48,934.05, the same being the actual hospital
and professional fees charged to her; and that private respondent
wrongfully refused to pay petitioner the said amount which she is
entitled to recover under the policy.
Private respondent's answer raised the special and affirmative
defenses that under the insurance policy, definitions and exclusions
were clearly specified and among the exclusions are conditions
which pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which
the insured was aware or should reasonably be aware; and that
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence petitioner's sickness
is non-compensable.
On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its
decision in I.C. Case No. 3277 in favor of petitioner ordering private
respondent to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied,
plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. In the main, the Insurance
Commission, after a review of the evidence presented, concluded
that petitioner's illness, contrary to private respondent's defenses,
was not a pre-existing disease and therefore, is fully compensable. 1

According to respondent court, a copy of said decision was received

by private respondent on September 27, 1990. On October 15, 1990,
or more than the fifteen (15) days allowed by Section 2, Republic Act
No. 5434, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
petitioner opposed. On December 13, 1990, the Insurance
Commission denied said motion for reconsideration. 2 On December
17, 1990, private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the
Insurance Commission. 3
On March 15, 1991, the Third Division of respondent Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of
time and that private respondent did not duly file a copy of its notice
of appeal with respondent Court as mandated by Republic Act No.
5434. 4
Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 5434, private respondent had ten (10) days from its
receipt on December 14, 1990 of the aforesaid order denying its
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. While respondent
court, in its resolution of May 8, 1991, subsequently agreed that
private respondent filed its notice of appeal with the Insurance
Commission within the said 10-day period, no such notice was filed
with respondent court as required by Section 3, Republic Act No.
5434.
Private respondent then moved for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of its appeal. On May 8, 1991, the Special Third Division of
respondent court resolved to reconsider its original resolution and
ordered the reinstatement of the appeal "in keeping with the ends of
substantial justice." 5
Hence, the petition at bar with the following assignment of errors:
1. The respondent court committed an error in
reinstating the appeal when it has no jurisdiction to
do so, no notice of appeal having been filed with it.

2. The manner of appeal from quasi-judicial bodies

has been fixed with the solemnity of a statute; the
Court of Appeals erred in ignoring it. 6
We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in
reconsidering its previous resolution dismissing herein private
respondent's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120. The dismissal of said
appeal is proper and fully justified by private respondent's failure to
file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as required by
Republic Act No. 5434 for the perfection of its appeal from the
decision of the Insurance Commission.
The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During the period relevant to and
involved in the appeal from the Insurance Commission to respondent
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120, subject of the present review, the
appeal to the Court of Appeals from said quasi-judicial body was
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same are not inconsistent with the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. 7
As restated and clarified in the Lacsamana case, to perfect an
appeal under Republic Act No. 5434, the following rules must be
observed:

In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court

of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section
22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals
and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days
from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment; or in case a motion for reconsideration is
filed within said period, then within ten days from
notice of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434).
No extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is
needed, much less allowed. 8
It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be
filed both with the Court of Appeals and with the board, commission
or agency that made or rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a
notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the Insurance
Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The said failure of petitioner to comply with the
requirements of law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its
present remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance
Commission final and executory and the same can no longer be a
subject of review. 9
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional. 10 The failure to perfect an appeal as required
by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party
and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
case. 11
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 12 The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of
the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 13

It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed

where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. 14 In the case at bar,
however, the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of
liberality, nor has the private respondent advanced any compelling
reason to warrant the same. In fact, in its original
resolution, 15 respondent court itself expounded at length on the very
same doctrines enjoining strict compliance with the rules governing
appeals which we have set out herein and, on such considerations,
dismissed the appeal therein.
Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues
raised are mainly factual. The decision of the Insurance Commission
was based on its findings that the illness of private respondent,
cholecystitis, was not a pre-existing ailment and is, therefore, fully
compensable. It further specifically found that private respondent
failed to prove petitioner's awareness of that pre-existing condition
which is excluded under the insurance policy. We find no reason to
disturb the said findings which are supported by the evidence on
record and the conclusions of experts.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals
from handling specific matters falling under their
jurisdiction. 16 Courts cannot take cognizance of such factual
issues. 17 In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court
cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. 18

It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless ENDING delays
and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 19 For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply
strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to
warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. 20 Otherwise, the rules
must strictly apply, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The challenged resolution of
respondent court dated May 8, 1991 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and its resolution of March 15, 1991 is REINSTATED. The
decision of the Insurance Commission in I.C. Case No. 3277, dated
September 21, 1990, is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 21
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JESUS BERNAS and
REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners
in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as Lot 13, their ownership
being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3239 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas,
adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed on May 2, 1952. The southern portion, described
as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the northern, to
Federico. 1
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his
name from the Capiz Registry of Property, numbered T-1346. He
died on April 20, 1973, at the age of 81 years. His wife, Victoria
Comorro, predeceased him dying at age 70 on July 16, 1971. They
had no children. 2
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate
children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These
two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As security therefor
they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C. In the
"Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage" executed between
them and Bernas on October 30, 1975, they described themselves
as the absolute co-owners of Lot 13-C. A relative, Raymundo Aranas,
signed the agreement as a witness. 3

Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas

caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C
on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land at the auction sale as the
highest bidder. 4 After the foreclosure sale, Dorothea and Teodoro
executed a deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated June 21, 1978, in
which they adjudicated the same Lot 13-C unto themselves in equal
shares pro-indiviso.: nad
On October 25, 1978 Bernas consolidated his ownership over Lot
13-C, the mortgagors having failed to redeem the same within the
reglementary period, and had the latter's title (No. T-1346 in the
name of Modesto Aranas) cancelled and another issued in his name,
TCT No. T-15121. 5
About a month later, or on November 24, 1978, Consolacion
Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas who, as aforestated, was an
instrumental witness in the deed of mortgage executed by Dorothea
and Teodoro Aranas on October 30, 1975 filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City against Jesus Bernas and his
spouse, Remedios Bernas. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. V-4188, and assigned to Branch 14. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs prayed that the latter's title over Lot 13-C, TCT No. T-15121,
be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They
grounded their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on or
about November 20, 1978 of two (2) wills, one executed on February
11, 1958 by Modesto Aranas, and the other, executed on October 29,
1957 by his wife, Victoria Comorro. Victoria Comorro's will allegedly
bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo, and to Dorothea and
Teodoro Aranas, in equal shares pro indiviso, all of said Victoria
Comorro's "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . . as
her net share from (the) conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Modesto Aranas . . ." Modesto Aranas' will, on the other
hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas (his illegitimate
children) all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria "as
well as his own capital property brought by him to (his) marriage with
his said wife." 6
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on certain facts, including the
following:
1) that the property in question was registered before the
mortgage in the name of the late Modesto Aranas, married to

Victoria Comorro, (covered by) TCT No. 1346, issued on

March 21, 1953;

4) that the lot in question is not expressly mentioned in the

will; and

and Jesus Bernas married to Remedios

O. Bernas, over the lot in question
executed on October 30, 1975 before
Notary Public Roland D. Abalajon and
the corresponding Certificate of Title No.
T-15121 registered in the name of Jesus
Bernas (defendants spouses) as having
been
executed
and
issued
in
accordance with law, are declared legal
and valid;

5) that TCT No. 15121 exists, and was issued in favor of

defendant spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios Bernas.:cralaw

6) For failure to prove all other counter-claim

and damages, the same are hereby
dismissed.

2) that the wills above described were probated only after the
filing of the case (No. V-4188);
3) that Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas are
not children of either Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro;

Trial ensued after which judgment was rendered adversely to the

plaintiffs, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas. 7 The
dispositive part of the judgment reads as follows: 8
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs as follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed and
ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the
defendants the following:
1) THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,500.00) as attorney's fees;
2) FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
actual damages;
3) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
as moral damages;
4) Declaring the defendants spouses Jesus
Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas as
legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and
including all the improvements thereon;
5) Declaring the loan agreement with real
estate mortgage (Exh. '2') entered into
by Dorothea Aranas Ado married to
Reynaldo F. Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas

7) To pay costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where
they succeeded only in having the award of actual and moral
damages deleted, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court having
been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, 9 Consolacion Villanueva
appealed to this Court. Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
The only question is, what right was acquired by Consolacion
Villanueva over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by
virtue of Victoria Camorro's last will and testament giving to her all of
said Victoria's "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . .
as her net share from (the) conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Modesto Aranas . . ." She is admittedly, not named an
heiress in Modesto Aranas' will.: nad
Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not "conjugal
partnership property" of Victoria Comorro and her husband, Modesto
Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property, which he had
inherited from his parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa,
the original owners of the property registered solely in his name,
under TCT T-1346. Whether Modesto succeeded to the property
prior or subsequent to his marriage to Victoria Comorro the record
being unfortunately none too clear on the point is inconsequential.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter

of law. This is what Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that
to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter
alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that
which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title." Thus,
even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot
13-C took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot
would nonetheless be his "exclusive property" because acquired by
him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two (2)
years ahead of her husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of
Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never
therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of
Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva
or anybody else.
It would seem, however, that there are improvements standing on Lot
13-C, and it is to these improvements that Consolacion Villanueva's
claims are directed. The question then is, whether or not the
improvements are conjugal property, so that Victoria Comorro may
be said to have acquired a right over them by succession, as
voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either
the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership," and
buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same." 10 Proof, therefore, is needful of the
time of the making or construction of the improvements and the
source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character
of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to
one spouse separately. No such proof was presented or proferred by
Consolacion Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that the
land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of
Modesto Aranas and that where, as here, property is registered in
the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when
precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that it
belongs exclusively to said spouse. 11 It is not therefore possible to
declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.

Yet another consideration precludes relief to Consolacion Villanueva

and that is, that when Lot 13-C was mortgaged to Jesus Bernas, the
title was free of any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim presented
by or for Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else, and that when
Bernas subsequently consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C and
obtained title in his name, the Registry of Deeds contained no record
of any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim affecting the property.
Furthermore, Bernas' mode of acquisition of ownership over the
property, i.e., by a mortgage sale, appears in all respects to be
regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore
be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to Lot 13-C
which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising
and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
assertion and ventilation.:-cralaw
Finally, it bears stressing that the conclusion of the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the evidence establishes that the property in
question was the exclusive property of one spouse, not conjugal, is a
factual one which, absent any satisfactory showing of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Appellate Court in
reaching it, is not reviewable by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
subject of this appeal, being in accord with the evidence and
applicable law and jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997]

ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and
ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN
and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants-spouses Celestino U. Tan and
Rosario Dy, and Maximo U. Tan and Teresita Sy to partition the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 46249, deliver to plaintiff Eteria
Teves Tan the one-third share of plaintiffs-spouses Alfonso U. Tan
and Eteria Teves Tan; to pay Eteria Teves Tan P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The antecedents are as follows:

On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was

instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein
private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and
Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was
alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at
Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the
provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso
and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3)
portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the
action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963,
the brothers together with other siblings put up a business which they
registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was engaged in the
sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are
entitled to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business,
so that, an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the partnership,
as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper
in the premises.[2]
On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer
alleging that an accounting is not feasible because the company had
long been dissolved by the partners on September 30, 1982 on
account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each
partner was already given him. It was further alleged that Alfonso
mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager and,
as a consequence thereof, incurred advances and indebtedness
from the partnership in the amount of P130,000.00. Finally, private
respondents asserted that Alfonsos one-third (1/3) share of the
subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in
order to secure a loan he obtained from her.[3]
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at the
instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim
whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is
concerned. He prayed that the case be dismissed. [4] The trial court, in
its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but recognized
his reluctance to prosecute.[5]
Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan
but they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal

separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations

Court on August 31, 1977;[6] that during their marriage, they bought a
residential lot consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 46249[7]and that the funds used in the
construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan
she and her husband secured, although it was her husband and
mother-in-law who drew the loan.[8]
Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried
to establish the following: (a) that the family business, Bel Air Auto
Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982 on account
of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that
Alfonso had no more claim against the family business because he
borrowed heavily on his equity in the family business and from his
brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by
them from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed
money from their sister, Lolita, and as a consequence thereof,
mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso
failed to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question
was constructed using funds from a loan contracted by their mother
from the Social Security System (SSS). [9] No documentary evidence,
however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation
that the property was inherited from their mother.
As above-stated, a Decision[10] dated July 12, 1991 was
rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot with
improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through
installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and
their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot was acquired
during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be
deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal
property of the spouses. However, with respect to the business
dealing in auto spare parts, the same had been dissolved due to
losses.
On September 19, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[11] of the decision contending that the 906-square
meter lot, together with other properties, was actually inherited by the
Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on
December 15, 1968 but said lot was adjudicated to the three (3)
brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and

Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8,

1969, xerox copy of which was attached to the motion. [12] The lot was
described in the document as:
A parcel of land (lot 6448-C-5 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd21849 being a portion of Lot 6448-C with an area of 906 sq. meters
and described on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38759. Tax
declaration No. 022318. Assessed at P2,800.00.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs which was the basis
of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot in question
from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during
the trial.[13]
Aggrieved by the ruling, private respondents, the spouses
Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita
Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
reversed and set aside the said judgment. Respondent court ruled
that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage
of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan
brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their
exclusive property.
We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:
x x x. It is true that under the New Civil Code, all properties of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
be proved that it pertains to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160,
NCC).The provision of law on presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property requires the party who invoked it to prove first that the
property in controversy was acquired during marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22300, May 22, 1960, 23 SCRA
637-644).
On the other hand, the herein appellants, thru Maximo Tan, insist that
the property in dispute was acquired by inheritance from their late
mother Trinidad Uy Tan, who died on 15 November 1968 (pp. 17-17-

a, TSN; Dec. 21, 1990). There is documentary proof to support the

testimony of Maximo Tan that indeed the property in dispute was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother,
Trinidad Uy Tan. We note that the 906-square meter lot is registered
in the name of: ALFONSO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Eteria Teves of Bulacao, Pardo, Cebu City; CELESTINO U. TAN,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Rosario Dy Kushin of Banawa, Hill
No. 2; and MAXIMO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, single; of Banawa,
Hill No. 2, of Cebu City, Philippines, with equal shares. From the very
wording of the title, it can be deduced that 1/3 portion of the property
solely belongs to Alfonso Tan. The property is registered in the
names of the three brothers as married to their respective
spouses. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed:
(H)ad the property been acquired by them (spouses) during
coverture, it would have been registered in the name not of
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez' but the spouses
'Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez' (Ponce de Leon vs.
R.F.C., 36 SCRA 289, 312).
The title further states that the property is subject to the 'liabilities
imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, for a period of
two (2) years, from January 9, 1970, against the estate of the
deceased Trinidad Uy'. (Exh. 'A') [underlines Ours]. This condition
supports the contention of the herein appellants that the lot was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. It
shows that the 1/3 portion of the property belongs exclusively to
Alfonso U. Tan, and that it is not part of the conjugal partnership of
gains.[14]
From this ruling, Eteria Teves Tan seeks a second assessment
of the case in the present petition for review raising the following
errors, to wit:
1. That since respondent Court of Appeals had already ruled that 1/3
portion of the lot in litigation was acquired by Alfonso Tan while said
Alfonso Tan and his wife Eteria were still living together, the
presumption of conjugality remains and it is not petitioner but private
respondents who have the burden of proof to prove otherwise.

2. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of

the lot in question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because
the Certificate of Title states that the lot is registered in the name of
ALFONSO U. TAN, xxx married to Eteria Teves xxx; CELESTINO U.
TAN xxx married to Rosario Dy Kushin xxx and MAXIMO U. TAN is
against well-settled jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.[15]
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.[16] It is not necessary, to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. [17] So that when an immovable
was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is considered as
conjugal property.[18] In fact, even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and
it will be considered conjugal property.[19]
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence that the property belongs
exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.[20]
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the
undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the
conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had
inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the
property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan,
married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy
Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear
from TCT No. 46249 that the title was entered on January 9, 1970
and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late
Trinidad Uy to her children when she died intestate and which
property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the
Extrajudicial
Declaration
of
Heirs
and Adjudication
of
Properties. While this document was not admitted as evidence
because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents'
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the

source of the property can be reasonably and materially inferred from

TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is
subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court for a period of two (2) years, from January 9, 1979 against
the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy." [21] Such imposition on
property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived
of their lawful participation of the estate of the decedent. The
presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249, which was carried over
from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of
summary settlement of an estate from where the property was
derived, that of private respondents' deceased mother. There can be
no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to
Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as
Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148
of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
x x x.
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
x x x.
In Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [22] we ruled that
the husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his
marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively
property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by
lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil
Code.
On the other hand, petitioner had adduced no evidence at all
that the lot was acquired by her and her husband with their
funds. Neither was her allegation that the house was constructed
with the loan she and her husband obtained duly substantiated. From
whom the loan was obtained was not even revealed.
The foregoing disquisitions adequately answer the second issue
raised by petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the

decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.[1]
The antecedents are as follows:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997]

ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and
ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN
and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants-spouses Celestino U. Tan and
Rosario Dy, and Maximo U. Tan and Teresita Sy to partition the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 46249, deliver to plaintiff Eteria
Teves Tan the one-third share of plaintiffs-spouses Alfonso U. Tan
and Eteria Teves Tan; to pay Eteria Teves Tan P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and to pay the
costs.

On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was

instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein
private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and
Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was
alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at
Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the
provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso
and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3)
portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the
action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963,
the brothers together with other siblings put up a business which they
registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was engaged in the
sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are
entitled to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business,
so that, an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the partnership,
as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper
in the premises.[2]
On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer
alleging that an accounting is not feasible because the company had
long been dissolved by the partners on September 30, 1982 on
account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each
partner was already given him. It was further alleged that Alfonso
mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager and,
as a consequence thereof, incurred advances and indebtedness
from the partnership in the amount of P130,000.00. Finally, private
respondents asserted that Alfonsos one-third (1/3) share of the
subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in
order to secure a loan he obtained from her.[3]
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at the
instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim
whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is
concerned. He prayed that the case be dismissed. [4] The trial court, in

its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but recognized
his reluctance to prosecute.[5]
Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan
but they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal
separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on August 31, 1977;[6] that during their marriage, they bought a
residential lot consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 46249[7]and that the funds used in the
construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan
she and her husband secured, although it was her husband and
mother-in-law who drew the loan.[8]
Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried
to establish the following: (a) that the family business, Bel Air Auto
Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982 on account
of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that
Alfonso had no more claim against the family business because he
borrowed heavily on his equity in the family business and from his
brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by
them from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed
money from their sister, Lolita, and as a consequence thereof,
mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso
failed to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question
was constructed using funds from a loan contracted by their mother
from the Social Security System (SSS). [9] No documentary evidence,
however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation
that the property was inherited from their mother.
As above-stated, a Decision[10] dated July 12, 1991 was
rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot with
improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through
installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and
their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot was acquired
during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be
deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal
property of the spouses. However, with respect to the business
dealing in auto spare parts, the same had been dissolved due to
losses.
On September 19, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[11] of the decision contending that the 906-square

meter lot, together with other properties, was actually inherited by the
Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on
December 15, 1968 but said lot was adjudicated to the three (3)
brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8,
1969, xerox copy of which was attached to the motion. [12] The lot was
described in the document as:
A parcel of land (lot 6448-C-5 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd21849 being a portion of Lot 6448-C with an area of 906 sq. meters
and described on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38759. Tax
declaration No. 022318. Assessed at P2,800.00.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs which was the basis
of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot in question
from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during
the trial.[13]
Aggrieved by the ruling, private respondents, the spouses
Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita
Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
reversed and set aside the said judgment. Respondent court ruled
that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage
of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan
brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their
exclusive property.
We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:
x x x. It is true that under the New Civil Code, all properties of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
be proved that it pertains to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160,
NCC).The provision of law on presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property requires the party who invoked it to prove first that the
property in controversy was acquired during marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22300, May 22, 1960, 23 SCRA
637-644).

On the other hand, the herein appellants, thru Maximo Tan, insist that
the property in dispute was acquired by inheritance from their late
mother Trinidad Uy Tan, who died on 15 November 1968 (pp. 17-17a, TSN; Dec. 21, 1990). There is documentary proof to support the
testimony of Maximo Tan that indeed the property in dispute was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother,
Trinidad Uy Tan. We note that the 906-square meter lot is registered
in the name of: ALFONSO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Eteria Teves of Bulacao, Pardo, Cebu City; CELESTINO U. TAN,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Rosario Dy Kushin of Banawa, Hill
No. 2; and MAXIMO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, single; of Banawa,
Hill No. 2, of Cebu City, Philippines, with equal shares. From the very
wording of the title, it can be deduced that 1/3 portion of the property
solely belongs to Alfonso Tan. The property is registered in the
names of the three brothers as married to their respective
spouses. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed:
(H)ad the property been acquired by them (spouses) during
coverture, it would have been registered in the name not of
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez' but the spouses
'Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez' (Ponce de Leon vs.
R.F.C., 36 SCRA 289, 312).
The title further states that the property is subject to the 'liabilities
imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, for a period of
two (2) years, from January 9, 1970, against the estate of the
deceased Trinidad Uy'. (Exh. 'A') [underlines Ours]. This condition
supports the contention of the herein appellants that the lot was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. It
shows that the 1/3 portion of the property belongs exclusively to
Alfonso U. Tan, and that it is not part of the conjugal partnership of
gains.[14]
From this ruling, Eteria Teves Tan seeks a second assessment
of the case in the present petition for review raising the following
errors, to wit:
1. That since respondent Court of Appeals had already ruled that 1/3
portion of the lot in litigation was acquired by Alfonso Tan while said

Alfonso Tan and his wife Eteria were still living together, the
presumption of conjugality remains and it is not petitioner but private
respondents who have the burden of proof to prove otherwise.
2. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of
the lot in question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because
the Certificate of Title states that the lot is registered in the name of
ALFONSO U. TAN, xxx married to Eteria Teves xxx; CELESTINO U.
TAN xxx married to Rosario Dy Kushin xxx and MAXIMO U. TAN is
against well-settled jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.[15]
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.[16] It is not necessary, to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. [17] So that when an immovable
was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is considered as
conjugal property.[18] In fact, even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and
it will be considered conjugal property.[19]
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence that the property belongs
exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.[20]
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the
undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the
conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had
inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the
property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan,
married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy
Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear
from TCT No. 46249 that the title was entered on January 9, 1970
and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late
Trinidad Uy to her children when she died intestate and which
property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the

Extrajudicial
Declaration
of
Heirs
and Adjudication
of
Properties. While this document was not admitted as evidence
because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents'
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the
source of the property can be reasonably and materially inferred from
TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is
subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court for a period of two (2) years, from January 9, 1979 against
the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy." [21] Such imposition on
property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived
of their lawful participation of the estate of the decedent. The
presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249, which was carried over
from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of
summary settlement of an estate from where the property was
derived, that of private respondents' deceased mother. There can be
no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to
Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as
Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148
of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
x x x.
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
x x x.
In Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [22] we ruled that
the husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his
marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively
property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by
lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil
Code.

On the other hand, petitioner had adduced no evidence at all

that the lot was acquired by her and her husband with their
funds. Neither was her allegation that the house was constructed
with the loan she and her husband obtained duly substantiated. From
whom the loan was obtained was not even revealed.
The foregoing disquisitions adequately answer the second issue
raised by petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving

the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, from
the complaint filed against him by said plaintiff bank, and dismissing
the complaint with costs.
The appellant has assigned the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the testimony of Mrs.
Schuetze was inefficient to established the domicile of her
husband.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34583

October 22, 1931

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator of the

estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendantappellee.
Araneta, De Joya, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of
the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, has appealed to this court

2. The lower court erred in holding that under section 1536 of

the Administrative Code the tax imposed by the defendant is
lawful and valid.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that one-half () of
the proceeds of the policy in question is community property
and that therefore no inheritance tax can be levied, at least
on one-half () of the said proceeds.
4. The lower court erred in not declaring that it would be
unconstitutional to impose an inheritance tax upon the
insurance policy here in question as it would be a taking of
property without due process of law.
The present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan
Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209
paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of
the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax
upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy
on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the
beneficiary.
At the hearing, in addition to documentary and parol evidence, both
parties submitted the following agreed statement of facts of the court
for consideration:

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the

parties in the above-entitled action through their respective
undersigned attorneys:
1. That the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze,
window of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, is of legal age,
a native of Manila, Philippine Islands, and is and was at all
times hereinafter mentioned a resident of Germany, and at
the time of the death of her husband, the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, she was actually residing and living in Germany;
2. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands, is and was at all
times hereinafter mentioned a banking institution duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippine Islands;
3. That on or about August 23, 1928, the herein plaintiff
before notary public Salvador Zaragoza, drew a general
power appointing the above-mentioned Bank of the
Philippine Islands as her attorney-in-fact, and among the
powers conferred to said attorney-in-fact was the power to
represent her in all legal actions instituted by or against her;
4. That the defendant, of legal age, is and at all times
hereinafter mentioned the duly appointed Collector of
Internal Revenue with offices at Manila, Philippine Islands;
5. That the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze came to the
Philippine Islands for the first time of March 31, 1890, and
worked in the several German firms as a mere employee
and that from the year 1903 until the year 1918 he was
partner in the business of Alfredo Roensch;
6. That from 1903 to 1922 the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze
was in the habit of making various trips to Europe;

7. That on December 3, 1927, the late Adolphe Oscar

Schuetze coming from Java, and with the intention of going
to Bremen, landed in the Philippine Islands where he met his
death on February 2, 1928;
8. That on March 31, 1926, the said Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, while in Germany, executed a will, in accordance
with its law, wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir;
9. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands by order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila under date of May 24, 1928,
was appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze;
10. That, according to the testamentary proceedings
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case
No. 33089, the deceased at the time of his death was
possessed of not only real property situated in the Philippine
Islands, but also personal property consisting of shares of
stock in nineteen (19) domestic corporations;
11. That the fair market value of all the property in the
Philippine Islands left by the deceased at the time of his
death in accordance with the inventory submitted to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 33089, was
P217,560.38;
12. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator
of the estate of the deceased rendered its final account on
June 19, 1929, and that said estate was closed on July 16,
1929;
13. That among the personal property of the deceased was
found life-insurance policy No. 194538 issued at Manila,
Philippine Islands, on January 14, 1913, for the sum of
$10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
Manila branch, a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of Canada, and duly
authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands;

14. That in the insurance policy the estate of the said

Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was named the beneficiary without
any qualification whatsoever;
15. That for five consecutive years, the deceased Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze paid the premiums of said policy to the Sun
Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch;
16. That on or about the year 1918, the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, Manila branch, transferred said policy
to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, London
branch;
17. That due to said transfer the said Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze from 1918 to the time of his death paid the
premiums of said policy to the Sun Life Assurance Company
of Canada, London Branch;
18. That the sole and only heir of the deceased Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze is his widow, the plaintiff herein;

21. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands delivered to the

plaintiff herein the said sum of P20,150;
22. That the herein defendant on or about July 5, 1929,
imposed an inheritance tax upon the transmission of the
proceeds of the policy in question in the sum of P20,150
from the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze to the
sole heir of the deceased, or the plaintiff herein, which
inheritance tax amounted to the sum of P1,209;
23. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands as administrator
of the decedent's estate and as attorney-in-fact of the herein
plaintiff, having been demanded by the herein defendant to
pay inheritance tax amounting to the sum of P1,209, paid to
the defendant under protest the above-mentioned sum;
24. That notwithstanding the various demands made by
plaintiff to the defendant, said defendant has refused and
refuses to refund to plaintiff the above mentioned sum of
P1,209;

19. That at the time of the death of the deceased and at all
times thereafter including the date when the said insurance
policy was paid, the insurance policy was not in the hands or
possession of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, nor in the possession of the herein
plaintiff, nor in the possession of her attorney-in-fact the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, but the same was in the
hands of the Head Office of the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, at Montreal, Canada;

25. That plaintiff reserves the right to adduce evidence as

regards the domicile of the deceased, and so the defendant,
the right to present rebuttal evidence;

20. That on July 13, 1928, the Bank of the Philippine Islands
as administrator of the decedent's estate received from the
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, the
sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance
policy, as shown in the statement of income and expenses of
the estate of the deceased submitted on June 18, 1929, by
the administrator to the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil
case No. 33089;

In as much as one of the question raised in the appeal is whether an

insurance policy on said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's life was, by
reason of its ownership, subject to the inheritance tax, it would be
well to decide first whether the amount thereof is paraphernal or
community property.

26. That both plaintiff and defendant submit this stipulation of

facts without prejudice to their right to introduce such
evidence, on points not covered by the agreement, which
they may deem proper and necessary to support their
respective contentions.

According to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, the estate of

Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-

insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance

Company of Canada on January 14, 1913. During the following five
years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the
company, and in 1918 the policy was transferred to the London
branch.
The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze
married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914.
With the exception of the premium for the first year covering the
period from January 14, 1913 to January 14, 1914, all the money
used for paying the premiums, i. e., from the second year, or January
16, 1914, or when the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married
the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano, until his death on February 2,
1929, is conjugal property inasmuch as it does not appear to have
exclusively belonged to him or to his wife (art. 1407, Civil Code). As
the sum of P20,150 here in controversy is a product of such premium
it must also be deemed community property, because it was acquired
for a valuable consideration, during said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's
marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of the common fund
(art. 1401, No. 1, Civil Code), except for the small part corresponding
to the first premium paid with the deceased's own money.
In his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 9, page 589, second
edition, Manresa treats of life insurance in the following terms, to wit:

The amount of the policy represents the premiums to be

paid, and the right to it arises the moment the contract is
perfected, for at the moment the power of disposing of it may
be exercised, and if death occurs payment may be
demanded. It is therefore something acquired for a valuable
consideration during the marriage, though the period of its
fulfillment, depend upon the death of one of the spouses,
which terminates the partnership. So considered, the
question may be said to be decided by articles 1396 and
1401: if the premiums are paid with the exclusive property of
husband or wife, the policy belongs to the owner; if with
conjugal property, or if the money cannot be proved as
coming from one or the other of the spouses, the policy is
community property.
The Supreme Court of Texas, United States, in the case of Martin vs.
Moran (11 Tex. Civ. A., 509) laid down the following doctrine:
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.
A husband took out an endowment life insurance policy on
his life, payable "as directed by will." He paid the premiums
thereon out of community funds, and by his will made the
proceeds of the policy payable to his own estate. Held, that
the proceeds were community estate, one-half of which
belonged to the wife.
In In re Stan's Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.), 5, the Supreme Court of
California laid down the following doctrine:
A testator, after marriage, took out an insurance policy, on
which he paid the premiums from his salary. Held that the
insurance money was community property, to one-half of
which, the wife was entitled as survivor.
In In re Webb's Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.), 93, the same court laid
down the following doctrine:
A decedent paid the first third of the amount of the premiums
on his life-insurance policy out of his earnings before

marriage, and the remainder from his earnings received after

marriage. Held, that one-third of the policy belonged to his
separate estate, and the remainder to the community
property.
Thus both according to our Civil Code and to the ruling of those
North American States where the Spanish Civil Code once governed,
the proceeds of a life-insurance policy whereon the premiums were
paid with conjugal money, belong to the conjugal partnership.
The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a lifeinsurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the
death of the person insured, and that in the present case, as the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze named his own estate as the sole
beneficiary of the insurance on his life, upon his death the latter
became the sole owner of the proceeds, which therefore became
subject to the inheritance tax, citing Del Val vs. Del Val (29 Phil.,
534), where the doctrine was laid down that an heir appointed
beneficiary to a life-insurance policy taken out by the deceased,
becomes the absolute owner of the proceeds of such policy upon the
death of the insured.
The estate of a deceased person cannot be placed on the same
footing as an individual heir. The proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to the estate of the insured passed to the executor or
administrator of such estate, and forms part of its assets (37 Corpus
Juris, 565, sec. 322); whereas the proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to an heir of the insured as beneficiary belongs exclusively
to said heir and does not form part of the deceased's estate subject
to administrator. (Del Val vs. Del Val, supra; 37 Corpus Juris, 566,
sec. 323, and articles 419 and 428 of the Code of Commerce.)
Just as an individual beneficiary of a life-insurance policy taken out
by a married person becomes the exclusive owner of the proceeds
upon the death of the insured even if the premiums were paid by the
conjugal partnership, so, it is argued, where the beneficiary named is
the estate of the deceased whose life is insured, the proceeds of the
policy become a part of said estate upon the death of the insured
even if the premiums have been paid with conjugal funds.

In a conjugal partnership the husband is the manager, empowered to

alienate the partnership property without the wife's consent (art.
1413, Civil Code), a third person, therefore, named beneficiary in a
life-insurance policy becomes the absolute owner of its proceeds
upon the death of the insured even if the premiums should have
been paid with money belonging to the community property. When a
married man has his life insured and names his own estate after
death, beneficiary, he makes no alienation of the proceeds of
conjugal funds to a third person, but appropriates them himself,
adding them to the assets of his estate, in contravention of the
provisions of article 1401, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code cited above,
which provides that "To the conjugal partnership belongs" (1)
Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for
the partnership or for one of the spouses only." Furthermore, such
appropriation is a fraud practised upon the wife, which cannot be
allowed to prejudice her, according to article 1413, paragraph 2, of
said Code. Although the husband is the manager of the conjugal
partnership, he cannot of his own free will convert the partnership
property into his own exclusive property.
As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, were paid out of the conjugal funds, with
the exceptions of the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding the
proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute
community property, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was
made payable to the deceased's estate, so that one-half of said
proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other half to the deceased's
widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze.
The second point to decide in this appeal is whether the Collector of
Internal Revenue has authority, under the law, to collect the
inheritance tax upon one-half of the life-insurance policy taken out by
the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, which belongs to him and is made
payable to his estate.
According to the agreed statement of facts mentioned above, the
plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed
administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary
estate by an order dated March 24, 1928, entered by the Court of

First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid
Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the
sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on
the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same
date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said
Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's
estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate,
and then returned the money to said widow.
Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 10
of Act No. 2835 and section 1 of Act No. 3031, contains the following
relevant provision:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every
transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest,
gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance,
devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine
Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise
which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any
shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation
or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the
Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares
or rights in any partnership, business or industry established
in the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located
in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:
xxx

xxx

xxx

In as much as the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the

late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze were paid to the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, for management
and partition, and as such proceeds were turned over to the sole and
universal testamentary heiress Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze,
the plaintiff-appellant, here in Manila, the situs of said proceeds is the
Philippine Islands.

In his work "The Law of Taxation," Cooley enunciates the general

rule governing the levying of taxes upon tangible personal property,
in the following words:
GENERAL RULE. The suits of tangible personal property,
for purposes of taxation may be where the owner is
domiciled but is not necessarily so. Unlike intangible
personal property, it may acquire a taxation situs in a state
other than the one where the owner is domiciled, merely
because it is located there. Its taxable situs is where it is
more or less permanently located, regardless of the domicile
of the owner. It is well settled that the state where it is more
or less permanently located has the power to tax it although
the owner resides out of the state, regardless of whether it
has been taxed for the same period at the domicile of the
owner, provided there is statutory authority for taxing such
property. It is equally well settled that the state where the
owner is domiciled has no power to tax it where the property
has acquired an actual situs in another state by reason of its
more or less permanent location in that state. ... (2 Cooley,
The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., p. 975, par. 451.)
With reference to the meaning of the words "permanent" and "in
transit," he has the following to say:
PERMANENCY OF LOCATION; PROPERTY IN TRANSIT.
In order to acquire a situs in a state or taxing district so as
to be taxable in the state or district regardless of the domicile
of the owner and not taxable in another state or district at the
domicile of the owner, tangible personal property must be
more or less permanently located in the state or district. In
other words, the situs of tangible personal property is where
it is more or less permanently located rather than where it is
merely in transit or temporarily and for no considerable
length of time. If tangible personal property is more or less
permanently located in a state other than the one where the
owner is domiciled, it is not taxable in the latter state but is
taxable in the state where it is located. If tangible personal
property belonging to one domiciled in one state is in another
state merely in transitu or for a short time, it is taxable in the

former state, and is not taxable in the state where it is for the
time being. . . . .
Property merely in transit through a state ordinarily is not
taxable there. Transit begins when an article is committed to
a carrier for transportation to the state of its destination, or
started on its ultimate passage. Transit ends when the goods
arrive at their destination. But intermediate these points
questions may arise as to when a temporary stop in transit is
such as to make the property taxable at the place of
stoppage. Whether the property is taxable in such a case
usually depends on the length of time and the purpose of the
interruption of transit. . . . .
. . . It has been held that property of a construction company,
used in construction of a railroad, acquires a situs at the
place where used for an indefinite period. So tangible
personal property in the state for the purpose of undergoing
a partial finishing process is not to be regarded as in the
course of transit nor as in the state for a mere temporary
purpose. (2 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., pp. 982,
983 and 988, par. 452.)
If the proceeds of the life-insurance policy taken out by the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze and made payable to his estate, were
delivered to the Bank of the Philippine Islands for administration and
distribution, they were not in transit but were more or less
permanently located in the Philippine Islands, according to the
foregoing rules. If this be so, half of the proceeds which is community
property, belongs to the estate of the deceased and is subject to the
inheritance tax, in accordance with the legal provision quoted above,
irrespective of whether or not the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was
domiciled in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death.
By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the
proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the
other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid

partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part;
and (3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to
the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it
is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside.1awphil.net
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the one-half of the tax
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the
insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after
deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium,
without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Ostrand,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:

I cannot concur with the majority in holding that one-half of the
insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,
excepting the proportional part corresponding to the first year's
premium is community property belonging to the deceased's widow,
named Rosario Gelano, and as such is not subject to the inheritance
tax.
There is no question in regard to the facts: It is admitted that
Schuetze insured himself in the Sun Life Insurance Company of
Canada in Manila, and that the policy was issued on January 14,
1913, payable to his estate after death. He died in Manila on
February 2, 1928, leaving his widow as his sole testamentary
heiress. The appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as

administrator of the late Schuetze's testamentary estate, received

from the insurer the amount of this policy, or the net sum of P20,150.
It is an established and generally recognized principle that in a lifeinsurance policy where the insured has named a beneficiary, the
proceeds belong to said beneficiary, and to him alone. "Vested
Interest of Beneficiary. In practically every jurisdiction it is the rule
that in an ordinary life insurance policy made payable to a
beneficiary, and which does not authorize a change of beneficiary,
the named beneficiary has an absolute, vested interest in the policy
from the date of its issuance, delivery and acceptance, and this is
true of a policy payable to the children of the insured equally, without
naming them, or their executors, administrators or assigns." (14
R.C.L., 1376.) (Del Valvs. Del Val, 29 Phil., 534 et seq.; Gercio vs.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil., 53 et seq.) When in a
life-insurance policy the insured's estate is named beneficiary, the
proceeds must be delivered not to the decedent's heirs, but to his
administrator or legal representative. "Policy Payable to Insured, His
Estate, or Legal Representatives. ... Ordinarily the proceeds of a life
insurance policy are payable to the executor or administrator of
insured as assets of his estate where by the terms of the policy the
proceeds are payable to insured, his estate, his legal
representatives, his executors or administrators, his "executors,
administrators, or assigns," or even his "heirs, executors,
administrators, or assigns." ..." (37 C.J., 565.) "Personal
Representatives or Legal Representatives. While there is some
authority to the effect that "legal representatives" means the persons
entitled to the estate of the insured, and not his executor or
administrator, the better view is that ordinarily the proceeds of such a
policy pass to his executor or administrator." (14 R.C.L., 1372.)
If the foregoing are the principles which should govern life-insurance
policies with reference to beneficiaries and the right to the proceeds
of such policies, it is evident that Schuetze's estate, and not his
widow or the conjugal partnership, is entitled to the proceeds of said
policy exclusively, and may receive them from the insurer. The
parties must have so understood it when the insurer delivered the net
amount of the policy to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as judicial
administrator of the insured.

It is stated in the majority opinion that the money with which the
premiums were paid during the marriage of the Schuetzes is
presumed to have been taken from the conjugal funds, according to
article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that "All the property of
the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of
proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This is
the very argument which led to the settlement of the point of law
raised. The provisions of the Civil Code on conjugal property have
been improperly applied without considering that a life-insurance
contract is a peculiar contract governed by special laws, such as Act
No. 2427 with its amendments, and the Code of Commerce, which is
still in force. In Del Val, supra, it was already held:
We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life
insurance is a special contract and the destination of the
proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal
exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no
provisions which relate directly and specially to life insurance
contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds.
That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of
Commerce which provides for the terms of the contract, the
relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of
the policy.
The main point to be decided was not whether the premiums were
paid out of conjugal or personal funds of one of the spouses, but
whether or not the proceeds of the policy became assets of the
insured's estate. If it be admitted that the estate is the sole owner of
the aforesaid proceeds, which cannot be denied, inasmuch as the
policy itself names the estate as the beneficiary, it is beside the point
to discuss the nature and origin of the amounts used to pay the
premiums, as the title to the proceeds of the policy is vested in the
insured's estate, and any right the widow might have should be
vindicated in another action. In such a case she might be entitled to
reimbursement of her share in the conjugal funds, but not in the
present case, for she has been instituted the sole testamentary
heiress.
From the foregoing, it follows that as the proceeds of the policy
belong to Schuetze's estate, and inasmuch as the inheritance tax is

levied upon the transmission of a deceased person's estate upon, or,

on the occasion of his death, it is clear that the whole proceeds, and
not one-half thereof, are subject to such tax.

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.

In my opinion the judgment appealed from should have been

affirmed in its entirely.

Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.

Romualdez, J., concurs.

Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No.
63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON,
plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and
ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-appellants," upholding the validity
of three (3) documents questioned by Moises Jocson, in total
reversal of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch I, which declared them as null and void; and of its resolution,
dated September 30, 1980, denying therein appellee's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband
of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity

of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime.
These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties,
including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner
Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their
deceased parents.

The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises

Jocson, as the party assailing its validity, but rather by herein
respondents, are the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit
3 (pp. 12-13, Records) for the defendant in the
court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By this document
Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six
(6) parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the
sum of ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On the
same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged
receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG
LIBONG PISO (P10,000) salaping Pilipino na aking
tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang
pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang inaamin sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si
Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez,
at naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking
ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at walang ano mang
pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na
nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa
nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang
tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais kong
banggitin na kahit na may kamurahan ang ginawa
kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking
anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at
ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na
lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay
gagamitin ko sa aking katandaan at mga huling araw
at sa aking mga ibang mahahalagang
pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay
hindi labag sa ano mang batas o kautusan, sapagkat
ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan.
Ang mga lupang nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang
asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at

iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong anak

alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July
27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On
the face of this document, Emilio Jocson purportedly
sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice
mills and a camarin (camalig) located at Naic,
Cavite. As in the first document, Moises Jocson
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG
PISO (P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino na aking
tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak
na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad sa
akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa
malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile
ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit na
hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Adjudication with Sale, "dated March 9, 1969,
marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby
Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
without the participation and intervention of Moises
Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled
estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into
three parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of
Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same
instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to
Agustin for the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND
(P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the preceding
documents, Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of
the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight
thousand (P8,000.00) pesos, which I, the herein

Emilio Jocson had received from my daughter

Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell, cede, convey and
transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs
and assigns, administrators and successors in
interests, in the nature of absolute and irrevocable
sale, all my rights, interest, shares and participation,
which is equivalent to one third (1/3) share in the
properties herein mentioned and described the one
third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and
the other third (1/3) portion being the share of
Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3
and 4 were registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering
the properties therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p.
27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of
Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was
twice amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58,
Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the above documents,
as aforementioned, for being null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his
complaint for the reason that the nature of his causes of action is at
issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the
defendants, through fraud, deceit, undue pressure
and influence and other illegal machinations, were
able to induce, led, and procured their father ... to
sign [the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated
price of P10,000.00, which is a consideration that is
shocking to the conscience of ordinary man and
despite the fact that said defendants have no work

or livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null and

void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and
fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on
Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third document,
that they] are null and void because the consent of
the father, Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud,
deceit, undue pressure, misrepresentation and
unlawful machinations and trickeries committed by
the defendant on him; and that the said contracts
are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having been
made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from
participating and with the dishonest and selfish
motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him
of his legitimate share on said properties [subject
matter thereof]; and that without any other business
or employment or any other source of income,
defendants who were just employed in the
management and administration of the business of
their parents, would not have the sufficient and
ample means to purchase the said properties except
by getting the earnings of the business or by
simulated consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on
Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father
and daughter who are living under the same roof, especially so when
the father has no need of money as the properties supposedly sold
were all income-producing. Further, petitioner claimed that the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal).
As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the
extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his father to Agustina of the
former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).

The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp.

59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the considerations
mentioned in the documents were merely simulated and fictitious
because: 1) there was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
paid for the properties; 2) the prices were grossly inadequate which
is tantamount to lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability
of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the
parties; and that the real intention of the parties were donations
designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of
his parents. It further declared the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3
and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
because they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married
to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject matter
of all the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners
and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a
decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's and
ruled that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the
appellee's complaint for annulment, which is
indisputably based on fraud, and undue influence, is
now barred by prescription, pursuant to the settled
rule that an action for annulment of a contract based
on fraud must be filed within four (4) years, from the
discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal
contemplation is deemed to be the date of the
registration of said document with the Register of
Deeds ... and the records admittedly show that both
Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29,
1968, while on the other hand, the appellee's
complaint was filed on June 20, 1973, clearly
beyond the aforesaid four-year prescriptive period
provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4,
are decisively not simulated or fictitious contracts,
since Emilio Jocson actually and really intended

them to be effective and binding against him, as to

divest him of the full dominion and ownership over
the properties subject of said assailed contracts, as
in fact all his titles over the same were all cancelled
and new ones issued to appellant Agustina JocsonVasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and
subsisting, and the partition with sale therein made
by and between Emilio Jocson and Agustina JocsonVasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject
properties described therein have all been made in
accordance with Article 996 of the New Civil Code
on intestate succession, and the appellee's (herein
petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced
(pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following
assignments of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SUIT FOR
THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY
PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS
"BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS
INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S
BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE
CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND
GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT
FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND
NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION

AND IN REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION

OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be
jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of
action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a
contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained
through fraud, is voidable; and the action for annulment must be
brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud
(Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no
longer be contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud
is deemed to have taken place at the time the convenant was
registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No.
L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were
registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint
only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as
these documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had
prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in
assailing the questioned documents, We would have sustained the
above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner,
he further assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they
were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as
paid were in fact merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause
produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated
price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for
the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil
Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978,
85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the
judicial declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of
simulated price, is imprescriptible.

II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely
academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack
consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof
becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show that
the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where
the documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon
consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that
petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents
are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no
other source of income other than what she derives from helping in
the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and
which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted
by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and
her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p.
10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his
wife testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was
involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36,
t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the
business of buying and selling palay and rice even before her
marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing
so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing
and the presumption that a contract is with a consideration (Article
1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove
his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of
alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing
that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase
price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed
value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended
Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the
properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and
Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000,

P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of
Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra
Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the
purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight,
may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a
father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31,
April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of
sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the
parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract
(Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is nothing in the records at all to
indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a
father and his daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance
to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and
cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits
3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position
of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina JocsonVasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he
presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were
enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968,
23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:

Anent their claim that the shares in question are

conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a
modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly
invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which
provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the
party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de
Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according
to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that
the Property was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property." In the recent case of Maramba vs.
Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA
474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal,
reiterated that "the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the
marriage," and then concluded that since "there is
no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name
alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar,
since there is no evidence as to when the shares of
stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered
in the name of the husband alone is an indication
that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18,
1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843,
October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon
which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to

Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired

during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela
vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were
registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to
the latter.

application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule

that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of
Emilio Jocson.

Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their

face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the
registered owner. This is so because the words "married to'
preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v.
Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v.
Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In
other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio
Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held

that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino,
No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not
inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there
was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only
one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been
acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore,
presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented
proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented
sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired
during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the
properties, though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are
conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160.
There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the

There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills,
which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the
spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be
considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson,
the burden of proof being on petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
June 29, 1967
G.R. No. L-21533
HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

N. Tanopo, Jr. and Millora for plaintiff-appellant.

Not satisfied with the judgment, the defendants interposed an appeal

Manuel Ancheta and Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for defendants-

to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on March 30,

appellees.

1960 for failure of the defendants to file their brief on time. After the
record the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of execution

MAKALINTAL., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City
in its Civil Case No. 10485, dated June 28, 1961. This case was
originally brought to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified
to Us on the ground that the issues raised are purely legal.
It appears that on November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action
against the defendant Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual
Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court a
quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:

was issued, and on August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of
land covered by transfer certificate title No. 8192 of Pangasinan in
the name of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction
was published in accordance with law and scheduled for September
16, 1960.
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial
satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and requested
for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960. On October 17,
1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on
November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant
Pascual Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her

WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment, sentencing the

paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at one-

defendants herein, Nieves de Lozano and Pascual Lozano, to pay

half () of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the

unto the herein plaintiff, Hermogenes Maramba, the total sum of

resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from

Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos

carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.

(P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from date of the filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid.
With costs against the said defendants.

On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves
de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment

creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the

Plaintiff interposed an appeal from the above-quoted order and

balance of the judgment debt.

assigned several errors, which present three major issues, to wit:

On October 27, 1960, plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendant's

(a) whether or not the decision of the lower court dated June 23,

amended motion dated October 14, 1960. And on June 28, 1961, the

1959 could still be questioned;

trial court issued the questioned order, the dispositive part of which is
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby grants the motion of counsel for
defendant Nieves de Lozano, dated October 5, 1960, which was
amended on October 14, 1960, and holds that the liability of the said
defendant under the judgment of June 23, 1959, is only joint, or
P1,750.04, which is one-half () of the judgment debt of P3,500.07
awarded to the plaintiff and that the writ of execution be accordingly
modified in the sense that the liability of defendant Nieves de Lozano
be only P1,750.04 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint on November 5, 1948 until fully paid, plus the amount of

(b) whether or not the judgment was joint or solidary; and

(c) whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the
proceeds of the properties sold at public auction.
Plaintiff-appellant submits that a "nunc pro tunc" order should have
been issued by the trial court dismissing, as of November 11, 1952,
the case against the late Pascual Lozano by reason of his death, and
that the lower court should have corrected its decision of June 23,
1959, by striking out the letter "s" in the word "defendants" and
deleting the words "and Pascual Lozano."

P21.28 which is also one-half () of the costs taxed by the Clerk of

We do not think that the action suggested would be legally justified. It

Court against the defendant spouses. Let the auction sale of the

would entail a substantial amendment of the decision of June 23,

above-mentioned property of defendant Nieves de Lozano proceed

1959, which has long become final and in fact partially executed. A

to satisfy her liability of P1,750.04 with legal interest as above stated

decision which has become final and executory can no longer be

and the further sum of P21.28 representing the costs, unless she

amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or

voluntarily pays the same to the judgment creditor (herein plaintiff).

mistakes,[[1]]and however erroneous it may be, cannot be disobeyed;

[[ ]]

2 otherwise litigations would be endless and no questions could be

considered finally settled.[[3]] The amendment sought by appellee

is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired and

involves not merely clerical errors but the very substance of the

hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is

controversy. And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance of a

determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief (p.

"nunc pro tunc" order such as that sought in this case. The purpose

17) that the property in question is paraphernal.

of an "nunc pro tunc" is to make a present record of an which the

court made at a previous term, but which not then recorded. It can
only be made when the ordered has previously been made, but by
inadvertence not been entered. In the instant case there was no
order previously made by the court and therefore there is no now to
be recorded.

Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were
originally paraphernal, it became conjugal property by virtue of the
construction of a house thereon at the expense of the common fund,
pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has
been by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal
expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses doe not

Now then, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959 does not

automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal

specify the extent of the liability of each defendant. The rule is that

partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so

when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and

not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The

severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be

ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is

compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This is in harmony with

paid, and this payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of

Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.

the partnership (Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby
Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla,

Plaintiff-appellant contends that in any event the entire judgment

debt can be satisfied from the proceeds the property sold at public
auction in view of the presumption that it is conjugal in character
although in the of only one of the spouses. The contention is
incorrect. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to
property acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there

G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961). The record does not show that
there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership
between the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano.
Consequently, the property levied upon, being the separate property
of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the
liability of the other defendant.

On May 18, 1967 counsel for defendants-appellees filed with Us a

petition alleging,inter alia; that prior to the expiration of the
redemption period and pursuant to an order of the lower court
defendants filed a surety bond in the amount of P3,175.12 as the
redemption price, which bond was duly approved by the lower court;
that sometime last September 1966, defendants filed a petition
before the lower court praying that the sheriff of Pangasinan be
ordered to execute the corresponding deed of redemption in favor of
defendant Nieves de Lozano represented by her judicial
administrator or that, in the alternative, the Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City be directed to cancel Entries Nos. 19234 and 20042 at
the back of TCT No. 8192; and that said petition was denied by the
lower court. The same prayer made below is reiterated in the said
petition of May 18, 1967.
The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

after the perfection of the present appeal and which should therefore

FIRST DIVISION

be submitted to and passed upon by the trial court in connection with

G.R. No. 73733 December 16, 1986

the implementation of the order appealed from, which is hereby

affirmed, with costs.

EPIFANIA MAGALLON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALINA L. MONTEJO, in her Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur,
Branch XXI, CONCEPCION LACERNA, ELECERIA LACERNA and
PURITA LACERNA, respondents.
Latasa, Cagas and Aranune Law & Surveying Office for petitioner.

Alberto Lumakang for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The petition before this Court sinks the annulment of a writ of
execution issued by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 727 of
her court (RTC Davao del Sur). Said case was instituted by the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to
compel partition of parcel of land located in Barrio Kasuga
Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which said defendant
had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be
the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia
Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as
their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While
said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia
Pichan although he admitted living with her without benefit of
marriage until she allegedly abandoned him as well as paternity of
two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the
Trial Court gave his denials no credence. Said Court, on the basis of
the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been
married to Eustaquia, and that the plaintiffs were his children with
her. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the
homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his
coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs
were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. 1
Martin Lacerna appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court ACG.R. No. 59900-R). That Court affirmed, in a Decision promulgated
on August 31, 1984 which has since become final. 2
It appears that at the time the case was brought, and while it was
being heard in the Trial Court, no certificate of title to the land had yet
been issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied
with all the conditions necessary to a grant thereof. Original
Certificate of Title No. P-11 568 (issued on the basis of Homestead
Patent No. 148869) was issued only on November 22, 1978, while
Lacerna's appeal was pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court.

While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same
land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture with Eustaquia
Pichan, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no
clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ...
MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania
Magallon ... ," the latter being the present petitioner. 3
It appears further that on November 26, 1985, after the confirmative
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court had become final and
executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued
an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff::
... to order the defendant Martin Lacerna to divide
and partition the property located at Casuga,
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, consisting of 10 hectares
designated as Lot No. 5098 Cad. No. 275 covered
by H.A. No. 20-13378 (E-20-12748), of which is
the share of Eustaquia Pichan in the conjugal
property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are
also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5
hectares of the aforedescribed lot to the plaintiffs as
their share to satisfy the said judgment and your
fees thereon. 4
Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin Lacerna and
petitioner herein, for on December 17, 1985, the latter filed with the
Trial Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging
that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and
Martin Lacerna under a certificate of title (OCT No. P-11568) ...
issued way back 1978 (sic) without legal impediments, and ... now
incontestable," as well as ... valid, binding and legal unless declared
otherwise in an independent proceedings, ... and praying that ... the
property of herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of
the writ of execution." 5 Said motion was denied, as also was a
motion for reconsideration of the order of denial. Hence, the present
petition.
The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of
the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer

be controverted, as wen as the pertinent allegations of the petition,

leave no doubt that the land in question, which rightfully pertained to
the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan,
the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of
said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the
names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon In
such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with
an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled
thereto. The Civil Code provides that:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. 6
The provision restates one of the principles upon which the general
law of trust is founded, expressed in equity jurisprudence thus:
A constructive trust is a creature of equity, defined
supra (sec. 15) as a remedial device by which the
holder of legal title is held to be a trustee for the
benefit of another who in good conscience is entitled
to the beneficial interest. So. the doctrine of
constructive trust is an instrument of equity for the
maintenance of justice, good faith, and good
conscience, resting on a sound public policy
requiring that the law should not become the
instrument of designing persons to be used for the
purpose of fraud. In this respect constructive trusts
have been said to arise through the application of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel or under the broad
doctrine that equity regards and treats as done what
in good conscience ought to be done.
Where, through a mistake of fact, title to, and
apparent ownership of, property rightfully belonging
to one person is obtained by another, a constructive
trust ordinarily arises in favor of the rightful owner of
such property

It is a general principle that one who acquires land or

other property by fraud, misrepresentation,
imposition, or concealment, or under any such other
circumstances as to render it inequitable for him to
retain the property, is in equity to be regarded as a
trustee ex maleficio thereof for a person who suffers
by reason of the fraud or other wrong, and is
equitably entitled to the property, even though such
beneficiary may never have any legal estate therein.
It is to be observed, however, that in the absence of
equitable considerations or a fiduciary relationship,
fraud alone, either actual or constructive, will not
give rise to a trust, since, as has been pointed out, if
it were otherwise all persons claiming property under
defective titles would be trustee for the 'true'
owners. 7
Under proper circumstances, mistake, although
unconnected with fraud, will warrant relief under the
Code providing that one who gains a thing by fraud,
accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a
trust, or other wrongful act is, unless he has come
better title thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing
gained for the benefit of the person who would
otherwise have had it. 8
As stated by Justice Cardozo, a constructive trust is
the formula through which the conscience of equity
finds expression and when property has been
acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest; equity converts him into a
trustee. 9
In an early case in this jurisdiction, land of the plaintiff had, by
mistake, been included in the title of an adjoining owner who was
afterwards sued by his creditors, the latter obtaining writs of
execution and procuring their annotation on said title. In an action by
the plaintiff to enjoin the sale of his property, annul the levies thereon
and secure a new title without those encumbrances, this Court

affirmed judgment of the lower court in the plaintiff's favor, despite

the fact that he had done nothing to protect his interests in the land
during a period of almost six years following the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of the adjoining owner. The Court,
noting that the titular (ostensible) owner had never laid claim to the
property mistakenly registered in his name and that he had in fact
acquiesced to judgment in a separate action declaring the plaintiff
the real owner of the property, refused to apply the one-year
limitation period for disputing the title and held that in the
circumstances, the former merely held title to the property in trust for
the plaintiff. 10
In Bueno vs. Reyes, 11 where property belonging to an ancestor of
whom plaintiffs' parents were the intestate heirs was, though mistake
or in bad faith, registered in cadastral proceedings in the name of
other parties who had no right thereto, this Court reaffirmed the
principles already cited, holding that:
If any trust can be deduced at all from the foregoing
facts it was an implied one, arising by operation of
law not from any presumed intention of the parties
but to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and
as a protection against unfair dealing or downright
fraud. Indeed, in this kind of implied trust, commonly
denominated constructive, as distinguished from
resulting, trust, there exists a certain antagonism
between the cestui que trust and the trustee. Thus,
for instance, under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, 'if
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.' In a number
of cases this Court has held that registration of
property by one person in his name, whether by
mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the
character of a constructive trust for the real owner,
which would justify an action for reconveyance. 12

Clearly, therefore, the petitioner herein, as the trustee of a

constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private
respondents that part of the land in question to which she now claims
an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the
respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal
partnership with Martin Lacerna.
The question is whether that obligation may be enforced by
execution in the action at bar, which was brought and prosecuted to
judgment against Martin Lacerna only, without impleading the
petitioner. 13 Stated otherwise, is petitioner bound by final judgment
rendered in an action to which she was not made a party?
There are no clear precedents on the matter in our law. Reference to
American law for any persuasive ruling shows that even there the
question seems to be an open one.
"The authorities are in conflict as to whether a wife, not a party to an
action is bound by a judgment therein for or against her husband with
respect to community or homestead property or property held as an
estate in entirety.
Community property. It has been held that a judgment against the
husband in an action involving community property, is conclusive on
the wife even if she is not a party, but it has also been held that a
judgment against either husband or wife with respect to community
property in an action to which the other spouse is not a party does
not prevent the other spouse from subsequently having his or her
day in court, although, of course, a judgment against both husband
and wife is binding on both.
Estate by entirety. It has been both affirmed and denied that a wife is
in such privity with her husband in respect of property held by them
as an estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him respecting
such property in a suit to which she is not a party is binding on her.
Homestead. A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some
authorities, not binding on a spouse who is not a party to the action
in which it is rendered, unless the homestead is community property

or the homestead claim or interest would not defeat the action; but,
according to other authorities, where the husband sets up and
litigates a claim for the homestead, an adjudication for or against him
is binding on the wife. 14
As to her community interest in real property, a wife
is in privity with her husband and is represented by
him in an action as fully as though she had expressly
been made a party thereto. Cutting vs. Bryan, 274 P.
326, 206 Cal. 254, certiorari denied 50 S. Ct. 16, 280
U.S. 556,74 L.Ed 611. 15
In the particular circumstances obtaining here, the Court can as it
does in good conscience and without doing violence to doctrine,
adopt the affirmative view and hold the petitioner bound by the
judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact been
impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that
petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as
observed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, no marriage contract
was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner
either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is
clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other
than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere
mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
But whether the petitioner is a lawful wife or a mere "live-in" partner,
the Court simply cannot believe that she never became aware of the
litigation concerning the land until presented with the writ of
execution. What is far more probable and credible is that she has
known of the lawsuit since 1956 when Martin Lacerna "married"
her. 16 Her silence and inaction since then and until barely a year ago
bespeak more than anything else, a confession that she had and has
no right to the land and no defense to offer to the action, either on
her part or on the part of Martin Lacerna. Had she even the
semblance of a right, there is no doubt she would have lost no time
asserting it.
From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner
relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the

land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein,
Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of
title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as
resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud.
Moreover, on the authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 andStuart vs.
Yatco, 18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon written after the
name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does
not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna
and petitioner hereyn. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption
established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired
during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being
no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which
arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of
title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim
on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin
Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private
respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the
presumption does not operate where there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with even
greater force here.
The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the
reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial
Court which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court merely
declared the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land in
question, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them
of said half portion. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the
judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not
clearly included in, what is awarded by said judgment. Even if the
judgment in question is construable as authorizing or directing a
partition of the land, the mechanics of an actual partition should
follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court which
does not contemplate or provide for the intervention of the sheriff in
the manner prescribed in the writ complained of.
Both the Trial Court, in rendering the judgment in question, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in affirming the same, appear to have
overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and
compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise,

consistent with the finding that the half portion of the land sued for
pertained to the late Eustaquia Pichan as her share in the conjugal
partnership with Martin Lacerna, they should have ruled that Martin
Lacerna concurred with the three private respondents in the
succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal
share. 20 Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because Martin
Lacerna allowed the judgment to become final and executory without
raising that point of law, even on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution complained of is set aside and
annulled. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is
ordered to effect the partition of the land in question in accordance
with the terms of its now final and executory decision and the
provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. No pronouncement as to
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48137

October 4, 1943

In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA.

CONCEPCION PATERNO VDA. DE PADILLA, widow-appellee,
vs.
ISABEL BIBBY VDA. DE PADILLA, executrix-appellant.

BOCOBO, J.:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the
late Narciso A. Padilla. In order that his property may be divided
according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to
liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in connection with such

liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla,

commenced the instant proceedings by filing a petition wherein she
prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property be segregated from
the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the
corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given
one-half of the conjugal partnership property; and that her
usufructuary right over one-half of the portion pertaining to the heir
instituted in the will be recognized. The Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and
jewelry as well as certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and
ordering the same to be delivered to the widow (appellee herein).
The trial court's judgment, as amended, reads:
En vista de los hechos y consideraciones que preceden, el
Juzgado dicta sentencia y declara:

heredera testamentaria en pleno dominio, y la otra tercera

parte en nuda propiedad a la misma heredera testamentaria
y en usufructo a la viuda Concepcion Paterno mientras ella
viva.lawphil.net
(d) Que los gastos en que incurra esta Testamentaria por los
servicios de los Comisionados se paguen por ambas partes,
por mitad.
From the foregoing judgment the testator's mother and instituted heir,
Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appeals.
I

(b) Que se nombran tres (3) Comisionados, uno a

recomendacion de la heredera instituida en el testamento,
otro a recomendacion de Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, y el tercero por el Juzgado, para que se hagan cargo
de avaluar las fincas o partes de fincas que se deben
justipreciar de conformidad con las conclusiones sentadas
en esta decision hagan las computaciones correspondientes
a fin de determinar el remanente liquido de la sociedad de
gananciales, tomando por base los precios calculados y
avaluados sobre dichos bienes, y dividan por mitad el
remanente liquido entre Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, y la heredera testamentaria Da. Isabel Bibby Vda. de
Padilla, especificando los bienes que a cada una debe
corresponder;

The value in controversy being over P50,000, we have reviewed the

evidence. After a careful examination of the oral and documentary
proof, we find no error in the findings of fact made by the trial court.
From the evidence it appears that Narciso A. Padilla and Concepcion
Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. The husband, who
was a medical student, contributed a small capital to the conjugal
partnership at the time of the marriage. The wife, on the other hand,
brought to the marriage considerable property in real estate, jewelry
and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership property came
from the fruits of the paraphernal property. The conjugal partnership
lasted twenty-one years, the husband having died on February 12,
1934. (The wife also died recently, during the pendency of this
appeal, but in this decision she is referred to as if still living.) The
common fortune, consisting of real and personal property, is fairly
large. The husband, who left no children, executed a will giving his
whole estate to his mother, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appellant
herein. The property included in the inventory is appraised at
P261,000. Seven pieces of real estate are in controversy in this
case. The remaining ten real properties left by the deceased
husband admittedly pertain to the conjugal partnership.

(c) Que pagadas todas las deudas de la sociedad de

gananciales, dichos comisionados procederan a dividir en
tres partes los bienes que deben corresponder al difunto, a
fin de que las dos terceras partes sean adjudicadas a la

A thorough study of the evidence convinces us that the trial court

was right in finding that the following properties in Manila are
paraphernal: (1) the lot at 305 Arquiza Street and the demolished
improvements; (2) the lot at 1393-1409 Juan Luna Street and the

(a) Que todos los bienes que constan en el inventario, y

sobre los cuales no se ha suscitado controversia por las
partes, son bienes gananciales;

improvements that had been torn down; (3) the lot and improvements
(except the building constructed during the marriage for P4,000) at
401-407 Camba Street; (4) the lot at 613-631 and 634-636 Martin
Ocampo Street, with the original "accesorias" and a camarin which
was destroyed in order that new "accesorias" might be constructed,
these new "accesorias" being of the conjugal partnership; (5) the
property at 620-A-H Callejon De la Fe; (6) one-half of the property at
631 Regidor Street; and (7) nine twenty-ninths (9/29) of the property
at 302-306 R. Hidalgo Street.
We also agree with the finding of the lower court that certain jewels,
namely: two pairs of ear-rings, a bracelet, and a gold watch, belong
to the widow.
In like manner, we see no error in the following findings of the trial
court: (1) that the husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet
his personal obligations; and (2) that the amount of P21,046.52 (the
remainder of P66,046.52) received by the wife during the marriage
was commingled with the conjugal partnership funds.
II
Several questions of law are raised in the present appeal. We shall
discuss them one by one.
1. The first legal controversy is on a sort of no-man's land where
many a legal battle has been fought. The issue is, How far is a
Torrens title conclusive and incontestable? Various manifestations of
this legal question have been decided by the courts, and while
certain of its aspects may still be doubtful, we are persuaded,
however, that there can be no doubt, as will presently be shown, that
what appears in the Torrens certificate in this case is neither final nor
incontrovertible.
Appellant contends that because certain of these real estates (on
Camba, Martin Ocampo and Regidor Streets) have been registered
in the names of both spouses, Narciso Padilla and Concepcion
Paterno de Padilla, and considering the presumption in Art. 1407 of
the Civil Code, these properties must be held to be of the conjugal

partnership. The trial court, however, found that the whole purchase
price of the Camba and Martin Ocampo properties, and one-half of
the purchase price of the Regidor property, were from the wife's
exclusive funds, and therefore the whole of the original Camba and
Ocampo estates and one-half of the Regidor realty must be adjudged
paraphernal, in spite of the fact that the certificates of title are in the
names of both spouses.
There is nothing sacrosanct and definitive in the certificate of title
when the conjugal partnership is liquidated. The true and real owner
may be shown whether it be the husband, or the wife, or both.
Thus, in Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, this Court held that property
acquired during the marriage but registered in the husband's name
still belonged to the conjugal partnership. A similar ruling was
announced when the real estate was registered in the wife's
name. Romero vs. Sheriff, 53 Phil., 51. But the appellant maintains
that the converse is not true; and that even if evidence is admissible
to alter the conjugal character of the property, such evidence must be
clear, strong and convincing (citing Art 1407, Civil Code, and
Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil., 607).
We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made
when the property is registered in the names of both spouses. In
such instances, the property may be shown to be really of either
spouse, though recorded in the names of both. The underlying
reason is the same in all cases, which is the confidential relation
between husband and wife. Because of the feelings of trust existing
between the spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the
name of both, or of either, regardless of the true ownership of the
property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money. It is
thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the trust should be
recognized and enforced, so that the real ownership of the property
may be established. The principle that a trustee who takes a Torrens
title in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a
decree of title. (See Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343). It is
because a certificate of title under the Torrens system should not be
turned into an instrument for deprivation of ownership. The Torrens
plan, created to protect dominion, is not a Frankenstein that destroys
this very dominion. A trust, deriving its strength from confidence,

which runs though with the woof and warp of the social fabric, does
not lose that character on the plea that a Torrens certificate of title is
conclusive. It is meet and seemly that this should be so, for any rule
that permits the violation of a fiduciary duty would be a reproach to
any legal system. These observations apply with peculiar force to the
relations between husband and wife. In a normal marriage, the
spouses trust each other so implicitly that they attach little or no
importance to what appears in legal documents, fully and
unreservedly believing that no technicality would be availed of to
claim what in very truth pertains to one or the other. Things would
indeed come to a sorry pass if the jurisprudence of this country
should harbor any theory which would impair this intimate reliance,
this unquestioning loyalty, this befitting faith between husband and
wife.
There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property
as paraphernal should be allowed, despite the Torrens certificate. It
is this: the manager of the conjugal partnership is the husband. He
may, without let or hindrance, deal with and dispose of any property
appearing in the names of both spouses, even if the property should
really be paraphernal. In the course of years, any such property may
have been sold, transformed or substituted. Upon liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, to forbid an investigation of the true source of
the purchase price of the original property, after many years of
marriage, would make liquidation a mockery, for it would be well nigh
impossible to trace and identity the paraphernal property. The law
positively ordains that the wife's property (dowry and paraphernal)
should be returned, even before the payment of the debts of the
conjugal partnership (Art. 1421 and 1422, Civil Code). But how can
this mandate of the law be complied with when the means to that end
are withheld and forbidden?
As for the appellants proposition that the evidence to rebut the
Torrens certificates and the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership (Art. 1407) should be clear, strong and convincing, we
find that the proof, both oral and documentary, in the record is more
than sufficient to offset and counteract the certificates of title and the
presumption of law.

2. The second legal inquiry is the interpretation of Article 1404, par.

2, Civil Code: whether the value of the paraphernal land to be
reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. With conjugal funds the husband
constructed buildings on the wife's lots on Arquiza, Juan Luna,
Camba and Martin Ocampo streets. The court a quo ordered that the
value of the lots occupied by these constructions, to be paid to the
widow, should be that prevailing at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Appellant claims such pronouncement of the trial court to be
erroneous because from the time of the construction of the buildings,
the conjugal partnership became the owner of the whole property (lot
and building) in each instance, and therefore the subsequent
increase in value should accrue to the conjugal partnership, and any
depreciation should be suffered by the partnership.
Article 1404, Civil Code, provides:
Las expensas utiles hechas en los beines peculiares de
cualquiera de los conyuges mediante anticipaciones de la
sociedad o por la industria del marido o de la mujer, son
ganaciales.
Los seran tambien los edificios construidos durante el
matrimonio en suelo propio de uno de los conyuges
abonandose el valor del suelo al conyuge a quien
pertenezca.
Appellant's theory is untenable. The ownership of the land is retained
by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a
building from common funds does not automatically convey the
ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a
mode of using the land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is
simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the conjugal
partnership over the wife's land. As Manresa says, "la sociedad de
gananciales es realmente la usufructuaria de los bienes privativos de
cada conyuge." (Comment on Art. 1408.) In consequence of this

usufructuary right, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any

rent during the occupation of the wife's land because if the lot were
leased to a third person, instead of being occupied by the new
construction from partnership funds, the rent from the third person
would belong to the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before payment
of the value of the land is made from the common funds, inasmuch
as the owner of the land is the wife, all the increase or decrease in its
value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand
payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
because up to that time, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is
lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the
marriage.
The foregoing finds support, by analogy, in Article 361, Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 361. El dueo del terreno en que se edificare, sembrare
o plantare de buena fe, tendra derecho a hacer suya la obra,
siembra o plantacion, previa la indemnizacion establecida en
los arts. 453 y 454, o a obligar al que fabrico o planto a
pagarle el precio del terreno, y al que sembro, la renta
correspondiente. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, no reimbursement for the value of the lots was
made from the common funds during the marriage.
Moreover, Sanchez Roman declares:
Los derechos de la muyer en la sociedad legal de
gananciales se remiten todos a la epoca de su disolucion y
liquidacion, cuando se trata de la existencia normal de la
sociedad legal de gananciales. (Emphasis supplied.)
And Manresa states:

El valor fijado a los bienes debe ser el que realmente tengan

el dia de la disolucion de la sociedad, con las necesarias
aclaraciones, para conocer lo que pueda tener caracter
propio o ganancial. (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of
the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would
unduly disturb the husband's management of the conjugal
partnership. The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the interest of
successful administration of the common property, the wife should
not interfere with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the
partnership. Besides, such premature requirement of the value
making improvements, whereas article 1404, par. 2, has for its
purpose the encouragement of construction by the husband.
(Manresa's comment on Art. 1404.) On the other hand, if the
payment for the lot is deferred till the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the initial outlay for the erection of the building would be
less, and consequently the construction would be facilitated.
3. The next question of law is whether the value of the paraphernal
buildings which were demolished to make possible the construction
of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership, should be
reimbursed to the wife. Such tearing down of buildings was done with
regard to the Arquiza, Juan Luna and Martin Ocampo properties.
Appellant maintains that it is doubtful if these buildings had any value
at the time they were destroyed, and that there is no evidence that
the conjugal partnership realized any benefit therefrom. However, we
are certain these old buildings had some value, though small, and it
will be the duty of the commissioners mentioned in the judgment
appealed from, to assess that value. We entertain no manner of
doubt that the conjugal partnership derived a positive advantage
from the demolition, which made it possible to erect new
constructions for the partnership. It is but just, therefore, that the
value of the old buildings at the time they were torn down should be
paid to the wife. We dismiss, as without any merit whatever, the
appellant's contention that because article 1404, par. 2, of the Civil
Code does not provide for the reimbursement of the value of
demolished improvements, the wife should not be indemnified.
Suffice it to mention the ancient maxim of the Roman law, "Jure
nature aequum est, meminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri

locupletiorem" which was restated by the Partidas in these terms:

"Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro."
When the statutes are silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental principles which the courts invoke in order to arrive at a
solution that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
4. Then, there is the total amount of P7,000 borrowed by the
husband from the wife, thus itemized: (1) P3,000 lost in horse-races
and in poker; (2) P3,000 spent for pastime ("diversion"); and (3)
P1,000 to pay a personal debt of the husband. The trial court applied
article 1386 of the Civil Code, and ordered that said amount of
P7,000 be deducted from the husband's share. But appellant's theory
is that articles 1408 (par. 1) and 441 should govern, so that the
amount is chargeable against the conjugal partnership. These
provisions read thus:
Art. 1408. Seran de cargo de la sociedad de gananciales:
1.o. Todas las deudas y obligaciones contraidas durantes el
matrimonio por el marido, y tabien las que contrajere la
mujer en los casos en que pueda legalmente obligar a la
sociedad. . . .
Art. 1411. Lo perdido y pagado durante el matrimonio por
alguno de los conyuges en cualquier clase de juego, no
disminuira su parte respectiva de los ganaciales. . . .
It is true that article 1385 ordains that the fruits of the paraphernal
property form part of the conjugal partnership and are subject to the
payment of the charges against the marriage. But as Manresa says,
article 1386 contains a limitation on the first part (just cited) of article
1385.
It is likewise true that under article 1408, par. 1, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband during the marriage are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership, but article 1386 is an
exception to the rule, and exempts the fruits of the paraphernal
property from the payment of the personal obligations of the
husband, unless there is proof that they redounded to the benefit of

the family. It is self-evident that the amounts in question did not

benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the fruits
of the paraphernal property. They should be paid from the husband's
funds. We quote from Manresa's comment on article 1386:
No hay, desde luego, contradiccion entre los preceptos de
los articulos 1408 y 1386; hay solo una regla general
contenida en aquel, y una excepcion contenida en este. El
articulo 1386, como especial, modifica la regla, y ha de
aplicarse siempre que las obligaciones personales
contraidas por el marido quieren hacerse efectivas en frutos
o rentas de los bienes parafernales de la mujer.
La frase 'obligaciones personales', se reduce a deudas u
obligaciones contraidas privativamente por el marido,
deudas y obligaciones que son desde luego propiamente
personales o no reales, pues si se reclamase contra bienes
o derecho especial y legalmente efectos al cumplimiento de
la obligacion, no podria haber inconveniente para que esta
se hiciese efectiva. Por lo demas, el espiritu del precepto es
que el marido no puede aprovecharse en interes proprio o
para atenciones privativas o personales suyas, de los frutos
de los bienes parafernales; que estos se destinen a las
verdaderas necesidades y cargas de la sociedad conyugal,
y, por tanto, se emplean, como deben, en beneficio de la
familia.
Valverde in his "Tratado de Derecho Civil Espaol," Vol. 4, pp. 347348, says:
Consecuencia natural de esta especie de separacion de
responsabilidades y de patrimonios, es que el Codigo
ordene que 'las obligaciones personales del marido no
podran hacerse efectivas sobre los frutos de los bienes
parafernales, a menos que se pruebe que redundaron en
provecho de la familia'. En efecto, el marido, como
administrador de la sociedad legal, obliga a esta con sus
actos, y por eso los gananciales responden de las deudad y
obligaciones contraidas por el marido durante el matrimonio,

presumiendose hechos en interes de la sociedad, a no ser

que se pruebe lo contrario, pero como caso de excepcion, si
los gananciales son frutos de bienes parafernales, entonces,
para que respondan tales frutos de las obligaciones del
marido, es preciso que prueba este que las dichas
obligaciones redundaron en provecho de la familia, pues por
el precepto del codigo, si los frutos de los parafernales son
gananciales, cuando de las deudad del marido se trata, solo
son responsables esos frutos en el caso que se demuestre
que redundaron en provecho de aquella. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Oyuelos, in his work, "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia
Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol" (Vol. 6, pp. 79-80), has this to
say:
(c) Fundamento de la exencion de los frutos. El articulo
1386 es un complemento de los articulos 1385, 1408, 1413,
1417, 1433 y 1434, y se inspira en los mismos principios
economicos de la familia, porque si los frutos de los
parafernales forman parte de la sociedad conyugal, que
subsiste mientras no se disuelva el matrimonio o se decrete
la separacion de bienes, y si a cargo de la misma corre el
sostenimiento de la familia, la educacion de los hijos y las
deudas que el marido contraiga como jefe de ella, es logico
concluir, sobre todo teniendo presente el articulo 1385, que
aun prescindiendo del texto claro y terminante del articulo
1386, las responsabilidades del marido en tanto puedan
hacerse efectivas con los productos de dichos bienes en
cuanto se hubiesen contraido en provecho de la familia; no
existiendo contradiccion entre los articulos 1386 y 1408,
numero 1.0 (alegada en el concepto de que el articulo 1386
no puede aplicarse al caso de subsistencia del matrimonio),
por cuanto la esfera de actuacion del 1386 no se contrae al
estado de derecho consiguiente a la separacion de bienes
de los respectivos esposos.

Is the amount under consideration, P7,000, being enforced against

the fruits of the paraphernal property? Yes, because practically all of
the conjugal partnership assets have been derived from the fruits of
the wife's exclusive property.
In the case of Fidelity and Surety Co. vs. Ansaldo, 37 Off. Gaz.,
1164, (promulgated November 26, 1938), this Court held:
Article 1386 of the Civil Code provides that the personal obligations
of the husband may not be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal
property, unless it be proved that such obligations redounded to the
benefit of the family. It, as contended by the appellant, the properties
levied upon in Civil Case No. 33923 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled "Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippines Islands
vs. Romarico Agcaoili and Angel A. Ansaldo" were acquired with the
fruits of the paraphernal properties belonging to Margarita Quintos,
said properties, although conjugal (art. 1385, par. 1 and art. 1408,
Civil Code; Mirasol vs. Lim, 59 Phil., 701, 709) are not liable for the
personal obligations of the husband, unless said obligations
redounded to the benefit of the family. Paragraph 1 of article 1408 of
the Civil Code makes all debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the husband chargeable against the conjugal
partnership, as a general rule, that is to say, although the fruits of the
paraphernal property of the wife are conjugal, they do not respond
for the personal obligations of the latter unless said obligations have
redounded to the benefit of the family."
In the sentence of January 15, 1917, of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain, the following doctrine is enunciated:
Considerando a mayor abundamiento que si bien en orden
al regimen familiar y conforme a la doctina legal establecida
por el Tribunal Supremo, interpretando el art. 1385 del
expresado Codigo, al marido incumbe exclusivamente la
administracion de los frutos de los bienes parafernales como
parte del haber de la sociedad conyugal, esta potsted esta
condicionada y regulada por el 1386, al prohibir al esposo el
aprovechamiento de tales rendimientos en benficio propio o
sea de sus obligaciones personales,imponiendole por modo

expreso, el deber de aplicarlos al levantamiento de las

cargas matrimoniales, pues de otra forma se
desnaturalizaria la reserva y privilegio que constituye el
concepto del patrimonia parafernal,con riesgo de infringir la
disposicion legal que precede invocada. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the instant case, it is quite plain that if the amount of P7,000.00
under review should be charged against the conjugal partnership
property which came almost exclusively from the fruits of the
paraphernal property, the reservation and privilege established by
law on behalf of the paraphernal patrimony would be encroached
upon and tempered with.
There are just and sound reasons for article 1386. The wife
contributes the fruits, interests, and rents of her paraphernal property
to help bear the expenses of the family. When the husband contracts
any debt in his own name, it is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership as a general rule (article 1408, par. 1) because it is
presumed that the debt is beneficial to the family. But when such a
debt is enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal property, such a
presumption no longer applies, considering article 1386. On the
contrary, it must be proved that the purpose for which the wife
contributes the fruits of her paraphernal property has been
accomplished through such personal debt of the husband.
Appellant relies on article 1411 which reads:
Lo perdido y pagado por alguno de los conyuges en juego
licito, sera a cargo de la sociedad de gananciales.
Lo perdido y no pagado por alguno de los conyuges en
juego licito, sera a cargo de la sociedad de ganaciales.
But this provision should be applied only when the debt is not being
charged against the fruits of the paraphernal property. If the conjugal
partnership assets are derived almost entirely, if not entirely, from the
fruits of the paraphernal property, as in this case, it is neither lawful
nor equitable to apply article 1411 because by so doing, the fruits of

the paraphernal property would in reality be the only kind of property

to bear the husband's gambling losses. In other words, what the
husband loses in gambling should be shouldered by him and not by
the conjugal partnership if the latter's assets come solely from the
fruits of the paraphernal property. This is but just, because gambling
losses of the husband cannot by any process of reasoning be
considered beneficial to the family. By the same token, to charge the
gambling losses against the conjugal partnership in such a situation
would fly in the case of the stern prohibition of article 1386, which
protects the fruits of the paraphernal property precisely against
expenses of the husband that are of no help to the family.
We are satisfied that the foregoing is by and large a fair and rational
interpretation of articles 1408 and 1411, which must be read in the
light of article 1386. If such a qualification of articles 1408 and 1411
is not made, article 1386 becomes nugatory.
5. The next question is whether interest should be paid by the widow
on the amount of P9,229.48 withdrawn by her from the Monte de
Piedad savings account No. 3317 of the conjugal partnership. There
is no question that the principal should be credited to the partnership
as the appellee's counsel does not dispute this point. The withdrawal
of said amount was made on April 7, 1934, about two months after
the husband's death, and while the widow was a special
administratrix. There being no evidence in the record as to the
purpose for which this amount was used, although counsel for
appellee suggests the possibility that the same might have been
disbursed for funeral and similar expenses, we believe she should
pay such interest, if any, as the Monte de Piedad would have paid on
the amount aforesaid, had not the same been withdrawn by the
widow.
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellee shall pay such
interest, if any, on P9,229.48 as the Monte de Piedad would have
paid if the amount had not been withdrawn, the judgment appealed
from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991

SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO
LAGMAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO
HENSON, respondents.

Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.

Benjamin Dadios and Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for
private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on
certiorari is the issue of whether or not the execution of a decision in
an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction
are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action
stemmed.
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on
January 6, 1964. 1 They have three children but even during the early
years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the
time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the
latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971,
Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City
for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson 2 with money
borrowed from an officemate. His father need the amount for
investments in Angeles City and Palawan. 3
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to
Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong
dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded
payment of their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a
check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds.
Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV. 5 After trial,
the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the

ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no
estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a
pre-existing obligation. 6
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong
filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action
for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the
aforesaid court. 7 The records of the case show that Atty. Gregorio
Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in behalf of
Katrina. When the case was called for pre-trial, Atty. Albino once
again appeared as counsel for Katrina only. While it is true that
during subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated
with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on
record that said counsel also represented Romarico. In fact, a power
of attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the trial, showed that
the same was executed solely by Katrina. 8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs.
It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs
HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95 with legal interest from May 27,
1975, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid; P20,000 as
expenses for litigation; P15,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs of
the suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots
in Angeles City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950,
30951, 30952 and 30953 all in the name of Romarico Henson ...
married to Katrina Henson. 10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since
said date was declared a public holiday, Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat
reset the sale to November 11, 1977. On said date, the following
properties registered in the name of Romarico Henson "married to
Katrina Henson" were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with
respective areas of 293 and 289 square meters at P145,000 each to
Juanito L. Santos, 11 and (b) two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 with respective areas of

289 and 916 square meters in the amount of P119,000.00 to

Leonardo B. Joson. 12

Santos and Joson until the final outcome of the case subject to
Romarico's posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00. 16

After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 of the

levy on execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224, the
property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the
Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of the mortgage loan of
P8,000 which Romarico and Katrina had obtained from said bank.
The property was sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder for P57,000
on September 9, 1977. On September 14, 1978, Juanito Santos,
who had earlier bought the same property at public auction on
November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying the sum of P57,000 plus
the legal interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of P63,840.00. 13

After trial on the merits, the lower court 17 rendered a decision

holding that Romarico was indeed not given his day in court as he
was not represented by counsel nor was he notified of the hearings
therein although he was never declared in default. Noting that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced at the trial in said case do not show
that Romarico had anything to do with the transactions between
Katrina and Anita Chan, the court ruled that the judgment in Civil
Case No. 2224 "is devoid of legal or factual basis which is not even
supported by a finding of fact or ratio decidendi in the body of the
decision, and may be declared null and void ... pursuant to a doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the Court of First
Instance or a branch thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and
decide an action for annulment of a final and executory judgment or
order rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch
thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755)." 18

About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1 978,

Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in Civil
Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution
and the auction sale therein in the same Court of First
Instance. 14 Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court"
because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and
Yumul appeared solely for Katrina; that although he did not file an
answer to the complaint, he was not declared in default in the case;
that while Atty. Albino received a copy of the decision, he and his wife
were never personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to
do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize
her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on
execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital
properties and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the
case were null and void.
On November 10, 1978, the lower court issued an order restraining
the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of
sale of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 in favor of
Juanito Santos and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and
30953 in favor of Leonardo Joson until further orders of the
court. 15On January 22, 1979, upon motion of Romarico, the court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriff from
approving the final bill of sale of the land covered by the
aforementioned certificates of title and the Register of Deeds of
Angeles City from registering said certificates of title in the names of

On whether or not the properties lenied upon and sold at public

auction may be reconveyed to Romarico, the court, finding that there
was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the
personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in
view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal
partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely an
expectancy, the same may not be sold or disposed of for value until
after the liquidation and settlement of the community assets. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against all the defendants, as follows:

(a) The Decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV, rendered in
Civil Case No. 2224, entitled "RICKY WONG, ET AL.
vs. KATRINA PINEDA HENSON and ROMARICO
HENSON", is hereby declared null and void, only as
far as it affects plaintiff herein Romarico Henson;
(b) The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and
auction sale of the conjugal property of the spouses
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda Henson which
were sold at public auction on November 11, 1977,
without notice to plaintiff herein, by Deputy Sheriff
Emerito Sicat, are likewise declared null and void
and of no force and effect;
(c) Defendants Emerito Sicat and Conrado Lagman,
in their official capacity as Sheriff and Register of
Deeds, respectively, are enjoined permanently from
issuing and/or registering the corresponding deeds
of sale affecting the property;
(d) The aforementioned buyers are directed to
reconvey the property they have thus purchased at
public auction to plaintiff Romarico Henson;
(e) As far as the claim for reimbursement filed by
Juanito Santos concerning the redemption of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
30951 from the Rural Bank of Porac, which
foreclosed the same extrajudicially, is concerned,
plaintiff Romarico Henson may redeem the same
within the period and in the manner prescribed by
law, after the corresponding deed of redemption
shall have been registered in the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for Angeles City;
(f) Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan
are, with the exception of the defendants Juanito
Santos, Leonardo Joson, Sheriff and Register of

Deeds, are ordered jointly and severally, to pay the

plaintiff Romarico Henson the sum of P10,000.00,
corresponding to the expenses of litigation, with
legal interest thereon from the time this suit was filed
up to the time the same shall have been paid, plus
P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the costs
of suit; and
(g) The counterclaims respectively filed on behalf of
all the defendants in the above-entitled case are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
In its decision of January 22, 1985 19 the said court affirmed in toto
the decision of the lower court. It added that as to Romarico, the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 had not attained finality as the
decision therein was not served on him and that he was not
represented by counsel. Therefore, estoppel may not be applied
against him as, not having been served with the decision, Romarico
did not know anything about it. Corollarily, there can be no valid writ
of execution inasmuch as the decision had not become final as far as
Romarico is concerned.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal
properties, the appellate court ruled in the negative. It noted that the
properties are Romarico' s exclusive capital having been bought by
him with his own funds. But granting that the properties are conjugal,
they cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter were
exclusively hers because they were incurred without the consent of
her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and
they did not redound to the benefit of the family. The court
underscored the fact that no evidence has been submitted that the
administration of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to
Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said obligations
were incurred.

The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of

the appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit on
February 6, 1985. 20
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
contend that, inasmuch as the Henson spouses were duly
represented by Atty. Albino as shown by their affidavit of August 25,
1977 wherein they admitted that they were represented by said
counsel until Atty. Yumul took over the actual management and
conduct of the case and that Atty. Albino had not withdrawn as their
counsel, the lower court "did not commit an error" in serving a copy
of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 only on Atty. Albino. Moreover,
during the 2-year period between the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2224 and the public auction sale on November 11, 1977,
Romarico remained silent thereby making him in estoppel and guilty
of laches.
Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient evidence that the
auction sale was conducted in accordance with law, the acts of the
sheriffs concerned are presumed to be regular and valid. But
granting that an irregularity consisting of the non-notification of
Romarico attended the conduct of the auction sale, the rights of
Santos and Joson who were "mere strangers who participated as the
highest bidders" therein, may not be prejudiced. Santos and Joson
bought the properties sincerely believing that the sheriff was
regularly performing his duties and no evidence was presented to the
effect that they acted with fraud or that they connived with the sheriff.
However, should the auction sale be nullified, petitioners assert that
Romarico should not be unduly enriched at the expense of Santos
and Joson.
The petitioners' theory is that Romarico Henson was guilty of laches
and may not now belatedly assert his rights over the properties
because he and Katrina were represented by counsel in Civil Case
No. 2224. Said theory is allegedly founded on the perception that the
Hensons were like any other ordinary couple wherein a spouse
knows or should know the transactions of the other spouse which
necessarily must be in interest of the family. The factual background
of this case, however, takes it out of said ideal situation.

Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina

entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that
business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of Civil Case No.
2224, Romarico acted, or, as charged by petitioners, failed to act, in
the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his
estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the
complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the
husband of Katrina. On whether Romarico was also represented by
Atty. Albino, Katrina's counsel, the courts below found that:
... Atty. Albino filed an Answer with Counterclaims
dated July 25, 1975 solely on behalf of defendant
Katrina Henson. The salutary statement in that
Answer categorically reads: ... COMES NOW THE
DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON by and through
undersigned counsel, in answer to plaintiffs'
complaint respectfully alleges: ... .
That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO,
JR., over the phrase COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
KATRINA HENSON.
Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pretrial on November 27, 1975, before then Presiding
Judge Bienvenido Ejercito, it is clearly stated on
page 2 of the day's stenographic notes, under
"APPEARANCES that Atty. Albino, Jr. appeared as
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON".
And when the case was called, Atty. Jose Baltazar,
Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs while Atty. Albino
categorically appeared "FOR DEFENDANT
KATRINA HENSON".
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty.
Expedito Yumul 'appeared as counsel for the
defendants,' but the whole trouble is that he never
expressly manifested to the Court that he was
likewise actually representing defendant
"ROMARICO HENSON", for it cannot be disputed

that Atty. Yumul only entered his appearance in

collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn, January
26, 1976, Espinosa), who in turn entered his initial
appearance during the pre- trial, and through the
filing of an Answer, for defendant KATRINA
HENSON. As a matter of fact, the Power of Attorney
which Atty. Albino produced during the pre-trial was
executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON.
Accordingly, as collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul
cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as duly authorized to formally appear
likewise on behalf of defendant ROMARICO
HENSON for whom principal counsel of record Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr. never made any formal
appearance. On this score, it is not amiss to state
that "A spring cannot rise higher than its source:.

answer because my wife took a

lawyer and that lawyer I think will
protect her interest and my interest
being so I did not have nothing to do
in the transaction which is attached
to the complaint.' (TSN, Jan. 14,
1980, pp. 52-53).

Now, what about that statement in the

aforementioned joint affidavit of the spouses
KATRINA HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON, to
the effect that our first lawyer in said case was Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime later Atty.
Expedito B. Yumul took over ...

Q How about your husband, do you

remember if he physically appeared
in that Civil Case No. 2224, will you
tell us if he was represented by
counsel as a party defendant?

That plaintiff never appeared in Civil

Case No. 2224, nor was he therein
represented by counsel was
impliedly admitted by defendants'
counsel of records thru a question
he propounded on cross, and the
answer given by Katrina Pineda, to
wit:

A No, sir, he did not appear.

That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON

was made to sign by Atty. Yumul on August 25,1977,
after the filing of this case, allegedly for the purpose
of dissolving the writ of execution, as claimed in
paragraph XIV of the complaint herein, and is
satisfactorily explained by both plaintiff herein and
his wife, while on cross-examination by Atty.
Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
Q So, the summons directed your
filing of your Answer for both of you,
your wife and your good self?
A Yes, sir but may I add, I received
the summons but I did not file an

Q You are husband and wife, please

tell us the reason why you have your
own counsel in that case whereas
Romarico Henson did not appear
nor a counsel did not appear in that
proceedings (TSN, Feb. 25,1980,
pp. 6-7).
xxx xxx xxx
A Because that case is my exclusive
and personal case, he has nothing
to do with that, sir. (TSN, Feb. 25,
1980, p. 9). (Rollo, pp. 17-20)

Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside

from the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his
estranged wife, he was also not afforded an opportunity to defend
himself in Civil Case No. 2224.21 There is no laches or even finality of
decision to speak of with respect to Romarico since the decision in
Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed
by law. 22 Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to the fact
that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2224 acted on the presumption
that the Hensons were still happily married because the complaint
itself shows that they did not consider Romarico as a party to the
transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong. In all
likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal
party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court 23and, necessarily,
the public auction sale is null and void. 24 Moreover, the power of the
court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. 25
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the
Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately. 27
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico. 28 While there is proof that Romarico
acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the
loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the
conjugal assets 29 and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of
paramount importance considering that in the determination of the
nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.

The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's

indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having
been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership. 30 In addition to the fact that her rights over the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur
such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven
at the trial. 31
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of
purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the
husband fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of
the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or
by the husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for
Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Petitioners' contention that the rights of Santos and Joson as
innocent buyers at the public auction sale may not be prejudiced, is,
to a certain extent, valid. After all, in the absence of proof that
irregularities attended the sale, the same must be presumed to have
been conducted in accordance with law. There is, however, a
peculiar factual circumstance that goes against the grain of that
general presumption the properties levied upon and sold at the public
auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment debtor. Thus, the
guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
The rule in execution sales is that an execution
creditor acquires no higher or better right than what
the execution debtor has in the property levied upon.
The purchaser of property on sale under execution
and levy takes as assignee, only as the judicial seller
possesses no title other than that which would pass
by an assignment by the owner. "An execution
purchaser generally acquires such estate or interest
as was vested in the execution debtor at the time of

the seizure on execution, and only such interest,

taking merely a quit-claim of the execution debtor's
title, without warranty on the part of either the
execution officer or of the parties, whether the
property is realty or personalty. This rule prevails
even if a larger interest in the property was intended
to be sold. Accordingly, if the judgment debtor had
no interest in the property, the execution purchaser
acquires no interest therein." (Pacheco vs. Court of
Appeals, L-48689, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 382,
388-389 quoting Laureano vs. Stevenson, 45 Phil.
252; Cabuhat vs. Ansery, 42 Phil. 170; Fore v.
Manove, 18 Cal. 436 and 21 Am. Jur., 140-141.
Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos and Joson
possess no rights which may rise above judgment debtor Katrina's
inchoate proprietary rights over the properties sold at public auction.
After all, a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell
and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more that what the
seller can legally transfer. 36 But, inasmuch as the decision in Civil
Case No. 2224 is void only as far as Romarico and the conjugal
properties are concerned, the same may still be executed by the
Spouses Wong against Katrina Henson personally and exclusively.
The Spouses Wong must return to Juanito Santos and Leonardo
Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and P119,000 respectively,
received by said spouse from the public auction sale.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding

against Romarico and Katrina Henson filed by the Rural Bank of
Porac, should, however, be respected unless Romarico exercises his
right of redemption over the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 30951 in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower
court in Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modifications above stated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160347

November 29, 2006

ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE
GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN,
CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision1 and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Decision rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang [hereinafter referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly
and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de Guzman.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders
as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS
for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six
percent (46%) respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased,
from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was
subscribed by [the spouses Carandang]. Thereafter, on March 3,
1989, MBS again increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3
million, [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the
increase. They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital
stock.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions
were paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital stock
increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase
or a total of P336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a
demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said
total amount.

[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending

that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio
Carandang] and [de Guzman], whereby the latter promised to pay for
the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for
[Arcadio Carandangs] technical expertise, his newly purchased
equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness
on their part [sic].
On June 5, 1992, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover
the P336,375 together with damages. After trial on the merits, the
trial court disposed of the case in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of [de Guzman]. Accordingly, [the spouses Carandang] are
ordered to jointly and severally pay [de Guzman], to wit:
(1) P336,375.00 representing [the spouses Carandangs]
loan to de Guzman;
(2) interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from June 5, 1992 when this
complaint was filed until the principal amount shall have
been fully paid;
(3) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
(4) Costs of suit.
The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same in the 22 April 2003 assailed
Decision:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.2

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Carandang was

similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in the 6 October 2003
assailed Resolution:
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED and our Decision of April 22, 2003, which is based
on applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter is hereby
AFFIRMED and REITERATED.3
The spouses Carandang then filed before this Court the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari, bringing forth the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO STRICTLY
COMPLY WITH SECTION 16, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY
SECTIONS 2 AND 7, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED
LIABILITY OF PETITIONERS ARE JOINT AND SOLIDARY, IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.4
Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having
been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for
failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE IS AN
ALLEGED LOAN FOR WHICH PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE,
CONTRARY TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF BOOK IV, TITLE XI,
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE PERTAINING TO LOANS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
WERE ABLE TO DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE.
IV.

SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased

party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.
The spouses Carandang posits that such failure to comply with the
above rule renders void the decision of the RTC, in adherence to the
following pronouncements in Vda. de Haberer v. Court of
Appeals5 and Ferreria v. Vda. de Gonzales6 :
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that
survives and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of
the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution
of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever
been effected, the trial held by the court without such legal
representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial
are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the
persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the
trial and judgment would be binding. 7
In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal
representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal
representative appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased;
neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such
legal representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked
to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution
was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over
appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case and
making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as a
representative of the estate of her deceased mother.8
However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is
conferred by law and is not subject to the discretion of the

parties,9 jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.10Implied waiver comes in the
form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. 11
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had
been no valid substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and
therefore the judgment cannot be made binding upon them. In the
case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are
actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their
waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal
of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of such view
in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of de
Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
RTC.
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is
a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can
thereby waive it by silence.
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule requiring a
formal substitution of heirs. The underlying principle therefor is not
really because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but
because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation
of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of
the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein.12 Such violation of due process can only be asserted by the
persons whose rights are claimed to have been violated, namely the
heirs to whom the adverse judgment is sought to be enforced.
Care should, however, be taken in applying the foregoing
conclusions. In People v. Florendo,13 where we likewise held that the
proceedings that took place after the death of the party are void, we
gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended
party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of
the latter, the principal x x x." Nevertheless, the case at bar had
already been submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998,

several months before the passing away of de Guzman on 19

February 1999. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the
appearance of de Guzmans counsel were conducted before the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzmans
counsel cannot be said to have no authority to appear in trial, as trial
had already ceased upon the death of de Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express
waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because
there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no
further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans
counsel.
Before proceeding with the substantive aspects of the case,
however, there is still one more procedural issue to tackle, the fourth
issue presented by the spouses Carandang on the non-inclusion in
the complaint of an indispensable party.
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to
state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman,
allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff
The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks
used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of
Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an
indispensable party. Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the
failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the
dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name
of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action." 14
The Court of Appeals held:
We disagree. The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and
Milagros de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is
part of their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the

Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the
recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property.
Thus, in Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court
held that "x x x Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join
him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. x x x
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of
alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the
Family Code. x x x."
The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange
the terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.15 On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action, 16 in
contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination
or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 17
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that "(i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action."18 However, what dismissal on this ground entails is
an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all
persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter
query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and

necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in

interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as
real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity
of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any
marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
govern their property relations.19
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved.20 Credits are personal properties,21 acquired during the
time the loan or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore,
credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for
which the spouses Carandang are liable, such credits are presumed
to be conjugal property. There being no evidence to the contrary,
such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a coowner of specific partnership property,22 is certainly a real party in
interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
by reason that the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in
interest, is therefore unwarranted.
So now we come to the discussion concerning indispensable and
necessary parties. When an indispensable party is not before the
court, the action should likewise be dismissed.23 The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.24 On the other hand, the non-joinder of
necessary parties do not result in the dismissal of the case. Instead,
Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides for the
consequences of such non-joinder:

Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever

in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not
joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state
why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary
party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such
party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court
from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party
would not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an
exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to comply with an order of the court, as Section
9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the effect of such non-inclusion: it
shall not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of
such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the
non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action.
Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third
set of parties: the pro-forma parties, which are those who are
required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another
party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or
procedural rule.25 An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued
jointly, except as provided by law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither
indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a

husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be

part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in
such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined
as a party.
In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor
necessary, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be
followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a
case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that
the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional
defect.26 The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it
is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment. 27
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also
indispensable or necessary parties, the rules concerning
indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be, should be
applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not
joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the
credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be
either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an
indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a
necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there was
an order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to Section 9,
Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it
superceded:

Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on

the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a]
partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the
funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners
stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits
themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino
and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de
Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In
the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular28 and Adlawan v.
Adlawan,29 we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring
actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the
latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals,30 we also held
that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of the coowners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action
for the recovery of possession.31
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore,
only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for
the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are
not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to
have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. 32
We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable
party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to

the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been

impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by
her not being a party thereto.
Whether or not respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be
collected from petitioners
In the second and third issues presented by the spouses Carandang,
they claim that the de Guzmans failed to prove the alleged loan for
which the spouses Carandang were held liable. As previously stated,
spouses Quirino and Milagros de Guzman paid for the stock
subscriptions of the spouses Carandang, amounting to P336,375.00.
The de Guzmans claim that these payments were in the form of
loans and/or advances and it was agreed upon between the late
Quirino de Guzman, Sr. and the spouses Carandang that the latter
would repay him. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that there was
an oral pre-incorporation agreement wherein it was agreed that
Arcardio Carandang would always maintain his 46% equity
participation in the corporation even if the capital structures were
increased, and that Quirino de Guzman would personally pay the
equity shares/stock subscriptions of Arcardio Carandang with no cost
to the latter.
On this main issue, the Court of Appeals held:
[The spouses Carandang] aver in its ninth assigned error that [the de
Guzmans] failed to prove by preponderance of evidence, either the
existence of the purported loan or the non-payment thereof.
Simply put, preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as
a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. The
concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence that is of
greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in
opposition to it; it means probability of truth.
[The spouses Carandang] admitted that it was indeed [the de
Guzmans] who paid their stock subscriptions and their reason for not

reimbursing the latter is the alleged pre-incorporation agreement, to

which they offer no clear proof as to its existence.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegation. Thus, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove
his affirmative allegations in the complaints and the defendant or
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative
defenses and counterclaims.33
The spouses Carandang, however, insist that the de Guzmans have
not proven the loan itself, having presented evidence only of the
payment in favor of the Carandangs. They claim:
It is an undeniable fact that payment is not equivalent to a loan. For
instance, if Mr. "A" decides to pay for Mr. "Bs" obligation, that
payment by Mr. "A" cannot, by any stretch of imagination, possibly
mean that there is now a loan by Mr. "B" to Mr. "A". There is a
possibility that such payment by Mr. "A" is purely out of generosity or
that there is a mutual agreement between them. As applied to the
instant case, that mutual agreement is the pre-incorporation
agreement (supra) existing between Mr. de Guzman and the
petitioners --- to the effect that the former shall be responsible for
paying stock subscriptions of the latter. Thus, when Mr. de Guzman
paid for the stock subscriptions of the petitioners, there was no loan
to speak of, but only a compliance with the pre-incorporation
agreement.34
The spouses Carandang are mistaken. If indeed a Mr. "A" decides to
pay for a Mr. "Bs" obligation, the presumption is that Mr. "B" is
indebted to Mr. "A" for such amount that has been paid. This is
pursuant to Articles 1236 and 1237 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or
performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of
the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has
been beneficial to the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, cannot compel the creditor
to subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising from a mortgage,
guarantee, or penalty.
Articles 1236 and 1237 are clear that, even in cases where the
debtor has no knowledge of payment by a third person, and even in
cases where the third person paid against the will of the debtor, such
payment would produce a debt in favor of the paying third person. In
fact, the only consequences for the failure to inform or get the
consent of the debtor are the following: (1) the third person can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor; and (2) the third person is not subrogated to the rights of the
creditor, such as those arising from a mortgage, guarantee or
penalty.35
We say, however, that this is merely a presumption. By virtue of the
parties freedom to contract, the parties could stipulate otherwise and
thus, as suggested by the spouses Carandang, there is indeed a
possibility that such payment by Mr. "A" was purely out of generosity
or that there was a mutual agreement between them. But such
mutual agreement, being an exception to presumed course of events
as laid down by Articles 1236 and 1237, must be adequately proven.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their payment of the
spouses Carandangs stock subscriptions. These payments were, in
fact, admitted by the spouses Carandang. Consequently, it is now up
to the spouses Carandang to prove the existence of the preincorporation agreement that was their defense to the purported
loan.

Unfortunately for the spouses Carandang, the only testimony which

touched on the existence and substance of the pre-incorporation
agreement, that of petitioner Arcardio Carandang, was stricken off
the record because he did not submit himself to a cross-examination
of the opposing party. On the other hand, the testimonies of Romeo
Saavedra,36 Roberto S. Carandang,37 Gertrudes Z.
Esteban,38 Ceferino Basilio,39 and Ma. Luisa Carandang40touched on
matters other than the existence and substance of the preincorporation agreement. So aside from the fact that these witnesses
had no personal knowledge as to the alleged existence of the preincorporation agreement, the testimonies of these witnesses did not
even mention the existence of a pre-incorporation agreement.
Worse, the testimonies of petitioners Arcadio Carandang and Ma.
Luisa Carandang even contradicted the existence of a preincorporation agreement because when they were asked by their
counsel regarding the matter of the check payments made by the
late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr. in their behalf, they said that they had
already paid for it thereby negating their own defense that there was
a pre-incorporation agreement excusing themselves from paying Mr.
de Guzman the amounts he advanced or loaned to them. This basic
and irrefutable fact can be gleaned from their testimonies which the
private respondents are quoting for easy reference:
a. With respect to the testimony of Ma. Luisa Carandang
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how do you feel with
respect to the Complaint of the plaintiff in this case charging you that
you paid for this year and asking enough to paid (sic) your tax?
A: We have paid already, so, we are not liable for anything payment
(sic).41
b. With respect to the testimony of Arcadio Carandang
"Q: How much?

A: P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 per month.

Q: The plaintiff also claimed thru witness Edgar Ragasa, that there
were receipts issued for the payment of your shares; which receipts
were marked as Exhibits "G" to "L" (Plaintiff).
Im showing to you these receipts so marked by the plaintiff as their
exhibits which were issued in the name of Ma. Luisa Carandang,
your wife; and also, Arcadio M. Carandang. Will you please go over
this Official Receipt and state for the records, who made for the
payment stated in these receipts in your name?

2. Considering the technical expertise and talent of

defendant Arcadio M. Carandang and his new equipments
he bought, and his skill in repairing and modifying
radio/communication equipments into high proficiency, said
defendant would have an equity participation in the
corporation of 46%, and plaintiff 54% because of his financial
resources and franchise.

A: I paid for those shares."42

3. That defendant would always maintain his 46% equity

participation in the corporation even if the capital structures
are increased, and that plaintiff would personally pay the
equity shares/stock subscriptions of defendant with no cost
to the latter.

There being no testimony or documentary evidence proving the

existence of the pre-incorporation agreement, the spouses
Carandang are forced to rely upon an alleged admission by the
original plaintiff of the existence of the pre-incorporation agreement.

4. That because of defendants expertise in the trade

including the marketing aspects, he would be the President
and General Manager, and plaintiff the Chairman of the
Board.

Petitioners claim that the late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr. had

admitted the existence of the pre-incorporation agreement by virtue
of paragraphs 13 and 14 of their Answer and paragraph 4 of private
respondents Reply.

5. That considering their past and trustworthy relations, they

would maintain such relations in the joint venture without any
mental reservation for their common benefit and success of
the business.

Paragraphs 13 and 14 of petitioners Answer dated 7 July 1992 state

in full:

14. Having mutually agreed on the above arrangements, the

single proprietorship of plaintiff was immediately spun-off into
a corporation now known as Mabuhay Broadcasting System,
Inc. The incorporators are plaintiff and his family
members/nominees controlling jointly 54% of the stocks and
defendant Arcadio M. Carandang controlling singly 46% as
previously agreed.43

13. Sometime in November, 1973 or thereabout, herein plaintiff

invited defendant Arcadio M. Carandang to a joint venture by pooling
together their technical expertise, equipments, financial resources
and franchise. Plaintiff proposed to defendant and mutually agreed
on the following:
1. That they would organize a corporation known as
Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc.

Meanwhile, paragraphs 3 and 4 of private respondents Reply dated

29 July 1992 state in full:
3. Plaintiffs admits the allegation in paragraph 13.1 of the Answer
only insofar the plaintiff and defendant Arcadio M. Carandang

organized a corporation known as Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems,

Inc. Plaintiff specifically denies the other allegations in paragraph 13
of the Answer, the same being devoid of any legal or factual bases.
The truth of the matter is that defendant Arcadio M. Carandang was
not able to pay plaintiff the agreed amount of the lease for a number
of months forcing the plaintiff to terminate lease. Additionally, the
records would show that it was the defendant Arcadio M. Carandang
who proposed a joint venture with the plaintiff.
It appears that plaintiff agreed to the formation of the corporation
principally because of a directive of then President Marcos indicating
the need to broaden the ownership of radio broadcasting stations.
The plaintiff owned the franchise, the radio transmitter, the antenna
tower, the building containing the radio transmitter and other
equipment. Verily, he would be placed in a great disadvantage if he
would still have to personally pay for the shares of defendant Arcadio
M. Carandang.
4. Plaintiff admits the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Answer.44
In effect, the spouses Carandang are relying on the fact that Quirino
de Guzman stated that he admitted paragraph 14 of the Answer,
which incidentally contained the opening clause "(h)aving mutually
agreed on the above arrangements, x x x."
Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous. This
purported admission by Quirino de Guzman reeks of ambiguity, as
the clause "(h)aving mutually agreed on the above arrangements,"
seems to be a mere introduction to the statement that the single
proprietorship of Quirino de Guzman had been converted into a
corporation. If Quirino de Guzman had meant to admit paragraph
13.3, he could have easily said so, as he did the other paragraphs he
categorically admitted. Instead, Quirino de Guzman expressly stated
the opposite: that "(p)laintiff specifically denies the other allegations
of paragraph 13 of the Answer."45 The Reply furthermore states that
the only portion of paragraph 13 which Quirino de Guzman had
admitted is paragraph 13.1, and only insofar as it said that Quirino de

Guzman and Arcardio Carandang organized Mabuhay Broadcasting

Systems, Inc.46
All the foregoing considered, we hold that Quirino de Guzman had
not admitted the alleged pre-incorporation agreement. As there was
no admission, and as the testimony of Arcardio Carandang was
stricken off the record, we are constrained to rule that there was no
pre-incorporation agreement rendering Quirino de Guzman liable for
the spouses Carandangs stock subscription. The payment by the
spouses de Guzman of the stock subscriptions of the spouses
Carandang are therefore by way of loan which the spouses
Carandang are liable to pay.1wphi1
Whether or not the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and
solidary
Finally, the Court of Appeals also upheld the RTC Decision insofar as
it decreed a solidary liability. According to the Court of Appeals:
With regards (sic) the tenth assigned error, [the spouses Carandang]
contend that:
"There is absolutely no evidence, testimonial or documentary,
showing that the purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang] is
joint and solidary. x x x
"Furthermore, the purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang]
does not at all qualify as one of the obligations required by law to be
solidary x x x."
It is apparent from the facts of the case that [the spouses
Carandang] were married way before the effectivity of the Family
Code hence; their property regime is conjugal partnership under the
Civil Code.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and

wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the

partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when
the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered
into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability, as
between them, does not apply.47
The Court of Appeals is correct insofar as it held that when the
spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into
by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors. Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount,
similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership property. Thus, in the
case cited by the Court of Appeals, Alipio v. Court of Appeals, 48 the
two sets of defendant-spouses therein were held liable
for P25,300.00 each, chargeable to their respective conjugal
partnerships.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
judgment rendered against the spouses Carandang, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: The spouses
Carandang are ORDERED to pay the following amounts from their
conjugal partnership properties:
(1) P336,375.00 representing the spouses Carandangs loan
to Quirino de Guzman; and
(2) Interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from 5 June 1992 when the
complaint was filed until the principal amount can be fully
paid; and
(3) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case involves two appeals, one by the defendant the Manila
Railroad Company, and the other by the plaintiffs Aleko E. Lilius et
al., from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant
company to pay to the plaintiffs, for the purposes above
stated, the total amount of P30,865, with the costs of the
suit. And although the suit brought by the plaintiffs has the
nature of a joint action, it must be understood that of the
amount adjudicated to the said plaintiffs in this judgment, the
sum of P10,000 personally belongs to the plaintiff Sonja
Maria Lilius; the sum of P5,000, to the plaintiff Brita Marianne
Lilius; the sum of P250, to Dr. Marfori of the Calauan
Hospital, Province of Laguna, and the balance to the plaintiff
Aleko E. Lilius.
In support of its appeal, the appellant the Manila Railroad Company
assigns nine alleged errors committed by the trial court in its said
judgment, which will be discussed in the course of this decision.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39587

March 24, 1934

ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Harvey and O'Brien for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jose C. Abreu for defendant-appellant.

As a ground of their appeal, the appellants Aleko E. Lilius et al., in

turn, assign two alleged errors as committed by the same court a
quo in its judgment in question, which will be discussed later.
This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E. Lilius et al.,
praying, under the facts therein alleged, that the Manila Railroad
Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs, by way of indemnity for
material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and
negligence of the said defendant entity's employees, the sum of
P50,000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint, with costs.
The defendant the Manila Railroad Company, answering the
complaint, denies each and every allegation thereof and, by way of
special defense, alleges that the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius, with the

cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly

drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
The following facts have been proven at the trial, some without
question and the others by a preponderance of evidence, to wit:
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known
and reputed journalist, author and photographer. At the time of the
collision in question, he was a staff correspondent in the Far East of
the magazines The American Weekly of New York and The
Sphere of London.
Some of his works have been translated into various languages. He
had others in preparation when the accident occurred. According to
him, his writings netted him a monthly income of P1,500. He utilized
the linguistic ability of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his
articles and books into English, German, and Swedish. Furthermore,
she acted as his secretary.
At about 7 o'clock on the morning of May 10, 1931, the plaintiff, his
wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne
Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car driven by the said plaintiff
Aleko E. Lilius for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he made said
trip although he had already been to many places, driving his own
car, in and outside the Philippines. Where the road was clear and
unobstructed, the plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles an
hour. Prior thereto, he had made the trip as far as Calauan, but never
from Calauan to Pagsanjan, via Dayap. He was entirely
unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and had
no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap.
Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to
indicate its existence and inasmuch as there were many houses,
shrubs and trees along the road, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing,
coming from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the
left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed
down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people

to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards,
he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to
be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train coming
eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the
plaintiff's car right in the center. After dragging the said car a distance
of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force
of the impact was so great that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were
thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer
Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had
gone about seventy meters from the crossing.
On the afternoon of the same day, the plaintiff's entered St. Paul's
Hospital in the City of Manila where they were treated by Dr.
Waterous. The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius suffered from a fractured nose,
a contusion above the left eye and a lacerated wound on the right
leg, in addition to multiple contusions and scratches on various parts
of the body. As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was highly
nervous and very easily irritated, and for several months he had
great difficulty in concentrating his attention on any matter and could
not write articles nor short stories for the newspapers and magazines
to which he was a contributor, thus losing for some time his only
means of livelihood.
The plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius suffered from fractures of the pelvic
bone, the tibia and fibula of the right leg, below the knee, and
received a large lacerated wound on the forehead. She underwent
two surgical operations on the left leg for the purpose of joining the
fractured bones but said operations notwithstanding, the leg in
question still continues deformed. In the opinion of Dr. Waterous, the
deformity is permanent in character and as a result the plaintiff will
have some difficulty in walking. The lacerated wound, which she
received on her forehead, has left a disfiguring scar.
The child Brita Marianne Lilius received two lacerated wounds, one
on the forehead and the other on the left side of the face, in addition
to fractures of both legs, above and below the knees. Her condition
was serious and, for several days, she was hovering between life
and death. Due to a timely and successful surgical operation, she

survived her wounds. The lacerations received by the child have left
deep scars which will permanently disfigure her face, and because of
the fractures of both legs, although now completely cured, she will be
forced to walk with some difficulty and continuous extreme care in
order to keep her balance.
Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the
existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public
of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the
collision, coming from the station with a red flag in one hand and a
green one in the other, both of which were wound on their respective
sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented
himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The
train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed.
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence
which the parties presented at the trial in support of their respective
contentions, and after taking into consideration all the circumstances
of the case, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to
negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company, for not
having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at
Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order
that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees the flagman and
switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in
question to warn passers-by of the approaching train; the
stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to
his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the
necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the absence
of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving
at the crossing. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant
entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because,
otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing
and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the
flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at the
crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of
a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not

confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or

employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of
the discharge of their duties.
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity
for damages from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the
latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the
said victim has not, through his own negligence, contributed to the
accident, inasmuch as nobody is a guarantor of his neighbor's
personal safety and property, but everybody should look after them,
employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family
should apply to his own person, to the members of his family and to
his property, in order to avoid any damage. It appears that the herein
plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius took all precautions which his skill
and the presence of his wife and child suggested to him in order that
his pleasure trip might be enjoyable and have a happy ending,
driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to
the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed
in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons
on the road, in order to warn them of his approach and request them
to get out of the way, as he did when he came upon the truck parked
on the left hand side of the road seven or eight meters from the place
where the accident occurred, and upon the persons who appeared to
have alighted from the said truck. If he failed to stop, look and listen
before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving
at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go
ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor
anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing about it
beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the
impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the
locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the
accident had already become inevitable.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion
that the defendant the Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for
the accident by reason of its own negligence and that of its
employees, for not having employed the diligence of a good father of
a family in the supervision of the said employees in the discharge of
their duties.

The next question to be decided refers to the sums of money fixed by

the court a quo as indemnities for damages which the defendant
company should pay to the plaintiffs-appellants.
With respect to the plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius, although this
court believes his claim of a net income of P1,500 a month to be
somewhat exaggerated, however, the sum of P5,000, adjudicated to
him by the trial court as indemnity for damages, is reasonable.
As to the sum of P10,635 which the court awards to the plaintiffs by
way of indemnity for damages, the different items thereof
representing doctor's fees, hospital and nursing services, loss of
personal effects and torn clothing, have duly been proven at the trial
and the sum in question is not excessive, taking into consideration
the circumstances in which the said expenses have been incurred.
Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius,
wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius is in the language of the court,
which saw her at the trial "young and beautiful and the big scar,
which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound
received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the
fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which
renders it very difficult for her to walk", and taking into further
consideration her social standing, neither is the sum of P10,000,
adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way of indemnity for
patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. In the case
of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez (56 Phil., 177), the right leg of the plaintiff
Narciso Gutierrez was fractured as a result of a collision between the
autobus in which he was riding and the defendant's car, which
fractured required medical attendance for a considerable period of
time. On the day of the trial the fracture had not yet completely
healed but it might cause him permanent lameness. The trial court
sentenced the defendants to indemnify him in the sum of P10,000
which this court reduced to P5,000, in spite of the fact that the said
plaintiff therein was neither young nor good-looking, nor had he
suffered any facial deformity, nor did he have the social standing that
the herein plaintiff-appellant Sonja Maria Lilius enjoys.1vvphi1.ne+

As to the indemnity of P5,000 in favor of the child Brita Marianne

Lilius, daughter of Aleko E. Lilius and Sonja Maria Lilius, neither is
the same excessive, taking into consideration the fact that the
lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently
disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently
render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being
necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all
of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.
With respect to the plaintiffs' appeal, the first question to be decided
is that raised by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius relative to the insufficiency
of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way
of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as
journalist and author as a result of his illness. This question has
impliedly been decided in the negative when the defendant-appellant
entity's petition for the reduction of said indemnity was denied,
declaring it to be reasonable.
As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius
as damages for the loss of his wife's services in his business as
journalist and author, which services consisted in going over his
writings, translating them into English, German and Swedish, and
acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services
formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said
services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness and
had to employ a translator to act in her stead.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500
for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium"
of his wife, that is, "her services, society and conjugal
companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had
received from the accident now under consideration.
In the case of Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 255, 256),
this court, interpreting the provisions of the Civil Marriage Law of
1870, in force in these Islands with reference to the mutual rights and
obligations of the spouses, contained in articles 44-48 thereof, said
as follows:

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage

and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the
spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and
support each other. The husband must live with and protect
his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and
follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. . . .
Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the
husband's rights is to count on his wife's assistance. This assistance
comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties, including the care and education of the children
and attention to the husband upon whom primarily devolves the duty
of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the wife's
mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to
assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that she performed all the
said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the
husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance.
However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful
to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and
are aspiring to become man's equal in all the activities of life,
commercial and industrial, professional and political, many of them
spending their time outside the home, engaged in their businesses,
industry, profession and within a short time, in politics, and entrusting
the care of their home to a housekeeper, and their children, if not to a
nursemaid, to public or private institutions which take charge of
young children while their mothers are at work, marriage has ceased
to create the presumption that a woman complies with the duties to
her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he
who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from
deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the
case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja
Maria Lilius as translator and secretary, the value of which has not
been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented any
evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their
nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal
companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither

of the spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. Vazquez de

Arroyo, 42 Phil., 54), it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity
for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to
render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be
willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from
so doing.
In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and
so holds: (1) That a railroad company which has not installed a
semaphore at a crossing an does not see to it that its flagman and
switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at the
crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and is civilly
liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its
line without negligence on their part; (2) that an indemnity of P10,000
for a permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg, suffered by
a young and beautiful society woman, is not excessive; (3) that an
indemnity of P5,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and legs
of a four-year old girl belonging to a well-to-do family, is not
excessive; and (4) that in order that a husband may recover
damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness
from an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of
such assistance and his wife's willingness to continue rendering it
had she not been prevented from so doing by her illness.
The plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to interest of 6 percent per
annum on the amount of the indemnities adjudicated to them, from
the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final,
in accordance with the provisions of section 510 of Act No. 190.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is
hereby affirmed in toto, with the sole modification that interest of 6
per cent per annum from the date of the appealed judgment until this
judgment becomes final will be added to the indemnities granted,
with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.

Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their

marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. This presumption
stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that
the property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable
for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, challenging the November 22, 2002 Decision 2 and the
September 17, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CV No. 60939. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
dated August 12, 1981 and the Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
dated August 26, 1982 are declared NULL and VOID." 4

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160762

May 3, 2006

Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO, Petitioners,

vs.
LEONARDO YAMANE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:

The CA denied reconsideration in its September 17, 2003

Resolution.
The Facts
The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:
"Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot located
at Res. Sec. 'K', Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay
Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12491.
"As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty.
Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841, entitled 'Florence
Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs
therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, the

subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold
at public auction on August 11, 1981.
"Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party
Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public
auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property
and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal
obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with
the auction sale despite [respondent's] protest. The subject property
was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as
highest bidder. No redemption having been made during the oneyear period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was eventually issued
on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to
[petitioners].
"On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No. 417R, against [petitioners] and Sheriff Melgar for annulment and
cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the
abovementioned third-party claim. Citing the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No. 2288, which
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed the Register
of Deeds to issue new title in the name of Josephine Go x x x,
[petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was
denied by the trial court.
"In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the
material allegations of the complaint and interposed the following
special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by
prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy
to annul the execution proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity
in the auction sale; and that since the execution sale was made in
accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it
is deemed final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof
will not vitiate its validity.

"On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for

Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R, against [petitioners]
and Atty. Guillermo De Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud,
misrepresentation, manipulation and unlawful acts of the defendants
in causing the levy of the subject property with an estimated
commercial value ofP200,000 as against a charging lien in the
amount of P10,000.
"In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint hearing of
Civil Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. On August 30, 1985, Muriel was
declared non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing despite due
notice. As a consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was dismissed on
October 15, 1985."5
In its Decision6 dated March 25, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 4, held that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of
respondent -- and was not their conjugal property. The appearance
of his name on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was deemed to
be merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, his
late wife. Hence, finding that he had no legal standing to question the
auction sale or to pray for its annulment or cancellation, the RTC
dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998, respondent filed a
Motion,7 in which he prayed that he be allowed to file his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision, on or before May 30, 1998. The trial
court granted8 his Motion; received the Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was filed on May 28, 1998; and eventually
denied it in its Order dated June 5, 1998.10 He then elevated the
matter to the CA on June 15, 1998.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the RTC's Decision. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
dated August 12, 1981, and the Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
dated August 26, 1982, were declared null and void.

According to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage

is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one
spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. That the land
was acquired during the spouses' coverture was sufficiently
established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both
indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was "married to Leonardo
Yamane"; and by the undisputed testimony of the previous owner,
Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners' failure to establish that the
land in question had been acquired by Muriel using her exclusive
funds, the CA concluded that the contested land was conjugal
property.
The appellate court further held thus:
"x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property of
[respondent] and his wife, and absent any showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to their conjugal partnership from
the transaction between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De Guzman, the
public auction sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is
null and void."11
Hence, this Petition.12

exclusive paraphernal property and not as property coowned with her husband, the respondent herein.1avvphil.net
"III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that
the subject property is conjugal property between
respondent and Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same
cannot answer for the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de
Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841."13
In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the procedural
question of whether the CA erred in giving due course to
respondent's lapsed appeal; and, second, the substantive issue of
whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Whether Respondent's Appeal Should Be Given Due Course
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the
appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance
of the appeal and in not dismissing the same, despite the
fact that the respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the
15-day reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.
"II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the
subject property as conjugal property, despite the existence
of clear evidence showing that the subject property is the
exclusive paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during
her lifetime, always claimed the said property as her own

Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8,

1998. He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998, within which to file an
appeal. Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new
counsel be allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30,
1998. It was eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was denied.
Respondent subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1998.
By this time, the original period to appeal had expired. It should be
clear that the Rules prohibit an extension to file a motion for
reconsideration.14

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period

prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory, but
also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen days
deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment. 15
There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed
with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In
some of those instances, the presence of any justifying circumstance
recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or
admit an appeal filed out of time.16 In other instances, lapsed appeals
were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration
of a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case; d)
causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the failure to
show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory;
and f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced. 17
Indeed, in some exceptional cases, the Court has allowed the
relaxation of the rules regulating the reglementary periods of appeal.
These exceptions were cited in Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v.
CA,18 from which we quote:
"In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in
the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of
the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when
her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only
file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period
was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the
perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days
to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to
lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had
since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been
judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the

appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered
twice to make the same reparation to the appellee." 19
We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in
the present controversy. We have carefully studied the merits of the
case and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to
be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the
conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in Civil Case No.
417-R), must be set aside. It would be far better and more prudent to
attain the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice in the process. Thus, we would
rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the
case on appeal.
Substantive Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.20Accordingly, the
transaction was aptly covered by the then governing provisions of the
New Civil Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the
issue of the nature of the contested property.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."21 As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in
favor of the conjugal partnership,22 the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage.23
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.24 Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted
only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. 25 There

must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the

spouses,26 and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. 27
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and
Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February
27, 1967,28 or specifically during the marriage.29 We then follow the
rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject property during a
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It is
clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the
conjugal partnership.
Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the
subsistence of the marriage of Muriel to respondent.30 Nonetheless,
they insist that it belonged exclusively to her for the following
reasons:

Unilateral Declaration
Respondent's interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in
her Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of land
was her paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a property
-- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by
the will of one of the spouses.31 Thus, no unilateral declaration by
one spouse can change the character of a conjugal property.32
Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the
nature of the subject piece of land being levied upon, but whether
Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that
case, Muriel claimed that she had not officially retained him as
counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship had been established
between them.33
Deed and Title in the Name of One Spouse

First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in

Civil Case No. 505-R, which she had filed during her lifetime;
or in AG-GR Sp. No. 01616 (entitled "Muriel Pucay Yamane
v. Josephine Go"), that the disputed parcel of land was her
exclusive paraphernal property. They allege that his failure to
file a denial or opposition in those cases is tantamount to a
judicial admission that militates against his belated claim.
Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the
sole name of Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had the spouses
jointly purchased this piece of land, the document should
have indicated this fact or carried the name of respondent as
buyer.
Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land
within the redemption period after the auction sale indicated
that he was not its co-owner.
We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.

Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one

spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.34Hence, it cannot be
contended in the present case that, simply because the title and the
Deed of Sale covering the parcel of land were in the name of Muriel
alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive property. In
concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial court's reliance on Stuart
v. Yatco35 was clearly erroneous.
As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property, petitioners must present clear and convincing evidence.
We affirm and quote below, for easy reference, the relevant
dispositions of the CA:
"x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners'] contention that
the subject property was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds.
Mere registration of the contested property in the name of the wife is
not sufficient to establish the paraphernal nature of the property. This
reminds Us of the teaching in the recent case of Diancin v. Court of
Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses, regardless of

in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is

presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. To
quote:
"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless
of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In
the case at bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having
been acquired during the coverture of the marriage between Matilde
and Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that the grant was
solely in the name of Matilde did not make the property paraphernal
property. What was material was the time the fishpond lease right
was acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful
existence of Matilde's marriage to Tiburcio.
"x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence. The burden of proving that the property
belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party asserting it. Mere
assertion of the property's paraphernal nature is not sufficient."
"The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead
us to conclude that the contested property was indeed acquired
during the marriage of herein [respondent] and Muriel. To prove that
it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent upon
[petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that
Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed
to discharge the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by them
do We find any indication that the land in question was acquired by
Muriel with her exclusive funds. The presumption not having been
overthrown, the conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal
property."36
Non-Redemption After the Auction Sale

The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period

prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his
right or title to it. Contrary to petitioners' allegation, the fact is that he
filed a Third-Party Claim37with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy
and impending auction sale. This fact was specifically admitted by
petitioners.38 Respondent claimed that the parcel of land was
conjugal, and that he could not answer for the separate obligation of
his wife and her sisters.39 Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed
piece of land was sold at a public auction on August 11, 1981.
Consequently issued were a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated
August 12, 1981, and a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated
August 26, 1982.40
Likewise, in his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File Adm.
Case No. 2288,41 respondent raised the issue of the conjugal nature
of the property and reserved his right to file an independent action to
annul the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983 Order,42 however,
Branch 5 of the RTC of Baguio City did not rule on either the actual
ownership or the nature of the parcel of land. Rather, it granted the
Petition to issue a new certificate of title in favor of Petitioner
Josephine Mendoza Go. It found that, under Section 75 of
Presidential Decree 1529, respondent had no legal standing to
question the auction sale, because he was not the registered owner
of the property. Instead, his right to prove his claim in a separate and
independent action was upheld.43 Thus, he instituted the present
case for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale.
The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of respondent to
redeem the property. Misplaced is petitioners' emphasis on his failure
to do so within the period required by law, because redemption in this
case would have been inconsistent with his claim that the sale was
invalid.44 Redemption would have served as an implied admission of
the regularity of the sale and estopped him from later impugning its
validity on that ground.45
Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the
property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore

stands. The next question before us is, whether the charging lien of
Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land
in question.
Charging Lien Not Chargeable Against Conjugal Property
It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired
during the marriage of respondent and Muriel. The lawyer's legal
services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil
Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the
exclusive property of Muriel and her sisters.46 The recovery was done
during the marriage.47
The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:
"x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the
Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive
interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive
interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty.
De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her
sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested
conjugal property.
"Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be
held liable, levy on execution of the same property should still be
denied in accordance with the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for the
obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove that the
services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil Case No.
1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and Muriel. This
onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge." 48

We find no reason to deviate from the CA's findings, which are amply
supported by evidence. The expenses incurred by Muriel for the
recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal
property are her exclusive responsibility.49 This piece of land may not
be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not
been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership.50 Moreover, her rights to the property are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum;51 when administration of
the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 52 or
by the husband;53 or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity.54 Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the
present case means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to
answer for Muriel's personal obligation.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.55 In this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in
nature -- cannot be levied upon.56
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ
and JOSE HERMILO JOVELLANOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for
and in her behalf, and in representation of her two minor
daughters as natural guardian, ANA MARIA and MA. JENNETTE,
both surnamed JOVELLANOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision 1 promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27556 affirming with some modifications the earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject of
Civil Case No. Q-52058 therein to private respondent Annette H.

Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half of said property
to the three private respondents. all as pro indiviso owners of their
aforesaid respective portions.
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel
Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a lease and
conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon
City Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon,
located at and known as No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife
Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners
herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967,
Daniel married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom
he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil
Martinez and, at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house
on the back portion of the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the
lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter
donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the
lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos
died and his death spawned the present controversy, resulting in the
filing by private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court
below.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court
that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband
while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of
absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor
of her husband, Daniel Jovellanos. who was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 212286 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property,
specifically the lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the
beneficial and equitable title thereto, were acquired by their parents
during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and
conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 3 with the
following dispositions:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows
1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the
second marriage and directing the reimbursement of
the amount advanced by the partnership of the first
marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos
and the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia * J.
Martinez in the acquisition of the lot and bungalow
described in the Lease and Conditional Sale
Agreement (Exhs. D and 1);
2. After such liquidation and reimbursement,
declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos as proindiviso owner of 1/2 of the property described in
TCT No. 212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected
therein;
3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well
as the minors Anna Marie and Ma. Jeannette (sic)
both surnamed Jovellanos and the herein
defendants, as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the
other half of said property;
4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia
Martinez as exclusive owners of the two-storey
house erected on the property at the back of the said
bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as
builders in good faith under Article 448 of the New
Civil Code;
5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyances,
subject to the confirmation of this Court, and if they
are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that
the partition should be made by not more than three

(3) competent and disinterested persons as

commissioners who shall make the partition in
accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court;
6. Ordering the defendant(s) to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that
the lease and conditional sale agreement executed by and between
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is a lease contract and, in support
of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of the
trial court:
It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply
with all his obligations, i.e., the payment of the
stipulated rentals and adherence to the limitations
set forth in the contract before the legal title over the
property is conveyed to the lessee-vendee. This, in
effect. is a pactum reservati dominii which is
common in sales on installment plan of real estate
whereby ownership is retained by the vendor and
payment of the agreed price being a condition
precedent before full ownership could be transferred
(Wells vs. Samonte, 38768-R, March 23, 1973;
Perez vs. Erlanger and Galinger Inc., CA 54 OG
6088). The dominion or full ownership of the subject
property was only transferred to Daniel Jovellanos
upon full payment of the stipulated price giving rise
to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on
January 8, 1975 (Exh. 2) when the marriage
between the plaintiff and Daniel Jovellanos was
already in existence.
The contention of the defendants that the jus in re
aliena or right in the property of another person

(Gabuya vs. Cruz, 38 SCRA 98) or beneficial use

and enjoyment of the property or the equitable title
has long been vested in the vendee-lessee Daniel
Jovellanos upon execution of Exh. "1" is true, But
the instant case should be differentiated from the
cited cases of Pugeda v. Trias, et al., 4 SCRA 849;
and Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-18833, August 14,
1965, which cannot be applied herein even by
analogy. In Pugeda. the subject property refers
solely to friar lands and is governed by Act 1120
wherein the certificate of sale is considered a
conveyance of ownership subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if
the agreed price has not been paid in full; in the
case at bar, however, payment of the stipulated price
is a condition precedent before ownership could be
transferred to the vendee. 5
With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse
to petitioners their proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization
and burial expenses of the late Daniel Jovellanos, respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying Article
118 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly
from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and
partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before the
marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such
ownership was vested during the marriage. In either
case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors
raised before the respondent court and which may be capsulized into
two contentions, namely, that (1) the lower court erred in holding that
the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional sale
agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal property of the second marriage of
the late Daniel Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding

that the provisions of the Family Code are applicable in resolving the
rights of the parties herein. 6
It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied
in determining the successional rights of the party litigants to the
estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so would be to impair their
vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have
acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look
into the nature of the contract entered into by the contracting parties.
As appositely observed by respondent court, the so-called lease
agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do not
lose sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy has the force
of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith. 8Its provisions are binding not only upon them but also
upon their heirs and assigns. 9
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and
Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional
Sale Agreement" over the property involved with a lease period of
twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the
former, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the
property. 10 In a lease agreement, the lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. 11 In fact, Daniel
Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the
property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of
a family, permit inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in
regard to the use and preservation of the property. 12
It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the
lease period herein agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have
fully faithfully complied with all his obligations herein stipulated, the
LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the
LESSEE-VENDEE the property which is the subject matter of this
agreement; . . . 13

The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in

the nature of a contract to sell, as contrdistinguished from a contract
of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not
transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the
purchase price. 14 Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery,
but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until
full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect.
The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or
contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. 15Compliance with the stipulated payments is a
suspensive condition. 16 the failure of which prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. 17
Hornbook lore from civilists clearly lays down the distinctions
between a contract of sale in which the title passes to the buyer upon
delivery of the thing sold, and a contract to sell where, by agreement,
the ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until full
payment of the purchase price: In the former, non-payment of the
price is a negative resolutory condition; in the latter, full payment is a
positive suspensive condition. In the former, the vendor loses and
cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and unless the
contract of sale is rescinded or set aside; in the latter, the title
remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the
condition precedent of making full payment as specified in the
contract.
Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or
as a contractual amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by
the aforestated contract in petitioners' predecessor in interest was
merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His monthly
payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the
agreement that if he faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the
contract the same would in effect be considered as amortization
payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said
property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full
payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in
possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on
January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale
thereof in his favor.

The conditions of the aforesaid agreement also bear notice,

considering the stipulations therein that Daniel Jovellanos, as lesseevendee, shall not

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect

insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired nights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Sublease said property to a third party;
(c) Engage in business or practice any profession
within the property;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Make any alteration or improvement on the
property without the prior written consent of the
LESSOR-VENDOR;
(g) Cut down, damage, or remove any tree or shrub,
or remove or quarry any stone, rock or earth within
the property, without the prior written consent of the
LESSOR-VENDOR;
(h) Assign to another his right, title and interest
under and by virtue of this Agreement, without the
prior written consent and approval of the LESSORVENDOR. 18
The above restrictions further bolster the conclusion that Daniel
Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the
execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract,
Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of
ownership.
We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule
of retroactivity provided in the Family Code to the effect that

The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with
Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would
ripen into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership which,
as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment of the rentals
and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A
vested right as an immediate fixed right of present and future
enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right that is expectant or
contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute,
complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, 21 and which is perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. 22 Thus, for a property right to be vested, there must be
a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have
become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. 23
The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled
that the cases cited by petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar
since said cases involved friar lands which are governed by a special
law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In the
sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate
of sale is delivered to the vendee and such act is considered as a
conveyance of ownership, subject only to the resolutory condition
that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in
full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full
payment of the rentals was a condition precedent before ownership
could be transferred to the vendee. 24
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was
executed in 1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract
between the parties, only after full payment of the rentals. Upon the
execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married
to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his
conjugal partnership with his said second wife.

As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial
conference in the case below that the rentals/installments under the
lease and conditional sale agreement were paid as follows (a) from
September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first
marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of
Daniel Jovellanos; (c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds
of the second marriage; and (d) from 1972 to January 8, 1975, by
conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements
should be made in line with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of
the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
upon liquidation of the partnership."
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of
respondent court, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16857

May 29, 1964

MARCELO CASTILLO, JR., FELICISIMO CASTILLO,

ENCARNACION CASTILLO, AMELIA CASTILLO, JAIME
CASTILLO, RONALDO CASTILLO, VICTORIA CASTILLO,
LETICIA CINCO, LEVI CINCO and DANIEL CINCO,petitioners,
vs.
MACARIA PASCO, respondent.
Tomas Yumol for petitioners.
Mariano G. Bustos and Associates for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The legitimate children and descendants of the late Marcelo Castillo,
Sr. pray for the review and reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, in its Case CA G.R. No. 19377-R, that affirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, declaring that the fishpond
in San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan (covered by TCT No. 9928 of the
Registry of Deeds of said province), was the exclusive paraphernal
property of respondent Macaria Pasco, surviving spouse of the
deceased Marcelo Castillo, Sr., and dismissing the complaint for
partition and accounting filed by petitioners in said Court of First
Instance.
The Court of Appeals found, and the petitioner-appellants do not
dispute, that in October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower,
married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous

husbands. Petitioners were children and grandchildren (representing

their deceased parents) of Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous
marriage. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow
married her fourth husband, Luis San Juan, on June 8, 1934.
On December 22, 1932, Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as coowners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale (Exh. 1)
conveying said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria
Pasco for the sum of P6,000.00 (although the deed recited a higher
amount), payable in three installments: P1,000 upon execution of the
deed (Exh. 1) ; P2,000 on January 25, 1933 without interest; and
P3,000 within one year thereafter, with 11% interest from February 1,
1933, but extendible for another year.
Against the contention of petitioners-appellants that the fishpond thus
bought should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired
during coverture, the Court of Appeals declared it to be paraphernalia
because it was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria
Pasco. She was admittedly a woman of means even before she
married Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and the latter's principal source of
income was only his P80 a month salary, as provincial treasurer (as
found by the Court of First Instance), besides two small residential
lots and fishponds, which were encumbered and later transferred to
his five children by his first wife and whom he was then supporting in
medical and high school. Actually, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died without
enough assets to pay his debts. .
In point of fact, the Court of Appeals found that the initial payment of
P1,000 for the fishpond now in litigation was made up of P600, that
one of the vendors (Gabriel Gonzales) owed to appellee Pasco, and
P400 in cash, which the latter paid out of the proceeds of the sale of
one of her nipa lands. The second installment of P2,000 appears to
have been paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor
Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged by both spouses. Dr.
Jacinto later assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. The last
payment of P3,000 was derived from a loan secured by a mortgage
(Exh. 2) on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria
Pasco, and one of which she had inherited from a former husband,
Justo S. Pascual, while the other lot encumbered was assessed in
her exclusive name.

It was also found by the Court of Appeals that upon the death of
Marcelo Castillo, Sr., the loan and mortgage in favor of Dr. Jacinto
(later assigned by him to Dr. Antonio Pasco) was still outstanding.
Unable to collect the loan, Dr. Pasco foreclosed the mortgaged, and
the encumbered fishpond was sold to him; but the sale was
subsequently annulled. Later, on September 7, 1949, respondent
Macaria Pasco judicially consigned P12,300 on account of the
mortgage debt and its interest, and completed payment by a second
consignation of P752.43 made on April 24, 1950. As the estate of
Castillo had no assets adequate to pay off the claims against it, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the amounts consigned belonged to
the widow Macaria Pasco, respondent herein.1wph1.t
It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was
the applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous
consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate
property depending on the source of the funds employed for its
acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife
or to the husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:
ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the
spouses only.

The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the

circumstance of the sale of the fishpond in question being made by
the original owners in favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr.
and Macaria Pasco, is indifferent for the determination of whether the
property should be deemed paraphernal or conjugal. As remarked by
Manresa in his Commentaries to the Civil Code, Vol. IX (5th Ed), p.
549, "la ley atiende no a la persona encuyo nombre o a favor del
cual se realize la compra, sino a la procedenciadel dinero."
As above-noted, the Court of Appeals determined that the initial
payment of P1,000 for the fishpond now disputed was made out of
private funds of Macaria Pasco. Appellants, however, argue that
since there is no express finding that the P600 debt owed by Gabriel
Gonzales came exclusively from private funds of Pasco, they should
be presumed conjugal funds, in accordance with Article 1407 of the
Civil Code of 1889. The argument is untenable. Since the wife, under
Article 1418, can not bind the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband, her private transactions are presumed to be
for her own account, and not for the account of the partnership. The
finding of the Court of Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales owed this
particular indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence
of proof that the husband authorized her to use community funds
therefor, the appellate Court's finding can not be disturbed by us.
Whether the evidence adverted to should be credited is for the Court
of Appeals to decide.
Appellants next assail the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
other two installments of the purchase price should be, like the first
one, deemed to have been paid with exclusive funds of the wife
because the money was raised by loans guaranteed by mortgage on
paraphernalia property of the wife. The position thus taken by
appellants is meritorious, for the reason that the deeds show the
loans to have been made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, and by Gabriel and
Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria
Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations of the
conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned
is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage is on the
wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation
that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the
principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and

which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they
so desired.
In Palanca vs. Smith Bell & Co., 9 Phil. 131., this Court ruled as
follows (cas cit. at p. 133,) .
This P14,000, borrowed by said Emiliano Boncan upon the
credit of the property of his wife became conjugal property
(par. 3, Art. 1401, Civil Code) and when that same was
reinvented in the construction of a house, the house became
e conjugal property and was liable for the payment of the
debts of the husband (Art 1408, Civ. Code).
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wife's
property is conjugal in character, a fortiorishould it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan
becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
The case of Lim Queco vs. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 162, is clearly
distinguishable from the Palanca case in that in the Lim Queco case
the wife alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although
she guaranteed repayment with a mortgage on her parapherna
executed with her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have
the management or representation of the conjugal partnership where
the husband is qualified therefor, the loan to her constituted a
transaction that did not involve the community, and the creditor could
seek repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, as this
Court then held, the money loaned to the wife, as well as the
property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's
exclusive property.
The analogy between the case now before us and the Palanca vs.
Smith Bell case is undeniable, and the Palanca ruling applies. We,
therefore, find that the two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price
of the fishpond were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first
installment of P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money belonging
to the wife Macaria Pasco, appellee herein.

As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal

funds and partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice
requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total
purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be
deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held
property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and
Macaria Pasco (9 Manresa, Com. al Codigo Civil [5th Ed.], p. 549).
Puesto que la ley atiende no a la persona en cuyo nombre o
a favor del cualse realize la compra sino a la procedencia
del dinero, considerando el hecho como una verdadera
substitution o conversion del dinero en otros objetos,
debemos deduce que cuando una finca por ejemplo, se
compra con dinero del marido y de la mujer, o de la mujer y
de la Sociedad, pertenece a aquellos de quienes precede el
precio y en la proporcion entregada por cada cual. Si pues
marido y mujer compran una casa entregando el primero de
su capital propio 10,000 pesetas, y la segunda 5,000, la
casa pertenecera a losdos conyuges pro indiviso, en la
proportion de los terceras partes al marido y una tercera a la
mujer. (Manresa. op. cit)
The payment by the widow, after her husband's death, of the
mortgage debt due to Dr. Pasco, the assignee of the original
mortgagee, Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, does not result in increasing her
share in the property in question but in creating a lien in her favor
over the undivided share of the conjugal partnership, for the
repayment of the amount she has advanced, should it be ultimately
shown that the money thus delivered to the creditor was exclusively
owned by her.
It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided
property of the widow and the conjugal partnership with her late
husband, the heirs of the latter, appellants herein, were entitled to
ask for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate
interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into
account (a) the widow's one-sixth direct share; (b) her half of the
community property; (e) her successional rights to a part of the
husband's share pursuant to the governing law of succession when

the husband died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for any
amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage debt as aforesaid.
All these details must be settled after proper trial.
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the original complaint is hereby
revoked and set aside, and the records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118305. February 12, 1998]

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO

MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES
ALFREDO
&
ENCARNACION
CHING, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the conjugal
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for
review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al.,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632, [1] upholding the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the
conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured
by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.

A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for

a clear understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM)
obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As
added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent
Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a
case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband
Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch VIII, entitled Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching,
docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon
motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending
appeal. Upon AIDCs putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of
execution dated May 12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner
Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff
in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982
on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then
scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.

On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction

against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal
partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan
did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
[2]
Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from
proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the
sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the
sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court [4] from enforcing its
Order of June 14, 1982, thus paving the way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
[3]

On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the
only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo,
which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the
redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on
August 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982,
decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is
granted and the challenged order of the respondent
Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is
hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar
as it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 46309 is, however,
denied. No pronouncement is here made as to costs. x x
x x.[5]
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal
(Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and
academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their
opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that where a third
party who claims ownership of the property attached or levied upon,

a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, two (2)
of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching,
a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.[6]

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on

the merits proceeded. Private respondents presented several
witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any
evidence.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied

by the respondent court in a Resolution dated November 28, 1994. [7]

On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision

declaring the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to
the respondent court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632.

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the

respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of
private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the respondenthusband.

On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the

assailed decision, affirming the decision of the regional trial court. It
held that:

Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent

court are as follows:

The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was

for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees.
xxxxxxxxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the
New Civil Code or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice
it to say that the two provisions are substantially the
same.Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the
Family Code is the applicable law on the matter x x x x x
x.
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains x x x. The burden of proof
that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondentappellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains.

I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

OBLIGATION
INCURRED
BY
RESPONDENT
HUSBAND DID NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ACT OF RESPONDENT HUSBAND IN SECURING
THE SUBJECT LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS
INDUSTRY, BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH
HE SUPPORTS HIS FAMILY.
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to
prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership;
all that is necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very
clear: for the partnership to be held liable, the husband
must have contracted the debt for the benefit of the
partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for

the benefit of the conjugal

partnership x x x.
There is a difference between the phrases: redounded to
the benefit of or benefited from (on the one hand) and for
the benefit of (on the other). The former require that
actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires
only that the transaction should be one which normally
would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
whether or not actual benefit accrued.[8]
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference
between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on
the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other. They mean one and
the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of
the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the
benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code
provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit
of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent
court runs counter to the pronouncement of this Court in the case of
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin,[9] that the husband as head of the family and
as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have
contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal
partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of CobbPerez is not applicable in the case at bar. This Court has, on several
instances, interpreted the term for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmea,[10] Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger
& Galinger, Inc.,[11] Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin[12] and G-Tractors, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,[13] cited by the petitioners, we held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage
relation, for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes toward the support of
his family, are not his personal and private debts, and the

products or income from the wifes own property, which,

like those of her husbands, are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the
payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article
1412, Civil Code), has a right to embark the partnership
in an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, and the
fact that the wife may not approve of a venture does not
make it a private and personal one of the husband.
(Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise
of the industry or profession by which he contributes to
the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez)
x x x if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit
of his career or profession or suffers losses in a
legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. (GTractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity
Insurance
&
Luzon
Insurance
Co.,[14] Liberty
Insurance
[15]
Corporation vs. Banuelos, and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia,
[16]
cited by the respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of
the assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the
payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but
not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty
agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved that
such obligations were productive of some benefit to the
family. (Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution of an
indemnity agreement by the husband redounded to the
benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal
debt but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty
Insurance)

In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership

under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for
such debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make
a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon
Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can
derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e.,
he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his
own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly
for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters

into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the

benefit of the conjugal partnership.Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we
add, that of the three other companion cases, on the one hand, and
that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the
former, the husband contracted the obligation for his own business;
while in the latter, the husband merely acted as a surety for the loan
contracted by another for the latters business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on
behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove
that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The reason for this is as lucidly explained by
the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was
for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of
petitioners-appellees - this despite the fact that the
members of the said family happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the
case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove
that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is
apparent from the facts of the case is that the judgment
debt was contracted by or in the name of the Corporation
Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only
signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate
debt and respondent-appellants right of recourse against
appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent of his

corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the

conjugal partnership of gains of the family of petitionersappellees. x x x x x x. [17]
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the
conjugal partnership. To support this contention, they cite Justice
J.B.L. Reyes authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety Company
case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record
that, in my opinion, the words all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership used in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for
which the conjugal partnership is liable do not require
that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
partnership from the husbands transaction; but it suffices
that the transaction should be one that normally would
produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio
behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmea, 34 Phil. 336, that
obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his
profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority
decision that the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for
the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of a third
party. Such opinion merely registered an exception to what may be
construed as a sweeping statement that in all cases actual profit or
benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership. The opinion merely
made it clear that no actual benefits to the family need be proved in
some cases such as in the Javier case. There, the husband was the
principal obligor himself. Thus, said transaction was found to be one
that would normally produce x x x benefit for the partnership. In the
later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband was also the principal
obligor - not merely the surety. This latter case, therefore, did not
create any precedent. It did not also supersede the Luzon Surety
Company case, nor any of the previous accommodation contract
cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the benefit of third
parties.

But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in

such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for the family may
also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husbands employer.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the
respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching
would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his
monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of
time because of the loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family
would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated
through the loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced
and his career would be boosted should PBM survive
because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161
of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the
husband,[18] we underscored the requirement that: there must be the
requisite showing x x x of some advantage which clearly accrued to
the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or that such
obligations
are
productive
of
some
benefit
to
the
family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to
show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was
prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether or
not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock
appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings
of the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable
increase in the value of stocks) might have been already apparent or
could be anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was
entered into. But would those benefits qualify the transaction as one
of the obligations x x x for the benefit of the conjugal partnership?
Are indirect and remote probable benefits, the ones referred to in
Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of Appeals in denying the

motion for reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the

following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit extended
by respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt
granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely
signing as surety. While such petitioner-appelleehusband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the
principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code
provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1)
of the Family Code, so that debts for which the husband
is liable may not be charged against conjugal partnership
properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit The
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.

loan, the probable prolongation of employment in PBM and increase

in value of its stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as
one for the benefit of the suretys family. Verily, no one could say, with
a degree of certainty, that the said contract is even productive of
some benefits to the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is
not contested by the petitioners) that the provisions of the Family
Code is applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the
underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal
partnership; for the husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not
augment, not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that
the obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that
redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnerships liability is to the extent that the family is benefited. [20]

Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in

question falls under the exception laid down in said
Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan
procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees.

These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other
provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to
donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property.
[21]
Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety
agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal
property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in
danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.

x x x appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends

benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor
corporation), only because said husband is an employee
of said PBM.These salaries and benefits, are not the
benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the
Family Code. The benefits contemplated by the
exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit
derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at
bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and
used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or
his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously
harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental
but also speculative.[19]

In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the

view that acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the
respondent-husband.

We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the

odds involved in guaranteeing a large amount (P50,000,000.00) of

This theory is new as it is novel.

The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, hence the cited cases of CobbPerez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger;
G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the instant
case. Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business.
[22]

We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive

acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this

should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the

business of suretyship or guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives
are often asked to stand as surety for their companys loan
obligations. This is especially true if the corporate officials have
sufficient property of their own; otherwise, their spouses signatures
are required in order to bind the conjugal partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did
not require the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone
does not mean that being a surety became part of his
profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the
conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that
the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The
loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the
assailed decision should be upheld as we now uphold it. This is, of
course, without prejudice to petitioners right to enforce the obligation
in its favor against the PBM receiver in accordance with the
rehabilitation program and payment schedule approved or to be
approved by the Securities & Exchange Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby,
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO
ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.

Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A.
Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A.
Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V.
Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge
Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City)
granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of
Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P
entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo
Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of
Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of KayBiga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of
Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80,
CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said
spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all
surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was
issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and
82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was
deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts,

United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City
a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition
was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general
circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No
oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965,
consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching
was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December
28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp.
51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among
those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro
Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch
XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for
reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T.
No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching
Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City
which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad
Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint).
(Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was
filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of
Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the
fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the
present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or
dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other
processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by
publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial
court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the
complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of
general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on
March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day
period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive
pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the
court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation
of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June
15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in

the complaint to be duly substantiated by the
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the
former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute
owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137;
ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property
in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant
Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to
surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that
the same may be cancelled failing in which the said
T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby
ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer
certificate of title over the said property in the name
of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a
resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila,
upon payment of the fees that may be required
therefor, including the realty taxes due the
Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16,
1979 pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court
(CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in the
name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who
subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc.
on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the
abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10,
1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was
granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de
la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).

On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May

29, 1980 was reconsidered and set aside, the decision dated June
15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2,
1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said latter order but the same was denied by the trial court on
April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals but the same was dismissed on September 30, 1981. His
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February 10, 1982
(pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati,
Metro Manila during the pendency of the case with the Court of
Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p.
117, Ibid.) in compliance with the resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p.
109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982 (p.
159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the
resolution of June 28, 1982 (p. 191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG
AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED
WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY
PUBLICATION.
II

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR

RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND
IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE
BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND
DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR
RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE
CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE
LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE
DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of
title is in personam and the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction
over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service
of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down
in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].

On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for

cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that may
be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and
settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent
partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of
summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who on
the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line
with the doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and
seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the
thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a
parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it
binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title
being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching
Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the
latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic
Products,Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court
insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction
over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost
through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached
notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as co-defendant. it is

a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an

executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr.
872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng
is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death
certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate
proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and
notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such
misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on
the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been

wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one
year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No.
75011, June 16, 1988).

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be

filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting
as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay
City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).

Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19
years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private
respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest."
Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons
was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The exparte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held
(Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case
at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in
Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest
she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by
publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should
have been granted and the amended complaint of private respondent
based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly.
Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the
evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the
roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration
was issued.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to
stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered,
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157
SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of
the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that
they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof
not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.
39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision

dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980
reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2837

August 4, 1950

ROSARIO S. VDA. DE LACSON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ABELARDO G. DIAZ, defendant-appellant.
Jose R. Querubin for appellant.
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellees.
TUASON, J.:

This case, here on appeal from the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, involves an interpretation of a pre-war contract of lease
of sugar-cane lands and the liability of the lessee, defendant and
appellant, to pay rent for the period during and immediately following
the Japanese occupation. The defendant resisted payment of that
rent of the theory of force majeure, and claims, besides, right to an
extension of the lease to make-up for the time when no cane was
planted.

S. Vda. de Lacson in the haciendas in question. It was

further agreed that out of the annual rental of 1,000 piculs to
be sold by the defendant, Abelardo Diaz in such price as
may be agreeable to the plaintiff, Rosario S. Vda. de Lacson,
from the proceeds of which the sum of P2,000.00 was to be
applied to the loan of P10,000 extended by the defendant to
the plaintiffs. The balance of 100 piculs of said yearly rental
was to be placed at the complete disposition of the plaintiff,
Rosario S. Vda. de Lacson.

The material facts are set forth in the appealed decision as follows:
It appears that on June 2, 1939, the plaintiff, Rosario S. Vda.
de Lacson, as atty.-in-fact of the other plaintiffs leased to the
defendant, Abelardo G. Diaz, lots Nos. 429 and 1179 of the
Talisay Cadastre, together with its sugar quota of about
5,728.50 piculs. The term of the lease was for five crop years
beginning with the crop year 1940-41; with an option in favor
of the defendant for another two years, after the expiration of
the original period. The contract provided that the defendant
was to pay to the plaintiffs an annual rental of 1,000 piculs of
export sugar , of which 500 piculs were to be paid in the
month of January of every year and the rest at the end of
every milling season. The defendant also obligated himself
to pay to the plaintiff 20% of whatever alcohol he receive
from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. corresponding to
the haciendas above-mentioned.
To guarantee the payment of the said annual rentals, the
defendant Abelardo Diaz, loaned to the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000 without interest, which was to be paid by plaintiffs
with the proceeds of the annual rentals in sugar provided
however, that the sum of P7,000 was to be maintained as
the permanent balance until the termination of the lease
period, as security for the payment by the defendant of said
rentals.
On October 23, 1940, a supplementary agreement (was)
entered into between the parties so as to include in the lease
contract the rights and interests also of the plaintiff, Rosario

The defendant took possession of the haciendas in question

beginning with the crop year 1940-41. In that year he paid to
the plaintiffs the corresponding rental of 1,000 piculs of sugar
and their share in alcohol. As provided for in the
supplementary agreement the defendant Abelardo G. Diaz,
with the approval of the plaintiff, Rosario S. Vda. de Lacson,
sold 400 piculs of said rentals for the sum of P1,984.76, and
this amount was applied on the loan of the plaintiffs thereby
leaving a balance of P8,015.24 against them and in favor of
the defendant at the beginning of the crop year 1941-42.
On December 8, 1941, the war broke out. The defendant
claims that due to the unsettled conditions which follows, he
was unable to mill all his sugar canes so that during the crop
year 1941-42 he produced only the total amount of 966.42
piculs of sugar from the two haciendas, of which 579.86
piculs went to him as his planter's share. It appears that the
defendant failed to pay the plaintiffs the rentals of 1,000
piculs of export sugar and alcohol for said crop year. The
defendant tried to prove, however, that he assigned 225.65
piculs in 1941-42 to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank for
the account of the plaintiffs, but it was not duly established to
the satisfaction of this court that the said Bank actually
received the assignment.
The defendant also failed to pay the plaintiffs the stipulated
rentals for the remaining crop years up to the present time,
although the plaintiffs had made several demands for their
payment, so that on September 17, 1946, this action was

commenced by the plaintiffs for the rescission of the lease

contract.

the number of times sugar crops were raised and not by number of
years that transpired from the inception of the contract.

From the evidence adduced during the trial it was

established that during the years 1943 and 1944
thehaciendas in question were worked and cultivated by the
tenants of the defendant who planted cereal crops thereon
like corn and rice but there was no evidence as to how much
was really produced on the land. The defendant himself
admitted that he planted rice on the haciendas during the
years 1945 and 1946, which brought him a net participation
of 200 cavanes for each of these years. The defendant also
admitted that he did not give the plaintiffs any participation in
the rice or other crops he had produced in the
said haciendas, because according to him, his obligation
was to pay rentals in sugar only, and not in any other kind of
products. It also appears that the defendant has been unable
to plant sugar canes on the haciendas in question except in
preparation for the 19947-48 crop year which he estimated
to be around ten hectares.

We are unable to see any essential difference between crops and

crop years sufficient to alter the result. Under one or the other theory,
it seems to us that the contract contemplated seven consecutive
agricultural years. To the lessors time was of the essence of the
lease and they could not conceivably have agreed to have
discounted from the period, years which the lessees, who had the
exclusive disposition of the lands, might not care to plant sugar cane
or not use the lands at all.

The court below absolved the defendant, on the principle of fortuitous

circumstance, from any liability for rent for the crop years 1942-43,
1943-44 and 1944-45, although it allowed the plaintiffs "proportionate
share of the War Damage Compensation which the defendant may
recover from the War Damage Commission for the products of the
afore-mentioned haciendas for the crop year 1941-42, on the basis
of P5,000, the total value of 1,000 piculs of sugar which is the
corresponding rental of said haciendas for the crop year 1941-42."
(The defendant had filed a damage claim for the destruction early in
1942 of standing crops.) But the court gave judgment for the plaintiffs
for rent with interest corresponding to the crop years 1945-46 and
1946-47, amounting to P60,000, the value of 2,000 piculs of sugar,
from which amount was to be deducted the sum of P8,015.24 due
the defendant by the plaintiffs for advances. The court likewise
declared the lease terminated after the crop year 1946-47.
On the last point, it is the defendant's contention that he and the
plaintiffs stipulated seven sugar "crops" and not seven "crop years as
the duration of the lease and that this period should be computed by

Any how the contract speaks of "cosechas agricolas", and nowhere

is there any insinuation that the defendant-lessee was to have
possession of the lands for seven years excluding years on which he
could not harvest sugar. On the contrary, the parties not only used
the generic expression "cinco cosechas agricolas" but followed it with
the phrase "periodo de cinco aos."
The more important issue, though by no means difficult to decide,
concerns the obligation of the lessee to pay the stipulated rent for the
crop years 1945-46 and 1946-47. Admitting that those post-liberation
years, the lessee claims exemption from the obligation stipulated for
delivery of 1,000 piculs of centrifugal sugar as rent for each milling
season, and the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc., he adds, had been
destroyed and he could not mill any sugar.
The law regulating the facts of force majeure on contracts is to be
found in the following articles of the Civil Code:
ART. 1096. Should the thing to be delivered be a
determinate one the creditor, independently of the right
granted him by article 1004, may compel the debtor to make
the delivery.
Should the thing be determinate or generic, he may demand
that the obligation be performed at the expense of the
debtor.

Should the person obligated be in default, or should be have

engaged himself to deliver the same thing or two or more
different persons, it shall be at his risk, even in case of
inevitable accident, until the delivery is made.
ART. 1105. No one shall be liable for events which could not
be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with
the exception of the cases in which the law expressly
provides otherwise and these in which the obligation itself
imposes such liability.
ART. 1182. Any obligation which consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing shall be extinguished if such thing should
be lost or destroyed without fault on the part of the debtor
and before he is in default (mora).
In binding himself to deliver centrifugal sugar, the defendant
promised a generic thing. It could be any centrifugal sugar without
regard to origin or how he secured it. Hence, his inability to produce
sugar, irrespective of the cause, did not relieve him from his
commitment. War, like floods and other catastrophes, was a
contingency, a collateral incident, which he could have provided for
by proper stipulation. (Reyes vs. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 47 Off.
Gaz., 1193.

In reality there was no fortuitous event which interfered with the

exploitation of the leased property in the form and manner the
defendant had intended. We refer to the agricultural years 1945-46
and 1946-47. It should be observed that the defendant was not
bound to keep the lands during those years; it was entirely optional
on his part to put an end to the lease after the 1944-45 crop year.
When he decided to exercise the option he was fully aware that there
were no sugar mills in operation and he did not except to produce
sugar, He must have had an object other than to plant sugar cane
when he chose to retain the lands for two more years. His purpose
was, beyond doubt, to plant other crops, which he did. If those crops
did not bring good return he can not, under any principle of law or
equity, shift the loss to the lessor. Performance is not excused by the
fact that the contract turns out to be hard and improvident,
unprofitable or impracticable, ill-advised, or even foolish.
(Reyes vs. Caltex, supra.)
In the fourth assignment of error the appellant objects that "the trial
court . . . awarded the plaintiffs more than what is prayed for in the
complaint." He says that the plaintiffs pray "either the rescission of
the contract of lease and the immediate delivery . . . of lots 429 and
1179 of Talisay, or in the alternative, to condemn the defendant to
pay 5,000 piculs of export sugar; and to pay P500 as liquidated
damages and costs.".
We do not think the trial court erred in granting both remedies
although the prayer was in the alternative. The situation or status of
the contract had changed in the interval between the commencement
of the suit and the rendition of the judgment. At the time the
complaint was filed (September 12, 1946), the lease had not yet
expired. Its expiration took place during the pendency of the action, a
fact of which court was justified in taking cognizance.
For the rest, the prayer is not a material factor of the complaint. It is
not the prayer but the proven facts which determine the power of the
court to act.
SEC. 9. Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment
entered by default shall not exceed the amount or be

different in kind from that prayed for the demand for

judgment. In other cases the judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings. (Rule 35, Rules of Court.)

The judgment is affirmed with costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

But when the defendant is not in default, plaintiff. after trial,

may be granted any relief that is supported by the evidence,
although not specified in his pleadings. As held by the
Supreme Court, plaintiff's failure, in such cases, to specify
the relief to which he is entitled, is immaterial, and even if the
complaint contains no prayer for relief, he is still entitled to
such a relief as the facts proven may warrant. It is a rule of
pleadings that the prayer for relief, though part of the
complaint, is no part of the cause of action, and plaintiff is
entitled to as much relief as the facts may warrant. (I Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 574.)
It is unquestionable that, under the proven facts, the court had the
power to grant the remedies it did.
The defendant's counterclaim was, in our opinion, rightly overruled
by the court below. Said the court:
As to the counterclaims filed by the defendant the court
cannot reasonably entertain it for the simple reason that
there was no sufficient evidence supporting it and the fact
that the seven-year period, stipulated in the contract,
including the option of two years in favor of the defendant,
had already expired at the end of the crop year 1946-47,
which is of judicial notice to be at the end of May, 1947. After
the period, the defendant is no longer entitled to the
possession of the haciendas in question, nor their
corresponding sugar quota for the crop year 1947-48. If the
defendant had already planted sugar canes to the extent he
had testified to during the trial in preparation for the 1947-48
milling season, he did so at his own risk and responsibility for
which he could not hold the plaintiffs herein liable for any
loss he may suffer thereby.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25355

August 28, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
FROILAN LAGRIMAS, accused,
HEIRS OF PELAGIO CAGRO, heirs-appellants,
MERCEDES AGUIRRE DE LAGRIMAS, movant-appellee.

P6,000.00 plus the additional sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of

damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses. An appeal from the
judgment was elevated to this Court by the accused but thereafter
withdrawn, the judgment, therefore, becoming final on October 11,
1962.

Socrates G. Desales for heirs-appellants.

Marciano Chitongco for movant-appellee.

A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued by the

lower court upon motion of appellants. A levy was had on eleven
parcels of land in the province declared for tax purposes in the name
of the accused. The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled on
January 5, 1965 but on December 29, 1964 the wife of the accused,
Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of
attachment as well as the writ of execution with the allegation that
the property levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and,
therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the
husband was required to pay. The then judge of the lower court
granted such motion declaring null and void the order of attachment
and the writ of execution, in accordance with Article 161 of the new
Civil Code. Another judge of the same lower court set aside the
above order, sustaining the legality of the preliminary attachment as
well as the writ of execution. Thereafter, upon appellee filing a motion
for the reconsideration of the above order giving due course to the
writ of execution, a third judge, then presiding over such court, the
Hon. Ignacio Mangosing, revived the original order of March 5, 1960,
declaring such attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued
as null and void.

FERNANDO, J.:
The Civil Code, under the conditions therein specified, recognizes
the liability of the conjugal partnership for fines and indemnities
imposed upon either husband or wife "after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered," in the absence of any
separate property of the offending spouse or its insufficiency. 1 How
such an obligation "may be enforced against the partnership assets"
is the question, one of first impression, raised in this appeal from a
lower court order, based on the assumption of the total exemption of
the conjugal partnership from the liability thus incurred, prior to the
stage of liquidation. The result was to set aside the preliminary
attachment and thereafter the writ of execution in favor of the heirs of
the murdered victim, appellants before us, the judgment against the
accused imposing not only the penalty of reclusion perpetua but also
the indemnification to such heirs having attained the status of finality.
In view of the failure, apparent on the face of the appealed order, to
respect what the Civil Code ordains, we reverse and remand the
case for further proceedings.
The brief of appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, the murdered
victim, discloses that on February 19, 1960 an information was filed
against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for the above murder
committed on February 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar. Thereafter,
appellants as such heirs, filed on February 27, 1960 a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the
accused, such motion being granted in an order of March 5, 1960.
After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as such heirs in the sum of

This order of August 7, 1965, now on appeal, was premised on the

following considerations: "It can be readily seen from the abovequoted provisions of law that only debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before the marriage, and those of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the charges enumerated in article 161 have been covered. So
that as long as the obligations mentioned in said article 161 have not
been paid, the assets of the partnership cannot be made to answer
for indemnities like the one being sought to be enforced in the instant
case. And, before the obligations enumerated in said article 161 can
be paid, the conjugal partnership properties should first, by necessity,
be liquidated, and liquidation can take place only after the dissolution
of the partnership thru the occurrence of any of the causes

mentioned in article 175 of the same Code, one of which is death of

one of the spouses. Since both are still living there cannot be any
dissolution, imprisonment for life of the husband notwithstanding, in
the absence of a judicial separation of properly decreed in
accordance with the provisions of article 191 thereof. Moreover, the
fines and indemnities sought to be charged against the ganancial
properties of the accused and his wife are not such debts and
obligations contracted by said accused for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." 2
The conclusion arrived at by Judge Mangosing follows: "We
sympathize with the predicament of the widow and other heirs of the
deceased Pelagio Cagro, but the law is clear on the matter. The
indemnities adjudged by the Court in their favor may only be charged
against the exclusive properties of the accused if he has any, or
against his share in the partnership assets after liquidation thereof if
any still remains after the payment of all the items enumerated in
article 161 of the said Civil Code." 3
Hence, this appeal, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro assigning as sole
error the quashing and annulling of the writs of attachment and
execution aforesaid. As stated at the outset, we find the appeal
meritorious.
The applicable Civil Code provision 4 is not lacking in explicitness.
Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; ... ." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during
which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal
partnership is still existing. The law speaks of "partnership assets." It
contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Article
161, chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. It
is thus obvious that the termination of the conjugal partnership is not
contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt may still remain
should be erased by the concluding portion of this article which
provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
above-mentioned."

What other conclusion can there be than that the interpretation

placed upon this provision in the challenged order is at war with the
plain terms thereof? It cannot elicit our acceptance. Nor is the reason
for such a codal provision difficult to discern. It is a fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for felony is
also civilly liable. 5 The accused, Froilan Lagrimas, was, as noted,
found guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced toreclusion
perpetua as well as to pay the indemnification to satisfy the civil
liability incumbent upon him. If the appealed order were to be upheld,
he would be in effect exempt therefrom, the heirs of the offended
party being made to suffer still further.
It would follow, therefore, that the Civil Code provision, as thus
worded, precisely minimizes the possibility that such additional
liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory. In doing justice to
the heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is committed against the
family of the offender. It is made a condition under this article of the
Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161,
covering primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of
the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of them
as well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first
satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme cannot be
susceptible to the charge that for a transgression of the law by either
husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens
of an extremely onerous character.
The next question is how practical effect would be given this
particular liability of the conjugal partnership for the payment of fines
and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife? In the brief
for appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, they seek the opportunity
to present evidence as to how the partnership assets could be made
to respond, this on the assumption that the property levied upon
does not belong exclusively to the convicted spouse.
In Lacson v. Diaz, 6 which deals with the satisfaction of the debt
contracted by husband or wife before marriage by the conjugal
partnership, likewise included in this particular article, it was held:
"Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the
husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to
the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this

provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability
are obtaining."
Without departing from the principle thus announced, we make this
further observation. Considering that the obligations mentioned in
Article 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of
the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof
required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the
most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the conjugal
partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its obligation
irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the
offended party. That result is to be avoided. The lower court should
be on the alert, therefore, in the appraisal of whatever evidence may
be offered to assure compliance with this codal provision.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set aside
and the case remanded to the court of origin for the reception of
evidence in accordance with this opinion. With costs against appellee
Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L. and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.

JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA,respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the
Court
of
Appeals
and
its
resolution
denying
reconsideration[2] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo,
Branch 32[3]and declaring void the special proceedings instituted
therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in
view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal
property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for
the ostensible purpose of financial need in the personal, business
and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein
respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza,
and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda
Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy
came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a
stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any
motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of
herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private
respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior
Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro
Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex A) before the
R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent
him from competently administering his properties, and in order to
prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal

assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to

administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of
Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda
Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further
prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons,
particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located
along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza
herself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691,
before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration
of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the
same (Annex B). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred
the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then
confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo
Doctors Hospital.She signified to the court her desire to assume sole
powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also
alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands
of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of
real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus,
she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo
City issued an Order (Annex C) finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No.
4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing
thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition
proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her
counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda
Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.s attending physicians.
On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City
rendered its Decision (Annex D), finding that it was convinced that
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No.
4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court

also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.

Jardeleza was pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that
the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
The said court then disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition
dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be
incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of
conjugal properties;
2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT
No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda
L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his
Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case
No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a
decision has already been rendered on the case by public
respondent.
On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion
for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a
motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex F).He propounded
the argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity,
assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the
conjugal properties was essentially a petition for guardianship of the
person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary

proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow
the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of
Court which require procedural due process, particularly the need for
notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even
if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary
proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code,
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced
without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the
conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings.He then
restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be
consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and
pending before Branch 25.
Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot
No. 4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the
accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property
would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had
been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed
out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to
his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental
value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then
conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial
obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza,
Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set
against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which
allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do not
charge anything for their professional services.
On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex G). He
reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly
applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings
found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on

Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife which contemplates

of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he
argued that were one spouse is comatose without motor and mental
faculties, the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza
disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to
her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July
8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July
23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale.
On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the
motion for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the
motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until
the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor
prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not
allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would
have given his consent to the sale.
Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the
respondent Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No.
4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further
acting in this case (Annex I). The case was then reraffled to Branch
28 of the said court.

observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to

Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June
20, 1991.
Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that oppositor
Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the
instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of
the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Teodoro
L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which
among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of
the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda
L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991,
filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed
of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and
between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza,
as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City, is directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding
transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
SO ORDERED.[4]

On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex M)

denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and approving
respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute
sale. The said court ruled that:
After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20,
1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements
filed by oppositor, Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the
opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, including its
supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the
opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del RosarioBenedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly

On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated

its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial
court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale,
which was also declared void.[5]
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,[6] however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to
disturb the decision.[7]
Hence, this appeal.[8]

The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the

wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor
and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal
partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of
the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and
dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than
twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary
proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law,
for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in
relation
to
Article
124
of
the
Family
Code
are
notapplicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of
himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had
rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of
a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such
incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial
guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of
the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the
spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that
the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular
accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of
brain stem infarct.[9] In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the
conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole
powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian under the Rules of Court.[10]
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the
procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court
did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial

proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not
serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not
require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an
opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is
void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by
this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress
of nullity.[11] A decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.[12] A decision is void
for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard.[13] A void decision may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real

estate
broker.[3] After
some
bargaining,
petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for
the Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for the Makatiproperty[4] to be
paid on installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00
and P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance
thereof was to be paid as follows[5]:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002]

Taytay Property Makati Property

THELMA
A.
JADER-MANALO, petitioner,
FERNANDEZ
C.
CAMAISA
and
CAMAISA, respondents.

vs. NORMA
EDILBERTO

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may
validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wifes written
consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner
Thelma
A. Jader-Manalo allegedly
came
across
an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma
Fernandez C.Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads
Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue,
for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that
in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the
two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real
estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent
spouses.[1] Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with
the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real
property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps
relating to the properties.[2] Thereafter, petitioner met with the
vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a
definite
offer
to
buy
the
properties
to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of

6th month P200,000.00 P300,000.00

12th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.00
18th month 500,000.00
This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed
by Edilberto.[6] When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the
properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent
to the sale.[7] The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter
prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate
broker and Edilberto met in the latters office for the formal signing of
the typewritten Contracts to Sell. [8] After Edilberto signed the
contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB
Check No. 62807 datedApril 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB
Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the
presence of the real estate broker and an employee
in Edilbertos office.[9] The contracts were given to Edilberto for the
formal affixing of his wifes signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from
respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions
of the contracts.[10] To accommodate her queries, petitioner,
accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the
real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.[11] During the meeting,
handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they
arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the
formal signing of the contracts.[12]
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the
real estate broker at Edilbertos office for the formal affixing of
Normas signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses

informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because
they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration.
[13]
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell
had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to sign the
same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign
the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to
compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
[14]

A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondents which was

denied by the trial court in its Resolution of July 21, 1992.[15]
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, alleging that it was an agreement between herein petitioner
and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject
properties was still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife
Norma Camaisa.[16] Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her
consent to the sale, her refusal was duly communicated
by Edilberto to petitioner.[17] The checks issued by petitioner were
returned to her by Edilberto and she accepted the same without any
objection.[18] Respondent further claimed that the acceptance of the
checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation
of the sale of the subject properties.[19] Respondent Norma denied
that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the
subject properties and that she gave her consent and conformity to
the same.[20]
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment[21] asserting that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and
admission of the parties considering that the wifes written consent
was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal
properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null
and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment
dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the
Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction
in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused
to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby

rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on
TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 of the Registry of Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses
Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as
Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorneys
Fees.
Costs against plaintiff.[22]
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
On November 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal
by the trial court but deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages
and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of
the contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of
both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale.Since private
respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale
was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by
respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of
Appeals also stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or
encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the other
spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY
ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE
TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY

ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF
REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER
HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE
LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT
MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF
PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED
BY THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND
WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX G IN THE COMPLAINT
EXCEPT, FOR MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY
LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF
TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF NONPAYMENT,
WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO
THEIR INCLUSION;

Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of
four parcels of land between petitioner and respondent spouses;
that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an
agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, and
a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that
respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The issue
thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were
already perfected such that the latter could no longer back out of the
agreement.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY

ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT
OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE
MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403,
1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.[23]

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a
summary judgment in favor of respondent spouses there being a
genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether
the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was
perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted
by the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of
a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.[24] A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both
parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts
involved therein.

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by

the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires
the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is
void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were
conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent
of both husband and wife must concur.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written

consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,
which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law
for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not
consent.[25]
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly
refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court
authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as
she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court
which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the
circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court
authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the
spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. [26] In this case,
petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of
such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment
was proper considering that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was
whether the contract to sell involving conjugal properties was valid
without the written consent of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No.
43421 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the
trial court rendered a Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992, disposing
as follow: 5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the
plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights
dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null
void and of no effect;

G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders
the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this
petition for review of the Decision 1 dated January 30, 1996 and the
Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower
court and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an
Amended Complainant 3 against her husband Judie Corpuz and
Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her

2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership

and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the Deed
of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse
defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to
the payment made by defendants Guiangs to
Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account
of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another
sum of P379.62 representing one-half of the amount
of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests
thereon computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual
circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as
follow: 6
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this

Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's

failure to file her brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its
assailed Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendantsappellants motion for reconsideration of Our decision
in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a mere
rehash of the same issues which we have already
passed upon in the said decision, and there [being]
no cogent reason to disturb the same, this Court
RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private
respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her
husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal
peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood.
The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of
Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court
as follows: 8
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz
are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge.
This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also
admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he
testified in court (tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although
the latter says that they were married in 1967. The
couple have three children, namely: Junie 18
years old, Harriet 17 years of age, and Jodie or
Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in
August, 1990 when her mother testified in court.

Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda

and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in
Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo
who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of
sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The
consideration was payable in installment, with right
of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail
to pay three successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p.
6, February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and
Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendantsspouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter
have since then occupied the one-half portion [and]
built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992).
They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in
June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad,
in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a
victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was
not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in
Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South
Cotabato, . . . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's
departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle
East was with the consent of her husband Judie
Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10 Sept. 6,
1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie
Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling.
He stayed most of the time at his place of work at
Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and
a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to
school at King's College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as

household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr.

Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her
younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going to school. Her
mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14,
Sept. 6, 1991.)

"3-A"). The new sale (Exh. "3") describes the lot sold
as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is
obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct
lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot
earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.

Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned

that her father intended to sell the remaining onehalf portion including their house, of their homelot to
defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her
mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that
she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did
not inform her father about this; but instead gave the
letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she
[Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17,
Sept. 6, 1991).

5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned

home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house.
Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their house. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She was
informed by her children that their father had a wife
already.

4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz,

defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of
the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8,
(LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document
known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" (Exh. "A") the
remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house
standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in
June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie
and Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5,
1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant
Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred,
defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed
another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165408 (Exh. "3"), this time with Manuela Jimenez
Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner
from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz
originally bought the lot (Exh. "2"), who signed as
vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant
Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh.

6. For staying in their house sold by her husband,

plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio
Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay
General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South
Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990).
The case was docketed by the barangay authorities
as Barangay Case No. 38 for "trespassing". On
March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
document known as "amicable settlement". In full,
the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz
and her three children, namely:
Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave
voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Antonio Guiang, where they are
presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY
OF THE LAW.

Believing that she had received the shorter end of

the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature
on the amicable settlement. She was referred
however to the Office-In-Charge at the time, a
certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that
he could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31,
Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay
Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the
settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26,
1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment
of the settlement. Annulment not having been made,
plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the
amicable settlement with a motion for the execution
of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the
Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The proceedings [are] still pending before the said
court, with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses
Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as
the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo,
having assumed the remaining obligation of the
Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the
preparation of Exhibit "3"; a total of P759.62 basic
tax and special education fund on the lot; P127.50
as the total documentary stamp tax on the various
documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax;
P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00;
certification fee of P5.00. These expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses towards
the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were

incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165409.

Ruling of Respondent Court
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling
that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal
propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners'
contention that the "amicable sttlement" ratified said
sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification
of the contracts specified therein, particularly those "prohibited or
declared void by law."
Hence, this petition. 9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the
following errors: 10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not
declairing as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the
Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights
which was validly ratified thru the execution of the
"amicable settlement" by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which

recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and

possession of private respondent over the remaining
one half (1/2) portion of the properly.

fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of

sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. Gilda
Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11

In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale

(Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such
contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an
amicable sttlement with them.

Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you

still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that
time.

This Court's Ruling

xxx xxx xxx
The petition is bereft of merit.
ATTY. FUENTES:
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was
validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely
rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:

Q When did you come back to

Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990,
Ma'am.
Q Now, when you arrived at
Koronadal, was there any problem
which arose concerning the
ownership of your residential house
at Callejo Subdivision?

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are
annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2,
refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which
were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or

A When I arrived here in Koronadal,

there was a problem which arose
regarding my residential house and
lot because it was sold by my
husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the
teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both

spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the

husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
(Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code,
the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above
provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not
null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended
wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation
or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the

marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest
in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the
husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)
years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation
or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when
the Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation
referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the
document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged
during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between the husband and the
petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that
such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence
of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)

cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners
aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the
"amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay
Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have
resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The trial court
correctly held: 15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil
Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights
(Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable
settlement". The participation by some barangay
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot
otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B")
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent
spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A"). By
express provision of law, such a contract is also
void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the
direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of
Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement"
(Exh. "3") are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.

16

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing

offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the
last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the
MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not
mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of
such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

D E C I S I O N
T H I R D

D I V I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FRANCISCO L. GONZALES,

G.R. No. 159521

Petitioner,
Present:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
versus

Decision dated April 2, 2003 and Resolution dated August 8, 2003,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041,

CORONA,

entitled, Erminda F. Gonzales, plaintiff-appellee versus Francisco L.

CARPIO MORALES, and

Gonzales, defendant-appellant.

GARCIA, JJ.
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda

ERMINDA F. GONZALES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband and wife. After two

(2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union,

December 16, 2005

four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres,
Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of

management of the same and that all income from said business are
conjugal in nature.

marriage with prayer for supportpendente lite, docketed as Civil Case

No. 32-31111. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically

The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of the

incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats

trial court, and pursuant Section 48 of the Family Code, [1] certified

her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and

that no collusion exists between the parties in asking for the

denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they

declaration of the nullity of their marriage and that he would appear

lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza

for the state to see to it that the evidence is not fabricated or

business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the

suppressed.

declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of

the conjugal partnership of gains.

Each party submitted a list of the properties with their

valuation, acquired during their union, thus:

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is

respondent who is psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she
was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he
exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage.

1.
2.
3.

Acropolis property
Baguio City property
Nasugbu, Batangas
property

4.
In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire
generation

of

Fiesta

Pizza

representing

80%

of

the

total

Corinthian
and lot

5.

Sagitarius
condominium

house

Valuation of
respondent
(Record, p.
110)
None
P 10,000,000
5,000,000
18,000,000
2,500,000
30,000,000
10,000,000
7,000,000

Valuation of
petitioner(Record,
p. 111)
P 6,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
23,000,000
2,000,000
24,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000

6.
7.
8.
9.

Office
Greenmeadows lot
White Plains
Corinthian lot

12,000,000

None
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested
by his indiscriminate womanizing. The trial court found that:

Personal Property (Vehicles)

1.
2.

Galant 83 model
Toyota Corona 79
model

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Coaster 77 model
Pajero 89 model
Corolla 92 model
L-300 90 model
Mercedes Sedan 79

None
-

model
8.
9.

Pick-up 89 model
Mercedes wagon 80

The evidence adduced by plaintiff was

overwhelming to prove that the defendant by his
infliction of injuries on the plaintiff, his wife, and
excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, a
personality disorder called satyriasis, was, at the
time of the celebration of marriage, psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage although such incapacity
became manifest only after its solemnization.
The defendants evidence, on the other hand, on the
psychological incapacity of plaintiff did not have any
evidentiary weight, the same being doubtful,
unreliable, unclear and unconvincing.

model
10.

Nissan

Sentra

89

model
11.

8Tamaraws

On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision,

the dispositive portion of which reads:

Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used

to beat respondent without justifiable reasons, humiliating and
embarrassing her in the presence of people and even in front of their
children. He has been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

judgment is rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage contracted by
and between FRANCISCO L. GONZALEZ and
ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO solemnized by Rev. Fr.
Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4, 1979, at the
Manila Hilton Chapel, Nuestra de Guia Parish,
Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab initio with all
legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;

2) Awarding the custody of minors Maria

Andrea and Marco Manuel to the plaintiff, and
Carlo Manuel and Maria Angela with rights of
visitation given to both parties under an
arrangement mutually acceptable to both of them;
3) Ordering the parties to deliver the
childrens legitimes pursuant to Article 50, in relation
to Article 51 of the Family Code;

2. L-300 90 model ---------------- 350,000

3. Nissan Sentra 89 model ----- 200,000
P 1,050,000
B. 1) Defendants share of real properties:
1. Corinthian house and lot ---- P 20,500,000
2. Office ----------------------------- 27,000,000
P 47,500,000
2) Personal:

4) Ordering the defendant to give monthly

support to Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel in the
amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos
within five (5) days of each corresponding month
delivered at the residence of the plaintiff staring
January 1997 and thereafter;
5) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains and dividing the conjugal
properties between the plaintiff and the defendant
as follows:
A. 1) Plaintiffs share of real properties:
1. Corinthian lot -------------------- P 12,000,000
2. Acropolis property ------------- 6,000,000
3. Baguio property ----------------- 10,000,000
4. Nasugbu property -------------- 5,000,000
5. Greenmeadows property ----- 12,500,000
6. Sagitarius condominium ------ 2,250,000
P 47,750,000
2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model --------------- P 500,000

1. Galant 83 model --------------- P 120,000

2. Toyota Corona 79 model ---- 80,000
3. Coaster 77 model -------------- 150,000
4. Corolla 92 model -------------- 180,000
5. Mercedes Sedan 79 model --- 220,000
6. Pick-up 89 model -------------- 100,000
7. Mercedes wagon 80 model 300,000
P 1,150
,000
8. Four (4) Tamaraws ------------6) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant
in cash the amount of P2,196,125.
7) Ordering the defendant who has actual
possession of the conjugal properties to deliver to
plaintiff her share of the real and personal properties,
including four (4) Tamaraws, above-described, and
execute the necessary documents valid in law
conveying the title and ownership of said properties
in favor of the plaintiff.

Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided,

Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the

petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He did not contest that

Appellate Courts Decision declaring his marriage with respondent

part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent

void. Consequently, their property relation shall be governed by the

void ab initio.

provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted as follows:

In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court

affirmed the assailed Decision of the trial court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied

in an Order dated July 23, 1997.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of

Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties.

"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who

are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household."

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the

property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules

on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman

respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in

capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as

managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated

husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a

September 6, 1989, he admitted that Youve helped me for what we

man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this

are now and I wont let it be destroyed.

property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties

during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.

It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner

offered respondent to be his partner in his pizza business and to take
over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in
1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired

business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during

during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through

inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for work

their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in

everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any

equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate

salary or allowance.

in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed

to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

While it is true that all the properties were bought from the
proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. [2] Factual
findings of the Appellate Court are generally binding on, especially
this Court, when in complete accord with the findings of the trial

court,[3]as in this case. This is because it is not our function to

analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[4]

WHEREFOR, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66041, areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20530

June 29, 1967

MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD TEODORO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
De Santos and Delfino for petitioner.
V. J. Francisco and R. F. Francisco for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for
review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case
No. CA-G.R. 30916. The case relates to the execution of a joint and
several judgment for money obtained by the said company against
the Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas,
Jr., in a litigation started in 1952 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals with only a slight modification in respect of the
award for attorney's fees.
The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the
decision sought to be reviewed as follows:
When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure
secured on September 20, 1961, from the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 17014 a second alias
writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff
of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for respondent
Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner
at No. 794 Harvard Street, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied
upon a car, some furniture, appliances and personal
properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to
the petitioner with the exception of sewing machine which
belonged to a maid by the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E.
television set which was the property of the minor Jose
Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a
Columbia radio phonograph which belonged to Jose
Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was then abroad, her sister
Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody
and safekeeping of the properties, had made representations
to the deputy sheriff and to the counsel of respondent Manila
Surety regarding the ownership of the petitioner over certain
personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same and
proceeded with the levy.
Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places
notices of sale, preparatory to disposing petitioner's
properties at public auction.

To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner's properties,

she filed on November 3, 1961, with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a complaint with injunction, entitled
"Trinidad Teodoro vs Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal," praying among other things,
for damages and a writ of preliminary injunction which was
accordingly issued upon petitioner's filing of a bond in the
sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal
from selling at public auction the properties claimed by said
petitioner.
However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety
filed an "Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to
Dissolve Injunction" to which an opposition was filed.
After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of
their respective claims and after hearing their arguments, the
lower court declared that the properties in question are
community properties of Trinidad Teodoro (herein petitioner)
and Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May 12, 1962, the writ
of preliminary injunction it had issued and dismissed the
complaint (Civil case No. 6865, CFI Rizal).
Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case
No. 6865 of Rizal) interposed an appeal. In the meanwhile,
however, the Manila Surety filed on May 29, 1962, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of
a third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the
judgment debt in civil case No. 17014. Acting upon said
motion the Court of First Instance of Manila issued
on June 2, 1962, the "Third Alias Writ of Execution."
Thus, on June 7,1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of
Rizal again repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at
No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and levied upon the
same properties, with the exception of the baby grand piano
and the "Columbia" phonograph which were the properties of
Jose Corominas, Jr. and which had already been sold at
public auction November 6, 1961 for P3,305.00, the Regal

sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in the

boy's and girl's rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a
stereophonic phonograph and the G.E. television set. And on
the following day, June 8, 1962, respondent provincial sheriff
of Rizal advertised the sale at public auction of the
aforementioned properties claimed by herein petitioner,
setting the date thereof for June 16, 1962.
Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in
the Court of Appeals to stop the scheduled sale. On October 24,
1962 the said Court rendered the decision now under review,
granting the writ prayed for and permanently enjoining respondent
provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the properties
in question for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Jose
Corominas, Jr.1wph1.tThe case for herein petitioner rests on the
proposition that the said properties, claimed by respondent Teodoro
to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established
between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the
Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon on execution for
the satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon in
support of this theory of co-ownership are stated in the decision of
the court a quo and quoted by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo
on January 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of
divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada
dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares
and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on
October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26,1956, they went through
a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their
return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented
house at No. 2305 Agno Street, . . . Manila. On September 5,
1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a
second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under
review and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still

living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to

Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution
having been issued on October 21, 1957.
The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil
Code to the situation thus created. This Article provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through then work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of
Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed
divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose
Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although
their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the
former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is
bigamous and void.
While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any
qualification, the Court of Appeals declined to apply it in this case on
two grounds: (1) the subsisting marriage of Corominas to Sonia
Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid marriage between him
and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment, according to a
number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the
establishment of a co-ownership under said article, and (2) the funds
used by said respondent in acquiring the properties in question were
"fruits of her paraphernal investments which accrued before her
marriage to Corominas."
The decisions cited under the first ground are Christensen vs.
Garcia, 56 O.G. No. 16, p. 3199; Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No.
11, p. 2401; and Osmea vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. No. 20, p. 5526. In
a proper case, where it may be necessary to do so in order to
resolve an unavoidable issue, the precise scope of the "no
impediment to a valid marriage" dictum in said decisions will

undoubtedly deserve closer examination, since it establishes an

exception to the broad terms of Article 144. For one thing, a situation
may arise involving a conflict of rights between a co-ownership under
that provision and an existing conjugal partnership formed by a prior
marriage where, for instance, the husband in such marriage lives
with another woman and with his salary or wages acquires properties
during the extra-marital cohabitation. A ruling would then be in order
to determine which as between the co-ownership and the conjugal
partnership could claim ascendancy insofar as the properties are
concerned.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this
question. The particular properties involved here which were
admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to
belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said
properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which
accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they
were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void
marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries,
and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144.
They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
Several procedural questions have been raised by petitioner. First,
that the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was improper since
it was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; second, that respondent
Trinidad Teodoro having elected to appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, she may not pursue the remedy of
injunction as she did in this case; third, that respondent's petition for
injunction in the Court of Appeals failed to state a cause of action;
fourth, that the proper remedy available to respondent was by filing a
third-party claim; and finally, that the trial judge should have been
included as party respondent in the petition for injunction.
As to the first in second points, the fact is that respondent Trinidad
Teodoro perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, which found
that there were questions of fact involved therein, one of them being
whether the properties in question were acquired before or after her
void marriage to Corominas. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction,

therefore, the said Court could issue a writ of injunction. Of course,

what happened here was that before the record on appeal could be
filed (on June 18, 1962) or approved (on September 8, 1962) a third
alias writ of execution was issued by the trial court (on June 2, 1962)
and the properties in question were again levied upon by the sheriff
and advertised for sale on June 16, 1962. It was impracticable for
respondent to first wait for the appeal to be elevated to and docketed
in the Court of Appeals and there secure the ancillary remedy of
injunction therein. An independent petition for injunction, under the
circumstances, was not unjustified.

vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants.

Respondent could, indeed, have filed a third party claim instead as

indicated in Rule 39, Section 15.* But then her sister Josefina
Teodoro did make such a claim in her behalf after the second alias
writ of execution was issued, but it was ignored and the sheriff
proceeded with the levy. In any event, a third party claim is not an
exclusive remedy: the same rule provides that nothing therein
contained "shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim
to the property by any proper action.

DE CASTRO, J.:

We do not deem it to be a reversible error for Trinidad Teodoro not to

include the trial Judge as party-respondent in her petition for
injunction in the Court of Appeals. The trial Judge would have been
merely a nominal party anyway, and no substantial rights of petitioner
here have been prejudiced by the omission.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, with costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979
VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs
and appellees,

Victoriano O. Javier and Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

Luis Viscocho and Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr. for appellants.

This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the
ground that the questions raised in the appeal of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight
train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November
23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical
injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16)
years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
(4) In Civil Case No. SP-867 ordering defendants
Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of
P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint
until fully paid and costs of suit;
(5) In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants
Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and
severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased

Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario

Aonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of
P12,000.00 for the life of each of said deceased,
with legal interest from date of complaint, and costs
of suit. (pp. 47-48, Rello).
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that
the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay
damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.
The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of
the Civil Code which reads:
When a man and woman driving together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which,
as previously stated, certified the same to Us, the question raised
being purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error as
follows:
The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant
Rosalia Arroyo liable 'for damages resulting from the
death and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers' of the jeepney registered in the name of
Eugenio Jose, on the erroneous theory that Eugenio
Jose and Rosalia Arroyo, having lived together as
husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage,
are co- owners of said jeepney. (p. 2, Appellant's
Brief).

The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not

Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry, and
(2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the
jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the
registered owner of the same.
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership
contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. (Camporedondo vs. Aznar, L-11483, February
4, 1958, 102 Phil. 1055, 1068; Osmea vs. Rodriguez, 54 OG 5526;
Malajacan vs. Rubi, 42 OG 5576). Since Eugenio Jose is legally
married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision
of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The
jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal
wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by,
the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can
neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in
our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of
the passengers therein. (De Peralta vs. Mangusang, L-18110, July
31, 1964, 11 SCRA 598; Tamayo vs. Aquino, L-12634 and L-12720,
May 29, 1959; Roque vs. Malibay Transit, L-8561, November
18,1955; Montoya vs. Ignacio, L-5868, December 29, 1953).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby
declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed
decision is hereby modified accordingly. No costs.

Lamberto C. Nanquil & Associates Law Office for private

respondents.

VITUG, J.:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land
acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having
deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought
by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil
Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned
conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during
the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take
note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
Let us begin by paraphrasing the factual findings of the appellate
court below.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993

JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
Jaime I. Infante and Joanes G. Caacbay for petitioners.

The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July

1927, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and
Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to
live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment
basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his
civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife.
In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to
Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in
the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was
executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. A few days
later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790
was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo
Bosing, . . ."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage
with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 march 1967. About
three years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine

executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in

question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa
and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2)
interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth (1/4)
interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00
consideration, thereby completing for herself, along with her onefourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership"
of the property. The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on
04, 05 and 06 November 1970 in the Evening Post; the inheritance
and estate taxes were paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her
three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for
reconveyance of the property. On the basis of he above facts, the
trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that
. . . Josephine Bosing executed a deed of
reconveyance of the property in question to the legal
heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual
damages by way of attorney's fees and expenses in
litigation, TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as
moral damages, pus TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS exemplary damages to prevent future
frauds.
The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's order for reconveyance but reversed the decision on the
award for damages, thus
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendant Josephine
Bosing is ordered to execute a deed of
reconveyance of the property granting the same to
the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and
REVERSED insofar as it awards actual, moral and
exemplary damages. 1

Hence, the instant petition for review 2 submitting that

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT, THE ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE IS BASED UPON AN IMPLIED
OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE, AND LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT EVEN IF A NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED THE
SAME WOULD NOT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.
We rule for affirmance.
The first three issues are interrelated, and the same will thus be
jointly discussed.
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949
when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was
entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959
when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc.,
the legal results would be the same. The property remained as
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil
Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not
been convincingly rebutted.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property

was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should
thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was
acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to
Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have title to
the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly
recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of
Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition
and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the
property in what may be described as her share in the "conjugal
partnership" with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as
"surviving widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the
issue of the deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would
have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been
the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.
The appellate court below, given the above circumstances, certainly
cannot be said to have been without valid basis in concluding that
the property really belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership
between Alayo and his true spouse Juliana.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses,
Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established
through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes,
the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when
either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry
(Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under
Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate
from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this
case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family
Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made
following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the
property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended
to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was
deemed to have been created by operation of law under the
provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code.

Article 1456. If the property is acquired through

mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a
reconveyance of the property by the beneficiaries thereof is ten (10)
years (Article 1144, Civil Code). Ordinarily, that period starts from the
establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of
action would be considered to have accrued (Article 1150, Civil
Code). Unfortunately for Josefa and Josephine, however, the
property involved in this case is a realty titled under the Torrens
System. The prescriptive period is thus to be counted from the time
the transaction affecting the property is registered with the
corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. 3 Between the
time Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06
June 1974, and the filing of the action for the reconveyance of the
property with the court a quo on 30 October 1980, barely a period of
six (6) years and four (4) months had elapsed. The case has
accordingly been initiated seasonably.
The four-year prescriptive period, mentioned in passing by the
petitioners, would have had some value and relevance had the
private respondents or their predecessor in interest been parties to
the extrajudicial partition and sale. In that event, the latter's action
could only then be predicated on a vitiation of consent 4 where the
applicable statutory limitation would be four years. 5
The last issue raises the supposed error in the rejection of a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. We concur with the
resolution of the appellate court below (on appellants' [petitioners
herein] motion for reconsideration thereat), thus
Appellants' prayer for a new trial based upon what
they claim is newly discovered evidence deserves
scant consideration.

Appellant proposes to prove (1) that Josefa Bosing

sold certain property for P8,000.00 in 1948 and was
therefore in a financial position to make the
payments to Magdalena Estate Inc. and (2) that
appellee Juliana Bosing got married in 1961 to one
Burayos Ballit, and thus, "forfeited" her right to the
conjugal partnership.
The first ground is not meritorious. It is not newly
discovered evidence. As described in appellants'
Motion the documents were "not discovered or
considered as necessary evidence during the trial of
the case below" by the former counsel; it is therefore
more properly considered as forgotten evidence,
which the appellant knew or should have known
during the trial (Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54
SCRA 296; Republic vs. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA
336). Moreover, assuming the sale is proven, it does
not follow that the proceeds were used to pay the lot
in question; the payments were made in
installments, not in one lump sum.
Neither is the second ground deserving of merit.
Assuming that the marriage to Ballit in 1961 is duly
proven, and that this provided a cause for legal
separation and consequent disqualification of the
guilty spouse to succeed to the husband's intestate
estate under Article 1002 of the Civil Code, the fact
remains that no action for legal separation was
brought by the husband during his lifetime and within
the period provided by law. It is too late to raise the
issue at this time.

Accordingly, assuming that the Motion for New Trial

complies with the formal requisites for such motion
(See Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of
Orval Hughes, et al., G.R. No. 62662, prom.
November 12, 1987), a question We don't find
necessary to decide, a new trial would not serve a
useful purpose in altering the result of the
questioned decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in the instant petition for
review on certiorari is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 59045, which
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 942260 and the Resolution of the CA denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005]
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON
WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and
ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 142, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo
G. Francisco were married on January 15, 1983. [3] Eduardo was then
employed as the vice president in a private corporation. A little more
than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the
Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale
for P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to
Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a
house thereon located at St. Martin de Porres Street, San Antonio
Valley I, Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. One of the lots was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36519, with an area of 342
square meters, while the other lot, with an area of 360 square
meters, was covered by TCT No. 36518. [4] The purchase price of the
property was paid to the Bank via Check No. 002334 in the amount
of P320,000.00 drawn and issued by the Commercial Bank of
Manila, for which the Imus Bank issued Official Receipt No. 121408
on August 31, 1984.[5] On the basis of the said deed of sale, TCT
Nos. 36518 and 36519 were cancelled and, on September 4, 1984,
the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977
(60551) in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to
Eduardo G. Francisco.[6]
On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record
Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This
referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he
declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased
two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with
her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he had
over the property.[7] On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the
said property to Leonila Cando for a loan of P157,000.00.[8] It
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. [9]

On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General

Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought
7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works &
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On
November 27, 1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the
RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or the
value thereof in the amount of P768,750.00. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 90-3251. On January 8, 1992, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo. The
fallo of the decision reads:
Accordingly, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff
Master Iron Works And Construction Corporation against the
defendant [Eduardo] Francisco ordering the latter as follows:
1. To replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50 kilos/bag of Portland
cement or, in the alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount
of P768,750.00;
2. In either case, to pay liquidated damages by way of interest at
12% per annum from June 21, 1990 until fully paid;
3. To pay P50,000.00 as actual damages; and
4. To pay attorneys fees of P153,750.00 and litigation expenses
of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]

The decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 became final and

executory and, on June 7, 1994, the court issued a writ of execution.
[11]
On June 14, 1994, Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a public auction
one stainless, owner-type jeep for P10,000.00 to MIWCC.[12] Sheriff
Alejo issued a Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the lots
covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551) for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 90-3251. [13] On June 24, 1994, the sale of
the property at a public auction was set to August 5, 1994. [14]
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim[15] over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they
were her paraphernal property, and that her husband Eduardo had
no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit
of waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. She, likewise,
requested Sheriff Alejo to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy
on execution/attachment earlier issued by him.
On July 7, 1994, Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party
Claim in the trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff.
MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond[16] in the amount
of P1,361,500.00 issued by the Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made
a bid for the property for the price ofP1,350,000.00.[17]
On July 28, 1994, Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC
and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Paraaque for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2260. She alleged then that she was
the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo in
Civil Case No. 90-3251; hence, the levy on execution of the property
was null and void. She reiterated that her husband, the defendant in
Civil Case No. 90-3251, had no right or proprietary interest over the
said property as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver annotated at the
dorsal portion of the said title. Josefina prayed that the court issue a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
MIWCC from causing the sale of the said property at public auction.

Considering that no temporary restraining order had as yet been

issued by the trial court, the sheriff sold the subject property at public
auction to MIWCC for P1,350,000.00 on August 5, 1994. [18] However,
upon the failure of MIWCC to remit the sheriffs commission on the
sale, the latter did not execute a sheriffs certificate of sale over the
property. The RTC of Paraaque, thereafter, issued a temporary
restraining order[19] on August 16, 1994.
When Josefina learned of the said sale at public auction, she
filed an amended complaint impleading MIWCC, with the following
prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to
this Honorable Court that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and the same be in
the following tenor:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the following amounts:
A. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as actual damages;
B. The sum of P200,000.00 representing as moral damages;
C. The sum of P50,000.00 or such amount which this Honorable
Court deems just as exemplary damages;
D. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
2. Declaring the levying and sale at public auction of the plaintiffs
properties null and void;
3. To issue writ of preliminary injunction and makes it permanent;

4. Order the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the titles

as a result of the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 90-3251.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just under the
premises.[20]
In its answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and averred that the property was the
conjugal property of Josefina and her husband Eduardo, who
purchased the same on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on
January 14, 1983. MIWCC asserted that Eduardo executed the
affidavit of waiver to evade the satisfaction of the decision in Civil
Case No. 90-3251 and to place the property beyond the reach of
creditors; hence, the said affidavit was null and void.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina
filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, on the ground that when they were married
on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita
Carpio. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0169.
Josefina and Carmelita testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169.
Josefina declared that during her marriage to Eduardo, she acquired
the property covered by TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977
(60551), through the help of her sisters and brother, and that
Eduardo had no participation whatsoever in the said acquisition. She
added that Eduardo had five children, namely, Mary Jane, Dianne,
Mary Grace Jo, Mark Joseph and Mary Cecille, all surnamed
Francisco.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraaque rendered
judgment[21] in Civil Case No. 95-0169, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
In the meantime, Josefina testified in Civil Case No. 94-2260,
declaring, inter alia, that she was able to purchase the property from

the Bank when she was still single with her mothers financial
assistance; she was then engaged in recruitment when Eduardo
executed an affidavit of waiver; she learned that he was previously
married when they already had two children; nevertheless, she
continued cohabiting with him and had three more children by him;
and because of Eduardos first marriage, she decided to have him
execute the affidavit of waiver.

c. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

Eduardo testified that when his wife bought the property in

1984, he was in Davao City and had no knowledge of the said
purchases; he came to know of the purchase only when Josefina
informed him a week after his arrival from Davao; [22] Josefinas sister,
Lolita Castillo, told him that she would collect from him the money his
wife borrowed from her and their mother to buy the property; [23] when
he told Lolita that he had no money, she said that she would no
longer collect from him, on the condition that he would have no
participation over the property,[24] which angered Eduardo;[25] when
Josefina purchased the property, he had a gross monthly income
of P10,000.00 and gave P5,000.00 to Josefina for the support of his
family;[26] Josefina decided that he execute the affidavit of waiver
because her mother and sister gave the property to her.[27]

SO ORDERED.[28]

On December 20, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment

finding the levy on the subject property and the sale thereof at public
auction to be null and void. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THIS COURT finds the
Levying and sale at public auction of the plaintiffs properties null and
void.
The court orders the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff
the following amounts:
a. The sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as moral damages;

d. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.

The court orders the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at
the Titles as a result of the enforcement of the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 90-3251.

The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was
the sole and exclusive property of Josefina, applying Articles 144,
160, 175 and 485 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also held that
MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to the
acquisition of the property.
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which it alleged that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE
AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES
OWNED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
RECEPTION OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLEES
MARRIAGE
WITH
EDUARDO
FRANCISCO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
LEVY ON EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT
CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID;

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR ALLEGED IMPROPER
LEVY ON EXECUTION.[29]

The CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the

decision of the RTC on September 20, 2001. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision, dated 20
December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
260, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0126.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS
DECISION OF DECEMBER 20, 1997, THE SAME
BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.[31]
The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or
not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo
and Eduardo Francisco; and (b) whether or not the subject properties
may be held to answer for the personal obligations of Eduardo.
We shall deal with the issues simultaneously as they are closely
related.

SO ORDERED.[30]
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal
property of Eduardo and Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut
such presumption. It also held that the affidavit of waiver executed by
Eduardo was contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as
such, had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which was, likewise, denied by the
CA.
Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review,
alleging that:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN
PETITIONER
AND
EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF
PETITIONER;

The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to

Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no occasion that would give rise to
a regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The petitioner adds that to
rule otherwise would render moot and irrelevant the provisions on the
regime of special co-ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, in relation to Article 144 of the New
Civil Code.
The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code
governs their property relationship, the respondents must adduce
evidence to show that Eduardo actually contributed to the acquisition
of the subject properties. The petitioner asserts that she purchased
the property before her marriage to Eduardo with her own money
without any contribution from him; hence, the subject property is her
paraphernal property. Consequently, such property is not liable for
the debts of Eduardo to private respondent MIWCC.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the appellate
court was correct in ruling that the properties are conjugal in nature
because there is nothing in the records to support the petitioners
uncorroborated claim that the funds she used to purchase the
subject properties were her personal funds or came from her mother

and sister. The respondents point out that if, as claimed by the
petitioner, the subject properties were, indeed, not conjugal in nature,
then, there was no need for her to obtain marital (Eduardos) consent
when she mortgaged the properties to two different parties sometime
in the first quarter of 1986, or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of
waiver.
We note that the only questions raised in this case are
questions of facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in and resolved by the Court. The
Court may, however, determine and resolve questions of facts in
cases where the findings of facts of the trial court and those of the
CA are inconsistent, where highly meritorious circumstances are
present, and where it is necessary to give substantial justice to the
parties. In the present action, the findings of facts and the
conclusions of the trial court and those of the CA are opposite. There
is thus an imperative need for the Court to delve into and resolve the
factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law raised by the
parties.
The petition has no merit.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with
her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that
she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows
that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property to the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the
property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on
September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15,
1983.
We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil
Code does not apply in the present case. This Court in Tumlos v.
Fernandez[32] held that Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only
to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of
the parties is void from the very beginning. It does not apply to a

cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubinage, for it

would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and
his lawful wife. In this case, the petitioner admitted that when she
and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry her.
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, on which the
petitioner anchors her claims, provides as follows:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of
the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The
petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the
property in question.[33]

Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence

of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal
circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal
property.[34] Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides
that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before
the code took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws.[35] Thus, even if
Eduardo and Carmelita were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the property still cannot be
considered conjugal property because there can only be but one
valid existing marriage at any given time.[36] Article 148 of the Family
Code also debilitates against the petitioners claim since, according to
the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation
where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage
provided that the parents prove their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry and only to the extent of their
proportionate interest thereon.[37]
We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property:
First of all, other than plaintiff-appellees bare testimony, there is
nothing in the record to support her claim that the funds she used to
purchase the subject properties came from her mother and sister.
She did not, for instance, present the testimonies of her mother and
sister who could have corroborated her claim. Furthermore, in her
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim (Exh. C), she stated that the subject
properties are my own paraphernal properties, including the
improvements thereon, as such are the fruits of my own exclusive
efforts , clearly implying that she used her own money and
contradicting her later claim that the funds were provided by her
mother and sister. She also stated in her affidavit that she acquired
the subject properties before her marriage to Eduardo Francisco on
15 January 1983, a claim later belied by the presentation of the Deed
of Absolute Sale clearly indicating that she bought the properties

from Imus Rural Bank on 31 August 1984, or one year and seven
months after her marriage (Exh. D). In the face of all these
contradictions, plaintiff-appellees uncorroborated testimony that she
acquired the subject properties with funds provided by her mother
and sister should not have been given any weight by the lower court.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At
that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to
purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of
Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that
the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an
afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from
appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.[38]
Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered nothing to
prove her allegation that she borrowed the amount of P320,000.00
from her mother and her sister, which she paid to the Imus Bank on
August 31, 1984 to purchase the subject property. The petitioner
even failed to divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her
income, if any, and that of her sister. When she testified in Civil Case
No. 95-0169, the petitioner declared that she borrowed part of the
purchase price of the property from her brother,[39] but failed to
divulge the latters name, let alone reveal how much money she
borrowed and when. The petitioner even failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that her mother and sister had P320,000.00 in
1984, which, considering the times, was then quite a substantial
amount. Moreover, the petitioners third-party-claim affidavit stating
that the properties are the fruits of my own exclusive effort before I
married Eduardo Francisco belies her testimony in the trial court and
in Civil Case No. 95-0169.
We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued by the Imus
Bank, the payment for the subject property was drawn via Check No.
002334 and issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila in the amount
of P320,000.00.[40] The petitioner failed to testify against whose
account the check was drawn and issued, and whether the said
account was owned by her and/or Eduardo Francisco or her mother,

sister or brother. She even failed to testify whether the check was a
managers check and, if so, whose money was used to purchase the
same.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of
waiver executed by Eduardo on February 15, 1985, stating that the
property is owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative weight. We
are convinced that he executed the said affidavit in anticipation of
claims by third parties against him and hold the property liable for the
said claims. First, the petitioner failed to prove that she had any
savings before her cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite
Eduardos affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless affixed his marital
conformity to the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioner
over the property in favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986. [41] Third,
the petitioner testified that she borrowed the funds for the purchase
of the property from her mother and sister.[42] Fourth, the petitioner
testified that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver because she
discovered that he had a first marriage. [43] Lastly, Eduardo belied the
petitioners testimony when he testified that he executed the affidavit
of waiver because his mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the
property to the petitioner.[44]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

LUPO ATIENZA,

G.R. No. 169698

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus -

AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 29, 2006

YOLANDA DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda

GARCIA, J.:

became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and

Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later
part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born. However,
after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until
they parted ways.

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on

certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of

On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its

against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of

[2]

Resolution of September 16, 2005, reversing an earlier decision of

land

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action

Subdivision, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

for Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the

No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint,

herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda de

docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that

Castro.

the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as

with

improvements

located

in

Bel-Air

common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by

The facts:

Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and

General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian
Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U.
De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.

them.

Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in

question was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his
exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller
in Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent. He did not

interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was
still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of
information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the
disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a coowner.

property is not feasible because of its nature, that

either the same be assigned to one of the parties
who shall pay the value corresponding to the share
of the other or that the property to be sold and the
proceeds thereof be divided equally between the
parties after deducting the expenses incident to said
sale.

In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her,

she acquired the same property for Two Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She

The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and

expenses of litigation.

insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a

businesswoman.

In a decision[3] dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in

common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the
two in equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City to be owned in common by
plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the defendant
YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike
and ordering the partition of said property between
them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties
are hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of
the Court a mutually agreed project of partition of
said property or, in case the physical partition of said

From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein arguing that the evidence on
record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her
own name with her own money. She maintained that the documents
appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove
who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as
well as Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity to
acquire the disputed property.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its
decision[4] of April 29, 2005, reversed and set aside that of the trial
court and adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by
Yolanda, to wit:

the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005, [5] Lupo is now with
this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article
144[6] of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he
contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof, adding that under Article 484 [7] of Civil Code, as long as the

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,

the
assailed
decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The subject
property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned
by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No
costs.

property was acquired by either or both of them during their

SO ORDERED.

We DENY.

extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in

common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in
default of contracts, or special provisions.

In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda,

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to

the CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family

marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly

Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances,

married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the

Yolandas claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been

respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article

substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to

148[8] of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,

overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject

adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,

property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.

relationships where both man and woman are married to other

persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be

owned by them in common in proportion to their respective

who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,

contributions ...[9] Proof of actual contribution is required.[10]

asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the

union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of

the

proven

actual

contribution

of

money,

property

or

industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and

corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. [11]

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced

in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. [12] Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[13]

competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the

partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure
of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
[14]

Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a

mere allegation is not evidence.[15]

It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial

capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the
dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount
needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly
written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987,
the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and
the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and
between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the
exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that
here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party

Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo]

failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records
of the case, it is evident that the trial court committed
errors of judgment in its findings of fact and
appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of
the funds used for the purchase of the disputed
property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof.
Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled
to respect and shall not be disturbed, unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked or misinterpreted that would
otherwise materially affect the disposition of the
case.

As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily

rested on the apparent financial capacity of the
parties. On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea
captain and the President and General Manager of
two corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a
Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is
financially well heeled than [Yolanda], the court a
quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had
taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is
in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)

As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the
best and most complete evidence be formally
entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase money used as
consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo]
diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda]
by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman
without the capacity to purchase any property.
Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent
thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated
his complaint to a mere attack on the financial
capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents
pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts
of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately
failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase
of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a
limited access to the funds of the said corporations
and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their
bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the
money she used in buying the disputed property, or
any property for that matter, came from said
withdrawals.

property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate

his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very
trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof
redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his
mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly
find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence.
Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any

person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or
that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the

issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated,

Costs against the petitioner.

petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or

immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In
contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the
respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to
purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant
but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the
promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She
also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions,
which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase
price of the subject property.

All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no
reversible error in rendering the herein challenged decision and
resolution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed

issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004]

MILAGROS
JOAQUINO
a.k.a.
MILAGROS
J.
REYES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES
REYES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all
surnamed REYES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired
with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal
partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation of the paramours
children must be settled in a probate or special proceeding instituted
for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.

The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002 Decision [2] and
the August 14, 2002 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CV No. 45883. The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially
DENIED and the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 9722-P
isMODIFIED to read, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and

against the defendant as follows:
a. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 90293 (26627-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Metro
Manila, District IV as conjugal partnership property of the late
Spouses Rodolfo and Lourdes Reyes;
b. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject
property, pursuant to the applicable law on succession, to the
respective estates of the late Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and
to pay a reasonable rental of P10,000.00 a month, to the same
juridical entities, upon their failure to do so until possession of the
property is delivered; and
c. To pay [respondents] attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and
to pay the costs.[4]
The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages,
dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
containing the following allegations:
x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the
widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981; that
[respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the
legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo
A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino;
that before his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and
Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income

of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980,

received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount
of P315,0[1]1.79; that [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any
portion of the said amount.

actual, compensatory and moral damages to [respondents] as well

as attorneys fees.

The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of

[S]ale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes,
Paraaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez
and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds
of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of [petitioner]
Milagros B. Joaquino; that the funds used to purchase this property
were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes
as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as [petitioner]
Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same; that [petitioner]
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to
mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in
order to pay the balance of the purchase price; that said Rodolfo A.
Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he
secured a life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance
Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation; that the monthly
amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes
before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding
balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life
Insurance [p]olicy.

[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the

allegations of which have been summarized by the trial court in the
following manner:

The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in
[petitioners] possession and that the real and personal properties in
[petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the
spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half
belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other
half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the
[other respondents] as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore,
pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared
conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A.
Reyes and that [petitioner] be ordered to reconvey the property in
[respondents] favor; that the two cars in [petitioners] possession be
delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be made to pay

xxxxxxxxx

In her Answer, [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she

purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds
and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes
facilitated the mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo
Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the mortgage as attorney-infact of [petitioner], the money came exclusively from [her].
[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that during all the nineteen (19) years that [she]
lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September
12, 1981 when the latter died, [petitioner] never had knowledge
whatsoever that he was married to someone else, much less to
[respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes; that [petitioner] was never the
beneficiary of the emoluments or other pecuniary benefits of the late
Rodolfo Reyes during his lifetime or after his death because [she]
had the financial capacity to support herself and her children
begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes. [Petitioner] prays for a
judgment dismissing [respondents] complaint and for the latter to pay
unto [petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as
may be determined during the trial, including atto[r]neys fees and the
costs of the suit. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
On February 2, 1993, [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the complaint based on the
following factual findings:

Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3,

1947 in Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel,
Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in
this case. Rodolfo Reyes died on September 12, 1981. At the time of
his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife,
Milagros Joaquino, x x x with whom she begot three (3) children
namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes.
During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and
Company and later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co., where he
assumed the position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired
onSeptember 30, 1980. His monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co.
was P15,000.00 x x x and upon his separation or retirement from
said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum of P315,011.79
in full payment and settlement of his separation and retirement
benefits.
During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and
[petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided
to buy the house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3,
BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of [petitioner] Milagros
Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-90293 covering the
said property was issued in the name of [petitioner only] on July 20,
1979.
To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the
property in the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner] executed on July
20, 1979, a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes
for the latter, as attorney-in-fact, to secure a loan from the
Commonwealth Insurance Company. An application for mortgage
loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance
Company and a Real Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as
collateral to the mortgage loan. The loan was payable in ten (10)
years with a monthly amortization of P1,166.67. The monthly
amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death, the
balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth
Insurance by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes.[5]

On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings

of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been paid in full from
the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the
Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2) that his salaries and
earnings, which were his and Lourdes conjugal funds, paid for the
loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal; and 3) that
petitioners illegitimate children, not having been recognized or
acknowledged by him in any of the ways provided by law, acquired
no successional rights to his estate.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid
out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the
monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the
life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his
salaries and earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof
that petitioner was financially capable of buying the disputed
property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive
funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of
the property to the respective estates of the spouses.
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not
have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of
petitioners children. Such issues, it said, were not properly
cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages
and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding
instituted for the purpose.
Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues
Petitioner
consideration:

submits

the

following
I.

issues

for

the

Courts

Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law

and trier of facts, the Regional Trial Court, that petitioners three [3]
illegitimate children are x x x indeed the children of the late Rodolfo
Reyes.

The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house
and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila); and
2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of
petitioners children.

II.
Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a
mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of their [two] 2
illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the
very complaint filed by their mother, the lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows
that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner
Milagros and had lived with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.
III.
Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that
the house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal property of lawfully
wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds
which was used to pay the final bill for the house and lot, this will
prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
IV.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the
parties to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the trial and in [their]
pleadings x x x.
V.
Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes
should respect their fathers desire that his illegitimate children should
have a home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his duty
to love, care and provide for his children even after his death. [7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:
The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property
Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some
undisputed facts and guiding principles.
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo
Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes
on January 3, 1947.[8] It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and
while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living with
petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house
and lot was purchased and registered in petitioners name.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of
gains (CPG) is created upon marriage[9] and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial
separation of property.[10] Conjugal properties are by law owned in
common by the husband and wife. [11] As to what constitutes such
properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;

(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the
marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife
exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to
have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. [12]
The law places the burden of proof [13] on the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance of
evidence[14] -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing
than that which is offered to oppose it.[15]
On the other hand, Article 144[16] of the Civil Code mandates a
co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living together
but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though,
that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be incapacitated to
contract marriage.[17] It has been held that the Article is inapplicable
to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in
this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a coownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership
between the man and his lawful wife.[18]
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the
Family Code has been applied.[19] The latter Article provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidence of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party which acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be

forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the

preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to
marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by
them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now proceed to
the merits of the first issue.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid
for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this issue
depends the determination of whether the property is conjugal
(owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or
co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been passed
upon by both the trial and the appellate courts, with similar results in
favor of respondents. Such finding is generally conclusive; it is not
the function of this Court to review questions of fact. [20]
Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts
are reviewable by this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [21]This principle
applies with greater force herein, because the CA came up with the
same factual findings as those of the RTC.
Even then, heeding petitioners plea, we have gone through the
pleadings and the evidence presented by the parties to find out if
there is any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of the factual
findings. Unfortunately for petitioner, we have found none.
Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that
the disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using his
salaries and earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents showed
the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as
comptroller at Warner, Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on
September 30, 1980, upon which he received a sizeable retirement

package;[22] 2) that at exactly the same time the property was

allegedly purchased,[23] he applied for a mortgage loan[24] -- intended
for housing[25] -- from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 3)
that he secured the loan with a real estate mortgage [26] over the
same property; 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the
loan[27] as well as the semi-annual premiums [28] for a Philam Life
insurance policy, which he was required to take as additional
security; and 5) that with the proceeds of his life insurance policy, the
balance of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life
Insurance Company.[29]
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought
during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to
the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were
used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from
his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil
Code.
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her
claims -- that she was financially capable of buying the house and
lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments therefor.
Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at
any time after 1961[30] when the property was purchased. Hearsay
are the Affidavits[31] and the undated Certification[32]she had
presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and
had earnings from a jewelry business. Respondents had not been
given any opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, who had not
testified on these matters. Based on the rules of evidence, the
Affidavits and the Certification have to be rejected. In fact, they have
no probative value.[33] The CA was also correct in disregarding
petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had come from
the sale of a drugstore[34] four years earlier.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the
subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name was
tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express
provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void,
because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation.

The prohibition against donations between spouses[35] must

likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit
relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the
former.[36] Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides thus:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage. (Italics supplied)
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it
is enough to stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens system
aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the
deprivation of ownership.[37] It has been held that property is conjugal
if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a
preexisting legal marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the
common-law wife.[38] In this case, a constructive trust is deemed
created under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly
designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory heirs of
ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the
property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on the
registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known
exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title. [39]

Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper

It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are

entitled to a share in the disputed property, because they were
voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children.Claiming that
the issue of her childrens illegitimate filiation was duly established in
the trial court, she faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper
in the instant case.
Her position is untenable.
Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in
a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights.[40] Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay
v. Palang,[41] this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated
in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery
of property.
Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred
the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioners children. It is evident
from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in
either the original[42] or the Supplemental Complaint[43] for
reconveyance of property and damages; that it was not pleaded and
specifically prayed for by petitioner in her Answers [44] thereto; and
that it was not traversed by respondents Reply to the Supplemental
Complaint.[45] Neither did petitioners Memorandum,[46] which was
submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this issue. In view
thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been
duly established by the proceedings as required by Article 887 of the
Civil Code.[47]
In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for
tackling the propriety of the RTCs ruling on the status of the children
of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error. The
general rule -- that only errors assigned may be passed upon by an
appellate court admits of exceptions. Even unassigned errors may be
taken up by such court if the consideration of those errors would be
necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the interest of
justice.[48]
The invocation by petitioner of Articles 19 [49] and 21[50] of the Civil
Code is also unmeritorious. Clearly, the illegitimate filiation of her

children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly
established in this case. Thus, she could not have shown that
respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her
children. These are conditions necessary to show that an act
constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19. [51] She also failed to
show that respondents -- in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of
the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of
Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the trial court or
even in the CA. Hence, she should not be permitted to raise it
now. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on appeal issues
that have not been raised on trial.[52]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000]
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO
FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

"Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on

June 5, 1997 affirming in toto the appealed judgment
of the [MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one
is entered reversing said decision of the [MTC] and
dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled
case."[4]
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an
actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).[2] The dispositive part of the CA Decision
reads: Jur-is
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED,
and the questioned orders of the court a quo dated
October 7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondents."[3]
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows: Supr-ema

"[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil

Case No. 6756, an action for ejectment filed before
Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated
July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are
the absolute owners of an apartment building
located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance
they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the
last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the
payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that
after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will
pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental,
which agreement was not complied with by the said
defendants; that they have demanded several times
[that] the defendants x x x vacate the premises, as
they are in need of the property for the construction
of a new building; and that they have also demanded
payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos
representing rentals for seven (7) years and
payment of P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as
unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the said

demands went unheeded. They then prayed that the

defendants be ordered to vacate the property in
question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as
well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
"[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who
filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein
that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein
it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
"After an unfruitful preliminary conference on
November 15, 1996, the MTC required the parties to
submit their affidavits and other evidence on the
factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten
(10) days from receipt of such order, pursuant to
section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted
her affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996,
while the [respondents] filed their position paper on
December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their marriage
contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and
the Contract to Sell over the disputed property. The
MTC thereafter promulgated its judgment on
January 22, 1997[.]Scs-daad
xxxxxxxxx
"Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two
other] defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and
[Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship,
and that they acquired the property in question as
their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two

(2) children for around ten(10) years, and that

Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments,
until she discovered that [Respondent Mario]
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It
was also during the early part of 1996 when
[Respondent Mario] accused her of being unfaithful
and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
"In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two
other] defendants further averred that it was only
recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily
accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for
the children. In short, their presence there [was] only
transient and they [were] not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
"On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. S-daad
"The [petitioner and the two other defendants]
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on July
3, 1997, alleging that the decision of affirmance by
the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to
point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts
and law on which it was based vis--vis the
statements of issues they have raised in their
memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the
Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which
named the buyer as Mario P. Fernandez, of legal
age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should not be
given credence as it was falsified to appear that way.
According to them, the Contract to Sell originally
named Guillerma Fernandez as the spouse of
[Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the
sellers naming the [respondents] as the buyers after
the latter presented their marriage contract and
requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife.

Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma

was really a co-owner thereof, and that the
[respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the
property as recognized by law. Sd-aamiso
xxxxxxxxx
"The [RTC], in determining the question of
ownership in order to resolve the issue of
possession, ruled therein that the Contract to Sell
submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not
to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the
name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez.
Hence, the contract presented by the [respondents]
cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled
that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario] acquired the
property during their cohabitation as husband and
wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From
such findings, the court concluded that [Petitioner]
Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom.
"The [respondents] then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the
same was denied by the [RTC]."[5]
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed
by Guillerma Tumlos only.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioners claim that she and Respondent Mario
Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property. The CA
ruled: Scnc-m
"From the inception of the instant case, the only
defense presented by private respondent Guillerma
is her right as a co-owner of the subject property[.]

xxxxxxxxx
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily
proven by Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial
court. No other evidence was presented to validate
such claim, except for the said affidavit/position
paper. As previously stated, it was only on appeal
that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the
petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage,
and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to
her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates
of the said children. Such contentions and
documents should not have been considered by the
x x x (RTC), as they were not presented in her
affidavit/position paper before the trial court (MTC).
xxxxxxxxx
"However, even if the said allegations and
documents could be considered, the claim of coownership must still fail. As [herein Respondent]
Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent]
Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract dated
April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.
Thus, the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
xxxxxxxxx
"It is clear that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family
Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276

SCRA 340). The care given by one party [to] the

home, children, and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration provided to the other, is not included in
Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p.
209). Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares (Agapay, supra at p.
348, citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines Volume I by Arturo M.
Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
"In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution
by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the subject apartment building, We find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent
Mario]. The said property is thus presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and
Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage and there being no
other proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of
the Family Code).
"The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent
Mario] has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in
her custody, and that to eject them from the
apartment building would be to run counter with the
obligation of the former to give support to his minor
illegitimate children, which indispensably includes
dwelling. As previously discussed, such finding has
no leg to stand on, it being based on evidence
presented for the first time on appeal. Nc-mmis
xxxxxxxxx

"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence

was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider
that the need for support cannot be presumed.
Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides
that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand. x x x. Nc-m
"In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the
Supreme Court, the RTC instead presumed that
Guillerma and her children needed support from
[Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not
properly presented before the trial court (MTC).
"With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto
Tumlos, a close perusal of the records shows that
they did not file any responsive pleading. Hence,
judgment may be rendered against them as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for
in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. There was no basis for the public
respondent to dismiss the complaint against
them."[7] (emphasis in the original) Ol-dmiso
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused
its discretion in not outrightly dismissing the petition
for review filed by respondents.
"II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that
petitioner is not the co-owner of the property in litis.

"III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in

applying Art. 148 of the Family Code in the case at
bar. Man-ikan

4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first
determining whether to give due course to the Petition, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[12]

"IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the

substantive right of support vis--vis the remedy of
ejectment resorted to by respondents."[8]

The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this
wise: Mi-so

In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the

petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for support
bar this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these preliminary
matters: (a) whether the CA was biased in favor of respondents and
(b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. Manik-s
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein
respondents. This bias, she argues, is manifest in the following: Manikx
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review[9] despite
their failure to attach several pleadings as well as the explanation for
the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Section 11[10] of
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.[11]
2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not
attached.
3. It considered respondents Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had
allegedly been filed out of time. Ne-xold

"It is too late in the day now to question the alleged

procedural error after we have rendered the
decision. More importantly, when the private
respondent filed their comment to the petition on
April 26, 1998, they failed to question such alleged
procedural error. Neither have they questioned all
the resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of
such comment. They should, therefore, be now
considered in estoppel to question the same." [13]
We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these
matters before the CA. She cannot be allowed now to challenge its
Decision on grounds of alleged technicalities beingbelatedly raised
as an afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke Solar[14] because
she never raised this issue before the CA. Spp-edjo
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners
part to rely, on the one hand, on these procedural technicalities to
overcome the appealed Decision and, on the other hand, assert that
the RTC may consider the new evidence she presented for the first
time on appeal. Such posturing only betrays the futility of petitioners
assertion, if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of
origin, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did not have jurisdiction over
the "nature of the case," alleging that the real question involved is
one of ownership. Since the issue of possession cannot be settled
without passing upon that of ownership, she maintains that the MTC
should have dismissed the case. Josp-ped
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed
upon by the MTC to settle the issue of possession.[15] Such

disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of ownership is

concerned,[16] which may be the subject of another proceeding
brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to
petitioners substantive contentions. Spped
First Issue: Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents
action for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property
with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the
MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his
spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient to support her
claim. The RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she
had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence
presented before it,[17] ruled in her favor. Misspped
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced
before the RTC could no longer be considered because they had not
been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court
concluded that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily
proven x x x."[18]
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering
the evidence presented before it. Nonetheless, we reject her claim
that she was a co-owner of the disputed property.Missc
Evidence Presented on Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence
presented by petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not
raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during
appeal.[19]
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues
belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. The defense
invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner.

To support her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated

November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario Fernandez was legally
married to her. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a
mere elaboration of her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on
considerations of fair play. Respondents never objected when the
assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot
claim unfair surprise or prejudice. Scmis
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the
RTC, we cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a co-owner
of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code.
[20]
As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of
the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article,[21] only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith." Sc

Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a

man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other,
[22]
or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void [23] from the
beginning.[24] It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to
adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife.[25]
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario
Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was
legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily
admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent
Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out[26] that "[t]he Family Code has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a
state of adultery or concubinage." x-sc
Hence, petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable
because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred
before its effectivity -- deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say
that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does
not prejudice vested or acquired rights.[27] In this case, petitioner
failed to show any vested right over the property in question.
Moreover, to resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of
the Family Code retroactively.[28]
No Evidence of Actual Joint Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a
co-owner of the property. In Agapay,[29] the Court ruled:
"Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be

owned by them in common in proportion to their

respective contributions. It must be stressed that the
actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares."
(emphasis ours) xl-aw
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had
made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property.
Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her
cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does
not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code
provides that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The
property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering
the ejectment of petitioner from the premises. Sc-lex
Second Issue: Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to
repudiate her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark
Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an
admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the
theory that the childrens right to support, which necessarily includes
shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit
whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over

their property. It is summary in character and dealssolely with the

issue of possession of the property in dispute. Here, it has been
shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their
tolerance. Scl-aw
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez alleged failure to repudiate
petitioners claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case.
Indeed, it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue.
Besides, it was not properly taken up below.[30] In any event, Article
298[31] of the Civil Code requires that there should be an extrajudicial
demand.[32] None was made here. The CA was correct when it said:
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence
was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider
that the need for support cannot be presumed.
Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly
provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same need it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial and extrajudicial demand."[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Rtc-spped
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146294

July 31, 2006

JOHN ABING, petitioner,

vs.
JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set
aside the Decision1 dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed an earlier
decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in
an ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the
respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who,
during the good old days, lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired
properties. Later, they parted ways, and with it this litigation between
them involving one of their common properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for
short) met and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the

couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin

Macua which was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro Dio
on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase,
the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name
of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea.
She would send money to John who deposited the same in their joint
bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent
renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sarisari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the
properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John.
She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine
employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse.
Hence, they decided to partition their properties. For the purpose,
they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties
although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned
agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying
him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their
properties. On the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John
the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with
the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly
installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account
thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing
the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment
suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.

In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the

construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru
money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax
declaration for the structure was under his name. On this premise,
John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure, which
thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's
failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementionedMemorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was
renovated thru their common funds and that the subject structure
annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their
original residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of
them in common.
In a decision2 dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the
money used in the construction of the structure in question solely
came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the
latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction therefrom, including
the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession
thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
(John) and against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the
store in litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-00100445 in the name of the Plaintiff and turn over possession
thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the
sum of P2,500.00 a month from the time she withheld
possession of the store in litigation in June 1996 until she
vacates the same and turn over possession thereof to the
Plaintiff.

Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to

the Plaintiff by way of Attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29,
1995, affirmed that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October
24, 2000,3 reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and
set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the
property and maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995
and that they acquired certain properties which must be
divided between them upon the termination of their common
law relationship.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the

provision of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership... but by
the rule on co-ownership.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have

accumulated during their cohabitation shall be equal unless
there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for
the construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same pertained
to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted
therefrom, adding that if ever, John's cause of action should have
been for a sum of money "because he claims that Juliet still owes
him the payment for the extension." According to the CA, ejectment
cannot lie against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the premises
in dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did
she obtain such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of
Agreement which should have been binding between them
albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure
housing the sari-sari store) is owned by the two of them in
common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common
properties in a separate action for partition even as the
community character of the subject premises has not been
proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether
or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive
ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of
the two courts before it, the CA found that the premises in dispute is
owned in common by Juliet and John, the latter having failed to

establish by the required quantum of proof that the money spent for
the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of
the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the
Court normally eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual
findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the
exception4 to the general rule and proceed to make its own
assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived
together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit
of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991,
Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John
which the latter deposited in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still
in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds
and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction
of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent
therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives
from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money
he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money
in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a
certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner
borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his
affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the
subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the
amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the
construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while
petitioner was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he
failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from
whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a

single relative came forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In short,

there is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support
petitioner's self-serving allegation that the annex structure which
housed the sari-sari store was put up thru his own funds and/or
money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled
time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at
best an indicia of claims of ownership.5 Payment of taxes is not proof
of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of
an owner.6 Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for
taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs. 7
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It
reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary,
any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint

efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property

relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this
regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 4878 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may
bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property.
It bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally
wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive ownership of the
property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by
virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession
of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her
being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy
its possession and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the
subject Memorandum of Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and
John, has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay
John the amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for John's share
in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable
in twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. It is also a
matter of record that the Agreement was signed by the witnesses
thereto. Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was
left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding
force or effect between them, as evidently, Juliet's initial payment
of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had
agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA,
Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their
common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of
money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not
for ejectment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision

is AFFIRMED, except that portion thereof denying effect to the
parties' Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.