EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22533. February 9, 1967.]

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners, vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
BONIFACIO, respondents.

Placido B. Ramos and Renato L. Ramos for petitioners.

Trinidad & Borromeo for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
APPEAL; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS NOT FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO REEXAMINE. This Court has consistently respected the ndings of fact of the Court
of Appeals with some few exceptions which do not obtain herein.
2.
APPEAL; QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT DISTINGUISHED. For a question to
be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well known. There is
a question of law in a given case when the doubt or dierence arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
3.
CIVIL LAW; DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION OF A DRIVER ILLUSTRATED.
The uncontradicted testimony of (the) personnel manager of defendant company,
was to the eect that defendant driver was rst hired as a member of the bottle
crop in the production department: that when he was hired as a driver, defendant
company had size him by looking into his background, asking him to submit
clearances, and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of, rst, theoretical examination and second, the practical
driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense
that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the choice or selection of defendant driver.
4.
ID.; DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEE DISCUSSED;
ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED. From Article 2180, two things
are apparent; (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection; or both; and (2) that the
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a

good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from

liability.
5.
APPEAL; MATTERS NOT RAISED AND ARGUED IN THE LOWER COURT
CANNOT BE VENTILATED IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME.
Appellant's other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of this
Court's reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-COLA violated the
Revised Motor Vehicles Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not having
been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the
first time.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J :
p

On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.
1 and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a
collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck
and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by
Augusto Ramos, son and co-plainti of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor- truck was then
driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, nding
Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI- COLA had not suciently proved its
having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. PEPSI- COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintis
P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Said Court, on January 15, 1964, armed the trial court's judgment insofar as it
found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modied it by absolving defendant PEPSICOLA from liability, nding that, contrary to the plainti's contention, PEPSI-COLA
sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintis thereupon appealed to Us through this petition for review of the Court of
Appeals' decision. And appellants would argue before this Court that defendant
PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show that it had exercised due diligence n the
selection of its driver in question.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor,
thus:
"The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Aasco, personnel
manager of defendant company, was to the eect that defendant
driver was rst hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production

department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him
by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to
the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of:
'First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination,' all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of
the sense that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver. In
the case of Campo vs. Camarote, No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794,
cited in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down
as a rule that 'In order that the defendant may be considered as having
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should have
been satised with the mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualications, his experiences and record of
service.' Defendant Company has taken all these steps . 2

Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision under review
by taking issue with the testimony of Aasco upon which the ndings of due
diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now contended that Aasco, being PEPSICOLA's employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony is not
believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an issue of fact and
credibility, something as to which this Court has consistently respected the ndings
of the Court of Appeals, with some few exceptions, which do not obtain herein. 3
Stated dierently, Aasco's credibility is not for this Court now to re-examine. And
said witness having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testimony, as
accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be assailed. As We said in Co Tao vs.
Court of Appeals, L-9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of error involving the
credibility of witnesses and which in eect dispute the ndings of fact of the Court
of Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these proceedings. For a question to be one of law
it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. 4 And the distinction is well-known: There is a question
of law in a given case when the doubt or dierence arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or dierence arises
as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 5
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must be taken as
established that, as testied to by Aasco, PEPSI- COLA did in fact carefully examine
the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his qualications, experiences and record of
service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals in its decision already
quoted.
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required
due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs.
Camarote, 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as

having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satised
with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his qualications, his experience and
record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due
diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code provides inter alia:
". . . The owners and managers of en establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the letter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxx xxx xxx
"The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage."

And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, this Court said in Bahia
vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury
is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not jure et de juris, and
consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability."

As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is
only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is not
surprising that appellants thus conne their arguments to this aspect of due
diligence, since the record as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reects in quoting
in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness would show sucient evidence to
establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including
Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of this
Courts' reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-COLA violated the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law. and rules and regulations related thereto, not having
been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the
rst time. 6 And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the
negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby armed, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz
Castro, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

May 16, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J :
p

Petitioners seek a reconsideration 1 of Our decision 2 in the instant case arming in

toto the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals absolving respondent PEPSICOLA from liability. In Our decision, We refrained from passing on the merits of the
question whether PEPSI-COLA in operating the tractor-truck and trailer, violated the
Rev. Motor Vehicles Law 3 and the rules and regulations related thereto, for the
procedural reason that it did not appear to have been raised before the Court of
Appeals.
It now appears, however, that said question was raised in a motion to reconsider
led with the Court of Appeals which resolved the same against petitioners. Due
consideration of the matter on its merits, convinces Us that the decision of the
Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in toto.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars. I and 4(d), par. (a), Sec.
27 of M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in that at the time of
the collision the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 k. gms., was (a)
being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h., or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b)
was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver.
The cited provisions read:
"SECTION 27. Registration, operation, and inspection of trucktrailer combinations, semi-trailers, and tractors .
"(a)
No trailer or semi-trailer having a gross weight of more
than 2,000 kilograms and is not equipped with eective brakes on at
least two opposite wheels of the rear axle and are so controlled that the
brakes will act in unison with or preceding the eective action of the
brakes of the tractor-truck shall be registered for operation for public
highways of the Philippines; provided, that the trailers without brakes
may be registered from year to year for operation under the following
conditions:
"1.
No such trailer shall be operated at any time at a speed, in
excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck,
the actual gross weight of which is less than twice the weight of the
trailer.

xxx xxx xxx

"4(d)
Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with rear-vision
mirror to enable the driver to see vehicles approaching from the rear or
shall carry a helper who shall be so stationed on the truck or trailer that
he will constantly have a view of the rear. He shall be provided with
means of eectively signalling to the driver to give way to overtaking
vehicles.
"4(e)
No truck and trailer combination shall be operated at a
speed greater than 30 kilometers per hours."

It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit in subpar. 1, supra, refers only to trailers
or semi-trailers having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kgms., AND which are
"not equipped with eective brakes on at least two opposite wheels of the rear
axle and are so controlled that the brakes will act in unison with or preceding the
eective action of the brakes of the tractor-truck . . ." This is the condition set in
the proviso in par. (a), supra, wherein "trailers without [such] brakes may be
registered from year to year for operation . . .", i.e., they should not "be operated
at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a
tractor-truck . . ." But there was no finding by the Court of Appeals that the trucktrailer here did not have such brakes. In the absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4
(e), supra, that will apply. And petitioners admit that the truck-trailer was being
driven at about 30 k.p.h.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the night of the
collision since he was found to be driving alone. However, there is no nding that
the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be sure, the records disclose
that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the trac policeman who went to the collision scene,
testied that he saw the tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any
rear-vision mirror. 4 This cannot prove lack of rear- vision mirror. And the cited
provision subpar. 4(d) is complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having
a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said provision is
violated only where there is a positive nding that the tractor-truck did not have
both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the
Rev. Motor Vehicles Law, providing that:
"No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed the
following dimensions:
"Over all width . . . 2.5 meters"
xxx xxx xxx

since there was an express nding that the truck-trailer was 3 meters wide.
However, Sec. 9(d) of the same law, as amended, providing that
"SEC. 9.

Special permits, fees for. The chief of the Motor

Vehicles Oce with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications shall establish regulations and a tari of additional fees
under which special permits may be issued in the discretion of the Chief
of the Motor Vehicles Oce or his deputies, for each of the following
special cases, and without such special permit, no such motor vehicles
shall be operated on the public highways . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"(d)
For registration or fees of a motor vehicle exceeding the
limit of permissible dimensions specied in subsections (b) and (c) of
section eight-A hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

expressly allows the registration or use of motor vehicles exceeding the limits of
permissible dimensions specied in subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A. So, to conclude that
there was a violation of law which indisputably constitutes negligence, at the
very least it is not enough that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit
in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear that there was no special permit
granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is
missing. There was no proof much less any nding to that eect. And it was
incumbent upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack of such permit since
the tractor-truck and the trailer were registered. 5 Compliance with law and
regularity in the performance of ocial duty in this case, the issuance of
proper registration papers are presumed 6 and prevail over mere surmises.
Having charged a violation of law, the onus of substantiating the same fell upon
petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that there was a violation of the
law lacks factual basis.
Petitioners would also have Us abandon the Bahia ruling. 7 In its stead, We are
urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine, of respondent superior. We cannot
however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of
the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages
caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's
responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely claried what that
diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driveremployee.
Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his
employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently
select and supervise his erring employees. We do not - and have never - followed
the respondent superior rule. 8 So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based
as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz

Castro JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

For brevity hereinafter called PEPSI-COLA.

2.

Underscoring supplied.

3.

Among the exceptions to the rule that ndings of fact by the Court of Appeals
cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1.
When the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures: Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257.
2.
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible: Luna
vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15.
3.
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion: Buyco vs. People, 95 Phil. 453; 51
Off. Gaz., 2927.
4.
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts: Cruz vs. Sosing,
94 Phil. 26.
5.
When the findings of fact are conflicting: Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30,
1957.

6.
When the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee: Evangeslista vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401.
4.

Cf . II Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, 1963 ed., p. 412.

5.

See II Martin, RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, 255; II Bouvier's LAW

DICTIONARY, 2784.

6.

Tan Si Kiok vs. Tiacho, 79 Phil. 696.

1.

Typographical errors appearing in the printed motion for reconsideration have

been corrected upon petitioner's request granted by US.

2.

Promulgated Feb. 9. 1967.

3.

Act No. 3992.

4.

Session of Jan. 13, 1960, T.S.N., p. 68.

5.

See Pars. 2 and 3 of Complaint, Rollo, p. 44.

6.

Rule 131, Sec. 5(m) and (ff), Rev. Rules of Court.

7.

Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, which held that once the employer satisfactorily

shows that in the selection and supervision of the driver, he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, he is relieved from liability.
8.

Cangco vs. M.R.R., 38 Phil. 768; Cuison vs. Norton, 55 Phil. 18.