EQUAL PROTECTION

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

Facts: In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to
the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent
to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the
imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar
produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not
taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is
violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It
shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of
the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such
goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost
for no other sugar mill is found in the city.

Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the

constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being
discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of
Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and
Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the
franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education,
the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission,
the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial
Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang
Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City
Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec
2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA
2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried
in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal
protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At
the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it
is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification,
to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

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Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a
long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection
clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from
which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and
in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand
why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication
between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is
the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is
to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those
who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.
Tiu vs. CA
Facts: Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227
entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into
Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted
there to special privileges. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97,
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. The President issued
Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-dutyfree privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged before this Court the
constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection of the laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact
metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant
to Section 12 of RA 7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial
difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In
both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied
by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered
and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America, as amended . . .'"
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

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Held: No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the
circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base,
thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right
of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose
of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions,
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class. The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President
to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the
former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government
intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an
abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone,
particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for
their businesses and industries.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
Facts: On 3 July 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It
abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On 8
June 2001, almost 8 years after the effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise
of Authority) provides that "In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board
shall ... (c) establish a human resource management system which shall
govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of
all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be
instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource
development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own

system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under
salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
under Republic Act No. 6758." The Association alleges that the proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1)
the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the
SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic
case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal
protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
RULING:
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that
the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its
operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does
not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals
or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the
classification is not unreasonable.
B.
THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM
THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures
power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rankand-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged
proviso.

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The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined

by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one
set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of
altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes
arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the
long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work
with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification,
and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling
voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of
petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power
to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing
the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been
filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given
to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based
on the rational basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by

the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more

strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and
the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or nonpolitical, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or
limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and
the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the
system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,
we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the
land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit
specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while
the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are
paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist
of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms
of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the

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quality of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees
who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize
as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices.
These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and
they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and
iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination
cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from
reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and
implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
City of Manila vs. Hon. Laguio
Facts: On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers
that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates
that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for
entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC.
The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote
morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the
case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different
from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs,
super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that
it is baseless and insupportable.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing
restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to
avoid. The Ordinance however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise
of an assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the

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Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and

personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as
valid.
Quinto vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the
moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend
to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect
to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned
from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of
the equal protection clause

Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned
all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

It
It
It
It

must
must
must
must

be based upon substantial distinctions;

be germane to the purposes of the law;
not be limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial
differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle
is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with
the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only
for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to
exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

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The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to
the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in
the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign
rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet
for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at
the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected VicePresidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat
them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us
say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and
can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be
driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for
the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from
the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should
be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second

proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and

argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasijudicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because
it was validly created for laudable purposes.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of
the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.

ISSUE: WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

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HELD: Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.

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WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is

hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Garcia vs. Hon. Drilon
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before
the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition
is filed.
Issue: WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

Held: RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court
ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial

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distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.