Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Operation Kutuzov was a major military oensive operation conducted in July of 1943 by the Red Army
against Army Group Center of the German Wehrmacht.
The operation was named after General Mikhail Kutuzov, the Russian general credited with saving Russia from
Napoleon during the French invasion of Russia in 1812.
Operation Kutuzov was one of two major Soviet operations launched as counteroensives against Operation
Citadel. The Operation began on 12 July and ended on
18 August 1943 with the capture of Orel and collapse of
the Orel bulge.
Orel salient, cut behind the 9th Army engaged in oensive operations at Kursk, encircle and annihilate it. In
doing so they hoped to cause a general collapse of the
German forces in the Soviet Union. The attack was to
begin once the German panzer units engaged in Operation Citadele were locked into combat and weakened
from the defenses at Kursk. The initial attack was to be
made simultaneously on the northern and eastern faces of
the Orel salient, with the Central Front along the southern face of the salient joining in as well once the German
oensive had been stopped.
German intelligence had revealed the Soviet forces massing opposite the 2nd Panzer Army, and these had caused
1 Background
great concern on the part of von Kluge and Model. The
Soviet armies earmarked for the operation had amassed a
supAs the end of the rasputitsa or rainy season approached, force of 1,286,000 men and 2,400 tanks. These were
[14][15]
ported
by
26,400
artillery
guns
and
3,000
aircraft.
the Soviet command considered their next step to bring
the war to a successful conclusion. Stalin strongly desired
to seize the initiative and attack the German forces, but
was convinced by his senior commanders to take an initial defensive posture and allow the Germans to weaken
themselves in attacking prepared positions. After this the
Soviet forces would go over onto the oensive.[10] Operation Kutusov was the oensive plan for the Soviet forces
before Moscow facing the German forces of Army Group
Center. It was carried out by three Soviet Fronts or army
groups: the Western Front, the Bryansk Front, and the
Central Front. Their oensive was directed north of the
Kursk area against the German 2nd Panzer Army, with
the intention of cutting behind and entraping the German
9th Army then conducting oensive operations against
the Kursk salient.[11]
Map of Operation Kutuzov
The Germans had spread their forces thin all across the
front in an eort to provide as much men and material as possible for Operation Citadel. Holding the front
before the Soviet oensive were the 2nd Panzer Army
and elements of the 9th Army. The region had been
held by German forces for nearly two years, and despite
Hitlers admonition not to build defensive works behind
the front, some preparations had been made. A defensive
line had been started that was 5 to 7 km in depth, consisting of mineelds, interconnected trench works, and
strong points. Wherever possible, the Germans took advantage of terrain features such as streams, ravines and
gullies. However the positions were thinly held.[12]
The Soviet high command planned two major oensive 2 Oensive begins
operations as part of a large general oensive throughout
the eastern front.[13] Operation Kutuzov was the north- On 12 July a heavy artillery barrage marked the launching
ern oensive, with its major goals being to collapse the of the oensive. The armies of two Fronts, the Bryansk
1
2 OFFENSIVE BEGINS
Front and the Western Front attacked along the north and
northeast anks of the 2nd Panzer Army. The Western
Front assault was led by the 11th Guards Army under
Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan, supported by
the 1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Russians attacked with
overwhelming numbers. Along one 16 kilometer attack
sector near Ulianovo, six Soviet rie divisions attacked
two German infantry regiments. At 5 to 7 kilometers in
depth, the German defensive lines were deeper than the
Soviets expected. The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy
casualties but pushed through, and in some areas achieved
signicant penetration.[17][18] The defenders were overwhelmed by the afternoon of the rst day, with the 11th
Guards Army advancing some 23 kilometers. The German 5th Panzer Division attempted to ll the breach, but
they were met by the Russian supporting armour and were
forced back.
supported by 2,409 tanks and 26,379 guns.[19] The Soviets broadened the oensive, adding supporting attacks by
the 50th Army to the north of the 11th Guards Army. Between the 50th Army and the Bryansk Front was a thrust
by the 20th Tank Corps aimed at Bolkov, along with a
push by the Central Front on the south face. To increase
the momentum of the attack the Soviets now committed the 3rd Guards Tank Army and 4th Tank Army from
the reserves. The 3rd Guards drove straight for Orel, attempting to develop the eastern attack, while the 4th Tank
drove from the north along the wider breach made by 11th
Guards Army. In doing so they threatened to trap the
German forces defending the east face of the Orel salient.
Meanwhile, German defensive eorts were hampered by
partisan attacks to their communications and rail supply
lines.
gaged in Operation Kutuzov numbered 1,286,049 men With their position untenable, the Germans were forced
4 Aftermath
Soviet soldiers follow T-34s near Briansk
The battle was the bloodiest of the three major operations during the Battle of Kursk. Overall German losses
suered during the battle were 86,064 men KIA, MIA
or WIA.[22] Casualties for the Red Army were 112,529
men killed, with a further 317,361 wounded.[23] Tank
and assault gun losses for the Red Army were particularly high, with 2,586 vehicles destroyed or damaged during Kutuzov.[9] German tank losses are not available for
this battle, but Army Group Center is known to have lost
343 armoured ghting vehicles during both Citadel and
Kutuzov.[22]
Bibliography
Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second World War.
New York: Back Bay Books. ISBN 978-0-31602374-0.
Bergstrm, Christer Kursk - The Air Battle: July
1943. Chervron/Ian Allen 2007. ISBN 978-1903223-88-8.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz (Ed.) Das Deutsche Reich
und der Zweite Weltkrieg - Vol. 8: Karl-Heinz
Frieser, Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schnherr, Gerhard
Schreiber, Kristin Ungvry, Bernd Wegner: Die Ostfront 1943/44 - Der Krieg im Osten und an den
Nebenfronten, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Mnchen,
2007; ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 (German)
Glantz, David. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. Routledge, 1989. ISBN
REFERENCES
Glantz, David and Jonathon House When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
Lawrence, Kan: University of Kansas Press 1995.
ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7
Krivosheev, Grigoriy Soviet Casualties and Combat
Losses in the Twentieth Century London, Greenhill
Books 1997 ISBN 1-85367-280-7
Nipe, George. Blood, steel, & myth : the II. SSPanzer-Korps and the road to Prochorowka, July
1943 Southbury, Conn: Newbury, 2011. ISBN
Willmott, H.P. and Robin Cross, Charles Messenger
et al. World War II. New York, NY: DK Publishers,
2004. ISBN
6.1
Text
6.2
Images
6.3
Content license