STATUTORY CASES Case Title:

G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966) Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico
Palomar in his capacity as The Postmaster General
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General EnricoPalomar, parying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest notto be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering
respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mailsto bring the contest to the
attention of the public. In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest?which calls for participants to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at eachCaltex station will dispense
during a specified period.? The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivres?. There is neither a fee or consideration required nor
a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon request at each
Caltex station andthere is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may
be deposited.Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about
the contest, thus, Caltex sentrepresentatives to the postal authorities for advance
clearing for the use of mails for the contest.However, the postal authorities denied
their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983of the Revised
Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibitsthe
use of mail in conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as
lottery,gift enterprise, or similar scheme.Caltex sought for a reconsideration
and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the
contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even
threatenedCaltex that if the contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to
be issued against it(Caltex) and all its representatives?. This leads to Caltexs
filing of this petition for declaratoryrelief.The court ruled that the petitioner
does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has noright to bar the public
distribution or said rules by the mails?. The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief? b) Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? violates
the Postal Law?
3) Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action
for declaratory relief, and that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in
the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal
Law. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on
Section 1Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should
be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy1. The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse- The party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy2. The issue is ripe for judicial determination*
3. The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous distribution of
property by chance?.
It does not qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be
deemed as a lottery must constitute a
(1) prize,
(2) chance,
and (3) consideration.
The participants are not required to do anything or purchase anything from
Caltex in order to participate in the contest. The true test for having consideration
is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not
whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for
the distribution of the prize.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1
concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the
firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3
May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor
practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May

1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the
officers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The union filed
a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the
incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of
First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition forcertiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in
a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be
conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts
and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue
should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since
(1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;
since
(2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims
of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the
labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the
ordinary courts, and since
(3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims
for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied
the way it is worded.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly.
It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial
court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him
by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that
accompanied a strike. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and
nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted
the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his
behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on
the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It
also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982

Digest: People v. Mapa (GR L-22301, 30 August 1967)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas,digests
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise
Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to
possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano
Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was
elevated tothe Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor
is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms
and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors
or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law;
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any
clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent. Reliance in the decision in
People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority
to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in
Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption
that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within
the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the
conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Digest: # Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR L-34568, 28 March

1988)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas,digests

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second Division, Padilla (p): 4
concurring
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted
by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to
the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on
1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article
335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
Issue:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating
the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil
Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil
Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus
mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with
an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction.
In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and
affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special
Proceedings 37), without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras v. COMELECG.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996Ponente: Justice Francisco

Facts: Petitioner is the incumbent barangay captain of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. A recall election was set, against
which petitioner filed a petition. Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of LGC, which states
that
no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election
, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is
now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic
Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May1996, and every three years thereafter.
Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, henceno

recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the
recall election. We do not agree.
Issue: Whether or not an SK election is a regular election. Held: No. A statutes
provisions must be considered with the other parts and must be kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. Paragraph (b) with (a) of LGC74 merely
designates such a period, i.e. 2nd year of term. Considering the SK election as
regular will unduly circumscribe the LGC provision on recall. No recall election
can be conducted if that is the case (May 1996, every three years). It is assumed
that legislature intended to enact an effective law, and interpretation should give
effect to the intent, with the whole statute. It is likewise a basic
precepti n s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t a s t a t u t e s h o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e
d in harmony with the Constitution.
[7]
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum x x x. An interpretation too literal that the spirit is
denied will fall in former of the latter.
Aisporna v. CA of People, 113SCRA459
AISPORNA VS CA
Facts
Mapalad Aisporna was accused of acting as an agent in soliciting insurance without
securing the certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission in violation of section
189 of the Insurance Act. Mapalad contended that being the wife of a true agent, Rodolfo,
she naturally helped him in his work. She said the policy issued to Isidro, a client, was
merely a renewal at the time when her husband was absent.
Issue
Was Mapalad an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act?
Held
No. The first paragraph of section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent
or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; the
second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section;
and the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,

but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole