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PEDRO PACIS, in his capacity as
Acting Collector of Customs, Port of
Manila,
the
Flag
Officer-inCommand
and
the
Base
Commander of Cavite Naval Base,
Philippine
Navy, petitioners, vs. HON.
ALBERTO V. AVERIA, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite,
PROCESO
P.
SILANGCRUZ,
Provincial Sheriff at Trece Martires
City
and
EUSEBIO
MARGES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CERTIORARI; COURT CONFINED TO
QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN
CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS; FUNCTION
OF WRIT. In a certiorari proceeding, the
court is confined to questions of jurisdiction.
(Tuason vs. Concepcion, 54 Phil., 408.) The
reason is that the function of the writ of
certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its
jurisdiction. (Brillo vs. Buklatan, 87 Phil.,
519.) It is available for such purpose and not
to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge's findings or conclusion. (Regala vs.
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 77 Phil.,
684; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78 Phil., 785;
Icutamin vs. Hernandez, 81 Phil. 161;
Verhomal vs. Tan, 88 Phil., 389; Association
of Beverages Employees vs. Figueras, 91
Phil., 450; Matute vs. Macadaeg, 99 Phil.,
340.)
2. TARIFF AND
CUSTOMS
LAWS;
SEIZURE
AND
FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS;
JURISDICTION
OF
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS. When the
original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance under Section 44(c) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act
3828, tends to encroach upon and to render
futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings,
the Court of First Instance should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs,
because the jurisdiction of the latter is
provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took
effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the
Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a
later law prevails over a prior statute. (Herman
vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 50
Phil. 490; Pampanga Sugar Mills vs. Trinidad,
279, U.S. 211, 73 L. ed. 665.) Moreover, it is
reasonable to conclude that the legislators
intended to divest the Court of First Instance
of the prerogative to replevin a property which
is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture
proceedings for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for
forfeiture of property for violation of customs
laws could easily be undermined by the simple
device of replevin. Furthermore, Section 2303
of the Tariff and Customs Code which requires
the Collector of Customs to give to the owner
of the property sought to be forfeited written
notice of the seizure and to give him the
opportunity to be heard in his defenses, clearly
indicates the intention of the law to confine in
the Bureau of Customs the determination of
all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture
case. The judicial recourse of the property
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
The success of the law enforcement agencies
in curbing smuggling depends to some extent
upon the cooperation of the other branches of
the Government. Remove such cooperation
and the campaign against smuggling is
doomed, as concretely demonstrated in this
case.
On December 26, 1963 Coast Guard Cutter
115 of the Philippine Navy pursued a fishing
boat bearing the name of M/B "Bukang
Liwayway" off Ternate, Cavite. During the
chase the fishing boat fired upon the navy
cutter thus wounding two Philippine Navy
sailors. Said fishing boat was boarded and
found loaded with untaxed foreign made
cigarettes, to wit:
495 cases Union
cigarettes
1,385 cartons Union
cigarettes
3,197 packs Union
cigarettes
88 cases Chesterfield
cigarettes
498 carton Chesterfield
cigarettes
87 cases Salem
cigarettes
799 cartons Salem
cigarettes
50 cartons Winston
cigarettes
undersigned of whatever
progress your command has
made on the subject matter in
view of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued
by the Honorable Court."
(5) On September 11 and 16, 1964 respondent
Sheriff telegrammed the PC Provincial
Commanders of Batangas, Palawan, Mindoro
and Butuan requesting their help to locate the
M/B "Bukang Liwayway" but he has not
received any answer thereto.
Treating the motion of the Solicitor General
dated June 3, 1964 as a written charge for
contempt against Provincial Sheriff Proceso P.
Silangcruz and the latter's comment thereto as
his answer, this Court set the contempt
incident for hearing on September 21, 1966.
Only the counsel for Provincial Sheriff
Proceso P. Silangcruz appeared.
Up to now respondent Provincial Sheriff has
not taken custody of the motor boat in
question.
The issues are:
1. Whether or not petitioners
could elevate the case
at bar to this Court on
a
petition
for
certiorari.
2. Whether or not the owner
of M/B "Bukang
Liwayway"
could
recover possession of
the same by way of a
civil
case
replevin; and
with
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J p:
In this petition for review on
certiorari, petitioners spouses Dionisio
Fiestan and Juanita Arconada, owners of a
parcel of land (Lot No. 2-B) situated in
of
DECISION
MARTIN, J p:
The chief question to be decided in this case is
what law shall govern the publication of a tax
ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of
Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409,
as amended), which requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its
approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No.
2. The
principle
of
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies is strongly asserted by
petitioners as having been violated by private
respondent in bringing a direct suit in court.
This is because Section 47 of the Local Tax
Codeprovides that any question or issue raised
against the legality of any tax ordinance, or
portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to
the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a
city. The opinion of the city fiscal is
appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose
decision shall be final and executory unless
contested before a competent court within
thirty (30) days. But, the petition below
plainly shows that the controversy between the
parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of
law: whether it is the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila or the Local Tax Code that
should govern the publication of the tax
ordinance. In other words, the dispute is
sharply focused on the applicability of the
Revised City Charter or the Local Tax
Code on the point at issue, and not on the
legality of the imposition of the tax.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies before
resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule.
It admits of exceptions. Where the question
litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule
does not apply. 11 The principle may also be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It may and
should be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage. 12
3. It is maintained by private respondent that
the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance,"
because the imposition of rentals, permit fees,
tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing
power but a revenue-raising function, so that
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Original petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction to annul and set aside
Civil Aeronautics Board resolutions Nos. 166
(70), 321(70) and 330 (70), fixing temporary
and permanent rate or fare adjustments of
three domestic air carriers, Philippine Air
Lines (PAL), Filipinas Orient Airways (FOA)
and Air Manila, and dismissing petitioner's
objections thereto, based on alleged lack of
jurisdiction.
The issue submitted for Our decision is
whether authority to fix air carrier's rates is
vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
or in the Public Service Commission (PSC).
Petitioner Lechoco contends that by the
enactment of Republic Act No. 2677 (on 18
June 1960) amending sections 13(a) and 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146 (the original PSC
Act), jurisdiction to control rates of airships
was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics
Board and revested in the PSC, since Republic
"The
grantee
shall
fix
just,
reasonable and uniform
rates
for
the
transportation
of
passengers and freight,
subject
to
the
supervision
and
approval of the Public
Service
Commission. . ."
The following year the PSC was reorganized
by Commonwealth Act No. 146, enacted 7
November 1936. Section 13 thereof granted
PSC "general supervision and regulation of,
jurisdiction and control over, all public
services . . ." except as otherwise provided.
The same section, however, contained the
following reservation:
". . . Provided
further, That
the
Commission shall not
exercise any control or
supervision
over
aircraft
in
the
Philippines, except with
regard to the fixing of
maximum
passenger
and freight rates . . ."
In the aftermath of World War II the
Legislature of the independent Republic of the
Philippines passed Republic Act No. 51, on 4
October 1946, authorizing the Chief Executive
to reorganize within one year the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies and other instrumentalities of the
government, including corporations owned or
"SEC.
10. Powers and duties
of the Board. (A)
Except as otherwise
provided herein, the
Board shall have the
power to regulate the
economic aspect of air
transportation, and shall
have
the
general
supervision
and
regulation
of,
and
jurisdiction and control
over, air carriers as well
as
their
property,
property
rights,
equipment,
facilities,
and franchise, in so far
as may be necessary for
the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of
this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
'(C) The
Board shall have
the
following
specific
powers and duties:
'(2) To fix and
determine reasonable
individual, joint, or
special rates, charges or
fares which an air
carrier
may
demand, collect
or
receive for any service
in connection with air
commerce. The Board
freight
and
passengers." (Italics
supplied)
Contrary to the views of petitioner Lechoco,
there is nothing in Republic Act 2677 that
expressly repeals Republic Act No. 776. While
section 3 of Republic Act 2677 provides that
"All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed", the
fact is that the derogation was thereby made
dependent upon actual inconsistency with
previous laws. This is the very foundation of
the rule of implied repeal. However, there is
nothing in Act 2677 that evidences an intent
on the part of the Legislature to set aside the
carefully detailed regulation of civil air
transport as set forth in Act 776. Said Act in
itself constitutes a recognition of the need of
entrusting regulation, supervision and control
of civil aviation to a specialized body.
We find no irreconcilable inconsistency
between section 14 of the Public Service Act,
as amended by Republic Act 2677, and section
10 (c) (2) of the prior Republic Act 776, above
quoted, except for the fact that power over
rates to be charged by air carriers on
passengers and freight are vested in different
entities, the CAB and the PSC. Even that will
result in no more than a concurrent jurisdiction
in both supervisory entities, and not in the
divesting of the power of one in favor of the
other.
The absence of intent to repeal Republic Act
No. 776 by the enactment of Act 2677 is also
evidenced by the explanatory note to House
Bill 4030 (that later became Act 2677). It
expressly stated the desire to broaden the
1. CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE;
WHO MAY INITIATE CRIMINAL
CASES. Since the only officer
authorized by the Charter of the City of
Bacolod to initiate criminal cases in the
courts thereof is its City Attorney, the
Municipal Court may not entertain a
complaint filed directly with it by the
offended party.
2. STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION
OF REENACTED STATUTES.
Considering that the Charter of the City of
Bacolod merely incorporates therein the
pertinent provisions of the Charter of the
City of Manila, it may be presumed that
the Legislature intended to adopt also the
settled interpretation already given to the
latter by the judicial department.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
The question involved in this case
is one purely of law.
On June 13, 1953, respondent Jose
F. Benares filed, with the Municipal Court
of the City of Bacolod, a criminal
complaint, which was docketed as Case
No. 2864 of said court, against petitioners
herein, Alfredo Montelibano, Pastor
Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre and Jose
Articulo, charging them with the crime of
amount of
P13,000.00."
more
than
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J p:
In G.R. No. 72138, the spouses Felicidad M.
Alvendia and Jesus F. Alvendia filed an urgent
motion for extension of time to file an appeal
by certiorari from the denial of their motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the then
Intermediate
Appellate
Court
(IAC)
dismissing their petition docketed therein as
AC-G.R. No. SP-04423, entitled "Alvendia, et
al. v. Telan, etc., et al."
In G.R. No. 72373, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed by Bonifacio Bonamy,
seeking to annul and set aside: [a] Resolution
II dated September 11, 1985 granting the
motion filed by the spouses Alvendia to pay
Bonifacio Bonamy the amount of the
judgment in cash, and [b] Resolution I dated
October 8, 1985 denying Bonamy's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution
both issued by the Fourth Special Cases
Division in said AC-G.R. No. SP-04423.
Although no appeal was ever filed in G.R.
No. 72138, the same was ordered consolidated
with G.R. No. 72373 in the resolution of
February 3, 1986 of the First Division of this
Court.
The instant petitions trace their genesis to a
simple collection suit, Civil Case No. 5182-
corporation to members of
the GSIS provided, however,
that
the
P47,000.00
previously assigned to Wells
and Pu shall be first satisfied
before applying such GSIS
release to satisfaction of said
indebtedness to the herein
plaintiff;
"(2) That the plaintiff and
defendants shall thereby join
hands in asking the GSIS to
expedite the releases of the
funds due to said corporation;
and
"(3) That
for
and
in
consideration
of
this
agreement the plaintiff and
defendants hereby waive any
and all further claims
monetary
or
otherwise
against each other regarding
the subject matter of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx" 2
On the same date, the trial court, finding the
aforesaid compromise agreement not to be
contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public
policy and public order, approved and adopted
the same as the decision in the case. 3
Subsequently, Bonamy moved for execution
of judgment, alleging that the Alvendias "have
not submitted any finished project with the
GSIS, thereby preventing the full realization
of the aforesaid decision." 4
"Thirdly,
the
writ
of
execution could properly levy
on the properties of the
Alvendias because their debt
had already matured and
remained unpaid despite
demands. The judgment does
not have to indicate what
specific properties should be
levied upon.
"Fourthly, there could be no
execution against the family
corporation because it was
not a party to the case, was
not a party or signatory to the
compromise
agreement.
Neither was it represented by
the Alvendias.
"Fifthly, the issuance of the
writs was not premature.
There is nothing in the
compromise
agreement
which says that the release of
the GSIS loan was a
condition precedent to the
payment of the debt. True
there was an indication by the
Alvendias as to where they
would obtain the needed
financing, but this did not
make the obtaining of the
same a suspensive condition
which would give rise to the
creation of their obligation.
The obligation to pay was
admittedly there even
before any reference to the
GSIS. Had they desired to
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
2.STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION;
SPECIFIC PROVISION OF LAW PREVAILS
OVER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE.
Between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in
this jurisdiction.
3.OBLIGATIONS
AND
CONTRACTS;
ARTICLE 2154 OF THE CIVIL CODE;
REQUISITES TO ITS APPLICATION.
For Article 2154 of the Civil Code to apply the
following requisites must concur: (1) that he
who paid was not under obligation to do so;
and (2) that payment was made by reason of
an essential mistake of fact.
The Administrative
Code of
1987
characterizes the Career Service as: "(1) Open
Career positions for appointment to which
prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required; (2) Closed Career
positions which are scientific, or highly
technical in nature; these include the faculty
and academic staff of state colleges and
universities, and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions
which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career
Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and
trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No.
6683 was approved on 2 December 1988
providing for benefits for early retirement and
voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation
due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
with
pension
under R.A. No. 186,
as amended by R.A.
No. 6680 or P.D. No.
1146, as amended, or
vice-versa.
d) Officials
and employees who
retired
voluntarily
prior to the enactment
of this law and have
received
the
corresponding
benefits
of
that
retirement/separation.
dctai
e) Officials
and employees with
pending
cases
punishable
by
mandatory separation
from the service under
existing civil service
laws,
rules
and
regulations; provided
that if such officials
and employees apply
in writing within the
prescriptive period for
the availment of the
benefits
herein
authorized, shall be
allowed
only
if
acquitted or cleared of
all charges and their
application accepted
and approved by the
head
of
concerned.'
office
Based
on
the
above
exclusions, herein petitioner
does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to
all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil
Service Commission. She
held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a
position which belongs to the
Administrative Service. . . . If
casuals
and
emergency
employees were given the
benefit of R.A. 6683 with
more reason that this
petitioner who was holding a
permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A and has rendered
almost 15 years of faithful,
continuous service in the
government
should
be
similarly rewarded by the
beneficient (sic) purpose of
the law." 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission
reiterate in their comment petitioner's
exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act
No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminus with
the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of
NIA (the service record was issued by the
Watershed Management and Erosion Control
Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva
1987
type of
non-career
went to NIA-W.M.E.C.P.
(Watershed Management &
Erosion Control Project)
retaining
the
status
of temporary employee.
While with this project, her
designation was changed to
personnel assistant on 5
November 1981, starting 9
July
1982,
the
status
became permanent until the
completion of the project on
31 December 1988. The
appointment
paper 12 attached to the
OSG's comment lists her
status as co-terminus with the
Project."
The employment status of personnel hired
under foreign assisted projects is
considered co-terminous, that is, they are
considered employees for the duration of the
project or until the completion or cessation of
said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No.
39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and
benefits regular, temporary, casual and emerg
ency employees who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April
1987, provides:
"WHEREAS,
pursuant
to Executive
Order
No.
966 dated June 22, 1984, the
Civil Service Commission is
including government-owned
or controlled corporations, as
well as the personnel of all
local government units. The
benefits authorized under this
Act
shall
apply
to
all regular, temporary, casua
l, emergency and contractual
employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive
years government service as
of the date of separation. The
term 'contractual employees'
as used in this Act does not
include
experts
and
consultants hired by agencies
for a limited period to
perform specific activities or
services
with
definite
expected output.
"Uniformed personnel of the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines, including those
of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this
Act." (emphasis supplied).
The objective of the Early Retirement or
Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the
bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are
deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
retirement of their occupants. Will the
inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the
petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case,
upon termination of the project and separation
of the project personnel from the service, the
term of employment is considered expired, the
officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the legality of the additional
one-half percent (1/2%) realty tax imposed by
the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of
Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took
effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the annual realty
tax at one and one-half percent (1-1/2%). prLL
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447,
which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed
DECISION
REGALA, J p:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from
the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against
the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the
case and of the facts, as recited in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate.
The same is, consequently, here adopted, to
wit:
"In an information filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of
provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of
being deprived of his office
and being disqualified to hold
any public office whatsoever
for a term of 5 years:
Provided, however, that the
foregoing provisions shall not
be construed to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of
the right to vote at any
election. (Enacted January 9,
1907; Took effect on January
15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise
provided:
". . . No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace,
provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of
Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of
the Bureau of Education shall
aid any candidate or influence
in any manner or take part in
any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election. Any
person
violating
the
provisions of this section
shall be deprived of his office
or employment and shall be
disqualified to hold any
public office or employment
whatever for a term of 5
years. Provided, however,
that the foregoing provisions
Philippine Constabulary or of
the
police
of
any
municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau or
the classified civil service,
who aids any candidate or
violated in any manner the
provisions of this section or
takes part in any election
otherwise by exercising the
right to vote, shall be
punished by a fine of not less
than P100.00 nor more than
P2,000.00,
or
by
imprisonment for not less
than 2 months nor more than
2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public
office and deprivation of the
right of suffrage for a period
of 5 years." (Approved,
December
3,
1927.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act
No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This
law provided in Section 48:
"SEC. 48. Active intervention
of public officers and
employees. No justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the
Army, the Constabulary of
the National, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and
no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid
any candidate, nor exert
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.
No. CR-05409 1 granting private respondent's
motion for execution pending appeal and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding
writ of execution on the counterbond to lift
attachment filed by petitioner. The focal issue
that emerges is whether an order of execution
pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced
on the said bond. In the Resolution of
EXECUTED at Manila,
Philippines, this 28th day of
June, 1984." 12
SEC.
12. Discharge
of
attachment
upon
giving
counterbond. At any time
after an order of attachment
has been granted, the party
whose property has been
attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may,
upon reasonable notice to the
applicant, apply to the judge
who granted the order, or to
the judge of the court in
which the action is pending,
for an order discharging the
attachment wholly or in part
on the security given. The
judge shall, after hearing,
order the discharge of the
attachment if a cash deposit is
made, or a counter-bond
executed to the attaching
creditor is filed, on behalf of
the adverse party, with the
clerk or judge of the court
where the application is
made, in an amount equal to
the value of the property
attached as determined by the
judge, to secure the payment
of any judgment that the
attaching
creditor
may
v.
Ororama
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution dated April
28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner
Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner
withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065
dated November 3, 1993 and February 13,
1994 respectively, the COMELEC
imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to
file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated
February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied
the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M. R. Nos. 932654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner
went
COMELEC En Banc (UND
to
No.
the
94-
Section
14
of R.A.
No.
7166 entitled "An Act Providing for
Synchronized
National
and
Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefore, and
for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
"Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures: Effect of
Failure to File Statement.
Every candidate and treasurer
of the political party shall,
within thirty (30) days after
the day of the election, file in
duplicate with the offices of
the Commission the full, true
and itemized statement of all
contributions
and
expenditures in connection
with the election.
"No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until
he has filed the statement of
contributions
and
expenditures herein required.
"The same prohibition shall
apply if the political party
which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the
statement required herein
statements of contributions
and expenditures.
"Except
candidates
for
elective barangay office,
failure to file the statements
or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and
expenditures as required
herein shall constitute an
administrative offense for
which the offenders shall be
liable
to
pay
an
administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00)
to
Thirty
Thousand
Pesos
(P30,000.00),
in
the
discretion
of
the
Commission.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
JUDGE
ANTONIO
C.
DECISION
wound,
right
MENDOZA, J p:
Homicide as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the
will of the accused, that is by
timely medical attendance
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO and in
violation of Article 249 in
relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
After trial he was found guilty and sentenced
to one year of prision correccional in its
minimum period and ordered to pay to the
offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense,
without subsidiary imprisonment, and the
costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
private respondent's conviction but modified
his sentence by imposing on him an
indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional, as maximum. 1
On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge
Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the
case for repromulgation on January 4, 1993.
On December 28, 1992, private respondent
filed a petition for probation, 2 alleging that
(1) he possessed all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for probation
under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court
of Appeals had in fact reduced the penalty
imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its
CECILIO
S.
DE
VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB
B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
LORAYES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL
LAW;
JURISDICTION;
DEFINED. Jurisdiction is the power with
which courts are invested for administering
justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases
(Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157
SCRA 147 [1988]).
2. ID.;
ID.;
CLASSIFICATION.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision * of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1,
1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled
"Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag,
etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes", dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by
the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
"On October 5, 1987,
petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa
was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial
Region (Makati, Branch 145)
with
violation
of Batas
Pambansa
Bilang
22,
allegedly
committed
as
follows:
'That on or
about the 3rd day of
April 1987, in the
municipality
of
Makati,
Metro
Manila, Philippines
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make
Pambansa, February
7, 1979, p. 1376, cited
in Makati RTC Judge
(now Manila City
Fiscal)
Jesus
F.
Guerrero's
The
Ramifications of the
Law on Bouncing
Checks,
p.
5).'"
(Rollo, Annex "A",
Decision, pp. 20-22)
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the
nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19,
1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he
contended:
"(a) That since the questioned
check was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner
with
a
foreign
bank,
respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the same or
with accounts outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 could
have
not
contemplated
extending its coverage over
dollar accounts;
"(b) That assuming that the
subject check was issued in
connection with a private
transaction
between
petitioner
and
private
respondent, the payment
could not be legally paid in
dollars
as
it
would
"(c) That
the
obligation
arising from the issuance of
the questioned check is null
and void and is not
enforceable
within
the
Philippines either in a civil or
criminal suit. Upon such
premises,
petitioner
concludes that the dishonor
of the questioned check
cannot be said to have
violated
the
provisions
of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22." (Rollo, Annex "A",
Decision, p. 22).
DECISION
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J p:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines,
Inc., is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws engaged in the
manufacture of toilet preparations and
household remedies. On several occasions, it
imported from abroad various materials such
as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate,
sodium saccharinate, precipitated calcium
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
PROSECUTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
FOR
VIOLATION
OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,
OTHERWISE
KNOWN
AS ANTI-GRAFT
AND
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 1379, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR
THE
FORFEITURE
OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED
PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that
following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v.
Pea the Board, being a creation and/or
extension of the PCGG, is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On
the second issue, petitioner strongly argues
that the private respondent's case falls within
the jurisdiction of the PCGG.
The pivotal issue is the second one. On this
point, private respondent's position is as
follows:
1. . . . he is not one of the
subordinates contemplated in
Executive
Orders
1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the
alleged illegal acts being
imputed to him, that of
alleged amassing wealth
beyond his legal means while
Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are
acts of his own alone, not
connected with his being a
crony, business associate, etc.
financial institutions,
or by taking undue
advantage of their
office,
authority,
influence, connections
or
relationship,
resulting in their
unjust enrichment and
causing grave damage
and prejudice to the
Filipino people and
the Republic of the
Philippines";
b) otherwise
stated, that "there are
assets and properties
pertaining to former
President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, and/or his
wife Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos,
their close relatives,
subordinates, business
associates, dummies,
agents or nominees
which had been or
were acquired by
them
directly
or
indirectly, through or
as a result of the
improper or illegal
use of funds or
properties owned by
the Government of the
Philippines or any of
its
branches,
instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or
c) that "said
assets and properties
are in the form of
bank
accounts,
deposits,
trust
accounts, shares of
stocks,
buildings,
shopping
centers,
condominiums,
mansions, residences,
estates, and other
kinds of real and
personal properties in
the Philippines and in
various countries of
the world;" and.
2) that certain "business
enterprises and properties
(were) taken over by the
government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities
or persons close to former
President
Marcos."
[Footnotes deleted].
amended,
and Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
195 violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
7. The Court hastens to add that this decision
is without prejudice to the prosecution of
private respondent under the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
other related penal laws.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge
dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No.
57092. The temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE
PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED
from proceeding with the investigation and
prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No.
37, without prejudice to his investigation and
prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory
agency.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Migrino, G.R. No. 89483,
[August 30, 1990], 267 PHIL 337-352)
[G.R. Nos. L-48886-88. July 21, 1993.]
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF TAX APPEALS and LITONJUA
SHIPPING COMPANY represented
by Granexport Corporation as subagent, respondent.
SYLLABUS
5. ID.;
ID.;
BERTHING
FEES;
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL
PORTS AND MUNICIPAL PORTS. It is to
be stressed that there are differences between
national ports and municipal ports, namely: (1)
the maintenance of municipal ports is borne by
the municipality, whereas that of the national
ports is shouldered by the national
government; (2) municipal ports are created
by executive order, while national ports are
usually created by legislation; (3) berthing
fees are not collected by the government from
vessels berthing at municipal ports, while such
berthing fees are collected by the government
from vessels moored at national ports. The
berthing fees imposed upon vessels berthing at
national ports are applied by the national
government for the maintenance and repair of
said ports. The national government does not
maintain municipal ports which are solely
maintained by the municipalities or private
entities which constructed them, as in the case
at bar.
DECISION
MELO, J p:
This refers to a petition for review of the
decision dated July 28, 1978 of the Court of
Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Cases No. 2785, 2831
and 2832 which was promulgated prior to the
issuance on February 27, 1991, of Circular
No. 1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final
order or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
shall be to the Court of Appeals. LexLib
by
the
without
any
ports. LLphil
municipal
Customs Memorandum
Circular No. 47-73)
Plainly, therefore, the port of Kiwalan is not a
national port. However, petitioner maintains
that regardless of whether or not the port of
Kiwalan is a national port, berthing charges
may still be collected by the Bureau of
Customs from vessels berthing at said port,
citing the case of Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals and
Commissioner of Customs (18 SCRA 436
[1966]), where it was held:
Adverting to the terms of the
law, it is quite apparent that
the government's right to
collect berthing charges is not
planted upon the condition
that the pier be publicly
owned. The statute employs
the word pier without
more. Nothing there said
speaks
of private or public pier.
Where the law does not exact
the nature of ownership as a
condition, that condition
should not be read into the
law. We are not to indulge in
statutory
construction.
Because the law is clear. Our
plain duty is to apply the law
as it is written. So applying,
we rule that berthing or
mooring charges here were
properly collected. (at pp.
438-439.) LexLib
SO ORDERED.
||| (Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, G.R.
Nos. L-48886-88, [July 21, 1993])
[G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993.]
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA,
Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR.
ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS,
Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA
N.
LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. SECRETAR
Y JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and
NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION,
represented by RAOULITO
GAYUTIN, respondents.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order,
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the
Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7,
1992, directing the preventive suspension of
petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of
Hospital III; Isabelo C. Baez, Jr.,
Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey
Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of
Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and
The
Ombudsman or his Deputy
When
the Constitution vested
on
the
Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees
(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a
punitive measure. All the words associated
with the word "suspension" in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases,
e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under
the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense
as the other words with which it is associated.
Where a particular word is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with
which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez
Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.)
Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
P.
OF
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the Decision of respondent Appellate Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV,
convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant)
of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis
of the Stipulation of Facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense
during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
"a) That this Court has
jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter of this
case;
"b) That the accused was an
agent
of
the
Towers
Assurance Corporation on or
before January 21, 1981;
"c) That on January 21, 1981,
the accused issued and made
out check No. 26741, dated
No
agreement
or
admission made or entered
during
the
pre-trial
conference shall be used in
evidence against
the
accused unless reduced to
writing and signed by him
and his counsel." (Rule 118)
[Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory.
Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded
as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94
The
constitutional prohibition against bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws applies only
to statutes.
2.HABEAS
CORPUS;
SUSPENSION
THEREOF;
PROCLAMATION NO. 210; SEDITION,
NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. The stay
of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, ordered in Proclamation No. 210,
DECISION
BENGZON, J p:
The purpose of this appeal from the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City is
to test the validity of Proclamation No.
210 suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
A few months ago the same
proclamation came up for discussion in
connection with the request for bail of
some
prisoners
charged
with
rebellion. 1 The divided opinion of this
Court did not squarely pass on the validity
of the proclamation; but, assuming it was
obligatory, both sides proceeded to
determine its effect upon the right of such
prisoners to go on bail.
This decision will now consider the
points debated regarding the aforesaid
presidential order.
The facts are few and simple:
About five o'clock in the morning of
October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro
was arrested with others at the Samanillo
Bldg., Manila, by agents of the Military
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, for complicity with a
communistic
organization
in
the
commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrection or sedition. So far as the
record discloses, he is still under arrest in
the custody of respondents. On October
22,
1950,
the
President
issued
Proclamation No. 210 suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On
October 21, 1950, Maximino's father, the
petitioner, submitted this application for a
extend
country;
throughout
the
"WHEREAS,
100
leading members of these
lawless elements have been
apprehended
and
are
presently under detention,
and strong and convincing
evidence has been found in
their possession to show that
they
are
engaged
in
rebellious, seditious and
otherwise subversive acts as
above set forth; and
"WHEREAS, public
safety
requires
that
immediate and effective
action be taken to insure the
peace and security of the
population and to maintain
the
authority
of
the
government;
"NOW,
THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO
QUIRINO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by
article VII, section 10,
paragraph
(2)
of
the
Constitution,
do
hereby
suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus for the
persons presently detained, as
well as all others who may be
hereafter similarly detained
for the crimes of sedition,
insurrection or rebellion, and
all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in
furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection
therewith."
A.t is first argued that the
proclamation is invalid because it
"partakes" of a bill of attainder or an ex
post facto law, and violates
the
constitutional precept that no bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed. The argument is devoid of merit.
The prohibition applies only to statutes. U.
S. vs. Gen. El., 80 Fed. Supp. 989; De Pass
vs. Bidwell, 124 Fed., 615. 1 A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. (16 C. J.
S. p. 902; U. S. vs. Lovett (1946) 328 U.
S. 303). Anyway, if, as we find, the stay of
the writ was ordered in accordance with
the powers expressly vested in the
President by the Constitution, such order
must be deemed an exception to the
general prohibition against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder
supposing there is a conflict between the
prohibition and the suspension.
On the other hand there is no doubt
it was erroneous to include those accused
of sedition among the persons as to whom
suspension of the writ is decreed. Under
the Constitution the only grounds for
suspension of the privilege of the writ are
"invasion, insurrection, rebellion or
imminent danger thereof." Obviously,
however, the inclusion of sedition does not
invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is
immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the
dictator, it is extremely
dangerous; it would be a
sword with which he would
behead us.'
"In defense of the
amendment,
Delegate
Francisco pointed out that it
was intended to make this
part of the bill of rights
conform to that part of the
draft giving the President the
power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus also in the case
of an imminent danger of
invasion or rebellion. When
asked by Delegate Rafols if
the phrase, imminent danger,
might not be struck out from
the corresponding provision
under the executive power
instead, Delegate Francisco
answered:
"'Outright,
it
is
possible to eliminate the
phrase, imminent danger
thereof, in the page I have
mentioned. But I say, going
to the essence and referring
exclusively to the necessity
of including the words, of
imminent danger of one or
the other, I wish to say the
following: that it should not
be necessary that there exists
a rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion in order that habeas
corpus may be suspended. It
should be sufficient that there
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking to review and set aside the May 14,
2003 decision 1 and June 17, 2003
resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 54088, entitled Saturnino de la
Cruz vs. Civil Service Commission. In that
decision, the appellate court set aside CSC
four-year
supervisory
requirement for said position.
On July 20, 1995, then
DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia rendered a decision
finding the protest without
merit.
Apparently
dissatisfied,
Calamba
appealed
the
decision of the DOTC
Secretary to the CSCNCR. HIESTA
Under date of October 17,
1995,
Director
Nelson
Acebedo
of
CSC-NCR
requested ATO Executive
Director Manuel Gilo to
comment on the appeal and to
submit to the CSC-NCR the
documents pertinent thereto.
Since the CSC-NCR received
no action on said request for
comment, the CSC-NCR
again wrote Director Gilo
regarding the matter on May
5, 1997. But to no avail.
On October 14, 1997, for the
last time, the CSC-NCR
reiterated to Director Gilo its
request for comment.
On November 18, 1997, the
CSC-NCR
rendered
its
decision
upholding
the
protest of Calamba and
recalling the approval of
respondents appointment as
Chief
Aviation
Safety
Regulation Officer. Said the
CSC-NCR:
After
an
initial
evaluation of the
protest, we find that
the only issue to be
resolved is whether or
not the protestee
meets the minimum
experience
requirements as of the
date of the protestees
appointment to the
contested
position.
The
contested
position requires four
years
of
work
experience
in
position/s involving
management
per
Qualification
Standards
Manual
prescribed by MC No.
46, s. 1993 and/or
four
years
of
experience
in
planning, organizing,
directing,
coordinating
and
supervising
the
enforcement of air
safety laws, rules and
regulations pertaining
to licensing, rating
and checking of all
airmen and mechanics
as Chief thereof in
November 28, 1994,
up to present, he has
substantially satisfied
the
four
years
experience required
for appointment to the
contested position.
xxx xxx xxx."
In a letter dated January
1998, Calamba requested
CSC to implement
January 5, 1998 ruling of
CSC-NCR.
26,
the
the
the
ing, and
supervisi
ng
the
enforcem
ent of air
safety
laws,
rules,
and
regulatio
ns
pertainin
g
to
licensing
, rating
and
checking
of
all
airmen
and
mechani
cs
and
the
regulatio
n of the
activities
of flying
schools.
License
required:
Airline
Transpor
t
Rating/Fl
ight
Operatio
ns
Officer/
Aircraft
Maintena
nce
Engineer
(A&P)
License/
Flight
Engineer
License
TRAINING: In-service
training
in
manage
ment;
specializ
ed
course in
aircraft
maintena
nce/air
carrier
operation
s/flight
dispatchi
ng/aircra
ft
accident
investiga
tion/equi
pment
qualificat
ion
course/fli
ght
training
(local &
abroad)
ELIGIBILITY: Relevant RA
1080 Car
eer
Service
Prof. 1st
Grade
Relevant
Eligibility for
Second
Level
Position
5
July
15,
Panfilo
V.
Transportation Office
for more than 13
years already and
during such period, he
faithfully
and
efficiently (served in)
four of the five
sections
of
the
Aviation
Safety
Division of which the
position
under
consideration is the
head, thereby gaining
more
varied
experience
and
working knowledge
of the most important
and
sensitive
functions
of
the
Division over other
applicants;
2. The recommendee always
performs his assigned
tasks promptly with
dedication, integrity,
high
sense
of
responsibility
and
professionalism which
he had demonstrated
when he established
and developed the
Airport Crash Rescue
Organization (ACRO)
procedure to various
national airports of
the country, and when
he organized the Air
Transportation Office
(ATO)
Operations
Center which is now
on
a
24-hour
operation and serving
as the nerve center of
this Office;
3. He is a dedicated public
servant and is always
willing to respond to
call of duty even
beyond office hours
like when he is flying
the ATOs aircraft for
navigation aide check
during holidays and
weekends, aside from
conducting checkride
to airmen prior to
issuance of the pilot
license;
4. Capt. dela Cruz is an
outstanding
team
worker as well as a
leader and promotes
enthusiasm among coworkers. He handles
all areas of job with
minimal supervision
and
accomplishes
objectives efficiently.
He accepts stress
situations
and
performs extremely
well. 11
Because of respondents excellent credentials,
DOTC Assistant Secretary for Administrative
and Legal Affairs Wilfredo M. Trinidad, chair
previous
ruling
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for
brevity), through the Solicitor General, seeks
to assert its title, by reversion, to a Free Patent
and derivative titles therefrom, issued in favor
of private respondents. Thus, it prays for the
review and reversal of the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals of 13 August
1987 1 which affirmed, except as to costs
against the Government, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 12, 2 declaring (a) Free Patent No.
326416, issued in favor of Nicolas Felisilda on
14 April 1967 for Lot No. 2198 on Plan Pls209-D-11 situated at Dole Cannery Site,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, (b) Original
ALREADY ON OCTOBER
10, 1962.
2. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT THE POWER OF
THE
DIRECTOR
OF
LANDS TO INVESTIGATE
LAND
CONFLICTS
PERTAINS
ONLY
TO
CONFLICTS
OVER
PUBLIC LANDS, HENCE,
HIS
DECISION,
INCLUDING THAT WHICH
WAS RENDERED BY THE
MINISTRY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, ARE NULL
AND
VOID;
CONSEQUENTLY, AFTER
A FREE PATENT IS
GRANTED, AND THE
CORRESPONDING TITLE
ISSUED,
THE
LAND
CEASES TO BE PART OF
THE
PUBLIC
LAND
DOMAIN AND BECOMES
PRIVATE
PROPERTY
OVER
WHICH
THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
LOSES CONTROL AND
JURISDICTION.
3. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT THE TITLE HAS
ATTAINED THE STATUS
OF IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY
AND INDEFEASIBILITY,
THE PERIOD OF ONE
YEAR
FROM
ITS
REGISTRATION
LONG LAPSED.
HAVING
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal
seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge
of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and
March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent
Judge to decide petitioner's perfected appeal
on the basis of the evidence and records of the
case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan
City plus the memorandum already submitted
by the petitioner and respondents.
Since only questions of law were raised
therein, the Court of Appeals, on October 13,
1972, issued a resolution certifying said case
to this Court pursuant to Section 17, paragraph
(4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of
this case are as follows:
"It appears that private
respondents Tan That and
Ong Pin Tee filed an
ejectment suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6926 in the
City Court of Caloocan City,
against the petitioner. A
decision was rendered by said
Court on November 25, 1970,
which decision was appealed
by the petitioner to the
respondent
Court
and
docketed therein as Civil
Case No. C-2036.
"Courts
of
First
Instance shall decide
such
appealed cases on the basis of
the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or
municipal courts: Provided,
That
the
parties may
submit memoranda
and/or
brief with oral argumentif so
requested. . . . ." (Emphasis
Ours).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no
room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted
otherwise than that the submission of
memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the
parties, the latter may so choose to waive
submission of the memoranda. And as a
logical concomitant of the choice given to the
parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of
the party waiving the submission of said
memorandum. If the appellant so chooses not
to submit the memorandum, the Court of First
Instance is left with no alternative but to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted from the city or
municipal courts. In other words, the Court is
not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal
on the mere failure of an appellant to submit
his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis
of the available evidence and records
transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used
in a statute is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word "shall" is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-
to
the
the
on