UNIVERSITY OF THE VISAYAS

GULLAS LAW SCHOOL

List of Cases
Succession
Dean Teodoro A. Almase
(Third Year - First Semester)
For Preliminary Examination
(4 Weeks = 16 lecture hours)
Possible Examination Date
Case Studies:
Lee vs. RTC Quezon City (423 SCRA 497)
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITYFACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the
Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys
incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr.
Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma.
Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).2On
September 24, 1980, Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon CityBranch (now
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Dr. Ortaez. Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court
appoint as pecial administrator. As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,0293
shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife ), representing
50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock. O n A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e decedents wife,
Julian a S. Ortaez, c l a i m i n g t h a t s h e o w n e d 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal
share in the estate sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan
Assistance Group (FLAG) ,represented by its president , herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez
failed to repurchase
the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated
bypetitioner FLAG in its name. On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his
personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance sharein the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner
FLAG
,represented by its pre sident, herein petitioner Jos e C. Lee. After one year , petition er
FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez
failedto repurchase the same
It appears that several years befor e (but already dur ing the pendency of the int estate
proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children,
Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4,
1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. JuvencioOrtaez, partitioning the estate (including

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the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares
separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15,1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October
30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as priva te respondents Enderes e t a l . ) f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r
a p p o i n t m e n t o f s p e c i a l administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of
private respondents Enderes et al.
and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. On December
20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982.
On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
decedents estate. These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On March 22, 1996,
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void abinitio the deeds of sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock , which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.On
August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator
JoseOrtaez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that: Under the Godoy case, supra, it was
held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the probate court
is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by
Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the
same is not binding upon the Estate
Lorenzo vs. Posadas (64 Phil 353)
FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties.
Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the
CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real
properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named
in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein
was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas)
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment.
Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was
promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and refused
to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas
counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
(e) Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax?
HELD: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both
instances
YES.The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before the
delivery of the decedents property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to
the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the meaning of the first
paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. This contention is well
taken and is sustained. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust

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The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the
testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word trust is not mentioned or used in the will but the
intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust.
The words trust and trustee, though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two
words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created. To constitute a valid testamentary trust
there must be a concurrence of three circumstances:
(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;
(2) a definite subject;
(3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing.
There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his
properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The probate court
certainly exercised sound judgment in appointmening a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will
As the existence of the trust was already proven, it results that the estate which plaintiff represents has
been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and
surcharge provided by law in such cases.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore became trustee. On that
date trust estate vested in him. The interest due should be computed from that date.
NOTES: Other issues:
(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same.
Acording to article 657 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death. In other words, said Arellano, C. J., . . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before
his death.
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place
in any event at the moment of the decedents death. The time when the heirs legally succeed to the
inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive such inheritance. Thomas Hanley
having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the obligation to
pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on inheritance tax is clearly fixed by section
1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of the
same Code. The two sections follow:
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. The following shall not be taxed:
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.
(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or legatee to the trustees.
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in favor of another beneficiary, in accordance with
the desire of the predecessor. xx

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SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. The tax fixed in this article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section, before entrance into possession of the
property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if judicial
testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said period, the payment
shall be made by the executor or administrator before delivering to each beneficiary his share.
The instant case does[not] fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of section 1544 abovequoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the subsection, the tax
should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to Moore as trustee.
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the
testators death, or on its value ten years later?
If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its
being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests
instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedents
death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value
(c) In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to
trustees?
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from this it does not
follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate
subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees commissions to be deducted in
determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax
(d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be
given retroactive effect?
A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enacts, amends, or repeals an
inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a
retroactive effect, . . . . Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions indicating legislative intent to give it
retroactive effect. No such effect can be given the statute by this court.
Vitug vs. CA (183 SCRA 755)
FACTS: Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate.
Rowena Corona was the executrix. Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the probate
court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
alleged advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The advances were used to pay
estate taxes.
Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which formed part
of the conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for
reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall belong to
and be the sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such
survivor.

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The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating
that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the
formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation
between spouses).
ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.
HELD: YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the
testator.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that
the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.
It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also not a
donation between spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own properties to the other.
It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceaseds assets because it is the
separate property of Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property
and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be violative of
the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of creditors or to
defeat the legitime of a forced heir).

Azuela vs. CA (487 SCRA 119)

Will was two pages long. The number of pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a blank
was there.
The will was not properly acknowledged. (Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 Hunyo, dito sa
Manila.)
The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the page.
Held: Invalid will.
Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the attestation clause
establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below
it.
Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to Art 806. Acknowledgement is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.
Moreover, will must be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

Neyra vs. Neyra (76 Phil. 333)

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On June 29, 1957, a petition to probate the alleged last will and testament of Jose J. Javellana, who died on May 24 of the same year, was presented in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Crsiteta Jimenea Vda. de Javellana and Benjamin Javellana, widow and brother respectively of the deceased, alleging that the aforesaid Jose J.
Javellana, at the time of his death, a resident of Ssan Juan Rizal, left porperties with an approximate value of P400,000.00; that he also left a will which was delivered to
the clerk of court pursuant to the Rules of Court; that Oscar Ledesma, therein named executor, had agreed to act as such; that the decedent's next of kin were; the wido.,
Criteta J. Vda. de Javellana, his children Erlinda Javellana, Jose Javellana y Azaola, and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito), his sister Juanito J. de Ledesma, and brother
Benjamin Javellana, whose respective addresses wre given in the petition.
To this petition, Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) filed separate opposiytions, both claiming that the alleged will of Jose J. Javellana deposited by
peittioners with the clerk of court was null and void, the same not having been executed "in accordance with the formalities required by law" and that "the legal
requirements necessary for its validit" had not been complied with.
At the hearing, petitioners introduced as evidence in support of the petition, a copy of the will; certification of the date and cause of death of the testator; proof of
publication of the petition, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, and thre testimonies of Jose G. Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and
Jose Yulo, Jr., the 3 instrumental witnesses to the will, whi, in sustancer, testified that sometime in April, 1956, they were asked to witness the execution of the will of the
late Jose. J. Javellana; that on the said occasion, Jose J. Javellana signed the 4 pages of the will in their presence, and they, in turn, also signed each and evey page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another; and that these acts wetre acknowledge before notary public Fernando Grey, Jr. on the same occasion.
For their part, the oppositor limited their evidence to the presentation of two letters in the Visayan dialect allegedly written by the deceased, the signatures appearing
thereon being identified by Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) and Manuel Azaola, as those of the deceased, for the sole purpose of comparing said signatures woth those
appearing in the will.
On December 10, 1957, the court a quo issued an order allowing the probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to Oscar Ledesma as executor
thereoif, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000.00. From this order, oppositors appealed to this Court charging the lower court of committing error in
allowing oprobate of the will, Exhibit C, on 2 grounds: (1) that the 3 sttesting witnesses failed to clearly and convincingly estabish the due execution of the will; and (2)
that petitioners failed to prove that the will was written in a language known to the testator.
The first basis of oppositor's appeal has no merit. It is true that witnesses, particularly Miss Eloisa Villanueva, apparently found difficulty recalling who arrived first at the
appointed place, or the order of the witnesses' signing the will, or failed to mention by name the persons present at the time of the witnesses was signing the document.
These details, however, are minor and significant and do not enervate their positive testimony that at the execution of the will the testator, the 3 witnesses, the notary
public and Atty. Vicente Hilado were all together in the private office of the latter; that Jose Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the instrumental witnesses,
were unanimous in declaring that they actually saw the testator sign the will as well as each and every page thereof, and they, in turen, affixed their signatures to all of its
4 pages. For the purpose of determining tjhe due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of
the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the document by the dsaid wirtneese. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the
moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they wnated to do so. 1 In fact, in the instant case, at least two witnesses, Yulo and Guevarra, both testified hat
the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each and every one of them.
With respect to the second ground, there is some merit in appellant's contention that the language requirement of the law on wills has not been satisfactorily complied
with in this case. Admittedly, there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is
written. It is true that there is no statutory provision requiring this and that proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde. 2 But here, there is absolutely no such
evidence presented by the petitioners-appellees. Not even the petition for probate contains any allegation to this effect. No reference to it whatsoever is made in the
appealed order.
In some cases, it is true, this lack of evidence was considered cured by presumptioin of knowledge of the language or dialect used in the will, as where the will is
executed in a certain province or locality, in the dialect currently used in such provimnce or locality in which the testator is a native or resident, the presumption arises
that the testator knew the dialect so used, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; 3 or where the will is in Spanish, the fact that the testratrix was a "mestiza
espaola", was married to a Spaniard, made several trips to Spain, and some of her letters in her own handwriting submitted as evidence by the oppositor, are in
Spanish, give rise to the presumption that she knew the language in which the will was written, in the absence of proof to the contrary. 4
In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the contrary, there is evidence that the testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan, Rizal at the
time of his death. The will was executed in the City of Manila. Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the language currently used
either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows, therefore, that no presumption can rise that the testator knew the Spanish Language.
But petitioner-appellees insist in their brief that the burden is on the oppositors to allege and prove that the testator did not know the Spanish language in the face of the
legal presumption that "the law has been obeyed", "that a will executed in the Philippines must be presumed to have been executed in conformity with the laws of the
Philippines".5 and "that things have happened in accordance with the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life", concluding that it woiuld certainly be
contrary to the ordinary habits of life for a person to execute his will in a language unknown to him. This, we believe, is, to use a colloquial term, being the question. If the
argument of counsel is correct, then every unopposed will may be probated upon its mere presentation in court, without need of producing evidence regarding its
execution. Counsel's statement is its own refutation.
We find, in the record stone indicia, although insufficient to give rise to the presumption, that the testator might, in fact, have known the Spanish language. In oppositor's
own Exhibit 3 (a letter admittedly written by the testator) appear the salutation "Querido Primo" and the complimentary ending "Su primo" which are Spanish terms.
Having found that al the formal requisites for the validity of the will have been satisfactorily establishment, except the language requirement, we deem it in the interest of
justice to afford the parties a opportunity to present evidence, if they so desire, on this controverted issue.
Wherefore, let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for furhter proceedings as above indicated, without costs. It is so ordered.

Guerrero vs. Bihis (521 SCRA 394)

The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs witnesses in QC before a
notary public who was commissioned for and in Caloocan City.
Held: Invalid. Notary public was acting outside the place of his commission, and this did not satisfy Art 806. No notary
shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

Vda. de Leynes vs. Leynes (68 Phil. 745)

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Mindoro denying probate of the will of the deceased Valerio Leynez, on the ground that its attestation clause does not conform to the
requirements section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The attestation clause of the will is worded as follows:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a
ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio Leynez . El
testamento consta de los (2) paginas solamente.
The question presented is, under section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure, is this attestation clause legally sufficient? The
pertinent portion of this section of the Code is as follows:
. . . the attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, an the later
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The alleged defect in the attestation clause of the controverted will is that it fails to state that the testator and the three witnesses signed each and
every page of the will in the manner prescribed by law, because it merely states "firmanos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los
demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio Leynez." In deciding this question the Court of Appeals, however, ruled:
A la luz de las jurisprudencias arriba citadas en la clausada de atestiguamiento discutida en el asunto de autos no encontramos un cumplimiento
sustantial del requisito exigido por la ley, de que en ella se haga constar que el testador y los testigos han firmado unos en presencia de otros,
todas y cada una de las paginas usadas del testamento, requisito que no se puede establecer por medio de su prueba aliunde.
Against this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, petitioner puts forward the contention that it has decided a question of substance in a way not
probably in accord with the law and the applicable decisions of this court (Rule 47, paragraph e [1] of Supreme Court.) The rule of liberal
construction of the applicable law should, petitioner avers, be held to apply in the case at bar, and in support of her content on she invokes a long
array of cases (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs.
Abella, 43 Phil., 494; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzalez, 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs.
Cartagena, 56 Phil., 282; Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, 57 Phil., 437; Sebastian vs. Paganiban, 59 Phil., 653; De Guzman vs. Celestino,
G.R. No. 35273, April 25, 1932; Policarpio vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. 36349, November 14, 1932; Malate vs. Olea, G.R. No. 36154, December 16,
1932; In re Estate of Jennings, 1933, G.R. No. 38758). To this line of cases those of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939, and Grey
vs. Fabie, G.R. No. 45160, May 23, 1939, may perhaps be added. Respondent, on the other hand, equally invokes a number of cases wherein, he
contends, the rule of strict construction was made to prevail. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; In re Estate of Neuark, 46 Phil., 841;
Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481; Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150.)
This Court has already taken notice of these different views within, in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 437, 439-440), it frankly
made the following observation : "The truth is that there have been, noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills
the one being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the
decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala ([1930], 55 Phil., 150), sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other direction,
predicated on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." It is fairness to recognize the
existence of opposing currents of legal thought, a situation which perhaps has brought about a certain degree of confusion in this field. It is also
fairness to avow, however, that a more careful examination of the cases will show that, while the two tendencies mentioned in easily discernible,
the conflict in many cases is more apparent than real, and the variance, if at all, in the application of the principles involved was due in some
instances to the marked differentiation of facts and the consequent personal or collective criteria in particular cases.
We have taken pains to examine the numerous cases relied upon by the petitioner and those relied upon by the respondent, and while we do not
deem it necessary to make a detailed comparison between them, we find no difficulty in selecting what we consider is the reasonable rule to
apply in this case at bar. It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases.

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More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding
circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to
probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. This, in our opinion, is the
situation in the present case, and we, therefore, hold that the requirement that the attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied with, it appearing that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will
according to the stipulation of the parties. (Record on Appeal, stipulation, pp. 10, 14, 15); and this fact being shown in the will itself, and there
being, furthermore, no question raised as to the authenticity of the signature of the testator and the witnesses.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in
case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2 ed., sec. 132.) A
will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. The law-making body, in recognition of the
dangers to which testamentary dispositions are apt to be subject in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of the
wills with every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the exclusion of
evidence aliunde to prove the execution of the will. We should not, however, attribute the prohibition as indicative of a desire to impose
unreasonable restraint or beyond what reason and justice permit. It could not have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the
essential safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred.
The pronouncement of this Court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), expresses the sound rule to which we have recently adhered in
principle. (Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, promulgated May 18, 1939; and Grey vs. Fabie, G.R. No. 45160, promulgated May 23, 1939):
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
It follows that the writ of certiorari should be, as it is hereby, granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, with the result that the
controverted will, Exhibit A, of the deceased Valerio Leynez, shall be admitted to probate. So ordered, with costs against the respondentappellee. So ordered

Enriquez vs. Abadia (95 Phil. 627)

Holographic will was executed before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Prior to the said code,
holographic wills were not allowed. SC ruled using 795.
Rationale for 795 although the will operates after the death, the wishes of the testator was nevertheless
given solemn expression at the time the will was executed (provided of course it complied with the
formalities then required)
Also, SC added that if a will was void under the law during its execution and a subsequent law is
passed which does away with certain formalities, the will does not become valid.
Rodelas vs. Aranza (119 SCRA 16)
FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
in
her
favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

9
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not
intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce
no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in the case of
Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that in the matter of holographic wills the law, it
is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on
May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had
discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the
case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.
ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there
be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to
determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court.
Cruz vs. Judge Villasor (54 SCRA 31)
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, Petitioner , vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY,
Respondents. Paul G. Gorrez for petitioner. Mario D. Ortiz for respondent Manuel B. Lugay. ESGUERRA,
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the probate of the
last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse
of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed through
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the

10
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this
appeal by certiorari which was given due course.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case hinges, is whether the
supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed in accordance with law,
particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to
attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the
will before a notary public.
Molo vs. Molo (90 Phil 37)G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite
the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the
said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed
the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in
1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to
revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old,
and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
Nuguid vs. Nugid (17 SCRA 449)
NUGUID VS NUGUID
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived
by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the
universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the

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probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution
is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.
Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.
RULING:
The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious
The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The onesentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided
for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited
to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to
be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses
and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question.

Palacios vs. Palacios (106 Phil. 739)

1. WILLS; PROBATE DURING LIFETIME OF TESTATOR; OPPOSITION TO INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL NOT ALLOWED. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the
will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the
opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in
the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the
testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will
leaving the effects thereof after his death.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OR POWER OF TESTATOR. "After a will has been probated during the lifetime of a
testator it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he had a chance to
present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would be in order" (Report
of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code).
DECISION

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BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions
of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for
its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea
C. Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing
her legitime.
After the presentation of petitioners evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities provided by
law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The
court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and,
after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the
natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs against
petitioner.
From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, and
accordingly, the record was elevated to this Court.
It should be noted that petitioner instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will
availing himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a testator
to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such petition one Maria
Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that
she was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her legitime. In other words, Maria Catimbang does
not object to the probate of the will insofar as its due execution is concerned or on the ground that it has not
complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality of
the provisions of the will.
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so
when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his
will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
This is in line with our ruling in Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein we said: "The authentication of
the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be
allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would be in order" (Report of the Code Commission,
pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code).
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which
allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an acknowledged
natural daughter of the testator. This is an extraneous matter which should be threshed out in a separate
action.

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Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Mercado vs. Judge Santos (66 Phil. 215)
1. Mercado v. Santos
FACTS: Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The court admitted the will
to probate. 16 months after the probate of the will, the intervenors filed a complaint against Mercado for
falsification or forgery of the will probated. Mercado moved to dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have
been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusiveas to the
authenticity and due execution thereof.
ISSUE: w/n the probate of the will bars criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the probated will.
HELD: YES The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceeding. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
The probate of a will is a procee din g in rem. The provis ion of notice by publication as a
pre requisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when
probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to
be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in question having been probated by a
competent court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and
not a forgery.
Balanay v. Martinez
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her husband and 6 children as heirs. Her son Felix
Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of her will contained declarations of her ownership of
the southern half of their conjugal properties and that her properties be left undivided during her husbands
lifetime and the heirs legitimes be satisfied from the fruits of the properties. Felix Balanay, Sr., though
initially opposed to the probate for he was preterited, later on relen ted and renounced his share
in her estate. The CFI gave effect to the widowers conformity and appointed its clerk of court as
special administrator. When a purported lawyer for Felix Balanay, Jr. came and filed a motion for leave of
court to withdraw probate of the will, the CFI declared the will void and converted the testate
proceedings into intestate proceedings and ordered the issuance of notice to creditors. Felix Balanay, Jr.
asked that the lower court reconsider alleging that the purported lawyer was terminated hence the
withdrawal of theprobate was unauthorized. When this was denied, the recourse was to the SC.
Issue: W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on
its formal validity
Held: The SC ruled that in view of certain unusual provisions in the will, which are of dubious
legality and because of the motion to withdraw assumed to have been filed with authorization, the
trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity before formal validity can be
established. The probate of the will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Intestate Estate of Wolfson (45 SCRA 381)

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Manuel Y. Macias in his own behalf. Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa & Lozada for oppositorappellee.
Makasiar, J
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died on September 14, 1965 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
On January 10, 1966, Atty. Manuel Y. Macias, herein petitioner-appellant, unaware that Rosina died with a
will and testament, filed in behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
in his favor over the estate in the Philippines of the late Rosina, which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 63866, titled "Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, deceased," and was
assigned to Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by then Judge, now Court
of Appeals Justice, Manuel P. Barcelona.
Accordingly, Ricardo Vito Cruz was appointed Special Administrator for the estate of Rosina, qualified
thereto, took his oath and assumed the duties thereof.
It turned out that Rosina left a will executed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York and
through codicils executed in accordance with the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., naming therein the
Wells Fargo Bank as sole executor and the University of Michigan as the residuary beneficiary.
On September 24, 1965, said will and codicils of Rosina were presented for probate in the Superior Court
of the State of California, U.S.A.
On October 11, 1965, the said will and codicils were duly probated by said California court (Annex 4-A, pp.
28-35, rec. on appeal).
In a document dated November 10, 1965, duly notarized and authenticated, the Wells Fargo Bank, as the
sole executor designated in Rosina's will and codicils, appointed lawyers James M. Ross, Ewald Selph,
Rafael D. Salcedo, Arturo del Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa and Mariano Lozada, all of Manila,
Philippines, as its attorney-infact, with authority among others to file ancillary administration proceedings for
the estate of Rosina and to act as administrator or administrators of the estate (Annex "4-A", pp. 28-35, rec.
on appeal).
Pursuant to his appointment as attorney-in-fact of executor Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del Rosario filed
on August 13, 1966, a petition in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of
First Instance, praying that, inasmuch as the decedent left a will and codicils which were duly probated by
the Superior Court of California, U.S.A., the intestate proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 63866 be
converted into a petition for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils (Annex "4-C", pp. 38-42, rec. on
appeal).
On October 25, 1966, petitioner-appellant Macias, in his own behalf and without informing his client Ricardo
Vito Cruz, filed a similar but separate and independent petition, which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned to Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided by
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, alleging that he has a legal interest in Rosina's estate and praying for the
probate of Rosina's will and codicils as well as for his (Macias') appointment as special administrator (pp.
12-17, ROA).

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Because of petitioner-appellant's claim that he has a legal interest in Rosina's estate, Judge Cloribel of
Branch VI in an order dated October 27, 1966 set the hearing of the petition on December 17, 1966 and
appointed Macias special administrator (Annex "2", pp. 18-20, ROA). Accordingly, petitioner-appellant
Macias was issued letters of special administration on November 12, 1966 (Annex "3", pp. 21-22, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 9, 1966, Atty. Arturo del Rosario filed an opposition to the petition of
petitioner-appellant for the probate of the will and codicils of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson in Special
Proceedings No. 67302 on the grounds, among others, that Rosina's estate is the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII previously filed by petitioner-appellant Macias in behalf of
respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz and before which he (Atty. Arturo del Rosario) filed on August 13, 1966 a
petition for the conversion of the said intestate proceedings into one for the probate of Rosina's will and
codicils, which was then pending resolution (Annexes "4", "4-A" & "4-B", pp. 23-27, ROA).
Likewise, special administrator Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion dated December 13, 1966 to dismiss the
said petition of petitioner-appellant in Special Proceedings No. 67302 on the grounds, among others:
(1) that Rosina's estate is already the subject of Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII
(invoking Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court);
(2) that on August 13, 1966, Atty. Arturo del Rosario filed in behalf of Wells Fargo Bank a petition to convert
the intestate proceeding in Special Proceedings No. 63866 into a testate proceeding for the probate of the
last will and codicils of Rosina;
(3) that two proceedings over the same estate will only complicate matters and delay its closure; and
(4) that in filing his petition for the probate of the will and codicils of Rosina in Special Proceedings No.
67302 before Branch VI, petitioner-appellant concealed from the presiding judge of Branch VI the fact that
appellant previously filed Special Proceedings No. 63866 in his (Ricardo Vito Cruz) behalf as well as the
fact that Arturo del Rosario had already filed his pleading of August 13, 1966 for the conversion of the
intestate proceedings into a testate one (Annex "6", pp. 48-59 ROA).
In a pleading dated December 16, 1966, petitioner-appellant filed his reply and opposition respectively to
the opposition of Atty. Arturo del Rosario and the motion to dismiss of Ricardo Vito Cruz, contending:
(1) that the grounds advanced by Atty. Arturo del Rosario and Ricardo Vito Cruz are not legal grounds for
the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 67302, because he is seeking in this Special Proceedings No.
67302 his own appointment as regular, not ancillary, administrator of Rosina's estate, based simply on his
interest in the estate, without need of any authority from Wells Fargo Bank, which does not and cannot
possibly have anything to do with these proceedings because its (WelIs Fargo Bank) appointment by the
California Superior Court as executor of Rosina's estate does not extend ex proprio vigore to the
Philippines;
(2) that it is enough that a person has an interest in the will or in the property either as executor or
otherwise to justify his intervention in the proceedings, citing Section 1 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Santos vs. Castillo; 1 (3) that Special Proceedings No. 63866, which is an intestate proceeding
merely for the administration of Rosina's estate, is not a probate proceeding; and
(4) that to dismiss and/or consolidate Special Proceedings No. 67302 with Special Proceedings No. 63866,
would frustrate the implementation of Rosina's will to provide a suitable memorial in the City of Manila to
her parents and to provide help and assistance to her former Filipino dependents and those of their parents
(Annex "7", pp. 70-85, ROA).
In an order dated December 17, 1966, Judge Cloribel of Branch VI postponed the hearing of Special
Proceedings No. 67302 on the ground that the oppositors had raised a prejudicial question to the effect that

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another case involving the very same matter is pending in Branch VIII presided over by Judge Barcelona
(Annex "8", p. 86, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 21, 1966, petitioner-appellant filed in both Special Proceedings Nos. 63866
and 67302, a motion for the consolidation and joint hearing of both cases as they relate to the same estate
of Rosina (Annex "9", pp. 87-90, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 22, 1966 filed in both Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 67302, Severino
Baron, Anselmo A. Reyes, Paulino Andrada, Alfredo V. Walcott, Narciso S. Villanueva, Leonardo Baron,
Godofredo L. Dua
Testate Estate of Maloto; Casiano vs. Maloto (79 SCRA 232)Casiano v. Maloto, G.R. No. L-32328,
September 30, 1977
Facts: Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of the late Adriana Maloto, in the belief that the decedent died intestate, commenced on
November 4, 1963 in CFI-Iloilo an intestate proceeding. They partitioned the properties of Adriana among
themselves, and said partition was approved by the court. Four years later, Aldina and Constancio, herein
petitioners, went to the same court asking to re-open the case alleging that Adriana actually left a will. They
moved for the annulment of the intestate proceeding and the allowance of the said will. Panfilo and Felino
opposed the motion. The court dismissed the motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. Petitioners
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus which was later dismissed by the
Court saying that the proper remedy was to file a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.
Petitioners then filed with CFI Iloilo a petition for probate of the said will but the court dismissed the same
on the ground of res adjudicata and that the earlier intestate proceeding had made a finding that the will of
the decedent was destroyed and revoked. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for probate was barred by the judgment of an earlier intestate
proceeding.
Held: Negative. The Court ruled that the petition for probate of the alleged will was the proper remedy, and
should not have been dismissed. The earlier intestate proceeding is not a bar for the petition for probate of
the will as to constitute res adjudicata. The court also ruled that it was not proper for the court in the
intestate proceeding to make a finding that the discovered will had been destroyed and revoked. (The lower
court was directed to proceed with the hearing of the probate of the will).

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For Mid-Term Examinations:

(5 Weeks = 20 lecture hours)
Possible Examination Date
Case Studies:

Acain vs. IAC (155 SCRA 100)

Maninang vs. CA (114 SCRA 478)
Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449)
Orendain , Jr. vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Dona Margarita Rodriguez (591 SCRA 285)
Ramirez vs. Vda de Ramirez (111 SCRA 704)
PCIB vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 266)
Lunsod vs. Ortega (46 Phil. 664)
Nieva vs. Alcala (41 Phil. 915)
Gonzales vs. CFI (104 SCRA 479)
17

18
Chua vs. CFI (78 SCRA 412)
Re: Mario V. Chanliongco (79 SCRA 364)
For Semi-Final Examination
(5 Weeks = 20 lecture hours)
Possible Examination Date
Case Studies:
Bagunu vs. Piedad (347 SCRA 571)
Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte vs. CA (284 SCRA 511)
Rosales vs. Rosales ( 148 SCRA 71)
Manuel vs. Ferrer (247 SCRA 476)
Fabie y Grey vs. Fabie (68 Phi. 128)
Diaz vs. IAC (150 SCRA 645)
Santillon vs. Miranda (14 SCRA 563)
Bicomong vs. Almanza (80 SCRA 421)

For Final Examinations

(4 Weeks = 18 lecture hours)
Possible Examination Date
Case Studies:
Torres vs. Lopez (49 Phil 504)
Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Rigor (89 SCRA 493)
Govt. of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla (46 Phil 642)
Hrs. of Pedro Escanlar vs. Court of Appeals (281 SCRA 177)
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 259)
Fajardo vs. Fajardo (54 Phil 842)
J.L.T. Agro Inc. vs. Balansag (453 SCRA 211)
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Conti vs. CA (300 SCRA 345)
Chavez vs. IAC (191 SCRA 211)

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