Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
134 135 FC
GARCIA vs. MANZANO
103 PHIL 798
G.R. No. L-13414
February 4, 1919
[1]
[2]
purpose,
shall
instrument.
execute
the
proper
Street
and
Avancea,
PARTOSA-JO vs. CA
216 SCRA 692
FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of
Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and
fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against
the husband for judicial separation of conjugal
property in addition to an earlier action for support
which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of
that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.
Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed
[3]
ART. 136
BERMAS CASE
14 SCRA 327
LACSON vs. SAN JOSE LACSON
24 SCRA 837
FACTS:
Alfonso and Carmen were married on February 14,
1953. They had four children. On January 9, 1963
Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and
resided in Manila. On March 12, 1963 she filed a
complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court (JDRC) for custody of all their children as well
as support for them and herself. However, through
the assistance of their respective lawyers, the
spouses reached an amicable settlement as to
custody of their children, support, and separation of
property. On April 27, 1963, they filed a joint petition
with the CFI of Negros Occidental, submitting that
they had mutually agreed upon the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership. The terms included a)
separation of property, b) all earnings of each spouse
shall belong to that spouse exclusively, c) the
custody of the two elder children shall be awarded to
Alfonso and the two younger children to Carmen, d)
Alfonso shall compensate Carmen a monthly
allowance of P300.00 for the support of the children,
and e) each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of
visitation and every summer the former spouses
shall swap the children. For that particular year,
however, Carmen was allowed custody of all four
children until June of 1963, when she was supposed
to return the two older children to Alfonsos custody.
Finding the foregoing joint petition as conformable to
the law, the CFI issued an order approving their
compromise agreement on the very same day. On
May 7, however, Carmen filed a motion with the JDRC
alleging that the compromise agreement was the
only way she could get custody of all the children
and praying that she be relieved of the agreement
pertaining to the custody and visitation of the
children and that she now be awarded full custody.
Naturally, Alfonso opposed the motion and the JDR
ruled in his favor. Carmen went to the Court of
Appeals and the CA certified the case to the Supreme
Court. Carmen went to the CFI and filed a motion for
Issues:
1.
2.
a.
Were the assailed compromise
agreement and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on said agreement conformable
to law?
b.
Whether the custody of the four
children be granted to the mother?
Holding:
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
following
[8]
position
to
purchase
these
properties by his own efforts, his
own earnings and without the help
of Regina Morales. On the other
hand, we have the declaration of
Juana A. Morales, a widow of 68
years of age when she testified, the
sister-in-law of Regina Morales
Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact
that Melbourne Maxey held the
positions of teacher, provincial
treasurer, deputy governor, district
supervisor
and
lastly
superintendent
of
schools,
respectively (p. 203, t.s.n., de la
Victoria). But more important is her
declaration that her sister-in-law
Regina Morales had no property of
her own whence she could have
derived any income nor was Regina
gainfully employed. (pp. 203-204,
t.s.n., Id.) It must be remembered
that the showing must be CLEAR
that Regina Morales contributed to
the acquisition of these properties.
Here the evidence is not only NOT
CLEAR, indeed, there
is
no
evidence at all that Regina Morales
contributed to the acquisition of
the properties in question. In the
case of Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et
al, supra, the Supreme Court had
before it the common-law wife's
own testimony claiming that the
properties in controversy were the
product of their joint industry. Her
assertions
however,
were
completely brushed aside because
aside from her claim that she took
a hand in the management and/or
acquisition of the same, "there
appears no evidence to prove her
alleged
contribution
or
participation in the, acquisition of
the properties involved therein."
(Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar,
besides the absence of any
evidence showing that Regina
Morales contributed by her efforts
to
the
acquisition
of
these
properties in controversy, both
plaintiffs and defendants' evidence
show
that
it
was
through
Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone
that
these
properties
were
acquired. Indeed, that Regina
Morales had no means at all to
[9]
[10]
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied
only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal
THE FAMILY
ART. 149 151, ART. 2035
[11]
MENDOZA vs. CA
19 SCRA 756
FACTS:
Manotok was the administrator of a parcel of land
which it leased to Benjamin Mendoza; that the
contract of lease expired on December 31, 1988; that
even after the expiration of the lease contract,
Benjamin Mendoza, and after his demise, his son,
Romeo, continued to occupy the premises and thus
incurred a total of P44,011.25 as unpaid rentals from
January 1, 1989 to July 31, 1996; that on July 16,
1996, Manotok made a demand on Benjamin
Mendoza to pay the rental arrears and to vacate the
premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
demand letter; that despite receipt of the letter and
after the expiration of the 15-day period, the
Mendozas refused to vacate the property and to pay
the rentals. The complaint prayed that the court
order Mendoza and those claiming rights under him
to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to Manotok, and to pay the unpaid rentals
from January 1, 1989 to July 31, 1996 plus P875.75
per month starting August 1, 1996, subject to such
increase allowed by law, until he finally vacates the
premise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed error in giving efficacy to a lease contract
signed in 1988 when the alleged signatory was
already dead since 1986.
RULING:
This is a case for unlawful detainer. It appears that
respondent corporation leased the property subject
of this case to petitioners father. After expiration of
the lease, petitioner continued to occupy the
property but failed to pay the rentals. On July 16,
1996, respondent corporation made a demand on
petitioner to vacate the premises and to pay their
arrears.
An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when
possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other
person of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or
SUPPORT
Art. 195 208
DE ASIS vs. CA
303 SCRA 176
FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres
de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and
support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis
who failed to provide support and maintenance
despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew
the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel
denied paternity of the said minor and due to such
denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action.
They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of
the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not
pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel
filed a similar complaint against the alleged father,
this time as the minors legal guardian/mother.
Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the
dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the
obligation to give support is based on existence of
paternity between the child and putative parent, lack
thereof negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE:
WON the minor is barred from action for support.
HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor
can it be transmitted to a third person. The original
agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise
regarding future support which is prohibited by law.
With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of
filial relationship between him and the child and
agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original
claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of
any filial relationship between parties was not a
matter which the parties must decide but should be
decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in
order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be
first shown between the parties, but the presence or
lack thereof must be judicially established and
declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first
dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action
asking for the same relief (no force and effect).
Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by
Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be
the subject of any compromise or waiver.
The Case
Edward,
Chua
Giak
and
Mariano
The Facts
ordering
provide
respondents,
and
petitioners
monthly
support
to
to
defendants
sought
reconsideration,
Edward
P40,000
The trial
On 14 October 1990,
Cheryl abandoned
3
4
6
[13]
Court of Appeals
Philippines).7[7]
termination12[12]
The
issue
is
over
their
children, 14[14]
whether
are
respondents.
authority
held:
The law on support under
Article 195 of the Family Code is
clear on this matter. Parents and
their
legitimate
children
are
obliged to mutually support one
another and this obligation extends
down
to
the
legitimate
grandchildren
and
great
grandchildren.
the
The Issue
during
suspension13[13]
or
the
appealed
judgment
by
limiting
its
concurrence
degrees.16[16]
among
Thus,
relatives
although
the
of
differing
obligation
to
By
statutory9[9]
and
jurisprudential
12
13
authority,
conceivably
either
by
its
14
15
10
16
11
17
[14]
rights)
pertains
to
parents,
parental
degree,
petitioners
both
in
the
paternal
(petitioners)
and
19
raising
ascendants
sufficient means:
the
ancillary
issue
of
an
children
because
of
parental
inability
to
petitioners
partial
The
option
is
The
application
of
Article
204
which
provides that
give
The person obliged to give
support shall have the option to
fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has
a right to receive support. The
latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a
moral or legal obstacle thereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
However,
residence.
unavailable to petitioners.
Makati
concurrent
xxxx
There is no showing that
private respondent is without
means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing
to voluntarily provide for her
grandson's legal support. x x
x18[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal
citations omitted)
entitled
grandchildren
to
receive
and
support
are
petitioners
daughter-in-law.
Granting
will secure to
Cheryls
support
their
marital
share
from
20
bond. [20]
the
Unfortunately,
amount
of
monthly
21
to
discharge
her
obligation
to
exception
clause
of Article
204,
precluding
its
application.
provide
As an alternative proposition, petitioners
19
20
18
21
[15]
FUNERAL
Art. 305 310
[16]