Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Nyya
Nyya (literally Logic) is a leading school of philosophy within the Hindu umbrellathose communities which saw themselves as the inheritors
of the ancient Vedic civilization and allied cultural traditions. Epistemologically, Nyya develops of a sophisticated precursor to contemporary
reliabilism (particularly process reliabilism), centered on the notion of knowledge-sources (prama), and a conception of epistemic responsibility
which allows for default, unreflective justification accorded to putatively veridical cognition. It also extensively studies the nature of reasoning in the
attempt to map pathways which lead to veridical inferential cognition. Nyya's methods of analysis and argument resolution influenced much of
classical Indian literary criticism, philosophical debate, and jurisprudence. Metaphysically, Nyya defends a robust realism, including universals,
selves, and substances, largely in debate with Buddhist anti-realists and flux-theorists. Nyya thinkers were also Indias most sophisticated natural
theologians. For at least a millennium, Nyya honed a variety of arguments in support of a baseline theism in constant engagement with sophisticated
philosophical atheists, most notably Buddhists and Mmsakas (Hindu Ritualists).
Nyyas prehistory is tied to ancient traditions of debate and rules of reasoning (vda-stra). The oldest extant Nyya text is the Nyya-stra

attributed to Gautama (c. 200 C.E.). Throughout much of Nyyas formative period the philosophical development of the school took place through
commentaries on the stras (with important exceptions including works of Jayanta, c. 875, Udayana, c. 975, and the somewhat heterodox
Bhsarvaja, c. 875). Leading commentators include Vtsyyana (c. 450), Uddyotakara (c. 600) Vcaspati Mira (c. 900) and Udayana. The school
would enter its new phase (navya-nyya) in the work of the eminent epistemologist Gagea Updhyya (c. 1325). This article focuses on the older
tradition of Nyya, beginning with the stras, with occasional gestures toward developments within the new school. Given the breadth of Nyya
thought, this discussion has to exclude some important topics for the sake of economy, such as aesthetics, philosophy of language, and theory of
value. The article's primary focus is on epistemology and metaphysics. There is a brief consideration of Nyyas philosophy of religion.

Table of Contents
Epistemology
Perception
The Characteristics of Perception
Extraordinary Perceptual States
Introspection
Inference
The Characteristics of Inference
The Structure of Inference
Inferential Defeaters or Fallacies
Suppositional Reasoning
Analogical Reasoning
Testimony
Non-prama Epistemic Capacities
General Theory of Knowledge
A Causal Theory of Knowledge
Internalist Constraints
A Relational Theory of Cognition
Response to Skepticism
Metaphysics
Substance
Quality
Action
Universal
Inherence
Individuator
Absence
Causation
Philosophy of Religion
References and Further Reading
Sanskrit Source Materials
Primary Texts in English Translation
Studies of Nyya Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Religion in English
General Studies

1. Epistemology

The Nyya-stra opens with a list of its primary topics, sixteen items which may be grouped into the following four categories: epistemology,
metaphysics, procedures and elements of inquiry, and debate theory. That Nyyas initial topic is epistemology (pramas, knowledge-sources) is
noteworthy. Both the stras and the commentarial tradition argue that epistemic success is central in the search for happiness, since we must
understand the world properly should we desire to achieve the goods it offers.Vtsyyana claims that while Nyyas metaphysical concerns overlap
with other, more scripturally-based Hindu schools, what distinguishes Nyya is a reflective concern with evidence, doubt and the objects of
knowledge. He further defines Nyyas philosophical method as the investigation of a subject by means of knowledge-sources (NB 1.1.1).
Importantly, the pramas are not simply the means by which individuals attain veridical cognition. They are also the final court of appeals in
philosophical dispute. Uddyotakara thus claims the best kind of demonstrative reasoning occurs when the pramas are deployed in concert in order
to establish a fact.
The four pramas are perception, inference, analogical reasoning, and testimony. We will discuss them in order. Then, we will consider Nyyas
theory of knowledge in general.

a. Perception (pratyaka)
i. The Characteristics of Perception
Nyya-stra 1.1.4 defines perceptual cognition as follows.
A perceptual cognition arises by means of the connection between sense faculty and object, is not dependent on words, is non-deviating,
and is determinate.
This stra provides four conditions which must be met for cognition to be perceptual. The first, that cognition arises from the connection between
sense faculty and object, evinces Nyyas direct realism. It is such connection, the central feature of the causal chain which terminates in perceptual
cognition, which fixes the intentionality of a token percept. Uddyotakara enumerates six kinds of connection (sannikara) to account for the fact that
that we perceive not only substances, but properties, absences, and so on: (i) conjunction (samyoga), the connection between a sense faculty and an
object; (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (sayukta-samavya), the connection between a sense faculty and a property-trope which inheres in an
object; (iii) inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (sayukta-samaveta-samavya), the connection between a sense faculty and the universal
which is instantiated in a property-trope; (iv) inherence (samavya), the kind of connection which makes auditory perception possible; (v) inherence
in what inheres (samaveta-samavya), the connection between the auditory faculty and universals which inhere within sounds; (vi) qualifier-qualified
relation (vieya-vieaa-bhva), the connection which allows for the perception of inherence and absence in objects. In all cases, the perceptual
cognition is born of connection between a sense faculty and an occurrent fact or object.
The second condition, that the cognition produced is not dependent on words, has a somewhat complicated interpretive history. Generally, Nyya
holds that ordinary perception involves concept deployment. Therefore, this restriction does not endorse a view held by the Buddhist Dignga and his
followers, that genuine perception is non-conceptual (kalpan-apodha). Still, the meaning of avyapadeya is disputed amongst Naiyyikas. On one
reading, this qualification serves the purpose of distinguishing between perceptually and testimonially generated cognitions. The latter also require
information provided by the senses but further require the deployment of semantic and syntactic knowledge. An allied reading suggests that while
involving the application of concepts, perception of an object is often causally prior to speech acts involving it.
The third, non-deviating condition blocks false cognitions, like the misperception that an oyster shell is a piece of silver, from the ranks of
prama-born. This is tied to the Nyya notion that pramas are by definition inerrant, and that false cognitive presentations are not truly pramas
but pseudo-pramas (prama-bhsa). Though we may mistakenly take a pseudo-prama, like the illusion of a person in the distance, to be the
real thing, it is not. Perception and similar prama-terms have success grammar for Nyya.

The fourth, determinate condition blocks cognitions which are merely doubtful from the ranks of the prama-born. Dubious cognitions, like that
of a distant person at dusk, do not convey misleadingly false information, but being unclear, they do not properly apprehend the object in question. It
could be a person or a post. As such, one neither correctly grasps its character nor falsely takes it to represent accurately a certain object. Later
Naiyyikas, most notably Vcaspati Mira, read the qualifiers notdependent on words and determinate disjunctively, in order to say that
perception may be non-propositional or propositional. However anachronistic this may be as an interpretation of the Nyya-stra, this division is
accepted by later Nyya.
ii. Extraordinary Perceptual States
Nyya admits of certain kinds of extraordinary perception in order to account for cognitive states that are perceptual in character, but distinct from
those commonly experienced. They involve modes of sense-object connection other than the six kinds noted above. Later Nyya (beginning at least
with Jayanta) recognizes three kinds of extraordinary perception: (i) yogic perception, (ii) perception of a universal through an individual which
instantiates it, and (iii) perception of an objects properties as mediated by memory.
Yogic perception includes experiential states reported by contemplatives in deep mediation. Their cognitive objects (usually the deep self or God) are
taken to be experienced in a direct and unmediated way, but generally without the operation of the external senses. Given their experiential character
and their putative agreement with other sources of knowledge like scripture and inference, yogic experiences are prima facie taken to be veridical,
produced by non-normal perception.
Perception of a universal through an individual which instantiates it is Nyyas response to the problem of induction. Nyya holds that universals are
perceptually experienced as instantiated in individuals (see the third of Uddyotakaras six kinds of connection above). But the notion that we may
have apprehension of all of the individuals which instantiate a universal, qua their being instantiations of the universal, is further accepted by Nyya
in order to explain how we attain to knowledge of vypti, or invariable relation between universals, which undergirds causal regularities of various
sorts. Unless ones experience of some particular smoke instance as conjoined with a fire instance allows him to experience all instances of smoke
qua smoke as being conjoined with all instances of fire qua fire, through the natural tie between the universals smokiness and fieriness, inductive
extrapolation would be impossible. Nyya thus solves the problem of induction by appeal to extraordinary perception. This does not imply that we
are always able to recognize such relations. It may take repeated experience for us to notice the ever-present connection. But when such recognition
arises, it is due to perceptual experience, not an extrapolative projection of past experience.
Perception of the properties of an object mediated by memory involves the visual experience of unpresented properties of an object which is
currently seen. Standard examples include seeing a piece of sandalwood as fragrant or seeing a piece of ice as cold. Here, there is a standard kind of
sense object connection, but some of the phenomenal features of the experience, while veridical, are not generated by the ordinary connection. They
are rather mediated by a special connection grounded in memory. What distinguishes this kind of perception from straightforward inference is that
the property in question is experienced with a phenomenal character lacking in inference. This suggests that what may be considered inference for
some may take the form of perception for others, depending on their familiarity with the conceptual connection between the properties in question.
iii. Introspection
Nyya holds that while cognitions reveal or present their intentional objects, they rarely present themselves directly. When they are directly
cognized, cognitions are grasped by other, apperceptive cognitions. As apperceptive awareness reveals a cognition along with its predication content
or objecthood (that is, my cognition of a red truck is apperceptively cognized as having the predication content red and truck-hood), it is
practically indefeasible. But, as Gagea notes, this indefeasibility does transfer to the content of the original cognition (which is itself object of the
apperceptive awareness). I may have mistaken a purple truck for a red truck, forgetting that my eyewear distorts certain colors. Apperception is
subsumed by Nyya into the category of perception. In this case, the operative sense faculty is the inner organ (manas) and the object is a cognition
conceived of as a property of a self. Gagea argues at length with a Prbhkara Mmsaka (a representative of another leading Hindu school),

defending Nyyas version of apperception against the Mms view that each cognition itself has a component of reflectively self-awareness.
A few words on manas (the inner organ): NS 1.1.16 argues that the absence of simultaneous cognition from all of the senses indicates the presence of
a faculty which governs selective attention. The manas is identified as this faculty, an insentient psychological apparatus which processes the
information of the senses. A formulation of perception by the Vaieika school (Vaieika-stra 3.1.18), accepted by Nyya, is that it normally
consists in a chain of connection between four things: a self and its manas, the manas and a sense organ, and the sense organ and an object. Manas
also is the faculty which governs mnemonic retrieval and, as noted above, apperceptive awareness of mental states. Selves, in the Nyya view, are
fundamentally loci of awareness, cognition, and mnemonic dispositions (saskra). But just as they rely on the five senses to experience the world,
they rely on manas for the functioning of memory and apperception.
To conclude, we may note that perception is commonly called the jyeaprama (the eldest knowledge source) by Nyya, since other pramas
depend on perceptual input, while perception operates directly on the objects of knowledge. Indeed, Gagea suggests the following definition of a
perceptual cognition: a cognition that does not have another cognition as its proximate instrumental cause. Inference, analogy, and testimony, on
the other hand, depend on immediately prior cognitions to trigger their functioning. The normative status accorded to veridical perceptual cognition
is primarily a matter of causation and intentionality (viayat). If a cognition is caused by the appropriate causal chain, starting with the contact of a
sense faculty and an external object (or, in the case of apperception, the internal organ and an immediately prior cognition), and the cognition
produced has an objecthood or intentionality which accurately targets the object in question, the cognition is veridical and has the status prmya
(pram-derived).

b. Inference (anumna)
i. The Characteristics of Inference
Nyya-stra 1.1.5 defines inference as follows.
[An inferential cognition] is preceded by that [perception], and is threefold: from cause to effect, from effect to cause or from that which
is commonly seen.
This definition is somewhat elliptical. But it focuses on the fundamental character of inference: it is a cognition which follows from another
cognition owing to their being conceptually connected in some way. Etymologically, anumna means after-cognizing. Inference follows from an
earlier cognition, that in the stra above. Vtsyyana interprets that (tat) to refer to a perceptual cognition, and suggests that perceptual cognition
precedes inference in two ways: (i) to engage in inference requires having perceptually established a fixed relationship between an inferential sign
and the property to be inferred, and (ii) perceptual input triggers inference in that one must cognize the inferential sign as qualifying the locus of an
inference. He provides a more explicit definition of inference as a later cognition of an object by means of cognition of its inferential sign (NB
1.1.3).
Uddyotakara reasonably broadens the scope of that in NS 1.1.5 to refer to prama-produced cognitions of any kind which may trigger inference
(NV 1.1.5). The meaning of reasoning from cause to effect and from effect to cause should be clear. Uddyotakara interprets reasoning from what is
commonly seen as that which is grounded in non-causal correlations that have proven invariable. Vtsyyana offers another reading: when the
relationship between an inferential sign and the inferential target is not perceptible, the target may be inferred owing to the similarity of the unseen
prover with something known. The classic example of this kind of inference is as follows: Desire, aversion, and knowledge are properties. Properties
require substances which instantiate them. Therefore there is anunseen substance which instantiates desire, aversion, and knowledge: the inner self
(NB 1.1.5). Though the connection between mental states like desire and the self which supports them is unseen, the similarity between mental states
and other, commonly seen properties (like the color green) is enough to allow for the inference to a property-bearer.

The history of Nyyas logical theory is extensive. Here, we will note a few salient points and focus on inference as understood in the period most
important to this study (the final great creative period of what is normally known as Old Nyya). First, in Nyya, logic is subsumed within
epistemology, and therefore tends to have a strong informal and cognitive flavor, mapping paths of reasoning that generate veridical cognitions and
noting the common ways that reasoning goes wrong. Fundamentally, one makes inferences for oneself. Formal proofs are meant to mirror the kind of
reasoning that takes place internally, for didactic or polemical purposes. The first explicit recognition of this dual nature of inference is commonly
attributed to the Buddhist Dignga, who coined the terms svrthnumna (inference for oneself) and parrthnumna (inference for another). Such a
division is implicit, however, in the Nyya-stras distinction between inference as an individuals source of knowledge (NS 1.1.5) and as a
systematic method of proof meant to convince another (NS 1.1.32-39).
Second, inference is triggered by the recognition of a sign or mark, whose relationship with some other object (property or fact) has been firmly
established. The primary cause of an inferential cognition is an immediately prior subsumptive judgment (parmara) which grasps an inferential
sign as qualifying an inferential subject (the locus of the inference), while recollecting the signs invariable concomitance with some other fact or
object. The two fundamental requirements for inference are, therefore, awareness of pakadharmat, the inferential marks qualifying the locus of
the inference, and vypti, the signs invariable concomitance with the target property or probandum. A paradigmatic act of inference to oneself is:
There is fire on that mountain, since there is smoke on it, which is supported by the awareness that fire is invariably concomitant with smoke.
Naiyyikas examine and standardize the conditions under which invariable concomitance (vypti) between a probans and a target fact is established.
Third, as logics function is to generate veridical cognition, Nyya does not stress the distinction between soundness and validity in respect to the
quality of an argument. Both formal fallacies and the inclusion of false premises lead to hetv-bhsa (pseudo provers or logical defeaters), since
they engender false cognition.
ii. The Structure of Inference
Concerning inference for polemical or didactic purposes, Nyya employs a formal five-step argument illustrated by the following stock example.
There is fire on the hill (the pratij, thesis).
Because there is smoke on the hill (the hetu, reason or probans).
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire; like a kitchen hearth and unlike a lake (the udharaa, illustration of concomitance).
This hill is likewise smoky (the upanaya, application of the rule).
Thus, there is fire on the hill (the nigamana, conclusion).
In practice, the five-membered syllogism is often truncated into three steps as follows.
A is qualified by S,
because it is qualified by T
(whatever is qualified by T is qualified by S) like (Tb&Sb).
Again, the stock example:
The hill is qualified by fieriness
because it is qualified by smokiness
(whatever is qualified by smokiness is qualified by fieriness) like a kitchen hearth and unlike a lake.
The basic components of the argument are:

the inferential subject (paka), the locus of the inferential sign; the hill in our example. The general conditions for something to be taken up as
a subject for inference, are that it be under dispute or currently unknown, with no reports from other knowledge sources available to
definitively settle the issue.
the prover or inferential sign (hetu); smoke (more precisely, smokiness)
the probandum (sdhya), the property to be proved by the inference; fire (more precisely, fieriness)
the pervasion or concomitance (vypti) that grounds the inference, which is implicit in the step: wherever there is smoke, there is fire
a corroborative instance (sapaka); a locus known to be qualified by both the prover (hetu) and the probandum (sdhya); this is a token of
inductive support for the vypti; a kitchen hearth. There are also known negative examples, (vipaka) of something that lacks both the prover
property and the probandum; where there is no fire, there is no smoke, like a lake. Obviously, an instantiation of the prover property in the
vipaka class vitiates the argument.
This stock inference asserts that there is fire on the mountain (the mountain is qualified by the property of fieriness, Fm). Why? Because the
mountain is qualified by the property of smokiness, Sm. There is an implied concomitance which grounds the inference: Whatever is qualified by
smokiness is qualified by fieriness, x(Sx-->Fx). In the language of Nyya, fire pervades smoke. This is an epistemic pervasion: we never find
smoke instances without fire instances. As such, smoke is a prover property that allows us to infer the presence of fire. Finally, an example must be
included in the syllogism to illustrate the inductive grounding which undergirds the invariable concomitance. In kitchen hearth k, fire is known to be
concomitant with smoke, (Sk&Fk). In some instances, negative examples are used to indicate the vypti through contraposition. Wherever there is no
fire there is no smoke, as illustrated in a lake, (~Fl& ~Sl).
Nyya-stra 1.1.25 defines an example (dnta) as something about which experts and laypersons have the same opinion (buddhi-smyam).
Vtsyyana (NB Intro.; translation in Gangopadhyaya 1982: 5) elaborates:
Corroborative instance is an object of perceptionan object about which the notions (buddhi) of the layman as well as the expert are not
in conflict. . . It is also the basis of the application of nyya (reasoning). By (showing) the contradiction of the dnta the position of
the opponent can be declared as refuted. By the substantiation of the dnta, ones own position is well-established. If the skeptic
(nstika) admits a corroborative instance, he has to surrender his skepticism. If he does not admit any, how can he silence his opponent?
Regarding agreement between laypersons and experts, the basic idea, of course, is that supporting examples should be non-controversial. A good
illustration of this is found in Uddyotakaras Nyya-vrttika (2.1.16). Debating with a Buddhist interlocutor over the existence of property-bearing
substances, he claims there is no example whatever (na hi kaciddnta) . . . about which both parties agree (ubhaya-paka-sampratipanna).
In another interpretation of the three kinds of inference in the stra, Uddyotakara introduces three kinds of argument: wholly-positive, whollynegative, and positive-negative. Wholly-positive inference occurs when there are attested cases of sapaka but no vipakaknown. From a Buddhist
perspective, the inference whatever exists is momentary, like a cloud would require this kind of inference, since there would be no available
vipakato illustrate the non-presence of the prover. In cases where the property to be proven is entirely subsumed within the paka, a wholly-negative
form is employed. The vypti is contraposed, as in the following inference: A living body has a self because it breathes. Whatever does not have a
self does not breathe, like a pot. Most inferences are in principle amenable to the positive-negative form, like There is fire on that hill, since there is
billowing smoke over it. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like a kitchen hearth, and unlike a lake.
iii. Inferential Defeaters or Fallacies
Naiyyikas provide various typologies of inferential fallacies and defeaters (hetv-bsa, pseudo provers). We may note five common kinds: (i)
fallacies of deviation occur when the prover or inferential sign is not reliably correlated with the inferential target. To argue that my mother must be
visiting, since there is a Mazda parked outside would involve the fallacy of deviation, since Owning a Mazda is a property that tracks not only my
mother but many other drivers. It cannot, therefore, reliably indicate her presence. (ii) fallacies of contradiction occur when the prover in fact

establishes a conclusion opposed to the thesis that someone defends. This would occur should someone argue that Jones was not a kind man, since
he gave his life for others, as giving ones life for others is an indicator of kindness or compassion. (iii) fallacies of unestablishment occur when a
supposed prover is not actually the property of the inferential subject. Should someone argue I know that your mother is in town, since I saw a Prius
parked outside your home, the prover is unestablished, since my mother does not in fact own a Prius. (iv) argumentsare rebutted, when their
conclusions are undermined by information gleaned by more secure knowledge sources. Someone may argue that my friend must be out of town,
since he hasnt answered his phone all week. But if I just saw the friend in question at the local coffee shop, my perceptual knowledge rebuts his
prover, invalidating it. Similarly, (v) arguments are counterbalanced when counterarguments of equal or greater force are put forth in support of an
opposing conclusion. Disputant a argues that the inherent teleology of biological processes proves the existence of God. Disputant b argues that the
existence of gratuitous evil proves that there is no God. Pending further philosophical work, argument b neutralizes the conclusion of argument a.
iv. Suppositional Reasoning
Tarka, suppositional or dialectical reasoning, is crucial to Nyyas philosophical program. Still, according to Vtsyyana, it is not a full-fledged
independent prama. Rather it is an assistant to the pramas (prama-anugrahaka) (NB Introduction). Tarka is commonly employed as a form
of reductio argument for the sake of judging competing claims or arguments, a reductio which depends not only on logical inconsistency, but on
incoherence with deeply-held beliefs or norms. In the face of competing claims x and y about subject s, tarkais employed to show that x violates such
norms, thereby shifting the presumptive weight to alternative y. Vtsyyana (NB1.1.40) offers the example of competing claims about the nature of
the self. Some say that the self is a product which comes to exist within time while others claim that it is unproduced and eternal. The Naiyyika
deploys tarkaby arguing that a consequence of the former view is that ones initial life circumstances would not be determined by his karmic
inheritance from previous lives, a severe violation of fundamental metaphysical positions held by almost every Indian school. As such, strong
presumptive weight should be given to the latter view. This example illustrates the way in which considerations of negative coherence govern tarkas
deployment.
Vtsyyana notes that the reason tarkais not an independent prama is that it does not independently establish the nature of the thing in question
(anavadhrant). It provides consent (anujnti) for one of two alternatives independently supported by apparent pramas, by illustrating problems
with the competing view. Uddyotakara (NV 1.1.1) adds that it is excluded from the ranks of prama because it does not provide definitive cognition
(pramamparicchedakanatarka).
Later Naiyyikas extol tarka as a means to test dubious inferential concomitances (vypti) by testing them against more fundamental holdings of
various sorts. Tarka also has a crucial role in the management of philosophical doubt. Against the skeptic, Nyya argues that doubt is not always
reasonable. Tarka helps to distinguish legitimate doubt from mere contentiousness by illustrating which claims are better motivated and hence
deserving of presumptive weight.

c. Analogical Reasoning (upamna)

Nyya-stra1.1.6 defines analogyas follows.
Analogy makes an object known by similarity with something already known.
Naiyyikas commonly frame analogy as a means of vocabulary acquisition, and it has a severely restricted scope compared with the other pramas.
The standard example involves a person who is told that a water buffalo looks something like a cow and that such buffalo are present in a certain
place in the countryside. Later, when out in the countryside, he recognizes that the thing he is seeing is similar to a cow, and therefore is a water
buffalo. The cognition That thing is a water buffalo, born of the recollection of testimony regarding its similarity with a cow and the perception of
such common features, is paradigmatically analogical. Though most of the other schools either reduce analogy to a more fundamental pramaor
conceive of it in very different terms (Mms conceives of it as the capacity by which we apprehend similarity itself), Nyya contends that the

cognition in question is sui generis analogical, though it incorporates information from other pramas.

d. Testimony (abda)
NS1.1.5 defines testimony as follows.
Testimony is the assertion of a qualified speaker.
The semantic range of pta (authority, credible person) includes expertise, trustworthiness, and reliability. Vtsyyana claims that an pta
possesses direct knowledge of something, and a willingness to convey such knowledge without distortion (NB 1.1.7). It is clear, though, that Nyya
does not require any kind of special expertise from such a speaker in normal situations. Nor does a hearer need positive evidence of trustworthiness.
Mere absence of doubt in the asserters ability to speak authoritatively about the issue at hand is enough. Testimony is thus thought of as a
transmission of information or content. A person attains an accurate cognition through some pramatoken. In a properly functioning testimonial
exchange, she bestows the information apprehended by the initial cognition to an epistemically responsible hearer. On such grounds, Uddyotakara
notes that testimonial utterances may be divided into those whose contents are originally generated by perception or by inference. Jayanta likewise
claims that the veridicality or non-veridicality of a testimonial cognition is dependent on the speakers knowledge of the content of her statement and
her honesty in relating it.Vtsyyana (NB 2.1.69) illustrates a levelheaded frankness about testimonys importance, noting that in accord with
knowledge gained by testimony, people undertake their common affairs. Uddyotakarasimilarlyrecognizes that testimony has the widest range of any
source of knowledge, far outstripping what one may know from personal perception, inference or analogy.

e. Non-prama Epistemic Capacities

From the stra period, Nyya recognizes a number of epistemic capacities which are nevertheless considered non-prama (NS 2.2.1-12). They are
not considered independent pramas for one of two reasons: (i) they are reducible to subspecies of other pramas, or (ii) they do not produce the
specific kind of cognitions which a prama must deliver. A core locus of debate amongst classical Indian thinkers is the nature and number of
pramas. Nyya contends that the above four are the only irreducible sources of knowledge, which subsume all other kinds.

f. General Theory of Knowledge

i. A Causal Theory of Knowledge
Naiyyikas speak of cognitive success in causal terms. Prama normally refers to a means or process by which veridical awareness-episodes
(pram) are generated, as seen above. Vtsyyana glosses the meaning of pramaas that by which something is properly cognized
(pramtyateanena) (NB1.1.3). Uddyotakara concurs: what is spoken of as a prama? A pramais the cause of a [veridical] cognition
(upalabdhi-hetupramam) (NV1.1.1). Moreover, despite its focus on reflective consideration of belief and valid cognition, Nyya argues that the
simple,unreflective functioning of a prama like perception or testimony is enough to generate knowledge in the absence of countervailing
evidence.
ii. Internalist Constraints
Nyya does maintain an internalist constraint: Once doubt arisesby adversarial challenge, peer disagreement, inconsistency between
differentcognitions, and so forth a cognition must be validated in order to maintain the status of being prama-produced. Doubt triggers a
second-order concern with reflective inquiry and certification. The stras state that Where there is doubt, there must be ongoing examination (NS

2.1.7). Uddyotakara therefore claims that doubt is an essential component of investigation (vicra-aga) (NV 1.1.23). Validation involves
consciously reflecting on the etiology of a cognition to ensure that it is the product of a properly-functioning prama. It may also involve the
deployment of other pramasin the hopes for a convergence of knowledge-sources (prama-saplava) in support of the doubted cognition. In his
opening comments on the Nyya-stra, Vtsyyana famously provides a pragmatic test (but not definition) of truth: cognitions which guide us to
successful action are likely veridical.
iii. A Relational Theory of Cognition
Nyya epistemologists speak of cognition (jna, buddhi, upalabdhi, pratyaya): generally immediate awareness states of what Nyya understands to
be a mind-independent external reality. In the case of apperception, one cognizesher own mental states. Ontologically, cognitions are considered
properties (guas) of individual selves (tmans). Memory dispositions, when triggered, generate cognition about the past. With a few exceptions,
cognitions target things other than themselves.
For Nyya, cognitions target their objects by means of a relation called objecthood (viayat). Nyyas theory is thus not exactly representational,
but relational. Objecthood minimally has a threefold structure (with the possibility of iteration) corresponding to three features of the external
object in question: a portion of the cognition targets an object itself, a portion of the cognition targets a property of the object, and finally, a portion
of the cognition targets the relationship between the object and its property. In cases of veridical cognition (pram), the portion of cognition which
targets a substantive and the portion which targets its property match up. Gagea famously defines veridical cognition as a cognitive state with
predication content x about something in fact qualified by x (Tattvacintmai, pram-lakaa-vda). Seeing a male human being as qualified by
man would be a paradigm case of veridical cognition. Error is generally classified as a misfire of the property-scoping portion of cognition. In
error, a substantive is indeed cognized, but the property which is targeted does not actually qualify the substantive in question. The cognitions
intentionality is bifurcated, so to speak, simultaneously scoping a substantive and a property which is in fact alien to it.
iv. Response to Skepticism
Nyya is a staunchly anti-skeptical tradition of epistemology. While it does give an important role to doubt, which, as seen above, triggers reflection
and philosophical review, it rejects the notion that doubt should be the starting place in philosophical reflection. Doubt itself should be motivated, as
trust is a better default starting place in both ordinary life and philosophy. Pragmatically, Nyya argues that the role of epistemology is to better hone
our cognitive abilities in order to succeed in our life aims. But unrestricted doubt would undermine our ability to function on a basic level, and it
therefore militates against the very point of epistemological inquiry. Theoretically, Nyya argues that error and indeed doubt itself are conceptually
parasitical on true cognition. Error and doubt only make sense against a background of true belief, and therefore reflection must start by taking
putatively veridical cognition at face value. Allied to this is a strain of criticism that even the simple act of giving voice to skeptical arguments belays
a philosophers dependence on knowledge sources, including the inductively-supported tie between words and their meanings, which a skeptic relies
on to speak his case. Given that everyone, the skeptic included, relies on pramas, they are to be given the lions share of default entitlement.

2. Metaphysics
Nyya defends a realist and pluralist metaphysics of categories (padrthas, lit. things denoted by words), largely adapted, with some modifications,
from its sister school Vaieika. The categories are substance, quality, action, universal, individuator, inherence and absence. They will be discussed
individually below.

a. Substance (dravya), Including Self (tman)

Substances are the bedrock of Nyya/Vaieika metaphysics (hereafter, simply Nyya Metaphysics), as other categories generally inhere within
substances or are nested within properties that inhere within substances. Paradigmatic substances include the indestructible atoms of earth, water, air
and fire; composite substances like pots and trees; inner selves (tman) which are the eternal, reincarnating souls; and God, a unique tman.
Naiyyikas provide a number of arguments in support of a non-material self. A standard argument runs as follows: Things like desire, cognition,
experiences of pleasure and pain and volition are qualities. All qualities inhere in substances. Therefore, there is a substance to which desire and the
rest belong. This conclusion is then followed by an argument from elimination. None of the material elements like earth or water are the bearers of
desire and the rest. Therefore, there must be a special, non-material substance, namely a self (see various commentaries on NS 1.1.10). This
argument is bolstered by others meant to illustrate that the physical body, as a product of material elements cannot be the fundamental locus of
conscious states.
Some of the richest debates in classical India take place between Nyya and Buddhists over the reality of substances. The central concern of such
debates is often the statusof individual selvesan important substance, to say the least. Famously, the Buddha declared that reality is lacking a self
(antman), and his followers develop a number of arguments which purport to illustrate this in two ways. (i) Diachronically: moment by moment,
things are destroyed and new things arise, such that no substance (including selves) endures for longer than a moment. (ii) Synchronically: in a single
moment, what we take to be wholes (including selves) are nothing more than heaps of micro-properties (illustrated by the famous chariot metaphor in
The Questions of King Milinda.) The Buddhist position is that although there is no such thing as an enduring self, the need for moral continuity and
other desiderata may be satisfied merely by the causal connections between events in a single causal stream which we refer to as a person.
Nyyas response is to defend the existence of substances generally and selves in particular. In defense of substances, it argues that composite
substances have capacities beyond the mere collection of their parts (NS 2.1.35). Moreover, Nyya argues that the Buddhist reduction, if carried out
consistently, would lead to an absurdity. We can see composite substances, but we cannot seeentities like atoms, which exist below our perceptual
threshold. But if substances are nothing but heaps of micro objects/properties, which themselves can be reduced, and so on, then we should not be
able to perceive substances at all. Thus, there must be a unified identity for individual substances which undergirds their availability for perceptual
experience (NS 2.1.36).
In defense of the diachronic existence of individual selves, Nyya argues that our experience of recollection (that is the very man I saw a week
ago) requires a locus of memory which spans the time between the initial experience and the re-experience of an object (NS 1.1.10 and allied
commentaries). In this spirit, Uddyotakara, following Vtsyyana, argues that if I am now a different self than the me of yesterday, I should not be
able to recollect things which that me experienced, since one self is unable to recollect the content of anothers experience. In defense of the
synchronic identity of selves, Nyya argues that cross-modal recognition (that thing I see is the same thing I am touching) requires a single
experiencer with the ability to synthesize data from various senses (NS 3.1.1-3). Early Nyyas arguments for the self find their apex in Udayanas
monograph Determining the Truth of the Self.

b. Quality
Qualities (gua), are property tropes which qualify substances. Unlike universals they are not repeatable. The red color of some particular fire
hydrant is a quality. Like other instances of the color red it is inhered by the universal redness, but it is as particular as the hydrant which it qualifies.
Qualities include color, number (which is thought to inhere in objects), spatial location, contact, disjunction, and so forth, along with qualities which
are unique to selves, like desire, cognition, and karmic merit.

c. Action
Like qualities, actions (karma) inhere in substances and are non-repeatable tropes. But they have causal capacities which qualities lack, particularly
the ability to engender conjunction and disjunction between substances.

d. Universal
Universals (smnya or jti) inhere in substances (for examplepot-hood), qualities (redness) or motions (contraction-hood). Naiyyikas argue that
universals are required to account for common experiences of a recurring character, for the functioning of language, andto undergird causal
regularities in nature (which are held to be relations between universals). As its theory of universals is developed, Nyya recognizes entities which
are like universals, but which are, for theoretical reasons, excluded from their ranks (updhi). Udayana would famously chart the reasons for such
exclusion. These are: (i) A true universal must be capable of more than one instance. Spacehood would not be a true universal, as it can only have
one instance. (ii) Two universals which have the same exact instances are in fact the same universal, simply under two designations. (iii) Should two
apparent universals share an instance, while one is not entirely subsumed within the other, both are mere updhis. This criterion, which is the most
controversial of the universal-blockers, suggests that the operative notion of universal here is something akin to natural kinds. (iv) Any supposed
universal that would, if accepted, lead to an infinite regress (for example universal-hood), is not accepted. (v) There is no universal for individuators
(see below), as their ontic function is to introduce primitive differentiation. (vi) There is no universal for inherence (see below), as this would
engender a vicious infinite regress: inherence would require further inherence between it and its universal inherencehood, and so on.

e. Inherence
Inherence is a relation which is central to Nyyas ontology, by which qualities, actions, universals, and individuators relate to substances, by which
universals relate to qualities and actions, and by which wholes relate to their parts. In the first instance, the brown color of a cow inheres in the cow.
In the second, the universal brownness inheres in the quality trope brown. In the third, my car, a substance, is a single entity, which inheres in its
various parts. Thus, your touching just one part of my car is enough to justify the claim you touched my car simpliciter. Nyya contends that
inherence is a self-linking property. It does not rely on other instances of inherence in order to glue it to the two elements which it relates. Thus it
seeks to rebut regress arguments of the type advanced by recently by F. H. Bradley and by the classical Vedntin akarcrya (c. 9th century C.E.)
in classical India.

f. Individuator
Individuators are the finest-grained causes of ontological distinction. They are the means by which individual atoms within the basic kinds earth,
water, and so forth, and by which individual selves are ultimately particularized. Individuators for Nyyas ontology may be conceived as roughly
analogous to haecceities within Western philosophical discourse.

g. Absence
The ontological reality of absence, however attenuated, isaccepted by Nyya in order to account for both linguistic practice involving negation and
cognitive states which correctly ascertain non-existence of some kind.Vtsyyana argues that the positive knowledge produced by a knowledge
sourcegives immediate rise to knowledge of an absence insofar as one can reflect that if something was not made manifest at the time of the initial
cognition (and provided that the thing in question is ordinarily cognizable), it was absent. Uddyotakara famously argues that negation is often
perceptible: looking at my desk, I see the absence of a coffee mug, and such absence is located on the surface my desk. In this spirit, absence is
generally thought of as a qualifier (vieana) of some object or property, which is the qualificand (vieya). The four basic kinds of absences
accepted by Nyya in its mature period are prior absence (of something before it is created), absence-by-destruction (of an object after it is
destroyed), absolute absence (of something for some locus where it could never exist), and mutual absence (between two separately existing objects).

h. Causation

Naiyyikas speak of a cause or causal condition as something which is necessarily antecedent to aspecific kind of effect without being causally
irrelevant. Such causes are threefold. The (i) inherence cause, akin to a material cause, is the substratum out of which (or within which) an effect is
made (the threads which together make up a cloth). The (ii) non-inherence cause includes properties of the inherence cause which influence the
properties of the effect (the property of contact which inheres within the threads which make up a cloth). Finally, (iii), the instrumental/agential
cause(s). This third category is a kind of catch-all which includes everything aside from the substratum and its properties. Central in this category are
agents, their activities, and instruments used by then to produce effects. Out of the nexus of causal conditions which come together in the production
of an effect, Naiyyikas tend to speak of a most important factor as the trigger cause (for example the striking of a match against a rough surface
which produces a lit match).
In order to weed out unnecessary or unimportant factors from the causal nexus which produces an effect, Nyya includes the caveat that a proper
cause must not be causally irrelevant. Causal irrelevance occurs in various ways. For example, something x which universally precedes a certain
effect y, but whose relationship with the effect is mediated by some other factor z upon which it subsists is causally irrelevant. For example, a certain
artist may create a unique kind of sculpture, and she is thus identified as a causal factor in its production. She may have certain properties (hair color,
eye color, height) which also, by means of their subsisting in her, invariably precede the production of her sculptures. But since their participation in
the causal event is derivative, they are deemed causally irrelevant and unworthy of being specified as causes.

3. Philosophy of Religion
Nyya expressly conceives of itself as a rational defender of classical Hindu religious and theistic culture. Nyya-stra begins by claiming that
ascertainment of the ultimate good (nireya) requires correct apprehension of reality, which gives rise to a sustained epistemological/metaphysical
investigation of the kind the stras provide.Vtsyyanaargues that as a discipline of inquiry, Nyya is the support of all practices of legitimate
dharma. Jayanta claims that amongst the various research programs in the umbrella of classical Vedic culture, Nyya is of chief importance, since it
aims to defend Vedic tradition and its manifold subdivisions of study from the attacks of rival, anti-Vedic philosophers. Though the Nyya-stra
overwhelmingly focuses on theoretical issues and not praxis, it nonetheless recommends that students of Nyya engage in yogic practice (4.2.42) and
defends the possibility of enlightenment (4.2.44-5).
From fairly early in its history, Nyya specifically takes it upon itself to defend the existence of God (vara). Nyya primarily employs versions of
the design inference. Paradigmatic arguments include:
Primordial matter, atoms and karma function when guided by a conscious agent because they are insentient (acetaatvt) like an axe. As
axes, due to insentience, operate only when directed by a sentient agent, so too do things like primordial nature, atoms and karma.
Therefore, they too are directed by a cause possessed of intelligence. (Uddyotakara, NV 4.1.21)
Things like the earth have a maker as their cause, because they are products (kryatvt). (Udayana Nyyakusumjali, Fifth Chapter)
With various formulations like the above, and extensive supporting arguments, Nyya defends a version of the argument from design. Buddhist,
Mms (and later, Jain) philosophers respond by charging Nyya with violations of inferential boundaries: only by extrapolating far beyond the
correlation between ordinary products and makers is Nyya able to argue for a unique God-like maker of the world. A standard response, as seen in
Vcaspati (NVT 4.1.21) is that even in straightforward general-to-particular inductive reasoning, we employ some degree of inference to the best
explanation. This allows enough flexibility to infer new kinds of entities while appealing to correlations generated from ordinary experience.

4. References and Further Reading

a. Sanskrit Source Materials

JayantaBhaa. Nyya-majar. Critically Edited by Vidvan, K. S. Varadacarya.Vol 1. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute 1969.
JayantaBhaa. Nyya-majar. Critically Edited by Vidvan, K. S. Varadacarya.Vol 2. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute 1983.
Nyya-Tarkatirtha, Taranatha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, eds. Nyyadaranam: with VtsyyanasBhya [cited as NB above],
Uddyotakaras Vrttika[cited as NV], Vcaspati Miras Ttparyak [cited as NVT] & Vivanthas Vtti. Calcutta: Munshiram Manoharlal
2003.
Udayana. Nyyavrttikattpryauddhi of Udayancrya. Edited by Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

b. Primary Texts in English Translation

Gangopadhyaya, Mrinalkanti, trans. Nyya: Gautamas Nyya-stra with Vtsyyanas Commentary. Calcutta: Indian Studies 1982.
Iyer, S. R., Editor and Translator, Tarkabh of Keava Mira. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1979.
JayantaBhaa. Nyya-majar. Translated by JanakiVallabhaBhattacaryya.Vol. 1. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1978.
Jha, Sir Ganganatha, trans. The Nyya-stras of Gautama.Vols 1-4. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1999.
Phillips, Stephen and N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Epistemology of Perception: Gageas Tattvacintmai Jewel of Reflection on the Truth
(About Epistemology), The Perception Chapter (pratyaka-khaa). New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies 2004. [This also
contains the Sanskrit text.]
Potter, Karl H., ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.Vol. 2. Nyya-Vaieika. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977. [This volume contains
summary translations and helpful historical and conceptual introductions to early Nyya and its individual philosophers.]
Udayana. tmatattvaviveka. Translation and commentary by N. S. Dravid. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study 1995. [This also
contains the Sanskrit text.]
Udayana. Nyyakusumjali. Translation and commentary by N. S. Dravid. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1996. [This
also contains the Sanskrit text.]

c. Studies of Nyya Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Religion in English

Bhattacaryya, Gopikamohan. Studies in Nyya-vaieika Theism. Calcutta: Sanskrit College 1961.
Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyya Dualist Tradition. Albany: State University of New York Press
1999.
Chemparathy, George. An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayanas Nyyakusumjali. Publications of the De Nobili Research
Library, Vol. 1. Vienna: Gerold& Co.; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1972.
Ghokale, Pradeep P. Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic (with special reference to Nyya and Buddhism). Bibliotheca
Indo-Buddhica Series, Sunil Gupta, ed.Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1992.
Halbfass, Wilhelm. On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaieika and the History of Indian Ontology. Albany: State University of New
York Press 1992. [Though this text focuses on Vaieika, it is relevant given the great overlap between Nyya and Vaieika in metaphysical
theory.]
Matilal, B. K. Perception. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford 1986.
Matilal, B. K. The Character of Logic in India. Albany: SUNY Press 1998.

d. General Studies
Ganeri, Jonardon. Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. London and New York: Routledge 2001.
Matilal, B. K. Nyya-Vaieika. A History of Indian Literature, Vol. 6, Fasc. 2. Edited by Jan Gonda. Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz 1977.
Mohanty, J.N. Classical Indian Philosophy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000.
Phillips, Stephen. Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of New Logic. Chicago: Open Court 1995.

Author Information
Matthew R. Dasti
Email: mdasti@bridgew.edu
Bridgewater State University
U. S. A.
Categories: Indian Philosophy

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