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was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had theadvantage over Bautista

because Manaban was already pointing hisfirearm at Bautista when the latter turned
his back. The defense failedto establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause
that allegedlyproduced obfuscation.

Ramonito Manaban vs. Court of Appeals and


People of thePhilippines
FACTS:
At around 1:25 oclock in the morning of October 11, 1996, the victim,
Joselito Bautista, who was a member of the UP Police Force, took hisdaughter, Frinzi,
who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UPHealth Center. The doctors gave
him prescriptions and so he went toBPI Kalayaan to withdraw some money from its
Automated TellerMachine (ATM). When Bautista could not withdraw money, he
startedkicking and pounding the machine which caught the attention of
hereinpetitioner. Bautista said that the machine captured his card and thathe did not
get the money he badly needed. Manaban said that the PINentered was incorrect that
is why the card was captured. Angered bywhat Manaban said, Bautista then
continued kicking and pounding themachine. The former advised the latter to call the
customer servicewhich Bautista did but still kicked the machine. Failing to pacify
thevictim, petitioner fired a warning shot, and according to him fired thesecond one
hitting, and eventually, killing Bautista. Manaban said thathe feared that Bautista
would pull his gun first and might kill him so hefired his gun and shot Bautista.The trial
court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofthe crime of Homicide.
This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification respect
only to the award of loss of earningcapacity.This case is then submitted before this
court for review.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense isapplicable.
2. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrenderand obfuscation
are present.
RULINGS:1. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the
threerequisites to prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance whichmay exempt
an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawfulaggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of themeans employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) lack ofsufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the
persondefending himself. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault orat least
a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. Amere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not considered unlawfulaggression, unless the threat is
offensive and menacing, manifestlyshowing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There
must be an actual,sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts
the defendants life in real peril. In this case, there was no unlawfulaggression on the
part of the victim. The allegation of Manaban thatBautista was about to draw his gun
when he turned his back atManaban is mere speculation. Aggression presupposes
that theperson attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril soughtto be
avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such
actual or imminent peril to ones life or limb, there is nothing to repel
and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries onanother.
2. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report theshooting incident.
When the police arrived, Manaban surrendered hisservice firearm and voluntarily
went with the police to the police stationfor investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to
the benefit of themitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.On obfuscation, we
find that the facts of the case do not entitleManaban to such mitigating circumstance.
The threat was only in themind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not
sufficient toproduce obfuscation which is mitigating.41 Besides, the threat ordanger

People vs. Alconga


Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was
playing black jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners
in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave
signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and
he expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as a home guard.
While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came
along and said Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a swing of his pingahan, a
bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with
the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but
failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the
guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd
blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the ground.
The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow to the accused
who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to handfight ensued. The
deceased, looking already beaten and having sustained several wounds ran away.
He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one
which slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face downward besides many other
blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but
after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several
bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased absolutely/
Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if
there was reason to believe that he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent
that it is Alconga who is the superior fighter and his safety was already secured after
the first fight ended. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, selfdefense would have been valid, but that is not the case in the second fight. In the
second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of Alconga and as a result, he is
found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating circumstance (MC) of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. It should be proportionate to the act committed and adequate to
stir one to its commission

People vs. Genosa


FACTS: Marivic and Ben Genosa, who knew each other sinceelementary and were
3rd cousins, were married in November 19, 1983in Ormoc City. Their marriage, save
for the first year where, accordingto Marivic, she lived happily with Ben, had been
tumultuous andunhappy because of the many and frequent quarrels of the

couplewhich usually resulted in the cruel treatment of Marivic by Ben. Thiswent on for
about 10 or 11 years, occurring around thrice a weekwhen everytime the latter got
drunk. On the evening of November 15,1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas, his co-worker,
after having collectedtheir salary, went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO where they
stayedfor 3 hours and drank 2 bottles of beer, each. They then went to theGenosa
residence but Marivic was not there because, as sheexplained, she was out with her
cousin looking for Ben, knowing that itwas a payday and that he was probably out to
gamble again. Uponarriving later at the Genosa residence and finding Ben
drunkbecause of his staggering walking Marivic asked Ecel to sleep in the house
because she was scared that Ben might again beat her, butEcel declined for fear of a
repetition of an incident a year ago. Benwas in his usual unruly behavior, nagging and
yelling at Marivic, evencutting the antenna wire with a bolo to keep her from watching
TV. There were basically 2 incidents of attack made by Ben: 1) he
whirled Marivic, causing her to fall on the bedside, and two hours laterwhen 2) he
dragged her out of the room towards the drawer, holdingher neck. He tried opening
the drawer, failed, so reached for a bladeinstead in his wallet. At this point, she was
aware that he was going tokill her so she smashed his arm, causing the wallet and
blade to fall.She also subsequently smashed him with a metal pipe before running to
the childrens room, where she felt overwhelming selfpity and feltnauseous. Marivic
admitted killing her husband, however, by shooting him later on. She had distorted
the drawer where the gun was and shot him. The RTC charged Genosa with
parricide, giving her thedeath penalty.
ISSUES:
1) WON Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus(invoking BWS)
2)WON there was treachery in the killing of Ben Genosa1)No, but with 2 mitigating
circumstances2)None
HELD:RATIO: 1) Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of thebattered
woman at the time of the offense- she must have actuallyfeared imminent harm from
her batterer and honestly believed thatkilling him would save her life. Here, there was
a sufficient timeinterval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attackupon him. The reality or even imminent danger he posed endedaltogether the
moment he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed, notwithstanding the Courts
recognition of this special case that requiring the battered person to await an obvious,
deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to
murder byinstallment and that threatening behavior or communication can satisfy
the required imminence of danger. Aggression, if notcontinuous, does not warrant
self-defense. In the absence of suchaggression, there can be no self-defensecomplete or incomplete- thepart of the victim.Mitigating circumstance 1: Par. 9 and 10
of Art. 13 of the RPCThe cyclical nature of the BWS and repeated beatings over
a period oftime resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous toan
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without deprivingher of
consciousness of her acts.Mitigating circumstance 2: passion and obfuscation.This
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result ofan uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust acts or alegit stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason, with 1) there is anunlawful and sufficient act to produce such
condition and 2) noconsiderable length of time when the accused might recover
hernormal equanimity, as requisites. 2) There is no showing of the victims position
relative to appellant at the time of the shooting, nor that Marivic chose a specific
means of attacking her husband whichdoes not pose as a risk to her. Besides,

treachery cannot beappreciated as a qualifying circumstance when a killing is


preceded byan argument or a quarrel. JUDGMENT: Conviction of parricideaffirmed,
with 2 mitigating circumstances. Penalty reduced.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS


JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUEC.
facts

Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the crime of
murder for which Nicolas wasacquitted while Avelina was found guilty of homicide.
She appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon onJune 10, 1944 to
completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility for having acted in defense of her
honor, to find inher favour additional mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating
circumstance.
At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim, went
to the chapel of Seventh DayAdventists to attend religious services and sat at the
front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapelshortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last
one nearest the door.Upon seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelinas right
side from his seat on the other side of the chapel, and without saying a word, placed
his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had
in a pocket of her dress with theintention of punishing Amados offending hand.
Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on herleft hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 inchesdeep, which is mortal.
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing
his daughter approached her andasked her the reason for her action to which Avelina
replied, Father, I could not endure anymore.
Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada was
there and Avelina surrenderedherself. Lozada advised the Jaurigues to go home
immediately for fear of retaliation of Capinas relatives.
EVENTS PRIOR:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelinas handkerchief
bearing her nickname while it was washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and
professed his love for her which wasrefused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him, gave himfist blows and
kicked him. She informed her matter about it and since then, she armed herself with a
long fan knife whenever she went out.
2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina and
entered the room where she wassleeping. She felt her forehead and she immediately
screamed for help which awakened her parents and brought themto her side. Amado
came out from where he had hidden and kissed the hand of Avelinas father, Nicolas.
Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the day of the
incident (September 20, 1942) thatAmado had been falsely boasting in the

neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person. In the evening,Amado had
been courting the latter in vain.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility because she is justified inhaving acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor.
Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, presence ofprovocation and absence of intent in her favour
Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating
circumstance in this case
HELD:
Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely exempt
from criminal liability. To be entitled toa complete self-defense of chastity, there must
be an attempt to rape. To provide for a justifying circumstance of self-defense, there
must be a.) unlawful aggression, b) reasonable necessity of the mean employed to
prevent or repel it c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Attempt to rape is an unlawful aggression. However, under the circumstances
of the offense, there was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they were
inside the chapel lighted with electric lights and contained several people. Thrusting
at the bsae of capinos neck as her means to repel aggression is not reasonable but
instead, excessive.

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)

Excessive fines
Facts:

The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted."

The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally


aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which
public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance
those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561).

In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La
Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of
"Carnation" milk for thirty centavos.

As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good
terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in
this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of
Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of
commodity.

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by
the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months
and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all
other respects.
Ratio:

In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons,


corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or
of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred
from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense,
and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.

Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the


prohibition.

However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies
as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so
severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)

For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding,
that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings
up again two opposing theories

we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the
courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur.,
"Criminal Law" sec. 526).

the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is


excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of
proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed

Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:


SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor
more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than
ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article,
goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . .
..

Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price,
Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to
imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He
was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.
Issue/s:
1.
WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate
to the offence
2.
WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it
prescribed excessive penalties.
1.
Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too
excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in
the Executive Order?
2.
Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a
violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two


thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the
ceilings established in the Executive Order?

NO. because in overstepping the price barriers


Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos

The prison term must be so disproportionate to


the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what
is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.).

authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental


prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority

The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by


the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable
disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would,
under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.

Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual


for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

[in this particular case there are a number of issues, but the most compelling
is the 2nd and 4th issues]
DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE
WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS
REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
OR SELF-DEFENSE
- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to
the accused to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of
the evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful
aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being
hit in the forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense
makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that
was alleged to have constituted the unlawful aggression

NO.
In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not
measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one
violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial
system of price controls.

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING


CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE PREMISE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF
INTENT IN THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE
PART OF THE DECEASED?
- Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be
appreciated because the acts employed by the accused were reasonably
sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is
deemed sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
w/c must be proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by
itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as
contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish by competent
evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner.
HELD:
PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE
AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in imposing 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that
the attending circumstances should be considered. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should

People of the R.P. vs. Oriente


THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 11 Par. 1 and ARTICLE 13
Par(s): 3 and 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
"FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY (11")
"CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (13)"
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This case is about Manuel Orientes appeal of his conviction for the crime of
homicide. The appellant w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo
Vallo, hitting him with a lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal). In the
case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C
erred in finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the
R.T.C.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:

be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is,
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen
years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months

(2) Whether or not they should be granted amnesty.


Held:
The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of
the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that there was
a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of
Borjal's execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known
to Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving the
decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise. The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda,
relative of Borjal was also unreliable.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against late Borjal, but
court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they were
impelled by malice. In fact, prior to the execution, Beronilla sent the decision
for review. The lower court also found that Borjal was really guilty of
treasonable acts. The court held that the accused-appellants just acted upon
the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established.

People vs. Beronilla [96 Phil. 566 (1955)]


Facts:
Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and
continued to serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944
accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz
by LT. Col Arnold. Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by
Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to
try personsaccused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. He also
received a list of all puppet government officials of Abra, with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate saidpersons and gather against
them complaints. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under
custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also
appointed a 12-man jury composed of Labuguen as chairman and others,
plus Alverne and Balmaceda were prosecutors; Paculdo as clerk of the jury,
and Inovermo as counsel for the accused, later Atty. Ban-eras voluntarily
appeared as counsel for Borjal. The jury found Borjal guilty on all counts and
imposed death penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to
Headquarters of Infantry for review. Records were returned on April 18,1945
with approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of
Borjal. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to
Arnold, the latter complementing Beronilla.

Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not
be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after
actual liberation of the area from enemy control. The court held that any
reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

People vs Barroga 54 Phil 247


G.R. No. L-31563

January 16, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LUCIANO BARROGA Y SALGADO, defendant-appellant.

Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were
indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating
in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no.8, granting amnesty to
all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of
resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. All the accused ( except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by
the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission,
which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by
purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On
July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as
conspirator and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed.

M. H. de Joya and Briccio de Jesus for appellant.


Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the defendant
appeals from the judgment sentencing him to one year, eight months and
twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the Compaia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, with subsidiary
imprisonment, the accessaries of law, and the costs.

Issues:
(1) Whether or nor accused appellants are guilty of murder; and

The errors attributed by the appellant to the trial court are:

1. In considering the evidence of the prosecution more worthy of credit than


that of the defense.

relieve him from criminal liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience
must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a compliance with "a
lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule,
an inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has
said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving
just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what that
superior commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th
edition, p. 528.)

2. In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime of falsification of


private documents, and in imposing upon him the penalty of one year, eight
months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify
the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11,
and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial, notwithstanding the insufficiency
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant
committed the acts charged in the information in obedience to the
instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of argument, that
such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and
therefore does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil.,
433.)

The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full
knowledge of their falsity; but he alleges that he did so from data furnished
by his immediate chief, the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and only in
obedience to instructions from him.
As regards the data, we find it to be sufficiently proven that they were not
supplied by the aforementioned Baldomero Fernandez, but by the head of
the pressmen, Hermenegildo de la Cruz, and the defendant later collated
them with the books of the daily pressings.

There being no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed


from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez,


even supposing that he did in fact give them, and that the defendant
committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as such
instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield the appellant, nor