LocGov Digest Compilation (Class)

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
01 - PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO [2004] ......................................................... 1
02 - NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY AND ALEX DAVID VS. PAREDES [2004] ....... 3
03 - MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V DIRECTOR OF LANDS ....................................... 5
04 - TEJANO ....................................................................................................................... 6
05 - HEBRON VS REYES ..................................................................................................... 6
06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON VS. CA [1991] ........................................................................ 7
07 - VILAS, TRIGAS, AGUADO V. CITY OF MANILA [1921] ............................................... 8
08 - BARA LIDASAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [1967] .......................................... 9
09 - REPUBLIC V CITY OF DAVAO (2002) ........................................................................11
10 - GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. V. GANZON................................................12
11 - ALECHA V. PASION [2010] .......................................................................................14
12 - PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VS. COMMISSIONERS, COA [2010] ............15
13 - CAVESTANY ..............................................................................................................16
14 - KULAYAN V. TAN (3 JULY 2012) 675 S 482 .............................................................16
15 - PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [2012] ..........................................................17
16 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. YU [2012] .............................................................18
34 - AQUINO III V. COMELEC [2010] .............................................................................. 48

35 MMDA V BELAIR ........................................................................................................ 50
36 MMDA V. GARIN [2005] ......................................................................................... 52
37 - MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORTATION [2007] .......................................................... 53
38 - DISOMANGCOP VS. DATUMANONG [2004] .......................................................... 56
39 SERNA V. COMELEC [2008] .................................................................................... 59
40 ADORNA (KIDA) ....................................................................................................... 62
41 ABDON (ORDILLO ) ................................................................................................. 62
42 - CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA [1990] .................................................... 62
43 - BAGABUYO V. COMELEC ......................................................................................... 64
44 - SAMSON V AGUIRRE ............................................................................................... 65
45 TEJANO ...................................................................................................................... 66
46 - MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS MENDEZ ....................................................... 66
01 - PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMUL O [2004]
Digest by: Kathleen Villamin (sourced from Monique Lees digest)
Topic: Overview, Local Governments as part of the Executive Branch
17. SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991] ...................................................20
FACTS
18 PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE [2000] ................................................................................22
In 1998, then Pres. Estrada issued EO 48 entitled Establishing a Program for

Devolution Adjustment and Equalization in order to facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the
Local Government Code (LGC). Later, the program was renamed as the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF).
19 - TAN V. COMELEC [1986]..........................................................................................24

20 - TAN V. PEREA [2005] ...............................................................................................24
21 - BATANGAS CATV V. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD [2204] 25
22 - DAVAO NEW TOWN V. SPS. SALIGA (2013) ............................................................27
23 PROVINCE OF RIZAL V EXEC SEC [2005] ....................................................................29
24 - VELOSO, V. COA [2011] ...........................................................................................31
25 - ACCORD V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA ........................................................35
26 - ALDABA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188078, JANUARY 25, 2010 ..............................36
27 - FULLECIDO - NAVARRO 2010 .....................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
28 - NAVARRO V. ERMITA (2011) ...................................................................................39
29 DORIA.........................................................................................................................43
30 DOMINGO...................................................................................................................43
31 LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [2010] .....................................................................43
32 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC ..............................................................................45
33 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [APRIL 2011] ........................................................46
For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken
by the DILG. From 1999 onwards, the corresponding amount required to sustain the
program was to be incorporated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the IRRs governing equitable
allocation and distribution of said fund to LGUs.
In the GAA 1999, of the P96 billion allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal
revenue taxes, P5 billion shall be earmarked for the LGSEF for the funding
requirements of the LGUs provided that these funds will be released subject to the
implementing rules and regulations that may be prescribed by the Oversight
Committee. The Oversight Committee also passed several resolutions which
contained guidelines that the LGUs must follow in order for them to be eligible for
funding under the LGSEF (i.e. the LGUs had to identify projects and submit project
proposals that fell under the proposed criteria in the said resolutions in order to get
Page 1 of 67
a share in the LGSEF). Similarly, in the GAA 2000 and GAA 2001, P5 billion was
earmarked for the LGSEF.
2.
LGC Percentage Sharing Not Intended to Be A Fixed Determination. Sec. 285

of the LGC, which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the
LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed determination of the LGUs just share.
LGUs have no vested rights in a permanent percentage as Congress may adjust
the just share of the LGUs. Sec. 285 was merely intended to be the default
share to do away with the need to determine annually by law the LGUs just
share.
3.
Petitioner has no legal standing because he has no suffered injury. In fact, the
petitioners just share has even increased.
4.
Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact to the SC.
5.
Petition is already moot since the IRAs for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001 have
already been released and the government is now operating under the 2003
budget
As petitioner, Batangas Governor Mandanas assailed the provisos in the 1999, 2000
and 2001 GAAs and the corresponding resolutions, insofar as they each earmarked
the amount of P5 billion of the IRA for the LGSEF, as unconstitutional and void. It
was also argued that imposed conditions for the release of such funds were likewise
unconstitutional and void.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
1.
2.
3.
Violation of Automatic Release of Funds. The provisos in the GAAs and the
OCD resolutions violate the Constitution and the LGC. Art. X Sec. 6 of the
Constitution mandates that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically
released to them. Secs. 18 and 286 of the LGC of 1991 provides that the just
share of the LGUs shall be automatically and directly released to them
without need of further action. The use of the word "shall" must be given
compulsory meaning.
Anathema to Local Autonomy. To vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is part
of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy.
(Example: In 1991, the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the
Oversight Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines
were issued therefor.) Furthermore, the possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the diminution
of the latters share in the IRA.
Illegal Amendment to the LGC on Percentage Sharing among LGUs. The
Oversight Committee resolutions also made an improper amendment to Sec.
285 of the LGC on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said
resolutions allocate the IRA as follows: Provinces - 40%, Cities - 20%,
Municipalities - 40%; whereas in Sec. 285 of the LGC, it provides that: Provinces
- 23%, Cities - 23%, Municipalities - 34%, and Barangays - 20%. Petitioner
further point out that there was an instance when Exec. Sec. Romulo endorsed
to DBM Sec. Boncodin the release of funds from the LGSEF to certain LGUs In
accordance to with the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo. Thus,
the LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated.
[Issue/ Held: WON the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions violate
the Constitution and the LGC / YES]
SC RULING
[Procedural Ruling: (1) Petitioner has locus standi to sue since its interest pertains to
the LGUs share in the national taxes; (2) Petition involves a significant legal issue
and the nature of the present controversy warrants the relaxation of procedural
rules; (3) The SC will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable
of repetition, yet evading review.]
[Substantive Ruling: The SC cites the following as basis for its decision: Sec. 25,
Article II, 1987 Constitution The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments; Sec. 2, Article X, 1987 Constitution The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Control - one lays down the rules in the doing of an act; if not followed, one may
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or may decide to do it himself
Supervision - one merely sees to it that the rules are followed; if not followed, one
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform with the prescribed rules.
*Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
president's power over the LGUs to one of GENERAL SUPERVISION (and excludes the
power of control).
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
1.
LGU Shares Not Solely Determined by the LGC. The provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000, and 2001 and the assailed resolutions by the Oversight Committee
are not unconstitutional because Sec. 6 Art. X of the Constitution does not
specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the LGC.
The Congress can also determine what should be the just share of the LGUs
in the national taxes.
#1THE ASSAILED PROVISOS IN THE GAAS OF 1999, 2000 AND 2001 AND THE
OCD RESOLUTIONS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT ON LOCAL
AUTONOMY:
Section 6, Article X, 1987 Constitution Local government units shall have a

just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. [This provision mandates that (1) the LGUs
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shall have a "just share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be
determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to
the LGUs.]
The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of
the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the
vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee makes the
release not automatic. The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy 'means a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.' Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter
has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution,
are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the

national internal revenue.
#2THE ASSAILED PROVISOS IN THE GAAS OF 1999, 2000 AND 2001 AND THE
OCD RESOLUTIONS CANNOT AMEND SECTION 285 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
Section 284 of the LGC provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity,
the LGUs' share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This
percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except "in the event the national
government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon
compliance with stringent requirements set forth. This also means that the only
possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs' IRA is if the
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40
percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what
should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the
collections for the current fiscal year.
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%); (b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power

to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable'
and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and (d) Barangays Twenty percent

(20%).
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of

political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is

limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit. Any provision therein which is intended to amend another
law is considered an "inappropriate provision." The category of "inappropriate
provisions" includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel

v. Aguirre, the Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the
power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion
pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing
scheme.
The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is
conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not
do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
02 - NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY AND ALEX DAVID VS. PAREDES

[2004]
G.R. No. 130775 | J. Tinga | Digest by: Aaron Valdez
Page 3 of 67
c.
FACTS
Manuel Rayos, a Punong Barangay in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO against Alex David,
then President of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter after David allegedly
committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue, and conduct of the proposed
synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay (Liga) elections in 1997. One of these
irregularities was that the deadline of the filing of Certificates of Candidacy was set
on the third day prior to the election day and Rayos failed to meet the deadline
because he failed to obtain a certified true copy of a COMELEC Certificate of
Canvas. The Executive Judge issued a TRO in favour of Rayos, but David was
allegedly not properly served and elections for the Liga continued, hence David won
as President.
Rayos filed a 2nd petition for quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition against
David, the newly-elected officers of the Liga, and DILG Sec. Robert Barbers, alleging
the former won as President in a later elections held in June 14, 1997. Before both
cases were consolidated, Barbers filed an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents
power of general supervision over all local government units and praying the DILG
be appointed as Interim Caretaker to manage and administer affairs of the Liga.
Such prayer for injunctive relief was anchored on the ff grounds, among others:
a.
The DILG Sec exercises the power of general supervision over all govt
units;
b.
The Liga is a govt organization
c.
Undue interference of some local elective officials during the Municipal

and City Chapter elections of the Liga
d.
Improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by

David
e.
Incapacity of the Liga Board to address their problems properly
Petitioners (Davids) reply: Undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga
DILG USec Manuel Sanchez issued a Memorandum Circular directing all provincial
governors, vice governors, city mayors, vice mayors, and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod not to recognize and/or honor any Liga
Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex ofiicio members and
to disregard any pronouncements made by David.
On Aug. 4, 1997, respondent Judge Paredes issued the assailed order granting the
DILGs Urgent Motion for its appointment as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga.
Upon its appointment as caretaker, the DILG did the following:
a.
Provided supplemental guidelines for the 1997 elections
b.
Appointed Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan
Conducted synchronized elections of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga

Chapters
On October 10, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners
Respondents
The power of general supervision of the

president over LGUs does not apply to
the Liga because the Liga is not an LGU.
Sec. 507 of the LGC provides the Liga
shall be governed by its own Consti and
by-laws
The DILG Sec supervises acts of local

officials. Members of the Liga are local
officials, hence they are subject to the
supervision of the DILG Sec.
Assuming the Liga is an LGU over which

the President thru the DILG Sec has
power of supervision, there is no legal
or constitutional basis for appointing the
DILG as interim caretaker; such powers
go beyond supervision but are of control
eg altering, modifying, nullifying or
setting aside the actions of the Liga
Board of Directors
No legal or constitutional basis for the

DILG from refraining from taking over as
Interim Caretaker
They rely on Taule v. Santos which

provided that the DILG Sec has no
authority to pass upon the regularity or
validity of the election of the officers of
the katipunan ng mga barangay
SOLGEN: He agreed with the DILG did not merely exercise the power of supervision
but exercised powers of control as well.
ISSUE(S):
WON THE LIGA IS A GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUBJECT TO THE DILG
SECRETARYS POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS THE
ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT - YES
There is a difference between a barangay and the Liga ng mga Barangay
Barangay
Liga
the
primary
planning
and
implementing unit of government
the organization of all barangays, the

primary purpose of which is the
Page 4 of 67
policies, plans, programs, projects

and activities in the community, and
as a forum wherein the collective
views of the people may be
expressed,
crystallized
and
considered, and where disputes
may be amicably settled
determination of the representation of

the Liga in thesanggunians, and the
ventilation, articulation, and crystallization
of issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing solutions
thereto, through proper and legal means
The barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire
country. The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach
materialize and produce results. The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city
and provincial levels, automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively.
In Bito-onon v. Fernandez, the Court held that in Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the
DOJ ruled the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law,
whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local
Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in
the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto.
The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by
their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex
officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they
enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors,
city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is
the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of
ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than
the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the
bottom-to-top approach of development.
WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGES DESIGNATION OF THE DILG SECRETARY AS

THE INTERIM CARETAKER OF THE LIGA HAS INVESTED THE DILG WITH
CONTROL OVER THE LIGA YES
In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court defined supervision as overseeing, or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to
take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
In Taule v. Santos, the Court held the Constitution permits the President to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its officers
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
In Drilon v. Lim, the Court held that the supervisor or superintendent merely sees to
it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed.
When respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and
administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from
the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory
glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of
the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the
new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office
reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said
caretakership was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of
officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in
derogation of the Constitution.
In Bito-Onon, the Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as
it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral
protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines
already promulgated by the Liga.
HELD: The Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the RTC dated 04 August 1997 is SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
03 - MUNICIPALITY OF CATB ALOGAN V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS:
Petitioner attempts to have a certain parcel of land where the municipal

courthouse stands, be registered as property of the municipality.
Respondent argues that the land belongs to the insular government.

Page 5 of 67
Asks for the application of the doctrine in City of Manila v Insular

Government where the land was adjudicated in favor of the Insular
Government.
ISSUE:
WON the property belongs to the municipality or the insular government? The
municipality of Catbalogan owns the land
RATIO:
The Recompilation of Laws under Law 7 Title 7 Book 4, as well as Law 8 and
Law 14, allows for the formation of pueblos. Upon the formation of pueblos,
the casa reales (court-house) will be established. The municipality of
Catbalogan as the provincial seat of Samar, must have established its pueblo
and its casa reales in accordance with the laws in the Recompilation.
The court-house building was used and enjoyed quietly and peaceably and
without any opposition until the present time.
Adjudication of the lot to the municipality of Catbalogan as duly confirmed by
the Spanish Government may be inferred from the fact of continuous
possession.
If, in accordance with the laws during the Spanish period, the casa reales must
be established in the pueblo, it is only logical that the casa reales is established
WITHIN the pueblo, i.e., within the property of Catbalogan. In fact, the casa
reales were right at the town square, next to the church.
At present, the municipality's ownership of the land in question is bolstered by:
o the Civil Code. Art. 343 states that the provinces and towns may have
two types of property those for public use and those for patrimonial
use.
o Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code) under Section 2 provides that
municipalities may sue, enter contracts, and hold property.
The fact that there is no document or title is not unusual because it was not
common practice before to document and record everything.
Re the City of Manila v Insular Government argument, the difference is that in
that case, the property in question belonged to not to the municipality but was
held in common. (i.e., not as important to the pueblo as a casa reales)
FACTS:
This is a quo warranto proceeding case filed by a suspended mayor against the
acting mayor of Carmona, Cavite.
In 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron was elected Mayor while respondent Eulalio
Reyes was elected Vice Mayor, of Carmona, Cavite. The term was for four years
beginning from January 1952.
In 1954, Hebron received a letter from the Office of the President suspending him
from office which was to last until the final termination of the administrative
proceedings against him. In the letter he was advised that Reyes was to assume
office during the period of the suspension as acting mayor.
After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal
submitted his report thereon on July 1954. Since then the matter has been pending
in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to
be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to
expire, he instituted the present action.
ISSUE:
Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the
Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Held: No.
PETITIONER:
Petitioner: Respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and
had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who
claimed to be entitled thereto.
RESPONDENT AND SOLICITOR GENERAL:
Respondent was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and
lawful order of the President.
04 - TEJANO
The President has the power to suspend Hebron through section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 79(C) was inserted in the Administrative Code
by Act No. 3535, passed by the Philippine Legislature, during the American regime,
in line with section 22 of the Jones Law, pursuant to which "all Executive functions
of the Government must be directly under the Governor General or within one of
the Executive Departments under the supervision and control of the Governor
General."
05 - HEBRON VS REYES
Through section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President also has
the power To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare
Page 6 of 67
vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United
States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the (Philippines Islands) Philippines.
SUPREME COURT:
The procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative
Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to,
is mandatory. Supervisory and investigative authority are lodged with the provincial
governor and the provincial board.
If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the
same code, on the other, the latter being specific provisions, setting forth the
procedure for the disciplinary action that may be taken, particularly, against
municipal officials must prevail over the former, as general provisions, dealing
with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of the
Government.
President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid
down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the least
degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government; that
said supervision and control should be "confined within the narrowest limits"; that
in the distribution of powers among the governments to be organized in the
Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision". If
such were the basic principles underlying the organization of our local
governments, at a time when the same were under the control of the GovernorGeneral (the representative of the United States, which has delegated to us some
governmental powers, to be exercised in the name of the United States), with more
reason must those principles be observed under the Constitution of the Philippines,
pursuant to which "sovereignty resides in the (Filipino) people and all government
authority emanates from them" and the power of the President over local
governments is limited to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon obtained a preliminary

injunction vs the Secretary.
Ganzon then appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary.
SC issued a TRO v the Secretary and the CA.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS (GANZON):
The 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego
to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the
present Constitution was mere supervisory power
Denial of due process of the law
Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards Ganzon, which
arose from his alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
party and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional
and local elections; and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
Ganzon also requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come
ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988),
to no avail.
Ganzon requested postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds which was

unduly denied:
o
He was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement
A "vital"witness was also hospitalized, another lacked transportation
ISSUE:
WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials. (Yes.)
HELD:
TRO Lifted.
06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON VS. CA [1991]

FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City.
10 complaints were filed against him on various charges, among them, abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against

Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon
Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary
authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In
Page 7 of 67
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of

an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power
of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include
the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.
o
The SC is ill at ease with suspensions; injustice inflicted to the accused

if acquitted since right to office will have been nullified and to the
people who are deprived of the services of the man they elected.
The sole objective of a suspension:to prevent the accused from

hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence
and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records
and other evidence.
A preventive suspension may be justified. BUT, its continuance,

however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question
Suspension is temporary and Local Government Code provides:it may

be imposed for no more than sixty days. A longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, nothing less than tyranny.
Ganzon's guilt has not been proven; the length of his suspension
would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure
considerably-this cannot be allowed.
COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING RULES:

1.
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the
central government in the manner the law may provide;
2.
The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3.
The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause)

was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not
exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent
with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4.
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the

latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials;
5.
"Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation"

does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6.
The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far
ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged
originally; provided:
a. that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time
of suspension.
b. that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 LGC
07 - VILAS, TRIGAS, AGUADO V. CITY OF MANILA [1921]
FACTS:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioners Trigas, Vilas and Aguado are creditors of the City. After the
incorporation, petitioners brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to
them by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its
sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris.
In the case of Aguado, he sought to establish his claim as a charge against certain
property and funds held by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund (a trust
fund bequeathed to the city by a certain Don Carriedo for the establishment of
waterworks). Aguado took a contract with the Ayuntamiento of Manila to supply
coal for the use of the Carriedo works, and made a deposit to guarantee the
contract. When the city was occupied by the American Army it was indebted to him
for coal so supplied, as well as for the deposit so made. That the coal was bought
for and used in the operation of the Carriedo works is not denied. But there is no
evidence that the credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in trust under the
will of Carriedo.
PETITIONERS:
The City, under its present charter, is the same juristic person and liable upon the
obligations of the old city.
Page 8 of 67
RESPONDENT (CITY OF MANILA):

The present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable
for the debts of the Spanish municipality.
The corporate identity and corporate liability extinguished as a necessary

legal result of the new charter. The Ayuntamiento of Manila was a
corporate entity created by the Spanish government. When the
sovereignty of Spain in the Islands was terminated by the treaty of cession,
the municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. The death of the
principal ends the agency.
All the property (and property rights) of Manila passed to US for a
consideration (USD 20 million)which was paid. The US was justified in
creating a new municipality free from any obligation to the creditors of
that city.
HELD:
Background: Before the conquest of the Philippine by Spain, Manila existed. In
1571, the Spaniards occupied what was then and is now known as Manila, and
established it as a municipal corporation. From time to time there occurred
amendments, and, on January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city
government under a royal decree of that date. Under that charter there was power
to incur debts for municipal purposes and power to sue and be sued. The
obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter referred to, and are
obviously obligations strictly within the provision of the municipal power. To pay
judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the ayuntamiento of Manila, which
was the corporate name of the old city, to make provision in its budget. While the
contracts from which the claims in suit resulted were in progress, war between the
United States and Spain ensued. On August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by the
US forces, and its affairs conducted by military authority. On July 31, 1901, the
present incorporating act was passed, and the city since that time has been an
autonomous municipality. The charter in force is act 183 of the Philippine
Commission, and now may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the compiled acts of
the Philippine Commission. The charter contains no reference to the obligations or
contracts of the old city.
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of
the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict
with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted
sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public
law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with the military
occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power.
It is true that the United States acquired all the public rights of the City of Manila
under the Treaty of Paris. However, the relinquishment was limited to properties
belonging to the public domain and as such belonging to the Crown of Spain. It did
not affect property which, in conformity with law belonged to the City of Manila as
a municipal corporation. Since the new corporation is endowed with all the
property and property rights of the old, the new corporation also succeeds to the
contracts and obligations of the old corporation, and is subject to all of its liabilities.
In the Aguado case, the contract not having been made with special reference to
the liability of the Carriedo fund held in trust by the city, but apparently upon the
general credit of the city, the claim of Aguado did not constitute a charge upon the
Carriedo fund. Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The debt having
been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city liability.
08 - BARA LIDASAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [1967]
Prepared by Tobie Reynes
FACTS
1.
Ratio:
The argument of City of Manila loses sight of the dual character of municipal
corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are
of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a
governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of
the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic
person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of
local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its
governmental powers are conferred.
2.
[June 18, 1966] The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill No. 1247, which
became Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur.
a. The Act mentioned 21 barrios in the municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur that were to be separated from
said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of
Lanao del Sur.
b. It also established Togaig (one of the 21 barrios) as the seat of the
government of the municipality.
However, it turned out that two of the barrios (i.e. Togaig and Madalum) are
actually within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato; while ten
were part of the municipality of Parang, Province of Cotabato. These eleven
provinces were not part of Lanao del Sur.
Page 9 of 67
3.
4.
5.
6.
[Aug. 15, 1967] The COMELEC issued a resolution implementing the Act for
purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters, and other
election purposes.
[Sept. 7, 1967] The Office of the President, recommended to COMELEC that the
operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.
[Sept. 20, 1967] COMELEC stood by its own interpretation and declared that
the Act should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner Lisadan filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition in his
capacity as a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,
Cotabato, and as a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays for the Act
to be declared unconstitutional and for the COMELEC resolutions to be
nullified.
W/N REP. ACT NO. 4790 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR HAVING A DEFECTIVE

TITLE YES, IT IS.
1.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
1.
The Constitution provides that [n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill. [CONST. (1935) art. VI, 21 (1)]
2.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
The change in boundaries of the two provinces (Cotabato and Lanao del Sur) is
merely the incidental legal result of the definition of the boundary of the
municipality of Dianaton.
a. Thus, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away
need not be expressed in the title of the law.
The case of Felwa v. Salas is controlling. There, the title An Act Creating the
Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga, Apayao was
assailed as the provisions thereof in reference to the elective officials of the
provinces created were not set forth in the title. The Court ruled that a law
creating provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run
its affairssomething which is manifestly germane to the subject of legislation.
Assuming that the Act is unconstitutional for the arguments presented, it may
still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios. The limited title of the Act
still covers those barrios actually in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the Act.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
W/N THE PETITIONER IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST YES, HE IS.
1.
He is a qualified voter who expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to
vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected.
3.
4.
Rationale behind the constitutional mandate relied on by petitioner:

a. The provision contains two limitations upon legislative power: (1)
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration of heterogeneous subjects
under one statue; and (2) the title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
b. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment language of such precision as to mirror all the contents and
the minute details therein. It is simply to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.
c. The test of sufficiency of a title is WON it is misleading. Its substance
rather than its form should be considered.
The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur creates the impression that solely the province of Lanao de Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. However, it is a fact that the
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
town in Lanao del Sur.
a. In the Province of Lanao del Sur is thus misleading and deceptive.
COMELECs posture that the change in boundaries is merely an incidental legal
result only emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down
the title of the bill.
a. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to
another necessarily involves reduction of area, population, and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of the other; this is
as important as the creation of a municipality.
Felwa v. Salas is inapplicable as the Act in question is totally different, as the
statute involved here contemplates the lumping together of barrios from two
separate provinces under one statuteneither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of a new municipality.
W/N REP. ACT NO. 4790 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A WHOLE YES, IT IS.

1.
2.
The provisions of Rep. Act No. 4790 are inseparable. It is thus null and void in
its entirety.
When the bill was presented in Congress, the totality of 21 barrios (not just 9)
was in the mind of the proponent.
a. The Explanatory Note to House Bill 1247 read: The territory is now a
progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy.
Page 10 of 67
b.
c.
It can further be seen that Togaigone of the barrios located in

Cotabatowas established in the Act as the seat of the government
of the municipality.
With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population,
and sufficient income, the Court cannot now say that Congress
intended to create Dianaton with only 9 barrios with a seat of
government left to be conjectured.
Rep. Act No. 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. The COMELEC is PROHIBITED from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
09 - REPUBLIC V CITY OF DAVAO (2002)
which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, not
being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed
excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
2. The site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally
critical area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It
therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to
approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the
requirements for its issuance.
Petitioner filed MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the petition for
review.
Upon change of administration, respondent filed a manifestation expressing its
agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its
proposed project.
Doctrine: The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state
and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons.
Therefore, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
While the petition has been rendered moot, the court decided to address the
issue raised, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law.
FACTS:
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T.

ALVAREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his
capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI and ENGR.
BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENRENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Region XI
The City of Davao filed an application with the Environmental Management

Bureau (EMB), for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project,
the Davao City Artica Sports Dome.
The EMB Region XI denied the application, finding that the proposed project was
within an environmentally critical area. The City of Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact
Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy),
before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC, alleging that
1. Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor
within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the
EIS system.
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC, which granted
the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of the City of Davao
The proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City of
Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental
Impact Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment
Policy), before it can proceed with the construction of its project
2. It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue
a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.
Respondent: THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City

Mayor
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

1. There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction
No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which
requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law.
Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned
or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities
are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects
Arguments in the RTC: Its proposed project was neither an environmentally

critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the
scope of the EIS system.
It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a
CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.
(RTC in favor of Respondent) There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151
and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the
Page 11 of 67
EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are
mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have
significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, not being an agency
or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
ISSUES:
WON LGUs are required to comply with the EIS law (YES)
WON the site was within an environmentally critical area (NO)
RATIO:
Nature of LGUs
Section 15 of the Local Government Code, defines a local government unit as a
body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
conformity with law.
- It performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
- Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.
- Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits
or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.
- When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties,
an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate
activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local
affairs.
Environmentally Critical Area

The arguments, however, presuppose that a project is environmentally critical or
within an environmentally critical area. Respondent has sufficiently shown that
the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact
because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an
environmentally critical area.
The trial court found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental
protection and regulates certain government activities affecting the environment,
was established by Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Proclamation No. 2146 was later issued, proclaiming the areas and types of
projects which are regarded as environmentally critical and within the scope of
the Environmental Impact Statement System established under PD 1586.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not among the projects or areas enumerated
above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. Therefore, the project is not
classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. It
is therefore the ministerial duty of the DENR to issue the Certificate of NonCoverage.
10 - GREENHILLS EAST ASSO CIATION, INC. V. GAN ZON
FACTS:
Petitioner Greenhills East Association, Inc. (GEA) is the homeowners association of
Greenhills East Subdivision, a residential subdivision in Barangay Wack-Wack,
Greenhills East, Mandaluyong City.
Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides for the duty of the LGUs to
promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology. An LGU, like the City of Davao,
cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic
endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality
of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) sought to develop a 4,109-square meter lot (the land site) at
the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue in in Barangay with its owner, the San
Buena Realty and Development Corp. EGI wanted to build on the property a total of
85 storeys: 77 for mix-used and 8 for basement. It will be called the SKYCITY
Condominum (the project).
Section 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation shall

undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative.
Petitioner GEAs subdivision has been classified under Section 4, Article IV of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01 (MMZO 81-01) as an R-1 low
density residential zone. The subdivision consists of about 380 lots, a church (the
Sanctuario de San Jose), a school (the La Salle Greenhills), and a private road
network. On the other hand, the site on which the project will rise is classified
under the same ordinance as C-2 or a Major Commercial Zone.
- The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its
political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons.
Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the
coverage of PD 1586.
The EGI began the excavation and other works on the land without first getting a
clearance from the Barangay. The HLURB eventually issued to EGI a Certificate of
Locational Viability. The City of Mandaluyong likewise issued to it an Excavation and
Page 12 of 67
Ground Preparation Permit. HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and
Locational Clearance for its project.
of the residential zone, the proponent needs to get such approval. It is a

prerequisite for the issuance of a locational clearance and a building permit.
GEA wrote oppositions to with HLURB and to the DPWH. On June 4, 1998 the DPWH
advised the Building Official of Mandaluyong to require EGI to secure a
Development Permit and a valid Locational Clearance for its project from the
HLURB. In a separate development, EGI applied with the Barangay for clearance
covering its project. On July 15, 1998, however, the Barangay denied the
application.
*There were no arguments of the respondents stated in this case. Court only
rendered its decision.*
1. GEA invokes Section 10, Article V of MMZO 81-01. This section provides height
restrictions on a C-2 property that adjoins an R-1 property without an intervening
street or permanent open space that is over six meters wide and that the properties
have adjacent front yards, or even when there are none, the intervening street or
permanent open space does not exceed three meters in width.
2. The lots that Ordinance 128 converted into C-2 zones were only the lots between
Ortigas Avenue and Notre Dame Street that run parallel to EDSA but at some depth
from it. They are on the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue. Ordinance 128
describes the newly converted C-2 zones relevant to this case as "a lot deep along
Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre Dame Street." Because of the mention of Notre
Dame Street, which is found on only one side of Ortigas Avenue, GEA concludes
that the new C-2 zones did not extend to the other side of Ortigas Avenue where
Greenhills East Subdivision and respondent EGI's land site are located.
ISSUE
WON the SKYCITY Condominium project violate zoning areas. (NO)
RATIO
1. MMZO 81-01 applies to a situation where an R-1 property adjoins a C-2 property.
This has ceased to be the case between the land site and the subdivision after the
Mandaluyong City government enacted Ordinance 128 in 1993. That was before the
present case came up. Ordinance 128 converted certain R-1 zones to C-2 zones and
these included those on the western side of respondent EGI's land site, namely Lot
11, Block 4, and Lot 11, Block 20. Consequently, the subject land site ceased to be
adjacent to an R-1 zone and no longer suffered from height restrictions.
2. The purpose of the ordinance was to limit the land classification conversion only
to the side of Ortigas Avenue where the Wack-Wack Subdivision lay, it would have
simply stated, using the technical language applied to the other converted areas, "a
lot deep along the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre Dame
Street," instead of saying, "a lot deep along Ortigas Avenue." It could only mean,
therefore, that the ordinance intended to convert all the lots, on both sides and
margins of Ortigas Avenue up to the point where Notre Dame Street was.
3. If the purpose of the ordinance was to limit the land classification conversion
only to the side of Ortigas Avenue where the Wack-Wack Subdivision lay, it would
have simply stated, using the technical language applied to the other converted
areas, "a lot deep along the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre
Dame Street," instead of saying, "a lot deep along Ortigas Avenue." It could only
mean, therefore, that the ordinance intended to convert all the lots, on both sides
and margins of Ortigas Avenue up to the point where Notre Dame Street was.
3. Although the land site indeed adjoins Lot 11, Block 4, it does so not in the manner
that would properly call for the application of the zoning ordinance. Based on the
HLURB's observation, Lot 11 of Block 4 and the land site do not have common
boundaries that join them. Rather, they touch each other only at a certain point due
to the irregular shape of the properties, following the direction of the meandering
creek that lies between them. For this reason, it cannot be said that Section 10,
Article V of MMZO 81-01, which sets height restrictions, applies to the project.
4. The proposed 77-storey building would have mixed uses, part residential, part
office, and part commercial, which would not be accord with the patterns of land
uses suitable to C-2 zones. The buildings in C-2 zones, it suggests, should rise no
higher than 40 or 50 storeys from the ground. GEA invokes Article IV, Section 4,
paragraph 5 of MMZO 81-01, which states that establishments in a C-2 zone should
be sufficient to provide the needs of the district level. GEA infers from this that a C2 establishment must be such that it will provide the needs of the district level only
and that, beyond those needs, the establishment should be in High Intensity or C-3
Zone.
4. MMZO 81-01 contains no provision that allows the construction of not more than
40 or 50-storey buildings in a C-1 or C-2 zone and restricts higher buildings to a C-3
zone. There are just no height restrictions under the law for buildings located in C-2
zones, save probably for height clearances prescribed by the Air Transportation
Office. Houses of petitioner GEA's members are separated by fence and guarded
gates from the adjacent areas outside their subdivision. Their exclusiveness amply
protects their yen for greater space than the rest of the people of the metropolis
outside their enclave can hope for. Respondent EGI's project offers no threat to the
subdivision's privacy. It is on the other side of the fence, wholly unconnected to the
workings within the subdivision. The new building would be in the stream of human
traffic that passes EDSA and Ortigas Avenue. Consequently, it would largely attract
people whose primary activities connect to those wide avenues. It would seem
5. Lack of approval of the project by the homeowners' association or the Barangay

precludes it from proceeding. GEA invokes Section 14, Article V of MMZO 81-01
which provides that, where a proposed land use will necessarily affect the character
Page 13 of 67
unreasonable for petitioner GEA to dictate on property owners outside their gates
how they should use their lands if such use is not in contravention of law.
SC DECISION:
5. Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay
clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied
when the activity is in a permissible zone. The denial would otherwise be illegal.
Here, as discussed above, the applicable ordinance of Mandaluyong City does not
preclude the construction of the project on the land site in question over the
unreasonable objection of a nearby association of subdivision dwellers. Indeed, the
city or municipality to which the barangay unit belongs may still issue the required
license or building permit despite the withholding of the barangay clearance as had
happened in this case.
A FIFTH-CLASS MUNICIPALITY LIKE MIDSALIP IS NOT ABSOLUTELY

PROHIBITED FROM ADOPTING A SALARY SCHEDULE EQUIVALENT TO THAT
OF A SPECIAL CITY OR A FIRST- CLASS PROVINCE.
Local Budget Circular No. 64 dated January 1, 1997, in conjunction with paragraph
11 of Local Budget No. 56, allows local government units (LGUs) lower than special
cities and first-class provinces and cities to adopt a salary scheme for special cities
and first-class provinces. The adoption of a higher salary schedule needs only to
comply with the following requirements:
a.
b.
11 - ALECHA V. PASION [2010]

c.
FACTS:
Petitioners Paulino M. Alecha and Precioso M. Tapitan filed before the

Ombudsman (Mindanao) a criminal complaint against respondent municipal
officials of the Municipality of Midsalip, Zamboanga del Sur for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, Section 81 of RA 7160, Section 10 of RA
6758 and RA 9137.
Petitioners averred that respondent municipal officials conspired in unlawfully
adopting and actually collecting the salaries, representation and travel
allowances (RATA) and personnel economic relief assistance (PERA) of public
officials for special cities and/or first class provinces or cities, notwithstanding
the fact that the Municipality of Midsalip had no financial capacity to cover
such expenditures, thus seriously affecting the delivery of basic services within
its jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against respondent municipal
officials.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Ombudsman was in grave abuse of discretion (GAD) amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed their letter-complaint against
respondent municipal officials. Petitioners cite the admission made by
respondent municipal officials that they had been receiving salaries for special
cities even though the Municipality of Midsalip was a fifth-class municipality.
They also aver that the Municipality of Midsalip was financially incapable of
implementing a higher salary schedule.
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS GAD BY THE OMBUDSMAN? NO.
d.
e.
f.
g.
the LGU is financially capable;

the salary schedule to be adopted shall be uniformly applied to all
positions in the in the LGU concerned;
the salary schedule for the special and highly urbanized cities and first
class provinces and cities shall not be higher than that being adopted
by the national government;
in implementing a new and higher salary schedule, the salary grade
allocation of positions and the salary steps of personnel shall be
retained;
the adoption of the higher salary schedule shall be subject to the
budgetary and general limitations on personal services expenditures
mandated under Sections 324 and 325 of RA 7160;
in the case of component cities and municipalities, the salary schedule
to be adopted shall not be higher than that of the province or city in
the case of some municipalities, where they belong; and
the adoption of a higher salary schedule shall not in any manner alter
the existing classification of the LGU concerned.
The Municipality of Midsalip has complied with above requirements.

MIDSALIP WAS FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF ADOPTING THE CONTESTED
SALARY SCHEDULE AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:
5 years into the implementation of the higher salary schedule, the

Municipality of Midsalip had savings of P 14,913,554.68 in its bank
account.
Certified statement of savings of unobligated balances for the years 2002
and 2003 issued by the Midsalip municipal treasurer and accountant,
revealed repeated surplus accounts in the amounts of P7,709,311.64 and P
5,070,913.23 for the said years, respectively.
The certification of the Midsalip municipal accountant dated January 14,
2003 also stated that there was no realignment or disbursement of the
20% municipal development project for personal services expenditures
from 1998 to 2002.
Page 14 of 67
The Local Budget Ordinance of the Municipality of Midsalip was duly approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur and the Department of Budget
and Management. The Commission on Audit did not disallow or suspend the
foregoing disbursement and/or expenditures.
II. Constitutional And Legal Framework> B. RA 7160 [LGC]> 3. Declaration of Policy
[Sec 2, LGC1]> Local Autonomy and National Accountability
12 - PROVINCE OF NEGROS O CCIDENTAL VS. COMMIS SIONERS, COA

[2010]
FACTS
21 Dec 1994 - the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed

Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and
employees of the province.
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group
Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000
23 January 1997 the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97001-1015 suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from
the Office of the President (OP) as provided under Administrative Order No.
1036 (AO 103), and that the premium payment violated Republic Act No. 6758
(Salary Standardization Law).
President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in
the amount of P100,000.
The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued
Notice of Disallowance
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA.
COA affirmed the Provincial Auditors Notice of Disallowance
o COA: under AO 103, no government entity, including a local
government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the
President granting additional benefits to its personnel.
o Further, Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or
the Local Government Code of 1991 has to be harmonized with
Section 1212 of RA 6758.
o The insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance
company, was a duplication of the benefits provided to employees
under the Medicare program which is mandated by law.
MR: denied
ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of
P3,760,000 for premium paid by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949
officials and employees? YES. COA erred. Court rules in favor of the Petitioners.
PETITIONER:
1.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. (LGC)

(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
national government to the local government units.
2.
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units
through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum.
1.
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.1aw
3.
The payment of the insurance premium was paid from an allocation of its
retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance.
Such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle
of local fiscal autonomy which includes the power of Local Government Units
(LGUs) to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
While it is true that LGUs are only agents of the national government and local
autonomy simply means decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has
fiscal control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base.
RESPONDENTS:
2.
Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA
6758 and their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and applicable auditing rules and regulations enforced
by the COA
The grant of additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits in the present case, must have prior Presidential approval to
Page 15 of 67
3.
conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government

workers.
(Implied) Based on Section 2 of AO 103, 2 the President enjoined all heads of
government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits
or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the Presidents
prior approval.
COURT:
1.
2.
4.
5.
From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the
rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the
prohibition applies only to "government offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their
respective governing boards." Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the
prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior approval from
the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices
and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive
branch.
(SYLLABUS TOPIC) In other words, AO 103 must be observed by government
offices under the Presidents control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution which states:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
6.
modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not
need the approval of the President to be valid.
Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not
clearly establish that the medical care benefits given by the government at the
time under Presidential Decree No. 151917 were sufficient to cover the needs
of government employees especially those employed by LGUs.
Petitioner correctly relied on the Civil Service Commissions (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 33 (CSC MC No. 33), wherein all government offices
including LGUs were directed to provide a health program for government
employees, which included hospitalization services and annual mental,
medical-physical examinations.
The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402
(which expanded protection), recognized the deficiency of the state of health
care and medical services implemented at the time. Thus, consistent with the
state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under
Section 25, Article II20 and Section 2, Article X,21 and the Local Government
Code of 1991,22 we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization
and health care insurance benefits given to petitioners officials and employees
were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioners Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
13 - CAVESTANY
On the other hand, the President merely exercises general supervision over
LGUs under Section 4, Article X of the Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
3.
The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the
President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to
SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including government owned and/or

controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and
prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all forms of
allowances/benefits without prior approval and authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of
the President.
14 - KULAYAN V. TAN (3 JULY 2012) 675 S 482

FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped
in Patikul, Sulu y the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG).
Respondent Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a
group of armed male civilians redeployed to areas of Patikul.
Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG demanded
evacuation of military camps in Jolo.
Tan issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu province
and calling upon the PNP with the assistance of AFP and CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints and conduct general search and seizures.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON Proclamation 1-09 is valid. NO.
Page 16 of 67
Petitioners: General search and seizure in the pursuit of kidnappers violates the
Bill of Rights, Sec 2.
RATIO:
a.
Petitioners: Proclamation 1-09 violates the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 and 18,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers.
SC: Respondent cannot rely on Sec 465, par 1 (vii)3 as the said provision
expressly refers to calamities and disasters. Kidnapping cannot be considered
as a calamity or disaster. Par 2 (vi)4 is equally inapplicable. First, the AFP does
not fall under the category of a national law enforcement agency. Its mandate
is to uphold the sovereignty of the country. Second, there was no allegation
that the local police forces were inadequate. If they were, the recourse was to
ask assistance from the DILG Secretary.
The LGC does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently
vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted to the President. The intent behind the powers granted to LGUs is
fiscal, economic, and administrative. The LGC is concerned only with powers
that would make the delivery of basic services more effective and should not
be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers.
Respondent: Proclamation 1-09 is consistent with the LGC, Sec 16 and 465,
which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures
during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder.
SC: When the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President
who is authorized to exercise emergency powers (Article 6, Section 23) and
calling-out powers (Article 7, Section 7). The power to declare a state of martial
law is subject to the SCs authority to review the factual basis thereof. The
calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial
law, is bestowed upon the President alone.
The framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise
unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without
prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction, and their
prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations. But the
police is subject to the exercise by the President of the power of executive
control.
b.
Respondent: Nowhere does it limit the authority to declare a state of

emergency to the President alone. David v. Arroyo limits the authority to
declare a national emergency, and does not include emergency situation in
LGUs.
SC: It is the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to
security, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise
calling-out powers.
c.
Respondent: LGC, Section 465 in relation to Section 16 allows the governor to

carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies for assistance.
15 - PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [2012]

G.R. No. 19577017 July 2012
petitioners
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Sergio Tadeo, Nelson Alcantara
respondents Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, DSWD Secretary Corazon Soliman

summary
Petitioners assert that the budget allocation under the DSWD for its
CCTP violates the Constitution and LGC because it amounts to a recentralization of
basic government functions. SC ruled that unless an LGU is designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government even if it involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy and issued AO 16 s. 2008

setting the IRR for its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. This Conditional
3 The provincial governor shall: (vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary
during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
4
(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot,
lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so
requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is
happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;
Page 17 of 67
Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) provides cash grant to extreme poor households
to allow them to meet certain human development goals.
Under the AO, the DSWD, as lead implementing agency, institutionalized a
coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC (National
Anti-Poverty Commission) and the LGUs
Congress funded the program as follows: 2008: PHP298.5M, 2009: PHP5B,
2010: PHP10B, 2011, PHP21B.
Former Senator Pimentel, et al. challenged the disbursement of public funds
and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into
the local autonomy of LGUs.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP is with the legislation,
however, the object to the fact that it is being implemented through a national
agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions
of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have been
devolved pursuant to Sec. 17, LGC in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II and Sec. 3, Art.
X, 1987 Const.
They assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered results in
the recentralization of basic government functions, which is contrary to the
precepts of local autonomy and decentralization.
ISSUE
Whether the PHP21B budget allocation under the DSWD in the 2011 General
Appropriations Act (GAA) violates the Constitution and LGC. NEGATIVE.
RATIO
In order to secure the autonomy of LGUs, Sec. 17, LGC vests in them the duties
and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities. Par. (c),
however, provides an exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
programs and services.5 Unless an LGU is designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the GAA even if it involves the delivery of
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU
Ganzon v. CA: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State
shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure,
5
Sec. 17 par. (c), LGC. other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual GAA are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the LGU
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local
government units into mini-states.
Pimentel v. Aguirre: To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have
failed to prove the invalidity of the provisions under the 2011 GAA. The PHP21B
budget allocation for an intervention program formulated by the national
government can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of LGs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. DISMISSED I tell you.

16 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. YU [2012]
G.R. 189041; July 31, 2012; Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Digest by Reinerr Nuestro
FACTS:
In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program
pursuant to RA 7160 (the Local Govt. Code of 1991) which affected the Dept. of
Health along with other government agencies.
Prior to the devolution, Dr. Castillo held the position of Provincial Health
Officer II (PHO II) of the DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the
head of both the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services.
Respondent Dr. Agnes Yu, on the other hand, held the position of
Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned at the Integrated Provincial
Office in Isabela, Basilan.
Upon the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin
refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be
devolved to the LGU of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the
Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga where she would serve the remaining four
years of her public service.
In 1994, two years after the implementation of the devolution program,
Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.
On Feb. 23, 1998, RA 8543 (An Act Converting the Basilan Provincial
Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital
Under the Full Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of
Health, Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds
Therefor) was passed whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the
LGU of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH.The Basilan Provincial
Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of
PHO II was then reclassified to Chief of Hospital II.
Page 18 of 67
Dr. Yu was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given
the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II. One Dr. Domingo Remus Dayrit was
appointed by DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital II.
position was devolved to the local government. The said letter provided that only
the devolved health personnel who were not accepted by their Local Chief
Executive have been retained by DOH, the item positions per se remained in the
respective LGUs.
RESPONDENT:
Dr. Yu (Respondent in this Case) filed a letter of protest dated Sept. 30, 2003
before the Civil Service Commission claiming that she has a vested right to the
position of Chief of Hospital II. In her letter, she said that:
The Position of Chief of Hospital II to which Dr. Dayrit has been appointed is a
mere conversion from the item of Provincial Health Officer II she previously
occupied.
When the former Basilan Provincial Hospital was renationalized, the position of
PHO II which she then occupied was refused renationalization by the DOH
alleging that it was an LGU-created position created by the LGU of Basilan.
Hence, instead of being automatically reappointed PHO II later to be renamed
Chief of Hospital II pursuant to the Renationalization Law, she was instead
given an appointment still as a PHO II but under a coterminous status at the
Center for Health and Development, DOH which she refused to accept.
PETITIONER:
The Civil Service Commission (Petitioner in this Case) initially granted Dr. Yus
protest and revoked the appointment of Dr. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II. It further
directed DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit to appoint Dr. Yu to said position. But the
CSC reversed itself upon MR declaring that the position of PHO II was never
devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained by the DOH;
that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position, therefore, she
did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position created by RA 8543.
Dr. Yu moved to reconsider which was denied by the CSC. She then brought the
case to the CA on petition for review raising the sole issue of whether the item of
PHO II she previously occupied was a devolved position or a locally created one.
CA
The CA ruled in favor of Dr. Yu saying that she has a vested right in the Chief of
Hospital II position up to her retirement. It ratiocinated:
The CSCs ruling that there are two PHO II positions is not implausible but
contrary to the evidence at hand.
A perusal of the pleadings and attachments reveal that the PHO II position
was devolved to the Basilan Provincial Government.
A letter from one Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH, Local Government
Assistance & Monitoring Service, informed Governer Salapuddin that the POH II
ISSUE/RATIO #1:
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PHO II POSITION
PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY DR. YU IS A DEVOLVED POSITION. NO
Pursuant to the declared policy under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization, national agencies or offices, including the
DOH, were mandated to devolve to the local government units the responsibility for
the provision of basic services and facilities.
Devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and
authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
Sec. 17 (i) of the same Code provides that devolution shall include the transfer to
LGUs of the records, equipment and other assets and personnel of national
agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and
responsibilities. The personnel of said national agencies shall be absorbed by the
LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it
is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee.
Hence, it was MANDATORY for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the
position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. The absence of discretion is
highlighted by the use of the word shall both is Sec. 17(i) of the Code and in Sec.
2(a)(2) of EO No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order.
The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the
national government agency (NGA) personnel is when absorption is not
administratively viable such that it would lead to duplication of functions, in which
case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government.
In the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent
personnel shall be automatically reappointed [Sec. 2(a)(12)] by the local chief
executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond
June 30, 1992.
Evidence shows that the item position of PHO II was in fact devolved to the
Provincial Government of Basilan. Governor Salapuddin himself certified that said
position was included in the 1992 Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action
(OSCAS) received from the DBM with budget appropriation. He further declared
during the formal turn over program in 1993 that the item position of PHO II was
among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of Basilan. It cannot
be disputed that Dr. Castillos position was devolved.
Page 19 of 67
But Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved

position in the LGU for no other reason than that he wanted to accept only the item
position of PHO II. It was not shown that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not
administratively viable making Governor Salapuddins refusal whimsical.
Nonetheless, the refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo
which took effect by operation of law. To solve this dilemma, Governor Salapuddin
requested that Dr. Castillo be detailed instead at the DOH which was confirmed by
Secretary Juan Flavier in an order which provided that the Provincial Government of
Basilan would continue to pay her salary and other benefits.
Therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillos salary from the LGU of Basilan was
a necessary consequence of her devolution and subsequent detail to the DOH.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited
period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific
positions. If an employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may
appeal his case to the Commission.
The law afforded Dr. Castillo the right to appeal her case to the CSC but she
had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. The Court surmised that
since Dr. Castillo was looking at only 3 more years until retirement, she found it
pointless to pursue the matter.
Neither did Dr. Castillo complain when she was categorized as a devolution
non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she
was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not because of actual non-viability.
Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH Local Government Assistance and
Monitoring Service assured Governor Salapuddin that while Dr. Castillo was
retained by the DOH, her item position remained with the LGU of Basilan.
Moreover, Dr. Milagros Fernandez, Director IV of the DOH Regional Field Office No.
IX in Zamboanga City, clarified that Dr. Castillo never carried with her the item
position and the funds appropriated for salary and other benefits accruing to the
position of PHO II.
Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position of PHO II.
There are two essential elements of abandonment: (1) an intention to

abandon, and (2) an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into
effect.
Governor Salapuddins refusal to accept Dr. Castillo negates any and all
voluntariness on the part of the latter to let go of her position. The risk of incurring
the ire of a powerful politician effectively tied Dr. Castillos hands and it was quite
understandable that she could not don her gloves and fight even if she wanted to.
Under these circumstances with Dr. Castillos reabsorption by the DOH
which appears to bear the formers approval, her devolved position with the LGU of
Basilan was left vacant.
Thus, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and
consequently, acquired a vested right to its reclassified designation chief of
Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically reappointed by
Secretary Dayrit in accordance with the Guidelines for the Renationalization of
Personnel, Assets and Appropirations of Basilan Provincial Hospital.
Considering that Dr. Yu had already retired, the SC upheld the ruling of the
CA that since reappointment was no longer feasible, she should at least recover her
salaries for the services she had rendered.
However, Dr. Yu admitted that she received her salary as PHO II converted
to Chief of Hospital II for the period August to November 2001. Therefore, she
should receive her salary and benefits as Chief of Hospital from Dec 2001 up to her
retirement in aug. 2004.
17. SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991]
FACTS:
ISSUE/RATIO #2:
MAY DR. CASTILLO BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE ABANDONED HER POSITION
FOR CONSISTENTLY FAILING TO ASSERT HER RIGHTS THERETO? NO
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by

the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In
order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.
Petitioner Governor San Juan prays for the nullification of CSC resolutions
upholding the appointment of respondent, Almajose as Provincial Budget
Officer (PBO) of Rizal in this petition for certiorari.
Previously, the position of PBO for Rizal was left vacant by its former holder.
Petitioner informed DBM Region IVs director, Abella that a certain Dalisay
Santos assumed office as Acting PBO (Santo was the Municipal BO of Taytay,
Rizal before discharging functions of acting PBO). Futhermore, petitioner
requested Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos.
However, Abella recommended the appointment of Almajose on the basis of a
comparative study of all MBOs of Rizal. According to Abella, respondent was
the most qualified since she was the only CPA among the contenders
DBM USec Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose
In a letter addressed to Sec Carague, petitioner reiterated the request to
appoint Santos, unaware of the appointment made by Cabuquit
Page 20 of 67
DBM regional director Galvez wrote the petitioner that Santos and his other
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget
Circular No. 31 and w/n through oversight further required the petitioner to
submit at least three other qualified nominees
Petitioner, having been informed of Almajoses appointment protested on the
ground that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO and that
under EO 112, it is the governor, not the regional director, who has the power
to recommend nominees for the position
DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioners protest is not meritorious
considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling up the position
since none of the petitioners nominees met the requirements.
Petitioners MR was denied by DBM Sec.
Subsequently, petitioner wrote the CSC reiterating his protest. CSC issued
resolutions upholding Almajoses appointment, hence this petition.
ISSUE/HOLDING/RATIO:
W/N private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO
pursuant to the appointment made by DBMs USec upon recommendation of DBM
Region IVs director. NO. Petition granted, appointment of respondent Cecilia
Almajose is nullified.
PETITIONER:
Sole right and privilege to recommend nominees belong to petitioner and the
appointee should come only from his nominees. [see Sec 1 of EO 112 6] The phrase
"upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given
mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 257 and Art. X, Sec. 2 8
6 Sec 1 (EO 112). All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed
henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under
the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.
7 Sec. 25 (Art II, 1987 Consti). The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
8 Sections 2 and 3 (Art X, 1987 Consti):
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
thereof. His power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere

administrative issuance of DBM.
RESPONDENT:
As required by E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the
recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for
appointment to the position. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local
chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise
by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in
effect give E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended
therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is
directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly
authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a
similar role in the LGUhence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said
officer from the LGU, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing
official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with,
provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position
SC:
The issue involves the application of local autonomy; where a law is capable of
two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power and the other beneficial to
local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise of
greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. [see Art.
II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2] Thus, when the CSC interpreted the recommending
power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter
and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary
jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own
funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 9 is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set
aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees
to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for
new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
9 Sec. 6.0 (Local Budget Circular No. 31). The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy
where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
Page 21 of 67
18 PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE [2000]

18 - Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Alexander Aguirre in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Emilia Boncodin in her capacity as DBM Secretary | J. Panganiban | En
Banc
Case: Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking:
1.
To annul Sec. 2 of AO 372; and
2.
To enjoin respondents from implementing Sec. 4 of AO 372
FACTS:
12/27/1997 Pres. Ramos issued AO 372 as a government fiscal management

measure in response to the economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation for the purpose of maintaining economic stability and sustain the
countrys growth momentum.
The assailed provisions of AO 372 states:
1.
Sec. 1. All government departments and agencies, including SUCs,
GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will
reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services
2.
Sec. 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) of the emerging fiscal
situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld.
Petitioner Pimentel contends that:

1.
The President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the Constitution which vests in the
President only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the
principle of local autonomy
2.
Sec. 4 or the directive to withhold 10% of the LGUs IRA is in
contravention of Sec. 286 of the LGC and Sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to the LGUs their share in the national
internal revenue
SolGen, in behalf of respondents, claims on the other hand that:

1.
The President is merely exercising the power of supervision over
LGUs as AO 372 was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties brought about
by the peso devaluation.
2.
AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy because it merely
directs LGs to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for
non-personal services by at least 25%
3.
The withholding of 10% of the IRA of LGUs does not violate the
statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue
shares, because such withholding is temporary in nature pending the
assessment and evaluation by the DBCC of the emerging fiscal situation.
ISSUE:
W/N (a) Sec. 1 insofar as it directs LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and
(b) Sec. 4, which withholds 10% of the LGUs IRA, are valid exercises of the
Presidents power of general supervision over LGs.
HELD:
(a) Sec. 1 is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize
the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Sec. 1 is a
valid exercise of the Presidents power of general supervision over LGUs.
(b) Sec. 4 effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments,
thus, invalid.
RATIO:
(a) While the wordings of Sec.1 have a rather commanding tone, and while
the Court agrees with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of
the LGC (Requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: 1. Unmanaged public sector deficit of the national govt, 2.
Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representative, and president of the various leagues of local governments,
and 3. Corresponding recommendation from the DOF, DILG, and DBM
Secretaries) have not been satisfied, the Court accepted the SolGens
assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures that will
reduce total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The
language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that
emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. It
is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs
and their officials who do not follow such advice.
Page 22 of 67
Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the

powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the
directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.
(b) Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly

local fiscal autonomy. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly
to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year
and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall"
is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the

President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely
alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at
whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are
subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
2) THE EXTENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AUTONOMY
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,

1998, of 10 % of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by
the DBCC of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although
temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held
back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of
the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention
is prohibited.
OTHER NOTES: (JUST IN CASE MAAM ASKS)
The Court deemed it important to define certain crucial concepts:
1) the scope of the Presidents power of general supervision and
2) the extent of the local governments autonomy
1.
THE SCOPE OF THE PRESIDENTS POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION
Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments. This provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control
In the recent case of Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision
was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their
discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to
do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local
governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
Local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization." (Ganzon v. CA)
Decentralization means the devolution of national administration, not power, to
local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as
the law may provide.
In Limbona v. Mangelin, the Court explained that autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive
and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency."
Page 23 of 67
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. As the Court stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
19 - TAN V. COMELEC [1986]
July 11, 1986 | Alampay | En Banc
FACTS
comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

SC DECISION
The case cannot be moot and academic because the legality of the plebiscite itself is
challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites.
Pivotal issue revolves around the interpretation of C.A11.S3. Plain and simple logic
will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. There is no way to
reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional
requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. The draft of the legislation contemplates a plurality of areas to
participate in the plebiscite, including people living in the area of the proposed new
province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent
with the requirements in the Constitution.
Petitioners who are residents of Negros Occidental filed a case for prohibition to
stop the COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite pursuant to B.P. 885, an act
creating a new province to be known as Negros del Norte. The plebiscite sought to
be restrained was held as scheduled. Petitioners filed a supplemental petition to
plead for writ of prohibition against COMELEC to desist from issuing the official
proclamation of the results.
The created province does not even satisfy the area requirement.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
Respondent: Soccorro Perea
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code and Consti. Art. XI, Sec. 3.
Keywords: Cockfighting, Damages and Injunction, Implied Repeal
C.A11.S3. No provincemay be createdexcept in accordance withthe local

government code, and subject toa plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
LGC.S197. A province may be created if it hasa territory of at least three thousand
five hundred square kilometers
The requisite area in the LGC has not been satisfied.
Limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the
new province is violative of the Constitution.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS
B.P. 885 should be accorded the presumption of legality. The law is not void on its
face and the petition does not show a clear infringement of the Constitution.
The case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte.
The remaining cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental not included in the
area of Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit
or units affected."
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del
Norte and the appointment of the officials are also null and void.
20 - TAN V. PEREA [2005]
Petitioner: Leonardo Tan, Roberto Uy, Lamberto Te
Tinga, J. (2005)
FACTS:
1. 1974 - PD 499 (Cockfighting Law) was enacted. Sec. 5 (b) provides that only one
cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities of
municipalities with a population of over 100K, two cockpits may be established,
maintained and operated.
2. 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) was enacted. Among many others, the LGC
thru Section 447(a)(3)(v) empowered the sangguniang bayan (SB) to authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate
cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks.
3. 1993 - The (SB) of Daanbantayan enacted Municipal Ordinance (MO) No. 6, sec.
5 thereof provides that the number of cockpits to be allowed in Daantanyan shall
be based in PD 449 provided however that the ordinance may be amended for
purposes of establishing additional cockpits if the municipal population so warrants.
4. 1993 - Shortly after MO 6, MO 7 was enacted amending Section 5 of MO 6
allowing 3 cockpits in Daanbantayan.
B.P. 885 plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte
Page 24 of 67
5. 1995 - Petitioner Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission (MGC)
for the issuance of a permit/licese to establish and operate a cockpit in the
Municipality of Daanbantayan.
7. At the time of Tan's application, Respondent Perea is a holder of a franchise and
license to operate a cockpit in the municipality, valid until 2002.
8. The MGC recommended to Mayor Te that a permit be issued to Tan.
9. 1996 - Mayor Te issued a permit to Tan valid from Jan - Dec 1996. [Resolution 7896 eventually conferred to Tan a franchise for a period of 10 years (1996-2006)]
10. Perea filed a complaint for damanges with prayer for injunction against Tan and
Te.
11. Perea prayed for damages for the injury caused to her own business and for the
nullification of the permit and a permanent injunction be issued against Mayor Te
preventing Tan from conducting cockfights in the municipality and Te from issuing
any authority for Tan.
ARGUMENT OF TAN:
with the Cockfighting Law. What the provision did was to transfer to the SB the
powers that were previously conferred on the MGC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for
damages which does not contain a prayer to declare the ordinance valid. YES.
2. WON the LGC has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law. NO
SC:
1. The action is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An
action for injunction will require judicial determination WON there exists a right in
esse which is to be protected. The specific allegations in the complaint puts into
question the legal basis for allowing tan to operate another cockpit in
Daanbantayaan. The answer also posed as defense the valid effect of MO 7.
Therefore, the validity of MO 7 became a justiciable matter.
MO 6 and 7 violated Section 5 of the Cockfighting Law. (See Fact 1 for text of Sec. 5)
2. Since the Cockfightiing Law was not among the laws expressly repealed in the
LGC, the test of implied repeal must be applied. Applying the test, Section 5 of the
Cockfighting Law and Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC can stand together. While the
SB retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more
than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a
population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be
established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity
of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is
not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such
power may be exercised. In short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the
power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time. The SB is the sole issuing
authority but it can only issue as much as permit as the Cockfighting Law allows.
RTC - Dismissed the complaint. It ruled that since the case was only for damages, it
cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. It ruled that there was no evidence to
show plaintiff had actually suffered damages. In the MR by Perea, the RTC stated
that MO 6 and 7 were valid. It noted that while there seemed to be a conflict
between the ordinances and PD 499, any doubt in the interpretation should be
resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the LGU following thee principle of
devolution under the LGC.
Obiter: If Section 447(a)(3)(v) is construed as vesting an unlimited discretion to the

sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective
jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a
certain distraction in the daily routine of life in a municipality. If the arguments of
the petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred
from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and
cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v).
CA - Reversed the decision as to the injunction but upheld that Perea was not
entitled to damages. It ruled that Section 447 (a)(3)(v) of the LGC vested in SB the
power to authorize and license the establishments of cockpits but did not do away
21 - BATANGAS CATV
PANLUNGSOD [2204]
LGC empowered the SB of each municipality to grant franchises and enact

ordinances authorizing the establishment, licsneing, opration and maintenance of
cockpits. Thru such authority, MO 6 and 7 was promulgated. Section 447(a)(3)(v) Powers, Duties, Function and Compensation
xxx
(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting
and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not be
prejudiced;
ARGUMENT OF PEREA:
Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.
V.
CA,
BATANGAS
September 29, 2004
CITY
SANGGUNIANG
G.R. 138810
Page 25 of 67
SUMMARY:
ARGUMENTS:
Resolution No. 210 granted petitioner to operate a CATV system and charge its
subscribers with any increase in rates subject to the approval of the respondent.
Petitioner increased its subscriber rates without the approval of the respondent.
The court held that said Resolution is invalid and that an LGU cannot regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators due to NTCs exercise of regulatory
power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies as provided for by the
national legislature. A municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state
legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject matter.
Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only prescribe regulations to the use
of public properties or the construction of a CATV system.
Petitioner: The LGC of 1991 does not authorize respondents to regulate the CATV
operations. As per E.O. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV
operations, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
FACTS
The Sangguniang Panlungsod (respondent) enacted Resolution No. 210

granting Batangas CATV (petitioner) a permit to construct, install, and operate
a CATV system in Batangas City and authorizing them to charge its subscribers
the specified maximum rates with any increase subject to their approval. When
the petitioner increased its rates from Php 88 to Php 180 per month, the mayor
threatened to cancel their permit unless they secure the approval of the
respondent.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for injunction alleging that the
respondent had no authority to regulate the subscriber rates because the
National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to
regulate CATV operators in the Philippines pursuant to E.O. 205.
The Trial Court enjoined the respondents from cancelling the petitioners
permit to operate and from interfering with their right to fix their service rates,
which needs no prior approval from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It held that
the enactment of Resolution 210 violates the States deregulation policy as set
forth by the NTC commissioner with the NTC as the sole government agency
that can regulated CATV operations and that the LGU cannot exercise
regulatory power without legislation.
The CA reversed the trial court holding that although the NTC is the one
granting the certification, the respondent is not precluded from regulating the
operation of the CATV in the locality pursuant to the powers vested by the LGC
of 1983. Under the General Welfare Clause (Sec. 177 of the LGC of 1983), the
LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies
wherein the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided and
the fixing of service rates is lawful. Therefore, in violation of the requirements
expressed in Resolution No. 210, the City shall have the right to withdraw the
franchise.
Petitioners MR was denied.
Respondent:
1.
2.
Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant of Section 177 (c ) and (d) of the
LGS of 1983, which authorizes the LGUs to regulate businesses.
Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract, being a grant of a
franchise to operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. 205 amended its
terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts
MAIN ISSUE: W/N A LGU CAN REGULATE THE SUBSCRIBER RATES CHARGED
BY CATV OPERATOR WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
HELD: NO, the national government, through the NTC, has assumed regulatory
power over the CATV industry. Several presidential issuances 10 reinforced the NTCs
exercise of regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies,
including fixing of subscriber rates. A municipality cannot regulate the same
conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully
covers the subject matter. Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only
10
P.D. No. 1512 (President Marcos)

Established a monopoly of the CATV industry by granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive
franchise to operate CATV system, prescribed their subscriber rates and terminated all
franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by
local governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government.
LOI No. 894 (President Marcos)
Vested upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over the
operations of Sining Makulay, Inc.
E.O. No. 546 (President Marcos)
Integrated the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to
form the National Telecommunications Commission.
E.O. No. 205 (President Aquino)
Opened the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines
Mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the
necessary implementing rules and regulations.
E.O. No. 436 (President Ramos)
Prescribed policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the Philippines and restated the
NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations
Page 26 of 67
prescribe regulations to the use of public properties or the construction of a CATV

system.
RATIO:
establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its
sovereignty or absolve itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district.
ISSUE: W/N R.A. 7610 REPEALED E.O. 205 - NO
The Sanguniang Panlungsod has been empowered to enact ordinances and

approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of the LGC of 1983, which is a
delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to the LGUs to
prescribe regulations for the protection of their constituents and maintain peace
and order within their territorial jurisdictions.
The CATV operations may be regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause due to its use of public properties to reach its subscribers but in this case, the
respondents strayed from its limits through its violation of the mandate of existing
laws and the State deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as an agent of
the national legislature. However, Resolution No. 210 contravenes E.O. 205 and
E.O. 436 in so far as it permits the respondents to usurp the power exclusively
vested in the NTC, particularly the fixing of subscriber rates. In De la Cruz v. Paraz
Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the
general welfare clause [] must not be inconsistent with the laws
or policy of the state.
Under its general powers, a municipality cannot regulate the same conduct
that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the
subject matter.
E.O. 205, as a general law, mandates the regulation of CATV operations by
the NTC; an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of
said law. Municipal ordinances are subordinate to the laws of the state; therefore,
an ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and state-wide
application is held to be invalid. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent
with the general law. The basic relationship between the national legislature and
the LGUs has not been weakened by the new provision in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Congress still retains control of the
LGUs, although in a reduced degree. The national legislature is still the principal of
the LGUs, which cannot defy or modify or violate it.
E.O. 436 provided for the deregulation of cable television industry and the
LGUs are bound to follow. LGUs cannot defeat national policy through enactments
of contrary measures. Therefore, petitioner may increase its subscriber rate without
respondents approval, as per MC 06-2-81 and the implementing guidelines of R.A.
7925. It bears stressing that municipal corporations are bodies created as local units
of self-government AND as government agencies of the states. The legislature, by
Argument of the Respondent: The regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by the
LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7610), a handiwork of the national law making body. Thus, R.A.
7610 repealed E.O. 205.
COURT:
There is no basis to conclude that R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205. The repealing clause
of R.A. 7610 contains specific laws and parts it has repealed but did not mention
E.O. 205.
There is also no implied repeal by R.A. 7610, E.O. 436, MC 8-9-95, and the IRR of
R.A. 7925 (Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines) shows that the
NTCs regulatory power over the CATV operations is continuously recognized.
On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. 205 and R.A. 7610, the proper action
is to harmonize them if possible. Thus, NTC has exclusive jurisdiction over matters
affecting CATV operations, including the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing
precludes LGUs from exercising its general power to prescribe regulations for the
general welfare of their constituents.
ISSUE: W/N E.O. 205 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION

AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS - NO
Respondents Argument: E.O. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts because Resolution No. 2010 was a grant of franchise to
the petitioner.
COURT:
There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV systems.
Assuming there was one, it has been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D.
1512, terminating all franchises for the operation of CATV system previously grants
be the local governments. Only the NTC may issue Provisional Authority or
Certificate of Authority for the operation and maintenance of CATV system.
22 - DAVAO NEW TOWN V. SPS. SALIGA (2013)
J. Brion
Petitioner: Davao New Town Development Corporation
Respondents: Sps. Saliga and Sps. Ehara
Page 27 of 67
6.
The respondents submitted, among others, pertinent tax declarations showing

the property was agricultural as of 1985.
FACTS:
On 5 February 1998, respondents filed before Office of the PARAD in Davao City a
complaint for injunction, cancellation of titles and damages against the petitioner.
PETITIONER
1.
The petitioner alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith
from the previous owners (Paz Flores and Elizabeth Nepomuceno) in 1995.
2.
At that time, the alleged tenancy relationship between the respondent and
Eugenio had already expired following the expiration of their lease contract in
1986.
3.
Prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the Zoning Administrator confirmed
that the property was not classified as agricultural. The affidavit of non-tenancy
executed by the vendors affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural
lessees on the property.
4.
The property had already been classified to be within an urban/urbanizing

zone in th 1979-2000 Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao City that was
duly adopted by the City Council of Davao City and approved by the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board/HLURB)
RESPONDENTS
1.
The respondents claimed that they and their parents, from whom they took
over the cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as
early as 1965.
2.
On 12 August 1981, the respondents and Atty. Mendiola, originally registered

owner of the 2 parcels of land situated in Catalunan Pequeno, Davao City,
executed a five-year lease contract.
3.
While they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations
over the landholding, the respondents claimed that the instrument was actually
a device Eugenio used to evade the land reform law.
4.
Pursuant to the provisions of PD 27, they, as tenants, were deemed owners of

the property beginning October 21, 1972 (the PDs effectivity date); thus, the
subsequent transfer of the property to the petitioner was not valid.
5.
The petitioner could not have been a buyer in good faith as it did not verify the
status of the property whether tenanted or not tenanted prior to its
purchase.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses
prior to June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage of RA 6657 YES
The City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning resolutions and
ordinances. Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 (the then LGC), municipal and/or city
officials are specifically empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission."
This power of the local government units to reclassify or convert lands to nonagricultural uses is not subject to the approval of the DAR.
While DNTDC attached the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification only in its MR, the
DARAB should have considered it, especially in the light of the various documents
that DNTDC presented to support its position that the property had already been
reclassified as non-agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988.
Considering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June 15, 1988, it is
removed from the operation of R.A. No. 6657. Only those parcels of land
specifically classified as agricultural are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land
otherwise classified is beyond its ambit.
NO VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE PROPERTY ACCRUED TO THE RESPONDENTS

UNDER P.D. NO. 27
Under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn agricultural lands are "deemed
owners" of the land that they till as of October 21, 1972. Under these terms, vested
rights cannot simply be taken away by the expedience of adopting zoning plans and
ordinances reclassifying an agricultural land to an "urban/urbanizing" area.
However, this policy should not be interpreted as automatically vesting in them
absolute ownership over their respective tillage. The tenant-farmers must still first
comply with the requisite preconditions, i.e., payment of just compensation and
perfection of title before acquisition of full ownership.
The record does not show that the respondents had been issued certificates of
land transfer (CLTs) best evidence of the governments recognition of their
inchoate right as "deemed owners" of the property.
Page 28 of 67
Similarly, the record does not show that the government had placed the
property under its OLT program or that the government, through the MARO,
recognized the respondents as the actual tenants of the property on the
relevant date, thereby sufficiently vesting in them such inchoate right.
NO TENANCY
RESPONDENTS
RELATIONSHIP
EXISTS
BETWEEN
DNTDC
AND
THE
In a tenancy relationship, the subject must be agricultural land. Here, it has already
been reclassified as non-agricultural. Accordingly, the respondents are not de jure
tenants and are, therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural
lessees under the provisions of P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.
Under Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389,
declaration by the department head, upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission, to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes, terminates the right of the agricultural lessee to continue in
its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the conversion, however, is not
limited to the authority of the DAR or the courts. The reclassification and
conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 6657, on June 15, 1988, was a coordinated effort of several government
agencies, such as local government units and the HSRC.
In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship between the respondents
and Eugenio had been established by virtue of the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 or of
the five-year lease contract executed in 1981, this leasehold relationship had been
terminated with the reclassification of the property as non-agricultural land in 1982.
The expiration the five-year lease contract in 1986 could not have done more than
simply finally terminate any leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under
the terms of that contract.
Consequently, when the DNTDC purchased the property in 1995, there was no
longer any tenancy relationship that could have subrogated the DNTDC to the rights
and obligations of the previous owner
23 PROVINCE OF RIZAL V EXEC SEC [2005]
Dec 13, 2005; Chico-Nazario, J

FACTS:
case sprouted from a MOA signed by Secretaries of DPWH and DENR with the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor; provides that DENR is
allowing the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary
landfill by MMC
turned out, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo already wrote
to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR,
informing them of an SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro

Manila within its jurisdiction. No action was taken.
Upon investigations by forest officers, it was later found that the land subject
of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. A report
submitted by CENRO forest officers revealed that there was no permit issued to
MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes.
February 1990, DENR granted MMA (formerly MMC) an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite, ECC
was in compliance of PD 1586
o July 31 1990, less than 6 months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR
suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent DPWH Sec,
stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have
resulted from improper development of the site
March 9, 1990, LLDA sent a letter to MMA, expressing its objection to the
proposed location of the dumpsite within the watershed; LLDAs environmental
management program regards dumpsites as incompatible within the
watershed
November 1993, DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that the
all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be
dismantled; stated that after a series of investigations by field officials of the
DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17 November 1988 is
a very costly error
Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the
government agencies, the Office of the President, through Exec Sec Ruben
Torres, signed and issued Proclamation 635,Excluding from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as
Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of
the MMDA.
o 22 July 1996, petitioners filed before CA a civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus
o CA denied for lack of cause of action
28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling
attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite
o MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after 6 months
o 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum
ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 Dec 2000
o 20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and
Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Govt
of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo,
wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite
until its permanent closure on 31 Dec 2000
11 January 2001, Pres Estrada directed DILG Sec Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chair
Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation
Page 29 of 67
of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent

health and sanitation epidemic.
o Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of
violence erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an
Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001
24 January 2001, SC issued the TRO prayed for, effective immediately and
until further orders.
26 January 2001, RA 9003 The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000, was signed into law by Pres Estrada
mere presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is

definitely not compatible with the very purpose and objectives for which the
reservation was established
dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial Governor, Rizal
Province and without any permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction
over the Watershed Reservation
about 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by 4 Barangays
surrounding the dumping site will adversely be affected by the dumping
operations of MMC including their sources of domestic water supply
[based on petitioners assignment of errors by CA]
Presidential Proclamation 635 was based on a forgery of the DENR Secretarys

signature (of the recommendation)
spurious ECC
violation of RA 7586 when Proclamation 635 was issued considering it may only
be done by an act of congress
brushed aside the unanimous findings of concerned government agencies and
non-partisan officials; while MMDA Chair is an interested party
San Mateo dumpsite is not located in the buffer zone of the reservation
CAs unjustified fear of mini-Smokey Mountains
sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of implementation. The
amount of effort and money already invested in the project by the government
cannot easily be disregarded, in favor of the few settlers/squatters who chose
to ignore the earlier notice given to them
place within the jurisdiction of Metro Manila, with an area big enough to
accommodate at least 3 to 5 years of waste disposal requirements
site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under the administration
of the DENR, located at the lower periphery of the buffer zone; was evaluated
to be least likely to affect the underground water supply; and could, in fact, be
excluded from the reservation
relocating the site at this point and time would not be easy, if not
impracticable, because aside from the investments that had been made in
locating the present site, further investments have been incurred
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
WoN MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of
Dec 2000 (NO)
WoN DENR has the sole power to control or regulate the use of the San Mateo
site (NO)
WoN Proclamation 635 is unconstitutional (YES)
WoN permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by RA 9003
(YES)
HELD: reversed CA; ruled in favor of petitioners

RATIO:
1.
THE LAW AND THE FACTS INDICATE THAT A MERE MOA DOES NOT
GUARANTEE THE DUMPSITES PERMANENT CLOSURE.
(from the ruling and some from MMDAs letter to Senator Jovito Salonga
(represented the residents of Pintong Bocaue)
Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp: "The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare."
2.
Marikina Watershed Reservation, and thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the
public domain. Neither the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San Mateo
has the power to control or regulate its use since properties of this nature
belong to the national, and not to the local governments.
unless we are prepared with a better alternative, the project simply has to be
pursued in the best interest of the greater majority of the population,
particularly their health and welfare
REORGANIZATION ACT OF DENR DEFINES AND LIMITS ITS POWERS

OVER THE COUNTRYS NATURAL RESOURCES
DENR mandated by EO 192 to be the primary government agency responsible for

the conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain.
Page 30 of 67
Oposa v. Factoran: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental

legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of

their inhabitants.
Administrative Code of 1987 and EO 192 entrust the DENR with

the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our
other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of the
government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this
power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is
subject to the law and higher authority.
Under the LGC, therefore, 2 requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources: one of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was
an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. The
Regalian doctrine was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution and reaffirmed in the
1987 Constitution in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony.
3.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PROCLAMATION NO. 635 WAS

PASSED ALSO VIOLATES RA 7160, THE LGC.
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the LGC, which was approved 4 years earlier, on 10 October 1991. The
LGC gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of
their inhabitants.
Section 2(c) of LGC declares that it is the policy of the state to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented
in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations
before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior
approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
-
at the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump
garbage in their province
such action is allowed by Section 16, every local government unit may
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare, which involve, among other
things, promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people
4.
RA 9003, THE ECOLOGICAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2000,

WAS APPROVED ON 26 JANUARY 2001.
Law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework,

which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the
phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the
Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an
aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. The site selected must be
consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and
that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not
detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers,
groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.
24 - VELOSO, V. COA [2011]
G.R. No. 193677, 6 September 2011; Peralta.
Luciano Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion, and Marlon M. Lacson
v. Commission On Audit
FACTS
1.
On Dec 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040
entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public
Service Award (EPSA) to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been
Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2
thereof provides that the EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation,
retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time
served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the
availability of funds.
2.
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of the
following former councilors:
Councilor/Recipients
Check
Date
(P9,923,257)
Page 31 of 67
Abraham C. Cabochan
353010
06/07/05
P1,658,989.09
Julio E. Logarta, Jr.
353156
06/14/05
P1,658,989.08
Luciano M. Veloso
353778
06/30/05
P1,658,989.08
Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion
353155
06/14/05
P1,658,989.08
Marlon M. Lacson
353157
06/14/05
P1,658,989.08
Heirs of Hilarion C. Silva
353093
06/09/05
P1,628,311.59
3.
On August 8, 2005, Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila,

issued Audit Observation Memo No. 2005-100(05)07(05) with the
following observations:
The initial payment of monetary reward as part of EPSA is without

legal basis.
The amount granted is excessive and tantamount to double
compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA
7160 which provides that no elective or appointive local official
shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.
The appropriations to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal
Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III of the Manual on the
New Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local government
units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated September 20, 2004
which provide the updated description of accounts under the
NGAS.
4.
After evaluation, the COA Director, issued ND No. 06-010-100-05 (May 24,
2006) disallowing the payment.
5.
On Nov. 9, 2006, former councilors Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion, Luciano M.

Veloso, Abraham C. Cabochan, Marlon M. Lacson, Julio E. Logarta, Jr., and
Monina U. Silva, City Accountant Gloria C. Quilantang, City Budget Officer
Alicia Moscaya and then Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo B. Lacuna
filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance. The Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA decided in favor of them
Citing Article 170 of the IRR of RA No. 7160, the monetary reward
can be one of gratuity and, therefore, cannot be considered as
additional, double or indirect compensation. Giving importance to
the principle of local autonomy, the LAO-local upheld the power of

LGUs to grant allowances. More importantly, it emphasized that
the DBM did not disapprove the appropriation for the EPSA of the
City which indicate that the same is valid.
6.
Upon review, the COA sustained ND No. 06-010-100-05 disallowing the

payment. MR denied.
7.
Aggrieved, petitioners went to the SC on R65 alleging grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the COA (1) when it ruled that the monetary
award given was not a GRATUITY and (2) when it effectively nullified a dulyenacted ordinance which is essentially a judicial function. In other words,
in the guise of disallowing the disbursement in question, the respondent
Commission arrogated unto itself an authority it did not possess, and a
prerogative it did not have.
ISSUES:
Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local
government funds. YES
Whether the COA committed GAD in affirming the disallowance.
THE COA HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DISALLOW THE DISBURSEMENT OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENT FUNDS
PETITIONERSCONTENTION:
The power and authority of the COA to audit government funds and
accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a
particular disbursement. Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, petitioners claim that
the COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the
ground that the same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable. The
COA's remedy is to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer such expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant. While admitting that the cited case was decided
by the Court under the 1935 Constitution, petitioners submit that the same
principle applies in the present case.
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:
1.
It is vested by the Constitution the power to determine whether

government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements.
SC DISAGREES WITH THE PETITIONER.

Page 32 of 67
In NEA v. COA, Guevara has already been overturned by the Court in Caltex
Phil., Inc. v. COA. The Court explained that under the 1935 Constitution, the
Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures of public funds, but could only bring the matter
to the attention of the proper administrative officer. Under the 1987
Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds.
The SC quoted Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution11 and Section 11,
Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 12.
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested
with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.
11
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that
have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary
and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and,
for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers
pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties.
12
Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis,
the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous
state colleges and universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through the
government. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies cannot be taken away
from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting
any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the [COA]."
This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, and to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional

mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to
disapprove payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the
Government; to determine the meaning of "public bidding" and when
there is failure in the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds
unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will mean
discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a contract even after it has been
executed and goods have been delivered.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the
audit jurisdiction of the COA.
THE COA PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION IN DISALLOWING THE

DISBURSEMENT.
PETITIONERSCONTENTION:
1.
The retirement and gratuity pay remuneration is a valid exercise of the

powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod set forth in RA 7160.
2.
Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties, functions and

compensation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod:
SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:
xxxx
(viii) Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and
other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid
wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures
necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services,
and activities of the city government.
3.
In the exercise of the above power, the City Council authorized the
Page 33 of 67
conferment of the EPSA to the former three-term councilors and the award
is a "gratuity" which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value
bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration.
provision that "no elective or appointive local official or

employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emoluments,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign government." Section
325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal services
of a local government unit to not more than 45% of its total
annual income from regular sources realized in the next preceding
fiscal year.
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:
1.
The COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by
the term "compensation."
2.
Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the

limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It
explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary
reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by
Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or
gratuity to the former councilors.
4.
While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the
budgetary limitation set by RA 7160, the SC found that the COA is correct in
sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.
5.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment of "retirement

and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in
the position for three (3) consecutive terms" as part of the EPSA. The
recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total
compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic
salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance,
representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial
assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift. This is not
disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government
granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even
encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the
services of these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of
these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not
contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.
6.
In Yap v. COA, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of

government officers and employees should be granted to compensate
them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits
paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services
rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be
shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties
and functions of the government officers and employees. Without this
limitation, government officers and employees may be paid enormous
sums without limit or without justification necessary other than that such
sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public
funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all
times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.
7.
Undoubtedly, the computation of the reward is excessive and tantamount

to double and additional compensation. This cannot be justified by the
mere fact that the awardees have been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
the same position. Neither can it be justified that the reward is given as a
SC DISAGREES WITH THE PETITIONER.

1.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of

administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created
not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. \
2.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation
of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism.
3.
The power cited by the petitioners is not without limitations.
Section 81 of RA 7160,. Compensation of Local Officials and

Employees. The compensation of local officials and personnel shall
be determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the
increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect
only after the terms of office of those approving such increase
shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in
compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take
effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase;
Provided however, That said increases shall not exceed the
limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services
provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided finally,
That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional
Page 34 of 67
gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified elective official.
8.
9.
The fact remains that the remuneration is equivalent to everything that the
awardees received during the entire period that he served as such official.
Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive
half of them at the end of their last term.
SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local government units shall
have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
The purpose of the prohibition against additional or double compensation

is best expressed in Peralta v. Auditor General:
This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle

that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government
official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the
demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He
is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the
functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding
consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should
be unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends, public
employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be
resisted. That at least is the idea. There is then to be an awareness
on the part of the officer or employee of the government that he
is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With
such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious
or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his
position.
10. Verily, the COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with
its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as
conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to the policy that
government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved
and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and property should be prevented.
11. However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not require the
refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good
faith.
25 - ACCORD V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA
J. Carpio Morales
FACTS:
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).

The General Appropriations Act (GAA) SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) passed by Congress
and subsequently approved by President Estrada, however provides that:
1. IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000 only.
2. An UNPROGRAMMED FUND in the amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10B)
shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount which amount shall be
released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to
be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance
of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it
appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification
of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the
occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
NGOs filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents
then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor
Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
above-quoted provision. Governors of the provinces of Batangas and Nueva Ecija
intervened.
ISSUES:
WON the GAA provisions on Unprogrammed Fund is unconstitutional as they
violate the autonomy of local governments by reducing by P10B the IRA due to the
President Estrada submitted the National Expenditures Program for fiscal year 2000
to Congress. In the said program, the President proposed an Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) in the amount of P121,778,000,000, following the formula provided
for in Section 284 of the Local Government Code of 1992:
Page 35 of 67
local governments and withholding the release of such amount; WON said GAA
provision violates ART. X, SEC. 6 of the Constitution (and SECS. 284, 286. 13)
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
The above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the
executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing
conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Basis: During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioners
Davide and Nolledo shared a common assumption that the entity which would
execute the automatic release of internal revenue was the executive department.
The subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the
government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from
authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of
respondents, This essentially means that the President or any member of the
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute,
withhold the release of the IRA
SUPREME COURT
HELD: The GAA provision on the P10B Unprogrammed Fund is void and
unconstitutional.
RATIO: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall
be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of
the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term shall is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative.
Under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the release
thereof. The plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution
to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution binds the legislative just as much as the
executive branch was presumed in the ruling of this Court in the case of The
Province of Batangas v. Romulo which is analogous in many respects to the one at
bar.
This provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be
automatically released to the LGUs.
NOTE: There is an exception to the automatic release of IRA rule. SECTION 284: . .
.Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
"liga", to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year:
26 - ALDABA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188078, JANUARY 25, 2010
13
Section 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit shall be
released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and
which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local government
units under existing laws.
FACTS:
1.
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional,

R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement
for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009,
the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative
districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later
converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.
Page 36 of 67
2.
3.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued

to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda
of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the
year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet
the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representative in Congress.
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987

Constitution.
27 - NAVARRO V ERMITA (2010)
Issue: Constitutionality of RA 9355 An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands?
ISSUE: WON R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional.
Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
HELD: Republic Act No. 9591 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President

of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao
del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new
Province of Dinagat Islands
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the
demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the
NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of
Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared
official by the NSCB.
The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In
addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been
designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for
demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given
credence by the Court.
Based on the Certifications own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for
individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative
district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first
attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no
showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10
May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of
Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May
2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed
attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to
have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
FACTS:
Petitioners are taxpayers and residents of Surgao del Norte (served once as
Vice-Governor and Provincial Board)
o They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province,
if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly
deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the
area.
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under
RA 2786. The rovince is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the
Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3)
Dinagat Island
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code, a province may be created if it has
o an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991
constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and
o a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the
NSO, or
o a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau.
o The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not
contribute to the income of the province. (Dinagat Island 106,951)
RESPONDENT ARGUMENT:
Petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of

the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly
Page 37 of 67
injured by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in
controversy.
The petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province of
Dinagat Islands has already commenced
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual
income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002 to 2003
based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.25.
the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one
or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square
kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code.
The number of inhabitants in the Province of Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or
almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006, was
371,576, which is more than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants
PETITIONER ARGUMENT:
the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a province

because
o it failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement. It
has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls
short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers.
o Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of
the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the
statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.
the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph
2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
RATIO:
Standing
o The Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party
Moot and Academic
o The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Constitutionality
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article

X of the Constitution states:
o SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
The Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation of a
province, thus:
o (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
o (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
o (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income.[15]
As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code
requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.
Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the
territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there
is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
Code.
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating
that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and void.
Page 38 of 67
In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in
accordance with a known standard provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR
added an exemption to the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area
requirement, which exemption is not found in the Code.
They filed a second one which was noted without action.
Movants-Intervenors filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

o
They are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte, whose
positions will be affected if the SC Resolution is not reversed.
28 - NAVARRO V. ERMITA (2 011)
As per COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, which says that:
If the decision of the SC is reversed, then status quo will

remain since the system in place is that Dinagat and Surigao
del Norte are two separate provinces.
If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final

and executory before the elections, the province of Dinagat
will revert to its previous status as part of Surigao del Norte.
FACTS:
On Oct. 2, 2006, the President approved into law RA 9355, creating the
province of Dinagat Islands.
On Dec. 3, 2006 the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC.
o
69, 943 affirmed while 63,502 voted in the negative.
The President appointed the interim set of provincial officials, and they took
their oaths on January 26, 2007.
Rodolfo Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in the SC, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9335.
o
The creation of Dinagat as a new province would perpetuate an illegal

act of Congress, and would deprive the people of Surigao del Norte a
large chunk of territory, natural and financial resources.
That when the law was passed, Dinagat only had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers and a population of 106, 951
Violating Sec. 461 of the LGC which mandates that at least

2,000 sq.km. of land and a population of 250,000 are needed
to create a province.
And in thus violating the criteria set by the LGC, it also

violated Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The SC granted this petition and declared RA 9335 unconstitutional.

o
Again, they filed a petition for the same reason, on the grounds that:
o
But the petition was dismissed on technical grounds.
Also declared null and void the provision on Art. 9(2) of the LGC IRR
which said that the land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed o 1 or more islands inasmuch as the
same exemption is not provided for in the law.
Voters of Dinagat will not be able to vote for

candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and Member, House of Reps, and candidates for
Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte,
since they are not in the respective ballots.
Thus, the COMELEC will postpone the elections.
If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final

and executory after the elections, the province of Dinagat will
revert to its previous status as part of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the elections would have to be

nullified, and a special election would be conducted.
The SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene.

o
The movants intervenors filed an MR. Denied.
The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that this decision had
become final and executory already.
The Movant-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion for Recall Entry of Judgment

which is resolved in this Resolution.
ISSUES + RULING:
ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE URGENT MOTION FOR RECALL ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT
There appears nothing in the case which would support the contention that
this motion was a ploy by the respondents lawyers to reopen the case despite
the entry of judgment.
It was COMELEC resolution 8790 which gave the movant intervenors interest in
reopening the case.
The law only states an exception to the contiguity requirement for

pronvinces composed of islands.
The Republic, the Sol Gen and Dinagat filed their MRs but were all denied.
Their election to their offices would be annulled.
Page 39 of 67
If the motion was not entertained, the movant-intervenors would be left with
no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their elections.
It cannot be denied that movant-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the even
that their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied.
They should not be left without any remedy simply because their interest in the
case became manifest only after the case had already been decided.
Anyway, in this case, the compelling concern is not only the movantintervenors right to be heard, but also the arrival at the correct interpretation
of the LGC and the manner of creation of LGUs.
Thus, it seems that the exception given to cities and municipalities was
inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461, or for provinces.
o
Finds merit when considering the underpinning principle of local

autonomy.
Economic viability
Efficient administration
Capability to deliver basic services to constitutions
In Sec. 2 of the LGC (Declaration of Policy)
The criteria prescribed by the LGC (income, population, land area) are designed
with central policy considerations on creating an LGU in mind:
Economic viability being the primordial criterion, as given evidence by

congressional debates.
o
Hon. Laguda: The reason why we are willing to increase the income,
double than the House version, because we also believe that
economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are
functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an
income level which would be the trigger point for economic
development, population will naturally increase because there will be
an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from
being converted into a province because of the population problems
in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could
become a province simply because it will never have the economic
take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
Case also cited the provisions and IRR on the creation of the LGUs.
The LGC says that when the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit
to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively.
o
The inclusion of such exemption in the IRR was to correct such

oversight.
Thus, the Court upholds the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
ON THE CREATION OF THE LGUS
In fact there is greater likelihood that island or ground of islands would

form part of the land area of a newly created province.
This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the

creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears no reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municiaplities, but not to provinces.
It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the

territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units

genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land
area requirements for prospective local government units should be
liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.
Strict interpretation of the previous SC decision would be

counterproductive.
Anyway, if the provision is applied, This would mean that

Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to
create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands -- and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and
the delivery of basic services to the constituency
This preferential option would prove more difficult

and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer
territory of a province is scattered because the
Page 40 of 67
islands are separated by bodies of water, as

compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
o
DISPOSITION: The Court granted the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
The first SC Resolution is set aside, and provision in Art. 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 is declared VALID. RA 9335 is also
declared VALID. Original petition is dismissed.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction.
CARPIO, J., DISSENTING:
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees
on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight
Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to
the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by
Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and
this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
1.
The ruling is a blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local

Government Code, and opens the floodgates to the proliferation of pygmy
provinces and legislative districts.
The Dinagat Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for the
creation of a province.
The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and

consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered
the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC
when the IRR was formulated.
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income requirement

and either the minimum land area or minimum population requirement. In
short, two of the three minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the
minimum income requirement one of the two.
This amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great

weight and respect from this Court,[ but to legislative construction as
well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four
leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight
Committee.
The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the minimum land area
requirement or the minimum population requirement. Its population was
only at 120,813 in 2006 and the land area of the island comprised only
802.12 sq.km.
The Local Government Code contains no exception to the income and

population or land area requirements in creating provinces.
Despite lack of exemption in the LGCt Congress, recognizing the capacity and
viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect
to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the
LGC-IRR.
What the Code relaxed was the contiguity rule for provinces consisting of
"two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province.
No exception was ever created by law. Hence, the exception created in the
implementing rule of the Local Government Code, exempting provinces
"composed of one (1) or more islands" from the minimum land area
requirement, is void for being ultra vires.
The majority argues that since the exception of island provinces from the
minimum land area requirement was inserted in the implementing rules by
the congressional Oversight Committee, the Court should extend great
weight to this "legislative construction" of the Code. BUT:
Court also quotes portions of the a Bicameral Conference Committee

meeting which clearly show the manifest intention of the Congress to
promote development in the previously underdeveloped and
uninhabited land areas by allowing them a direct share in the national
budget.
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the

enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably
voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both
Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGCIRR.
i.
A congressional oversight committee has no power to approve or

disapprove the implementing rules of laws because the
Page 41 of 67
implementation of laws is purely an executive function

(Macalintal v Comelec)
ii.
Congress has no power to construe the law. Only the courts are
vested with the power to construe the law. Congress may provide
in the law itself a definition of terms but it cannot define or
construe the law through its Oversight Committee after it has
enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.
The province, as the largest political and corporate subdivision of

local governance in this country, serves as the geographic base
from which municipalities, cities and even another province will
be carved, fostering local development.
The ruling wipes away the territorial and population tiering
among provinces, cities and municipalities the Local Government
Code has carefully structured, reducing provinces to the level of a
rich municipality,unable to host otherwise qualified new smaller
local government units for sheer lack of space.
Even assuming that the minimum land area requirement does not apply to
island provinces, an assumption that is devoid of any legal basis, Dinagat
Islands still fail to meet the minimum population requirement.
The majority's ruling clearly violates Section 461 of the Code, no question
about it.
When Congress creates a province it necessarily creates at the same time a

legislative district. The province must comply with the minimum population
of 250,000 because the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall be the
minimum population for the creation of legislative districts. The 1987
Constitution mandates that "each province[,] shall have at least one
representative
As an effect of the ruling, The House of Representatives will now count

among its members a representative of a district consisting, as of the 2007
census, of only 120,813 constituents, well below the minimum population
of 250,000 his peers from the other regular districts represent.
This malapportionment tolerates, on the one hand, vote undervaluation in

overpopulated districts, and, on the other hand, vote overvaluation in
underpopulated ones, in clear breach of the "one person, one vote" rule
rooted in the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, one vote in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in
Metro Manila for the purpose of representation in the House of
Representatives.
This is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Ratio behind the withholding of exemption for minimum land area

requirement for provinces composed of islands:
o
2.
legislative district, which under the Constitution must have a minimum

population of 250,000.
To treat land area as an alternative to the minimum population

requirement (based on the conjunctive "either" in Section 461) destroys
the supremacy of the Constitution, making the statutory text prevail over
the clear constitutional language mandating a minimum population
through the requirement of proportional representation in the
apportionment of all legislative districts.
In creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can replace
the minimum population requirement with a land area requirement
because the creation of a province necessarily creates at the same time a
3.
4.
Fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by

assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds.
For each new province created - entailing at the same time the creation of
a legislative district - a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is opened, with
the Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how and where he will
dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majority's ruling, not only land area but also population is
immaterial in creating island provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling
political clans strategically situated in this country's thousands of islands to
sponsor the creation of more underpopulated provinces within their
political bailiwicks.
Far from being dispensable components in the creation of local government

units, population and land area - not income - are the pivotal factors in
funding local government units.
Under the Local Government Code, these components determine 75% of

the share from the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each
local government unit receives, the lifeblood of their operations, based on
the following formula:
o
Population - Fifty percent (50%)
Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%)
Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
Page 42 of 67
5.
6.
Thus, population, with a weight of 50% ranks first in determining the

financial entitlement of local government units, followed by land area
(25%)
11th Congress: 33 bills were converted into law by Congress, each converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress didn't act on 24 bills meant to convert
24 other municipalities into cities.
By treating Dinagat Islands' land area of 802.12 square kilometers as

compliant with the 2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section 461, the
majority effectively included in their land area computation the enclosed
marine area or waters of Dinagat Islands.
12th Congress: RA 9009 was enacted, which raises the annual income requirement
for the conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, thus
amending Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009 was meant to restrain
the rush of municipalities to convert into cities just to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment. Joint Resolution No. 29, however, sought to exempt
the previously mentioned 24 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement of RA 9009.
In short, other island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, TawiTawi and Palawan, can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part of
their "land area" in computing their share of the IRA.
On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large bodies of water, like

Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite and Lanao del Sur, the situation is reversed.
Finding themselves holding, but not surrounded by, water, the submerged
territory, no matter how large, is excluded from the computation of their
land area, thus proportionately lowering their share in the revenue
allotment compared to their island counterparts.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for
courts to reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino
people as encoded in their provisions.
Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of their sworn duties when
they second guess the intent of the Constitution's framers and the people's
elected representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have been
accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see fit.
13th Congress: Joint Resolution No. 29, now readopted as JR No. 1, was forwarded
to the Senate for approval. The Senate failed to act on it though, prompting 16 of
the 24 municipalities to file individual cityhood bills, each bill containing an
exemption from the P100 million income requirement of RA 9009, and directing
the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in the concerned
municipalities approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. These
cityhood bills were passed into cityhood laws.
In 2008, the Supreme Court struck down the cityhood laws for violating Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. However, the
court reversed itself in 2009. The case is now before the SC again for reexamination.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONERS:
The Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
29 DORIA
ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
30 DOMINGO
31 LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC (2010)
FACTS:
Operative Fact Doctrine

Def. This doctrine recognizes the unconstitutionality of a law but leaves undisturbed
its effects prior to its declaration of nullity, in the name of equity and fair play.
This theory is invoked to argue for the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. The
idea is that if the law is already implemented prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court, it can no longer be revoked and must be
continuously applied even after said declaration
The subject matter of this case pertains to the conversion of municipalities into
cities, and the concomitant requirements therefore.
Page 43 of 67
can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act; only the

law's EFFECTS prior to the declaration of nullity remain. The doctrine modifies the
effects of the unconstitutional law, but not the unconstitutional law itself.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
RULING OF THE COURT:
As applied to the Cityhood Laws, only its effects prior to RA 9009 are left
undisturbed such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities, or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts. The Cityhood Laws, however, are
unconstitutional and void from the time of enactment of RA 9009 onwards.
1. YES, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
2. YES, the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.
"No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other
political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
The exemption from the P100 million income requirement provided in the Cityhood
Laws clearly violates and deviates from the Local Government Code, specifically
Section 450 thereof, which, as amended by RA 9009, requires municipalities to earn
at least P100 million annually in order to be eligible for conversion into a city. RA
9009 does NOT provide any exemption from this income requirement. The Cityhood
Laws were enacted AFTER RA 9009 (enacted in 2001); thus, the exemption in the
former deviates from the requirements of the latter. It must be noted that RA 9009
is not different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section
450 of the said code.
Operative Fact Doctrine
The court strikes down the interpretation of the Operative Fact Doctrine aimed at
constitutionalizing the Cityhood Laws. To interpret the doctrine in this way would
result in a mad rush to immediately implement laws before the Court can declare
them unconstitutional, since doing so would leave their implementation
undisturbed despite a subsequent declaration of their unconstitutionality. This
interpretation invites a quick and serial violation of the constitution.
The classification criterion-- mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That
specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can
Note:
In relation to the creation of municipal corporation being a legislative matter
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does
not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from
amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA
9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the
Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in
the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of
the Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code. In other words, Congress
exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood
Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity and must thus be applied as an
exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It
Page 44 of 67
32 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC (2011)

FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
The Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the
P100 million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities
were unconstitutional.
On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the
respondent municipalities first MR. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc,
by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities second MR. The 18 November
2008 decision became final and executory.
However, on 21 Deceber 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18
November 2008 decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws
ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONERS:
The Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities
will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
First, when Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local
government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of
laws, let alone the Local GovernmentCode (LGC) of 1991.
Second, deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators
Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary
legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale
of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would
not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were
concerned.
On 22 Dec 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
Third, petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no
deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was
presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim
on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.
Fourth, the existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws
in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause.
ISSUES
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court, by a majority vote, declared the 16

Cityhood laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
Page 45 of 67
RULING OF THE COURT:

The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear the creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent
of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units
follows the same uniform, non -discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code.
From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income
requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause
in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and
prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain
and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet
the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the
law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not
create one.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
Respondent municipalities theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws,
which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of
officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood
Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely
dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the wanton
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate
implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional.
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play.
Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
implementation of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of
salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair
play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the
purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the
time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This
violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated;
municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
33 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [APRIL 2011]
April 12, 2011; Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
At the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was enacted which amended Sec 450 of the LGC
by increasing the annual income requirement for the conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The law did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted a
joint resolution exempting 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending
when RA 9009 was enacted (These cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress). The joint resolution, however, was not approved by the Senate.
At the 13th Congress, HOR re-adopted the said joint resolution but the Senate
again failed to approve it.
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional

law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
Page 46 of 67
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Upon the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 municipalities instead filed individual

cityhood bills which had a provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the new P100M income requirement under RA 9009.
All the cityhood bills were enacted and later lapsed into law without the
Presidents signature.
These Cityhood Laws also directed COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the affected constituents approved of the conversion.
League of Cities, et al filed petitions with the SC for prohibition with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction and TRO assailing the constitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws and enjoining the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscites.
The petitioners main contention is that the 16 municipalities should not be
exempt from the new income requirement under RA 9009.
On February 15, 2011, the SC issued a resolution declaring the 16 Cityhood
Laws constitutional.
Petitioners filed this Ad Cautelam MR challenging the February 15, 2011
Resolution.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
(SC basically reiterated its ratio in its Feb. 2011 resolution)
1.
W/N the 16 cityhood laws are constitutionalYES.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood
Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
1.
2.
3.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 614 and 1015 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share
in the national taxes.
The new income P100 million requirement from locally generated sources is
not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with since there are several
municipalities that have already complied (i.e. Sta. Rosa, Navotas, San Juan,
Dasmaris, and Bian, etc.).
There exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of petitioners member cities,
considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for
conversion at the time of their creation.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the 100M requirement is arbitrary

and difficult to be complied with.
(not explicitly stated in the case; probably the same as the SCs decision)
14
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
15 Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
SC cited the manifestation of Senator Pimentel showing the legislative

intent to exempt the LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws from the P100
million requirement.
The acts of both Chambers of Congress (of unanimously approving the
conversion bills together with the deliberations on the scope of RA 9009)
show that the exemption clauses in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. As
such, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.
When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no
research or empirical data supported the figure. Nor was there proof that
the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise.
With the imposition of the 100M requirement, even the danger the
passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality
that metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in
terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become
a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or
whatever. (Senator Pimentel)
By increasing the income requirement abruptly, cities outside of Metro
Manila would be less likely to become cities. This is antithetical to what the
Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside
development and national growth.
Petitioners 3rd argument is too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the P20
million requirement was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential
government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a
city.
Page 47 of 67
The increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only
conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a
component city. This is evidenced by the fact that even the 59 members of
the League of Cities have failed to be compliant with the new P100 million
income requirement five years after R.A. 9009 became law but still
remained viable.
The LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their
own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been
centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation,
rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and
flourishing tourism spots.
While the Constitution mandates that the creation of LGUs must comply
with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that
the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the
original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization,
countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
b.
2.
Cityhood Laws did not violate the League members right to a just share in the
national taxes.
The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under

Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the
cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area
(25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the
number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases,
then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. With every newly
converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the
percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will
decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that
received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section
285 and Section 286 of the LGC.
DISSENTING OPINION (CARPIO)
3.
4.
Since the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the LGC, said
laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution:
i. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
c. The constitution is clear that the creation of LGUs must follow the
criteria established by the LGC itself and not in any other law.
The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor
difficult to comply.
a. The legislature is not required by the Constitution to show the courts
evidence to support the increased income requirement such as data
like inflation rates. This court should not venture into areas of analyses
beyond its competence. The increase is a policy determination
involving the wisdom of the law which exclusively lies within the
province of the Legislature.
b. Cities of San Juan and Navotas. Sta. Rosa, Dasmarias and Bian were
created in full compliance with the P100 million income requirement.
21 other municipalities have also satisfied the requirement.
The reduction in the Internal Revenue Allotment will adversely affect the cities
economic situation.
The P20 million criterion is not substantial compliance, but outright violation of
the constitution.
Topic: Creation of municipal corporation is a legislative matter (Sec. 14, LGC)

34 - AQUINO III V. COMELE C [2010]
by LA Celebrado
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs.
Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189793 | April 7, 2010 | En Banc | Perez, J.
This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.
1.
Majority opinion erred in declaring that the Cityhood Laws amended the LGC.
a. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this be
inferred. The laws contains a uniformly worded Separability Clause:
i. That if any of its provisions is inconsistent with the LGC, the
other consistent provisions shall continue to be in full force
and effect. Hence, any provision in each Cityhood Law
inconsistent with the LGC is void and ineffective.
FACTS:
Aquino et al. seek the unconstitutionality of RA 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the 1st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment." and pray that COMELEC be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of RA 9716.
Page 48 of 67
ISSUES:
Reapportionment introduced by RA 9716, runs afoul of the explicit

constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250k for
the creation of a legislative district16
Reconfiguration of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur will end
up with a population of less than 250k
Existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new
districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at
least 250k
Intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population
minimum of 250k
250k population requirement found in Constitution is based on the
population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing
the initial 200 legislative seats, when they fixed the original number of
district seats in the House of Rep to 200, they took into account the
projected national population of 55M for the year 86
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
On procedural matters:
o first, error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of RA 9716 via
the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65;
o second, absence of locus standi
On substantive matters:
o Theres an apparent distinction between cities and provinces
drawn by the Constitution and that it has no application with
respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces
o 250k minimum population is only a requirement for the creation
of a legislative district in a city and no fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces
o RA 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a
perfectly valid reapportionment law
16
Section 5(3), Article VI, 1987 Constitution: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
1.
2.
WON theres a fatal procedural lapse? (NO)

WON the Constitution fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district? (NO)
HELD:
1.
2.
NO. Absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review
may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be
settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be
relaxed.
NO. The contested provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250k in order to be similarly
entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand"
from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) requires a 250k minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the LGC on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the LGC 17 shows that the
requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
In Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, the Court held that the Constitution does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
17
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
Page 49 of 67
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative

district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory.
We dont say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the
resulting additional district should not be considered. Population is not the
only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
35 MMDA V BELAIR
FACTS:
1995: BAVA received a notice from MMDA requesting for the opening of
Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, respondent was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
BAVA filed a case for injunction against MMDA.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
Carpio, J.: Under the ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces
without regard to any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a
population of 150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the
window the constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity
in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum population
requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while maintaining it in city
legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the constitutional
standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of
legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This
means that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of
anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while legislative districts in cities will
always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our
democratic and republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned
in the 1987 Constitution. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of
Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four,
ten times more populous than other favored districts, elected by voters holding
"mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored districts, elected by
voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable than the votes
in disfavored districts.
Carpio-Morales, J.: Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely
partakes of gerrymandering. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from
population, should be considered in the composition of additional districts, thereby
adding other requisites despite the Constitutions clear limitation to population and
contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic
lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open
Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural,
racial and even religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
RTC issued a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening

of Neptune St but after due hearing, the RTC denied the issuance
of injunction.
On appeal, the CA conducted an ocular inspection and

afterwards, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
MMDAs proposed action. On the merits of the case, it held that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune St and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls, as this authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has authority to order the opening of subdivision road NO
SHORT RATIO: MMDA was constituted for the administration of metro-wide basic
services affecting Metropolitan Manila. Among these services is transport and traffic
management. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is
no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 (MMDAs Charter) that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. When RA 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila
became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a
"special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." MMDA is not a LGU or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" as contemplated in Sec. 11, Art. X of the Constitution.
MMDA only cites as basis for the opening a NOTICE it sent to BAVA. The notice itself
does not cite any ordinance or law either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or MMDA
as legal basis. MMDA simply relied on the authority in its charter to rationalize
roads and thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons by
no stretch of imagination can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of
ordinance making power, much less police power.
MMDA therefore has no power to enact ordinances. Likewise, it cannot order BAVA
Page 50 of 67
to open a private road by mere notice, when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
did not pass any ordinance ordering such opening.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT
It has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila.
One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of
the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the
general public.
It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate CA.
From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for
the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT (WALANG SINABI SA CASE)
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel -Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial
district of Makati City. (Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.)
SUPREME COURT
MMDA does not have police power. It does not have legislative power either.
MMDA is not a LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Sec. 11, Art. X of the Constitution.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power.
The two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar.
Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC.
In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is
contained in the notice of Dec 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent
BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law,
either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as
the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner
MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the
use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement
of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the
acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no
stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express
or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power.
In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass
any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent CA did not err in so ruling.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the
MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA.
Some bit of history:
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824.
It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding
that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified
development; that the public services rendered by the respective local
governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated
under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the
maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that
fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures
under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area.
Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all
subject to review and approval by the MMC.
Page 51 of 67
When RA 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development

and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority"
whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local
government units."
It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power.
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and
does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
A license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right,

but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the
interest of the public safety and welfare.
The revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking

without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the
revocation.
36 MMDA V. GARIN [2005]
RTC:
36 - [G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]

METROPOLITAN
MANILA
GARIN, respondent.
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
vs. DANTE
O.
FACTS:
Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his drivers license was
confiscated for illegal parking along Binondo.
In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting
a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating
the due process clause of the Constitution.
The provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation

of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties.
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 (authorizing confiscation of

licenses upon issuance of a TVR) was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the
absence of a quorum.
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 void. It was passed without a

quorum.
The summary confiscation violates due process.
MMDA is ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving
the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
SUPERVENING EVENT:
ISSUE:
WON Section 5(f) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA, which authorizes it to

confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic
laws and regulations, is valid.
RULING:
MMDAS ARGUMENTS:
MMDA implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04 S. 2004. Under the circular,

traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of
course in cases of traffic violations.
Case is moot. The petitioner, however, is not precluded from implementing

any scheme that would entail confiscating drivers licenses.
The powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which
powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to
determine the validity of the penalty imposed.
RATIO:
The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three
powers of government in administrative agencies.
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 has an existing IRR: MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis
for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is
The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed

with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government
Code of 1991. A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in
the exercise of its police power.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
Page 52 of 67
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Local
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
a. In one of the Whereas clauses: The MMDA recommended a plan to

decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the
mass transport system by providing common mass transport terminal
facilities, integrating buses and railway systems.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature.18
MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative
rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is
no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
b. Secs. 2 and 3: The project was for four interim common terminals,
focusing initially on North and South Metro Manila. The MMDA would be
designated as the Implementing Agency for the project.
c. For this project, the MMDA would have several functions and
responsibilities:
1. preparation of the project Master Plan
2. coordinating with agencies and landowners for the use of
land/properties for the project
3. supervising and managing construction of structures and
facilities.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
4. executing necessary contracts for the implementation of the

project in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations
5. managing funds as may be necessary for the projects in

accordance with prevailing accounting and audit practice in
government
MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down

policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector,
which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
37 - MMDA V VIRON TRANSPO RTATION [2007]
6. enlisting the assistance of any national govenrment agency,

office, or department, including LGUs and GOCCs, as may be
necessary
G.R. No. 170657; 15 Aug 2007; CARPIO MORALES, J.| Digest by Miguel
7. assigning and hiring personnel for the above purposes
FACTS:
8. performing such other related functions as necessary to

accomplish the objectives and purposes of EO 179.
1. Recognizing the worsening traffic situation in Metro Manila and nearby

provinces, on February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
the questioned EO 179, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transport System." Among the salient points of the EO are the following:
18
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- MMDA shall perform planning,
monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority
over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
the local government units concerning purely local matters.
2. The MMDA's governing board and policymaking body, the Metro Manila Council
(MMC), issued Resolution No. 03-07 s.2003 expressing full support of the Project. In
particular, the MMC stressed the need to remove the bus terminals along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares.
3. The MMDA then began implementing the EO. Around February 24 of the same
year, two bus companies filed petitions before the RTC of Manila:
a. Viron Transport filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the
MMDA was poised to issue a Memo Circular or Order closing, or
tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the
Page 53 of 67
whole of Metro Manila. Its terminals in Sampaloc, Manila and in Quezon

City would be among them. They allege that such is outside the authority
of the MMDA to regulate traffic under its charter, RA 7924. In addition,
they seek a ruling on the legality of the said acts alongside the Public
Service Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and
maintain their own terminals as requisite for operating as common
carriers.
2.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
a. The MMDA has no authority to order the elimination of their
bus terminals under the EO. Such violates the Constitution and
the Public Service Act; they do not even have the necessary
authority in their charter.
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
a. The real issue is the President's authority to undertake/cause
the implementation of the project. EO 125 (Reorganizing the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications), her residual
power, and the Revised Administrative Code constitute
sufficient authority.
b. Moreover, the EO is a valid exercise of police power.
b. Mencorp Transport filed a similar petition, making similar allegations

as Viron. They also seek that the EO be declared unconstitutional and
illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of
public land transportation units over their respective terminals.
4. The TC in its original decision ruled in favor of MMDA, holding that the EO was a
valid exercise of police power as it satisfied the subject matter and means tests.
However, they reversed on MR, holding that the EO was an unreasonable exercise
of police power, that MMDA's authority under Sec. 5e of its charter does not
include the power to close the terminals, and that the EO is inconsistent with the
Public Service Act. MMDA's MR being denied, they file the present petition with the
Supreme Court.
3.
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS PER ISSUE:

1.
W/N the case presents a justiciable controversy, allowing for a petition for
declaratory relief.
A. PETITIONER MMDA's ARGUMENTS
a. There is no justiciable controversy as nothing in the body of
the EO mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus
terminals. No evidence was cited apprising the transport groups
of an immediate plan to close down their terminals.
b. Even then, the EO is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and to make
available for use government property along EDSA and SLEX. As
such, the EO only created a relationship between the Chief
Executive and the implementing officials, and not third persons.
B. RESPONDENTS' COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
a. There is a justiciable controversy. They resorted to the Court
because the EO, in one of its whereas clauses (see Facts), set out
the MMDA's plan to eliminate the bus terminals. Viron even
alleged that there is already a diagram laying down the design of
one the terminals, and that such is already being constructed. (the
MMDA even affirmed that they have begun implementing the EO)
W/N the MMDA has the authority to order the elimination of the bus
terminals given the law and the Constitution.
Assuming arguendo that police power was validly delegated to the MMDA,
W/N the EO was a valid police power measure.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS:
a. No issue as to public purpose. Traffic congestion is a public
concern that needs to be addressed immediately.
b. The exercise of the power was oppressive and transgressed
their rights over their respective terminals (of a confiscatory
character).
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS:
a. There was a valid exercise of police power.
4.
Regardless of the implementing agency, W/N the EO is in line with the

provisions of the Public Service Act.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT:
a. The closure of the terminals is not in line with the PSA, which
mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own
terminals as requisite for the privilege of operating as common
carriers.
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT:
a. The closure is in line with the PSA. The issue is more on the
Presidents authority.
COURTS DISCUSSION:
Page 54 of 67
1. YES, as the EO is already being implemented, and there is already the possibility
of closure of terminals (an event that would make the EO applicable to the
transportation companies)-- such would be ripe for declaratory relief.
- General: The requirements of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court are: (1) There must be a justiciable controversy, (2) Such
controversy must be between persons with adverse interests, (3) The party seeking
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (4) The issue invoked must
be ripe for judicial determination.
As to the argument that closure was not contemplated:
- A justiciable controversy is present when an actual legal controversy
exists between the parties, and is before the Court, and the declaration sought
would help in ending the controversy: in other words, where there is a claim of a
right which is actually contested. Moreover, in a petition for declaratory relief, the
action must be brought before the breach or violation as per Rule 63, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court.
- The resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the EO. Several
provisions under the EO show an intent to immediately execute the plans laid
therein:
2. NO, as (1) the agency with the power to establish and administer integrated
programs for transportation is the DOTC, and (2) even if the MMDA could be
delegated the power, the MMDA's Charter is limited merely to administer and apply
the law.
I. On the part of the President
- Secs. 4, 5, 6, and 22 of EO 125 gave the DOTC the power to establish and
administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications, with the DOTC as the primary entity for the promotion,
development, and regulation of transportation and communications.
- Such power extends to the President through her control of the
executive department, bureaus and offices under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution, and Sec. 1, Bk III and Sec. 38, Chapter 37, Bk IV of the Revised
Administrative Code. The latter even defines supervision and control to include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate.
[Note that such a delegation is a delegation of police power. This is a matter of
importance in related issues.]
- The EO was made effective immediately.
II. On the part of the MMDA
- Sec. 2 laid down the immediate establishment of common

terminals for north- and south-bound commuters.
- However, EO 125 states that the DOTC is the primary implementing and
administrative entity for transportation. With this alone, EO 125 is ultra vires by
making the MMDA the implementing agency.
- Sec. 8 directed the DBM to allocate funds for the terminals.

- Such resolve is bolstered by the MMC's Resolution 03-07, where it also
stressed the intent to remove bus terminals, and to establish common terminals.
The MMDA even affirmed that they have begun implementing the project.
- This is no longer conjectural or anticipatoryit is an actual, justiciable
controversy. For them to wait for actual issuance of an order of closure would be to
bring the case outside the ambit of declaratory relief.
As to the argument that the EO is unrelated to third persons:
- The provisions of the EO are clear that the MMDA seeks to eliminate the
existing bus terminals, including those owned by the respondents. Said
respondents would have to operate from the common terminals.
- Surely, there would be an adverse effect on them for they stand to be
deprived of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
- Moreover, RA 7924 does not give authority to the MMDA to eliminate

bus terminals.
- The scope of the MMDA's functions was already settled in MMDA v BelAir, where the Court stressed that they are limited to the delivery of seven basic
services-- one of which is transport and traffic management, including the mass
transport system, and that only certain acts were allowed under their charter:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of systems and administration.
- That scope did not give them anything resembling police or legislative
power, unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs. They cannot order the elimination of
terminals, the act being one of police power.
3. NO, as the means used in lessening traffic congestion were unduly oppressive.
Page 55 of 67
- There are two tests for a valid police power measure.

(1) Public purpose test - the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise
(2) Means test - the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals
This recognizes the terminals as a necessary service where elimination would run
counter to the law.
PETITION DENIED. EO 179 DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES.
38 - DISOMANGCOP VS. DATU MANONG [2004]
G.R. No. 149848; November 25, 2004; Tinga. | Digest by Ian
- There was no issue as to public purpose, only as to the means

employed. The effect of the EO would necessarily be the closure of the existing
bus terminalsis this oppressive?.
- This is similar to Lucena Grand Central Terminal v JAC Liner, where a city
ordinance requiring all PUVs in Lucena to unload and load at a single common
terminal was struck down due to overbreadth, the Court then finding that it was
beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city.
Worse, the compulsory use of the central terminal was held oppressive as it
subjected its users to additional fees and charges. Surely there could have been
alternatives-- if terminals lack adequate space that drivers have to load and unload
on the streets, then they could impose regulations for terminal specifications.
Worse, the scope is so broad that even entities that may be able to provide better
facilities are barred.
- The same is the case here. There are so many less intrusive measures
that could have been availed of, such as banning colorum vehicles or strictly
enforcing traffic rules. Here, there is certainly an invalid exercise of police power.
- A caveat: the EO cannot said to be confiscatory of properties as their
certificates of public convenience confer no property rights-- they are mere licenses
or privileges that must yield to legislation.
FACTS:
This case involves the constitutionality and validity of RA 8999 19 signed by Pres.
Estrada and DPWHs D.O. 11920 issued by then Sec. Gregorio R. Vigilar.
Petitioners in this case are Arsadi M. Disomangcop and Ramir M. Dimalotang, in
their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II,
respectively, of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.
The 1987 Constitution21 mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate,
RA 673422 was signed into law on Aug. 1, 1989 by Pres. Aquino eventually
creating the ARMM. This was followed by E0 426 (Placing the Control and
Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways
within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous
Regional Government).
After 9 years, on May 20, 1999, Sec. Vigilar issued DO 119 creating DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi
City and the province of Lanao del Sur. This was followed by RA 899923 on
January 17, 2001 which provided that the sum necessary for the maintenance
and operation of the district office shall be included in the annual GAA. Then
Congress passed R.A. 905424 which lapsed into law ]on 31 March 2001. It was
ratified in a plebiscite held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the
4. NO, as the law recognizes the terminal facilities as a necessary service, with the
elimination of such running contrary to it.
19
- Paragraph (a), Sec. 13, Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now part of
the LTFRB charter) vested the PSC (now LTFRB) with jurisdiction, supervision and
control over public services (at least for land transport), as well as their franchises,
equipment, and other properties. It may also impose conditions as to construction
and service as the public interest and convenience may require.
- Among these is the power to compel public utilities to furnish safe,
adequate and proper service, including facilities (Sec. 16 of the Public Service Act).
An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur
and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
20
Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
21 Art. X, Secs. 1 and 15.
22 An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
23
An Act Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province Of Lanao Del Sur
And Appropriating Funds Therefor
24 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose RA 6734.
Page 56 of 67
City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A.
9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
On July 23, 2001, petitioners wrote DPWH Sec. Simeon Datumanong seeking
the revocation of the DO and the non-implementation of the RA. No action was
taken on the petition so they filed this petition before the SC.
1.
2.
PETITIONERS
Reliefs sought:
1. to annul and set aside D.O. 119;
2. to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing the DO
and RA and releasing funds for public works projects intended for
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office and other administrative regions of DPWH;
3. to compel the DBM Sec. to release all funds for public works projects
intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and
4. to compel respondent DPWH Sec. to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works
projects within its jurisdictional area.
Arguments:
1. DO was issued with grave abuse of discretion and it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM because it has tasked the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have
already been devolved to the DPWH- ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur.
2. On RA 8999
a. A piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly
studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995
(H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable. [SC
will mention at the later part of the case that the HB was
passed in record time on 2nd reading (not more than 10
mins.), without the usual sponsorship speech and debates].
b. Prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor
consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House
Committee on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed
to invite a single official from the affected agency.
c. The law was skillfully timed for signature by former Pres.
Estrada during the pendency of the impeachment
proceedings.
RESPONDENTS (THROUGH THE OSG) ARGUMENTS:
3.
Maintain the validity of the DO because it was issued in accordance with

EO 124 (Reorganizing The Ministry Of Public Works and Highways,
Redefining Its Powers And Functions, And For Other Purposes).
In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the
powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power
of Congress.
Petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that
petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
Petitioners: They have standing, as they will suffer actual injury as
a result of the enactments complained of.
ISSUES:
WON (I) R.A. 8999 and (II) D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
Held: The Court agrees in part with the petitioners. It held the RA and DO
unconstitutional.
It does not agree, however, that there is grave abuse of discretion based on the
allegation that the RA was allegedly signed into law under suspicious circumstances
because according to the SC, it cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or
expediency of the acts of legislative branch. It further disagrees as regards the
alleged lack of consultation or public hearing because absence of consultation does
not render a law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not transgress the
Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person
from the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting.
DISCUSSION:
I.
On RA 8999 and the Autonomy Organic Acts- RA 8999 violates regional

autonomy
It never became operative because it was superseded by RA 9054.
It is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for
the adjudication of this case. The challenged law never became
operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent
enactment., RA 9054.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic
Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation
by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by
an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory
law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. This was explicitly mentioned
Page 57 of 67
in the excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

quoted by the SC.
provision also curtails the power of Congress over

autonomous regions.
Regional Autonomy under RA 6734 and RA 9054

Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination
exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central
government. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of
basic internal government powers to the people of a
particular area or region with least control and
supervision from the central government.
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not

signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from
that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit
determined groups, with a common tradition and shared
social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways
of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge
of their own business. This is achieved through the
establishment of a special governance regime for certain
member communities who choose their own authorities
from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional
authority legally accorded to them to decide internal
community affairs.
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the
cultivation of more positive means for national
integration. It would remove the wariness among the
Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave
the way for the unhampered implementation of the
development programs in the region.
And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean
meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.
Substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind
of local self-government which allows the people of the
region or area the power to determine what is best for
their growth and development without undue
interference or dictation from the central government.
To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of
the President over autonomous region. In essence, the
RA 8999 violates regional autonomy

E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the
DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government
(ARG).
Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved
the administrative and fiscal management of public works
and funds for public works to the ARG.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and
supervision of the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM,
including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG.
According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional
Government enables it to appropriate, manage and
disburse all public work funds allocated for the region by
the central government.
The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in
the ARMM and transfer of the administrative and fiscal
management of public works and funds to the ARG are
meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. Christians in
this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and
the National Government takes control again.
II.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and

powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously
devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur.
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the
powers of the national government to the autonomous
government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy.
The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs
afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of
powers which have previously been handed over.
On DO 119:
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same
powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department
order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously
Page 58 of 67
devolved under the said EO. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of
E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than
its source of power the Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O.
124signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative
powersis of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general
one. Lex specialis derogant generali.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a
plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124.
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of
D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also
rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
39 SERNA V. COMELEC [2008]
In the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, 2 legislative districts were

apportioned for the Province of Maguindanao. Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities formed the first legislative district of Maguindanao which, in turn,
formed part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as created by
Organic Act RA 6734, amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, however, is part of
Region XII and not ARMM because constituents voted against its inclusion in ARMM
in the Nov 1989 plebiscite.
Aug 28, 2006, ARMMs Legislature (ARMM Regional Assembly/ARMM Assembly)
exercised its power to create provinces (granted by Sec 19, Art. VI of RA 9054) by
enacting the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201 (Act 201)25 which created the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan (SK); 8 municipalities from the first district of
Maguindanao were separated from the latter to make up the province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
As a result of SKs creation, all that was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities
constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, while part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, now belonged to SK.
Bai Sandra S. A. Sema v. Commission on Elections and Didagen P. Dilangalen

G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008 | Carpio, J.
SUMMARY:
Upon the creation by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the new province of Shariff
Kabunsuan via local law (Act 201), Cotabato City, as one of the local units
transferred to the new province from its former province of Maguindanao, asked
COMELEC to clarify its legislative district status in light of the upcoming May 2007
elections. COMELEC issued Resolution 7902, which stated that Cotabato City, while
belonging to the new province of SK, would retain its status as part of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao, absent any national law proclaiming otherwise.
Petitioner Sema, a candidate for representative of SK, assailed this Resolution
arguing that the Province of SK should have its own legislative district, and that the
votes cast in Cotabato City, as belonging to the first legislative district of
Maguindanao, should be excluded from elections for an SK representative to
Congress.
The Court ruled that Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Act 201
creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is
valid.
25
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and
constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional
Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their
unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where
an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to
a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and
shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections;
Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the
approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a
part thereof, shall remain.
FACTS:
Page 59 of 67
In anticipation of the May 2007 elections, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato

City requested COMELEC via resolution to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view
of the enactment of Act 201. COMELEC issued several resolutions in response:
1.
2.
3.
Resolution 07-407: maintained status quo with Cotabato City as part of SK in

the first legislative district of Maguindanao, pursuant to the COMELECs Law
Departments memo recommending that Cotabato Citys status quo be
maintained pending enactment by appropriate law by Congress. (in other
words without law by Congress, Cotabato City was to remain part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, despite belonging to the province of SK).
Resolution 7845 (subsequently issued): Maguindanaos first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City, because of the enactment of Act 201.
[Contested] Resolution 7902, amending 07-0407: renaming the legislative
district as SK Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City)
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:
2.
SEMAs prayer became moot when Respondent Didagen Dilangalen was

proclaimed representative of the legislative district of SK Province with
Cotabato City.
RESPONDENT DILANGALEN:
1.
2.
3.
SEMA is estopped from questioning COMELECs resolution because the

certificate of candidacy indicated she was seeking election as a representative
of the Province of SK including Cotabato City.
COMELEC Resolution is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative
district for SK nor reapportion legislative districts in Maguindanao, but merely
renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district.
COMELEC did not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make
Cotabato City its lone component because the power to reapportion lies
exclusively with Congress and Cotabato City does not meet minimum
population requirements under the Constitution for the creation of a legislative
district within the city.
PETITIONER SEMA
B. ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A PROVINCE CREATED BY THE ARMM

ASSEMBLY IS ENTITLED TO ONE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (HOR) WITHOUT NEED OF NATIONAL LAW CREATING A
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT.
(a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan w/

Cotabato City) prayed for the nullification of COMELECs Resolution 7902 and the
exclusion of the votes cast in Cotabato City as far as the province of SK is
concerned, arguing that:
PETITIONER SEMA (W/ CONCURRENCE BY COMELEC, ABANDONING ITS

EARLIER STANCE): YES
A. ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT OF MAGUINDANAO
1.
1.
2.
3.
SK, as a province, is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec 5(3)

Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
[ main ] COMELEC acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing said Resolution
maintaining the status quo of Maguindanaos first legislative district when its
earlier resolution had already designated Cotabato City as the lone component
of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district
COMELEC had usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative
districts
2.
3.
RESPONDENT DILANGALEN: NO
1.
RESPONDENT COMELEC:
1.
SEMA wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify the COMELEC

resolution because COMELEC issued such resolution pursuant to the exercise of
its administrative, and not-quasi-judicial, power
Citing Felwa v. Salas, SEMA argues that when a province is created by statute
(Act 201 by the ARMM Assembly in this case), a corresponding representative
district comes into existence by operation of the Constitution, without
reapportionment.
RA 7160 on the creation of provinces affirms the apportionment of legislative
districts incident to such creation.
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution mandate apportionment of a legislative district.
2.
3.
Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Assembly the power to
enact measures relation to national elections, including the apportionment of
legislative districts for members of the HoR
Recognizing a legislative district for every province created by the ARMM
Assembly would lead to disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the
HoR
Cotabato Citys population of less than 250k does not entitle it to a
representative in the HoR
Page 60 of 67
C. ON WON SEC. 19, ART. VI, RA 9054 DELEGATING TO THE ARMM

REGIONAL ASSEMBLY THE POWER TO CREATE PROVINCES IS
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND IF SO, WHETHER A PROVINCE SO CREATED IS
ENTITLED TO ONE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HOR WITHOUT NEED OF A
NATIONAL LAW.
While there is no conflict with the Constitution wrt to the delegation of power
to create municipalities and barangays, the creation of provinces and cities is a
different matter because under the Constitution, pending certain
requirements, the creation of the latter two units may result in additional
representatives to the House of Representatives.
o Cities with a population of at least 250k or more shall have at least 1 HoR
o Any province subsequently created, or city with a population of 250k or
more, shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one member in the HoR
o Thus, a province, or a city with a population of 250k or more, cannot be
created without a legislative district, or else the Constitution will be
violated. Even the creations of provinces, or cities with less than 250k,
also requires the power to create legislative districts because a citys
population may increase in the future.
Legislative districts are created or reapportioned only by an Act of Congress.

o The power to increase allowable membership in the HoR and reapportion
legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress. (Art. VI, Sec. 5,
Constitution):
Sec 5(1), Art VI: Congress may increase through law allowable
membership in the HoR; Sec 5(4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, which necessarily includes the power to create
such districts.
o These powers are exercised exclusively through Congress because the
latter is a national legislature, thus any change in its allowable
membership or incumbent membership must be embodied in national
law; an inferior legislative body (i.e. a regional body) may not change the
membership of the superior legislative body (i.e. national body)
ARMMs Regional Assembly cannot create legislative districts whose

representatives are elected through national elections, because such would
extend ARMMs legislative powers beyond its territorial jurisdiction, in
violation of the Constitution.
o Nothing in Sec. 20, Art. X of the Constitution (which enumerates the
powers of autonomous regions) authorizes autonomous regions expressly
or impliedly to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
o Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 provides that the ARMM Assembly may exercise
legislative powers except on certain matters, including national
elections, thus it cannot create a legislative district whose representative
is elected in national elections.
PETITIONER SEMA: YES

1.
2.
RA 9054 is a constitutional delegation by Congress to the ARMM Regional

Assembly of the formers power to create provinces.
Art. X of the Constitution grants to autonomous regions through the organic
acts legislative powers over other matters authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people in that region
RESPONDENT
DILANGALEN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1.
2.
(W/
CONCURRENCE
BY
COMELEC):
the power to create provinces is not granted to autonomous regions

to grant ARMM the power the prescribe lower standards in the creation of
provinces than those provided by RA 7610 contravenes Art. X of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
COURTS RULING:
Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Act 201 creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is void. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid.
RATIO:
ISSUE [main] : WON Sec. 19 Art VI of RA 9054 delegating to ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is
constitutional. Unconstitutional, wrt the creation of provinces and cities.
While Congress, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, has delegated to

provincial boards and municipal councils the power to create barangays within
their jurisdiction, the Local Government Code states that only an Act of
Congress can create provinces cities or municipalities.
o Under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, three conditions must be
complied with for the creation of any of the four local government units:
a) criteria in the local government code must be followed, creation of said
unit must not be in conflict with Constitutional provisions, and c) a
plebiscite must be held in the political units affected
Page 61 of 67
o
o
The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national

office, maintained by national funds.
ARMMs Regional Assembly cannot create a national office because such
would allow the formers legislative powers to operate outside of ARMMs
territorial jurisdiction, in violation of Art. X of the Constitution which
expressly limits coverage of regional assemblys to within its territorial
juridiction.
ISSUE [main] : WON a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly via Act
201 is entitled to one representative in the HoR without a need of national law
creating a legislative district for such province. NO. A province cannot legally be
created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each
province have at least one representative. The creation of the SK Province
without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Petitioner SEMAs use of the Felwa ruling (the creation of legislative districts by
operation of the Constitution upon the creation of a province) does not apply
in this case. In Felwa, the creation of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao occurred via RA 4595 which was a national
law. The new province of SK was enacted by a regional law. While the Felwa
doctrine holds true insofar as the creation of a legislative district occurs by
operation of the Constitution when a province is created, the power to create
such legislative districts nevertheless remains exclusively with Congress
because the power to create provinces belongs exclusively to Congress.
If the creation of the SK Province included an apportioned legislative district,
Cotabato City would be left as the lone component of the first legislative
district of Maguindanao, in violation of the Constitution, because pursuant to
the 2000 census, Cotabato Citys population stands at 163, 849.
The grant by Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the
power to create provinces and cities without regard to the criteria provided by
RA 7160 (minimum annual income of P20M and minimum contiguous territory
of 2k sq. km., or minimum population of 250k) would give rise to the ff. absurd
possibilities:
o An inferior legislative body like ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100
or more provinces and increase its membership in a superior legislative
body like the HoR beyond the maximum limit provided by the Constitution
(250)
o Proportional representation in the HoR of one representative per 250k
residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not
comply with the requirement that every province created must have at
least 250k population
Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in
the HoR thru the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of
provinces or cities within ARMM
Organic Acts of Autonomous Regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Sec.
20, Art. X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of
regional assemblies are limited, within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to
the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.
ISSUE: [minor] WON the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were proper
to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution 7902, and whether the
proclamation of Dilangalen as representative of the SK Province with Cotabato City
mooted Semas petition. Yes, the writs are proper. The petition is not moot.
The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality of election

laws, rules and regulations.
Dilangalens proclamation as representative to the province of SK does not
moot the petition because this case does not involve Dilangalens election, but
inquires into the validity of the COMELEC Resolution and the constitutionality
of Act 201 and Sec. 19, Art VI of RA 9054. The issue is whether votes cast in
Cotabato City for the representative of SK Province will be included in
canvassing of ballots, and ruling on these petitions will affect all other
succeeding elections, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create future additional provinces.
40 ADORNA (KIDA)
41 ABDON (ORDILLO )
42 - CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA [1990]

Digest by Kathleen Villamin | 29 January 1990 | Cortes, J.:
Topic: Part III Creation of autonomous regional bodies
GENERAL FACTS
Page 62 of 67
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 220, which created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), covering Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm. The CAR, Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such
time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an

autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall
first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional
consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies.
The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization
and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the
approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the
plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.
In this case, the constitutionality of EO 220 is now being assailed on the primary
ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the
creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
the act through a plebiscite.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising
legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to
provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in
the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created.
1.
By issuing EO 220, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior
to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually
pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
2.
EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political

subdivision.
3.
The creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is
the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras." E.O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. The
bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethnolinguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted
effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS (IMPLIED)

1.
By issuing EO 220, the President did not preempt Congress.
2.
EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision.
3.
The creation of CAR did not contravene local autonomy for the provinces
involved.
SC RULING
1.
E.O. No. 220 actually envisions the consolidation and coordination of the
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy.
2.
E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision.
-
Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political

subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers
that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and
be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create
its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas.
Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President

over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering
Page 63 of 67
further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the

National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else
as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to
the regional development councils which the President may create under
the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].
3.
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec.

2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the
decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar
to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not
just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage
for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions
already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region
vested with political autonomy. Petitioner failed to show how the creation of
the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces
and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to
probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
43 - BAGABUYO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176970 | J. Brhion | Digest by: Aaron Valdez
FACTS:
Rogelio Bagabuyo filed a petition for CPM with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and a writ of PI to prevent the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 7387
on the ground that RA 9371 (the law that Resolution No. 7387 implements) is
unconstitutional. Then-CdO Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed HB No. 5859
(which then became RA 9371) titled An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
Lone Legislative District of Cagayan de Oro, which apportioned Cagayan de Oro
into two legislative districts. The COMELEC issued a Resolution to implement RA
9371.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner
Respondent
The COMELEC cannot implement R.A.

No. 9371 without providing for the
rules, regulations and guidelines for
the conduct of a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local government unit
R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the

representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
the
House
of
Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant
to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
In his Reply:
The creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator - the
material change in the political and
economic rights of the local
government units directly affected, as
well as of the people therein
A voter's sovereign power to decide
on who should be elected as the
entire city's Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half
because the questioned law and
resolution only allowed him to vote
and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC
The criteria established under Section 10,

Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition
or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any
change in Cagayan de Oro's territory,
population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required.
A voter was also arbitrarily denied his

right to elect the Congressman and
the members of the city council for
the other legislative district
Government funds were illegally
disbursed without prior approval by
the sovereign electorate of Cagayan
De Oro City
Page 64 of 67
ISSUE(S):
WON No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de
Oro City, or whether it involves the division and conversion of a local government
unit
population) is entitled to one

representative. In this sense, legislative
districts and provinces and cities relate
and interface with each other.
It merely provides for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro. There is

a difference between legislative reapportionment and mere reapportionment.
Further, there are differences between legislative districts and local government
units.
Legislative Reapportionment
Reapportionment
Legislatives Districts
LGUs
It is the determination of the number

of representatives which a State,
county or other subdivision may send
to a legislative body. It is the allocation
of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the
drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power
among the districts (Blacks Law)
The realignment or change in legislative

districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality
of representation.
Covered by Art. VI Sec. 5 which does

not require a plebiscite
Covered by Art. X Sec. 10 which requires

a plebiscite
A representative unit that may or may

not encompass the whole of a city or a
province, but unlike the latter, it is not
a corporate unit. Not being a corporate
unit, a district does not act for and in
behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas
occupied by the people who will choose
a representative in their national
affairs.
These are political and corporate units.

They are the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state. They possess
legal personality on the authority of the
Constitution and by action of the
Legislature. The Constitution defines
them as entities that Congress can, by
law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or
whose boundaries can be altered based
on standards again established by both
the Constitution and the Legislature.
Authority to act vested in Legislature
Authority to act vested in Legislature
The aim is political representation and

the means to make a legislative district
sufficiently represented so that the
people can be effectively heard
Its concern is the commencement, the

termination, and the modification of
local government units' corporate
existence and territorial coverage; and it
speaks of two specific standards that
must be observed in implementing this
concern, namely, the criteria established
in the local government code and the
approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income,
population and land area are specified
as verifiable indicators of viability and
capacity to provide services.
Emphasis is given to the number of

people represented; the uniform and
progressive ratio to be observed among
the representative districts; and
accessibility and commonality of
interests in terms of each district being,
as far as practicable, continuous,
compact and adjacent territory.
In terms of the people represented,
every city with at least 250,000 people
and every province (irrespective of
R.A. No. 9371 is a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the

authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. The
wording of its provisions provides that no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a
political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City
politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial
lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for
purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Article X, Section 10 of
the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
HELD: Petition DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT
44 - SAMSON V AGUIRRE
FACTS
petitioner was a councilor who opposed RA 8535 which created the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Petitioner argues:
Page 65 of 67
there would be no adverse effect to QC. The fact that the Quezon City
Council was not given a copy of the petition (to create the new city) was
insignificant too, because the councilors were all aware of the bill.
RA 8535 failed to conform to the requirements on income, population,

and land area established under Sections 7, 11, and 450 of the LGC.
RA 8535 did not specify a seat of government
There was no certification that the said law, when it was being
proposed, would not adversely affect Quezon City.
The said law in effect amends the Constitution.
On the amendment of the constitution, the court held that RA 8535 only
apportions the seats of the HOR to different legislative districts. Nowhere
in the constitution is it provided that Metro Manila shall forever be
composed of only 17 cities and municipalities.
45 TEJANO
ISSUE:
WON RA 8535 is unconstitutional or is invalid for failure to comply with the
requirements of the LGC?
Held: RA 8535 is valid and constitutional.
46 - MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS MENDEZ

RATIO:
(The court essentially sided with the OSG's defense of the law)
First of all, all statutes are presumed to be valid (Victoriano v Elizalde Rope
Workers Union)
On the requirements of the LGC in terms of land, income and population,

Novaliches more than exceeds these requirements. The income
requirement is 20M annually for the last two years, and Novaliches had an
income of 26M. The population requirement was 150k, and Novaliches had
a population of 347,310. the land requirement was 100 square kilometers,
but the case did not specify Novaliches' land area.
on the requirement of certification of compliance with the requirements

on income, population, and land, the court held that while it was true that
no certificate was submitted to the Senate, a certificate was submitted to
the House of Representatives. Considering that the bill emerged from the
HOR, the court held that the certification submitted to the HOR was
enough. The fact that the certification was oral (made by representatives
of the DILG, DOF, DBM) was enough, since these officials are presumed to
be knowledgeable about matters such as the area's income, population,
etc.
On the failure of RA 8535 to specify a seat of government, the court held
that the same could be specified after the creation of the city. Section 12
of the LGC speaks of government centers, which could also include the seat
of government.
On the fact that there was no certification that the creation of said city
would not adversely affect Quezon City, the court held that Mayor
Mathay's failure to protest or make issue with the bill is an indication that
FACTS:
In 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia issued EO 353 creating the municipality of San
Andres, Quezon. The new municipality was created by segregating it other barrios
from the municipality of San Narciso
In 1965, President Diosdado Macapagal issued EO 174 which recognized San Andres
as having gained the status of a 5th class municipality. The EO added that "(t)he
conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill
No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
In 1989, the municipality of San Narciso filed a quo warranto petition which sought
the declaration of nullity of EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of
the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing
the duties and functions of their respective offices.
IN RTC, PETITIONER:
Relying on Pelaez vs Auditor General, EO 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality
argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no
right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully
belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
IN RTC, RESPONDENTS:
asked for the dismissal of the petition. It was at the instance of petitioner
municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of
EO 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning
Page 66 of 67
the creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San Andred
had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be
assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner
municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being
reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.
In the meantime, RA 7160 was passed which provided in Sec 442 (d) thus,
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or EOs and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
considered one of the twelve municipalities comprising the 3rd district of

Quezon.
3) At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must
be dispelled. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in
the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws,
as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested
rights.
RTC: dismissed the petition. Whatever defects (were) present in the creation of
municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and EOs,
(were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government
Code of 1991.
Issue: W/N San Andres is a de jure municipality. YES.
IN SC, PETITIONER:
The existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be
attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is
inoperative such as though it has never been passed.
SUPREME COURT:
1) Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. It took petitioners almost 30 years from the time EO 353
was issued before they decided to challenge its legality. In the meantime, the
Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
2) Granting the EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, considering the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case, San Andres at least attained the status a
de facto municipal corporation. When the Pelaez ruling came out, San Andres
had only been in existence for six years and the ruling could have been used to
declare EOE 353 as unconstitutional. This was not done. Instead San Andres
was continually recognized by the State through its acts it was reclassified as
a 5th class municipality, a municipal circuit court has jurisdiction over it, its
Page 67 of 67

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34 - AQUINO III V. COMELEC [2010] .............................................................................. 48

17. SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991] ...................................................20

18 PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE [2000] ................................................................................22

In 1998, then Pres. Estrada issued EO 48 entitled Establishing a Program for

19 - TAN V. COMELEC [1986]..........................................................................................24

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

LGC Percentage Sharing Not Intended to Be A Fixed Determination. Sec. 285

Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact to the SC.

Section 6, Article X, 1987 Constitution Local government units shall have a

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the

Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power

(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and (d) Barangays Twenty percent

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is

Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel

02 - NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY AND ALEX DAVID VS. PAREDES

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

The Liga is a govt organization

Undue interference of some local elective officials during the Municipal

Improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by

Incapacity of the Liga Board to address their problems properly

Provided supplemental guidelines for the 1997 elections

Appointed Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan

Conducted synchronized elections of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga

On October 10, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,

The power of general supervision of the

The DILG Sec supervises acts of local

Assuming the Liga is an LGU over which

No legal or constitutional basis for the

They rely on Taule v. Santos which

the organization of all barangays, the

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

policies, plans, programs, projects

determination of the representation of

WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGES DESIGNATION OF THE DILG SECRETARY AS

Petitioner attempts to have a certain parcel of land where the municipal

Respondent argues that the land belongs to the insular government.

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

Asks for the application of the doctrine in City of Manila v Insular

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon obtained a preliminary

SC issued a TRO v the Secretary and the CA.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS (GANZON):

Denial of due process of the law

Ganzon requested postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds which was

He was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement

A "vital"witness was also hospitalized, another lacked transportation

06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON VS. CA [1991]

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City.

The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of

The SC is ill at ease with suspensions; injustice inflicted to the accused

The sole objective of a suspension:to prevent the accused from

A preventive suspension may be justified. BUT, its continuance,

Suspension is temporary and Local Government Code provides:it may

COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING RULES:

Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause)

Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the