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DE LEON, Azalea Ikelyn R.

1.) Valeroso v. Court of Appeals

GR. no. 164815 Sept. 3, 2009
Facts: Judge Ignacio Salvador ordered SPO2 Antonio Disuanco to issue a warrant of arrest against Senior Inspector Valeroso for
kidnapping with ransom. The team conducted surveillance.
When the petitioner was about to aboard into a tricycle, he was arrested and fire ammunition was seized from him. Said fire arms were
found out that it was named under a different person.
They accosted Valeroso. However, the latter in his defense, contended that when the officers came to his childrens Boarding
house in Sagana Homes, he was forced to the faucet while the men ransacked the room until one shouted that they found something.
He further stated that it was not done with a warrant. Contrary to the prosecutions testimony, he was said to be arrested near the INP
Central Police in Culiat. He was found guilty by the trial court for the crime of illegal possession of firearms. On appeal, his sentence
was lowered..

Whether or not there is a breach of Valerosos Constitutional rights.

Held: Yes.
The court favors the version of the Defense. Valerosos appeal is anchored on the Constitutional right alleged to be violated
thus making the evidence against him inadmissible.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution but with certain
exceptions of valid warrantless arrest. However, in this case, such cannot be justified. For one, the warrantless search could not be
justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to to rearch and remove from the arrestee that may be
used by him to effect escape to the danger of the officer doing the arrest and the concealment and destruction thereof. It is also the
duty of the arresting officer to search the area under his immediate control over any weapon and also in his plain view.
In this case, it cannot be said that the area that the officers searched is in their immediate control as the weapon was found in
a locked cabinet which needed force to be revealed. Also, it is not in plain view which could not effectively merit a valid warrantless

2.) People v. Nunez

G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
Facts: The Police detectives conducted a search at Raul Nunez residence based on reports of drug possession.. They were
accompanied by the Baranggay Tanod to assist in the serving of search warrant. They showed the warrant to Nunez. They found 31
packets of Shabu. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted
carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Nunez was convicted of violating RA 6425 for possessing the
regulated drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted is irregular.
Held: Yes.
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject
of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In the case at bar,
Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of shabu and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis,
where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually
be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement
which would repel such inference.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder,
camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their
own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were proceeds of the crime or means
of committing the offense. This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the
things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize
3.)Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue
GR. No. 174570 Feb. 22, 2010
Facts: An information on the crime of Robbery was filed against Sy Tiong Gue and others for the taking of a large amount of cash, post
dated checks and other equipments in the office of Guan Yiak Hardware in Binondo Manila belonging to Sy Siy Ho and Sons
represented by Romer S. Tan. Search warrants were applied for stating therein the personal knowledge of the police officer of the items
lost. Judge Lanzanas Issued the Search warrants. The warrants were later served. Under Search Warrant, three boxes containing
twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the enforcement of Search Warrant
yielded negative results. Respondents filed a Motion to Quash which petitioner opposed. The respondents received a favorable
decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants.
Held: Yes. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before the court. The issuance of a
search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. It does not call for an
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in
issuing the subject search warrants.

4.) Marimla v. People

GR. no. 158467 Oct. 16, 2009
Facts: Special Investigator (SI) Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with
the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and
(2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagascas request for the issuance of the search
warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series
of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize
Shabu, Marijuana weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia.
Juadge Guarina found probable cause to issue the search warrant. The officers conducted a search and found separate dried
flowering tops in different containers. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant for it was allegedly filed outside the
territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the crime is committed
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed Orders denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion
for Reconsideration, respectively.
Held: No.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this
case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
Rule 126 of the Criminal Prcedures on Search and Seizure states that: Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant
shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed, (b)For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was

committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their
ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by
their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. We cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant.


G.R. No. 82544

June 28, 1988

Facts: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, both Americans, and Adriaa Van Den Elshout (Dutch) were apprehended from their respective
residences at Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders
issued by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after 3 months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 2 days after apprehension, or on 29 February
1988, 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country.

One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working
visa. Thus, of the original 22, only Harvey, et. al. have chosen to face deportation. Seized during their apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act.
There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
They are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against
Harvey, et. al. for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case 88-13). On 22
March 1988, Harvey, et. al. filed a Petition for Bail which, however, the Commissioner denied considering the certification by the CID
physician that the accused were healthy. To avoid congestion, the Commissioner ordered Harvey, et. al.'s transfer to the CID detention
cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting then to and from the CID where trial
was on-going. On 4 April 1988, Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying
that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the
country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of 5 days only under certain conditions.
However, it appears that on the same date that the Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the
present petition for a writ of habeas corpus.













The rights granted in Section 2 are available to all persons including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.


The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view.
Thus, from the foregoing, the search


G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967




Facts: Stonehill et, a.l were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and
their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and; (b) those found seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law.

The prosecution argues that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government


Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid?



The Court ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed

by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.


G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

Facts: Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the National
Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag,
alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something.
They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter
brought him to the house of Barangay Captain where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners
bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.

RTC convicted the accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, after dried marijuana leaves were found in his
possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him. Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted
from the bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The accused was then
brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the
dried marijuana leaves were found. Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Whether or not the warrantless search of the bag by the brgy. Tanods was likewise contrary to law?



A stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Moreover, in People v. Bacla-an, the Court held that, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible
by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop
and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the
arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific,
and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded

location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the
police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control
of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As a result, petitioners lack of objection
to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.


G.R. No. 141137
January 20, 2004
Facts: Acting upon an information that a jeepney at Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber, the Police officers of PNP
Tublay Station swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet. At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives
spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan,
La Trinidad where it finally halted. The driver and his companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police
immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were
charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of
Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized. But it was denied, so as their motion for reconsideration. On Appeal, the CA dismissed the
petition and held that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are
admissible in evidence against the accused. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied,
hence this petition.

Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the officers are valid.



Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and
seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap, the exceptions where search and seizure may be
conducted without warrant, are: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is
the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, it was ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or
fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace
officers. There is also probable cause on the part of the officers for the warrantless arrest because when they flagged the jeepney
down, it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad . A search of the vehicle disclosed
several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the
In People v. Vinecarao, the Court ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the
law or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense.


G.R. No. L-35500

October 27, 1932

Facts: The chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue received a report from a reliable
source that there are prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in Rubios house, and that he
(Rubio) keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit: Fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & of subsidiary
companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp. Thus, a search warrant was issued. On the same day, internal
revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in the warrant, searched the premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and
documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the manager.
Rubio filed a motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have returned to him the
books of account, invoices, and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. However, the motion was denied.
Issues: Whether or not the search warrant was illegal?
Whether or not that the seizure of appellant's books and papers was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence
against him in a criminal prosecution and was, therefore, unlawful?


The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's contention that the
search warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is untenable. The depositions speak for
themselves. It is also contended that the application and the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified
statements of the two internal revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the property
sought to be seized as "fraudulent books, invoices and records". While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has
not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under the warranty by seizing property other than that described in
the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and records seized by said officers is the best evidence to show that they strictly
obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing those things, and only those described in the search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the command of their warrant
by seizing no other property than that described therein.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the public has an interest in the proper regulation of appellant's books. (Act No. 3292,
section 4.) In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager. And in the third
place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause to adopt the language alike of section 96 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the search warrant that "fraudulent books, invoices, and records" were "now being used in the commission
of a felony." Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the purpose of being
used as evidence against Rubio, we find no support for this contention in the record. In the trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: "As
we have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were made under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the
authority of a search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the
violation of said laws committed by the defendant." On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its position that the seizure was
made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the commission of further offenses or
fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to be found in the record to prove that the Government has used the
books of account, documents, and papers as evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the intention of so doing.
All we know is, that an information was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he compromised
another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000. On this showing, we perforce cannot
deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers were wanted solely for use as evidence of a crime.


532 SCRA 152
September 2, 2007
Facts: Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate number
PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount ofshabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief of
Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville
Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window
of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then
that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant
allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3
Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic
sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately
brought to the police station.

Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment, however, the trial court found
the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Appellant claims that as the confidential informant had
been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his identity and his alleged
illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant,
the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos
testimony to be "clear and unequivocal" and should therefore prevail over appellants defense of denial. The Court of Appeals likewise
brushed aside appellants contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has become a
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was valid?



The constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police
authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence
dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A
confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo
City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct
as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun
tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of
the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that the same was
obtained through a warrantless search.
G.R. No. 182178
August 15, 2011
Facts: PNP of the Dumaguete City Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was
going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. While walking at the pathway going to the interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay
Looc, at a distance of about two (2) meters away, they saw a man, later identified as the [petitioner] in this case, examining a
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same. They approached the [petitioner], introduced themselves as
policemen and announced his arrest for illegal possession of dangerous drug. RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established
all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision convicted petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
Upon appeal, the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Wether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the right of the petitioner against unlawful searches and
seizures was not violated.


Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Corolarilly, the 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
In the case at bar, the established facts reveal that on June 11, 2005, PO3 Faelogo, an Intelligence Operative of the
Dumaguete City Police Station, received information from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was going on at Zone 3,
Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. Together with PO3 Paquera, PO3 Faelogo immediately acted on the information and went to the
place. While traversing the pathway going to the interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, they saw petitioner, at a distance of two (2)
meters, examining and flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder. The two then approached petitioner, introduced
themselves as police officers, and announced the he is being arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. While being informed
of his constitutional rights during the arrest, petitioner tried to escape by boarding his motorcycle. While wrestling with PO3 Faelogo,
petitioner dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground, which was picked up by PO3 Paquera. The police officers eventually were able
to subdue and handcuff petitioner. Upon searching his person, they also found in his possession a disposable lighter. The seized
sachet was marked on location. They then brought petitioner, together with the items seized, to the police station and conducted a
proper inventory thereof. The heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance was submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug under RA No. 9165.
G.R. No. 187047
June 15, 2011
Facts: The prosecution witness testified that a a male informant came in with an information that a certain alias Maning was engaged
in selling illegal drugs at Sitio de Asis, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Paraaque City. Accordingly, a buy-bust operation against alias
Maning was planned and a team was formed. At around 5:00 p.m., the buy-bust team, together with the male informant, proceeded to
the target area on board two vehicles. At this juncture that alias Maning was arrested and was brought to the office of DAID-SOT,
Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, for investigation and proper documentation. In the course thereof, alias
Maning was later on identified to be Manuel Cruz y Cruz, the herein appellant.
The trial court, convinced on the merits of the prosecutions case, convicted the accused with the crime of illegal sale only. The
Ca affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, and ratiocinated that accused was caught committing the offense while he was in the act of
passing the shabuto PO2 [Gallano] in exchange for P2,000.00, thus, they were justified in arresting him and seizing the materials
without warrant.

Whether or not the arrest and seizure was lawful.



In People v. Sembrano citing People v. Agulay, this Court held that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, as in this case, deserves judicial sanction. Moreover, in a buy-bust operation,
the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the same are not only authorized but also duty-bound to
apprehend the violator and consequently search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
In the case at bench, after the police operatives of DAID-SOT, Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila,
received information from their male informant regarding appellants criminal activity, an entrapment plan was then set up. The same

was made specifically to test the veracity of the informants tip and to subsequently arrest the malefactor if the report is found to be true.
The prosecutions evidence positively showed that appellant agreed to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, who was introduced to him by
the male informant. He was, in fact, caught red-handed plying his illegal trade. Thus, the warrantless arrest of the appellant was legal
and within the confines of law. In the same breath, it cannot be doubted that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the legitimate
buy-bust operation is admissible and was properly admitted in evidence against him.
Appellants assertion that he was just framed up as the shabu seized from him was planted evidence so he can be prosecuted
for the illegal sale thereof finds no support in evidence.


G.R. No. 176077
Facts: Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU received an a information about an illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being
undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo.
Immediately, a surveillance team was formed.
Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of
small plastic sachets containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood
covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand,
after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was
earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets
of shabu to their headquarters. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old. Thus, an information
was filed against the accused, and upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
The RTC convicted the accused with the crime of illegal possession of drugs which the CA affirmed in toto upon appeal.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by one of
the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a
valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. He also posits that peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as
within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not peeping through a curtain is within the meaning of plain view doctrine as to justify the arrest of the accused and
the seizing of the sachets.


Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: 1.)
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2.) Search of evidence in "plain view"; 3.) Search of a moving vehicle; 4.) Consented
warrantless search; 5.) Customs search; 6.) Stop and Frisk; and 7.) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio
and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four
plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view"
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is
among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the
result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the
ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.


G.R. No. 174774

August 31, 2011

Facts: The arresting officers of the Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group of the National Capital Region Police
Office a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila
Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City. The officers went there and positioned themselves for the operation. Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a
white Toyota Corolla, and delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent Reyes
subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and delos Reyes calling de Claro through his cellular phone; that
accused/respondent delos Reyes and de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom was
waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which de Claro handed-over to delos Reyes, the latter in turn
handed the box in a plastic bag to Reyes.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the RTC. Instead, the
appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged.
De los Reyes and Reyes alleged that the arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional circumstances
to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a
confidential informant and not because of any apparent criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless
arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.
Further, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal,
not at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for possession of
















Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations.
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);
and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
(arrest of escaped prisoners).
The police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando
delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or
carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to
accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of a felonious enterprise." SPO1
Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their
confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also
no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the
arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu. The
police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of
the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
G.R. No. 193833
November 16, 2011
Facts: The three accused were all charged with kidnapping for ransom for having abducted Lawrence Yu and Irma Navarro and
demanding a ransom of P1 M. After having paid 180 000, the accused warned the victims to not report the incident or else their family
would be in danger. Irma decided not to tell her mother about the incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence however made a report to
the Makati police station. Buboy Pineda in the meanwhile kept on calling them, demanding for their balance of one million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00). Irmas parents learned of the incident and lost no time in contacting authorities from the CIDG. As Buboy Pineda
continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that date. The entrapment was successful and

Pineda was arrested. the trial court found Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Issue: WON there is a valid warrantless arrest
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when warrantless arrests are lawful.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is clear that Trestizas warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113. However,
Trestiza failed to make a valid objection to his warrantless arrest.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.45 Trestiza, being a policeman himself, could
have immediately objected to his warrantless arrest. However, he merely asked for the grounds for his arrest. He did not even file
charges against the arresting officers. There was also a lengthy amount of time between Trestizas arrest on 16 November 2002 and
the filing of the Omnibus Motion objecting to Trestizas warrantless arrest on 11 May 2004. Although it may be argued that the objection
was raised prior to the entry of Trestizas plea of not guilty in the kidnapping for ransom charge, it must be noted that the circumstances
of the present case make us rule otherwise. Trestiza was charged with two crimes at the time of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom
under Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and illegal possession of firearms under Criminal Case No. 02-3394. Trestiza did not question the
legality of his warrantless arrest nor the acquisition of jurisdiction of the trial court over his person, and fully participated in the hearing of
the illegal possession of firearms case. Thus, Trestiza is deemed to have waived any objection to his warrantless arrest. Under the
circumstances, Trestizas Omnibus Motion in the kidnapping for ransom case is a mere afterthought and cannot be considered as a
timely objection.

16.) ISON v. GALVEZ, JR.

Facts: A Contract of Employment was entered into by and between petitioner and respondents whereby the former agreed to work as
Cook A for the latter on board M.V. Stadt Kiel for a period of 12 months at a basic monthly salary of US$550.00. Said contract was
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
After his pre-employment medical examination, petitioner boarded the vessel in November 1999. During the course of his employment,
however, petitioner experienced chest pains and leg cramps. Thus, when the vessel reached Miami, Florida, he was sent to Sunshine
Medical Center for a medical check-up, electrocardiogram (ECG) and chest x-ray. The tests revealed abnormal findings with the
corresponding recommendation that petitioner consult a cardiologist.[8] Petitioner was thereafter medically repatriated on June 24,
Upon repatriation, petitioner was referred to respondents physician at El Roi Diagnostic Center for a medical examination and was
diagnosed to be suffering from enlargement of the heart and hypertension. For two months, he underwent a series of treatment at
respondents expense. On August 25, 2000, petitioner was declared fit to return to work since the diagnosis of the company-designated
physician already showed controlled hypertension with the concomitant advice, however, of continuous medication for life. Petitioner
thereafter executed on September 8, 2000, a release and quitclaim in favor of respondents wherein he acknowledged receipt of
US$1,136.67 corresponding to his sickness allowance, thereby releasing his employer from future claims and actions.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC to claim full disability benefits.
Petitioner claimed that his illness continued to worsen despite the fit to work assessment of the company-designated physician,
rendering him unfit for sea service and entitling him to total and permanent disability compensation.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that petitioner is not entitled to any disability compensation as he was declared fit to return to
work as a seaman on August 25, 2000 after undergoing two months of medical treatment at respondents expense. Respondents
further claimed to have settled its obligation to petitioner when the latter received the amount of $1,136.67 as full settlement of his
claims including sickness allowance, as evidenced by a release and quitclaim duly executed and signed by him.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of petitioner considering that the certifications he presented do not outweigh the companydesignated physicians fit to work assessment. According to the Labor Arbiter, the certifications of disability issued by petitioners
physicians were made long after he was declared fit to work and were based only on petitioners single consultation with each of them.
In contrast, respondents dutifully complied with their obligations under the employment contract by providing petitioner with medical
assistance at the foreign port, repatriating him at their expense, providing him with medical examination and treatment, paying his
sickness allowance, and assessing him to be fit to return to work. The claims for damages and attorneys fees were also denied.
The NLRC disregarded the certification of fitness to work issued by the company-designated physician since it found petitioners
subsequent consultations with Drs. Vicaldo and Caja as proof of the severity of petitioners illness. The NLRC went on to declare that
petitioners poor health condition, which required close monitoring and continuous medication, resulted to the impairment of his earning
capacity thereby entitling him to disability benefits.
The CA issued a TRO enjoining the NLRC from enforcing the following issuances: a) NLRC Decision dated February 26, 2004; b)
NLRC Decision dated August 24, 2004; c) NLRC Resolution dated February 28, 2005; and d) Writ of Execution issued by the Labor
Arbiter on May 31, 2005 in NLRC NCR OFW 01-11-2316-00. Thereafter, on September 28, 2005, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
issued upon respondents posting of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
The CA then rendered its Decision[22] on February 17, 2006. It found merit in the petition and ruled that the NLRC gravely abused its

discretion in relying on the certification issued by Dr. Caja instead of the fit to work declaration of the company-designated physician
who, under the POEA-SEC, is the one tasked to assess petitioners medical condition for purposes of claiming disability compensation.
Besides, the medical certificate of Dr. Caja cannot be considered as an accurate assessment of the illness contracted by petitioner
during the course of his employment with respondents. It was based merely on the statements given to Dr. Caja by petitioner and
same did not even provide for any justification for the rating given. Also, the certification was made 10 months from the date petitioner
was declared fit to work and almost one year from the date of his repatriation. And the most notable of all, petitioner consulted Dr. Caja
only once. With regard to the release and quitclaim, the CA upheld the same considering that it was voluntarily executed by petitioner
and that the consideration for its issuance was not unconscionable and unreasonable. It ruled that respondents were already released
from liability when petitioner was declared fit to return to work and after they paid him sickness allowance for which he even executed a
Issue: WON the ruling of the CA is correct
Held: We hold that the CA is correct in ruling thus. The company-designated physician has cleared petitioner for employment
resumption after two months of continuous treatment and after medication has successfully controlled his hypertension. As aptly held
by the CA, the extensive medical attention given by the company-designated physician to petitioner enabled the former to acquire a
detailed knowledge and familiarity of petitioners medical condition. This enabled the company-designated physician to arrive at a more
accurate prognosis of petitioners disability as compared to other physicians not privy to petitioners case from the beginning. It has
been held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and
regularly monitored and actually treated the seamans illness, is more qualified to assess the seamans disability.
On the other hand, the medical reports of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Caja were issued after petitioner consulted each of them only once.
Clearly, said physicians did not have the chance to closely monitor petitioners illness. Moreover, Dr. Vicaldos evaluation of petitioners
illness was unsupported by any proof or basis. While he diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease, Concentric Left Ventricular Hypertrophy, Lateral Wall Ischemic and suggested an Impediment Grade V (58-96%), no
justification for such assessment was provided for in the medical certificate he issued. Similarly, Dr. Cajas medical report contained no
supporting proof but was rather based on the findings of past examinations done by the company-designated physician, as well as on
the statements supplied to her by the petitioner. In Coastal Safety Marine Services Inc. v. Esguerra,[35] this Court brushed aside the
medical certifications upon which the seaman therein anchored his claim for disability benefits for being unsupported by diagnostic tests
and procedures as would effectively dispute the results of the medical examination earlier made upon him in a foreign clinic referred by
his employer.
Likewise significant is the fact that it took petitioner more than a year before disputing the declaration of fitness to work by the companydesignated physician. Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefit on the basis of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Cajas medical certifications which
were issued after five and 10 months, respectively, from the company-designated physicians declaration of fit to work. Unfortunately,
apart from the reasons already stated, these certifications could not be given any credence as petitioners health condition could have
changed during the interim period due to different factors such as petitioners poor compliance with his medications as in fact
mentioned by Dr. Caja in the medical certificate she issued. As such, the said medical certifications cannot effectively controvert the fit
to work assessment earlier made.
G.R. No. 185128
January 30, 2012
Facts: Pursuant to an information received that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon conducted surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, thereafter secured a search warrant from the RTC
and the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and
went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a
small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with
the entrances and exits of the place.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the
house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the
petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. The contents of the four heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of
which proved positive for the presence of shabu. Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner. During arraignment,
petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.
The accused denied the allegations and according to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they
found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father. Nevertheless, the RTC
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. Petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the
latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the
police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted
prior to the application of the same search warrant. Moreover , petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from

his house is no longer within the permissible area that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search
warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched.

Whether or not there is a probable cause to justify the warrant of arrest?

Whether or not the search conducted in the nipa house was valid?



The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining
probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the
issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought
to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case,
Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated
in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay
tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under
his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's
control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

18.) SEC v. MENDOZA et, al.

Facts: Acting on the search warrant, NBI and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) agents searched the offices mentioned and
seized the described documents and articles from them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal complaint with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) against respondents Rizza Mendoza, et., al. for violation of Republic Act 8799, also known as the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC), and b) commit estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.[1] The court granted the application.
The Muntinlupa petition sought to prevent the SEC and the NBI from using the seized articles in prosecuting Mendoza, et al.
and the DOJ from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of their case, using the same. They feared that the seized articles may
have already been tampered with, altered, or augmented by those responsible for seizing them. Essentially, Mendoza, et al.s action is
one for the suppression of evidence whose seizure had become illegal for failure to turn them over to the issuing court. The three
agencies moved for reconsideration of the Muntinlupa RTCs orders granting the intervention and the preliminary injunction. They also
moved for the dismissal of action. Court issued an omnibus order, denying their motions for reconsideration and to dismiss. This
prompted the three agencies to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, seeking to annul the Muntinlupa RTCs orders.
During the pendency of the case before the CA, the Makati RTC rendered a decision nullifying the search warrant it issued
and declaring the documents and articles seized under it inadmissible in evidence. The Makati RTC also directed the SEC and the NBI
to return the seized items to respondents Pastrana and Abad. The CA did not mention the Makati RTC order and did not dismiss the
petition before it on ground of mootness. It denied the three agencies petition, and affirmed the orders of the Muntinlupa RTC. The CA
ruled, among other things, that Mendoza, et al.s action before the Muntinlupa RTC was proper and distinct from that which
respondents Pastrana and Abad filed with the Makati RTC. The three agencies moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
Undaunted, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari.


Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.s injunction action

The rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to
suppress. It is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek
suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action where a
party complains of a violation of his right by another. The Court clearly explained in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,[20] the nature of a
search warrant proceeding.
The CA held that the proceedings before the Makati RTC and the Muntinlupa RTC are separate and distinct. The object of the
motion to quash search warrant, here filed by respondents Pastrana and Abad with the Makati RTC, the issuing court, was to test the
validity of its issuance, given that the warrant was made to cover several offenses rather than just one as the rules provide. On the
other hand, the object of the Muntinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seized articles in any criminal
proceeding against Mendoza, et al. considering the SEC and the NBIs failure to immediately turn over the seized articles to the court
that issued the warrant as the rules require.
But Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the search warrant and 2) the suppression of
evidence seized under it are matters that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in
the meantime been filed in court.
The section 14 provides:
Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action
has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to
resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
(Emphasis supplied)
Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et al. filed with the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which
is to prohibit the three agencies from using the items seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as
evidence. Consequently, Mendoza, et al. should have filed it with the Makati RTC that issued such warrant.
It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the issuance of the search warrant, they had
no standing to question the same or seek the suppression of evidence taken under it. Consequently, since they had reasons for
questioning government use of the seized items against them, they had the right to bring the injunction action before the Muntinlupa
RTC where they resided.
Search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not
one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John
Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant
evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police
weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private
rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be
applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.
Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to
file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress the use of the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI
to immediately turn these over to the issuing court. The issuing court is the right forum for such motion given that no criminal action had
as yet been filed against Mendoza, et al. in some other court.
Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the seized documents and articles for months rather than
immediately turn them over to the Makati RTC. Justifying its action, the SEC said that it still needed to study the seized items.
Evidently, it wanted to use them to build up a case against the respondents, unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to the court.
Clearly, SECs arbitrary action compromised the integrity of the seized documents and articles.
19.) Ambre vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 191532
August 15, 2012
Facts: The Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a
police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp (Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs
at a residential compound in Caloocan City. The buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao
(Tagoranao), however, the Sultan was able to ran away from the scene of the entrapment operation, to which PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi
and PO1 Mateo, pursued him. In the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house. Inside the house, the police
operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session, where Ambre was caught sniffing what was suspected to be shabu
in a rolled up aluminum foil. Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her.

The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal
use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted her of the
crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the drug paraphernalia
found in her possession. Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime. The CA
denied the appeal.
Issues: Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person were valid?

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law,
it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception established by
jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest. In this exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus,
can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being
held by Castro. Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument
is specious.

20.) HPS Software and Communication Corporation vs PLDT

687 SCRA 426
Facts: PAOCTF applied for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for Theft of Telephone
Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipment following the complaint of the
PLDT that they were able to monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and equipment capable of receiving
and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT. Complainants
witnesses conducted a test call using Mabuhay Card and discovered in the course of their test calls that PLDT telephone lines/numbers
were identified as the calling party. They testified that the test calls passing through the Mabuhay Card were being reflected as local
calls only and not overseas calls thus making the international long distance calls appear as local calls, to the damage and prejudice of
PLDT which is deprived of revenues as a result thereof. They discovered that the lines were subscribed by Philip Yap whose address is
HPS Software Communication Corporation. The trial court issued the search warrant and it was implemented. Subsequently,
corresponding information filed against HPS and Yap.
Yap filed a Motion to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence. HPS Corporation filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Return. Both pleadings sought to quash the search warrants at issue on the grounds that the same did not refer to a
specific offense, that there was no probable cause, and that the search warrants were general warrants and were wrongly
implemented. Before PLDT could submit its memorandum, RTC granted to quash the search warrant and return the things seized.
Hence PLDT filed separate notice of appeal and certiorari. PLDT argued that two search warrants were improperly quashed. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC.
CA concluded that no test calls using the same Mabuhay card were actually made by PLDTs witnesses when it applied for a
search warrant against HPS C, otherwise, the Mabuhay card should have had less than $10.00 value left in it before it was used in the
test calls conducted at the NTC-Region VII office and in open court.
Issues: Whether the two search warrants were improperly quashed?
Whether the subject warrants are in the nature of general warrants?
Whether the release of the items seized by virtues of the subject search warrants was proper?

This Court cannot subscribe to CAs hasty conclusion because the determination of whether or not test calls were indeed
made by PLDT on Mabuhay card cannot be ascertained solely by checking the value reflected on the aforementioned Mabuhay card. In
fact, reliance on this method of verification is fraught with questions that strike deep into the capability of the said Mabuhay card to
automatically and accurately reflect the fact that it had indeed been used by PLDTs witnesses to make test calls. PLDT never
represented that the Mabuhay card had an accurate recording system that would automatically deduct the value of a call from the value
of the card at the time the call was made. Certainly, PLDT was not in a position to make such an assertion as it did not have a hand in
the production and programming of said Mabuhay card.

The court held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in
the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized.
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as
will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., this Court held that the quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not
the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be
subsequently filed. We ruled in this case that:
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
The court finds that the subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently
identified physically and were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged which are Theft and Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR activities.
A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be
valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. In Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, we explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a valid search warrant, to wit:
[A] search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant x x x what
articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed.
x x x
As properly pointed out by PLDT, Order of the respondent judge is not immediately executory. It is a final order which
disposes of the action or proceeding and which may be the subject of an appeal. From the foregoing, it is clear that execution may
issue only upon motion by a party and only upon the expiration of the period to appeal, if no appeal has been perfected. Otherwise, if
an appeal has been duly perfected, the parties would have to wait for the final resolution of the appeal before it may execute the
judgment or final order except for instances where an execution pending appeal is granted by the proper court of law.
G.R. No. 173474
August 29, 2012
Facts: Chief Insp. Divina, received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself. The caller tipped him off about a robbery
to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. Thereafter he was immediately order to form a team. They positioned themselves to
aforesaid street and spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate. The team pursued the driver, which is Belocura,
signaled him to stop but was ignored and sped off the car. Later, the team was able to blocked Becolo's path and they approach
Belocura. Duvina and his team queried Belocura about the plate no., confiscated his pistol that was tucked in his waist and arrested
him. SPO2 Santos searched the jeep and recovered a red plastic bag containing a marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
On the other hand, Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he only sees the marijuana for
the first time in the court. On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of marijuana whether at the time of
his arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed to
the jeep, the bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the drivers seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the
wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the
bricks of marijuana were intact.
RTC convicted Belocura which the CA affirmed in the appeal.

Whether the warrantless search on Belocura's jeep was valid.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence
under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations
(Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is
dispensed with.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code). In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the

positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it
"proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a
crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under the
first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became
cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within
his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect
the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the
arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the
fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the corpus
delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 188526
November 11, 2013
Facts: Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy, is the sole distributor and registered
trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap for a period of ten years. Her representative, Ping,
requested the assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which are selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the
general appearance of their products. The NBI agents conducted an investigation and test buys. The agents was able to confirm that
the respondent's claims to be true. An issuance of search warrants against the drugstores involved for violations of trademark
infrigement and unfair competition.
Petitioners contend that the seizure of products from their stores are not subject of the search warrant and seizures. Those
items taken from the stores are not products of any kind of any crime, used, or intended to be used in any crime. The petitioners claim
that they are legitimate distributors of the products in question, thus they are authorized to sell those products.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners to quash the said search warrant and ordered the same to return the seized products
within several days. However, the CA reversed the decision on grounds that the search warrant was issued because of anticipation of
committing an offense. Petitioners argue that the RTC erred in the issuance of search warrant because the claims of anticipatory civil
action was never raised in the court.

Whether the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC to quash the search warrant



It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search warrants on grounds of trademark infringement and
unfair competition is the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private complainant-appellant was issued a Certificate of
Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the
lawful holder of the said trademark. Being the registrant and the holder of the same, private complainant-appellant had the authority to
enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it. This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents of the NBI, who
thereafter conducted a series of investigation, test buys and inspection regarding the alleged trademark infringement by herein
respondents-appellees. Subsequently, Ping Na Lau, private complainant-appellants representative, issued a certification with the
finding that the examined goods were counterfeit. This prompted the NBI agents to apply for the issuances of search warrants against
the respondents-appellees. Said applications for the search warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining under oath
the applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R. Ismael.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied with and that there is
probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense were in the
places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property
rights of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of
Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office
The rules provided for by the Intellectual Property Code is not applicable in the case at bar because the warrants were not applied base
on such facts but rather on the anticipation of the commission of the offense under the Intellectual Property Code, in the NBI agent's
affidavit it stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in criminal actions that are likely to be instituted." Rule
126 of the Rules of Court should apply rather than those provided for by the Intellectual Property Code.


G.R. No. 198694
February 13, 2013
Facts: PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who wereall assigned
tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along
Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?". For purportedly
violating Manila City Ordinance which punishes breaches of the peace, Ramon (Petitioner) was apprehended by the authorities. Later,

as the petitioner was apprehended, he was asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover
0.173g of shabu and was confiscated. Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs.
The RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs, finding all elements to have been established through
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The court upheld the legality of the warrantless arrest by reason of disturbance of peace in
violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time of his apprehension.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding no error therein.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC, was the warrantless arrest valid and does it follow that the search
conducted was admissible as evidence.


Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person's right against unwarranted intrusions of the goverment as provided for by the
1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 2. Nevertheless, there are exclusionary rules provided by the rules of court that validates
warrantless arrests, in the case at bar it is searches incidental to a lawful arrest, Rule 113, Section 5 (a), flagrante delicto.
The situation of the petitioner however, the warrantless arrest was discredited and negate the probable cause when the police
officers apprehended the accused, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing
with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance. Futher
stressed, there was no complain heard of with Ramon's shouting. In its totality, the court observed that the facts and circumstances
could have not build a well-found belief that any breach in peace was made, thus no probable cause existed to justify the warrantless
Consequently, as the warrantless arrest was invalid, such search and seizure is also deemed illegal. The shabu purportedly seized from
the accused is inadmissible evidence.
G.R. No. 191263
October 16, 2013
Facts: On July 31, 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, Trayvilla, personnel of the Philippine National Police, while performing her
duties as a female frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay City, frisked the accused (Cadidia) upon her entry at the
departure area and noticed something unusual and thick in the buttocks area of the accused. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered it was
only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with the explanation she and her co-employee brought the
accused to the comfort room to check. When the authorities asked to remove her underwear, they discovered two sachets of shabu.
The accused denied the ownership of the said sachets of drugs, and said she was only asked to bring the same.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and ruled that the alleged minor inconsistencies do not diminish the credibility of the witnesses
and the case.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest made by airport security is valid, does inconsistencies with procedure change the proof against
the accused
The court held that such minor inconsistencies devoid merit, the integrity and evidentiary value of the specimen as handled by
the chain of custody, such non compliance with these requirements do not void or invalidate the seizure. The statements of the
witnesses may have minor inconsistencies but such statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken recollection of
On final note, the court held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure. Persons may lose the protection
of the search and seizure by exposure or their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increasing concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the airports. The airports even notify the
passengers that ordinary constitutional protection against warantless search and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.


G.R. No. 161106
January 13, 2014
Facts: A search warrant was issued to search the premises of herein petitioner, World Wide Web Corporation as well as the premises
of Planet Internet. The application for the search warrants alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations that
amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401, to damage and prejudice the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
Several equipments in various categories were taken from both petitioner and Planet Internet.
The accused filed a motion to quash in the RTC and was granted. Planet Internet was able to explain on how they were able to bypass
the charges of PLDT and such explanation satisfied PLDT, these contentions were not refuted by PLDT. PLDT appealed to the CA and
the court declared the search warrants valid and effective.
Toll bypass operation is a method explained where in such connection would show that International calls would be identified as local
calls only.

Issues: Was there probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant,
Whether or not the search warrant particularly describing the items to be search and seized
Was the fruit of the theft committed by the petitioners


Probable cause is determined based on evidence showing that more likey than not, a crime has been committed and that it
was committed by the offender. In the case at bar, probable cause existed which justified the issuance of the search warrants in
The search warrants issued must be described in particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized.
The application for search warrant does not require the conformity of the public prosecutor as a requisite. Search warrants are
applied for and it is not obtained by filing a complaint or an information. Rule 110, Section 5 should not apply.
Theft was committed by the petitioners by turning international calls into local calls, to explain further it was the use of the
communication facilities of PLDT without consent that constitute the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone service
and business.


G.R. No. 203028

January 15, 2014

Facts: A confidential informant went to the District Anti-Illegal Drug (DAID) office in the Western Police District to report that a certain
Joselito Beran, alias "Jose," a pedicab driver, was selling prohibited drugs. A buy-bust team was formed and operations took place to
apprehend the suspect. The plan took place, and the exchange was made for P100 and 0.30g of shabu, after examination of the
poseur-buyer, he signaled his team to go after the suspect. The poseur-buyer then took possession of the said shabu, but forgot to
label it nor was there any person in his team that could attest that he took possession in transit to the police station.
The RTC rendered its judgement finding the accused Beran guilty for the crime charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. In affirming in toto the RTC the CA ruled that Beran was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a valid and legitimate buy-bust
operation, an entrapment to apprehend law breakers while in the act of executing their criminal plan.

Whether the evidence is admissible due to discrepancies in the mandatory procedure



The cruicial issue in the case is to establish the corpus delicti the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug have been
preserved in an unbroken chain of custody. The court held that no unbroken chain of custody, and that the court ruled that the
prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged. Failure of the operatives to observe the mandatory
procedure of labelling the seized shabu in the presence of the accused casted a shadow on the evidence itself, therefore the accused
must be set free because the very body of the crime and the evidence pointing to such offense is no longer admissible to the said case.
In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photograph must be conducted in the place where the
search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable;
however, nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the
items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in keeping with the law's intent of preserving their integrity and evidentiary
In People v. Dela Rosa it was ruled that the prosecution must establish by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, and all the way to the time it is offered in evidence. In the instant case, from the testimony of PO3 Sia it is clear that the
apprehending operatives did not, immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal item, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and an elected public official, notwithstanding that they were supposed to have been conducting a planned sting operation. Indeed, it is
not gratuitous to state that they took no efforts whatsoever to observe even a modicum of the above procedures. Worse, the
prosecution did not bother to explain why they failed to observe them, although they knew these procedures were intended to preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized. Moreover, none of the other witnesses of the prosecution could corroborate the
culpatory narrative of PO3 Sia at any of its material points to create the successive links in the custody of the seized drug. Of the sixman buy-bust team, only PO3 Sia and PO3 Francia testified in court, and PO3 Francia himself twice stated that he did not witness the
actual buy-bust sale as it was taking-place
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of marking of the seized
items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and

photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the marking of the seized itemsto truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as
well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or
theft.45 (Citations omitted and emphases in the original)
It needs no elaboration that the immediate marking of the item seized in a buy-bust operation in the presence of the accused
is indispensable to establish its identity in court. PO3 Sia admitted that he marked the sachet of shabu only at the DAID-WPD precinct,
several kilometers from the buy-bust scene, as well as impliedly admitted that Beran was not then present. Indeed, none of the buybust team attested that they saw him take custody of the confiscated shabu and later mark the sachet at the DAID-WPD office.


G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
Facts: On August 26, 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army. The mass
graves contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victimes of "Operation Venereal Disease" launched by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP to purge their ranks of suspected military informants. An analysis of the remains and the grave came up with names of
possible victims after comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses. Complaint-affidavits were from
relatives of the alleged victimes of the operation. All of the relatives swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again. An information was then filed before the RTC, later the judge issued an
order finding probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged, he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them. Petitioner herein argued that a case for rebellion against him and others was then pending before the RTC, putting
forward the political defense doctrine, that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion.

Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
Whether or not the warrant was legal?


No, petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is
proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story cannot
claim denial of due process.
The respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits
and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in their last known
address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in
spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before
him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last
known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor
Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge as long as there is no
grave abuse of discretion. Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an
examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the
determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. Because there is another way the examination of the
prosecutors report.
G.R. No. 203335
February 11, 2014

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act

of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The Cybercrime prevention act was enacted in 2012 petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original
120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from
implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The petitioners asked for certain provisions (with regard to our subject criminal procedure) be unconstitutional:

Whether or not the pertinent such provisions violate criminal procedure/constitutional law on searches and seizures.


Not all the alleged provisions violate the mandate of the constitution with regard to criminal procedures.

Section 12 authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time unconstitutional.

When seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which
can then be used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a
persons close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the
public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. Section 12 does not even bother to
relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.unconstitutional.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of
expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant,
it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.
Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant constitutional.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant- constitutional.
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
naccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face,
however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation,
and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any
threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure
rules but merely supplements them.
29.) PLDT Co. vs. Alvarez
G.R. No. 179408, March 5, 2014
Facts: PLDT regularly conducts investigation on various prepaid cards maketed and sold abroad to determine alternative calling
patterns (ACP) and network frauds being perpetrated against it.
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDTs Quality Control Division, together with
the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at
No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered that PLDT telephone
lines were connected to several pieces of equipment which prompted Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz to file a consolidated
application for search warrant before Judge Francisco Mendiola for the crimes of theft and violation of PD 401. According to PLDT, the
respondents are engaged in the form of network fraud known as International Simple Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the
Judge Mendiola found probable cause for issuance of search warrants applied for and four search warrants were issued for

violations of Art. 308, in relation to Art. 309 of RPC and of PD 401 as amended.
PNP searched the premise indicated in the warrants and made a return with a complete inventory of the items seized PLDT and PNP
filed with the DOJ a joint complaint affidavit for theft and violation of PD 401 against the respondents. Respondents filed with the RTC a
motion to quash the search warrant on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority to issue search warrants which were
enforced in Paraaque City; second, the enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked particularity; and third, there was
no probable cause for the crime of theft. PLDT opposed the respondents' motion. RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Whether the issuance of search warrant was valid

The accused is indeed guilty of theft, while PLDT does not own the calls perse, the facilities of PLDT company is used without
its permission, therefore it is an unlawful taking of telephone services and business of PLDT.
The issuance of the search warrant is valid, probable cause is determined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed that leads the connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. In the present case, PLDT correctly pointed out the sufficiency to establish probable cause for the
crime of theft.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause
which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
The requirement of particularity provided by the constitution does not require technical accuracy in description of the property
to be seized. Specificity is satisfied if the personal properties' description is as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be so
30.) Sesbreno v Aglugub
720 SCRA 57
Facts: The
The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition. In a Consolidated
Resolution, only the charge of Usurpation was set for arraignment, the rest of the charges having been dismissed. Thereafter,
Complainant made a manifestation that the complaint also charged the defendants with violation of RA No. 10 accompanied by a
prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrests against the defendants. Respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the
charge for violation of R.A. 10.She also denied complainants prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused and
ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed respondents order and
remanded the case to the court for further proceedings on the sole charge of Usurpation of Authority. During the hearing of the case on
February14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however, did not move for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
Issues: Did Respondent err in not conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority?
Did Respondent err in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial?


A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. Thus, a preliminary investigation
is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
There is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of
the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private
prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676
January 29, 2009
Complainant Bayaca was the accused in a criminal case for arson through reckless imprudence presided by respondent
judge. After trial, respondent Judge promulgated his Decision dated April 2, 2004. Complainant appealed the case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 37 of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya which came out with its decision affirming with modification the decision of the
Despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in the RTC decision, respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest and
Commitment on Final Sentence which led to complainants incarceration at the Solano District Jail from August 8 to 28, 2006.

Bayaca filed a complaint alleging that respondent Judge acted without legal basis in ordering his detention, and committed grave abuse
of discretion. Complainant added that respondents conduct was unbecoming and inappropriate for a judge which is greatly prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Judge clarified that his issuance of the warrant of arrest against herein complainant was a mistake
done in good faith. He added that for almost sixteen (16) years it was the practice in his sala that before acting on a motion it passed
through his Clerk of Court who studied the records to determine whether or not to grant it. If it would be granted, the Clerk of Court
would then request the stenographer to type the order and thereafter, he would affix his initial for respondent Judges signature. This
was the procedure that they followed in the instant case which was unfortunately the only instance that they committed a mistake.
Respondent Judge maintained that the matter was merely a case of simple negligence.

Whether the issuance of Warrant of Arrest by respondent judge was a mistake done in good faith.



The respondent Judge was inexcusably negligent when he issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence
despite the deletion by the appellate court of that portion of the judgment imposing the penalty of imprisonment. In the performance of
his duties, respondent Judge failed to observe that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of
any public service. If only respondent Judge had exercised the requisite thoroughness and caution, he would have noted not only the
modification of the monetary awards by the appellate court, but also the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment upon which the Warrant
of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence that he signed was based.
Respondent Judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or Stenographer. A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his very own court personnel. Certainly, a judge is responsible not only for the dispensation of
justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. In the discharge of the functions of his
office, respondent Judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He must
act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. Surely, a judge is enjoined to pore over all
documents whereon he is required to affix his signature and give his official imprimatur.The negligence of respondent Judge in this case
simply cannot be countenanced.








This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Court of Appeals upheld the judgement of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
petitioner Don Djowel Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of marijuana.

The evidence shows that the petitioner scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan. He arrived the
Manila Domestic Airport As part of the routine security check at the pre-departure area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal
Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a nonuniformed personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG) found something slightly bulging
inside the right pocket of his short pants. When asked to bring out the accused refused and this called the attention of PO1 Cherry
Upon arraignment Sales duly assisted by counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty to the charge. Denying the charge against him,
petitioner testified that on May 24, 2003, he, together with his girl friend and her family were headed to Boracay Island for a vacation.
While he was queuing to enter the airport, he was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. The two asked him to empty his
pockets since it was bulging. Inside his pocket were a pack of cigarettes and cash in the amount of P8,000.00 in 500 peso-bills. His girl
friend told him to get a boarding pass but he asked her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort room. On the way to the comfort
room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This male person wearing a
white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets which he did. The male person then said it was "okay" but as
petitioner proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the male person called him again saying that "this fell from you" and showing him
two "small white wrappings which seemed to be marijuana." Petitioner told the male person that those items were not his but the latter
said they will talk about it in the comfort room. The RTC found him guilty of illegal possession of Marijuana.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted was in violation of the rights of the accused with regards to personal
property and in cases of possession of illegal substance what is the proper protocol in search and seizure.


The CA ruled that the body search conducted on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a routine airport
security procedure allowed by law. It found no merit in petitioners theory of frame-up and extortion. On the issue of the integrity and
probative value of the evidence used to convict petitioner, the CA held that there is no hiatus or confusion that the marijuana that was
marked at the airport, then subjected to qualitative examination on the same day and eventually introduced as evidence against

petitioner, is the same prohibited drug that was found in his custody and possession when he was apprehended at the pre-departure
area of the airport in the morning of May 24, 2003.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security
officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the
airports pre-departure area.
In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport,
this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures,
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
Petitioner contention that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and
PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous
search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner walked past through the
metal detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security check.
The court found no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon
the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said
provision reads:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a
part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
In People v. Johnson, the Courts ruling was also applied in People v. Canton:
Where the accused, a female passenger was frisked at the NAIA after passing through the metal detector booth
that emitted a beeping sound. Since the frisker noticed something bulging at accuseds abdomen, thighs and
genital area, which felt like packages containing rice granules, accused was subjected to a thorough physical
examination inside the ladies room. Three sealed packages were taken from accuseds body which when
submitted for laboratory examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused was forthwith arrested and prosecuted for illegal possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Cantons conviction for the crime of illegal possession of shabu, we ruled that accusedappellant was lawfully arrested without a warrant after being caught in flagrante delicto. We further held that the scope of a
search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" 1 doctrine.
The more extensive search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of packages on her body, her
apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion of the frisker that she was hiding something illegal.
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the
airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby
depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the ladies
room was justified under the circumstances.
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioners reluctance to show the contents of

his short pants pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the
suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners argument that the non-presentation of SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as witnesses is fatal to
the prosecutions case.


G.R. No. 197788
February 29, 2012
Facts: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, he saw the
accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,Naga City, driving a motorcycle without
a helmet. This prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet while driving said motor vehicle. While he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He was on the alert and so, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in
size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it. The accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it and upon his instruction,
the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu
Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he
had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest.

No, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto
and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent
on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.The following are the instances
when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii)
search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. It must be
noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside
a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. Neither was there a consented
warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a
limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused
G.R. No. 201363
March 18, 2013
Facts: On December 25, 2006 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th
Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. PO3
de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle
and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Upon seeing

PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellants attempts to
resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the
SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet. Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence
as well as the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment
receipt and prepared a letter request for the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the
request and the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior
Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist. Upon qualitative examination it tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Consequently, appellant was charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of
not guilty to the offense he was charged. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police
officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters firing range. There, he was forced to
answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him
when he continued to deny knowledge about the cellphone.Appellant sustained head injuries and brought to the Diosdado Macapagal
Hospital for treatment. The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that he was being
charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11." The first charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC convicted appellant,finding that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been
established. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the former
had previously arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs under Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and
credit to PO3 de Leons testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in
plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of the arrest. The CA sustained appellants conviction, finding "a clear case of in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held
that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," aggravated by the existence of his
past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him. Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise
ruled that the prosecution had adequately shown the continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was
confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime
laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo, the forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.

Issue: Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to
appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in ones hands cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a)
of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with,
i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.
In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled
with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to
create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. Furthermore, appellants act of darting
away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
G.R. No. 162808
April 22, 2008
Facts: In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from
petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The
confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed
against petitioner an Information or Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec)
Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case, docketed as

Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG);and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and
Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez
and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went down of the jeep but before he could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked his way.
His other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a
person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his
house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements.
While we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted
a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant. That after a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of
the petitioners jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them, He searched his
wallet and gave the asked document. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two days having been
released only after posing a bail.
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving private respondents
Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and
criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely
being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. The RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman dismissed the charges against private respondents for lack of probable cause.

Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the private respondents.



Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against
private respondents was proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark
because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit
of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Public respondents completely overlooked the fact
that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result
achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus,
the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that
issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from
interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, except when the same is shown to
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search,
arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act
for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. - In addition to the liability
attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his
authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two
witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents
of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by
Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.


GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658 November 03, 2008

Facts: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in
that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution
No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates
the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
Issue: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional. (Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f)
and (g) are not )


However, sec. 36 and (d) are valid. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this
case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug
testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a
judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not

required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search
in question.


G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the
Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na"program of the CSC.
CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her aware that there is a corrupt
official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein.
David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to administrative cases and were for on
the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice
that he pursued regularly.
Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition
and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA
6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental
duties. The CA ruled that the search was legal because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly conduct
search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

Issue: Whether there was illegal search.



The SC ruled in favor of the CSC. Basing their decision on other cases, the SC asked whether Pollo has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files and was the search reasonable in its inception and scope.
On regards the first inquiry, the SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not have a
separate office space nor did he use a password for his computer. He would have visitors which he let them use his computer. The
CSC also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
On the second inquiry, the SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related