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KILOSBAYAN VS.

MORATO
locus standi

Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens,


priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They are joined by
some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.)
They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO
on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier
nullified by the SC.
There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil.
Gaming Mgt. Corp. The equipment lease agreement
covers online lottery equipment to be leased to PCSO.
The agreement was invalidated by the SC for it violated
the Charter of PCSO.
An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing
for 4.3% of the gross sales as consideration.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease
Agreement is a different lease contract. They claim that
the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public
bidding because it fell within the exception under EO
301. They also claim that the power to determine
whether the Agreement is disadvantageous belongs to
the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the
petitioners standing.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no
standing since they are not parties to the contract, and
have no personal or substantial interest likely to be
injured by the enforcement of the Contract.
Petitioners however contend that the earlier case
sustained their standing to challenge the validity of the
first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the
case (that they have standing).

SC:

The law of the case is not applicable in this case because


this case is NOT a sequel to the previous case. It is not its
continuation. This proceeding is essentially different from
the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a prior case that
petitioners had standing to challenge that 1993 Contract
does NOT PRECLUDE their determination of their standing in
the present suit.
Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recently been laid down as rule since
the previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may
itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real
issue is not lack of legal standing but whether they are real
parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this
case since standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, and here no constitutional question was actually
involved.
Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very
different from questions relation to whether a party is the
real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only
certain parties can maintain an action, Standing requires
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader public
policy concerns.
The question in standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largele depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown
what particularized interest they have for bringing the suit.

It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as


civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of the
required to maintain an action. It is true that the present
action involves not a mere contract between private
individuals but one made by a government corporation.
HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS
ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO MAKE THIS ACTION A
PUBLIC ONE, and justify the relaxation of the requirement
that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the
real parties in interest are those who are parties to the
agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or
are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties and can show the deteriment which
would positively result to them from the contract even
though they did not intervene in it.
The phrase present substantial interest means such
interest of a party in a subject matter of action as will
entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient.
Petitioners
here
DO
NOT
HAVE
SUCH
PRESENT
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement as would
entitle them to bring this suit.
Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or
the necessity for a public bidding can be raised in an
appropriate case before the COA, or before the
Ombudsman.

Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:


1) public funds involved
2) utter disregard for the constitution
3) lack of party who can bring a suit.

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