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Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC. PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract.
Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC. PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract.
Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC. PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract.
Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens,
priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They are joined by some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.) They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC. There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil. Gaming Mgt. Corp. The equipment lease agreement covers online lottery equipment to be leased to PCSO. The agreement was invalidated by the SC for it violated the Charter of PCSO. An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing for 4.3% of the gross sales as consideration. PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease Agreement is a different lease contract. They claim that the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public bidding because it fell within the exception under EO 301. They also claim that the power to determine whether the Agreement is disadvantageous belongs to the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the petitioners standing. PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract, and have no personal or substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the Contract. Petitioners however contend that the earlier case sustained their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the case (that they have standing).
SC:
The law of the case is not applicable in this case because
this case is NOT a sequel to the previous case. It is not its continuation. This proceeding is essentially different from the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a prior case that petitioners had standing to challenge that 1993 Contract does NOT PRECLUDE their determination of their standing in the present suit. Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as rule since the previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real issue is not lack of legal standing but whether they are real parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this case since standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, and here no constitutional question was actually involved. Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very different from questions relation to whether a party is the real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only certain parties can maintain an action, Standing requires partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader public policy concerns. The question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largele depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown what particularized interest they have for bringing the suit.
It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as
civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of the required to maintain an action. It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO MAKE THIS ACTION A PUBLIC ONE, and justify the relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the deteriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it. The phrase present substantial interest means such interest of a party in a subject matter of action as will entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient. Petitioners here DO NOT HAVE SUCH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement as would entitle them to bring this suit. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding can be raised in an appropriate case before the COA, or before the Ombudsman.
Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:
1) public funds involved 2) utter disregard for the constitution 3) lack of party who can bring a suit.