Defense Pacts

Foreign Policy Analysis (2011) 7, 4565
Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?1

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds
Rice University
Do military alliances lead to peace or to war? Research has suggested
that defensive alliances to potential targets deter dispute initiation
(Leeds 2003b:427). This would seem to suggest that forming defensive
alliances is a good policy prescription for those seeking to encourage
peace. Yet, some argue that even if defense pacts have a deterrence
effect, defense pacts may also have other effects that increase militarized conflict in the international system. Specifically, defense pacts may
encourage member states to initiate and or escalate disputes. In an
analysis covering the period from 1816 to 2000, we evaluate these three
potential effects of defense pactsdeterrence, initiation, and escalation.
We find support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the
initiation of disputes but no evidence in support of the claims that
states with defensive allies are more likely to initiate disputes in the
international system or that targets with allies are more likely to
respond to dispute initiation with further militarization. We conclude
that defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict
and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace
in the world.
Introduction: Security Institutions and the Quest for Peace

One of the most important goals of international relations scholars is to identify
cost-effective foreign policy actions that can reduce the probability of military
combat. War and militarized disputes short of war are directly costly in lives and
treasure and have additional opportunity costs in lost trade and development.
Fortunately, militarized conflict is rare, but given its enormous cost, it remains
worthy of considerable scholarly attention.
What has been particularly frustrating to scholars wishing to influence policy,
however, is that many of the factors that we know are associated with an
increased probability of war are not easily manipulable by policymakers. There is
consensus in the literature that stronger states are less likely to be attacked, but
increasing military capabilities dramatically through economic development, population growth, building arms, and adding military personnel is a very costly
proposition. Democratic states are less likely to fight one another, but democratization (of ones own state or a potential adversarys) is also a difficult process.
1
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
February 1720, 2010, New Orleans, Louisiana, and at the North American meeting of the Peace Science Society,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, November 2022, 2009. The authors thank Daina Chiba, Songying Fang, Doug Gibler,
Michaela Mattes, Cliff Morgan, Gary Uzonyi, and participants in the Rice University International Relations Workshop for helpful comments on this research. Data for replication and all additional analysis referenced in the text
and footnotes are available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds.
doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00122.x
2010 International Studies Association
46
Defense Pacts and Peace
Thus, it is not surprising that policymakers are attracted to the potential pacific effects of international security institutions. More easily manipulable than
regime type or power, alliances are a potentially useful policy tool for reducing
the probability of militarized disputes. But whether states can design alliances
that make them safer without unintentionally increasing incentives for members
to initiate or escalate militarized conflicts is currently unclear to scholars. While
evidence supports the claim that states with allies committed to defend them in
the event of attack are less likely to be the targets of militarized attack (Leeds
2003b), studies have also shown that alliance membership may encourage states
to initiate disputes (Palmer and Morgan 2006) or to escalate conflicts to higher
levels (Smith 1995; Senese and Vasquez 2008).
In this study, we first test the hypothesis that defensive alliances to potential
targets deter dispute initiation on a larger spatial-temporal domain than was
examined in previous studies. We find support for this hypothesis. We then test
hypotheses regarding the probability that states with defensive alliances are more
likely to initiate disputes and that targets with defensive alliances are more likely
to resist when challenged, opening the possibility of escalation to war. We find
no support for these additional hypotheses. If anything, our results all aim in the
direction of peacestates with defensive allies are less likely to be the targets of
disputes; states with defensive allies are no more likely to initiate disputes; and
targets with allies are no more likely to resist when challenged. In view of these
results, we feel increasingly comfortable suggesting that defensive alliances promote peace. While we believe that future research should aim to be more precise
in specifying the particular conditions under which alliances are likely to be most
effective at promoting peace, we see these results as a helpful first step that
should be relevant to important current policy debates.
The Dangerous Side Effects of Defense Pacts
Recent theoretical research points out that war is an inefficient way to divide
resources. If both sides knew what the outcome of a war would be, they would
prefer to reach a peaceful division of their assets that would satisfy both sides
without paying the costs of war. Incomplete information and commitment problems, however, can prevent states from reaching a successful prewar bargain.
When the leader of a challenger state believes that the status quo distribution of
benefits does not reflect what he could claim through force, he will demand concessions from his target, with a threat of force should the demand be rejected.
In other words, the challenger state will initiate a militarized interstate dispute
(MID). If the leader of the target state believes that granting the concessions will
produce a preferable settlement to what could be gained through fighting, the
target will concede the demand and peace will ensue. Alternatively, if the target
believes he can achieve a preferable outcome (relative to the settlement proposed by the challenger) through bearing the costs of war, he will resist the
demand, raising the possibility of escalation to war (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999).
How do alliances fit into the war story described above? Alliances are formal
agreements among states to cooperate militarily in the event of conflict. While
alliances vary in the actions they require of member states, a subset of alliancesdefense and offense pactsrequire member states to join conflicts involving their allies when the casus foederis of the treaty is invoked. While alliances are
not always reliable, both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that challengers should expect most states to fulfill their alliance commitments (Morrow
1994; Smith 1995, 1998; Fearon 1997; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000; Leeds
2003a). Thus, defensive and offensive alliances provide ex ante information to
both potential challengers and potential targets that conflicts are unlikely to
remain bilateral. Leaders of states with allies committed to assist them should
47
expect a higher probability of success in war, and leaders who expect their opponents to gain assistance from allies should expect a lower probability of success
in war. All else equal, potential targets with allies committed to assist them
should be less likely to be targets of MIDs, and potential challengers with allies
committed to assist them should be more likely to initiate militarized disputes.
Leeds (2003b) provides evidence in support of these hypotheses using data covering the period from 18161944, and we test these hypotheses again on a larger
spatial-temporal domain.
In recent years, offense pacts (that is, alliances that promise assistance in conflicts initiated by a member state) have become rare. When states promise one
another active military assistance in conflict, they most often limit their commitments to cases in which their partners are attacked. According to the Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set, during the period from 1815
to 2003, 71% of alliances requiring active military assistance are limited to defensive situations only, that is, cases in which the sovereignty or territorial integrity
of a member state is attacked. For alliances formed between 1945 and 2003, that
proportion rises to 85%, and to 100% for alliances formed after 1989 (Leeds
and Mattes 2007). For those who seek policy prescriptions that make militarized
conflict less likely, this appears to be good news given the evidence that defensive alliances deter dispute initiation (Leeds 2003b).
Yet, some have questioned whether defensive alliances may have some additional effects that embolden alliance members and increase the likelihood of
war. First, some scholars have suggested that while defensive alliances may help
states avoid being attacked, they may encourage them to go on the attack. Second, scholars have suggested that when challengers are not deterred and initiate
disputes against states with allies, target states may be particularly intransigent,
leading to a higher probability of dispute escalation. Thus, while the deterrence
effect of defensive alliances increases peace, the overall pacific effect of defense
pacts may be tempered by an initiation effect and or an escalation effect.
We consider the potential for an initiation effect of defensive alliances first.
There are at least three different causal mechanisms that have been proposed
that could lead states with defensive allies to go on the attack. First, members of
defensive alliances may make demands of other states believing that their allies
will help them in any conflict that results despite the fact that the conditions do
not meet the specific casus foederis of the alliance agreement. Essentially, this is a
moral hazard or entrapment argumentstates may behave in a more risky
manner because of their increased protection (for example, Snyder 1984). Given
that it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint who started a conflict (and both
sides have incentives to blame their adversaries for initiating the dispute), this
argument is intuitively plausible.
Policymakers have sometimes expressed concerns about the possibility of
entrapment. For example, France and Russia formed a military alliance in 1893,
specifically aimed at deterring German attack. The agreement states If France
is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ
all her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or
by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to
fight Germany (Hurst 1972:668). Yet, Russian leaders delayed making such an
explicit formal commitment for some time, out of fear that a promise of Russian
support might lead France to provoke a war with Germany to regain AlsaceLorraine (Langer 1951:8; Taylor 1954:345; Michon 1969:17, 61; Snyder 1997:
113). The Russian czar explicitly warned the French ambassador of the need for
France to avoid pursuing revenge shortly before accepting the agreement
(Langer 1951:48; Taylor 1954:345).
Alternative arguments that suggest defense pacts may lead to an increase in
militarized disputes also exist. A second argument suggests that defensive
48
alliances may reduce the resources that states must devote to preserving their
independence and territorial integrity. To the extent that their defense burden
is reduced, states may choose to use the newly available resources to pursue
aggressive action in the international system. Palmer and Morgan (2006), for
instance, argue that states pursue two foreign policy goalsmaintenance and
change. In other words, states want to invest in keeping the things they like in
the international system and in changing the things they do not like. At any
given time, a state is investing some portion of its foreign policy resources in
maintenance and the remainder in change, and the relative investment is determined by relative preferences for the two goods, resource endowment, and the
efficiency by which the two goods can be produced. If a defensive alliance allows
a state to invest fewer resources in defending itself (that is, producing maintenance), the state might choose to use those newly freed resources to support
policies of change, which could involve initiating disputes against outside states.2
This argument differs from the moral hazard argument because there is no
expectation of allied assistance in the offensive endeavors but is similar to the
moral hazard argument in predicting that states with allies committed to defend
them are more likely to initiate interstate disputes against outside states. In a
monadic analysis, Palmer and Morgan find that joining a new alliance increases
the probability a state initiates a new MID against some other state (2006:158).3
Just as we find historical evidence that policymakers have worried about
entrapment, we also find anecdotal evidence that policymakers have expressed
concern about the effects of defensive alliances on the willingness of members
to initiate aggression in areas where they might not expect allied support. Upon
witnessing the formation of the same 1893 Franco-Russian alliance, British officials feared that greater security in Europe might lead both France and Russia to
become more aggressive in their pursuit of objectives outside of Europe, particularly French claims in Africa and Russian claims in Asia (Langer 1929:198, chapter 12; Michon 1969: 61). In fact, it was in 1894, shortly after signing the alliance
with Russia, that France created an independent Ministry of Colonial Affairs with
Theophile Delcasse, an advocate of imperialist expansion, at its helm. France did
pursue an aggressive colonial policy in the mid- to late 1890s, leading to disputes
with Britain in both the Far East and Africa (for example, Aldrich 1996; Kaiser
2000:293).
A third and final argument linking defense pacts to increased conflict suggests
that forming alliances may be part of a process that leads to increased militarization and insecurity, which in turn make dispute initiation more likely. Senese
and Vasquez (2008) see alliance formation as one of a series of power politics
steps that states may use when dealing with issues in dispute. Every action that
makes one state more secure will lead its rivals to feel more insecure and to
respond with increased hostility, including counter-alliances, arms spending, or
dispute initiation. The dyad ends up in a conflict spiral, each reacting to the
other, that increases the probability that hard-liners take control of the states
and the states eventually end up in war. Thus, while alliances may not immediately lead to war, alliance formation is dangerous because it contributes to a climate of militarization that has a higher probability of eventually resulting in the
use of force. While Senese and Vasquezs theory does not specify which side will
initiate the dispute, nor does it distinguish between types of alliances, Senese
2
Palmer and Morgan (2006) argue that alliances can be change-producing or maintenance-producing depending on the relative capabilities of the state and its ally. To the extent that defensive alliances are limited to protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of alliance members, however, we believe they are more likely to
enhance maintenance rather than change.
3
The Palmer and Morgan test does not distinguish between types of alliances. Ententes, neutrality nonaggression
pacts, and defense pacts are all included in their analysis (2006; see also Morgan and Palmer 2003).
49
and Vasquez do expect the presence of alliances to be associated with a higher

number of militarized disputes and wars.
While the causal mechanisms are different, all three of these arguments suggest that defensive alliances may have indirect, sometimes unintended, effects
that increase rather than reduce militarized conflict. While states that are members of defense pacts may be less likely to find themselves the target of a MID,
they may be more likely to initiate interstate disputes. If there is evidence to support this initiation effect, it should temper our enthusiasm for defensive alliances
as tools of peace.
Another concern arises when we consider the cases in which alliances do not
deter attacks. Even if defense pacts deter the initiation of some MIDs, nothing in
the theory suggests that all potential challengers are deterrable. While targets
with allies committed to defend them are less likely to be challenged than targets
without defensive allies, some may still find themselves facing challenger
demands, either because challengers doubt the reliability of allies or because
challengers believe their probability of success in a multilateral war is sufficient
to justify making a demand. How will targets respond? Some scholars claim that
targets who expect allied support will be more likely to escalate the dispute
rather than making concessions (Smith 1995). Because targets with allies believe
their probability of winning is higher than in a bilateral setting, they are dangerously intransigent. Thus, when defensive alliances fail to deter dispute initiation,
the resulting conflicts may be particularly severe, as target resistance is a necessary step on the path to war. This escalation effect, too, might call into question
the overall effects of defense pacts on peace.
In 1911, for instance, Germany initiated a crisis with France in Morocco.
France intended to exert colonial control over Morocco, and Germany was
unwilling to allow France to expand her influence in the Mediterranean without
appropriate compensation. The Russians worried that their French allies were
risking war by rejecting the substantial demands Germany made for territorial
cessions in Africa. Indeed, while the French and Germans eventually agreed
upon an exchange of colonial properties and avoided war, Russia was concerned
that the promise of support against Germany in Europe that was included in the
1893 Franco-Russian alliance caused France to take too firm a position in bargaining. The result, the Russians feared, could be an unintended war (Michon
1969:195; Snyder 1997:285).
In addition to historical anecdotes such as this, there is some systematic evidence that seems to link alliances to a higher probability that disputes escalate
to war. Senese and Vasquez (2008) report that conflicting dyads in which one or
both states have outside allies are more likely to end up in war. While Senese
and Vasquez do not match specific alliances to wars directly, they do provide two
different statistical analyses that associate the tendency for states to have outside
allies with the tendency for their disputes to escalate to war. First, Senese and
Vasquez show that dyads that have spent a larger proportion of their conflict history with both states or one state involved in an outside alliance are more likely
to end up in war at some point during their history than states that spend more
time without outside allies (2008: chapter 5).4 Second, Senese and Vasquez show
that if participants in a MID have outside allies, they are more likely to experience war sometime within the next five years (although not necessarily owing to
the escalation of this particular MID) than if participants in a MID do not have
4
Senese and Vasquezs (2008) alliance dominance measure includes defense pacts, nonaggression neutrality
pacts, and ententes, but only with politically relevant states. They examine each MID that the dyad is involved in
to see whether one or both sides were members of outside alliances. Whichever alliance status is the modal value
for a dyads MIDs throughout its history is coded as its dyad-history value and used to predict whether the dyad
ever experiences war.
50
allies (2008: chapter 7). Neither of these analyses provides a direct test of the
influence of alliances on the decisions of targets to escalate disputes, but if alliances do make targets more likely to escalate disputes, the resulting aggregate
patterns could be consistent with Senese and Vasquezs results.
While we find the logic behind an initiation and an escalation effect of defensive alliances plausible and we believe testing for these effects is important for
judging the efficacy of alliances as a tool to promote peace, we also believe that
there may be countervailing effects of alliances that limit their potential to encourage the initiation and escalation of disputes. Several scholars have argued that
allies are in a unique position to restrain their partners from engaging in aggressive international actions. Snyder (1984, 1997) and Pressman (2008), for instance,
argue that alliances produce norms and institutions through which members can
exert influence over one anothers foreign policy. These authors suggest that the
mechanisms of information sharing and norms of consultation that develop
within alliances increase the ability of states to convince their allies to change
course. In addition, a credible threat to withhold support or to terminate the alliance can be a potent bargaining tool under some circumstances. Gelpi (1999)
argues that allies have both the incentive and the ability to serve as successful
mediators for disputes between their partners and outside states; because allies
have the ability to influence an eventual war outcome by withholding or offering
support, they are in a position to compel concessions from both sides.
There is reason to believe that states may sometimes wish to use these tools of
influence to limit the probability that their allies initiate and escalate disputes.
First, and most obviously, states may wish to avoid being drawn into militarized
conflicts by their allies actions. But even if the conflict would not invoke alliance
obligations and the state would not need to participate in a dispute initiated or
escalated by a partner, the state might prefer that a partner avoid wasting
resources on other conflicts and instead shepherd resources for conflicts that
might emerge that are more germane to the states own interests. When these
factors outweigh the benefits a state stands to gain from an allys aggression or
resistance, the state may attempt to convince its ally to refrain from initiating disputes or resisting demands.
The 1893 Franco-Russian alliance also provides us with anecdotes of restraint.
When France became involved in heated negotiations with Germany during the
second Morocco crisis in 1911, Russia reportedly recommended that France
accept a less favorable deal with Germany (Snyder 1997:285) and even encouraged France to ask Russia to mediate the dispute (Michon 1969: 195). Similarly,
when the crisis over Austrias annexation of Bosnia threatened to erupt into a
European war, France strongly encouraged Russia to moderate her position
(Michon 1969:1834; Snyder 1997:280) and tried to convince Austrias ally
Germany to agree to mediate the crisis jointly (Taylor 1954:4535). In both
instances, the crises were resolved without war.
Whether a state can restrain an ally depends on relative bargaining power
within the alliance. States that are relatively less dependent on an alliance are
more likely to have a credible threat to abandon an ally and thus have more control over their allys behavior. Whether a state wishes to restrain an ally depends
on the extent to which the state shares its allys interests in altering or preserving
the status quo and the costs the state expects from its partners participation in
war (Snyder 1984, 1997). Thus, none of the theorists who argue that states can
and sometimes do restrain their allies claims that states always wish to restrain
their partners nor that they always succeed when they attempt to restrain their
partners. Theories of allied restraint do, however, present an interesting counterbalance to claims that alliances encourage aggression in their members and dampen our concerns that the side effects of defense pacts lead unequivocally
toward conflict.
51
In sum, we believe that both theory and existing empirical evidence support
the claim that defense pacts deter the initiation of MIDs against members;
defensive alliances have a deterrence effect. Yet, whether the overall effect of
defense pacts is pacifying seems questionable, because plausible arguments and
counter-arguments exist regarding the effects of defense pacts on incentives for
members to initiate and escalate disputes, and some existing empirical evidence
supports the claim that alliances are associated with more militarized disputes
or wars. We believe that in some cases, defense pacts may have unintended
side effects that produce militarized conflict, but we also believe that these
cases are counterbalanced by cases in which allies successfully restrain the initiation and escalation of conflict. The question then becomes as follows: which
effect dominates in the empirical data? Over a wide spatial-temporal domain,
have defense pacts been associated with an increase in dispute initiation by
members or the escalation of disputes to war? If so, this should temper our
enthusiasm for defense pacts as a prescription for peace. On the other hand, if
there is limited evidence of negative side effects, we should feel confident promoting defense pacts as a tool to deter the initiation of militarized disputes.
With this in mind, we test the following three hypotheses, associated respectively with the deterrence effect, the initiation effect, and the escalation effect
of defense pacts:
Hypothesis 1: (Deterrence effect): A potential challenger is less likely to initiate a
militarized interstate dispute if the potential target has a relevant defensive alliance.
Hypothesis 2: (Initiation effect): A potential challenger is more likely to initiate a
militarized dispute if the potential challenger has a defensive alliance.
Hypothesis 3: (Escalation effect): A target of a militarized interstate dispute is more likely
to resist if the target has a relevant defensive alliance.
Research Design: Deterrence and Initiation Effects
Our first two hypotheses (regarding the deterrence and initiation effects) concern the initiation of MIDs. We evaluate these hypotheses on a sample of all
directed dyads in the interstate system as defined by the Correlates of War project over the 18162000 time period, which coincides with the availability of data
on our dependent variable. Our dependent variable is operationalized using the
Correlates of War MID data set and, specifically, Zeev Maozs dyadic version of
the data set (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Maoz 2005). A MID occurs whenever one state threatens, displays, or uses force against another state. We limit
our consideration to initial participants in the MID; we do not include joiners.5
The dependent variable for our analysis is coded one if the potential challenger
initiates a dispute against the potential target in the directed dyad-year and zero
otherwise. Our sample includes a total of 1,077,992 directed dyad-years and
2,354 directed dyad-years (0.22% of the observations) in which the challenger
initiates a dispute against the target.
Our first key independent variable is designed to evaluate the deterrence
effect of defensive alliances. We employ a dichotomous variable that codes
5
We follow Maozs determination of which dispute dyads involve a principal initiator interacting with a
principal target. We do not include joiners in our analysis of the deterrence effect because joiners (on either the
side of the initiator or target) usually make an active choice to participate in a dispute. Failed deterrence is not the
cause of their participation in the dispute. We do not include joiners in our analysis of the initiation effect because
we believe that the decision for an ally to join an ongoing dispute may be driven directly by alliance commitments
that obligate the state to join disputes involving an ally and not an emboldening effect that encourages the initiation of new disputes.
52
whether the potential target had a defensive alliance that is applicable to a dispute with the potential challenger to test for this relationship. We code this variable using information from the ATOP data set (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and
Long 2002; Leeds and Mattes 2007).
The ATOP data set provides information about the obligations of states as
written in their alliance agreements. Alliances include one or more of five different obligationsdefensive support, offensive support, neutrality, nonaggression,
and or consultation. This study is primarily concerned with alliances that
include provisions for defensive support, which we refer to as defense pacts.
According to the ATOP coding rules, defense pacts are alliances that include a
promise of active military support in the event of attack on the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of one or more alliance members (Leeds and Mattes 2007:
189).6
Defense pacts do not always obligate all members to defend one another in all
circumstances, however. Forty-five percent of defense pacts in the ATOP data set
specify certain conditions under which the defensive obligation becomes operative, with the most common restriction being a restriction to a specific adversary,
a restriction found in 31% of all defense pacts. In addition, some defense pacts
are asymmetric in which one partner makes no commitment to defend the other
in return for defensive support. To the extent that the parties to an alliance
have made it clear that their alliance would not be invoked by an attack by a
particular potential adversary against a particular member, that adversary should
not be deterred by the existence of the alliance.
We use several coding rules to determine which defense pacts should be
expected to exhibit a deterrent effect in which potential conflict dyads. First, we
eliminate all secret defensive alliances. If the potential challenger is unaware of
the alliance, then we would not expect the potential challenger to be deterred.7
Second, we code asymmetric defensive alliances as having a potential deterrent
effect only for alliance members who can expect to receive defensive support
according to the provisions of the agreement, and not for those who promise to
provide support to others but do not receive similar promises themselves. Third,
defensive alliances that are conditional on specific adversaries are coded as
relevant only in cases in which the potential challenger is an adversary that
would invoke the alliance commitment.8 In other words, if a potential target is a
member of a defensive alliance in a given year that is conditional upon a specific
adversary, then the potential target is coded as having a defensive alliance in any
directed dyad including a potential challenger identified in the context of the
alliance agreement, but not in its other dyadic relations. So, for instance, the
1925 alliance between France and Czechoslovakia requires the two member states
to defend one another in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany, but
not under other conditions. Thus, both France and Czechoslovakia are coded as
having an ally committed to defend them in the GermanyFrance and Germany
Czechoslovakia directed dyads, but not (for example) in the RussiaFrance or
RussiaCzechoslovakia directed dyads. Fourth, we code alliances that are limited
6
Any alliance that includes a defense provision is included in this analysis regardless of its other content. For
example, if an alliance agreement includes provisions for both defense and neutrality or for defense, neutrality,
and consultation, it is coded as a defense pact for the purpose of this study.
7
We remove only alliances that include provisions requiring members to keep the full existence of the alliance
secret, not those that have some public and some secret content. We are aware that some, or even most, of these
alliances may become known to (or at least highly suspected by) potential adversaries. Because of this, we also analyze a model that includes alliances with provisions requiring the signatories to keep the alliance secret in our test
of the deterrence effect. Our conclusions are not affected by the inclusion of secret alliances.
8
Some cases involve difficult coding decisions because the specification of adversaries who invoke the alliance
commitments is ambiguous. For example, some examples of phrasing that required special consideration are
European great powers, Balkan states, or imperialist states. We provide coding notes describing these
coding decisions with our replication data set.
53
to a particular ongoing conflict as applicable only in those directed dyad-years in

which the potential challenger is involved in the specified conflict on the opposite side. Fifth, we code all remaining defensive alliances as applicable to disputes
with all potential challengers in a given year.9
Most of the remaining defensive alliances are unconditional and would be
invoked by any potential conflict. Some, however, are conditional on conflict
occurring in a specific location, for example on the home territory of the alliance members and not on colonial territories or military outposts. When conflicts occur, it is easy to determine whether the casus foederis for the alliance was
invoked or not based on the location of the attack. The problem is that in
most dyad-years, no conflict occurs, but conflict might have occurred in the location specified in the treaty. Because it is possible that conflict could have
occurred in the specified location with any potential challenger, we code the
alliance as potentially relevant in relations with all potential challengers. In
some cases, this means we will attribute failed deterrence to alliances that were
not relevant to the conflict. For example, Argentina initiates a militarized dispute against Great Britain that becomes the Falklands War. Great Britain did
have a number of defensive alliances in operation at the time, but none were
invoked by attack on its territory in the Falklands. Yet, if Argentina had
attacked Great Britain in its home territory, the alliances would have been
invoked. Thus, for 1982 (and the surrounding years), Great Britain is considered to have defensive allies who might contribute to deterring an Argentine
attack. While this coding rule does add some noise to our data, we believe it is
the most theoretically justified systematic rule we can choose. Implementing
the full set of coding rules described in the last two paragraphs produces
585,467 directed dyad-years (54.31% of the observations) in which the potential
target had a defensive alliance that was applicable to a dispute with the potential challenger.10
Our second key independent variable allows us to evaluate the initiation effect
of defense pacts. Here, we utilize a dichotomous variable, also drawn from the
ATOP data set, that codes whether the potential challenger had any allies committed to defend her under any conditions in the given year. We do not distinguish between conditional and unconditional alliances in this analysis. Because
the arguments supporting an initiation effect do not depend on an ally having a
treaty obligation to join a conflict, we see no reason to distinguish between
defense pacts based on the conditions under which they can be invoked. Secret
alliances are also included in the analysis. While secret alliances may be
concealed from potential adversaries, they are known to the alliance members
and thus can influence the conflict initiation behavior of alliance members.
Asymmetric alliances, however, are coded as influencing the initiation decisions
9
For multilateral alliances, defensive obligations that are not conditional upon a specific adversary are applied
to potential conflicts among members. That is, we code potential targets as having allies committed to defend them
against other members of a defensive alliance. Members of NATO, for instance, are coded as having defensive allies
in their relations with other members of NATO. Our reported results, however, are not sensitive to this coding decision. We performed a number of robustness checks including (in separate analyses): (i) dropping directed dyads in
which both states are members of the same defensive alliance from the sample; (ii) coding all directed dyads in
which both states are members of the same defensive alliance as having no allies committed to defending them;
and (iii) controlling for shared defensive alliance membership in our analysis. In no case, did our assessment of
support for our hypotheses change.
10
There are differences over time in the proportion of directed dyads in the international system in which the
potential target has an ally committed to its defense. In a sample covering 18161945, 14.31% of directed dyad-years
include a potential target with a relevant defensive ally, whereas in a sample covering 19462000, 64.10% of directed dyad-years include a potential target with a relevant defensive ally. Large, long-lasting multilateral alliances
formed during the Cold War (for example, NATO, the Rio Pact OAS, the Arab Collective Defense Pact, and the
Warsaw Pact) have resulted in a much higher proportion of states in the international system belonging to one or
more defense pacts.
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of alliance members for whom the alliance offers defensive support only, and
not for those members who promise to defend others but receive no promise of
defensive support from their partners. In 592,261 directed dyad-years (54.94% of
the observations), the potential challenger has at least one ally committed to
defend her if she is attacked.
In coding both of these independent variables (the potential targets alliance
status and the potential challengers alliance status), we are careful not to attribute the initiation of disputes to agreements that were not in effect at the time
of the dispute. Our data are aggregated by year, so in most cases, if an alliance is
in effect for any part of a year, that year is coded as an alliance year. For years in
which MIDs begin, however, we remove any alliances that were (i) formed after
the beginning of the MID or (ii) terminated before the beginning of the MID,
because such alliances could not have caused or deterred dispute initiation.
Thus, alliances that are formed in response to a MID do not influence our
estimates.
To understand the contribution of alliances to deterring or encouraging the
initiation of conflict, it is important to control for other factors that determine
the baseline probability of conflict within a dyad. There are many dyads in our
data set that would be unlikely to experience a MID under any circumstances
owing to factors unrelated to alliances. We use a number of control variables to
capture an underlying probability of conflict that then allows us to judge more
appropriately the impact of defense pacts on deterrence and conflict initiation.
To the extent that some of these control variables could be related as well to the
propensity to form defense pacts, excluding them from the model will bias our
results.
We include four variables in our model that have been shown consistently to
be related to the probability of MID initiation.11 The first is a variable that codes
the potential challengers likelihood of defeating the potential target in a
conflict. If a potential challenger is unlikely to defeat the potential target in a
conflict, then the potential challenger should be less likely to initiate a dispute
against the potential target. To operationalize the potential challengers likelihood of defeating the potential target in a conflict, we use the ratio of the
potential challengers military capabilities to the sum of the potential challengers and potential targets military capabilities. As this variable approaches
one, the potential challenger is more likely to defeat the potential target in a
conflict, and thus, we expect a positive relationship between this variable and
MID initiation. The states Correlates of War CINC scores are used as measures
of their capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).
The second variable is the natural log of the capital-to-capital distance between
the potential challenger and the potential target. As the distance between the
potential challenger and the potential target increases, the potential challenger
should be less likely to initiate a dispute because conflict with more distant states
is more costly and states further apart have fewer issues to dispute. We expect a
negative relationship between distance and MID initiation. The data on distance
were collected with the use of the EUGene data generation program (Bennett
and Stam 2000).
The third variable measures how similar the potential challengers interests
are to those of the potential target. If the two states have similar interests, the
potential challenger will be less likely to initiate a dispute. We use Signorino and
Ritters S-score to measure this variable (1999). Higher values of the S-score
indicate more similar interests, so this variable should be negatively related to
MID initiation.
11
EUGene software version 3.201 is used to generate this set of variables (Bennett and Stam 2000).
55
Fourth, we include a measure of joint democracy. Numerous studies posit and

demonstrate that two democracies are less likely to enter into a dispute than
other dyads (for example, Russett and Oneal 2001). To measure joint democracy, we use a dichotomous variable that codes whether both states receive a
score of 6 or higher on the Polity2 variable from the PolityIV data set (Marshall
and Jaggers 2002). We expect joint democracy to be negatively related to dispute
initiation.
In addition, following Leeds (2003b), we include two additional alliance variables that have previously been shown to affect the initiation of MIDs. We
include one variable that codes whether the potential challenger has an offensive alliance that is applicable to a dispute with the potential target and one variable that codes whether the potential challenger has a neutrality pact that is
applicable to a dispute with the potential target. Challengers who expect support from outside states and challengers who expect their targets not to receive
support (because states have promised to remain neutral should conflict arise)
may believe they are more likely to succeed in accomplishing their goals
through the threat or use of force and will be more likely to initiate a dispute.
Thus, these variables should be positively related to dispute initiation. Information from the ATOP data set and a coding procedure similar to the coding procedure described earlier is used to generate these variables (see also Leeds
2003b).
To estimate the deterrence and initiation effects of defense pacts, we use a
probit model that includes all of the variables described earlier in the systematic
component of the model. Furthermore, to take into account any possible temporal dependence in our data, we employ the strategy suggested by Carter and
Signorino (2010). That is, we include a variable that codes the number of years
that have elapsed since the last conflict in the dyad as well as the square and the
cube of that variable in our estimation.
Empirical Results: Deterrence and Initiation Effects
Table 1 presents the results of our analysis of dispute initiation. Consistent with
theoretical expectations and previous empirical research, we find that defensive
alliance agreements have a deterrence effect. That is, a potential challenger will
be less likely to initiate a dispute against a potential target with a relevant defensive alliance than a potential target without one.12 Figure 1 provides predicted
probabilities of dispute initiation with 95% confidence intervals for an average
dyad in which the potential target has a relevant defensive alliance and for an
average dyad in which the potential target does not have a relevant defensive alliance. The predicted probability of dispute initiation is approximately 20% lower
in an average dyad in which the potential target has a relevant defensive alliance
than it is in an average dyad in which the potential target has no relevant defensive alliance.13
Thus, our model reveals a statistically significant deterrence effect, suggesting
that defensive alliances promote peace. But what does our analysis say about the
potential additional effects of defensive alliances that may increase conflict? We
find no evidence that defensive alliances encourage states to initiate disputes.
Table 1 indicates that the coefficient for our variable capturing whether the
potential challenger has one or more allies committed to defend her is negative
12
To check the robustness of our results and ensure that they are not being driven by a small number of large,
long-lasting alliances, we dropped observations in which the target was a member only of NATO, the OAS and or the
Rio Pact, or the Arab Collective Defense Pactfour alliances that account for a significant proportion of our alliancedyad-year observations. Our interpretation of results remains unchanged.
13
We generate predicted probabilities using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) holding the values of
all other independent variables constant at their mean values.
56

TABLE 1. Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 18162000
Deterrence effect: potential target has a relevant defensive alliance

Initiation effect: potential challenger is a member of a defensive alliance
Potential challenger has a relevant offensive alliance
Potential challenger has a relevant neutrality pact
Challengers likelihood of winning
Distance
Similarity in alliance portfolios
Joint democracy
Constant
Observations
)0.062 (0.015)***
)0.068 (0.016)***
0.276 (0.029)***
0.315 (0.025)***
0.161 (0.022)***
)0.384 (0.006)***
)0.455 (0.041)***
)0.155 (0.027)***
0.827 (0.068)***
1,077,992
(Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .1; peace years, (peace years)2, (peace years)3
included in estimation).
FIG 1. Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Initiation

(Notes. These densities are 1,000 simulated conditional probabilities of a potential challenger initiating a dispute. The black density represents the estimated probability of a potential challenger initiating a dispute when the potential target does not have a relevant defensive alliance, and the gray
density represents the estimated probability of a potential challenger initiating a dispute when the
potential target has a relevant defensive alliance. The conditional probabilities were calculated using
simulated coefficients from our model of dispute initiation and setting the covariates at values for an
average directed dyad-year.)
and statistically significant. States with allies committed to defend them are no
more likely to initiate disputes than states without allies committed to defend
them and, if anything, are less likely to initiate disputes.
Because this finding goes against some established arguments in past literature, we were concerned that multicollinearity or post-treatment bias might be
masking the true effect of challenger defense pacts on conflict (King and Zeng
2007). In other words, we thought it might be possible that some of our control
variables (for instance, defense pacts to the target) might be correlated with, or
even caused in part by, the challenger defense pact variable. To be confident
that this estimate is not a result of multicollinearity or post-treatment bias, we
estimated a number of simpler models. For example, we estimated a model
including only challenger defense pacts as an independent variable, a model
including only challenger defense pacts and distance as independent variables,
and models using a variety of other combinations of control variables. In none
57
of these simpler models was the estimated coefficient for the variable indicating
whether a potential challenger had at least one defensive ally positive and statistically significant, although in many of the simpler models, the coefficient was
negative and statistically insignificant. We are convinced that in our sample, the
potential initiation effect of defensive alliances does not undermine the notion
that defensive alliances promote peace.
The rest of the estimates in Table 1 are consistent with previous research. Similar to Leeds (2003b), we find that potential challengers with relevant offense
and neutrality pacts are more likely to initiate disputes; the estimated coefficients
for both of these variables are positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the idea that the effect of alliances on conflict is conditional upon the
content of the alliance. As we expected, we find that potential challengers are
less likely to initiate disputes when they are unlikely to win, they have interests
similar to the target, the target is far away, and both actors are democratic.14
The estimated coefficients for the variable representing the power ratio between
challenger and target are positive and statistically significant, whereas the estimated coefficients for variables representing distance, similarity in alliance portfolios, and joint democracy are negative and statistically significant.
The fact that defense pacts have a positive deterrence effect and no discernible initiation effect suggests that alliances can be a useful policy tool for promoting peace. For policy-making purposes, however, it is interesting to know not
only whether particular variables make militarized conflict less likely but also the
relative effects of different manipulable factors. Presumably, policymakers prefer
a stronger reduction in conflict propensities when it is available at reasonable
cost. Thus, we compare the reduction in the probability of dispute initiation
associated with defense pacts to those associated with changes in power ratios
and regime type.
Recall that calculations based on an average dyad reveal that a state with a
defensive ally is approximately 20% less likely to be the target of a MID than a
similar state without a defensive ally. Compare this to the effects of changing the
power balance between a potential challenger and a potential target. The predicted probability of dispute initiation in an average dyad in which the potential
target is three times stronger than the potential challenger is 13% lower than in
an average dyad in which the potential targets power is approximately equal to
that of the potential challenger.15 Thus, to achieve a 20% reduction in the probability of being the target of a militarized dispute by developing ones own military capacity is probably out of reach for many countries; such a reduction in the
probability of conflict requires a very large change in the power relationship
between potential challenger and potential target. Joint democracy does have a
stronger conflict-reducing effect. The predicted probability of dispute initiation
in an average dyad that is jointly democratic is approximately 40% lower than in
an average dyad that is not jointly democratic, approximately double the average
reduction achieved by a defensive alliance. Democratization, however, of either
ones own state or a potential adversarys (or both) is a difficult and expensive
proposition, especially in the short term.
Our analysis of dispute initiation does not reveal evidence that defensive alliances increase conflict. Yet, Palmer and Morgan (2006) provide statistical evidence of a relationship between alliance formation and conflict. Why are our
results different? There are three primary research design differences that we
14
We also estimated a model that included a control variable for contiguity. Contiguity is positively related to
MID initiation in our analysis, which is consistent with existing research, but the inclusion of contiguity as a control
variable does not change our interpretation of results regarding our key independent variables.
15
These predicted probabilities (and those for joint democracy described below) were generated using Clarify
(King et al. 2000) holding the values of all other independent variables constant at their mean values.
58
suspect are consequential for the inferences drawn.16 First, we employ different
units of analysis. Palmer and Morgan evaluate whether a new alliance is associated with a states propensity to initiate conflict at a monadic level. We instead
investigate whether the existence of a defense pact makes a state more likely to
initiate a militarized dispute against a particular target, controlling for factors
that make a directed dyad more or less likely to engage in conflict. Second, Palmer and Morgan examine the effect of the formation of new alliances, whereas
we examine the effect of the existence of alliances. Their alliance variable captures only whether a state acquired one or more new alliance partners in the
given year, not whether the state had any alliance partners. Thus, many fewer
state-years are coded as alliance years in their analysis than in ours. Third, Palmer and Morgan do not distinguish between types of alliances. The formation of
any alliance of any kind, whether the alliance provided for active assistance, is
included in their analysis.17 We believe that our research design, and particularly
considering the full time period of the alliance and limiting the analysis to
defense pacts, is more appropriate for evaluating the relationship between
defense pacts and the propensity to initiate interstate conflict.
To summarize our results so far, we find evidence in support of a deterrence
effect for defensive alliances but no evidence in support of an initiation effect
for defensive alliance. The formation of defense pacts, therefore, seems to result
in the initiation of fewer MIDs in the international system. But, how do defense
pacts affect those disputes that are not deterred? Are disputes involving targets
with allies committed to defend them particularly likely to escalate to more
severe levels? We turn now to this question.
Research Design: Escalation Effect
To estimate the escalation effect of defensive alliances, we need to evaluate the
potential targets behavior once a dispute is initiated. Therefore, we are interested in the sample of observations where the potential challenger initiated a dispute against the potential target. This sample comprises 2,354 of the 1,077,992
directed dyad-years from 1816 to 2000.
The argument we are evaluating predicts that states with allies committed to
assist them will be less likely to concede demands because of their greater expectation of success should the dispute escalate. In other words, targets with relevant
defense pacts may be more likely to respond to dispute initiation by continuing
the dispute and resisting the challenger. The dependent variable we use to
evaluate this argument is a dichotomous variable coded one if the target takes
militarized action in the dispute (that is, responds with a threat, display, or
use of force) according to the COW MID data set, and zero otherwise.18 The target responds with a threat, display, or use of force in 1,115 of the 2,354 directed
dyad-years (47.37% of the observations). Target response is a necessary first step
toward the potential escalation of a dispute to higher levels of force and potentially war.
The key independent variable we use to estimate the escalation effect of defensive alliances is nearly the same variable we use to estimate the deterrence effect
of defensive alliances. It is a dichotomous variable that codes whether the
potential target has a defensive alliance that is applicable to a dispute with the
potential challenger. The coding procedure for this variable is described earlier.
16
Palmer and Morgans model also includes different control variables than ours does.
Palmer and Morgan operationalize alliances using the Correlates of War formal alliance data set (Gibler and
Sarkees 2004). The CoW alliance data set includes defense pacts, nonaggression neutrality pacts, and ententes.
18
In directed dyad-years in which more than one MID occurs, we consider the MID with the highest hostility
level by the target.
17
59
The one difference is that in our analysis of the escalation effect, secret defensive
alliances are included, because they are known to the target and should therefore influence the targets behavior.19 In 1,134 of the 2,354 directed dyad-years
(48.17% of the observations) in which a dispute is initiated, the target has
a defensive alliance that could be applicable to a dispute with the potential
challenger.
In addition to this variable, we also include several other independent variables in the model that may also affect the targets decision to escalate the dispute. First, we include dichotomous variables that code whether the potential
challenger had any offense or neutrality pacts that were applicable to a dispute
with the target. These alliances would make the target less likely to respond
militarily because they provide information that, all else equal, the target is less
likely to win a conflict against the challenger. Second, we include a variable
that measures the challengers likelihood of defeating the target in a conflict.
Targets should be less likely to respond to a challenge militarily as the likelihood of the challenger defeating them in a conflict increases. We use the same
operationalization as described earlier, the ratio of the potential challengers
capabilities to the sum of the potential challengers and potential targets
capabilities.
We also take into account any unmeasured factors that may influence the challengers decision to initiate a dispute and the targets decision to resist by estimating a censored probit model in which the dependent variable for the
selection stage is the same as the dependent variable for the previous research
design, a dichotomous variable that codes whether the potential challenger initiates a dispute against the potential target in the directed dyad-year. All of the
independent variables that were used in the previous research design are
included in the selection stage of the censored probit model with the same operationalizations discussed earlier: whether the potential target has a relevant
defensive ally, whether the potential challenger is a member of a defense pact,
whether the potential challenger has a relevant offensive ally, whether the potential challenger is a member of a relevant neutrality pact, the potential challengers likelihood of winning, distance between the two states, similarity of the
two states foreign policy interests, a dummy variable indicating whether both
states are democracies, and the number of years since the last MID in the dyad,
plus squared and cubed values of the peace years variable.
We identify the censored probit model using several variables: the challengers
defensive alliance membership, distance, S-score, and joint democracy. That is,
we include these variables in the selection stage of the censored probit model,
but we exclude them from the outcome stage. We contend that these variables
influence the challengers decision to initiate a dispute but not the targets decision to resist the challenger.20 As a robustness check, however, we estimate the
19
Removing secret alliances from the test of the escalation effect does not change our results.
Why should some of these variables influence the challengers decision to initiate a dispute, but not the targets decision to resist, and thus be included in only the selection and not the outcome stage of our model? For
two variables (challengers defense pact and distance), we believe the impact is really on the challengers decision,
much more so than the targets decision. Because most of the theories of the initiation effect do not rely on the
assumption that the ally will help the challenger in the dispute, there is no reason to believe the challengers
defense pact status will influence the targets decision. Because the dispute is likely to be fought on the targets territory, distance between the states is much more consequential for the challengers decision than for the targets
decision. Similarity in alliance portfolios is included in the dispute initiation equation because we believe that it is
an indicator of whether contentious issues are likely to exist between the two states. Disputes are much less likely to
occur between states that agree on policy. Once a dispute has been initiated, however, we know there is a contentious issue, and thus, this variable is no longer relevant. The final variable we leave out of the outcome equation is
joint democracy. While there are theories of target resistance that predict different behaviors depending on the
regime type of the challenger, these arguments are not dependent on dyadic democracy.
20
60
censored probit model including each one of the identifying variables in the outcome stage of the model in turn, and our inferences do not change.21
Empirical Results: Escalation Effect
Table 2 presents the results of our analysis of target resistance. These results do
not support arguments in favor of an escalation effect of defense pacts. Targets
of disputes with relevant defensive alliances are no more likely to resist challengers than targets without relevant defensive alliances. The coefficient on the variable is negative and statistically significant with 90% confidence intervals in the
model presented in Table 2. As a robustness check, we estimated a number of
other models including each of the variables in the selection equation of the
censored probit model in the outcome equation of the model. The variable representing whether a dispute target has a relevant defensive alliance was negative
in each case although sometimes did not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance. There is no systematic evidence in this sample to suggest that additional effects of defense pacts on conflict behavior undermine the notion that
defensive alliances promote peace.
With regard to the rest of the estimates in Table 2, there are two new results.
Previous research and our estimates from Table 1 support the idea that offense
and neutrality pacts increase conflict by encouraging potential challengers to initiate disputes. Table 2 does not dispute this finding, but it shows that once a dispute is initiated, a target will be less likely to resist a potential challenger with a
relevant offense or neutrality pact. Therefore, offense and neutrality pacts
increase dispute initiation, but they reduce target resistance.
We believe that target resistance is an important first step in determining
which disputes escalate to war. If a target does not respond to dispute initiation
with militarized action, it is hard to imagine how war could result. On the other
hand, while targets respond with force in 47% of dispute initiation cases, only
4% of these (93 cases) escalate to war. Thus, as an additional check, we estimate
the same censored probit model replacing target resistance with war as the
dependent variable in the outcome equation. We rely on the hostility level coding to determine which disputes in the MID data set end in war (Ghosn et al.
2004). The results are similar and appear in Table 3. Cases in which the target
of a dispute has a relevant defensive ally are not more likely to escalate to war;
the coefficient on the relevant independent variable is negative and statistically
significant.22
Again, our results seem to disagree with some published results, most notably
those presented by Senese and Vasquez (2008), and again differences in the
unit of analysis and the types of alliances evaluated might account for the different conclusions.23 Our evaluation examines how a target responds in a particular MID and whether a particular MID escalates to war. Senese and Vasquez, on
21
Sartori (2003) provides a possible strategy for estimating selection models in which all the variables influencing selection also influence the outcome of interest. Sartoris model is only appropriate, however, when a strong
theory exists about the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both selection and outcome. In fact, the signs of
all of the coefficients in the outcome stage of the model are dependent upon the assumption made about the signs
of the unmeasured factors. Because we do not feel confident in our ability to identify, and thus theorize about, all
unmeasured factors linking the challengers decision to initiate a dispute and the targets decision to resist, we identify our model with variables that we believe are more likely to influence the selection stage than the outcome stage
rather than using Sartoris estimator.
22
This is consistent with results reported by Leeds (2005) on a smaller sample of cases. Leeds (2005) does find,
however, that disputes in which the target has allies committed to assist her are more likely to expand beyond the
initial participants and that conflicts that expand are more likely to escalate to war.
23
Our control variables also differ from those of Senese and Vasquez (2008). Senese and Vasquez (2008: 146,
192) control for the issue under dispute, prior MIDs enduring rivalry, and arms races and not the variables we control for.
61

TABLE 2. Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Resistance 18162000
Target resistance
Escalation effect: potential target has a relevant defensive alliance
Constant
Dispute initiation
Distance
Joint democracy
Constant
Rho
Observations
Uncensored observations
)0.103
)0.241
)0.261
)0.304
1.672
(0.048)*
(0.084)**
(0.075)**
(0.074)***
(0.119)***
)0.060 (0.015)***
)0.066 (0.015)***
0.276 (0.029)***
0.315 (0.025)***
0.161 (0.022)***
)0.383 (0.006)***
)0.449 (0.041)***
)0.168 (0.027)***
0.818 (0.067)***
)0.588 (0.052)***
1,077,992
2,354
included in dispute initiation estimation stage).
TABLE 3. Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Escalation to War 18162000
Escalation to war
Escalation effect: potential target has a relevant defensive alliance
Constant
Dispute initiation
Distance
Joint democracy
Constant
Rho
Observations
Uncensored observations
)0.479
0.252
)0.467
)0.126
)0.601
(0.105)***
(0.150)
(0.190)*
(0.153)
(0.298)*
)0.062 (0.015)***
)0.069 (0.016)***
0.276 (0.029)***
0.315 (0.025)***
0.161 (0.022)***
)0.384 (0.006)***
)0.457 (0.041)***
)0.156 (0.027)***
0.829 (0.067)***
)0.313 (0.096)**
1,077,992
2,354
included in dispute initiation estimation stage).
the other hand, evaluate whether war occurs any time during a particular time
period (either the full dyad-history or within five years after a MID) given that
at some point, a MID occurred among participants with outside allies. Senese
and Vasquez evaluate the effect of alliance with any major or regional power
regardless of the obligations of the agreement; that is, defense pacts, neutrality nonaggression pacts, and ententes are all included in their analysis (see
Gibler and Sarkees 2004). We, on the other hand, do not limit the types of
alliance partners we consider, but we do limit our consideration to defense
pacts only. Thus, our analysis is more appropriate for judging specifically the
62
influence of defense pacts on the targets willingness to escalate an individual

militarized dispute.
So, how can we explain the fact that targets with allies are not more likely to
respond militarily to dispute initiation? Presumably, targets with allies are more
likely to believe they can be successful in conflicts than targets without allies, so
on first examination, this seems like an odd result (Smith 1995). First, it is possible that only very strong and resolved initiators are not deterred from initiating
disputes against targets with allies, and targets avoid escalating disputes against
such initiators. Our selection model and control variables should capture this
dynamic, however, and thus, we believe this is an insufficient explanation for our
results. More likely, allies play a useful role in brokering a peaceful deal to keep
these disputes from escalating, as our discussion of the potential restraining
effect of alliances would suggest (Gelpi 1999). It is also possible, however, that
challengers adjust their demands and ask for smaller concessions from targets
with allies committed to assist them, increasing the probability that targets concede without fighting (Werner 2000; Yuen 2009). Evaluating these potential causal mechanisms for this empirical result is an important direction for future
research.
A Policy Prescription for Peace
One of the main goals of international relations scholars should be to identify
policies that states can adopt that are likely to reduce the probability of militarized conflict. In addition to resulting in the direct loss of life, militarized disputes have indirect effects on quality of life through the reduction and diversion
of productive capacity. Militarized conflict is fortunately quite rare in the international system, but it is always costly and sometimes devastating. As a result, policies that can be adopted that reduce the risk of militarized conflict, even slightly,
are worth a great deal of attention.
Previous research suggested that defense pacts are effective at deterring the
initiation of militarized disputes (Leeds 2003b). Targets that have allies committed to defend them are less likely to find themselves challenged militarily. In this
study, we demonstrate that this deterrence effect of defense pacts is robust over
a larger spatial-temporal domain, and it compares well to much more costly policy options for reducing the probability of conflict like increasing ones military
capabilities or democratizing ones own or a rivals country. Yet, if there are additional effects of alliances that increase incentives for member states to initiate or
escalate disputes, our enthusiasm for promoting defense pacts as a policy tool
for peace might be dampened. Before proceeding with confidence to recommend defense pacts as a policy tool for peace, we felt a need to evaluate whether
systematic patterns exist that suggest that alliances encourage states to initiate or
escalate disputes.
We find no evidence that defense pacts produce either initiation or escalation
effects in our large sample, covering all directed dyad-years from 1816 to 2000.
While we are not willing to argue that defense pacts never encourage states to
initiate or escalate disputes, we can conclude that as a general policy, defense
pacts seem to have more positive than negative effects. Defense pacts are a useful
tool for deterrence, and they do not have consistent side effects that undermine
peace.
That being said, we believe future research can do a better job of identifying
the particular conditions under which defense pacts are most likely to encourage
peace without any unintended side effects that lead to more or more severe conflicts. First, we believe scholars can specify more clearly the conditions under
which allies have the ability and willingness to restrain their partners from behaving aggressively. We have argued that restraint is most likely when the outside
63
state has a strong bargaining position in the alliance and would find a conflict
costly relative to the value of what could be gained. These are hypotheses that
can be tested directly in the future.
Second, and relatedly, we believe that a weakness of our analysis is that it does
not take into account any differences in characteristics of allies or alliances. We
treat all defensive allies as equivalent and do not examine the effect of stronger
allies, more reliable allies, or allies with stronger interests in the issue under dispute. We do not distinguish bilateral and multilateral alliances, alliances with different levels of peacetime military coordination or institutionalization, or
alliances that have been more durable or more recently formed. One can imagine that some of these characteristics of allies and alliances might affect the
deterrence effect of defense pacts and any initiation or escalation effect that
exists in limited circumstances. This is a very challenging task to undertake given
that many states have multiple allies; attributing behavior to the characteristics of
a particular ally or alliance in a large alliance portfolio is very tricky. We do
believe it is a worthy goal for another study, however.
Third, our analysis here does not consider the effects of defense pacts on conflict expansion and diffusion. Existing evidence suggests that states are more
likely to join conflicts involving their allies (for example, Werner and Lemke
1997; Huth 1998), that alliances are agents of conflict diffusion (Siverson and
Starr 1991), and that disputes involving states with allies are more likely to
expand beyond the original participants (Leeds 2005). In cases in which deterrence fails and the target resists, past research suggests that disputes involving
states with allies are less likely to remain bilateral affairs. The effects of alliances
on the decisions of states to join conflicts involving their allies and the corresponding effects of conflict expansion on conflict severity are worthy of further
research.
Future research should be aimed, therefore, at making our policy prescriptions
more specific. We believe that this research does provide a helpful first step and
clearly suggests that alliances can be tools for peace, a finding that is relevant to
such current policy issues as the debate over whether NATO membership should
be extended to Ukraine and Georgia. Our analysis shows that defense pacts deter
the initiation of disputes against their members and do not seem to have consistent effects that encourage members to behave aggressively, either by initiating
new disputes or by escalating those that are not deterred.
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Foreign Policy Analysis (2011) 7, 4565

Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?1

Introduction: Security Institutions and the Quest for Peace

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

and Vasquez do expect the presence of alliances to be associated with a higher

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

to a particular ongoing conflict as applicable only in those directed dyad-years in

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Fourth, we include a measure of joint democracy. Numerous studies posit and

Defense Pacts and Peace

Deterrence effect: potential target has a relevant defensive alliance

FIG 1. Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Initiation

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

influence of defense pacts on the targets willingness to escalate an individual

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

Defense Pacts and Peace

Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds

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