FACTS:

March 27, 1960: Idonah Slade Perkins died in New York City

August 12, 1960: Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration

proceedings appointing ancillary administrator Lazaro A. Marquez later on
substituted by Renato D. Tayag

On January 27, 1964: CFI ordered domiciliary administrator County Trust

Company of New York to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines 33,002 shares of stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine
corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of
local creditors

When County Trust Company of New York refused the court ordered Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. to declare the stocks lost and required it to issue new
certificates in lieu thereof

Appeal was taken by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleging the failure to comply
with its by-laws setting forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost,
stolen or destroyed so it cannot issue new stock certs.

ISSUE: W/N Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court order because of its bylaws
HELD: NO. CFI Affirmed

Fear of contigent liability - obedience to a lawful order = valid defense

Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance

and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts

Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the
command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...."It owes its life

to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. Cannot ignore the
source of its very existence

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his
minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.
FACTS: Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau
in Manila, three Visit the U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son,
Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had
been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport,
Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty and was issued tickets with
corresponding boarding passes with the words: Check-in-required. They were then
set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA
ruled that private respondents failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his
claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying
on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the USA.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.
HELD: No. According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and
interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the
contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court
should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States,
the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were
"rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila

ADALIN VS POEA
238 SCRA 721
Facts:
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract
workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising
from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII .
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment
on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired
portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved
Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of
withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited
practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of B
Issue:
Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that
is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process.
Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor
Code or Art. 1144 of Civil Code.
Ruling:
Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed.

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on
the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employeremployee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be
forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code which the
petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which
provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host
country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract."
Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is
already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and
the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the
contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

Facts:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl Builders Co. (AIBC), a
domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown &
Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas.
Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the
unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the
termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the
Private Sector of Bahrain: a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the
contract,
it
appears
that
their
suit
has
prescribed.

Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by

Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be
applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor
Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The

Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr period provided
by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in our country as we must adopt our own procedural laws.
EXCEPTION:
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such
as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule stating if by the laws of the State or country
where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines. Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the court contends
that Bahrains law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not
enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forums public policy and the 1 yr.
rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils.
Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art
291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period since
the claim arose from labor employment.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in

his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as
Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
FACTS: Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants. Base
station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East
and Europe. roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA sent separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of company benefits and bonuses.PIA contented that both private
respondents were habitual absentees and further claimed that the services of both
private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment
contract. The court oredered that private respondents had attained the status of
regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service
and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which
court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement
which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement
and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public
interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at
least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually
doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents
were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East
and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative
agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the
parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be
given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested
upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must
therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the
same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.

By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate

children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy),
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman

By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis

August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his
estate as follows:

1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen

2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives

July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A

September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on

People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children

Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law
of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:

o The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent
thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as
the law of the forum.
o In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,

INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana purchased 3
airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. petitioners checked
in but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before
them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Cesar Zalamea and Mr. Zalamea was
allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets
were denied boarding and were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets
from American Airlines. petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. CA held that
moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where there is fraud or bad faith.

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary damages.

RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign
laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be
made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service
agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent courts finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law
of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,
where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court
held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a
certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of
having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check
in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said
passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty a duty to provide
public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or
enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it
could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was
overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the
tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be
prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving
less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that
petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a
hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right
to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that
their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent
TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold
on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA
placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such
conscious disregard of petitioners rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To
deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge
respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a passenger is
entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline.
Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should
be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though
the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC

G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the
laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro
Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court
of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court and Court of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian
Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as
the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court
of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely
to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a
prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until
a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and

respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country

having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the
lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved,
the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive
validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the
High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole witness, testified to the effect
that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine
and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17,
1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a
financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the
filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th
Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for
private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but
subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because
private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an
application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support
of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of
dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to
support their claim.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign
judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the
party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private
respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian
High Court judgment.