SLANDER (ORAL DEFAMATION) Article 358

REGEN B. VOLOSO

BONIFACIO L. CAAL, SR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 163181 October 19, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:
On July 25, 1996, petitioner Bonifacio L. Caal, Sr. utterred words and
expressions against Daylinda P. Caal, said in Filipino: Why should you be afraid of
Daylindas witness, they are all nincompoops. Daylinda is a thief! She has been long
eking out a living as a thief. After hearing those offensive remarks in the presence of a
number of persons outside the courtroom, and being embarrassed and downright
humiliated therein, Daylinda went inside the courtroom and simply cried her heart out.
The trial court affirmed the decision of the MCTC finding the accused guilty of the
crime of grave oral defamation. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
lower courts decision. The motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of grave
oral defamation?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to
certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Indeed, calling Daylinda a
thief is defamation against her character and reputation sufficient to cause her
embarrassment and social humiliation. Daylinda testified to the feelings of shame and
humiliation she suffered as a result of the incident complained of.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
REGEN B. VOLOSO

ROGELIO PADER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R.

No. 139157 February 8, 2000, PARDO, J.

FACTS:
On April 20, 1995, while Atty. Benjamin Escolango, candidate for vice mayor, was
conversing with his political leaders at his house, petitioner then appeared at the gate
and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was
dumbfounded and embarrassed. Atty. Escolango then filed a complaint against
petitioner for grave oral defamation with the trial court.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of grave oral defamation.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of shouting defamatory words constitutes slight or serious oral
defamation.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might
tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.

Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the

factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.

The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors;
that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that
petitioner's anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner's father
died. 13 In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.

In Reyes vs. People, we ruled that the expression "putang ina mo" is a common
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to
express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates
one's expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous
incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would
utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of
resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice
mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and found petitioner Pader guilty only of
slight oral defamation.

REGEN B. VOLOSO
DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. L32836-37 May 3, 1989, BIDIN, J.

FACTS:
Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace
and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for
sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of
petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner
decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and
his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Exequiel Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge
Guiang which was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio
is the son of Exequiel Victoria.

During the hearing of the administrative case in the sala of Judge Avancea, Atty.
Castillo presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancea to hear the
administrative case, who apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave
him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the
administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.

After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the
corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avancea, petitioners were
overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following defamatory words:

Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang

utak, suwapang at estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta
ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as,
Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang
inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
On February 8, 1964, Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio were separately
charged with the crime of Serious Oral Defamation. The trial court found petitioners
guilty of the crime grave oral defamation.
ISSUE:
W/N the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.
HELD:

The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358,
Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral

defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and
insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).

To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the
Court adopted the following guidelines:

. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that

defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as
Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite
v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).

Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the
crime of estafa, the Court ruled:

The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The
language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He
'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he
'received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another
P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the
capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.'
No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of
grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances
need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .

In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous
epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and

tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime
committed was grave slander:

The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to

the complainant. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure
complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for
the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality
to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the
reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable
and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social
circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts
to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud
slander. (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words
against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which
attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated
by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these
statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . No circumstances need to
be shown to upgrade the slander."

Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession
are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that
"where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are
susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him
in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of
allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain
lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or
profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S.
2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d
638 [1968]).

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent
lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no
special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered
grave oral defamation Balite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact that the offended
party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang
at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or
improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE Article 365

REGEN B. VOLOSO

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN

PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 CARPIO,
J.

FACTS:
On August 2004, following a vehicular collision, petitioner was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two separate offenses: 1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and 2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor and
damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner pleaded guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC dismissing the motion to quash
on the second case. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner contends that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in the second case, having
been previously convicted in the first case for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
ISSUE:
1. Distinguish between imprudence and negligence.
2. Is criminal negligence a crime in itself or only a modality for the commission of
another offense.

HELD:
1.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

2.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
xx

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty
for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if

the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. (Emphasis
supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.