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PolicyCoherenceand

theFutureofthe
UK’sInternational
DevelopmentAgenda
AreporttoWorldVisionUK
ByMatthewLockwoodandSarahMulley,withEmilyJones,AlexGlennie,KatiePaintinand
AndrewPendleton

March2010
©ippr2010

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Contents
Aboutippr ........................................................................................................................... 3
Abouttheauthors............................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. 4
ForewordbyWorldVision ................................................................................................... 5
Listofabbreviations........................................................................................................... 7
Executivesummary ............................................................................................................. 8
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 13
1.Conflict.......................................................................................................................... 19
2.Tradeandinvestment.................................................................................................... 30
3.Corruption..................................................................................................................... 40
4.Climatechange ............................................................................................................. 46
5.Internationalmigration ................................................................................................ 52
6.Towardsgreatercoherence............................................................................................ 60
7.Conclusionsandrecommendations .............................................................................. 74
References......................................................................................................................... 77
Appendix:Listofinterviewees.......................................................................................... 85
3 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeand
providepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
possible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluence
beyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:info@ippr.org
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2010.©ippr2010

Abouttheauthors
MatthewLockwoodisanAssociateDirectorinippr’sGlobalChangeProgramme.Matthew
hasover20years’experienceofglobaldevelopmentissueswithafocusonAfrica.He
studiedattheUniversityofOxford,wherehetookanM.Philineconomicsin1984anda
D.Philin1989.HewasthenaResearchFellowattheUniversityofCambridgeandaLecturer
inSociologyattheUniversityofSussex.From1997to2000hewasHeadofInternational
PolicyatChristianAid,andwasHeadofUKAdvocacyatActionAidbetween2002and2004.
In2005hepublishedaninfluentialcritiqueofconventionalgovernmentandNGOthinking
onAfrica,TheStateThey’reIn(June2005,2nded.October2006,ITDGPublishing).Before
joiningipprin2006,hewasanadviseronclimatechangetothethenDeputyMayorof
London,NickyGavron,andworkedfortheLondonClimateChangeAgency.
SarahMulley isaSeniorResearchFellowinippr’sGlobalChangeProgramme.Beforejoining
ippr,SarahwascoordinatoroftheUKAidNetwork,acoalitionofUKNGOsworkingtogether
todeveloppolicyandadvocacyoninternationalaid.Shewaspreviouslyaresearchassociate
attheGlobalEconomicGovernanceProgrammeinOxford,andaseniorpolicyanalystatHM
Treasury,workingonarangeofdomesticandinternationalpolicyissues.SarahhasanM.Phil
inInternationalRelations,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomics,bothfromthe
UniversityofOxford.
AlexGlennie hasworkedonarangeofinternationalandsecurityissuesatipprsince2006.
Duringthistime,shehasservedontheSecretariatofippr’sCommissiononNationalSecurity
inthe21stCentury,contributedtoaprogrammeofresearchonmigrationanddevelopment
andhasledtheInstitute’sworkonpoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Prior
tothissheworkedatAccountAbility,aninternationalNGOcommittedtopromoting
accountabilityforsustainabledevelopment.AlexholdsaMastersdegreeinInternational
StudiesandDiplomacyfromtheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,andaBAhonours
degreeinInternationalHistoryfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomics.
KatiePaintinwasaresearcheroninternationalandnationalsecurityissuesatippruntilJuly
2009andamemberofthesecretariatforippr’sCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe
21stCentury.SheholdsaMastersdegreeinconflictsecurityanddevelopmentfromtheWar
StudiesDepartmentatKing’sCollegeLondonandaBAhonoursdegreeinhistoryfromthe
UniversityofCambridge.
AndrewPendleton isaSeniorResearchFellowatipprandconvenoroftheGlobalClimate
Network.HepreviouslyworkedatChristianAid,whereheledpolicyandresearchonclimate
4 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

issues,workedonWorldTradeOrganisationnegotiationsandwrotetheagency’slandmark
BehindtheMask reportdebunkingthemythofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Andrewspent
10yearsasareporterandproducerinBBClocalandnetworkradioandisthewinneroftwo
SonyRadioAwards.
EmilyJones isreadingforaDPhilintheInternationalRelationsandPoliticsDepartment,
OxfordUniversity,wheresheisexaminingthepoliticaleconomyoftheEconomicPartnership
AgreementnegotiationsbetweenEuropeandthegroupofAfrican,CaribbeanandPacific
countries.Priortothis,sheworkedasatradepolicyadviserforOxfamGBwheresheled
researchandpolicydevelopmentonbilateralandregionaltradeagreementsacrossthe
OxfamInternationalfederation.EmilyholdsaMastersinDevelopmentEconomicsfromthe
SchoolofAfricanandOrientalStudies,UniversityofLondon,andaBAinPhilosophy,Politics
andEconomicsfromOxfordUniversity.

Acknowledgements
Theauthorswouldliketothankallthosewhogenerouslygaveuptheirtimetobe
interviewedduringtheresearchforthisreport,andthosewhoprovidedcommentsand
feedbackonthedraft.WeareindebtedtoWorldVisionUK,withoutwhosesupportthis
workwouldnothavebeenpossible.ParticularthanksareduetoPatrickWattwho,whileat
WorldVision,playedaninvaluableroleinshapingtheresearch,andtoChrisPage.

Note:Theopinionsinthisreportarethoseoftheauthorsonlyanddonotnecessarily
representthoseofWorldVisionorippr.
5 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

ForewordbyWorldVision
Poverty,forWorldVision,isanissueofjustice,or,morecorrectly,anissueofinjustice.
Poverty,exploitationandviolencearenotinevitable.Theproblemsthatmillionslivingin
economicallypoorcountriesface,andwhichclaim30,000youngliveseachday,arethe
resultoffailurestoensurethatsystemsandstructuresatinternational,nationalandlocal
levelssupportthewell-beingofthosewhofindthemselvesatthemarginsofsociety.
Itisthetransformationofsocietyandcommunitiesthatwilldeliverimprovedwell-beingin
thelivesofthoseintendedtobenefitfromdevelopmentefforts.Dramaticincreasesinaid
overthelastdecadehavesavedandimprovedthelivesofmillionsofpeopleinpoorer
communities,particularlychildren.Thecommunitiesweworkwithcanseethechangethat
aidmoneyisdeliveringandthecontributionitismakingtosustainabledevelopment,but
theseincreaseshavealsohighlightedthelimitsofaidasadevelopmenttool.
Factorssuchasgovernanceandcorruption,securityandpeacebuilding,trade,finance,
migrationandclimatechangeareallimpactingondevelopment,andtheinterplaybetween
thesefactorsisincreasinglyimportantifwewantdevelopmenttobesuccessfuland
sustainable.Tacklingstructuralandsystemicinjusticemustgohandinhandwiththe
provisionofdevelopmentaid.ThismeansthatawiderangeofUKpoliciesbeyondaidhave
significantimplicationsforthelivesofpeopleineconomicallypoorcountries.
ForWorldVision,amajordevelopment,humanitarianandadvocacyorganisationworkingin
townsandvillagesinnearly100countriesaroundtheworld,theimpactofeachofthese
policiesonchildrenisofparamountimportanceasweseektoalleviatethepovertyand
sufferingexperiencedbysomanyintheworldtoday.Ourprimarygoalthrougheveryaspect
ofourworkistocontributetochangesinsocietyandcommunitiesthatresultinimproved
well-beinginthelivesofchildrenthroughtherealisationoftheirrights.
Ourfocusonchildrenisinformedbyabeliefthatchildrenarecentraltothedevelopment
process,andpoliciesimpactingondevelopmentthatignorethewell-beingofchildrenwill
ultimatelyfailtotransformthelivesofallthoselivinginthepoorestcommunities.Afocuson
childwell-being:
•supportssustainableandequitablehumandevelopmentbybreakingcyclesofpoverty
andinequality–theeffectsofpovertyonchildrentoday,whoconstitutethemajority
ofthoselivinginpoverty,haveconsequencesthatareoftenpassedontotheir
childrentomorrow
•providesanentrypointintoaddressingthewell-beingoffamiliesandcommunities
andactsasa‘barometer’forthewell-beingofthewiderpopulation–childwell-being
isbestimprovedthroughensuringthatthecontextsinwhichtheyliveareonesin
whichtheycanthrive.Assuch,childwell-beingisanimportantmeasureofimpactfor
anyinterventionaimedatsupportingsocialandhumandevelopment
•recognisesthatchildrencanplayasignificantroleasagentsoftransformationintheir
communities
•recognisesachildrightsframeworkasthemosteffectivetooltoachieveminimum
standardsofwell-beingforchildreninareassuchashealth,care,protectionand
education.
Failingtoputchildrenatthecentreofdevelopmentweakenstheimpactoftoday’s
developmenteffortsbothnowandforthefuture.Butourcallforchildrentobeplacedat
theheartofthedevelopmentagendaisnotpurelyutilitarian.Childrenarerights-holders,as
outlinedintheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild,and,assuch,
developmentactors,includingtheUKGovernment,haveanobligationtoaddresstherights
ofchildrenthroughallpoliciesandactionsthatimpactondevelopmentoutcomes.
6 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Recognitionthatpositive,sustainabledevelopmentoutcomescanonlybeachievedthrough
engagementwiththeunderlyingcausesofpovertyexpandstheareasofpolicyrelevantto
thedevelopmentendeavourbeyondthosewithapurefocusondevelopment.Theimpacts
ofotherareasofpolicythathaveimplicationsoninternationalpovertyreductionobjectives,
suchasthoserelatingtoconflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeand
migration,mustberecognised.
WorldVisionisconcernedthattherelationshipbetweenthesefactorsanddevelopmenthas
notbeenadequatelyexplored.ThoughwestronglybelievethattheDepartmentfor
InternationalDevelopmentshouldremainastrongandindependentdepartmentwithin
Governmentwithacabinet-levelSecretaryofState,developmentpolicymustbeconsidered
byotherUKdepartmentsincludingtheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,Ministryof
DefenceandtheDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkillsifwearetomakeprogress
indevelopmentoutcomesandtoimprovethewell-beingofchildrenlivinginpoverty.Aswe
approachacrucialelection,andtheworldconvenestoreviewtheMillenniumDevelopment
Goals,nowistherighttimetoaskthesequestionsandtodeterminehowUKdevelopment
policywillbetakenforward.
WecommissionedtheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)tocarryoutthis
independentresearchasaleadingUKthinktankandwethankthemfortheirconsiderable
workonthisprojectandthecontributionwehopeitmakestothefuturedevelopment
debate.Wearealsogratefultoallthose,bothinsideandoutsideoftheUKGovernment,
whoparticipatedininterviewsandprovidedcommenttoinformthefindingsandconclusions
ofthisreport.
Whilethedetailedconclusionsandrecommendationsinthereportarethoseofippr,World
Visionsupportsthefindingsandthecallforgreaterpolicycoherencefordevelopmentacross
theUKGovernmentwithacontinuedstrongandindependentrolefortheDepartmentfor
InternationalDevelopment.HowtheUKcontributestodevelopmentpolicyandusesits
positionontheglobalstageneedstoberevisited,andWorldVisionhopesthatthisresearch
helpsshapethatdebate.

JustinByworth
ChiefExecutive,WorldVisionUK
7 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Listofabbreviations
ACP African,CaribbeanandPacificstates
BAF BritishArmedForces
BERR DepartmentforBusiness,EnterpriseandRegulatoryReform
BIS DepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills
CA Conflictadviser
CPP ConflictPreventionPool
CT Counter-terrorism
DAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee[OECD]
DECC DepartmentforEnergyandClimateChange
Defra DepartmentfortheEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs
DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment
DG DirectorGeneral
DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongo
EBA EverythingButArms
ECGD ExportCreditGuaranteeDepartment
EITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative
EPA EconomicPartnershipAgreement
FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOffice
FTA FreeTradeAgreement
GATS GeneralAgreementonTradeinServices
HMGovernment HerMajesty’sGovernment
HMT HerMajesty’sTreasury
IDA InternationalDevelopmentAct(2002)
MDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoal
MOD MinistryofDefence
NHS NationalHealthService
NIC Newlyindustrialisingcountry
ODA Officialdevelopmentassistance
OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment
PBS Points-basedsystem
PETS Publicexpendituretrackersurveys
PSA PublicServiceAgreement
QIP QuickImpactProject
SU StabilisationUnit
SWAPs Sector-wideapproach
UKBA UKBorderAgency
WTO WorldTradeOrganisation
8 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Executivesummary
Overthelast12years,theUnitedKingdomhasbuiltaninternationalreputationasaleading
aiddonor,andasaninnovatorindevelopmentpolicy.TheDepartmentforInternational
Development(DFID)isastrong,independentactorbothinLondonandinthecountriesin
whichitworks.Furthermore,aconsensushasnowbeenestablishedacrossmuch(ifnotall)
ofthepoliticalspectrumforthedepartment’sexistence,forthecommitmenttomeetthe0.7
percentofGDPaidtarget,andforthelegitimacyofthedevelopmentagenda.These
achievementsshouldbecelebratedandbuilton.
Butbeyondaid,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewith
theunderlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesbeyondthetraditionalterritory
ofdevelopmentpolicy–inforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,infinanceand
environment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoas‘policycoherencefordevelopment’,andis
thefocusofthisreport.
AlthoughaidfromtheUKcanhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeoplein
thedevelopingworld,theimpactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsareboth
moreprofoundandfarwider.Theseinclude:insecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunities
forandreturnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;corruption,andclimatechange.The
UK’scommitmentto,anddeliveryof,internationalpovertyreductionobjectivesthusneeds
tobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesfarbeyondwhatisusuallythoughtofas
‘developmentpolicy’,andwhichareoutsidethedirectcontrolandremitofDFID.
ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFID’splacewithin
government.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasbecomeadevelopmentministry,
notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)
asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutside
government)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagency,separatefromtherest
ofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,environment,migration
andtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens(particularlywherethereare
genuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoorcountries);andthattheresultisa
lackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUK’ssupportfor,andengagementwith,thepoorest
countries.Ofcourse,intherealworldofpoliticstherearegenuinetrade-offs–between
tightly-focuseddevelopmentpoliciesandwiderinfluence,betweenshort-termpoverty
reductionobjectivesandlonger-termchangeprocesses,and,insomecases,betweenthe
interestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreportdoesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers.Rather,
weaimtosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offsthatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)
decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKgovernmentinthefaceofthesetrade-offsand
drawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidencesuggeststhatdifferentchoices
shouldbemadeinthefuture.

TheUKrecordonpolicycoherence
Theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehas,inprinciple,beenpresenteversincethe
establishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominenceto
policycoherence,althoughthefocushasshiftedovertime.TheGovernmenthasalsotriedto
useitscentralpolicyandtarget-settingmachinerytopromotecoherence.Aplethoraof
cross-Whitehallmechanismshavealsoevolvedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachievea
morejoined-upgovernmenteffortondevelopment.Thesebodiesoftenoverseespending
fromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadoutacrossdepartmentalboundaries.
Thisreport,basedinpartoninterviewswitharound25civilservantsfromarangeof
departments,aswellaspoliticaladvisersandexternalexperts,suggeststhattheGovernment
hasmaderealstepstowardsgreatercoherence,especiallyinsomeareassuchastrade,
climatechangeandconflictresolution.However,moreremainstobedone.DFIDstillappears
9 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

tohaveacorefocusonconventionalaidprogrammesandin-countryreformprocesses,and
iscriticisedbysomeforitslargelytechnocratic(ratherthanpolitical)approachtoputtingthe
developmentcaseingovernment.Otherdepartments,whiletheydoincreasinglyvalue
DFID’sinput,alsohaveawaytogoinreflectingtheimportanceoftheUK’sinternational
developmentobjectivesintheirpoliciesandpractice.
Policycoherence,andtheinteractionbetweenDFIDandothergovernmentdepartments,has
evolvedinaratherunevenway,oftenawayfromthepoliticalspotlight.
TradepolicywastargetedfromtheverystartofDFID’sexistence:anearlydecisionwas
takentoinvestinexpertisewithinDFID,andtoengagewiththethenDepartmentofTrade
andIndustry(DTI)tomaketheargumentthatoncetradepolicymovedawayfrom
mercantilism,developmentbecamethemainissue.TherewasalsoanevolutioninDFID’s
approachtoconflictquiteearlyon,withhumanitarianmilitaryinterventionintheBalkans
andSierraLeoneforcingthedepartmenttothinkabouthowitworkedalongsidethe
MinistryofDefence(MOD),andabouttherelationshipsbetweenstabilisation,
reconstructionandlong-termdevelopment.Asomewhatdifferentsetofissueshasarisenin
themorerecentcasesofIraqandAfghanistan.Whileworkinthesecountriesaccountsfora
relativelysmallpartofDFID’sprogramming,ithasattractedalargeamountofpolitical
debate.
Morerecently,therehasbeenmajorengagementwithNumber10andtheDepartmentfor
EnergyandClimateChange(DECC)ontheinternationalaspectsofclimatechange.DFIDhas
alsopressedsuccessfullyforactionbyotherdepartmentsonquitespecificissues,suchasthe
banningofclustermunitionsbytheUKandthepromotionofaninternationalagreementon
thesameissue.
Onarangeofotherissues(suchasmigration),DFIDhaseithermadelittleefforttoshape
policyinothergovernmentdepartments,orhaslackedtheresources,argumentsorpolitical
weighttodoso.
DFIDhashadgoodreasontoholditselfslightlyapartfromtherestofgovernment–the
benefitsofDFID’sindependenceareclearinthepovertyfocusofUKaidspending,andinits
internationalreputation–butthegainsmadeinthelastdecadeneedtobesecuredby
advanceintoawideragenda,notbyaretreatintoanarrowlydefinedaidagencyrole.

Whypolicycoherencemattersnow
Developmentoutcomesdependcruciallyonfactorsbeyondaid,andUKGovernmentpolicies
acrossarangeofareasmatterforpovertyreductionandforsecuringbasichumanrights.On
theotherside,UKinterestsareincreasinglyboundupwithsuccessfullyrespondingtoa
rangeofinternationalissues(suchasclimatechange).Inthiscontext,anarrowviewofthe
UK’snationalinterestislookingincreasinglyoutdated.
Butcuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychanging
fiscalandpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.Amassivesqueezeonpublic
expenditureandapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUK
developmentpolicy.ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewider
parametersoftheconsensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservative
governmentwouldkeepDFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainoreven
increaseaidspending.Therearenoproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFID
spendingtopovertyreduction,althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywantto
explorethepossibilityofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-relatedspending.Inany
case,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFID’sbudget,independence
andwaysofworking.
Therearedifferentviewsonthequestionof‘wherenext?’forDFID,andforUKdevelopment
policy.Somearguethat,facedwithincreasingfiscalandpoliticalpressuresinthecoming
years,DFIDshoulddefendits‘separateness’andindependenceevenmore;othersthatthe
10 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

changingnatureofpovertyrequiresamorejoined-upapproachacrossgovernment.Some
evenarguethatDFIDshouldbemergedbackintotheForeignandCommonwealthOffice.
MuchofthecontroversyhasfocusedonhowDFIDoperatesincountrieswheretheUKisat
war,andIraqandAfghanistaninparticular.Thesesituations,whileveryimportantpolitically,
representonlyasmallpartofwhatDFIDdoes.Particularproblemsdoariseinsuchsituations
butwesuggestthattheyrequiretargetedsolutionsratherthansystematicchanges.Itwould
beamistaketoreconfigureDFID’sentireapproachonthebasisofthedemandsofthese
particularcases.Insuchsituationsitiscriticaltohaveclarityaboutthemissionand
objectives,andanagreedstrategyforthewholeofGovernmentbasedonsharedanalysis.It
thenmakessensetoapplyprinciplesofflexibilityandtransparencyintheuseofresources.
Governmentspendinginsuchcircumstancesshouldnotbeaboutastrugglebetweenthose
whowantto‘raid’theaidbudgetandthosewhowanttodefendtheaidbudgetatallcosts.
Theimportantdistinctionshouldnotbebetweenwhichspendingcancountasofficial
developmentassistance(ODA)andwhichcannot,butbetweeneffectiveandineffective
spending.ThismightmeanDFIDrecognisingthatsecurityobjectivesarelegitimatefor
povertyreductionaswellasforwiderUKinterests,andagreeingtospendonnon-ODA
categories,butthiswillalsomeantheGovernmentbeingclearthatthisexpenditurecannot
becountedasODA.
Intheend,concernsaboutprotectingaidspendingforpovertyreductionandmaintainingan
appropriateallocationofDFIDspendingbetweencountriesarebestaddressedthrough
havingastrongDFIDvoicemakingthedevelopmentalcaseattheheartofgovernment.We
thinkthatthebenefitsofastrongDFID,independentoftheFCO,clearlyoutweighthe
costs,andthereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFID’spositionasaseparatedepartment
withaCabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.
However,thisdoesnotmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.Itis
importantbothforUKdevelopmentpolicyandforDFIDasadepartmentthatthecoherence
ofgovernmentpolicyandpracticedeepensandbecomesmoresystematic.DFIDshould
continuetobeindependentandtomakedecisionsbasedonaclearsetofdevelopmentand
povertyreductionobjectives(particularlyaboutaidprogramming),whilealsoengagingmore
effectivelywiththerestofgovernmentatthepolicylevelandontheground.
Inthecurrenteconomicandpoliticalclimate,apublicandpoliticaldefenceofaidspending,
andoftheUK’ssuccessfulinternationaldevelopmentpolicies,mustrecognisethe
interdependencyofdifferentobjectives.ThedevelopmentdebateintheUKwillincreasingly
belinkedtodebatesonissuesincludingconflictandsecurity,climatechange,andmigration
andtrade.Similarly,whenconsideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountries,itseems
impossiblenottorecognisethelinksbetweendevelopmentandissuessuchasconflictand
climatechange.
So,therearebothpragmaticandprincipledreasonstoconsiderpolicycoherence.Itseems
likelythattheUK’sinternationaldevelopment‘community’mayneedtomakethese
interdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inorderto
protecttheaidbudgetandDFID’sindependence.Thisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebate
aboutwhetherDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andonwhat
terms.

WherenextforUKdevelopmentpolicy?
DFIDneedstocontinuebuildingcloserrelationshipswithothergovernmentdepartments,
whichbringsrisksforthe‘purity’ofDFID’spovertyreductionmission.However,DFID
cannotaffordtokeepbeingseenas‘theNGOdowntheroad’,asithasbeencaricatured
withinotherpartsofgovernment–perceptionscanmatterasmuchasreality.Instead,inthe
wordsofoneinterviewee,thedepartmentmustbecomemoreofa‘Whitehallwarrior’.
Successfulpolicycoherencefordevelopmentmustbejustthat–fordevelopment.This
meansthatthereneedtobeclearpoliticalandofficialmechanismstoensurethatthe
11 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Government’sdevelopmentobjectivesaresystematicallyconsideredacrossarangeofpolicy
areas.Whenotherobjectivesorinterestslegitimatelysupersededevelopmentobjectives,this
shouldbetransparent,andstepsshouldstillbetakentominimiseharmandmaximise
developmentbenefits.Policycoherencedoesnotmeanabandoningpoliciesthatseek
developmentandpovertyreductionfortheirownsake.Butconfidenceisneededtoengage
onchallengingissues,andtorecognisethatmessycompromisesarepartofmakingprogress.
Thekeyrisktobemitigatedisthat,inseekingcoherence,thedevelopmentagendagetslost
ordowngradedrelativetootherissues(forexample,security),andthattheUK’score
developmentpoliciesbecomelesseffectiveasaresult.
Acentralconclusionofthisstudyisthatgreatercoherenceisnotusuallybeingpreventedby
alackofcross-governmentmechanismsfordialogueandcooperation;therearemanysuch
mechanismsonmostissues,oftenatverysenioraswellasoperationallevels.Amore
importantissueistheincentives(orlackthereof)withingovernmenttomakethese
mechanismsworkwellinpractice.Wearguethatthekeytocoherenceisagreed-uponjoint
strategyacrossgovernment,basedonsharedanalysisandclearpoliticalleadership,and
supportedbyaneffectivecasemadetothepublic.

Summaryofrecommendations
•Developmentconcernsandobjectivesshouldformakeypartofdecision-making
acrossthefullrangeofUKpoliciesthatimpactondevelopingcountries.Attemptsto
increasepolicycoherencefordevelopmentshouldalwaysincludeachildwell-being
andrightsperspective.Wheretensionsexistanddevelopmentobjectivescannot
appropriatelybegivenpriority,harmshouldbeminimised,developmentbenefits
maximisedanddecisionsshouldbemadeopenlyandaccountably.
•TheGovernmentshoulddevelopawhole-of-governmentinternationaldevelopment
strategy,andshouldcarryoutasystematicanalysisofthedevelopmentimpactsofUK
policies(including,butnotlimitedto,conflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,
climatechangeandmigration).Thisshouldhavestrongownershipacrossgovernment,
andastrongfocusonnon-DFIDpolicylevers.
•TheGovernmentshouldensurethatDFID,theFCO,theMOD,theDepartmentfor
Business,InnovationandSkills(BIS),DECC,theUKBorderAgency(UKBA)andother
relevantdepartmentsagreejointUKGovernmentstrategiesforallimportant
developingcountrieswheretheUKhasbothasubstantialaidprogrammeand
significantstrategic,commercialorsecurityinterests.Thesecountrystrategiesshould
bebasedonsharedanalysiscontributedtobyalldepartments.
•FCOpostsandDFIDcountryofficesshouldplayakeyroleintheprocessofforming
jointcountrystrategiesandwiderthematicstrategies.DFIDshouldretainoperational
independenceatthecountrylevel,butneedstooperatewithincross-governmental
strategicframeworks.
•Alldepartmentsshouldcreateincentives–forexamplethroughappraisalsand
promotioncriteria–forspendingtimeandresourcesoninter-departmentalworking.
Theseincentivesshouldextenduptoseniorlevels(includingviaPublicService
Agreementframeworks)toencourageseniorcivilservantstoprovideanexampleto
morejuniorstaffandcreateaculturewhereworkingwithotherdepartmentsisvalued.
Careerprogressionstructuresshouldalsoreflecttheimportanceofcross-departmental
working.
•Alldepartmentsshouldreviewtheskillsoftheirstafftoensurethattheyare
appropriateforachievinggreatercoherence(forexample,DFIDshouldemploymore
politicaladvisers).
•DFID’ssolespendingfocusonpovertyreductionundertheInternationalDevelopment
Actshouldberetainedandevenstrengthened,butshouldbebasedonabroad
12 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

analysisofwhatdrivespovertyreduction.TherestrictionsoftheActshouldapplyto
ODAspendingacrossgovernment,notjustinDFID.ThedefinitionofODAshouldnot
bereopened,butDFIDshouldhaveaccesstomorenon-ODAfunds,particularlyin
ordertoengagemoreeffectivelyinsituationsofconflict.
•TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheOECD’sDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeto
providebetterreportingonnon-ODAspendingonalimitedtypeofclearly-defined
activitiesthatpromotedevelopment,inordertograntsuchspendingmorerecognition
andpoliticalcredit.
•Alldepartmentsshouldengagewiththeircivilsocietyconstituencies,andwiththe
public,ontheimportanceandvalueofthecoherenceagenda.DFIDinparticular
needstoproactivelycommunicatewiththepublicandwithParliamentinorderto
explainthecomplicatedrealitiesandambiguitiesofthedevelopmentprocess.Ifthey
arereallyinterestedinachievingeffectiveoutcomesindevelopingcountries,theFCO
andMODhavearesponsibilitytopromotethelegitimacybothofdevelopment,and
ofDFID,withtheirownconstituencies.
•Ministersandpoliticiansmustmakethepoliticalandpubliccaseforpolicycoherence,
andshouldhavetheconfidencetoengagewiththecomplexrealitiesofdevelopment.
13 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Introduction
TheaimofthisreportistoinformthedebateaboutthefutureoftheUK’sdevelopment
policy.WeassesshowfarUKpoliciesarecoherentfromadevelopmentperspective,and
whatthebalanceisbetweeninternationaldevelopmentandotherobjectives,acrossarange
ofareas.Weidentifysomeofthebarrierstomorejoined-upgovernment.Onthebasisof
thisanalysiswemakeaseriesofrecommendationsforboththeDepartmentforInternational
Developmentandtheworkingsofgovernmentmorewidely.

Thecontext
Overthelast12yearstherehavebeendramaticchangesintheUKinternational
developmentpolicylandscape.Whenitcametopowerin1997,theLabourGovernment
createdanewDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andaseatfordevelopment
policyintheCabinet.Thiswasfollowedbytheuntyingofaidin2001andanInternational
DevelopmentActin2002,whichgaveBritishaidanexplicitpovertyreductionremit.
Spendingonaidsteadilyincreasedto£6.3billionby2008,a140percentincreaseinreal
termssince1997.Itcurrentlystandsat0.43percentofnationalincome,andin2005the
GovernmentcommitteditselftotheUnitedNations’targetofgiving0.7percentofnational
incomeinaidby2013,acommitmentitnowproposestolockinthroughlegislation.
Inmanyways,Britain’sinternationalaidefforthasbeenanenormoussuccess,especiallyin
theareasithasprioritised,suchashealthandeducation.Infantandchildmortalityrates
havefallenacrossthedevelopingworld,morechildrenareinschool,andrealprogresshas
beenmadeintacklingtheHIV/AIDSepidemic.Whilethesechangeshavebeenbrought
aboutbymanydifferentactors,DFIDestimatesthattheUKaidprogrammehelpstolift3
millionpeopleoutofpovertyeachyear(DFID2009).
DFIDisnowanacceptedpartofgovernment.Oppositionpartieshavepledgedtoretain
DFID’sCabinetplace,andtomeettheUNaidtargetof0.7percentofnationalincomeby
2013atthelatest.Intheinternationaldevelopmentsystem,theUKcarriesgenuine
influence.ItisnowthebiggestsinglecontributortotheWorldBank’sprogrammeforlow-
incomecountries,andhasspearheadeddiscussionsintheOECD,alongsideotherEuropean
donors,onhowtoimprovethequalityofaid.DFIDisrecognisedasaworld-leading
developmentagency,andiswidelyseenasanexampleofbestpractice.AlthoughtheUKaid
programmeisbynomeansperfect,significantprogresshasbeenmade–theGovernment,
andDFID,canrightlybeproudofthevolume,qualityandpovertyfocusofUKaid.
However,thereisalsoafundamentaltensionattheheartofUKdevelopmentpolicy.Ever
sincethecreationofDFID,policymakershavewrestledwithabalancebetweenthedesireto
focusonaddressingthemanifestationsofextremepovertyontheonehand,andtheneed
toengagewithitsunderlyingcausesontheother.
ThefirstapproachhasbeenframedintermsoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs).
TheMDGshavealsoplayedacentralroleinpubliccampaignstoincreasetheaidbudgetin
theUK,suchasMakePovertyHistory.Inbothpublicandpoliticaldebate,international
developmenthasbecomealmostsynonymouswiththeMDGs.Inturn,aidhasdominated
discussionsabouthowtheMDGscouldbemet–theUK’seffortshavefocusedonDFID
deliveringaideffectivelyinordertosupportbasicservicesindevelopingcountries,especially
healthandeducation.
Thesecondapproachhasbeenlessabouttacklingtheimmediatemanifestationsofpoverty,
andmoreaboutshapingpoliciesinbothrecipientanddonorcountriesacrossawiderange
ofareas,fromtradeandmigrationtogovernanceandconflictprevention,andmorerecently
climatepolicy.Therehasbeenagrowingrecognitionthatpovertyisaffectedbyawiderange
offactors,andthatgivingaidwithoutengagingwiththemisnotaneffectivelong-term
strategyforreducingpoverty.ThisanalysishasbeenapparentinUKaidprogramming,and
DFIDhasbeenincreasinglyusingaidtoaddresssomeoftheseissues,andengagingwith
14 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

developingcountrygovernmentstoimprovewiderpolicyframeworks.
ChangesinaidprogrammingandDFID’sstrategyinthedevelopingcountrieswhereitworks
areanimportantpartofthisbroaderapproachtodeliveringpovertyreduction.Butbeyond
this,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewiththe
underlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesathomebeyondthetraditional
territoryofdevelopmentpolicy–inforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,in
financeandenvironment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoas‘policycoherencefor
development’,andisthefocusofthisreport.Coherenceisamoreambitiousagendathan
‘coordination’.Coordination(forexamplebetweenDFIDandFCOofficialsworkinginthe
samecountry)suggestscommunicationanddivisionoflabour,whilecoherencesuggestsa
morefundamentalalignmentofpolicyobjectives.
DFIDhasbecomeincreasinglykeentoemphasisethatitisadevelopmentministry,notan
aidagency.AkeypartofthisisinfluencingthewiderUKGovernmenttoensurethatthe
UK’spolicieshelpdeliver(oratleastdonothinder)internationaldevelopmentobjectives.
Itisimportanttonotefromtheoutsetthatthetwoapproachestointernationaldevelopment
andpovertyreductionsetoutabovearenotmutuallyexclusive.Theyshouldbemutually
supportiveandreinforcing.However,DFIDhastodeliverambitiousobjectiveswithfinite
resources,negotiatingcapitalandpoliticalwill.Quiterightly,prioritiesmustbeset,anditis
notalwaysclearwhichapproachesandstrategieswillreapthegreatestrewardsforpeoplein
thepoorestcountries.
OurargumentinthisreportisnotthattheGovernmentorDFIDhasgotitwronginthepast,
butratherthatnowmightbeapropitioustimetore-examinethewayDFIDengageswith
therestofgovernmentonthewidersetofissuesthataresoimportanttodevelopment.

Whycoherencemattersnow
TheevidencepresentedinthefollowingchaptersdemonstratesthatwhileaidfromtheUK
canhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeopleindevelopingcountries,the
impactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsarebothmoreprofoundandfar
wider.Theseinclude:thelevelofinsecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunitiesforand
returnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;theextentofcorruption;andtheimpactof
climatechange.ThismeansthattheUK’scommitmentto,anddeliveryof,international
povertyreductionobjectivesneedstobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesthatextendfar
beyondwhatisusuallythoughtofasdevelopmentpolicy,andthatareoutsidethedirect
controlandremitofDFID.
Thisfacthasparticularimportanceforagenciesthatfocusonchildwell-beingandrights,like
WorldVisionUK(seeForeword,above).Partlybecauseofthegreaterphysicalandsocial
vulnerabilityofchildren,theysufferparticularlyfrompovertyandhunger,exploitation,
violenceandinsecurityandabusesofrights.Conversely,theyalsobenefitthemostfrom
moresecureandbetterlivelihoodsfortheirfamilies,frombetterschoolingandhealth
servicesandfrompeaceandenvironmentalstability;inshort,childrenhavethegreaterstake
inthefuture.Becausemanyoftheseoutcomesdependfarmoreontherangeoffactors
outlinedabovethanonaid,thecoherenceagendashouldbeatthecentreofthinkingabout
children’shealth,educationandrighttoprotectionandcare,bothinhumanitariancrisesand
morewidely.
Theimportanceofpolicycoherencehasalwaysbeenunderstood(intheUKandelsewhere),
butithasneverbeenaneasyagendatodeliver,eventhoughithasarguablygrownin
importanceinrecentyears.Inthelast18monthstheseissueshavemovedtothecentreof
UKdebatesaboutinternationaldevelopmentandpovertyreduction,1 promptingcallsto

1.Forexample,in2009thesekindofargumentsfeaturedprominentlyinboththeGovernment’sInternationalDevelopment
WhitePaper,BuildingOurCommonFuture,andintheConservatives’PolicyGreenPaper,OneWorldConservatism:AConservative
AgendaforInternationalDevelopment.
15 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

thinkafreshaboutthefuturedirectionofUKdevelopmentpolicy.Thereareanumberof
reasonsforthis.Thefirstisthattheworldfeelsincreasinglyinter-connected.Newglobal
issues,likeclimatechange,haverisenuptheagenda,whileoldonesliketheglobalimpacts
ofbankingandfinancepolicyhavereturnedwithavengeance,causingaseverecrisiswith
deepimpactsonmanyofthepoorestcountries.Crisescanhaveparticularlynegativelong-
termimpactsonchildrenbyinterruptingtheireducation,orbylimitingtheiraccessto
nutrition,healthcareandsocialsupportduringkeystagesoftheirdevelopment.Inturn,the
long-termimpactsofcrisisonchildrenwillservetodeceleratedevelopmentmorebroadly
duetotheinter-generationalnatureofpovertytransmission.
Anotherreasonfortheincreasingrelevanceofthecoherencedebateisdue,paradoxically,to
successfuldevelopmentinmanycountries.Aspovertyinthesecountriesdeclines,
developmentpolicyislikelytobecomeincreasinglyfocusedonthe‘bottombillion’(Collier
2008,WorldBank2007b)–thosepeoplelivingincountrieswithmultipleandparticularly
intractableproblems,wherestatesarefragileorfailing,whereinstitutionsareweak,where
conflictisoftenrife,wherechangesintheinternationaleconomymoreoftenhavenegative
impactsthanpositiveones,andmostimportantly,wheretraditionalaidapproachesdonot
workverywell(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).Developmentpolicyinthesecontextshas
tobeaboutmuchmorethanjustdeliveringbasicservicesasusuallydefined,andin
particularmeansbeingabletounderstandandhelpresolveviolentconflicts.Insettingslike
Afghanistan,Pakistan,Somalia,Sudan,KenyaandSierraLeone,theconceptual‘firewalls’
betweenpoverty-focuseddevelopmentinterventionsandgovernance,securityandwider
foreignpolicyobjectiveshavebrokendown.
Inprinciple,theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehasbeenpresenteversincethe
establishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominenceto
policycoherence,althoughtheparticularpolicyfocushasshiftedovertime.The1997White
Paperthatestablishedthedepartmenthasawholechapteronpolicycoherenceand
explicitlystatedthatDFIDshouldnotsimplybeanaidagency.The2000WhitePaper
focusedontheimportanceoftradeandtradepolicyinthecontextofglobalisation
(followingthefailureoftheWorldTradeOrganisationsummitinSeattle).Thekeythemeof
the2006WhitePaperwasimprovinggovernance,whilethe2009WhitePaperprioritised
climatechangeandconflict.
Atthesametime,theGovernmenthastriedtouseitscentralpolicyandtarget-setting
machinerytopromotecoherence.In2007itcreatedanumberofrelevantpublicservice
agreements(PSAs),usedtoholddepartmentstoaccounttotheTreasuryandthePrime
Minister,whichapplyjointlyacrossanumberofdepartments.ThusPSA29,whichcalledfor
quickerprogresstowardstheMDGs,appliestoDFID,theFCO,DECCandtheTreasury.PSA
30,whichisaboutreducingtheimpactofconflict,appliestoDFID,FCOandtheMOD.PSA
27onclimatechangeisledbyDECCbutalsoinvolvestheFCOandDFID.Inturn,these
PSAsaretranslatedintodepartmentalobjectives.Forexample,oneoftheFCO’s
departmentalobjectivesis:‘Sustainabledevelopment,underpinnedbydemocracy,good
governanceandhumanrights.’
Beyondtarget-settingandobjectives,aplethoraofcross-Whitehallmechanismshave
emergedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachieveamorejoined-upgovernmentefforton
development.TheseincludeajointDFID-BIStradeunit,thejointfundingpoolsforconflict
sharedwiththeFCOandtheMOD,andajointunitwithDECConclimatechange.These
bodiesalsooftenoverseespendingfromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadout
acrossdepartmentalboundaries,suchasthe£800millionenvironmentalfundshared
betweenDFIDandDECC,anda£260millionpost-conflictfundmanagedjointlybyDFID
andtheFCO.
However,thereisanongoingdebateonhowfarpolicycoherencehasbeenachievedinthe
UK.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasindeedbecomeadevelopmentministry,
notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)
16 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutside
government)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagencyandistooseparate
fromtherestofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,
environment,migration,andtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens
(particularlywheretherearegenuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoor
countries);andthattheresultisalackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUK’ssupportfor,
andengagementwith,thepoorestcountries.
ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFID’splacewithin
government.SomebelievethatdefendingDFID’spositionasafullyindependent
departmentwithaspecificpovertyreductionremitistheonlywaytopreventthe
encroachmentofotherinterestsintotheUK’spolicyapproachtothepoorestcountries.
OtherssuggestthatitisthisveryindependencethatlimitscoherenceinUKpolicy,andthat
reducesthe‘voiceofdevelopment’inwiderUKpolicydecisions,andsomeevenarguethat
DFIDshouldbereintegratedintotheFCO.
ipprthinksthatthebenefitsofastrongandindependentDFIDclearlyoutweighthecosts–
thereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFID’spositionasaseparatedepartmentwitha
Cabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.However,thisdoes
notmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.
InsomesensesthisdebateaboutDFID’spositioningovernmentisamicrocosmofwider
debatesaboutthemosteffectiveapproachtopolicycoherence.Intherealworldofpolitics
therearegenuinetrade-offstobemade–betweentightlyfocuseddevelopmentpoliciesand
widerinfluence,betweenshort-termpovertyreductionobjectivesandlonger-termchange
processes,and,insomecases,betweentheinterestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreport
doesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers;rather,wetrytosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offs
thatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKinthe
faceofthesetrade-offs,anddrawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidence
suggeststhatdifferentchoicesshouldbemadeinthefuture.

Developmentinthedownturn
Cuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychangingfiscal
andpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.Amassivesqueezeonpublicexpenditure
andapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUKdevelopment
policy.
ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewiderparametersofthe
consensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservativegovernmentwouldkeep
DFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainorevenincreaseaidspending.Thereare
noproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFIDspendingtopovertyreduction
(ConservativeParty2009),althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywantto
explorethepossibility(withinOECDDACrules)ofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-
relatedspending(forexample,onanewStabilisationandReconstructionForce)
(ConservativeParty2010).
However,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFID’sbudget,
independenceandwaysofworking.Thesemaycomelessfromthecurrentleadershipofthe
ConservativePartythanfromexistingbackbenchers,peers,andthenewgroupofMPs
expectedtocomeintoParliamentatthenextelection.2

2.Forexample,DouglasHurd,formerlyForeignSecretaryandnowaConservativepeer,recentlycalledforDFIDtobemerged
backintotheFCO(DODSNetwork2009).Asurveyof144ConservativeprospectiveParliamentarycandidatesbythewebsite
ConservativeHomeshowedonly4percentarguingthatinternationaldevelopmentshouldbeimmunefromspendingcuts,as
comparedwith39percentinfavourofprotectingdefenceand34percentforprotectinghealthspending
(ConservativeHome.com2009).ThePoliticsHomewebsitealsofindslittlesupportforprotectingtheaidbudgetamongagroupof
respondentsthatincludesConservativefrontbenchers,senioradvisersand‘influentialcommentatorsintheright-leaningpress’
(PoliticsHome.com2009).
17 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

EveniftotalUKaidspendingisprotectedbythecommitmenttomeetthe0.7percent
target,thelikelyscaleofpublicspendingcutselsewheremeansthattherewillbepressures
tore-routespendingviaotherdepartments.Indeed,thisisalreadyhappeningtosome
extent–withODAspendingoutsideDFIDrisingfasterthanDFID’sownprogramme
spendinginthelastspendingreview.TherearealsolikelytobecallstoallocateDFID’s
spendinginsuchawayastogivegreatersupporttoobjectivesbeyondpovertyreduction,
especiallynationalsecurity.Forexample,arecentpolicyGreenPaperindicatesthata
ConservativegovernmentwouldprobablyincreaseaidspendinginAfghanistanandPakistan
(ConservativeParty2009).3
Underlyingtheseanticipatedpressuresistheview–heldincertainpartsoftheConservative
Partyandamongitscorevoters,andalsopartsofthepress–thatthetraditionallyliberal,
welfare-centredapproachtodevelopmentaidisweak,andthatwherewegiveaidtoother
countries,itshouldprimarilyservetheUK’snationalinterest,supportingoursecurityand
foreignpolicies,andcommercialinterests(forasenseoftherecentdebate,seeMaxwell
2007).Thisargumentexplicitlyrejectstheideathatinternationaldevelopmentpolicy(andin
particularaid)shouldbedeliberatelyisolatedfromthenationalinterestsofrichcountrieslike
theUK.ThelatterideahasarguablybeenadrivingforceinUKpolicyinthelastdecadeand
has,forexample,ledtoDFID’sstatusasanindependentdepartment,withlegally-limited
povertyreductiongoals.
Thisargumentisalsorelatedtothepolicycoherencedebate,becauseone‘progressive’
responsetoitreversesthepolicycoherenceargument.Thatresponseisthatreducing
povertyoverseasisanessentialandirreplaceableprerequisiteforasustainableendto
conflictandterrorism,andforathrivingworldeconomyinwhichtheUKcanprosper(see,
forexample,ippr2008).Inthisargument,developmentandpovertyreductionareimportant
forwiderpolicies,aswellasthereverse.
Inpractice,anydefenceofdevelopmentpolicyandaidinthecurrenteconomicandpolitical
landscapemustrecognisetheinterdependencyofdifferentobjectives.Indeed,when
consideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountriesitwouldseembizarrenotto.This
notionofinterdependencybetweenpolicyobjectivesisnotconfinedtoprogressives.For
example,theideathatachievinglastingsecurityinplaceslikeAfghanistanrequiresnon-
militaryactionsuchaseconomicreconstructionandtheestablishmentoflawandorder,
reinforcingeachother‘likestrandsofarope’(Browne2006),isthebasisfortheso-called
ComprehensiveApproachtointervention,embracedbytheUKarmedforcesandNATO.
ItseemslikelythattheUK’sinternationaldevelopmentactorsmayneedtomakethese
interdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inorderto
protecttheaidbudgetandDFID’sindependence.Thisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebate
aboutwhetherornotDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andon
whatterms.

Reportmethodologyandstructure
Aswellasawide-rangingreviewofevidenceondifferentpolicyimpactsondevelopment,
thisstudyisbasedonaround40interviewswithacademics,NGOs,civilservantsfroma
numberofgovernmentdepartments,andspecialadvisersandpoliticiansfromallthemajor
politicalparties.Toencouragefrankness,weallowedallintervieweestospeakanonymously.
Namesofcurrentgovernmentofficialsandadvisersarenotlisted,butotherinterviewees
whowerehappytobenamedarelistedintheAppendix.Adraftofthisreportwasshared
withallthosewhowereinterviewedaspartoftheresearch,andthefinaltextreflects,where
appropriate,furthercommentsandfeedbackfrominterviewees.

3.DFIDcurrentlyspendsaround10timestheamountinAfghanistanasitwouldinacountrywithacomparabledegreeof
povertybutnoconflict.SeecommentsbyMichaelFoster,UnderSecretaryofState,DFID,inevidencetotheDefenceSelect
Committee,7July2009.
18 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Sections1to5examineanumberofissuesinturn:conflict,tradeandinvestment,
corruption,climatechangeandmigration.Theseissuesdonotrepresentacomprehensive
surveyofalltheUKpoliciesthatarerelevantfordevelopmentobjectives,butwehopethat
theyprovideasenseoftherangeofchallengesandissuesthattheUKneedstoconfront.
Eachsectionreviewsthecurrentstateofevidenceontheimpactsoftheissueinquestionon
povertyandrights,especiallyforchildren,whoformthemainfocusofWorldVision’swork.
Wethenlookathowjoined-upUKpolicyandgovernmentdepartmentsareintheseareas,
fromtheperspectiveofinternationaldevelopment.Weidentifyareaswhereobjectivesare
(orcouldbe)alignedandthosewherethereareconflictingagendas.Theobjectiveisto
assessactualcoherenceinpractice,asopposedtojustpolicystatements.Althoughmanyof
theissuesdiscussedhereareshapedbyinstitutionsandpoliciesataEuropeanand/or
internationallevel,wedonothavespaceheretodojusticetotheseinternational
dimensions.Wewouldalsosuggestthatthefirststeptosuccessfulengagementwith
EuropeanandinternationalpartnersontheseissuesisacoherentUKapproach.
Section6drawsoutsomegenerallessonsthatemergefromandarecommonacrossallthe
particularpolicyareas.Afinalsectionconcludesandsummarisesourrecommendations.
19 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

1.Conflict
Ifhumandevelopmentisregardedasaprocessof‘expandingchoiceandadvancingrights’,
assuggestedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),thenviolentconflict
mustsurelybeconsideredoneofthemostsignificantobstaclestoachievingit(UNDP
2005).Westartthissectionbyreviewingtheeconomicandsocialcostsofconflict.

Theeconomiccostsofconflict
Inadditiontodeprivingmillionsofcitizensoftheirbasicrightstolifeandsecurity,protracted
violentconflictsarealsolikelytocauseaconsiderabledropinlevelsofproductiveeconomic
activity,withsomestudiesestimatingthatitcantakeatleastadecadeforcountries
emergingfromamajorcivilconflicttoreturnpre-warlevelsofGDPpercapita(Haughton
1998).Whileattemptstoquantifytheglobalcostsofconflicthavebeenhinderedbyalack
ofaccurateandcomprehensivedata,PaulCollierandothershaveestimatedthatthetypical
costofacivilwarisatleastUS$50billion(Collier2004).Otherssuggestthatcivilwars,on
average,causeapermanentlossinincomeofaround2percentofGDP(Knightetal 1996).
Thishasseriousimplicationsforlevelsofpovertyincountriesthatexperienceconflictandfor
thedynamicsofpovertyinpost-conflictsituations(Justino2006).
Duringaconflict,thediversionofacountry’sresourcesfromproductivetodestructive
activitiesinvolvesadoublelossfordevelopmentinthatittakesawayfromspendingon
programmesrelatedtoeconomicandsocialgrowth,whilesimultaneouslyinflictingcostsin
termsofthekeyinfrastructure(includingtelecommunicationssystems,railways,roads,
bridges,portsandenergygenerationfacilities)thatmustberebuiltaftertheviolenceends
(Collieretal 2003).Conflictalsohasanimpactontheresourcesavailablefordevelopment,
sincepoliticalandeconomicinstabilityoftenpromptsresidentstotransfertheirfinancial
assetsoutofthecountry,aswellasdiscouragingpotentialexternalinvestors.Furthermore,
civilwarservesasapowerfulstimulusforemigration,andasCollieretal note,‘someof
theseemigrants,especiallythoseinindustrialcountries,thenprovideapost-conflictchannel
forfurtheremigration’(Collieretal 2003:21).Notwithstandingtheboostthismightgiveto
remittancelevelsintheshorttomediumterm,theforcedflightoffinancialandsocialcapital
tendstohaveanadverseeffectondevelopmentincountriesravagedbyconflictinthe
longerterm.
Atthelevelofindividuals,householdsandcommunities,conflictcanclearlyhaveasevere
impactonsustainablelivelihoods.Manyofthosecaughtupinconflictwillloseimportant
assetslikeproperty,modesoftransportandlivestock.Onestudyofthe1994civilwarin
Rwandaestimatedthat12percentofallhouseholdslosttheirhomes,whilecattlestock
diminishedbyaround50percent(Verpoorten2003).Otherslosejobsoraccesstoincome-
generationopportunities(oftenduetothedeathormilitaryconscriptionoffamily-member
breadwinners).Ithasbeensuggestedbysomeresearchthatafteracivilwarsevenyearsin
duration,incomesaretypicallyabout30percentlowerthantheywouldhavebeenifthe
warhadnotoccurred(Collieretal 2003).Conflictcansometimescreateopportunitiesforthe
verypoorestindividuals,ifjoininganarmyormilitiagroupsinvolvesmonetaryorotherforms
ofreward,butthenetoutcomeforsocietyisusuallyasignificantincreaseintheincidenceof
absolutepovertyandinequality.

Thesocialcostsofconflict
Beyonditsimpactoneconomicgrowth,conflictinvolvessignificantsocialcoststhatarenot
simplylimitedtothenumberofbattledeaths.Forexample,arecentInternationalRescue
CommitteereportontheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)estimatesthatnearlyfiveand
ahalfmillionexcessdeathshaveoccurredinthecountryasaresultofmorethanadecade
ofarmedconflictsincethelate1990s.Just0.4percentofthedeathsintheIRC’ssurvey
periodarethoughttohavebeenthedirectconsequenceofviolence,whilemostarethought
20 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

tohavebeencausedbyinfectiousdisease,malnutritionorneo-natalandpregnancyrelated
conditions(InternationalRescueCommittee2007).
Anotherstudy,onSierraLeone,surveyedfourruraldistrictsinconflict-affectedregionsand
foundthatthreeyearsaftertheendofadecade-longcivilwar,theaveragecrudemortality
rateintheseareaswasnearlyfourtimeshigherthantheSub-Saharanbaseline.Similar
findingshavebeenmadeinrelationtocivilwarsinAngola,LiberiaandSouthernSudan,
whileawiderstudyof51countriesaffectedbyarmedconflictshowsastronglinkbetween
conflictandtheriskofdeathanddisabilityforyearsaftertheviolencehasended(see
MédecinsSansFrontières2006,SapirandGomez2006,Beckeretal 1993,Ghobarahetal
2004).
Masspopulationdisplacementisanotherconsequenceofviolentconflictthathasserious
implicationsfordevelopment.In2007,theestimatednumberofpeopleinternallydisplaced
asaresultofconflictandviolenceexceeded26millionforthefirsttimesincetheearly
1990s,with52countriesaroundtheworldhavingexperiencedsignificantlevelsof
displacement(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentreandNorwegianRefugeeCouncil
2008);notethatthreecountriesinparticular–Sudan(5.8million),Colombia(4million),and
Iraq(2.5million)–accountedforalmosthalfofthisglobaltotal.Internallydisplacedpersons
(IDPs)oftenhavelimitedornoaccesstothebasicnecessitiesoflifesuchasfood,waterand
shelter,andasaresultofthebreakdownoflawandorderthataccompaniesconflict,they
frequentlysufferviolationsoftheirhumanrightsthrougharbitraryattacks,detentionsor
arrests.WomenandgirlsamongtheIDPpopulationareexposedtorapeandexploitation
whilechildrenoftenloseaccesstoeducationalopportunitiestheymayhavehadpreviously.
Internallydisplacedpopulationsalsofaceseriousrisksfrominfectiousdiseaseasaresultof
poorconditionsinmanyIDPcamps,andbecauseofdisruptionstoessentialhealthservices.
Forexample,malariahadvirtuallybeeneliminatedinAfghanistanbytheendofthe1970s.
However,thecollapseofcontrolprogrammesduringthe1978–1995civilwaralloweditsre-
emergence,andby2002,morethan50percentofthepopulationwaslivinginmalaria-
endemicareas(Gayeretal 2007).
Thedisplacementthatusuallyaccompaniesprotractedconflictshasafurther‘spill-over’
impactondevelopment,inthatviolenceinonecountryoftenaffectsthestabilityofits
neighbours.TheinterconnectedconflictsinWestAfricaoverthepastdecade–inLiberia,
SierraLeone,Guinea,Côted’Ivoire,GuineaBissauandSenegal–areaprimeexampleofthis,
whilethemovementofrebelgroups,refugeesandsmallarmsandlightweaponsacrossthe
borderbetweenUgandaandtheDRChasalsoservedtoperpetuateconflictandinhibit
developmentinbothcountriesuntilveryrecently.

Conflictandchildwell-being
Exposuretoconflictandviolencehasaparticularlynegativeimpactonchildrenandyoung
people.Ashighlightedbyakeyreportin1996,childrenarerarelybystandersinwarsand
civilconflicts,butareoftendirecttargetsoractiveparticipants.Inadditiontothenumberof
youngpeoplethatarekilledorinjuredbywar,‘countlessothersgrowupdeprivedoftheir
materialandemotionalneeds,includingthestructuresthatgivemeaningtosocialand
culturallife’(Machel1996).Violentconflictusuallyputssubstantiallimitsonthestate’s
capacitytoprovideessentialhealthandeducationservices,andthereareanumberof
studiesthatdrawonempiricalevidencetodemonstratetheadverseeffectsthatthishason
youngpeople(seeBundervoetetal 2008andShemyakina2006).
Forexample,theprevalenceofmalnutritionandtherateofmortalityamongchildrenunder
theageoffiveinUgandaaresignificantlyhigherinareasofthecountryaffectedbyconflict.
Schoolattendanceisalsomuchlowerinsomeconflictareas,withonly43percentof
childrenintheKaramojaareaattendingprimaryschool,comparedwith82percentatthe
nationallevel.Thisrecognitionoftheparticularharmcausedtochildrenbyconflicthasled
21 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

tothecreationofspecificinternationallegalprotectionsforchildreninsituationsofarmed
conflict,includinga2005SecurityCouncilresolutionwhichestablishedaUNWorkingGroup
onChildrenandArmedConflict,includingamonitoringandreportingmechanism.
Althoughtheemotionalconsequencesofgrowingupinanenvironmentofconflictare
hardertomeasure,thereisabroadconsensusintheliteratureabouttheharmfulimpacts
doingsohasonyoungpeople.Childrenthatlosetheirparentsorotherrelativesasaresult
ofconflictarefrequentlyrequiredtotakeonadditionalresponsibilitiestohelpsupportthe
family,whichmayinvolvedroppingoutofschool,workingonthestreetsorengaginginsex
workandotherdangerousactivitiesasameansofmakingmoney.Othersmaybe
conscripted(eitherbyforceorvoluntarily)byarmedgroupsandusedassoldiersorfornon-
combatpurposes,includingtheprovisionofsexualservices(UNICEF2009;seealsoUNDP
2006).Aftertheconflictends,theseyoungpeopleareoftenstigmatisedbytheirsocieties
forhavingcommittedwarcrimesandfinditdifficulttosuccessfullyreintegrate,
compoundingthetraumatheyexperienceasaresultoftakingpartinconflict(Zakaria
2006).

DFID’sapproachtoconflictanddevelopment
DFIDhashadadedicatedsectionworkingonconflictsincethelate1990s.Initially,the
department’sengagementinsituationsofconflictwaslargelytoprovidehumanitarianrelief
toaffectedcivilianpopulations.Overtime,workinginconflict-affectedorinsecurecountries
hasbecomemorecentraltoDFID’swork,anditisnowspendingaround£1.5billionayear–
almostaquarterofitstotalspending–incountriesclassifiedasinsecure.Someofthe
largestincreasesinDFID’sprogrammesinrecentyearshavecomeinhighlyinsecure
countries,suchasAfghanistanandtheDRC(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).DFID
programmeshavealsobranchedoutintoconflictpreventionandrehabilitationand
reconstructionafterconflict.Thedepartmenthasbecomeincreasinglyinvolvedinwider
governmentpolicyonsecurityandconflicttoo(suchascontributingtonationalsecurity
strategiesandassessingUKarmsexports4).
The2009DFIDWhitePaperplacesaspecialemphasisonconflictresolution(seeBox1.1),
providingadeeperanalysisthatbringspeace-buildingtogetherwithstate-building(thatis,
buildinginclusivepoliticalsettlementsandstrengtheninginstitutions),andacommitmentto
treatingsecurityandjusticeasabasicservice,alongsidehealthandeducation(DFID2009).
Ithasbeenwidelywelcomed,bothbyexternalstakeholdersandbyothergovernment
departments.
SeveralofourintervieweesfeltthatinsomeareasthenewWhitePapercatchesupwith
whatDFIDisalreadydoingontheground.ButasastatementofGovernmentpurpose,it
alsosetsoutanewagendaforconflictreductionandstate-buildingwhichneedstobeput
intopractice.
TherearevaryingviewsonhoweasilyDFIDcanachievesuchashiftinfocus.Some
observers,bothwithinDFIDandoutside,seeatensionwithinthedepartmentbetween
thosewhoworkdirectlyonconflictanalysisandprevention,and‘classicaidpractitioners’or
‘developmentprofessionals’focusedonachievingtheMDGsthroughthedeliveryofbasic
serviceslikehealthandprimaryeducation.Itisarguedthatthelattergroupmakeupthe
‘core’ofthedepartment,holdthemajorityofseniordecision-makingposts,andcomefrom
aparticularprofessionalperspectiveofdevelopmentpolicywhichissometimestechnocratic,
whereasreallytacklingconflictandbuildingstatesrequiresamorepoliticalperspective.One
implicationofthisviewisthatnewstaff,withnewskills,willincreasinglybeneededas
DFID’sfocusshiftsovertime.

4.Thearmsexportregimeisoneofseveralimportantissueswhich,forreasonsofspace,wehavenotbeenabletodiscussin
detailinthisreport.
22 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Box1.1:Conflictanddevelopmentinthe2009WhitePaper
TherearethreeelementstotheapproachtoconflictintheWhitePaper.Thefirstisafocus
ontheunderlyingcausesofconflict,andtherecognitionthatbuildinginclusivepolitical
settlementsthataremorethanjustbargainsbetweenelitesiscritical,sinceitisonlythese
settlementsthataresustainable.Thisapproachwilloftenmeanaddressingproblemssuch
associalandpoliticalexclusion,poorgovernance,andhighlevelsofunemployment,as
wellasstrengtheningformalandinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms.TheWhitePaper
recognisesthatinfragilestatestheformalandinformalmechanismsrequiredtomediate
conflictspeacefullyareoftenlackingandthatformalmechanismsaremoreoftenthannot
subvertedbycorruption.
ThattheWhitePaperincludessuchanexplicitlypoliticalapproachisstriking,becausean
oft-statedcriticismofDFIDisthatitistootechnocratic(andconservativeinitsthinkingas
aresult).Thispointismadenotonlybythoseelsewhereingovernment(forexamplethe
FCO)andbyexternalcommentators,butalsosometimesfromwithinDFIDitself.For
example,therecentevaluationofDFID’sprogrammeinAfghanistannotedthatunderlying
politicalproblemswererecognisedonlybelatedly(Benettetal 2009).Itisalsoimportant
becauseitallowsfortherecognitionthataiditselfcanexacerbateconflictundercertain
circumstances(seeHouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentCommittee2006,CRISE
2007).
Thesecondelementrelatestostate-building,whichisaboutstrengtheningthe‘survival
functions’ofthestate,themostimportantofwhichistoprovidecitizenswithsecurityand
theruleoflaw.Atthesametime,theWhitePaperisclearthatitiscriticalthatthesurvival
functionsarestrengthenedwithaccountabilitytopopulations,recognisingthatif,for
example,securitystructuresarestrengthenedwithoutaccountability,thereisariskof
increasingrepression.
Athirdelementisaboutmeetingtheexpectationsofthepopulation.Withinthiscontext,
oneinterestingattempttolockconflictreductionintothecoreofDFID’sactivityisthe
framingofsecurityasa‘basicservice’.Oneintervieweearguedthatthiswasparticularly
importantbecauseDFIDiscommittedtospending50percentofitsbudgetonbasic
serviceprovision.However,meetingpeople’sexpectationsisnotjustaboutbasicservices:
itisaboutabroaddefinitionofaccountability,includingdemocraticinclusion,human
rights,dealingwithcorruptionandpoorgovernance.

Others,includingsomeseniorstaffinDFID,arguethatthedepartmentmovedawayfroma
servicedeliveryapproachseveralyearsago,thattherearenowveryfewpureaid
administratorsleftthere,andthatmoststaff(atleastinLondon),aremainlyconcernedwith
widerpolicyissues–asthequotefromNematShafikbelowshows,forexample.Theypoint
tothefactthatDFIDhasbeencarryingoutanalysesofwhatdriveslocalcapacityand
institutions,suchastheDriversofChangeseriesandmorespecificstrategicconflict
assessments,foranumberofyears,andnotethatgovernancewasamajorthemeofthe
2007WhitePaper(DFID2007).InthewordsofthePermanentSecretary:‘Whatwehave
learnedoverthelastfewyearsisthatavoidingoneconflictisequivalenttoall[the]foreign
assistanceintheworld,soifwecanjustmaintainstabilityinthecountryforaperiod,that
hashugeeconomicbenefits’(NematShafikinevidencetothePublicAccountsCommittee
2009:Ev8).
OnereasonforwhytherearesuchdifferentviewsaboutthenatureofDFIDmaybethat
whileithasprogressivelyinvestedinpoliticalanalysesofweakandfailingstates,andindeed
ofopenconflicts,ithasstruggledtoputtheseanalysesintopractice(Unsworth2008).Cases
suchasNepal,whereastrategicconflictassessmentfundamentallychangedDFID’said
programme,stillappeartoberelativelyrare.
23 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Moreover,becauseDFIDissohighlydecentralisedontheground,thewayinwhichthe
WhitePaperconflictagendacanbepushedfromthecentrewillbelimited.Forexample,
thereiscurrentlynooverarchingcentralstrategyforthedeploymentofconflictadvisers
(CAs),whoareoftencriticalfordevelopingcountryaidprogrammesthatrecogniseand
addressconflicts.WhetherornotanofficehasaCAdependsontheheadofthecountry
officeandtheissuestheyarechoosingtoprioritise.Thiscanleadtowhatappeartobe
anomaloussituations.ThereisnoCAinPakistan,forexample,althoughtherearetwoin
Nepal.5 ThereisnoCAinZimbabwebutthereisoneinUganda.Someworkhasbeendone
withinDFIDtotryandsystematisethemainstreamingofconflictissuesintoaid
programmingin-country,butnotenough.
AfinalbutcrucialpointisthatinmostcaseswhereDFIDistryingtopreventorresolve
conflicts,itisnotworkingalone.Britishtroopsaresometimesdirectlyinvolved,asincases
likeSierraLeone,ornowAfghanistan;ormoreoften,UNpeacekeepers.Inanincreasing
numberofcases,conflictsinthecountrieswhereDFIDisworkingarerelatedtowiderissues,
suchasterrorismorinternationalcrime,whereUKnationalinterestsareatstake.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesonconflictanddevelopment?
Overthelasttwodecades,addressingviolentconflictindevelopingcountrieshasmovedup
theUKpolicyagenda.Thisispartlybecauseofthegrowingrecognitionofitsimportancefor
developmentasdescribedabove,butalsobecausetheUKhasbeeninvolvedinanumberof
directmilitaryinterventionsindevelopingcountries,includingSierraLeonein2000,
Afghanistanfrom2001andIraqfrom2003.Changingpolicyhasreflectedthelessons
learnedfromtheseexperiences.
Basedonitsexperienceoverthelast20years,theMODhasbecomemuchmoreawareofthe
importanceofthewidercivilcontextforachievingsecurity.Oneintervieweepointedoutthat
becausetheBritisharmedforceshaveincreasinglybeendeployedasmuchforreasonsof
humanitarianintervention–‘asaforceforgood’–asforstrategicnationalinterest,‘we[the
MOD]haveaninterestinworkingwithDFIDandothersinpreventingandresolvingconflict’.
Therecognitionofthefailureofapurelymilitaryapproachinsuchcontextshasgivenriseto
whatisknowninmilitarycirclesasthe‘ComprehensiveApproach’,whichistheneedforthe
militarytoworkinajoined-upwaywithciviliancounterpartstounderpinsecuritywith
economicdevelopmentandinstitutionalreconstruction(MOD2006).
TheformaloverarchingframeworkforpolicyisnowgivenbyPSA30,whichhasapplied
jointlytoDFID,FCOandtheMODsince2007,andisaimedatreducingtheimpactof
violentconflict.6 EachdepartmentinturnhasobjectivesandtargetsrelatingtoPSA30.
Meanwhile,theFCOisalsogovernedbyPSA30,andhasitsowntargetsforconflict
resolution.Itcurrentlyspendsover£400millionayearonconflict–itslargestsingle
programme.Atthesametime,theFCOalsohasanexplicitobjectivetopromotesustainable
developmentinternationally.TheFCOalsohasaspecificworkstreamonchildrenin
situationsofarmedconflict,andisseekingtoimprovecoherenceacrossgovernmentonthis
issueinparticular.

Howjoinedupisgovernmentinpractice?
Belowthesehigh-levelstatementsofprinciple,itisclearthatthestoryofUKpolicy
coherenceismuchmorecomplex,andthatjoined-upgovernmentonconflictindeveloping
countriesisstillverymucha‘workinprogress’(asdescribedbyLordMarkMalloch-Brown,

5.WeunderstandthataconflictadviserisnowbeingrecruitedinPakistan.
6.Actiononconflictcouldbebrokendownintoseveralconstituentparts,forexample,conflictprevention,conflictresolution,
providingsecurityandpeace-keeping,andpost-conflictreconstruction.Thusfar,thefocushastendedtobeonthelastthreeareas,
withconflictpreventionsomethingofanorphanissue,partlybecauseofthelackofvisibilityofimpactandthereforethedifficultyof
gainingpoliticalsupportforexpandingit.ForDFID,thismaychangewiththeapproachtakeninthe2009WhitePaper.
24 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

MinisterforAsia,AfricaandtheUNattheFCO,ontheComprehensiveApproachtothe
DefenceSelectCommittee[2009,Q304]).Apictureemergesofsomebasichistoricaland
structuraltensions,withsignificantrecenteffortstoovercomethese.
ItiseasytoforgethowdifferentthemachineryoftheUKGovernmentlookedjusttwo
decadesago.TheFCOwasthemainleadonalloverseasissues,andtheMODwas
preoccupiedwiththeColdWar.Overthelast15years,inthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee,
‘everythinghasbecomemorecomplex,moreoverlapping.MODnowworksinfragilestates.
DFIDnowexists.Leadsarelessclear.’7
Andwhilenewheadlinepoliciesforcoherencehavebeenintroducedinthelastfewyears,
theFCO,MODandDFIDallhavedifferenthistoricalraisonsd’êtresandcultures,whichhave
notdisappearedovernight.Coreskillsetshavenotyetadjustedtothenewpolicylandscape.
TheFCOandMODaredrivenprimarilybyUKinterestsandsecurity,andtheirhumanitarian
objectiveshavetobebalancedbyothers,suchasreducingtheriskfrominternational
terrorism.Bycontrast,DFIDhasafarmoreinternationalist,humanitarianagenda,and
throughtheInternationalDevelopmentAct,DFIDspendingcannotbetiedtonational
interest.AsBillRammellMP,MinsterfortheArmedForces,putittotheDefenceCommittee:
IfIamhonest,Ithinktherearestillculturalchallengesbetweenallthreeofour
departmentsinthatthemilitary,aidworkersanddiplomatshaveadifferentmindset
whentheycometoaprobleminitiallybutsomefundamentalsharedinterests.I
thinkwestillneedtodomoretoensurethatwecanbreakdownthosebarriers.
(HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee2009:Q303)
OneofthemostimportantwaysinwhichthedifferentculturesandapproachesofDFID,
FCOandMODaremanifestedisintheirtimeframes.WhereastheMODoftenhasan
immediatesecurityfocus,andtheFCOisusedtodealingwithcrisesandpoliticalevents
occurringoverweeksormonths,DFID’sfocusonpovertyreductionandsustainable
developmentnecessitatesmuchlongertimeframes,oftenstretchingtodecades.Thiscontrast
intimeframes,linkedtodifferenttraditionsandwaysofthinking,appliesevenwithinareas
ofactivitythatallagreeareimportant.Asoneintervieweeputit,DFIDwantstobuildthe
capacityofacountrysoitcanbuilditsownschools,whiletheBritisharmywantstobuild
theschoolsandgetout.Foranumberofinterviewees,includingsomeatveryseniorlevels,
thisdifferenceisthenubofthepolicycoherenceproblemwhenitcomestoconflictand
failingstates.
Thesedifferentbackgroundagendas,departmentalculturesandtimeframesforactionand
thinkingmeanthat,despiteprogresstowardscoherenceandbetterjointworking(see
below),thereareneverthelessstilltensions,withsomeintervieweesfeelingthatdepartments
arenotclosetooneanotherandstilldonotowneachother’sobjectives.Acommon
perceptionofDFID,fromFCOandMODintervieweesbutalsomorewidely,includingfrom
seniorpoliticaladvisersatthecentreofGovernment,wasthatithadnotalwaysbeena
‘teamplayer’,andsawitselfasstandingapartfromothergovernmentdepartments.
MuchoftherecentdebateontherelationshipbetweenDFID,FCOandMODhasbeen
drivenbycasessuchasIraq,Afghanistan(seeBox1.2)andPakistan.InthesecasestheUK
hasamilitarypresencerelatingtointernationalsecurity,orasetofnationalsecurity

7.Thefullcomplexityofhowdepartmentalrelationshipscanworkoutonthegroundwasbroughtoutbyoneintervieweeinthe
MOD:‘TheFCOhavetheleadonforeignpolicyin-country,butifthecountrygoesdownthetubes,atsomestagewemightbe
calledinasthearmedforcetotryandstabilise,doapeacesupportoperationorsomethinglikethat…Atwhichstage–let’ssay
Iraqin2003–weendupsortofbeingtheleadagency…whilewar,fighting,peacesupporthappens.Assoonaswecan,wewant
totransitionbacktooneoftheothergovernmentdepartments,andwewanttogo,butquiteoftenwe’recaughtintherefora
longerperiodoftime.Ideally,ifit’sacountrythat…needsstabilisation,becauseit’safailedorfailingstate…orithasno
infrastructure,DFIDwouldbethenextorganisationafterwe’ve…dealtwiththeenemy…todosomeofthedevelopmentwork.
Oncethat’shappened,inconjunctionwiththeFCO,thenclearlyitwoulditwouldgobacktotheFCO.’
25 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

concerns,orboth,andagreatdealisatstakepolitically.Asaresult,thetensionsbetween
DFIDandtheotherdepartmentshavecomeoutmorestrongly.Thereisariskthatthese
highprofilecases,whicharealsosomeofthemostchallengingbutaccountforarelatively
smallpartofDFID’swork,willdominatethinkingaboutDFID’swiderroleorapproach.

Box1.2:Afghanistan
Afghanistanisadifficultcountrytoworkin,withhigh discontent.TheMODtendedtoseethemasabout
levelsofinsecurity,anopiumpoppy-basedeconomy enhancingthelegitimacyofBritishforces;DFIDwasin
andwidespreadcorruption.Theexperienceofjoint somecasesreluctanttosupportthisapproach,
workingbetweenDFID,MODandFCOinAfghanistan becauseitsawenhancingthelegitimacyofthelocal
illustratessomeofthechallengesandtensionsthat hostgovernmenttobemoreimportantforlong-term
ariseindeliveringdevelopmentinsuchcountries. sustainability,and/orbecausethequalityofsome
QIPshasbeendubious.Additionally,accordingtoone
DFIDstartedaprogrammeinthecountryin2002,
interviewee,itproveddifficultforDFIDtofund
followingthemilitaryinterventionin2001,andwill
deliverypartnersinAfghanistanandtogetthingsup
havespentoverUS$1billionby2013.DFID’s
andrunningasquicklyasthemilitarywanted:
programmehasevolvedindistinctphasessince2002,
fromlimitedhumanitarianassistance,through TherehasbeenalotofcriticismofDFID.Butitis
attemptstobuildthecapacityofthecentral toosimplistictoblamefailuresinAfghanistanon
governmentinKabul,toanadditionalfocuson lackofrisktakingandlackofwillingnessbyDFID.
HelmandProvinceintheSouthWestsince2006 TheGovernmenthadunrealisticexpectationsof
(Bennettetal 2009). whatcouldbeachievedbyDFIDinthese
circumstances.NotafailureofDFIDbutafailureof
OnepastproblemwithDFID’sattemptstodevelop
thebroaderstrategy.Therelationshipisalotbetter
thecapacityoftheAfghangovernmenthasbeenthat
now.
ithasbeenquitetechnical,focusingonpublic
administrationbyformalinstitutions.Inthewordsofa Theotherproblemhasbeenaboutsecurity.Inthe
recentevaluation,‘untilrecently,relativelylittle wordsofoneFCOinterviewee:
attentionwasgiventodevelopingapoliticaleconomy
Themilitaryoperatedunderunrealistic
andconflictanalysistounderpin…strategicchoices
expectationsofwhatwouldhappen.Partofthis
made’(Bennettetal 2009).Progressivelyless
camefromHelmandwherethemilitaryoperateda
attentionhasbeengiventosecuritysectorreform,
veryforwardstrategyandexpectedDFIDtobe
whichhasalsobeencriticised.
thereinstantlyinordertofollowupwithaidand
FurthercontroversyhasarisenfromtheroleofDFIDin reconstructionwork.Butthemilitarywasnotable
Helmand,wheretheUKmilitarywasdeployedin todeliverthesecurity,orprovidearmouredcars
2006.Thedepartmentsufferedfromthefactthatit andvehicles.
wassometimebeforetheUKGovernmenthada
TheUKstrategyinAfghanistanhasevolved,and
sharedstrategyforsecurityanddevelopment,andin
lessonshavebeenlearnt.DFIDreportsthatcross-
thewordsoftheevaluation:‘Pursuingmultiple
Whitehallworkinghasbeen‘transformed’bymore
objectivesinHelmandwasinitiallyproblematic
joined-upstrategysince2007/8.Inadditiontoasingle
becauseapproachestowardscounter-insurgency,
cross-governmentstrategy,ministersnowmeetmore
stabilisation,counter-narcotics,peaceand
frequently,andgovernmentspendingprioritiesare
developmentwerenotnecessarilymutuallyreinforcing’
agreedacrossdepartments.Ontheground,asingle
(Bennettetal 2009:xiii).
commandstructurewithcivilianleadershipforthe
TensionsbetweenDFIDandtheMODinHelmand HelmandProvisionalReconstructionTeam(PRT)has
aroseintwomainareas.Inimmediatepost-conflict helpedtoresolvetensionsbetweenDFID,MODand
situations,themilitarywerekeentopursuewhatare theFCO.TheHelmandexperiencehasalsoprompted
called‘QuickImpactProjects’(QIPs),givingtangible effortstocoordinateajointmilitaryandcivilian
benefitstolocalpopulations,suchasbuildingschools capabilitywithspecialtraining,specificallyforpost-
ordiggingwells.QIPshavebeenthefocusforsome conflictstabilisationandreconstruction(seebelow).
26 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

IncasessuchasPakistanorAfghanistan(andincreasinglyinplacessuchasSomaliaand
Yemen)thechallengeforDFIDistoensurethatthedevelopmentperspectivedoesnotget
lostintheprioritisationofmilitaryandcounter-terroristobjectives.Butinmostofthe
countriesinwhichDFIDworksthereisaverydifferentkindofproblem,namelythattherest
oftheUKGovernmentdoesnotpaysufficientattention.
TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)isagoodexample.DFIDhasitsfifthlargest
programmethereandtheFCOnowhasasignificantpresencetoo.Despitethefactthatthe
humanitarianimpactofconflictintheDRCisonafargreaterscalethanitisinAfghanistan
orPakistan,thesecuritythreatstotheUKaremuchlessevidentandtherearenostrategic
alliancesatstake,andasaresulttheUKonlydeploystwomilitaryadvisers.
Howfarthiswillchangeinthefuture,withPSA30andothermechanisms,isunclear.
However,itwillalmostcertainlyrequireDFIDtomakeastrongerandmoreeffectivecaseto
alltherelevantpartsofgovernmentforengagingwiththedevelopmentagenda.Thisinturn
willrequireDFIDtobeclosertootherdepartments.
Wefoundsomeevidencethatthisisalreadyhappening.Whiletherewasmuchawarenessof
thetensionsanddifferencesbetweenDFID,theFCOandtheMOD,itwasstrikingthat
officialsfromallthreedepartmentsemphasisedtheprogressmadeinmutualunderstanding
andforgingsharedobjectives.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee:‘Myimpression,based
onbeinginandaroundWhitehallfor20yearsis,actually,we’refarmorejoinedupnowthan
we’veeverbeen.’8
Similarly,aDFIDintervieweeemphasisedthattheimportanceofstate-buildingisincreasingly
recognisedbytheMOD,whileanMODintervieweearguedthatDFIDhascomealongway
overthepastfewyearsandthereisamuchbetterunderstandingthatsecurity,stabilisation
anddevelopmentallgohandinhand.WithinDFID,theviewwasputthatthedepartmentis
‘belatedly’willingtoengagewithobjectivesofothergovernmentdepartments,andgetting
betteratmakingitscase.
Ourintervieweesemphasisedagrowingrecognitionanduseofskillsinonedepartmentby
another,withexamplesofDFIDdrawingontheanalysisandintelligenceofmilitaryattachés
inCentralAfrica,andtheMODcomingtorecognisethevalueofadevelopmentperspective
inAfghanistaninthelasttwoyears.Perhapsmostcrucially,thereseemstohavebeena
recognitionandacceptanceofthedifferenttimeframesthatdifferentdepartmentsare
workingto.
Departmentshavealsogainedvaluableexperienceofeachotherthroughcross-government
mechanisms,especiallytheConflictPoolsandtheStabilisationUnit(seeBox1.3).
Theviewthattherehavebeensignificantchangesinthewaythatthethreedepartments
regardeachotherandworktogetherisechoedinrecentcivilservicecapabilityreviews
undertakenbytheCabinetOffice.ThereviewofDFIDconcludesthat:‘DFID’srelationswith
othergovernmentdepartmentshavesignificantlyimproved’(CabinetOffice2009a:9).The
FCOreviewnotesthat:‘Atseniorlevel,theworkingrelationshipswiththeDFIDandthe
MODhaveimprovednoticeably.ThisisasaresultofconcertedeffortsbythePermanent
Secretariesinparticular,who,forexample,nowundertakejointtripstokeypoststogather
evidenceofprogressontheground’(CabinetOffice2009b:10).TheMODispraisedfor:
‘continuingtosupportimprovedwaysofworkingbetweenthemilitaryandtheForeignand
CommonwealthOfficeandtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentonoperations’
(CabinetOffice2009c:10).

8.DiscussingtheComprehensiveApproach,MichaelFoster,Under-SecretaryofStateatDFID,putitthus:‘WhenIworkedin
industryIwasabelieverincontinuousimprovement,andIthinkthatiswhatwehaveseenfromtheearlyexperiencesofjoint
working,forexampleinBosniainthe1990scomparedwithwherewearenow.Therehasbeenarealimprovementinthe
relationshipsandhowthethreedepartmentsanddifferentpersonnelworkontheground.’(HouseofCommonsDefence
Committee2009:Q304)
27 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Box1.3:Cross-governmentmechanismsonconflictanddevelopment
Closerworkingbetweendepartmentsonconflictandsecurityhasbeenbothfacilitated
andfurtherencouragedbythedevelopmentofsomepost-1997cross-Whitehall
mechanisms.ThemostimportantaretheConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)andthe
StabilisationUnit(SU).
ConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)
CPPswereoriginallysetupin1999bythenSecretaryofStateforInternational
Development,ClareShort,asawaytofundthetrainingoftroopsinAfrica,whichinthe
wordsofoneinterviewee,‘wasn’tonMOD’sradaratthetime’.Theideacameoutofthe
experienceofSierraLeone,whichshowedboththeneedforandthedifficultiesinvolved
inorganisingfundingforconflictpreventioninterventionsthatinvolvedbothDFIDandthe
MOD.TheAfricaCPPwassoonfollowedbyaGlobalCPP.TheworkofthePoolshas
widenedovertime,andnowincludeskeyactivitiesrelatingtochildren’swell-beingand
rights,includingtryingtoensureeffectiveimplementationofUNSecurityCouncil
resolutionsrelatingtowomenandchildreninconflict,andtothedemobilisationand
reintegrationofchildsoldiers.
DFID,theMODandtheFCOallputresourcesintotheCPP(althoughDFIDcontributes
thelion’sshareandalsofinanciallymanagesand‘owns’thepooledfunds),butonlysome
oftheexpenditurecountsasODA.Themechanismhasasteeringboardwithtri-
departmentalrepresentation.
TheCPPwasviewedbyallourintervieweesasagoodideaintheory,andatoolthatsome
othercountries(particularlytheUS)lookatwithenvy.TherewasaviewthattheCPPdoes
encouragejoined-upthinking,andthattheculturalchangesithasbroughttoallthree
departmentshavebeenasvaluable,iflesstangible,thanprogrammeoutcomes.However,
therewasalsoageneralconsensusthattheimplementationofprojectswaspatchy,
dependingontheindividualsleadingthem,andthatthebudgetsinvolvedweretoosmall
foritsworktohavelastingimpact.
StabilisationUnit(SU)
TheSUwassetupmuchmorerecently,outoftherecognitionthattheearlyapproachin
Afghanistansufferedfromalackofcommonunderstandingandstrategyacross
departments,andinsufficientskills.TheSUtriestomeetthesegaps,workingtothethree
parentdepartmentsofDFID,theFCOandtheMOD.Itskeyresponsibilitiesinclude
organisingthetraininganddeploymentofcivilianswhocanworkininsecure
environments,andlearninganddisseminatinglessonsfrompastexperience.Thishas
recentlybeenbroughttogetherintheformofthe1000-strongUKCivilianStabilisation
Capacity(CSC),whichismadeupofcivilianexpertsfromarangeoffields,includingcivil
servantsfromanumberofgovernmentdepartments.
TheUnitwasdescribedbyoneintervieweeasan‘enabler’–itcanbringpeopletogether
sotheycangetabetterunderstandingofeachother’sculture,butitcanonlyachieve
whattheparentdepartmentsarewillingtoputinandallow.

Thereisalsoaviewthatamomentumnowexists.Sufficientefforthasbeenputinto
investinginrelationshipsandapproachesonconflictthatthisattitudeisnow‘inthe
bloodstream’ofallofthethreemaindepartments,inthewordsofoneinterviewee.With
failedandfailingstatesverylikelytobehighontheagendaoverthenextdecade,theMOD,
FCOandDFIDarelikelytobeworkingtogethercloselyinanumberofcountriesforthe
foreseeablefuture.
28 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Thesituationin-country
OutsideofWhitehall,onthegroundindevelopingcountriesthemselves,thereappearstobe
considerablevariationinhowjoined-upUKGovernmentthinking,strategyandactionon
conflictandsecurityis,bothacrossdevelopingcountries,andwithinanyonecountryover
time.
Asdiscussedabove,DFIDisquitedevolved,sotheheadofthecountryofficehasalargesay
inhowprogrammeresourcesaredeployed,suchasthedecisionaboutwhetherornotto
haveconflictadvisers.Themaininter-departmentalrelationshipiswiththeFCO,and
dependsquiteconsiderablyontheindividualheadofofficeandHighCommissioneror
Ambassadorinvolved.
Insomecases–DRCandIndiahavebeencitedascurrentexamples–wherecountry-specific
objectivesareagreedandwherejointunitslookingataspecificproblemaresetup,the
relationshipisclose.Inothercases,especiallywherethereisnoagreedtri-departmental
strategy,andwheretheDFIDofficeisnotlocatedintheHighCommissionorEmbassy,it
maynotbe.Thedifferenttimeframesofthedifferentdepartmentsdiscussedaboveareoften
asmuchofaproblemin-countryastheyareinWhitehall.
ThereareanincreasingnumberofcountriesinconflictforwhichtheUKGovernmentdoes
haveagreedcross-Whitehallstrategies(seebelow),andinsomecases,evenjoint
departmentalcountryunitsinLondon.Sucharrangementsshouldhelpjoined-upapproaches
toconflictin-country.However,thiswillonlyworkwhenthereisalsocoherencebetweenthe
approachin-countryandinWhitehall(seeBox1.4onSudan).
Atthesametime,itisclearthatnewtoolsareneededforimmediatepost-conflictsituations
wheretheUKhasitselfbeenactivelyinvolvedinmilitaryaction,partlybecausedomestic
politicalexpectationsareunderstandablydifferentinsuchsituations.Ajointmilitary-civilian

Box1.4:Sudan
Sudanprovidesanexampleofhowdifficultitcanbetoachievethiscoherence,andalso
howhavingacross-governmentmechanisminplace,suchasacountryunit,isnot
sufficientbyitself.Inprinciple,theFCOandDFIDhavejoinedupobjectivesonSudan:
achievingaComprehensivePeaceAgreementandreducingpoverty.ThereisaSudanUnit
inLondon,locatedintheFCO,aswellasaSpecialEnvoy,whoworkstoboththeForeign
SecretaryandtheInternationalDevelopmentSecretary.
IntheconstantlyshiftingandcomplexenvironmentofKhartoum,DFIDandtheFCOhave
hadagoodrelationship,andovertimehavedevelopedconsiderablecapacitytoanalyse
theSudanesegovernment’sroleandmotivationsinrelationtotheDarfurconflict,whichis
thedominantprobleminthecountry.ThisrelationshipisparticularlyimportantforDFID,
astheFCOhasgenerallyhadbetteraccesstotheSudanesegovernment–whichhasbeen
moreinterestedinforeignpolicyincentives,suchasthenormalisationofrelationswiththe
USoropeninguptheissueoftheindictmentoftheSudanesePresidentatthe
InternationalCriminalCourtintheHague,thanindevelopmentalones,likedebtrelief.
TheSudanconflictisahighlypoliticalissueattheinternationallevel–forexampleitisa
highprofileissueintheUS–andministers,waryofnegativeheadlinesaboutsupportfor
theregime,havefavouredalowriskfocusonhumanitarianaidandbasicservices.The
challengeforthearguablybetter-informedDFIDandFCOofficesinKhartoumhasbeento
persuadeministerstotakerisksinadifficultenvironment,bytakingonmorecomplex
institutionalissues,suchassecuritysectorreform,orindeedthelargerpoliticaltrade-offs.
TheSudancase–whereacentralunitinLondonhasmorepowerthanbetterinformedin-
countryoffices–maybeanunusualone,butitshowstheneedtothinkabout
relationshipsbetweenLondonandposts,aswellasbetweendepartments.
29 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

capacityisurgentlyneeded,intowhichbothDFIDandtheMODcaninput.Progresshas
beenmadethroughtheStabilisationUnitandtheArmy(andnowthroughthenewCivilian
StabilisationCapacity)toprovidethiscapacity.However,iftheseexistingarrangementsare
noteffectiveinbridgingthegapbetweenshort-termmilitaryengagementandlong-term
developmentengagement,thenaseparatejointstabilisationandreconstructionforceshould
bedeveloped,asrecommendedbyippr’sCommissiononNationalSecurity(ippr2009).
Despiterecentimprovements,joined-upgovernmentincountrieslikeAfghanistanwillremain
challenging.ItisalsoworthnotingthatthedebateaboutDFID’sroleinAfghanistancanbe
quiteinward-focused,whileboththemilitaryinterventionandthedevelopmentassistance
effortareinternational.Thereisthusanadditionalvaluetohavingacoherentstrategyacross
theUKGovernment,basedonsharedanalysis,sincethiscanavoidproblemsarisingfromthe
challengesofmaintainingkeyinternationalrelationships.

Conflict:conclusions
Despitesomeofthesharpestdifferenceinculturesandobjectives,andsomeofthegreatest
politicalpressures(orperhapsbecauseofthem),conflictisoneoftheareasinwhichDFID
haschangedthemostinrecentyears,andhasworkedhardesttoachievegreatercoherence.
Crucially,thisistakingDFIDinthedirectionofgreaterawarenessandanalysisofpolitics.
Aseriesofexperiences,notallofthemsuccessful,inSierraLeone,theBalkans,Iraqand
AfghanistanhasbeenanimportantshaperofcloserworkingbetweentheMODandDFID,
withtherealisationthattheyneedeachotherinordertodeliverconflictprevention,
stabilisationandreconstruction.However,thisprocessisfarfromcomplete.Theemphasison
conflictpreventionandresolutioninthe2009WhitePaperisstillastatementofintent,and
DFIDwillhavetochangethewayitworksinordertodeliverthevision.Atthesametime,
thedevelopmentagendaisnottakenasseriouslyasitshouldbeintheFCOandMOD.
Thereremaintensionsoverresourcesinareaslikethetrainingofmilitaries.Akeyissueis
thereforehowtheprocessofgreatercoherencebetweenthethreedepartmentscanbe
maintainedandacceleratedthroughaperiodoflikelypoliticalchange.
Itisalsoimportantthatimprovedcoherenceiseffectivelycommunicated–pasttensions
betweenDFIDandtheMODinAfghanistanandelsewherehaveleftalastingimpressionof
un-joined-upgovernmentinsomequarters(andespeciallyamongthosewhoworkon
securityandconflictissues).SuchperceptionscouldbedamagingtoDFID’spositioninthe
mediumtolongterm.
30 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

2.Tradeandinvestment
Overthepastfewdecades,ithasbecomeclearthattradeandinvestmentarecentraltothe
developmentdebate.Themostbasic,butperhapsmostimportantlessonthathasbeen
learnedisthattheeconomicresourcesavailabletopoorcountriesthroughtradearemuch
largerthanthosecomingfromaid.In2008,totalaidfromOECDcountrieswasaround
US$120billion,withtheleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)receivingaroundone-thirdofthis,
atjustoverUS$40billion.Bycontrast,totalexportsfromdevelopingcountriesin2007were
worthUS$5.2trillion,over40timesthesizeofaidflows.ThecontrastforLDCsismuchless
–exportsin2007wereworthaboutUS$126billion,butthisisstillroughlythreetimesthe
amountofaidtheyreceived.

Tradeanddevelopmentoutcomes
Historically,exportinghasusuallybeenanessentialpartoftheprocessbywhichverypoor
countrieshaveescapedpoverty.Intheregionsthathaveseenthemostdramaticfallsin
poverty–EastandSouthEastAsia–thegrowthofexportshasplayedacentralrolein
economicgrowthandpovertyreduction(WorldBank1993).Thisremainstruetoday,with
examplessuchasVietnamandBangladeshshowingtheimportanceofexportsforincreasing
incomes.InChina,around200millionpeoplehaveescapedfromextremepovertysince
1980,largelythroughworkingintheexportsector.Veryfewcountrieshaveeliminated
povertywithouttradeplayingamajorrole.
However,thedevelopmentalbenefitsoftradedependonanumberoffactors.These
include:thetypeofproductstraded,howfarthegainsfromtradearepassedthroughto
workersandfarmers,andhowfartraderesourcescapturedbygovernmentsareused
efficientlyandaccountablyforpublicservices(UNCTAD2004).
Manyoftheworld’spoorestcountries,especiallythoseinAfrica,areactuallyquiteexport-
oriented.Buttheirexportsareoftenheavilyconcentratedinlow-valueagricultural
commodities(UNCTAD2002).Theseeconomieswillbenefitwhenthereisasurgein
commodityprices(aswasthecaseinthefewyearsleadinguptomid-2008).However,the
internationalfinancialcrisishasunderscoredthefragilityofAfrica’srecentexpansion,and
exportvaluesareexpectedtofallby40percentasaresult(CommitteeofAfricanFinance
MinistersandCentralBankGovernors2009).Afterafewyearsofsustainedstronggrowth
andhighlevelsofoptimism,economicgrowthrateswereexpectedtofallto1.5percentin
2009(IMF2009).
Moreover,inthelongterm,thevalueofcommoditiesrelativetomanufacturesisindecline.
Itisonlybymovingupthe‘valuechain’,andbydiversifyingintoprogressivelymorevaluable
manufacturedproducts,thatcountrieshavehistoricallyusedtradeasanescaperoutefrom
poverty.9
Theextenttowhichpoorpeoplebenefitfromtradealsodependsonhowgainsare
distributed,andwhatkindsofactivityaredisplacedbyproductionforworldmarkets.In
agriculture,muchdependsonmarketingarrangements.Historically,farmershaveoften
sufferedbecauseofstatemarketingboardsthatcapturedmostoftherevenuefromtraded
crops(Rodrik1998),andthen,followingliberalisation,frommonopolyprivatemarketing
agents.Overtheyears,therehavealsobeenmanyconcernsabouttheimpactofexportcrop
productiononfoodcropsandfoodsecurity,andinparticularaboutthefactthatwomenand
childrenmayloseoutasashifttowardsexportcropproductionmeansgreatercontrolover

9.Somecountrieswillfinditharderthanotherstodiversifyoutofagriculturalorothernaturalresourceexports,becauseoftheir
relativeavailabilityofland,labourandcapital,knownas‘factorendowments’.Wood(2002)arguesthatAfricawillalwayshavea
greaterratioofprimaryprocessingtomanufacturingproductionthanEastAsiaasAfricaisrelativelyland-abundantandlabour-
scarcewhileothers,includingRodrik(2004)andCollierandVenables(2007),arguethatcomparativeadvantageis,toadegree,
acquiredandtheyattributefargreaterimportancetoeffectivetradeandindustrialpolicies.
31 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

cashincomesbymen.Infact,researchsuggestsacomplexpictureinmanydifferentsettings,
withoutcomesdependingonthedetailsofthekindsoffoodandexportcropsinvolved,as
wellasthegenderdivisionsoflandandlabour(MaxwellandFernando1989,Whitehead
2008).
Inmanufacturing,producingforexporttypicallymeansthathigherpricescanbeobtained
forgoodsthanareavailableinthelocaleconomy.However,theimpactonpovertydepends
onhowmuchofthesegainsarepassedontoworkersinwages.Inmostcases,wagesfor
workersinthefactoriesproducingforexportwillbehigherthanincomesthatcanbeearned
infarmingorinlocalservices,althoughtheywillofcoursebemuchlowerthanincomesin
developedcountries.Thiscontrastoftenpromptsconcernaboutexploitation,andhasdriven
thefairtradeandtradejusticemovements.
Risingrealwageswereakeypartofthestoryofpovertyreductionthroughtradein
countrieslikeSouthKoreaandTaiwan.Buttwodevelopmentsinrecentyearshaveraised
concernsthatnewlimitstowagesindevelopingcountrieshavestartedtoemerge.Thefirstis
theentryofChinaintotheworldeconomyasamajormanufacturer.Thereissomeevidence
thatthevastreservearmyoflabourinthatcountryisslowingwagegrowthglobally(see
Kaplinsky2005).Thesecondistheprogressiveliberalisationofcapitalsincethe1970s.As
investmentbecomesmoremobile,investorshavebeenmoreabletomoveonfromcountries
asrealwagesrise,andseekoutnewlocationsforlowwageproduction.Thiscanbeseenin
industrieslikegarments,whereinvestorshavemovedfromtheoriginalnewlyindustrialising
countries(NICs)toChina,Bangladesh,VietnamandCambodia.
Theotheraspectoftradeistheroleofimports.Thisroleiscomplex.Ontheonehand,
importsmakeproductsavailabletopeople,includingthepoor,atlowerpricesthanthe
domestically-producedalternatives.Thisisgoodforpoorconsumers,buthasoftenmeant
thatworkersorfarmerslosetheirlivelihoods.Inthelongerterm,andiftheprivatesectorhas
thecapacity,importscanactuallyhelpdomesticproducers,bygivingtheminformationon
whatcompaniesinothercountriesareproducing,andtowhatstandard.Bothproducersin
theearlyNICs,andmorerecentlyChinesecompanies,havesuccessfullyusedimportedgoods
(andideas)asthebasisfortheirownenterprises.
Tradeandchildwell-being
Thegeneralimpactsoftradeoutlinedaboveallaffectthewell-beingofchildren.Buttrade
affectsdifferentgroupsindifferentways,andthismeansthattradehasspecific
consequencesforchildren.Amongthepoor,menandwomenhaveoftenbeenaffected
differentlybythegrowthofmanufacturingexportsindevelopingcountries.Maleworkers
predominate,butsomesectors,suchasthegarmentindustry,tendtogeneratealarge
numberofemploymentopportunitiesforwomen.Womenareoftenbetteroffwhen
employedintheseexportsectorsthaninalternativeemployment(orunemployment)inthe
domesticeconomy.Moreover,increasingearningopportunitiesforwomenraiseshousehold
well-beingtoagreaterextentthandoesexpandingearningopportunitiesformen(Kabeer
2003).Theextenttowhichthistranslatesintoimprovedchildwell-beingdependslargelyon
complementarypolicies,includingavailabilityofchildcare(Barrientosetal 2004).
Tradecanhavemoredirectimpactsonchildwell-beingwhenitaffectsthelivelihoodsof
communitiesandfamilies,withconsequencesforchildren’sworkandeducation.Akeyissue
inthespreadoflow-costmanufacturingforexportindevelopingcountrieshasbeentheuse
ofchildrenasworkers.Althoughtheabuseofchildrenisfrequentlyevenworseinfactories
andworkshopsproducingonlyforthehomemarket,childlabouringlobalmarketsisclearly
deeplyproblematic,andformedanearlyfocusforthecorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)
movement.NGOscampaigningontheissuehavedevelopedasophisticatedunderstanding
ofhowtoapproachtheproblem,includingtheneedtoavoiddrivingchildrenintoevenmore
dangerousorundesirablesituations,suchassexwork.Tradeandforeigninvestmenthave
differentimpactsonchildlabourindifferentcircumstances,dependingontheimpacton
32 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

wagesforunskilledworkers–insomecountriesevidencesuggestthatchildlabourhas
increasedasaresultoftrade,whileinothercountriesithasreduced(inpartbecausetrade
hashelpedtoincreasereturnstoeducation)(ILO2006).

DFID’sapproachtotradepolicyanddevelopment
Intherun-uptothe1997election,officialsrecognisedthattheincominggovernmentnot
onlyintendedtosetupanewdepartmentforinternationaldevelopment,butalsowantedto
takeanewapproachtotradepolicy.Thisnewapproachwouldmoveawayfroma
mercantilistdefenceofUKcompaniestoapositionthatUKinterestswerebestservedby
widerprosperity;itwasconsideredthataliberalisingapproachtotradewasthewayto
achievethis.Accordingtoanintervieweeinvolvedinthisprocess,staffinwhatwasthenthe
OverseasDevelopmentAdministrationintheFCOmadeplansforthecreationoffournew
teamstoworkontradeissues,recognisingthatdevelopingpolicycapacitywasthewayto
seizetheagenda.
Thisinvestmentintradepolicyanalysiswasreflectedinthe1997WhitePaper,whereitwas
statedthat‘thefullrangeofGovernmentpoliciesaffectingdevelopingcountries,including
environment,trade,investmentandagriculture,takeaccountofoursustainable
developmentobjective’(DFID1997:7).
Tradepolicydebates–liberalisationversus‘policyspace’
TounderstandDFID’sapproach,itisnecessarytobrieflyexplorethemaindebatesintrade
policy.Sincethe1980s,aparticularviewontradeanddevelopmenthascometo
predominateinmanydevelopmentinstitutions,includingtheWorldBank.Thisview,whichis
heldbymosteconomists,drawsattentiontostrongempiricalrelationshipsbetweenthe
expansionoftrade,economicgrowthandpovertyreduction,andconcludesthatallcountries
–inboththeNorthandtheSouth–shouldberemovingbarrierstotradeandinvestment,in
theformoftariffs,subsidiesorotherpolicies(seeforexampleDollarandKraay2002,Dollar
2005).Thepursuitoftradeandinvestmentliberalisationhasalsobeenthedrivingforce
behindtheWorldTradeOrganisation(WTO).Agoodexampleofthedebateoverthe
potentialgainstothepoorindevelopingcountriesfromtradeliberalisationisinagriculture
(seeBox2.1).
Amongotherthings,thedebateontradepolicyandagricultureshowstheimportancenot
onlyofwhetherdevelopedcountrymarketsareopentoimportsfromdevelopingcountries,
butalsothecapacityofdevelopingcountriestoexportintothosemarkets.Thisapplieseven
morestronglytomanufacturedproducts,inwhichdevelopedcountrymarketsarealready
moreopen.10
Manytradepolicyanalystshaverecognisedtheselimits,andhaveplacedincreasing
emphasisoncomplementarypolicieswithindevelopingcountriestostrengthentheirabilities
totakeadvantageofincreasedmarketaccessopportunities.Reformstoproducean
‘enablingenvironment’forexportersincludereducingregulation,increasingtransparencyof
government,clarifyingandenforcingpropertyrightsandprovidingincentivessuchastax-
breakstoinvestors.
However,inrecentyears,someeconomistshavequestionedtheorthodoxythatliberalisation
andaharmonisedenablingenvironmentisthebestwayfordevelopingcountriestomake
themostoftrade.Rodrik(2007),forexample,observesthatsomecountriesthathavedone

10.Lockwood(2006)pointsoutthatpoormarketaccesscannotaccountfordifferencesinexportperformancebetweenAfrican
countriesnowandEastAsiancountriesinthe1960sasthelatterfacedmuchmorechallengingmarketaccessconditionsduring
theirinitialexportdrive.Othersnotethatwhiletheheadlinefigurescitedbyproponentsoftradeliberalisationsoundimpressive,
theytranslateintoverysmallpercapitagains.Forinstance,totalliberalisationofworldmerchandisetradewouldresultin
estimatedgainsofUS$84billionperyear.Equallydistributed,thistranslatesintoamere$0.04perpersonperday,hardly
sufficienttomakeadentin$1adaypovertylevels(AckermanandGallagher2008).
33 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Box2.1:Agricultureandtradepolicy
Three-quartersoftheworld’spoorliveinruralareas,andmostdependonagriculturefora
living(IFAD2007).Agricultureisalsothemostdistortedsectorintheglobaleconomy.Itis
theonlysectorwherebothquantitativerestrictionsandexportsubsidiesarepermitted
undercurrentWTOlaws,andagriculturaltariffsinhigh-incomecountriesarefarhigher
thanthoseformanufacturedgoods(Elliott2007).Asaresult,agriculturaltradebarriers
andsubsidies,particularlyintheUSandEU,havebeenwidelycondemned.Thecurrent
DohaRoundoftradenegotiationsaimstoeliminatethese.
However,recentstudiesshowthattheprimarybeneficiariesofloweragriculturaltrade
barrierswouldnotbethepoorestcountries,butratheremergingeconomieslikeBrazil,
IndiaandChina,becausetheyhavethegreatestcapacitytoincreasetheirexportsin
responsetonewmarketopportunities(Elliott2007).Somelow-incomecountriescould
gainfromliberalisationofspecifictropicalproductsbutothers,notablyinAfricaandthe
Caribbean,wouldlosefrompreferenceerosionespeciallyinproductssuchassugarand
bananas(AndersonandMartin2006,Sachsetal 2004).Manyofthecountriesthatwould
suffermostfrompreferenceerosionaresmallandvulnerableislandeconomies,andthey
faceparticularstructuraldifficultiesindiversifyingawayfromcommodities(Wintersand
Martin2004).
Similarly,agriculturalsubsidiesintheEUandUShavebeenthefocusofNGOcampaigns,
andhavebeencriticisedbymanyothersonthegroundsthateliminatingsubsidieswould
endthe‘dumping’thatunderminesthelivelihoodsofpoorfarmers,particularlyinAfrica.
However,areviewofstudiesanalysingtheimpactoftotalsubsidyeliminationonthe
welfareofdevelopingcountriesfindsanegativeimpact(CharltonandStiglitz2005).This
isbecausemanylow-incomecountriesarenetimportersofthefoodcropswheresubsidies
arehighest,andmanyofthepooresthouseholdsspendhighpercentagesoftheirbudgets
onfood.
Recordincreasesinfoodpricesduring2007–8ledtoaswitchinemphasisinagricultural
tradepolicy,awayfromprioritisingmarketaccessintodevelopedcountriesandtowards
increasingfoodsecurityinlow-incomedevelopingcountries.Netfood-importinglow-
incomecountrieswereparticularlyvulnerabletofoodpricespikes,andwithinthem,poor,
landless,female-headedhouseholdswereworsthit.Familiescutbackonthequalityand
quantityoffoodconsumedandotherexpendituresincludinghealthandeducation.
Children,pregnantwomenandbreastfeedingmothersweremostvulnerable(Foodand
AgricultureOrganisation2008).11

wellfromtrade,suchasVietnam,haveactuallyfollowedunorthodoxpolicies,whilesome
othercountriesthathaveliberalisedhavedoneverybadly,suchasHaiti.PaulKrugman,
anotherleadingtradeeconomist,hasalsoobservedthatthetheoreticalpredictionsthat
liberalisingeconomieswouldseehighergrowthandpovertyreductionhavenotbeenborne
outincaseslikeMexico(Krugman2008).
Thealternativeviewisthatcountriesthathavegainedthemostfromtrade–suchasthe
EastAsianNICs–haveusedselectiveindustrialandtradepoliciesthatactivelyintervenedin
markets(seeWade1990,Amsden1989,Lall1996,Chang2002,Rodrik2004,Stiglitiz
2005).Inadditiontopromotinghorizontalpoliciesthatcreatedabroadly‘enabling
environment’,successfulgovernmentsinEastAsiancountriesandindeedinthe
industrialisedcountriesbeforethem,notonlypickedwinners,butcreatedthem(see
NewfarmerandNowak2006).

11.Thefoodcrisisalsopromptedcallsforinvestmentinsmallholderagricultureandfoodcropproductionforlocalandregional
marketstoimprovefoodsecurity.Aswomeninfemale-headedhouseholdsarefarmoredependentongrowingfoodcropsthan
anyothersegmentofthepopulation,thisfocusisparticularlybeneficialforreducingchildpoverty(Whitehead2008).
34 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Fromthisperspectiveitiscrucialthattheinternationaltradepolicyregime‘enablespoor
countriestoexperimentwithinstitutionalarrangementsandleavesroomforthemtodevise
theirown,possiblydivergentsolutionstothedevelopmentbottleneckstheyface’(Rodrik
2007:10).Thisideahasbecomeknownas‘policyspace’.Exponentsoftheimportanceof
policyspaceareconcernedthatmultilateralandbilateraltradeagreementsareundermining
it,12 alongwithrelatedtradepolicyconditionalitythatdonorsattachtoaid.13 Policy
autonomyisparticularlycircumscribedinAfrica,where,asSoludoandOgbu(2004)among
othersnote,theWorldBankandtheIMFhaveconsistentlyattemptedtocontroleconomic
policiesandinstitutions.Coupledwiththepolicyconstraintsinherentininternationaltrade
agreements,policymakersinAfricasometimeshavelittleroomtochoosetheirowntradeand
industrialpolicies.
Withinthisdebate,thepositionoftheUKGovernmenthastendedtowardsliberalisation
ratherthanpolicyspace.DFIDadvocatestradeopenness,preferablythroughmultilateral
tradeliberalisation,whichisunderstoodtobemutuallybeneficialastradedrivesgrowth
(‘Sharingthebenefitsoftrade:aidfortradestrategy2008-2013’,2009).ThecoreofDFID’s
agendahascontinuedtobeensuringmarketaccessforthepoorestcountriesintomarketsin
theEUandtherestofthedevelopedworld,alongwithotherdevelopingcountries,and
especiallyinagriculture.Mostnotablyithaschampionedtheeliminationofdeveloped
countrysubsidiesandpromotedpreferencessuchastheEverythingButArms(EBA)
preferentialEUmarketaccessschemeforleastdevelopedcountries.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesontradeanddevelopment?
Since1997theUKGovernmenthasplacedinternationaltradeatthecentreofitsvisionfor
development,andhasestablisheditselfasachampionoftradeanddevelopmentamong
otherdevelopedcountries.(Mostrecently,theUKsucceededinachievingstronglanguage
ontradefinanceattheG20.)PascalLamy,DirectoroftheWTO,notesthattheUK‘stands
outasagloballeaderinadvocatingandactivelypromotingtradeasanengineforgrowth
anddevelopment’.14
Intervieweeswithingovernmentspeakofthehighdegreeofemphasisplacedontradeand
developmentsince1997,reflectedinthefactthatthecentralorgansofgovernment,and
particularlytheCabinetOffice,havetakenakeeninterestintradenegotiations,especially
theDohaDevelopmentRound.Inanattempttopromotecoherence,DFIDandthethen
DepartmentforTradeandIndustryweregivenajointPSAtargetin2001whichaimedto
alignUKbusinessanddevelopmentinterests.15 Intervieweeshadmixedopinionsonthejoint
PSAtargets.Somearguedthattheyhavenothadmuchimpact.Tradenegotiationsdonot
lendthemselvestotargetsastheyareunpredictable,andoutcomesarelargelyoutsideofthe
influenceoftheUK,particularlygiventhatmostnegotiationsareconductedviatheEU(for
instance,thebreakdowninWTOtalksmeantthatthe2001targetbecameirrelevant).In

12.UndertheWTO,therearesomeconstraintsonpolicyspace,buttherearestillaconsiderablenumberofpolicyinstruments
thatdevelopingcountriescanuse(Page2007).However,manyareexplicitlyprohibitedinNorth–Southfreetradeagreements,
particularlythoseoftheUS(GallagherandThrasher2008).IntellectualpropertyisparticularlycontentiousasbothWTOand
bilateraltradeagreementsimpedetheadoptionandadaptationofnewtechnologies,makingpracticessuchasreverseengineering
andcopyingmuchharder(Rodrik2004).
13.AsPage(2007)notes,ifadevelopingcountrynegotiatorknowsthathisorhercountryisheavilydependentonthetrading
partnerforaid,thisinevitablyinfluencesthebargainingprocess.IntheEconomicPartnershipAgreementnegotiationsbetween
theEUandAfrican,CaribbeanandPacific(ACP)countries,theroleoftheEUasadonorisconstantlyemphasisedaspartofthe
samenegotiation.TheACPcountriesthereforefoundthemselvesaskingforaidandnegotiatingwiththeEUontradeaccessatthe
sametime,whichseverelyconstrainedtheirbargainingpowerandresultedinthembeingfarlessactivenegotiatorsthaninthe
WTOcontext.Thesepowerasymmetriesarecompoundedininstanceswheredonorsdirectlypayfornegotiatingcapacity,or
providesupportintradedisputes.
14.QuotedinUKGovernmentpromotionalmaterialduringInternationalTradeWeek.
15.TheoriginalPSAtargetwasto‘ensuretheEUsecuressignificantreductionsinEUandworldtradebarriersby2008leadingto
improvedopportunitiesfordevelopingcountriesandamorecompetitiveEurope’(DFID’sWorkonInternationalTradeand
Development2005–7,2005)
35 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

addition,whilemanagerspayattentiontothem,technicalofficialsarenotguidedbythemin
theirday-to-dayactivities.
Nearlyallintervieweesattributethehighprofileaccordedtotradeanddevelopmentpolicy
coherencetothepersonalinterestofseniorpoliticians,notablyClareShort,theformer
SecretaryofStateforDevelopment,andGordonBrownasChancellorandPrimeMinister.
Someofourintervieweesvoicedconcernsthatasthetradeanddevelopmentagendahas
beendrivenbyafewpoliticalfigures,itcouldlosedynamismandprofilewithachangein
politicalleadership.However,otherssuggestedthattheneedforcoherenceisnowagreed
uponacrossthepoliticalspectrum,socommitmenttocoherenceisunlikelytoweakenwith
anypoliticalchanges(althoughtheConservatives’differentapproachtotheEUmayhave
implicationsfortradeanddevelopmentcoherenceinpractice).
Withinthegovernment,responsibilityfortradepolicyfallsjointlytoDFIDandthe
DepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills(BIS,formerlyBERR,andbeforethatDTI).
Governmentofficialsreportfewsubstantivedisagreementsonpolicybetweenorwithin
departments.Inthewordsofonegovernmentinterviewee:‘Overall,theUKisverystrong
andveryclearontradeanddevelopmentpolicy.Thisreflectsanunderlyingbeliefin
liberalisation,institutionaldevelopmentandaidfortrade.’
However,officialsdonotedifferencesinemphasis.Broadlyspeaking,BIShasatrade
economistperspective,andstronglysupportstradeliberalisationandopennessina
multilateralsystem.Whileofficialsrecognisethatdevelopingcountriesneedtransitiontimes
andsupportforadjustment,theirfocusisonestablishinganopenmultilateraltradingsystem
withharmonisedrules.Conversely,DFIDofficialsagreeonthepotentialgainsfromtrade,but
aremorelikelytofocusontheasymmetriesgeneratedbyinternationalrules,andto
advocateadegreeofdifferentiationto‘givespace’fordevelopment.16Theyarealsomore
focusedonthemicro-levelimpactoftradewithindevelopingcountries.Therearenotable
differenceswithinDFIDbetweeneconomistsandsocialdevelopmentadvisers,withthelatter
focusingmoreonequityaspects,suchasthegenderimpactsofliberalisationandthe
fairnessofthetradenegotiatingprocess.
Whendifferencesarisebetweenofficials,thesetendtoberesolvedatthetechnicalleveland
intervieweescouldnotthinkofexamplesthatrequiredaministerialdecision.Themostcited
exampleoftensionbetweenofficialswasthelanguageusedtocommunicatetradepolicyto
thepublic.WhileDFID,mindfulofitsNGOconstituents,isconcernedtoemphasisethe
povertyangleandtheneedforflexibilityandpolicyspacefordevelopingcountries,BIShas
toreassurethebusinesscommunitythattherearegainsfortheUKthatwillresultfromits
approach.

Howjoinedupisgovernmentinpractice?
TradepolicyisperhapsthemostcommonlygivenexampleofwhereDFIDhasbeen
successfulininfluencingwiderUKGovernmentpolicy.Thereisalso,broadlyspeaking,an
alignmentbetweentheBISviewofwhattradepoliciesaregoodforUKinterestsandthe
DFIDviewofwhattradepoliciesareinthelong-terminterestsofdevelopingcountries.
However,tensionsdoappearwhentheagendaofdevelopingcountriescomesintopotential
conflictwithBritishbusinessinterests.Forexample,developingcountries’industriesarein
manycasesunabletocompetesuccessfullywithmultinationalfirmsindevelopedcountries,
andemergingnationsinparticularhavepushedforadegreeofprotectioninWTO
negotiations.Innegotiationsonmarketaccessformanufacturedgoods,BISofficialsfeelthat

16.Intellectualproperty(IP)providesanexampleofthis.WTOnegotiationshaveexpandedrapidlysincethemid-1990sto
includeareassuchasservices,investment,governmentprocurement,andIP,andin1994anagreementontrade-relatedIPrights
wasreached(theTRIPSAgreement).Becauseofconcernsaboutthepotentialanti-developmentalimpactsofexcessiveIP
protection,DFIDestablishedanindependentIPCommissionin2001thatexaminedthelinkswithdevelopment.Sincethenthe
UKhashadastrongpolicylineagainsttheexpansionofinternationalrulesbeyondthoseintheTRIPSAgreement.
36 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

somedevelopingcountriesaregoingtoofarininsistingonminimaltariffcutsintheirhome
markets.
InreflectingonwhoseinterestswouldprevailintheeventofaconflictbetweenUKand
developmentcountryinterestsoveraspecificissue,severalofourintervieweessuggested
thatUKinterestswouldultimatelywinout.However,severalintervieweesalsonotedthatas
theUKhashadfewspecificbusinessinterestsintheDohaRound,therehavebeenminimal
tensionsinrecentyears.
TherealtestwillcomewiththeFreeTradeAgreements(FTAs)withemergingmarkets,where
therearebothclearUKbusinessinterestsandobviouspovertydimensions.TheUK’sbroad
policystanceisthatliberalisationcommitmentsinFTAsshouldbeasdeepaspossible,to
minimisetradedistortions,butatthesametimeDFIDhasadvocatedsubstantialflexibility
andasymmetryinthenegotiationofEconomicPartnershipAgreements(EPAs)–effectively
FTAs–betweentheEUandvariousdevelopingcountries.Itisnotyetclearhowthe
Governmentwillbalancethesecompetingapproaches.
Thetreatmentofinvestmentinsuchagreementsislikelytobeoneareaofpotentialtension.
Overthepastyear,theUKhasplacedgreateremphasisonBritishtradeandinvestment
promotionindevelopingcountriesasatoolforpromotingdevelopment.Althoughthisis
seenasimportant,severalinterviewees(insideandoutsidegovernment)feelthattheUKhas
atendencytobeuncriticalinitsapproachandisfailingtoengageintheimportantquestion
ofunderwhatconditionsUKinvestmentisbeneficialfordevelopingcountries.Inthecaseof
oneEPA,forinstance,thevisitofaUKbusinessdelegationafterthesigningofthe
agreementwasindangerofcreatingtheimpressionthattheUK’sinterestwas,inthewords
ofanexternalinterviewee,‘reformingtheCaribbeanregulatoryenvironmenttotheneedsof
Britishbusinesses’.Inarelatedvein,itwassuggestedthattheUKcoulddomoretoreform
itsBilateralInvestmentTreatieswherethereareconcernsthataspectsofthetreatiesconflict
withdevelopmentobjectives.
Finally,therearealsocaseswhereUKtradepolicymayclashwithUKpolitics.Several
externalexpertsandex-governmentintervieweesnotedthattheUKtendstoplaceemphasis
onchampioningdevelopment-friendlyreformsintradepolicyinareaswheretherearefew
coststotheUK,andwheretherearesynergieswiththeUK’sowninterests.Inparticular,the
emphasisonEUliberalisationisrelativelyeasytopushforastheUKisalreadyrelatively
openandithasclearinterestsinmultilateraltradeliberalisationandreformoftheCommon
AgriculturalPolicy.Incontrast,theUKdoeslittleinsomeareaswheredevelopingcountries
standtogainhugelybutthatarepoliticallysensitivefortheUK.Oneexampleofthisis
Mode4oftheGeneralAgreementonTradeinServices(GATS):theUKhasfacedcallsin
boththeDohaandEPAprocessestoliberalisethemovementofskilledworkerstoprovide
servicesunderMode4,buthas,ifanythingtightenedrestrictions(seeChapter5).

Cross-governmentmechanisms
Forthepastdecade,theUKhasdevelopedaseriesofcross-Whitehallcommitteestoagree
ontradepolicy.In2007,withthechangeinPrimeMinister,furthermovesweremadeto
institutionalisetradeanddevelopmentcoherence.TheSecretaryofStateforInternational
DevelopmentwasmadechairoftheCabinetsub-committeeontrade,andanewJoint
DFID/BISMinisterwasappointedandtaskedwithdeliveringontradeanddevelopment.
Inaddition,aJointDFID/BISTradePolicyUnitwasestablishedatthetechnicallevel.The
jointTradePolicyUnitgeneratesverymixedreactions.OfficialsfromBIStendtoholdthe
positionthatitgreatlystrengthenscollaborationbetweenDFIDandBIS.Moreregular
informalinteractionintheunitwithstaffcomingfromDFIDhasexposedstafffromBISto
developmentaspectsoftradetoagreaterextent.TradePolicyUnitofficialsfromBIS
welcometheopportunitytoexpandtheirtradeworktoconsiderdevelopmentingreater
detailandtheUnitisattractingofficialswhoaregenuinelyinterestedindevelopment.Some
37 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

alsoarguethatDFIDofficialshavetraditionallybeenoverlyacademicintheirapproachto
tradepolicy,unrealisticastowhatitisfeasibletoachieveinnegotiations,andweakat
influencing.BringingDFIDstaffintomoreregularcontactwithBISstaffthroughtheUnit
hasledtogreaterpragmatismandrealismintheirapproachtotrade,andhencetheyare
morelikelytoachievechange.
InDFID,ontheotherhand,thereissomeconcernthatthedevelopmentdimensionofwork
ontradeisbeingwatereddown.TheJointUnitisheadedbyanofficialfromBIS,wherethe
majorityofstaffalsocomefrom,andtheyleadonmosttradenegotiations,includingthe
WTOandFTAs.AlthoughallTradePolicyUnitstaffaretaskedwithincorporatinga
developmentperspective,fewstafffromBIShaveformaltrainingintradeanddevelopment
orexperienceofworkingontradeinadevelopingcountry.Whentradewasindifferent
departments,DFIDplayedanimportantchallengefunctionacrossWhitehall,andDFID
seniormanagementchampionedtradetoagreaterextent.WiththeJointUnitinplace,there
isatendencytoassumethattheUnitisincorporatingdevelopmentconcerns,andthereis
lesspressureonDFIDtofocusontrade,arguablyresultingintheoverallmarginalisationof
developmentperspectiveswithinUKtradepolicy(theseconcernswerealsoexpressedby
externalobservers).
Theseproblemsareexacerbatedbyalong-termchallengeofattractingandretaininghigh-
calibrestafftoworkontradeinDFID.Oneunintendedconsequenceofsuccessfuljointunits
suchastheTradePolicyUnitisthattheycanbecomerathercutofffrommainstream
departmentalcareerstructures.TheprofileoftradepolicyinDFIDhasdeclinedsincethe
slowdowninWTOnegotiationsandinNGOcampaigning.Asaresult,althoughdevelopment
isaccordedprominencewithintrade,tradeislosingprominenceinthewiderdevelopment
agenda.WhiletheBISsideoftheJointUnittendstohavespecialisedtradeexperts,the
DFIDsidehasahighturnoverandanincreasingnumberofstaffdonothaveatechnical
tradebackground.Accordingtobothofficialsandexternalinterviewees,eveninareaswhere
DFIDofficialsareformallytaskedwithleading(suchasonEPAnegotiations),inpracticeBIS
officialstendtohaveahigherlevelofexpertise,sotheirpositionsoftenholdsway.
TheJointUnithasalsohadproblemswithperceptionsbyexternalstakeholders.Accordingto
bothgovernmentandexternalinterviewees,theConfederationofBritishIndustry(CBI)was
initiallyscepticalthattheUnitwouldprioritisebusinessconcerns,andinsistedonaDirector
fromBIS.Althoughthebusinesscommunityhassincebeenwonover,thedevelopment
communityisnowincreasinglysceptical.Developingcountriesarequestioningwhetherthe
UKisshiftingtowardsgreateremphasisonpromotingUKbusinessinterestsinitstrade
policy.SincemanyofthemoreexperiencedDFIDstaffhaveleft,therearealsoconcerns
amongotherinternationalinstitutionsthattheUKmayloseitsreputationforexpertiseon
tradeanddevelopment,andwithittheabilitytoinfluenceinternationally.
Finally,DFIDofficeshavetendedtofocusoncountry-leveltradepolicyenvironmentsrather
thanUKtradepolicy,andfewhaveplayedanactiveroleinfeedingdevelopingcountry
perspectivesbacktotheJointTradePolicyUnit.Asaresult,theTradePolicyUnitdoesnot
receivesustainedinputontheviewsofdevelopingcountries.DFIDisintheprocessof
appointingadditionalregionaltradeadvisersinseveralAfricanregions,whichshould
strengthenthislink.Accordingtoourinterviewees,thereisalsolittlecommunication
betweentradeattachéswhofocusonpromotingUKtradeandinvestment,andDFID
officialswhofocusoneconomicdevelopment.

TherelationshipwiththeEU
AstheUK’smultilateraltradepolicyisdelegatedtotheEuropeanCommission,theabilityof
theUKtodeliveronitscommitmenttopolicycoherencedependsinpartonthedegreeto
whichtheEUalreadyalignstradeanddevelopmentpolicy,andtheUK’sabilitytoinfluence
EUpolicy.Amongmemberstates,theUKhasbetterinstitutionalcoordinationthanmany
othersand–alongwithDenmark,NetherlandsandIreland–isperceived(withintheEU)to
beattheforefrontofthecoherenceagenda.
38 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Severalofourintervieweescharacterisedtradeanddevelopmentcoherenceatthelevelof
theEuropeanCommissionasbeingveryweak.TradeisledbyDG(DirectorateGeneral)Trade,
whileDGDevelopmentleadsondevelopmentforACPcountries,andDGRelex(external
relations)leadsondevelopmentforotherdevelopingcountries.AtpresentDGDevelopment
andDGRelexarealmostexclusivelyconcernedwithaid,andhavenoexpertiseintrade.
AlthoughDGTradehasadevelopmentunittaskedwithensuringcoherence,inpracticethis
teamlacksexpertiseandhaslittleinfluence.
InformalforumsarekeytotheUK’seffortstoinfluencetheEUpositionontradeand
development.17 Coalitionsareaparticularlyimportantmechanismandthereareregular
meetingsontradeanddevelopmentbetweenlike-mindedmemberstates,particularlythe
UK,Sweden,Denmark,NetherlandsandIreland.Onthewholethislike-mindedlobbygroup
hasfocusedontheneedfortheEuropeanmarkettobeopenedtodevelopingcountries,as
thisistheareaofgreatestconsensusamongmembers.
However,theUK’sabilitytoinfluencesignificantchangestointernationaltraderulesis
ultimatelydeterminedbyitswillingnessandabilitytoinfluenceinEuropeatahigherpolitical
level.Accordingtooneindependenttradepolicyexpertweinterviewed:‘TheUKsaysthatit
ischampioningdevelopmentintrade,buttherealityisthattradeisnothighontheagenda
forinfluencinginBrussels…otherissueslikeemploymentlawandfinancialandbanking
regulationmattermuchmore.TheUKinvestsverylittlepoliticalcapitalintrade.’

Tradeandinvestment:conclusions
TradewasDFID’sgreatpolicy-influencingsuccessstory,movingUKtradepolicyfrom
mercantilismtoopenness.TradehasalsobeenafairlycoherentpolicyareafortheUK
Government,withNumber10andthedepartmentsallsharingaliberalisingapproach,
althoughperhapswithvaryingviewsonpaceandscale.Thissharedapproachhasfacilitated
successfuljointworkingacrossgovernment,basedonanunderstandingthattheUK’s
interestsarelargelyalignedwiththoseofdevelopingcountries.However,inareaswhereUK
interestsarelessclearlyalignedwiththoseofdevelopingcountries(suchasGATSMode4),
theUKhasbeenlessproactive–mechanismsforpolicycoherenceinthisareahavenotbeen
wellsuitedtoresolvingtensions.Also,theconsensusonsharedinterestsbetweentheUK
anddevelopingcountriesmaybeincreasinglychallengedbyresearchshowingthatsuccessful
useoftradefordevelopmentisnotsimplyamatterofliberalising.Thismayintroducenew
tensionsbetweenperceivedUKinterestsandthoseofdevelopingcountriesinyearstocome,
andpresentarrangementsmaynotbeadequatetogeneratepolicycoherencefor
developmentinthisarea.
GoodcommunicationbetweenDFIDandthebusinessdepartmentovertheyearswas
formalisedintheestablishmentofaJointUnitin2007,showinghowimportantthetrade
agendawasfordevelopmentandviceversa.
Butdespite(orperhapsbecauseof)thissuccess,DFIDhasarguablynotsustaineditsefforts
tokeepdevelopmentattheforefrontofUKtradepolicy,andinparticularislessinclinedto
challengeBISinareaswheretheremaybetensionsbetweenUKanddevelopingcountry
objectives.Thedepartmenthasbecomeincreasinglydisengaged,and‘DFIDposts’inthe
JointUnitareoftenstaffedbytradepolicyanalystsfromBIS.Thisispartlybecausetherehas
beenlessactivityontradepolicyinrecentyears–theDohaRoundofnegotiationsinthe

17.InthelastfewyearstheUKGovernmenthashadrelativelyhigh-levelinformalaccesstotheEuropeanTradeCommissionersas
theyhavebeenUKappointees.SomeintervieweessuggestthatthishasenabledtheUKtohaveahigherlevelofinfluenceover
tradepolicy.IntheEPAnegotiationsforinstance,theUKhassuccessfullypushedforrelaxationinrulesoforigin,aregional
integrationfocusandinclusionofamonitoringmechanism.Incontrast,otherssuggestedthatastheformerEuropeanTrade
Commissionerwassuchastrongcharacter,inpracticetheUKhadlittleinfluence.OneintervieweecitedaninstancewhenaDFID
Ministerhadmadeastrongstanceondevelopmentandhadbeen‘rappedontheknuckles’bytheEuropeanTradeCommissioner,
resultingintheUKbeingrelativelyquietand‘justplayingthegame’.
39 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

WTOhavegroundtoahalt,andtheframeworkfortheEconomicPartnershipAgreements
betweentheEUanddevelopingcountrieswaslargelynegotiatedbeforethecreationofthe
jointunit.However,itisclearlyalsorelatedtoincentivesinsideDFID.Tradepolicyisno
longerseenasthe‘cuttingedge’,andtherearefewincentivesforgoodstafftoworkonthe
issue–theexistenceoftheJointUnitmakestradecareerstructureswithinDFIDlessclear.
Insomeways,theUKtradepolicyexperiencedemonstratestheperilsofpolicycoherence–
developmenthasbeen‘mainstreamed’intotradepolicy,butthishascomeattheexpenseof
DFID’sabilityandwillingnesstochallengeothergovernmentdepartmentsonpolicy.Thereis
broadconsensusbetweenDFIDandotherdepartmentsaboutpolicy,butthishasledtothe
creationofcross-governmentstructuresandpolicyframeworksthatarenotwellsuitedto
managingandresolvingtensionsbetweenUKinterestsandtheinterestsofdeveloping
countrieswhentheydoemerge,andmaymakeitharderforUKpolicytorespondtonew
evidence.
40 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

3.Corruption
Developmentoutcomesareprofoundlyaffectedbygovernance,whichwedefinebroadlyas
thecapability(ofstates)todeliverservicesandgetthingsdone;responsivenesstocitizens’
wantsandrightsintermsofpoliciesandinstitutions;accountabilityofstateinstitutionsand
processestocitizensandcivilsociety,andruleoflawandjustice(DFID2006).

Governanceandcorruption
Statesthatareweak–inthesenseofbeingunabletomeettheircitizens’needs–and
unaccountablearewidespreadinthedevelopingworld.Forexample,vandeWalle(2001:
131)describesAfricancivilservicesascharacterisedby:‘pervasiveabsenteeism,endemic
corruption,politicisation,declininglegitimacyandlowmorale’.Andersonetal (2003)draw
onevidencefromsurveysin20countriesinLatinAmericaandCentralAsiatoshowthe
extentofthemisuseofpublicresources,thepoliticisationandpersonalisationofstaffingand
budgetdecisions,andthefactthatordinarycitizensoftenarefearfulofmakingcomplaints
aboutcorruption,forexampleinColombiaandHonduras.AbedandGupta(2002)provide
evidenceoftheimpactofpoorgovernanceandcorruptionontheeconomiesofdeveloping
countries.TheAfricanUnionhasestimatedthatcorruptioncostsAfricaintheregionof
US$150billionayear,raisingthecostsofgoodsby20percentanddeterringinvestment.
However,therootsoftheseproblemsdonotliewithpublicofficials,whoareoftenforcedto
usetheirofficestoextractbribesasawaytomakealivingbecausecivilservicewagesareso
low.18 Rather,weakstatecapacityandendemicpettycorruptionindevelopingcountriesis
typicallytheresultofasituationinwhichaneliteinterestedmoreinself-enrichmentthanin
developmentusesamixofcorruption,patronageandrepressiontomaintainpower(see
Lockwood2005,vandeWalle2001,Collier2007).Theresulthasbeenadeephollowingout
offormalstatestructuresandcapacity,includingthecapacitytodeveloptheeconomy.
Theworstcasesofsuch‘anti-developmental’regimes(Sindzingre2004)involveviolent
repression,widespreadcorruptionandlootingofpublicresources,lackofaccountabilityand
ruleoflawandpoororabsentpublicservices.Insuchstatestheeconomyoftenlurchesfrom
crisistocrisisandbasichumanandcivilrightsareroutinelyflouted.Contemporaryexamples,
themajorityfromAfrica,includeHaiti,DRC,Sudan,Guinea,SomaliaandZimbabwe.
Itisalsoclearthattheavailabilityofnaturalresources–suchasoil,diamonds,goldand
othermineralsandtimber–isoftenassociatedwithcasesofverypoorgovernance,
sometimesbreakingdownintocivilwar.ExamplesincludeZaire(diamondsandminerals),
SierraLeone(diamonds),Guinea(goldandtimber),Nigeria(oil)andAngola(oil).Countries
withsuchresourcesoftentendtobepoorerthanthosewithout(UNCTAD2002),leadingto
thenotionofthe‘resourcecurse’(SachsandWarner1995,Ross1999,Collier2008).The
rootsoftheresourcecurselieinthefactthatrevenuesfromthesaleofnaturalresourcesare
typicallyverylargeandcanbecontrolledbyelites,oftenindealswithforeigncompanies,
withverylittleaccountability.Thiscombinationnotonlyallowslootingofpublicrevenues
andcapitalflight,butalsoheightenstensionsandconflict,asgroupswithincountriesthat
areexcludedfromsuchnaturalresource‘rents’havepowerfulincentivestotrytoseize
powerbyanymeansnecessary.
Donorcountrieshavebecomeincreasinglyengagedwiththeseissuesofgovernanceand
corruptionthroughtheiraidprogramminginrecentyears.Aidinstrumentshavebeen
reformedtopromote(oratleastnothinder)goodgovernance,aidhassometimesbeen
madeconditionalongovernancereformsandspecificgovernanceprogramminghasbecome
anincreasinglyimportantfeatureoftheaid‘landscape’inmanycountries.

18.Forexample,civilservicesalariesinAnglophoneAfricalostroughly80percentoftheirvalueinthe1970sand80s(Lienert
andModi1997).
41 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

However,corruptionisnotaproblemthatisuniquetopoorcountries,soaidprogrammingis
not,andshouldnotbe,theonlywayinwhichdonorcountriesliketheUKengagewiththe
issue.Fundsobtainedthroughcorruptionareoftenbankedandinvestedinrichcountries,so
accesstofinancialandotherservicesincountriesliketheUKarguablyfacilitatesgrand
corruptioninpoorcountries.Globalisedsystemsoftradeandbankingprovideopportunities
foranti-developmentalelitestocaptureandmanagerents,andtherebybettermaintaintheir
politicalpositions(Moore2009).CapitalflightfromSub-SaharanAfrica(moneydepositedby
AfricansoutsideofAfrica)wasestimatedatUS$285billionin2000(BoyceandNdikumana
2000).Bribesareoftenpaidbycompaniesorindividualsbasedinrichcountries.Inorderto
achievepolicycoherence,itisessentialthattheUKGovernmentdoesallthatitcanto
ensurethatcorruptionisnotpromotedorfacilitatedbyUKinstitutions,companiesor
individuals.

Corruptionandchildwell-being
Itisclearthatitisthepoorwhosuffertheworsteffectsofbadgovernance,especially
throughitseffectonbasicservices,infrastructureprovisionandjustice:
Corruption…biasesgovernmentspendingawayfromsociallyvaluablegoods,such
aseducation.Itdivertspublicresourcesfrominfrastructureinvestmentsthatcould
benefitpoorpeople,suchashealthclinics,andtendstoincreasepublicspendingon
capital-intensiveinvestmentsthatoffermoreopportunitiesforkickbacks,suchas
defensecontracts.Itlowersthequalityofinfrastructure,sincekickbacksaremore
lucrativeonequipmentpurchases.(WorldBank2001:201)
Oneindicatorofstatefailureinserviceprovisiondevelopedinthe1990swasthepublic
expendituretrackingsurveys(PETS).Theseassessedhowmuchofthemoneyearmarkedfor
aparticularpurposeinthecentralgovernmentbudgetactuallyreachedtheintended
beneficiaries.OneoftheearliestPETS,inUgandain1996,foundthat87percentofmoney
intendedforschoolswasdivertedforotherpurposes.InPeru,astudyofamilkprogramme
forpoorchildrenfoundthatonlyonethirdofeachdollartransferredfromcentral
governmentreachedthem(WorldBank2004:185).Therehavebeensimilarresultsfrom
PETSinalargenumberofcountriesincludingChad,Ghana,Honduras,Mozambique,Papua
NewGuinea,Rwanda,Senegal,TanzaniaandZambia.
Thediversionofresourcesandexclusionofthosewhocannotpaybribeshasanimpacton
outcomes,especiallyforpoorchildren.Guptaetal (2000)andRajkumarandSwaroop
(2002)provideevidencethatcorruptionisassociatedwithhigherinfantandchildmortality
rates,lowbirthweightandhigherprimaryschooldrop-outrates.
Thereisalsoalargebodyofevidence,fromanumberof‘participatorypovertyassessments’
undertakenin23countriesbytheWorldBankandDFIDinthe1990s,thatsuggeststhe
poorthemselvesregardpoorgovernanceandcorruptionasamongtheworstaspectsof
poverty(BrocklesbyandHoland1998,Robb2002).Thesesurveysshowthatpoorpeople
seelackofaccesstojusticeandpolicecorruptionassomeoftheworstaspectsofbad
governance,emphasisingthelackofaccountabilityofthestatetoitscitizens.

DFID’sapproachtogovernance,corruptionanddevelopment
DFIDhaslonggivenconsiderableattentionandprioritytogovernanceproblemsinitsaid
programming,andgovernancewasthemainfocusofits2006WhitePaper.Thedepartment
wasoneoftheearlychampionsof‘sector-wideapproaches’,orSWAPs(Andersen2000).
Theseprogrammesrecognisedthatindividualprojectsinareaslikehealthandeducation
wereoftennoteffectivebecausetheentireministrylackedcapacityandresources,and
intendedtobuildupthatcapacityatbothcentralandlocallevels.Thisapproach
subsequentlybroadenedoutintowidercross-governmentcivilservicereformandanti-
corruptionprogrammes,oftencarriedoutthroughmultilateralinstitutionsliketheWorld
Bank.DFIDhasalsofocused,andcontinuestofocus,muchofitsattentionincountry
programmesontryingtoimprovethemanagementandaccountabilityofpublicfinance.
42 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

However,therecordofsuchgovernancereformsisnotparticularlygood(Poldiano2001,
Goetz2005).InthewordsofDanielKaufmann,wholedtheWorldBank’spolicieson
governanceandanti-corruption:‘Thelasttenyearshavebeendeeplydisappointing.Much
wasdone,butnotmuchwasaccomplished.Whatwearedoingisnotworking’(quotedin
Naim2005).
Suchreformstendtoworkonlywherethereishigh-levelpoliticalcommitment,whetherthey
areSWAPs(Fosteretal 1999),trade-relatedcapacitybuildingprogrammes(NorthSouth
Institute2004),widercivilservicereforms(Kjaer2004)oranti-corruptionprogrammes
(OperationsEvaluationDepartment2004).
ThelimitstogovernancereformrelatetoacriticismoftenmadeofDFIDbyexternal
observersandthoseinotherpartsofgovernmentalike–thatithascometotaketoo
technocraticaviewofdevelopment,attheexpenseofignoringpoliticsandpolitical
economy.19 Partlyinresponsetosuchcriticism,thedepartmentstartedtocommissionmore
seriousanalysesoftheunderlyingpoliticsinanumberofcountries,calledthe‘Driversof
Change’studies.Thesehavecertainlyincreasedawarenessandunderstandingofpolitical
dynamics,butitisnotclearthatDFIDhasmanagedtoabsorbthelessonsofthesestudies
intoitsprogramming(Unsworth2008).DFIDhasalsoestablishedasystemofCountry
GovernanceAnalysis(CGA),amandatorytoolinthepreparationofcountryassistanceplans
andstrategiesthatisintendedto‘provideashort,sharpandrobustoverviewofthekey
governanceandconflictissues,thescenariosandtheimplicationforDFID/HMG[Her
Majesty’sGovernment]’(DFID2008:3).
AnotherapproachthatDFIDhastakentoimprovinggovernanceistosupportcivilsociety
effortstoincreaseaccountabilityacrossawiderangeofareas.Thesehaveincludedcivil
societyinputstoandmonitoringofcountryPovertyReductionStrategies,attemptsto
strengthentheoversightofparliamentsandsupportforgrassrootscampaignsforrights.
However,thisisstillarelativelyminorstrandofDFID’swork.Forexample,theCivilSociety
ChallengeFund,aimedprimarilyatsupportingtheroleofcivilsocietyorganisationsin
enhancingthecapacityofpoorandexcludedpeoplethroughrights-basedactivities,hasan
annualbudgetofonlyaround£14million.
Beyondaidprogramming,DFIDhasalsoengagedwiththeroleofinternationalcompaniesin
supportingcorruptioninpoorcountries.Inparticular,DFIDhaschampionedtheExtractive
IndustriesTransparencyInitiative(EITI),designedtotackletheextremeproblemsoflackof
accountabilityinmanydevelopingcountriesthatexportnaturalresources.TheEITIwasset
upin2003,partlyinresponsetoanNGOinitiativein2002calledPublishWhatYouPay
(PWYP).WhereasPWYPcalledforallnaturalresourcecompaniestodisclosetheirpayments
toallgovernmentsaroundtheworld(withtheaimofgettingstockmarketstodelistthemif
theydidnotcomply),EITIisavoluntaryinitiativethattriestodrawinbothcompaniesand
governments.
EITIhasgrownconsiderablyinscopesinceitsearlydays.Therearenow42oil,gasand
miningcompaniesthataresignedupandcommittedtodisclosingtheirpayments.28
countrieshavesigneduptobe‘candidate’countries,aprocessthatplacesthemontrackto
becomefullypartoftheInitiative,andstartfulldisclosure.However,onlytwocountries–
LiberiaandAzerbaijan–havecompletedtheprocesstodate.
TheEITIhasbeenwelcomedbroadly,includingbyorganisationsthatwerebehindthePWYP
coalition,suchasGlobalWitness.TheorganisationhasbeenfloatedfreeofDFIDand
relocatedtoNorway.TheEITIfocusesonputtingpaymentsmadebycompaniesto

19.OneexampleisthecriticismthatDFIDshouldhavesupportedthepositionoftheBritishHighCommissionertoKenya,Sir
EdwardClay,atthetimeofhispublicattackoncorruptioninthecountryunderMwaiKibakiin2004,bycuttingoffaid.Itshould
benotedthatwhiletheunderlyingpointaboutDFID’slackofengagementwithpoliticsmaybetrue,thecriticismitselfshowsa
lackofawarenessaboutthelimitstopoliticalconditionalityofthissort–itisalmostalwaysineffective(Devarajanetal 2001).
43 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

governmentsintothepublicdomain.TheWorldBanknowwantstoextendthefocusonthe
managementanduseofnaturalresourcerevenuesin-countrythroughanewinitiativecalled
EITI++.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesongovernanceanddevelopment?
CorruptionisnotanissuethatDFIDcandealwithalone–thepoliciesandactionsofother
governmentdepartmentsandagenciesareimportant,especiallythoserelatingtobriberyby
UKcompaniesornationals,andmoneylaunderingorcapitalflightthroughtheUKorUK
territories(particularlybyso-called‘politicallyexposedpersons’20).Clearly,inboththese
areas,UKactiononitsownwillnotsolvetheproblem,ascorruptelitescanseekbribesfrom
companiesfromothercountries,andchoosetobankelsewhere.However,inbothareas,
thereareinternationalframeworksforaction,andactionisalsobeingtakenbyother
countries.ItisalsothecasethattheCityofLondonremainstheworld’smostimportant
financialcentre,andanimportantdestinationforflightcapital.
Inprinciple,theUKistakingactionintheseareas–theSecretaryofStateforJusticehas
beendesignatedtheUKAnti-CorruptionChampion(supportedbyasecretariatinBIS),and
cross-departmentalbodiesintheformoftheForeignBriberyStrategyBoard(chairedbythe
officeoftheAttorneyGeneral)andthePoliticallyExposedPersonsStrategicGroup(chaired
bytheSeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency).
DFIDisinvolvedintheseinitiativesinvariousways–forexamplebyfundingpoliceunitsto
investigatebriberyandmoneylaunderingandprovidingthesecretariatforthePolitically
ExposedPersonsStrategicGroup.The2009WhitePaperalsocommitsDFIDtofurtheraction
inthisarea,includingthroughmorefinancialsupportforassetrecoverythroughtheUK
criminaljusticesystem.
EarlierthisyeartheGovernmentintroducedaBriberyBill,tobebroughtintothenext
Parliamentarysession,whichwillmakeUKlawcompliantwiththeOECDAnti-Bribery
ConventionandmakebriberybyUKcompaniesabroadacriminaloffence.
TheGovernmenthasalsointroducedaseriesofmoneylaunderingregulations,themost
recentofwhichwasbroughtin2007aspartofEUlaw,andwhichrequiresbankstotighten
checksonpoliticallyexposedpersonsandreportsuspicionstotheauthorities.
ThePublicServiceAgreementonreducinginternationalpoverty(PSA29)hasasectionon
effectivestates,andincludesextendingtheEITIapproachtoconstructionand
pharmaceuticalindustries,aswellassupportingUKinvestigationsofallegationsofbribery
overseas,moneylaunderingofcorruptionassetsandhelpingpoorcountriesrecoverstolen
assets.However,themaindeliverydepartmentsaretheFCOandDFID,andthelatterwas
givenresponsibilityforleadingtheactionplanoninternationalcorruptionin2006.Thereis
nomentionofBIS,theHomeOffice,theTreasuryortheFinancialServicesAuthority.Equally,
PSA6,whichrelatestocorporategovernance,isledbyBISbutmakesnoparticularmention
ofcorruptionoverseas.

HowjoinedupisGovernmentinpractice?
Inpractice,theUKGovernmenthasnottakenaninternationalleadonbriberyoverseas,
preventionofmoneylaunderingofcorruptionassetsortherecoveryofstolenassets.
TheOECDAnti-BriberyConventionwasratifiedin1999,soithastaken10yearsforthe
GovernmenttoevenintroduceappropriatelegislationtoParliament.Overthatperiodthe
OECDhasbeenhighlycriticaloftheUK’senforcementrecord.Themostrecentreportofthe
OECDmonitoringgroupstatesthat:

20.Thedefinitionofpoliticallyexposedpersonsincludes:‘headsofStateorofGovernment,seniorpoliticians,seniorgovernment,
judicialormilitaryofficials,seniorexecutivesofstate-ownedcorporations,importantpartyofficialsandclosefamilymembersor
closeassociatesofallofthese.’FATF(2007:41)
44 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

TheWorkingGroupisdisappointedandseriouslyconcernedwiththeunsatisfactory
implementationoftheConventionbytheUK.ThecontinuedfailureoftheUKto
addressdeficienciesinitslawsonbriberyofforeignpublicofficialsandoncorporate
liabilityforforeignbriberyhashinderedinvestigations. (OECDWorkingGroupon
Bribery2009:143)
InarecentTransparencyInternationalreportonenforcementoftheOECDConvention,the
UKranksfifteenth,behindKorea,ItalyandJapan(HeimannandDell2009).Instarkcontrast
withcountriesliketheUS,therehadalsobeennoprosecutionofaUKcompanyforoverseas
bribery(despitemanyallegations)untilSeptember2009(whenconstructioncompany
MabeyandJohnsonwasconvictedofbriberyinJamaica,Ghana,Bangladesh,Madagascar,
MozambiqueandAngola).Famously,acaseagainstBAESystemsforbriberyinSaudiArabia
wasalsodroppedongroundsofnationalsecurityin2006(althoughtheSeriousFraudOffice
isseekingaprosecutionofBAEinrelationtoothercountries,includingTanzaniaandSouth
Africa).
Oneoftheproblemshasbeenthelackofresourcesallocatedforpursuingcases.In2006,
DFIDgave£6millionoverthreeyearstofundinvestigationsbytheCityofLondonpolice,
whodealwithmoreminorcorruptioncases.However,themajorcaseshavebeenthe
responsibilityoftheSeriousFraudOffice,whountilveryrecentlydidnotmakethisissuea
priority.
Otherpartsofgovernmenthavealsohadafairlyrelaxedapproachtoenforcementoflaws
againstbribery.TheExportCreditGuaranteeDepartment,whichinsurescompanies
undertakingcontractsandinvestmentsindevelopingcountriesagainstpoliticalrisk,had
proceduresinplacetopreventbribery,buthadneversanctionedanycompany.In2004it
proposedweakeningtheseproceduresafterdiscussionwithsomeofitsclients,butthiswas
challengedinjudicialreviewbycampaigners,andthedecisionwassubsequentlyreversed.
Therecordonmoneylaunderinghasalsobeenweakinthepast.TheUKisalow-tax
jurisdictionandLondonamajorfinancialcentre,makingitanattractivedestinationforelites
seekingtoplacefundsoutsidetheirowncountries.Inacasethatbecameamajor
embarrassmentfortheGovernment,thedeeplycorruptNigerianmilitarydictatorSani
Abacha(whoisestimatedtohavestolensomeUS$4billionfrompublicfunds),movedover
US$1.3billionthroughtheCityofLondonduringaperiodinthe1990swhentherewereEU
sanctionsonhimandhisfamily.Ofthismoney,onlyatinyproportionwaseverreturnedto
Nigeria.Thisepisodedemonstratedthewhollyinadequatearrangementsinplace,andledto
theintroductionofnewregulationsonmoneylaunderingin2003andanewProceedsof
CrimeActin2002.Nevertheless,aslateas2006anFSAsurveyfoundthatbankswerestill
notimplementingregulationsonpoliticallyexposedpersonsintheproperway(FSA2006).

Corruption:conclusions
Inrelationtobroadergovernmentactiononcorruptionandbribery,thepressureforchange
hasoftencomemorefromexternalactors,suchastheOECD,theEUandanti-corruption
campaigners,thanfromDFID,whichhashadrelativelylittlepurchase.Asoneexternal
observernoted,eventheEITI,DFID’sbiggestsuccessinshapingtheexternalenvironmentto
reduceopportunitiesforgrandcorruption,hashappenedinisolationfromotherpartsof
government.Infact,theEITIshouldarguablyhavehadstronglinkswith,orevenbeen
locatedin,thedepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills.
DFID’slimitedroleandsuccessindrivingthisagendaacrossgovernmentistheresultof
severalfactors.Oneisthetendencytohaveaninstitutionalratherthanpoliticalanalysisof
weakandfailingstates.Thisdoesappeartobechanging,albeitslowly.Anotherisascarcity
ofstaffwithstrongbackgroundsandexpertiseintheprivatesectorandbanking,whocould
buildthecaseforactionmorestrongly.However,athirdisthat,likemigration,thisisan
inherentlydifficultagenda,withsomepowerfulUKcommercialinterestsatstake,andaction
45 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

isalsohinderedbyareluctance(atleastbeforethefinancialcrisis)toregulatetheUK’s
financialsector;DFIDdoesnotcurrentlyhavesufficientpoliticalorinstitutionalstrengthto
counterthesestronginterests.21

21.Itisworthrememberingthat,ontheoccasionthatClareShortasSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentclashed
withthePrimeMinisteronacaseofsuspectedcorruption–aBAEdealtosupplyaradarsysteminTanzaniain2001–shelost.
46 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

4.Climatechange
Climatechangeisnowwidelyrecognisedasthegreatestlong-termchallengefacing
humanity.The2007HumanDevelopmentReportarguesthatfailuretodealwithclimate
change‘willconsignthepoorest40percentoftheworld’spopulation–some2.6billion
people–toafutureofdiminishedopportunity’(UNDP2007:2).

Climatechangeanddevelopmentoutcomes
Climatechangecandirectlyaffectdevelopmentoutcomesthroughanumberofdifferent
routes(IPCC2007):
•Agriculturalproductionandfoodsecurity
•Waterstressandwaterinsecurity
•Risingsealevelsandexposuretoclimatedisasters
•Ecosystemsandbiodiversity
•Humanhealth.
Belowwepresentevidenceonbroadassessments.Comprehensiveassessmentsofthelikely
impactsofclimatechangeonparticularleastdevelopedcountries,alongwithactionplans
foradaptation,havebeendevelopedinNationalAdaptationProgrammesofAction(for
furtherinformationseeUNFCC2010).
Themajorimpactsofunmitigatedclimatechangeonagriculture,fromhotterdrier
conditions,floodsandcoastalerosion,areexpectedtocomeinthedevelopingworld,with
decreasesinproductivityofmorethan25percentpossibleinSouthAsia,muchofAfrica
andLatinAmericaby2080(Cline2007).Cropyieldsinaridandtropicalregionscouldbe
reducedwithevenarelativelymodestglobalaveragetemperatureincreaseof1–2°C.
Africa,alreadytheworld’spoorestcontinent,istheregionmostatrisk,withsomecountries
facingpotentialfallsinyieldsof50percent.Withalmost60percentofthepopulation
workinginagriculture,andagriculturealsoplayingakeyroleinGDPandexports,thereare
massiveimplicationsforfoodsecurityandpoverty.Upto600millionpeoplewillbeat
additionalriskofhungerworldwideby2080.
Someearlyeffectsarearguablyalreadybeginningtobefelt,withdroughtsnowaregular
occurrenceinSouthernAfricaandtheHornofAfricainparticular.Onerecentsurveyofthe
adaptiveneedsofpastoralistsindrylandsintheHornofAfricausedlocalisedmeteorological
datafromKenyaandTanzaniashowingincreasingtemperaturesandhigherrainfallinthe
rainyseason(HumanitarianPolicyGroup2009)–althoughthe2007IPCCreportpointsout
thattheliteratureonagriculturehasnotyetestablishedafirmtrendatawiderlevel.Outside
ofAfrica,drought-proneareasofIndiacouldalsobebadlyaffected(UNDP2007).
Lessrainfallinsomeareas(alongwithdecreasedriverflowsbecauseofglacierretreat)will
alsomeanincreasednumbersofpeoplewithinsufficientavailabilityofwater–upto1.8
billionby2080(UNDP2007).TherearealreadysignsofcollapsingriversystemsinChina
andfallinggroundwaterlevelsinSouthAsiaandintheMiddleEast.Wateravailabilityisof
coursealsorelatedtohumandisease.
Thewarmingoftheclimaticsystemwilldirectlyproducemorefrequentandmorepowerful
tropicalstorms,hurricanesandcyclones,bringingwiththemfloodingandlandslides.In
addition,sealevelswillriseinthelongrun,althoughthereismuchuncertaintyabouthow
muchby.Thereisalreadyaclearpatternofincreasesinclimate-relatednaturaldisastersin
thelast25years,especiallyflooding(UNICEFUK2008).Thenumberofpeopleaffectedby
climate-relateddisastersisnowrunningatover250millionperyear(UNDP2007,Oxfam
2009).Poorerpeopleareoverwhelminglymoreatriskfromclimate-relatedevents.InOECD
47 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

countries,itisestimatedthatonein1,500peopleisaffectedbyclimatedisaster.The
comparablefigurefordevelopingcountriesisonein19–ariskdifferentialof79(UNDP
2007).
Someofthemostwidespreadbutalsomostcompleximpactsofclimatechangeon
developmentwillbeonhumanhealth,workingviatheavailabilityofcleanwaterfor
drinking,andforsanitation,butalsoviachangesintheconditionsforvectorsformajor
diseases,especiallymalaria.Anestimatedadditional220–400millionpeoplecouldbe
exposedtomalaria,andagain,suchimpactsarealreadyvisible,forexampleinEastAfricain
2007(UNDP2007).
Theseimpactsofclimatechangecanbeseenas‘shocks’–orexternalneweventsortrends
thathaveanimpactonsocietyandeconomy.Thedegreetowhichacountrycandealwith
theseshocksdependsonitscapacitytodealwithshocksingeneral,whethereconomic(like
asuddenriseinthepriceofoil)orsomeothershock(theriseofHIV/AIDSinAfricacanbe
seeninthisway).Thestrongerthesocietyandeconomyatthetimeoftheshock,thebetter
placeditwillbetodealwiththechangeitbrings.
Thisperspectiveisimportantbecauseitmeansthatweshouldbeparticularlyconcerned
aboutthepotentialfollow-onimplicationsofclimateimpactsincountriesthatarealready
fragile.Itisinthesecountriesthatchangesinrainfallpatternsmightleadtomovementsof
populationsandconflictsoverlandandotherresources.EighteencountriesdefinedbyDFID
as‘fragilestates’arealsoclassedasthemostvulnerabletoclimatechange(Agulhas2007).
InternationalAlerthasidentified46countriesatriskofclimate-relatedconflict(2007).
Therelationshipbetweengreenhousegasemissions(especiallycarbondioxide),climate
changeanditsoverallimpactsiscomplex,uncertainandnon-linear(Stern2007,Jametand
Corfee-Morlot2009).Wearealreadyexperiencingtheimpactsofsomeclimatechange,and
irrevocablycommittedtomore,giventhepersistenceoftoday’semissionsintheatmosphere.
However,itisclearthatmitigatingfurtherclimatechangeasfaraspossibleiscentraltothe
policyagendaneededtoprotectdevelopmentaloutcomes,andchildren’swell-beingand
rightsinparticular.
Ofcourse,thisisnotaneasyagenda,requiringstringentemissionsreductionsnotonlyin
developedcountries,butalsoinemergingindustrialpowers(AndersonandBows2008,Baer
etal 2008).Sinceachievingthesereductionsinvolveslarge-scaleandeconomicallyand
politicallycostlychangesonbothsides,thecurrentprognosisforinternationalagreementis
notgood(LockwoodandPendleton2009,Helm2009).
Atthesametime,thosecountriesfacingtheworstimpactsofclimatechangeincludemany
oftheworld’spoorest,sothereisbothamoralandanhistoricalresponsibilityonricher(and
lessaffected)countriestohelpwithadaptation.However,thisalsoinvolvessomechallenges,
suchasthemobilisationoflargesumsofmoney–perhapsUS$100–150billionayear–ata
timeofworldwidefinancialcrisisandrecession.
This,then,isthepolicychallengethatDFIDandtheUKGovernmentfaces.Climatechange
representsanenormousthreattopeopleindevelopingcountries.Theimpactsof
unmitigatedclimatechangearelikelytobesevereandmulti-faceted,workingthroughmany
differentchannels.Atthesametime,achievingeffectivemitigationofandadaptationto
climatechangewillbeverydifficult,requiringinternationalagreementandlargecosts(see
UNDP2007,Birdsalletal 2005,Collieretal 2008).

Climatechangeandchildwell-being
Theimpactsofclimatechangeonthewell-beingandrightsofchildrenhavebeenexplored
indetailbyUNICEF(UNICEFUK2008,UNICEFIRC2008;seealsoSC-UK2008).These
impactsarelikelytobeparticularlysevere,bothbecausechildrenaremorevulnerableto
somerisks(suchasillness),butalsobecausetheyfindithardertorealisetheirrights(for
instance,theyoftencomelastinlineforfood).
48 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Inthemostdirecteffects,children’slivesandhealthwillbeatriskfromclimate-related
disasters,whilechildren’srightswillfrequentlybedeniedthroughthedisasterreliefresponse
(seePlanInternationalandWorldVisionInternational2009).Childdeathandillnesscanalso
beexpectedtoincreasefromcommunicablediseases,especiallymalaria,water-borne
diseasesanddiarrhoea.Childrenarelikelytosufferespeciallyfromanincreaseinfood
insecurity,withbreast-feedinginfantssufferingviaadeclineintheirmother’sbreast-milk.
Children’seducationwillbemoreofteninterruptedbyclimate-relatedcrises,whichcanhave
long-termimpactsoneducationalattainment(BangayandBlum2009).Morewidely,the
lossofincomethatcomesfromadeclineinagriculturalincomesandforcedmigrationfrom
floodingwillmeangreaterpoverty,morechildrenoutofschoolandchildrenatagreaterrisk
ofharmfromconflict.
Theseoutcomesarenotjusttheoreticalpredictions.UNICEFUK(2008)reviewedsomeof
theimpactsofhazardousweathereventsonchildrenin2007,whichinclude:4.2million
Bangladeshichildrenaffectedbyextrememonsoonrains,whichalsodamagedordestroyed
3,000primaryschools;10,000childrenmadehomelessinJamaicabyHurricaneDeanand
200schoolsinSudandestroyedbyfloods,disruptingtheeducationofsome45,000children
(UNICEFUK2008).

DFID’sapproachtoclimatechangeanddevelopment
ClimatechangefirstappearedasamajorthemeforDFIDinits2006WhitePaper.Priorto
that,DFIDhadhardlydevotedanyresourcestotheissue,withonlyafewpeopleworkingon
climatechange.Thisquicklyscaledup,andwithclimatechangeoneoftheprioritiesfora
newSecretaryofStatefrom2007,fivenewteamshavebeencreated,withover40people
nowinvolvedinpolicy,internationalnegotiationsandassistancetoaidprogramming.The
levelofattentiongiventoclimatechangehasincreasedagainwiththenewWhitePaper,
whichstatesthat:‘Climatechangeissocriticaltotheprospectsofdevelopmentthatitwill
takecentrestageintheUK’sinternationaldevelopmentefforts’(DFID2009:54).
OnefocusforthisisgettingDFIDcountryaidprogrammestobuildthecapacitytoanalyse
theimpactsofclimatechange,identifyvulnerablesectorsandpeopleandplaninvestments
tobuildresilience.DFIDisrunninganumberofPilotProgrammesforClimateResilience
(PPCR)incountriesincludingNepal,BoliviaandZambia.
Overthelastfewyearsthishasnotbeenastraightforwardprocess.SomeDFIDprogrammes
(forexampleinBangladesh),havepaidalotofattentiontoclimatechange,butforothers
climatechangecanbeperceivedasyetanotherissuetoaddtoanalreadyovercrowdedlist
ofpriorities.Atthesametime,someofthecountriesthatwillbemostaffectedbythe
impactsofclimatechangeareweakorevenfailingstates(seeabove)withlittleinterestin
buildingcapacityforplanningofthiskind.Overall,oneseniorDFIDofficialsaw
mainstreaminganawarenessofclimatechangeasthesinglemostimportantchallengein
implementingthenewWhitePaper.
However,thereisalsorecognitionthatbecauseoftheglobalnatureofclimatechangeand
theneedforinternationalcollectiveaction,justchangingDFIDcountryprogrammesto
supportadaptationisnotgoingtobeasufficientresponse.Formitigatingevenmore
dangerousclimatechangeand,crucially,forsecuringthefundingneededforadaptation,
DFIDhastogetinvolvedinUKGovernmentnegotiationsataninternationallevel.
Thisimperativemeansworkingwithotherdepartments,especiallytheFCOandDECC.It
raisesthequestionofhowthoserelationshipswork,andwhetherDFIDhasbeeneffectivein
keepingadevelopmentalperspectiveinoverallgovernmentpolicyandstrategy.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesonclimatechangeanddevelopment?
Asinsomeotherareas,suchasconflictortrade,UKpolicyonclimatechangeappearsquite
coherent.Asthe2009DFIDWhitePapernotes:‘Ourdevelopmentandclimateaspirations
forCopenhagenoverlapsignificantly–acomprehensive,fairandequitabledealat
49 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Copenhagenthattacklesclimatechangeeffectivelyalsohasthepotentialtobethemost
importantdevelopmentagreementofthedecade’(DFID2009:50).
TheoverallmitigationgoalofUKpolicyistolimitglobaltemperaturerisetonomorethan
2°C.AsspeltoutintheDFIDWhitePaper–andaswrittenintotheclimatechangePSA27,
whichtasksDECC,FCOandDFIDwithjointdelivery–theUK’sobjectiveintheinternational
climatenegotiationsistoachieveaglobaldealonmitigationandadaptationthatincludes:a
50percentreductioninglobalemissionsby2050from1990levels;a‘fairandequitable
divisionofeffort’betweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries;areformofcarbonmarkets
toincludetheforestrysector;andsupportforlow-carbontechnologiesandsupportfor
adaptation–thecurrentnegotiatingposition,laidoutbythePrimeMinisterinJune2009,is
aninternationalfundofsomeUS$100billionayearby2020,largelyadditionaltocurrentaid
commitments.However,accordingtomostclimatemodels,evena50percentreductionin
greenhousegasemissionsstillleavesasignificantriskoftemperaturerisesofmorethan2°C.
AndersonandBows(2009)arguethata4°Criseismorelikely,whileHansenetal (2008)
say6°Cisadistinctpossibility.
In2007theGovernmentannouncedthecreationofan£800millionfund(theinternational
EnvironmentalTransformationFund)tosupportclimatechangeadaptationandmitigationin
developingcountries.ThisfundhasnowbeenusedasthebasisforanewStrategicClimate
FundattheWorldBank.Thesignificanceofthisforthisreportisthatthefundisjointlyrun
byDFIDandDECC.AlthoughDFIDhasinsomesensestakenaclearlead,thedirect
involvementofDECCinwhatisineffectUKaidprogrammingisasignificantdeparture,asis
thestatedobjectiveofthefundtoprovidemodelsoffinancingthatcaninformthe
internationalclimatenegotiations.
TheGovernmenthasalsocreatedanumberofcross-Whitehallgroupsonclimatetotryto
coordinatestrategy.TheclimatenegotiationsarehandledbytheEuropeandGlobalIssues
SecretariatintheCabinetOffice,withthePrimeMinister’sadhocCabinetCommitteein
InternationalClimateChangebroughtinatkeymoments.Furtherdownthehierarchy,there
isadirector-levelgroupbetweenthethreedepartments,aswellascross-departmentalpolicy
teamsonissueslikefinanceandforestry.

Howjoinedupisgovernmentinpractice?
Whenitcomestotheinternationallevel,theUKlooksmorejoined-upinpracticeonclimate
changethanonalmostanyotherissue.Thismaybeinpartbecauseclimatechangeisanew
issue,withoutlong-standingarrangementsinWhitehall,soDFIDhasengagedfromthe
beginningoftheprocessandcoordinationhasnotbeenlimitedbyentrencheddepartmental
objectivesorstructures.
Oneexamplethatalmostallintervieweespointedtowasthepolicyonfinanceforadaptation
andmitigationindevelopingcountries,announcedbythePrimeMinisterinJune2009.This
wasnotableinproposingaseriousleveloffunding(althoughlessthandevelopmentand
environmentNGOswanted),andinmakingacommitmenttotheprinciplethatnewmoney,
additionaltoODA,isneeded.DFIDhasalsoworkedhardtotrytoensurethatthelessonsof
thelimitstoaidconditionalityandtheimportanceofcountryownershiphavebeenlearned
innewclimatefunds.ThisisseenasadecisionofmajorimportanceforDFID.Withoutit,in
thewordsofoneseniorinterviewee,‘wewouldhavegoneintoCopenhagenbehindthepack
andnotinfrontofit,andwithouraidbudgetunderthreatofbeingeroded’.
Tosomeextent,theUKpositiononfinanceisaresultofstructuralfeaturesoftheclimate
issue.TheUKGovernmentwantsaglobaldeal,butnodealispossiblewithoutthemajor
developingcountries,allofwhomwantsignificantadditionalfinanceforadaptationand
mitigation.Atthesametime,however,thepolicyisanoutcomeofpoliticalandanalytical
effortbyDFID,notleastbecauseanydecisioninvolvingadditionalmoneyisalwayshard
won.
50 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

WhilealltheMinistersinvolvedhadasimilarbroadapproachtotheclimatetalks,strong
leadershipfromtheInternationalDevelopmentSecretarywasessential.Inthewordsofone
official:‘Wewouldnothavegotthedecisionasitwasonadditionalitywithoutastrong
politicalvoice…thiswasnotjustgoingtoameetingandreadingfromabrief,thiswasvery
muchdirectpersonalengagementbytheminister,anditneededapowerfulministertodo
that.’
Atthesametime,DFID(andDECC)officialsworkedhardtopreparethegroundand
anticipateobjections,especiallyfromtheTreasury.Accordingtoonesource,ittookovertwo
yearstogettothePrimeMinister’sspeech,butthisanalyticalworkwasworththeeffort:
‘There’ssomuchatstakeforDFIDintheclimatedebate,wecouldn’tleaveittochance.’
Overthelasttwotothreeyears,thisprocessofengagementwithotherdepartments–
especiallyDECC(andpreviouslyDEFRA)–hasraisedthereputationofDFIDasbeing
capableofprovidingseriousanalysisonthecostsofclimateimpactsandhowtosetup
deliveryandgovernancemechanismsforclimatefinance.ItalsomeansthatDFIDis
increasinglyinvolvedinthekeydiscussions.Accordingtooneinterviewee:‘Some
departmentsneedtolearnstillthatweshouldbeinvitedtomeetings,butit’sgettingbetter.
Forinstance,anythingoninternationalenergy,we’renowinvolved.Similarlyanything
financeandclimate,we’reinvolvedtogivethedevelopmentperspective.’
ThisprocesshasalsomadeDFIDmoreconfidentaboutwhatotherdepartmentsaredoing.
Forexample,theFCOhasrecentlycreatedanewcadreof‘climateattachés’toidentifyand
influencekeyactorsshapingthinkingonclimatepolicyinothercountries,bothinsideand
outsideofgovernment.InitialconcerninDFIDaboutthisinitiativeturnedintoarealisation
thatitcouldhelpDFID’sownobjectives.Inthewordsofoneofficial:‘Ifanything,nowIsee
[theclimateattachés]asaresourcethatwecanusetoouradvantage….Ifwecomeupwith
theideasandthematerialtoharnessthatenergythenthat’sgreat,anditdoesn’treally
matterwhichbitofgovernmentthey’reworkingfor.’
Climatechangeemergesasaclearexampleofwherehavingadevelopmentperspective
makeswidereffortstoachieveoverallgovernmentobjectivesmoreeffective,andtheadded
valueofwhatoneintervieweedescribedasa‘reallystrongnew-styleDFIDwithabigpolicy
capacity’.MoreandmoreUKpolicyobjectiveshaveglobaldimensions,andatthesametime
theinternationalactorsarechanging.AsoneDFIDintervieweeargued,50yearsagothe
UK’scounterpartsweredevelopedcountries,butnow–asverymuchwiththeclimate
negotiations–theyareincreasinglyalsodevelopingcountries.Thisshiftmeansthatitis
essentialthattheUKGovernmentbecomesawareofdifferentconcernsandperspectives,
andthisiswhereDFID’svaluelies.AnFCOofficialtoldus:‘Intheidealworld,DFIDarepart
oftheconversations[withotherdepartments],hammeringoutwhatwethinkisafairdeal
…andsobythetimeyou’reinNewDelhi…you’rehopefullyrepresentingsomethingthat
bothsidesfeelcomfortablewith.’
Againstthisverypositivepictureofinternationalpolicycoherence,theoneimportantareaof
climatepolicywhereDFIDhashadmuchlessinfluenceisintheUK’sdomesticemissions
reductionsefforts.DomesticperformanceshouldmattertoDFID.Significantlyandrapidly
reducingemissionsathomethrougheffectiveclimatepolicies,anddemonstratinghowother
countriescandothisatreasonablecost,shouldbeakeypartoftheUK’sinternationalpolicy
onclimate(andanimportantindicatorofitscredibility).ButtheUK’srecordondomestic
climatepolicyandperformanceismixed.GreenhousegasemissionsfromtheUKitselfhave
fallenoverallsince1990andtheUKwillmeetitsKyototarget.However,thisisinlargepart
duetothe‘dashforgas’inelectricitygenerationinthe1990sfollowingprivatisation,for
reasonsunrelatedtoclimatepolicy.Inrecentyearscarbonemissionshaverisen.Inthepast,
specificissuesorpoliciesmayalsohavecreateddifficultyforDFID(andFCO),suchasthe
possibilityofnewinvestmentsincoal-firedpowergenerationora60percentemissions
reductiontargetfor2050.
51 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Domesticclimatepolicyhasstrengthenedinthelasttwoyears,andbothoftheabove
positionshavebeenreversed.However,despiteitsclaimtointernationalleadershipon
climate,theUKhasyettoachieveasignificantsustainedfallinemissionsthroughclimate
policy.Ifthiscontinuestobethecaseoverthenextfivetotenyears,thedevelopmental
implicationsoftheUK’sdomesticpolicies,andthemessagethecountryissendingtothe
restoftheworld,willbecomemuchmoreconcerning.

Climatechange:conclusions
Climatechangeisacoherencesuccessstory,asfarasUKGovernmentpolicyandpracticego.
Fromarelativelylowprofilejustafewyearsago,climatechangehasemergedasabigissue
forDFID,justasthepaceofbothdomesticpolicyandinternationalnegotiationshavepicked
up.ThecreationofDECCandthetakingupofclimatechangebytheFCOhavealsohelped
enormously.DFIDhasincreasinglybeenseenbyotherdepartmentsasaddingvalue,through
goodanalysisoftheimpactsofclimatechangefordevelopingcountries.
Thisispartlyastructuraloutcome,inthesensethatglobalagreementonclimatedepends
cruciallyondevelopingcountries,especiallythelargeemitters.Thishasbroughthigh-level
commitmenttotheissuefrombothDFIDandtheFCO.Itmayalsobepreciselybecause
climatechangeisanewproblem,meaningthatnoonedepartmentfeelsdefensiveaboutthe
interestofothers.Atthesametime,itappearsthatoncedifferentdepartmentsrealisethe
valueofjoined-upanalysisandstrategyintermsofpolicyoutcomes,thisinitselfcreatesthe
incentiveforstaffinonedepartmenttocontinuetoworkwiththoseinothers.Perhaps
unsurprisingly,DFIDhasbeenlessable(andlesswilling)toengageontheissueoftheUK’s
ownemissions,wherethereisasharperconflictbetweentheUK’sowninterestsandthose
ofdevelopingcountries.
52 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

5.Internationalmigration
Someoftheissuesexaminedinthisreport,suchasclimatechangeorconflict,haveclearly
negativeimpactsondevelopmentoutcomes.Theimpactofmigration,liketrade,ismore
complex,especiallyintermsofitsimplicationsforchildwell-beingandrights.

Internationalmigrationanddevelopmentoutcomes
Migrationcanhavebothpositiveandnegativedevelopmentimpacts,partlydependenton
thedifferenttypesofmigrationinvolvedandthedifferentcontextsinwhichittakesplace.22
Economistsoftenconsidermigrationtobeanalogoustotradeingoodsandservices,and
economicmodellingsuggeststhatincreasedinternationalmigrationhasthepotentialto
increaseglobaloutput,growthandwell-being(Winteretal 2003).Inthesimplestterms,
manydevelopingcountrieshaveashortageofcapitalrelativetolabour,whilerichcountries
faceshortagesoflabour.Inthesecircumstances,migrationfrompoortorichcountriescan
benefitbothsendingandreceivingcountries.Aswithtrade,however,theimpactof
migrationonindividualdevelopingcountries,operatinginacontextfarfromthefreemarket
ofeconomictheory,ishardtopredict.
Thebulkofmigrationinthedevelopingworldhappenswithincountries,mostlyfromruralto
urbanareas.Forthemajorityofthepoorestpeopleindevelopingcountries,itisinternal
migrationthathasthemostdirectimpactontheirlives.However,ourfocushereisonareas
ofpolicywheretheUKGovernmenthasamajorimpact,whichmeansthatwefocuson
internationalmigration,andonvoluntary migration,whichisusuallydrivenbyeconomic
factors,ratherthanonforcedmigration,asylumortrafficking.Althoughthesemigration
flowshavesignificantimpactsontheindividualsconcerned,theUK’smigration policies
usuallyhaverelativelylittleimpactonthesendingcountriesinquestion–flowsaredrivenby
conflictandpoliticalcriseswhicharebestaddressedwithotherpolicies(seeChapters2and
3).
Migrantswhomovefrompoortorichcountriesarelikelytoreapsignificanteconomic
benefitsasaresult.Thiscanliftpeopleoutofpoverty,andmayallowthemtotransfer
resourcestofriendsandfamilyathome,creatingdirectdevelopmentbenefits(Institutefor
PublicPolicyResearchandGlobalDevelopmentNetwork2010).However,theimpactsof
internationalmigrationondevelopmentalsoworkthroughbroadersocialnetworks,andlocal
andnationaleconomies,tohavemuchwiderimpacts.Thisisparticularlyimportantbecause
inmostcases(althoughnotall),migrantsmovingfrompoorcountriestoricheronesarenot
theverypoorest.Exceptionstothisinclude,forexample,thebulkofmigrantsfromMexico
totheUS,whoareunskilledandfromthepoorestpartsofthecountry.ManyBangladeshi
migrantstotheUKcomefromtheverypoorSylhetiregion.
Theliteratureontherelationshipbetweeninternationalmigrationanddevelopmenttendsto
focusonthreekeyissues:
•Theimportanceofmigrants’remittancesfordevelopment
•Thepotentiallynegativeimpactsof‘braindrain’
•Therelationshipbetweendiasporacommunitiesabroadanddevelopmentintheir
countriesoforigin.

22.Thereareagrowingnumberofmultilateralforumsandinitiativesdevotedtomigrationanddevelopment,includingtheHigh
LevelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentthatwasorganisedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyin2006,andthe
now-annualmeetingsoftheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment,whichwaslaunchedinBrusselsinJuly2007.
53 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Remittances
Globally,remittancesfrominternationalmigrationhavebeensteadilyincreasinginvolume
overthepasttwodecades.Althoughitisdifficulttogetafullyaccuratepictureofthescale
ofinternationalremittanceflows–sincetheyarefrequentlysentthroughinformalchannels
–itisclearthattheyconstituteasignificantandrelativelystablesourceofforeignincome
fordevelopingcountries.TheWorldBankestimatesthatdevelopingcountriesreceived
US$167billioninremittancesin2005(WorldBank2007a),secondonlytoforeigndirect
investmentasasourceofexternalfinance(IMF2005).Remittancesareoftenconsiderably
higherthanaid,particularlyforsomecountries.Forexample,theamountremittedto
Bangladeshin2005byoverseasworkerswasestimatedatUS$2.2billion,significantlymore
thantheUS$1.4billionthatwasreceivedininternationalODA(DFID2007).Insomeofthe
pooresteconomies,remittancesrepresentalargeshareofGDPandexportearnings(DFID
2007).
Researchsuggeststhatremittancescanhaveanumberofbeneficialimpactsintermsof
povertyreductionanddevelopment,bothforindividualmigrantsandtheirfamiliesandfor
thecommunitiestheylivewithin.Theyofferapredictablesourceofincomeandsavingsfor
poorfamilies(andtendtobelessaffectedbyadverseeconomicconditionsthanother
incomesources).Becausetheyflowproportionatelymoretopoorerfamiliesthanotherforms
offinance,remittancescanalsosometimeshelptoreducelevelsofinequalityinhighly
dividedsocieties(forexample,WorldBank2006b).Inmanycasesremittancesareinvestedin
education,healthandconsumergoodsandservices(UNDP2009),whichwilllikelybe
beneficialfordevelopment,andespeciallyforchildhealth,well-beingandrights.Remittance
incomeisofteninvestedinlocalservicesandindustries,andissometimesusedascapitalto
createnewbusinesses.
Becauseremittancesflowdirectlytofamiliesinpoorcountries,theyalsoavoidtheproblems
ofcorruptionandineffectivenessassociatedwithfinancethatflowsviaweakstates.
However,conversely,theyareessentiallyprivateflowsofmoneyandcannotbedirectly
accessedbygovernmentanddirectedintopublicgoodsandinfrastructure(OECD2005).
Thereisalsoaconcernthatremittanceflowsmightencouragesomeindividualsorfamiliesin
developingcountriestowithdrawfromthelabourmarketandcometorelyonremittancesas
theirprimarysourceofincome(AbbottandPollard2004).Further,theoverallvalueof
remittancescanbedilutedbythehighcostsofsendingmoneyabroadandbyweakfinancial
systemsinfrastructureincountriesoforigin.
‘Braindrain’
Theemigrationofskilledprofessionalsfromdevelopingcountriescanrepresenta
considerablelossofhumancapital,whichisaverylimitedresourceformanysending
countries.Thesenegativeimpactsofmigrationaremostoftendiscussedinrelationto
educationandhealthsystemsindevelopingcountries,whichhavebeensignificantlyaffected
bythedepartureoftraineddoctors,nursesandteachers.Morewidely,‘braindrain’canlimit
economicgrowth,andcanalsolimitthereturnsongovernmentinvestmentineducation
(whichmayreducegovernment’sinclinationtoinvestinit).
BraindrainisaparticularlysignificantprobleminSub-SaharanAfrica,wherelowwages,
limitedemploymentopportunitiesandweakinfrastructurehavedrivenlargenumbersof
professionalstomigrateabroadinsearchofbetteropportunities(DFID2007).Onestudy
claimsthat‘thedepartureofhealthprofessionalshaserodedtheabilityofmedicalandsocial
servicesinseveralSub-Saharancountriestodeliverevenbasichealthandsocialneeds’,with
38ofthe47countriesintheregionunabletomeettheminimumWorldHealthOrganization
(WHO)standardof20physiciansper100,000people(Tebeje2005).
However,braindrainmaybebestunderstoodasasymptomratherthanacauseof
developmentproblems–skilledworkersoftenemigrateduetoalackofopportunitiesat
home.Thismeansthatitisnotnecessarilythecasethatpreventingbraindrainwillleadto
54 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

developmentbenefits;unlessopportunitiesexistathome,internationalbraindrainmaybe
replacedbyinternalbraindrainasskilledworkersareforcedintolow-skilledwork.Braindrain
thereforecannotbeaddressedbymigrationpolicyalone.
Infact,whilethelossofhumancapitalcanclearlycauseproblemsfordevelopment,what
lookslikea‘braindrain’mayinfactbea‘braingain’.Itisimportanttorememberthat
individualswhomigratefrompoorcountriesoftengainsignificantlyfromdoingso.But
skilledemigrationcanalsobringbenefitstosendingcountries,suchastheknowledge,skills,
technologyandcapitalthatmigrantsremitorbringwiththemwhentheyreturnhome,as
wellasthebusinessandtradenetworksthatareoftenestablishedbyabsentmigrantsand
diasporacommunities(DustmannandKirchkamp2001).Migrationcanalsostimulatemore
intangiblegains,forexamplebyprovidingincentivesforindividualsorfamiliestoinvestmore
moneyinhighereducationiftheybelievethatthiswillenhancetheirmigrationprospects
(WorldBank2006).Somelevelofskilledemigrationisthereforegoodfordevelopment.
Diasporas
Inrecentyears,theliteratureonmigrationanddevelopmenthasrecognisedthathighly-
skilledandwell-educateddiasporagroupscanimproveaccesstocapital,informationand
contactsforpeopleandcommunitiesintheircountriesoforigin,provideasourceofforeign
exchangeearningsandactasconduitsfortraderelationships(WorldBank2006).For
example,therearecurrentlymorethan600Mexican‘HomeTownAssociations’inover30US
cities,whichhavehelpedtodeveloptheirlocalitiesoforiginby,forexample,investinginthe
constructionofpublicinfrastructure,donatingvitalequipmentandbypromotingeducation
(GCIM2005).Diasporagroupscanalsostimulateeconomicdevelopmentintheircountries
oforiginmoredirectly;theexampleofoverseasChineseisoftencited,whoareestimatedto
havecontributed70percentofChina’sforeigndirectinvestmentbetween1985and2000
(KuznetsovandSabel2006).Anddiasporasareoftenthedrivingforcebehindthe
coordinationofdonorassistanceintheaftermathofwarsornaturaldisasters.Inthedecade
followingadevastatingearthquakeinArmeniain1988,diasporagroupsprovidedhuge
amountsofhumanitarianaid:approximatelyUS$630millionaccordingtooneestimate
(GevorkyanandGrigorian2003).
Therelationshipbetweendiasporasandconflictisalsostartingtoreceiveattentioninthe
literature.Manyanalystsseethesegroupsasaregressiveforce,perpetuatingconflictsand
insecuritythroughtheprovisionofeconomicandpoliticalsupporttoviolentmovementsin
theircountriesoforigin.Thisphenomenonhasbeenidentifiedinrelationtoprotracted
conflictsinEthiopia,Kashmir,SriLanka,Israel,Palestine,KosovoandKurdishgroupsinIraq
andTurkey(CollierandHoeffler2001,Kaldor2001,Vertovec2005,Østergaard-Nielsen
2006,PirkkalainenandAbdile2009).However,thisisonlyonesideofthestory.Although
lessresearchhasbeendoneonthisissue,thereisnowsomerecognitionofthepotentially
positiverolethatdiasporasmightplayinpeace-buildingefforts.Forexample,many
commentatorsbelievethatthemoderatinginfluenceoftheIrishdiasporaintheUSwas
instrumentalinconvincingtheIRAtoaccepttheGoodFridayAgreementin1998(Newland
andPatrick2004).
Beyondremittances,braindrain/gainanddiasporas,itisclearthatthereareawiderrangeof
developmentalimpactsthatflowfromtherapidmovementofpeoplearoundtheworld,
especiallythetransferofnewknowledge,skills,attitudesandtechnologiesthroughpeople
movement(DFID2007).Forexample,the‘feminisation’ofmigrationfromsomecountries
hasalteredtraditionalgenderroles,withanincreasingnumberofwomennowmoving
abroadinresponsetoademandforfemalelabour.Onestudyestimatesthatwomennow
accountfornearly65percentofSriLanka’srecordedmigrantpopulation(JollyandReeves
2005).Migrationbymencanalsoenhancetheopportunitiesavailabletowomenandcan
improvetheirstatus,particularlyiftheyassumeresponsibilityformanagingthehousehold’s
financesandexpenditurefollowingthedepartureofamaleheadofhousehold(vanDoorn
55 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

2003).Meanwhile,livingabroadcanexposemigrantstonewideasaboutequalityand
genderbalancewhichtheymightspreadmorewidelywhentheyreturnhome.However,if
migrants(bothmenandwomen)arenotgivenadequatesupportbysendingandreceiving
countries,theymaybecomevulnerabletoabuseandtrafficking(seeEldis2010).
Migrationandchildwell-being
Thelimitedamountofresearchthathasbeendoneontheimpactofmigrationonchildren
presentsamixedpicture(WhiteheadandHashim2005).Someresearchhasindicatedthat
childrenwholiveinhomeswhereadultshavemigratedmayhavebettereducationaland
healthoutcomes,possiblyasaresultofremittancesbeingspentonthesetwogoodsand
alsobecauseoftheknowledgebeingexchangedthroughmigrationnetworks(Bryant2005).
Butthesocialandemotionaldislocationcausedbyoneormoreabsentparentmayoffset
thesegainsifastronglysupportiveextendedfamilynetworkisnotinplace(Whiteheadand
Hashim2005).Thereareanumberofcomparativestudiessuggestingthatthechildrenof
migrantparentstendtoperformworseinschoolandtobelesssociallyadjustedthan
childrenwithbothparentsathome(UNICEF2007).
Anincreasingnumberofchildrenarethemselvesmigrants,notjustaspartoffamilies,but
alsoindependently.AsWhiteheadandHashim(2005)note,migrationcanhaveaprofound
effectonchildren,andthefocusofmuchconcernisontheextremeviolationoftherightsof
traffickedchildren,especiallyforpurposesofsexualexploitation.However,thevulnerability
oftraffickedchildrencanbeusedasasmokescreenforpoliciesthatrestricttherightsofa
widerrangeofpotentialchildmigrants,includingasylum-seekers,whileactuallyfailingto
protecttherightsofchildrenwhodomove(e.g.O’ConnellDavidsonandFarrow2007).In
fact,migrationmayprovideanopportunityforsomechildrentoescapesituationsofextreme
poverty(MigrationDRC2008).

DFID’sapproachtointernationalmigrationanddevelopment
Migrationfrompoortorichcountrieshasclearimpactsondevelopmentoutcomes.This
raisesanumberofquestionsforcountriesliketheUK,whichseektopromoteglobal
development:
•Howcanimmigrationpolicyinrichcountriesmaximiseopportunitiesforpeoplefrom
poorcountriestobenefitthemselves,theirfamilies,communities,andcountries?
•Howcanimmigrationpolicyinrichcountriesminimisethepotentialnegativeimpacts
ofmigration(particularlyofhighly-skilledpeople)ondevelopment?
•Howcanmigrant-receivingcountriescreateapolicyenvironment(forexample,with
respecttoeconomicintegration,remittances)thatmaximisesthepositive
developmentimpactsofmigrationfrompoorcountries?
•Howcanaidpoliciesandotherinterventionsindevelopingcountriestakeaccountof
internationalmigrationpatterns?
Incomparisonwithotherissuessuchastrade,DFIDhasnotmademigrationamajorfocus
forpolicy,anditplaysonlyaminorroleinthevisionsetoutinthe2009WhitePaper.
AccordingtoBlackandSward(2009)anindicationofthislowprofileisgivenbythefact
thattheFCOteamworkingonpromotingreturnofirregularmigrantsandfailedasylum
seekersiscurrentlyfivetimeslargerthantheteamfocusedonmigrationanddevelopmentin
DFID.
DFID’scurrentapproachislaidoutina2007policypaper(DFID2007).Thereisaclear
recognitionofthepotentialdevelopmentbenefitsofmigration,butalsothepotentialcosts,
andpolicyisframedintermsofmaximisingtheformerwhileminimisingthelatter.
Oninternationalmigration,thepolicypaperlaysoutthreekeyagendas–theimportanceof
providinglegalopportunitiestomigrate,addressingbraindrainthroughtrainingprogrammes
56 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

andincentivesforskilledworkersindevelopingcountriesandprotectingmigrants’rights
(includingthroughtheregulationofrecruitmentagencies).Thisbroadapproachresponds,at
leasttosomeextent,toallfourofthequestionssetoutabove.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesoninternationalmigrationand
development?
Overalongperiod,theUKhasbeenanimportantdestinationfordevelopingcountry
migrants,andparticularlythosewithhistoricallinksthroughtheCommonwealth.Thefirst
majorwaveofpost-warmigrantscamefromtheCaribbean,especiallyJamaica,startingin
thelate1940s,andpeakingatmorethan66,000peopleayearintheearly1960s.By1970,
therewerealmost300,000peoplefromtheCaribbeanlivingintheUK(Dorling2009).A
secondwaveofmajorimmigration,fromSouthAsia(includingviaEastAfrica),cameinthe
1970sand1980s,numberinghundredsofthousandsayearatitspeak,andthiscontinues
todayinlargepartthrough‘familyreunion’immigrationroutes.Morerecently,theUKhas
alsoseensignificantnumbersofpeoplemigratingfromvariousAfricancountries,especially
NigeriaandZimbabwe,aswellaslargenumberof(mostlyshort-term)migrantsfromthe
new,poorercountriesoftheEU.
SomeoftheearlywavesofmigrationwereactivelyorganisedbytheGovernmenttofill
labourshortagesinkeysectorsandservices.TheNationalHealthServicehaslongreliedon
recruitment,bothtemporaryandpermanent,fromabroad.In2002,halfofthedoctorsfully
registeredwiththeGeneralMedicalCouncilhadbeentrainedinothercountries,mostlyfrom
outsidetheEU(Bach2003).ThisproportionsubsequentlyroseastheDepartmentofHealth
ranaglobalrecruitmentplanfordoctorsintheearly2000stocovertheshortfallindomestic
supply.Similarly,aboutoneintenofthoseregisteringwiththeNursingandMidwifery
Councilin2008camefromoutsidetheEU,withIndia,thePhilippines,NigeriaandNepal
beingmajorsendingcountriesinthedevelopingworld(NursingandMidwiferyCouncil
2008).
Theperiodofsustainedeconomicgrowthandtightlabourmarketsfromthemid-1990s
onwardssawanincreaseinimmigration,bothfromwithintheEU(especiallyafterthe
accessionofnewcountriestotheEUin2004)andfromtherestoftheworld.TheUK
developedofanumberoftemporaryvisaschemesformigrantsoutsidetheEU,someaimed
atspecificsectors(Barberetal 2005),aswellaslonger-termmigrationschemestargetedat
highly-skilledworkers.Since2008,theGovernmenthasconsolidatedtheseschemesintoa
single‘pointsbasedsystem’orPBS(seeUKBA2009).Thatsystemallowsskilledmigrants
fromoutsidetheEUtocometotheUKtowork,iftheyhaveenoughpoints,basedon
qualificationsandexperience.Tier3ofthescheme,forunskilledworkers,iscurrentlynot
opentomigrantsfromoutsidetheEU.
AlongsidethesedevelopmentsinthelegalframeworkforimmigrationtotheUK,therehas
beenasignificantriseinthepopulationofirregularmigrantsintheUK.Thisisinpart
becausetheimmigrationregimehasnotcreatedmanylegalmigrationroutesforlow-skilled
workers.Demandfortheseworkersintheeconomyhasnotbeenmatchedbyopportunities
forlegalmigration,whichhascreatedworkopportunitiesforillegalentrantsandforvisa
over-stayers.Thefailureofthesystemforprocessingasylumclaimstocopewitharapid
increaseinapplicationsduringthe1990salsocreatedabacklogofclaims,andapublic
concernaboutlackofcontrolintheimmigrationsystem.Thechallengeofcontrollingthe
immigrationsystem,alongsidepublicconcernaboutthetotallevelofimmigration,hasmade
immigrationadifficultpoliticalissueforgovernment.
Governmenthasbeenfacedwithacleareconomicneedforimmigration,butahostilepublic
andpoliticalclimate,andresolvingthistensionhas(understandably)beentheprimaryfocus
ofsuccessiveministersintheHomeOffice.Thispressurehasmeantthattherehasbeenlittle
roomforinternationaldevelopmentobjectivestobeintegratedintomigrationpolicy.As
DFID’sownpolicypapernotes:
57 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Untilrecentlymigrationanddevelopmenthavebeentreatedasveryseparatepolicy
areas.Theprioritiesformigrationauthoritieshavebeentocontrolthemovementof
peopleandintegrateregularmigrantsintonationallabourmarketsandwider
society.(DFID2007:33)
Infact,migrationisanareawheretheUK’sinternationaldevelopmentobjectivesarenot
easytoreconcilewithdomesticpolicyandpoliticalimperatives.TheGovernmentdoeshavea
migrationPSAthatrecognisesthelinksbetweenmigrationanddevelopment.Thereisa
strongfocusondevelopment(orlackofit)asadriverofmigration,butthescopefor
migrationtosupportdevelopmentisalsoacknowledged.
TheinternationalpovertyreductionPSADeliveryAgreementalsomentionsmigration(but
onlyonce,withrespecttotheEU,whereasitreferencestrademorethan30times).However,
severalofourintervieweesacknowledgedthatthisisanissuewhere,despitesome
complementarities,therearemajortensionsinpolicyobjectives.
Atrulydevelopment-friendlyimmigrationpolicywouldhaveanumberoffeatureswhich
mightinclude:
•amoreopenimmigrationpolicy,allowingforgreaternumbersofunskilledworkers
fromthedevelopingworldtoworkintheUK
•encouragingcircularmigration,sothatmigrantscantakenewskillsandcapitalback
totheirhomecountry,mitigating‘braindrain’andmaximising‘braingain’
•ensuringmigrantsintheUKhaveopportunitiestodeveloptheirskills,maximisetheir
earnings,andremitearningssecurely,easilyandcheaply
•supportformigrantstomaintainlinkswithhome,forexampleflexibilityinthe
arrangementsbywhichmigrantscanvisittheirfamilies.

(SeeHouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentCommittee2004:70,Newland
2004andChappellandMulley2010)
Policyinitiativeshavebeendevelopedinseveraloftheseareas.Forexample,theUKhas
developed‘remittancepartnerships’withanumberofcountries(forexampleBangladesh),
whichexplicitlypromotethedevelopmentofandaccesstothefinancialsystemsothat
remittancescanbeusedmoreproductively.However,twokeypolicytensionsremain.
Politicalpressuresmilitateagainstanychangestoopenuptheimmigrationsystemtomore
migrantsfordevelopingcountries,particularlylow-skilledmigrants.Atthesametime,the
UK’sneedforhighly-skilledworkers,andtheneedtosupportthelong-termintegrationof
migrantsintheUK,conflictwiththeneedtoencouragehighly-skilledmigrantsfrom
developingcountriestoreturnhome.

Howjoined-upisgovernmentinpractice?
ThepotentialtensionsbetweentheUK’sdomesticpolicyobjectivesonimmigrationand
internationalpolicyobjectivesondevelopmentarereflectedinthewaygovernmentworksin
practiceonthisissue.DFID’sstrategypaperassertsthat:
DFIDwillworkwithcolleaguesintheHomeOffice,FCOandtheTreasurytoensure
thattheGovernmentapproachtomanagedmigrationtakesaccountofpoverty-
reductionanddevelopmentoutcomes. (DFID2007:35)
However,thepicturegivenbyourintervieweeswasthatDFIDhasnotsofarfocusedits
migrationworkonchangingtheUKimmigrationsystem.DFID’smainmigrationpriorities
havebeentoworkwithDFIDprogrammesinanumberofkeydevelopingcountries(India,
forexample)tomaximisethebenefitsofmigration,tobuildabetterevidencebaseonthe
interactionsbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentandtoinfluencedebatesonmigrationand
developmentinglobalandEUforums.Thisworkisimportant,andmaywellbeeffectivein
58 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

increasingthedevelopmentbenefitsofmigration,butithasnotgonetotheheartofthe
potentialtensionswithinUKpolicy.
TherehavebeensomerecenteffortstomaketheUK’simmigrationpoliciesmore
development-friendly.Interestingly,theinitiativeforthisseemstohavecomefromtheHome
OfficeImmigrationMinisterratherthanfromDFID.Thisagendaisstartingtotacklethe
secondofthetwotensionsbetweentheUK’simmigrationanddevelopmentobjectives,as
outlinedabove–changestopolicyseemlikelytofocusontheneedtopromotecircular
migrationandreturnbyskilledmigrantsfromdevelopingcountries.Inthecurrentpolitical
climate,itseemsunlikelythattheUKwillgivemoreunskilledworkersfromdeveloping
countriesaccesstotheUKlabourmarket,eventhoughthiscouldbringsignificant
developmentbenefits.AnyreformstothePBSwilllikelyfocusonthepartsoftheagenda
wherethereissomecommonalityofinterest(suchasbraindrainandreturn)andavoidthe
areaswheretherearemoreconflictinginterests(likelow-skilledmigrationthroughTier3).23
DFIDhasbeenmoresuccessfulin‘defending’itspovertyreductionobjectivesandaid
programmesfromattemptsbytheHomeOfficeandFCOtopursueotherUKmigration
policyintereststhroughaidresourcesbyapplyingwhatoneseniorofficialdescribedas
‘continualpressure’.Inparticular,DFIDhasconsistentlyresistedpressurestomakeanyaid
conditionalonrecipientcountries’willingnesstocooperatewiththeGovernmentonthe
returnoffailedasylumseekersandirregularmigrantsfromtheUK.However,DFIDis
workingwiththeFCOandtheHomeOfficeonaspecific‘ReturnandReintegrationFund’
whichfundsspecificjointworkonmigrationindevelopingcountries(forexampleprison
refurbishment,inparttoallowtherepatriationofforeignprisonersfromtheUK).Thefundis
administeredbytheFCO,butisjointlystaffedbyDFID.
Thestructuresforjointworkingonmigrationanddevelopmentdoseemtobelargelyin
place.AmigrationanddevelopmentcommitteebringingtogetherministersfromDFID,
UKBA,theFCOandtheMinistryofJusticeintheHomeOfficemeetsquarterly,andofficials
fromthedifferentdepartmentsmeetregularlyandcommunicateeffectively.Butperhaps
becauseDFIDhasfocuseditsmigrationworkoutsideWhitehall(workingwithother
governments,andDFIDprogrammesincountries),andbecauseDFIDhasbeenkeento
defenditspoliciesandprogrammingindevelopingcountriesfromUKimmigrationconcerns,
itappearsthatUKBAandtheFCOhaveformedastrongbilateralrelationship(forexample,
undertakingjointbusinessplanningonmigrationissues),which,whileeffective,has
inevitablylackedsomeofthedevelopmentperspective.
Butasoneintervieweeputit,‘changingthestructureswon’tnecessarilyhelpanything’,
sincethenatureoftherelationshipsisbasedontheunderlyingpolitics,andtheunderlying
politicsofmigrationareproblematic,tosaytheleast.

Internationalmigration–conclusions
In2004,theHouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentCommitteeproducedareport
onmigrationanddevelopment.OnUKpolicycoherence,theCommitteearguedthatDFID’s
interestsandobjectiveswereunlikelytobethesameasthoseoftheHomeOfficeorof
otherdepartmentswithaninterestinmigration–giventhatDFID’sfocusisonpoverty
reduction,whiletheHomeOffice’sconcernsliewithimmigrationandasylum.However,it
urgedmorejoined-upworkingacross‘theGovernmentasawhole’,with‘open,informed,
evidence-baseddiscussionsratherthan…institutionalinertia’.Itcontinued:
ItisonlythroughsuchdiscussionsthatDepartmentscanexplorewhetherandhow
theirpoliciescanbemademorecoherent.Ifdevelopmentobjectivesaretogetafair
hearing,thenitisimportantthatDFIDhasaseatatthetable.(HoCIDC2004:81)

23.TheUKscoresbadlyonthemigrationmeasureoftheCentreforGlobalDevelopment’sCommitmenttoDevelopmentIndex,in
largepartbecauseofthelackoflow-skilledmigrationroutestotheUKforpeoplefromdevelopingcountries.
59 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

TheCommitteewentontocallforDFIDtobefullyinvolvedintheformulationofpolicieson
migration.However,itisclearthatsomefiveyearson,thishasnottakenplace.
Thereappeartobetworeasonsforthis.Oneisthatthereisagenuineconflictofpolicy
objectives,especiallyinhowopentheUKistounskilledmigrantsfromdevelopingcountries.
TheGovernmentshouldtacklethisconflictheadon:havingUKdomesticmigrationpolicy
objectivesisperfectlylegitimate,butthedevelopmentimpactsofpolicycouldbemore
systematicallyevaluatedandconsideredindecision-making,sothatdevelopmentbenefits
canbemaximised.Thetrade-offsbetweentheUK’sdomesticandinternationaldevelopment
objectivesalsoneedtobeexplainedtransparentlytothepublic.
Asecondfactoristhat–likecorruptionbyUKcompaniesindevelopingcountries–
migrationisapoliticallydifficultissueforDFID,andoneonwhichitreceiveslittlesupport
fromNo.10,incontrastwiththedevelopmentalaspectsofotherissueslikeclimatechange.
Itisperhapsunsurprisingthatseniorministersarewaryofengagingwithanissueas
contentiousasimmigration,butwithoutpoliticalengagementfromthetopthesynergies
betweenmigrationanddevelopmentwillnotberealised.UKcivilsocietyshouldalsobe
moreconfidentindemandingthattheGovernmenttacklesthisissue,andbewillingtogive
politicalcreditandsupportasandwhenprogressismade.
60 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

6.Towardsgreatercoherence
AstrongpictureoftheevolutionofUKdevelopmentpolicyandofDFIDemergesfromour
researchandthischapterbeginsbymappingthechanges.

Apictureofchange
In1997DFIDwasanewdepartment,anditsfirstSecretaryofState,ClareShort,was
determinedtogiveitanindependentidentityandastrongremitthatmarkedabreakfrom
thepast.Intheearlyyears,DFIDestablisheditsownwaysofworking,skillbaseandculture,
andwasoftenlocatedin-country,separatelyfromtheFCO.Italsodevelopedaclose
relationshipwiththeexternalinternationaldevelopmentcommunity,especiallythelarge
developmentNGOs,whichhavebeenanimportantlobbyfortheexpansionoftheaid
budgetsince1997.
The1997WhitePaperandthe2002InternationalDevelopmentActgavedevelopment
policyaclearpovertyreductionfocus(andasetoftargetsintheMillenniumDevelopment
Goals),backeduppoliticallybypersonalcommitmentandinterest(especiallyinAfrica)from
twosuccessivePrimeMinisters.ThetaskofmeetingtheMDGswasinterpretedand
presentedpubliclyandpoliticallybyministerslargely,althoughnotexclusively,intermsof
increasingaidflowsanddeliveryofbasicservices(includingimprovingthecapacitiesof
developingcountrygovernments).OnlylatterlyhavesomepartsofDFIDstartedtoprioritise
thinkingabouttheirapproachindevelopingcountriesinawaymoreinformedbypolitical
andpoliticaleconomyanalysis.24
Withinthiscontext,policycoherence,andtheinteractionbetweenDFIDandother
governmentdepartments,hasevolvedinaratherunevenway,oftenoutsidethepolitical
spotlight.
TradepolicywastargetedfromtheverystartofDFID’sexistence:anearlydecisionwas
takentoinvestinexpertisewithinDFID,andtoengagewiththethenDepartmentofTrade
andIndustry(DTI)tomaketheargumentthatoncetradepolicymovedawayfrom
mercantilism,developmentbecamethemainissue.Thisargumentwasbroadlyaccepted,
withinageneralframeoftradeliberalisation.
TherewasalsoanevolutioninDFID’sapproachtoconflictquiteearlyon,withhumanitarian
militaryinterventionintheBalkansandSierraLeoneforcingthedepartmenttothinkabout
howitworkedalongsidetheMinistryofDefence(MOD),andabouttherelationships
betweenstabilisation,reconstructionandlong-termdevelopment.Asomewhatdifferentset
ofissueshasariseninthemorerecentcasesofIraqandAfghanistan,wherethebasisfor
interventionwasdifferent,andthesecurityproblemsmoreintractable.Whileworkinthese
countriesaccountsforarelativelysmallpartofDFID’sprogramming,ithasattractedalarge
amountofpoliticaldebate.ItisimportantthatDFIDfindswaysofworkingthatareeffective
insituationslikeAfghanistan,butequally,itwouldbeamistaketoreconfigureDFID’sentire
approachonthebasisofthedemandsoftheseparticularcases.
Inthelastfewyears,therehasalsobeenmajorengagementwithNo.10andDECConthe
internationalaspectsofclimatechange.DFIDhasalsopressedsuccessfullyforactionby
otherdepartmentsonquitespecificissues,suchasthebanningofclustermunitionsbythe
UKandthepromotionofaninternationalagreementonthesameissue.
Onarangeofotherissues(includingmigration),DFIDhaseithernotmademucheffortto
shapepolicyinotherpartsofgovernment,orhaslackedtheresources,argumentsorpolitical

24.SuchastheDriversofChangeexercises,StrategicConflictAnalyses,andtheCountryGovernanceAnalyses.Mostofthese
datefromthemid-2000sorlater.
61 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

weighttodoso.Thesetendtobeinareasthatarepoliticallymoredifficult,whereUK
interestsarenotclearlyalignedwiththoseofpoorcountries,orwhereDFIDstaffhavelittle
experience.
Atthesametime,otherdepartmentshavealsochanged,graduallyrealisingthevalueofa
longer-termdevelopmentalperspectivefortheirownobjectives,andpartlydrivenbythe
effortsofthecentretodrivecoherencethroughjointPSAs.
TherearealsokeydistinctionstobemadebetweenareaswheretheUKcouldinprinciple
deliverpolicycoherence(atleasttosomeextent)unilaterally(forexample,onmigrationor
corruption)andareaswherepolicyisset,oroutcomesdetermined,attheEuropeanor
internationallevel(suchasaroundconflict,tradeandclimatechange).
ItisbeyondthescopeofthisreporttoexploretheEuropeanandinternationaldimensionsof
policycoherence,butitisworthmakingtwokeypointshere.First,theUK’sabilitytodeliver
policycoherenceinEuropean/internationalareasofpolicywillonlybeasgoodasitsability
toinfluencemultilateralinstitutionsandinternationalpartners.Thisisandshouldbeamajor
priorityforDFIDinthecomingyears–justasitneedstobecomemoreeffectivein
influencingothersinWhitehall,itneedstobecomemoreeffectiveininfluencing
internationally.ButDFIDcannotdothisalone–particularlyinEurope,andinareassuchas
conflictandclimatechange,itsabilitytoinfluencemultilateralinstitutionsandinternational
partnersisdependentontheUKGovernment’swidereffortsandstrategicpositioning.
Second,thepolicycoherenceagendawill,undertheLisbonTreaty,increasinglybeshapedby
theEU.TheUKiswellpositionedtotakealeadhere,but,aswithmanyEUpolicyagendas,
progressseemslikelytobeslow,sotheUKneedstoadoptapositionofleadingbyexample
andmovingaheadwithitsownpolicycoherenceagenda,regardlessofprogressattheEU
level.
Becauseoftheunevennessdescribedabove,wefoundawiderangeofinterpretationsasto
howfarDFIDisengagedwiththerestofgovernment,andhowfarthedevelopmentagenda
isbeddeddownacrossWhitehall.Some,especiallythoseoutsidegovernment,seetheglass
ashalfempty,andarguethatDFIDisstilltechnocraticinitsapproach,drivenbyanarrow
interpretationoftheMDGs,andseparatistinitsculture.Others,especiallythosewithin
governmentandwithinDFID,seetheglassashalffull,andarguethatDFIDhaschanged
substantiallyinthelastfiveyears,thattheUKapproachtodevelopmentpolicyismuchmore
coherentthanitwasin1997,thatDFIDisalotclosertoothergovernmentdepartments
thanitusedtobe,andmoreinfluentialinWhitehall.AlthoughsomeperceptionsofDFIDas
technocraticandcutofffromtherestofgovernmentmaystemfrompracticesthathavenow
beenchanged,orontheexperienceinoneparticularareaofpolicy,theseperceptionsshould
themselvesbeaconcernforDFIDifitwantstomaintainitsinfluenceandreach.
Therearealsodifferentviewsonthequestionof‘wherenext?’forDFID,andforUK
developmentpolicymorewidely.Somearguethat,facedwithincreasingfiscalandpolitical
pressuresinthecomingyears,DFIDshoulddefendits‘separateness’andindependenceeven
more;othersthatthechangingnatureofpovertyrequiresamorejoined-upapproachacross
government.

Theneedforamoreproactiveapproachtopolicycoherence
WethinkthatitisimportantbothforUKdevelopmentpolicyandforDFIDasadepartment
thatthecoherenceofgovernmentpolicyandpracticedeepensandbecomesmore
systematic.AsnotedintheIntroduction,thisisnottosaythattheGovernmentorDFIDhas
gotitwronginthepast,butinsteadthatnowmightbeapropitioustimetore-examinethe
balancebetweendifferentareasofpolicy.
Thereareatleasttworeasonsthatcoherenceshouldbeapriority.Oneissimplythatthe
trendsdrivingpolicycoherence,asanessentialresponsetodevelopmentproblems,havenot
62 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

goneaway.Theevidencepresentedinthisreportshowsthatdevelopmentoutcomesdepend
cruciallyonfactorsbeyondaid,andthatUKGovernmentpoliciesacrossarangeofareas
(notlimitedtothosediscussedinthisreport)matterforpovertyreductionandbasicrights.
Ontheotherside,UKinterestsareincreasinglyboundupwithsuccessfullyrespondingtoa
rangeofinternationalissues(suchasclimatechange).AnarrowviewoftheUK’snational
interestislookingincreasinglyoutdated.
Theotherreasonisthat,althoughDFID’sexistenceandtheprincipleofaUKinternational
developmentpolicynottiedtoanarrowly-definednationalinterestarenowwellestablished
andnotseriouslyindoubt,therearelikelytobepressuresinthecomingfiscalandpolitical
environment.Itmaybesuggestedthatanincreasingpartoftheaidbudgetshouldberouted
throughotherdepartments,andthatDFID’sownbudgetshouldbeallocatedinwaysthat
reflectforeignpolicypriorities.Theremayalsobepressurestoalignoperationaldecisionsin
particularcountrieswithforeignandsecuritypolicypriorities(ConservativeParty2009).
Inthesecircumstances,DFIDmustbeonthefrontfoot,makingastrongcaseforitsglobal
povertyreductionobjectives;fortheneedforotherdepartmentstoengagewiththose
objectivesinpracticeaswellaspolicy;forthebenefitsthatalonger-termdevelopment
perspectivecanofferforarangeofUKobjectives,andfortheskills,experienceandanalysis
thatDFIDhas.
ThismeansDFIDcontinuingtobuildcloserrelationshipswithotherdepartments,whichdoes
bringrisks.However,DFIDcannotaffordtocontinuebeingseenas‘theNGOdownthe
road’,asithasbeencaricaturedwithinotherpartsofgovernment–politicallyand
pragmatically,perceptionsmatterasmuchasreality.Instead,inthewordsofone
interviewee,thedepartmentmustbecomemoreofa‘Whitehallwarrior’.DFIDofficialsare
typicallyhighlyprofessionalinthewaytheyusedatatomaketheircaseonarangeofissues,
butasoneFCOintervieweeargued,networksarewhatgetthingsdoneinWhitehall,and
DFIDislatetothegame,havingspentthebestpartofdecadeestablishingindependence
fromotherdepartments.25
ItisclearthatDFID,andindeedgovernmentmorewidely,ismuchhappieroperatingunder
conditionsofrealorconstructedconsensusthanitisindealingwithgenuinepolicytensions
betweendifferentgovernmentobjectives.Thekeyproblemishowgovernmentcanmanage
thosetensionsinaproductiveway,andhowitcanbeensuredthatthedevelopment
perspectiveisrepresentedproperly.Therealtestofpolicycoherenceisinresponding
appropriatelytosituationswheretherearegenuineconflictsortrade-offsbetweenpolicy
objectives.
Acommonresponsetothechallengesofpolicycoherenceistoreformexistingcross-
Whitehallbodiesorproposenewbodies.Forexample,theConservativesproposeraisingthe
StabilisationUnitaboveitscurrentparentdepartments,aswellascreatinganewNational
SecurityCouncil,toreplacetheexistingNationalSecurity,InternationalRelationsand
Development(NSID)Committee.Onthebasisoftheevidencecollectedforthisreport,we
believethatchangingthearchitectureofgovernmentisnotsufficienttodrivechange,and
maynotbenecessaryinmanyareasofdevelopmentpolicy.
Inordertodelivermorecoherentpoliciesfordevelopment,thepriorityshouldratherbeto
changetheincentivesthatoperatewithinthearchitecturethatcurrentlyexists,andto
developmoreeffectivejointstrategiesbackedupbyarenewedpoliticalcommitmentto
coherencefordevelopment,whileworkingtoincreasepublicunderstandingoftheissues.

25.Thisrelationshipbuildingalsomeansbeingwillingtolisten,andtobeinfluencedaswellasseekingtoinfluenceothers.The
2006OECDDACpeerreviewofDFIDwasgenerallyfullofpraisefortheDepartment,butdidobservethatDFIDcouldbe‘longon
strategy,shortontactics’(OECDDAC2006:24)whenworkingwithotherdonors,andsomeofourintervieweessuggestedthe
sameistrueinitsrelationshipsacrossWhitehall.
63 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

MakingWhitehallworkbetterfordevelopment:architecture,strategies,
incentivesandskills
Notwithstandingthelimitsofachievingchangethroughalteringthearchitectureof
government,itisimportanttonotethatthewayinwhichtheUKGovernmentisorganised
producesastructuraltendencyfordepartmentstoworkasseparatesilos.Despitethe
commoncomplaintaboutthecentralisationofpowerinrecentdecades,itisSecretariesof
Statewhoholdthelegislativeleversandoperationalbudgets,soenforcingcoherenceacross
thewholeofgovernmentisdifficult.ThePrimeMinisterandtheCabinetOfficecan
interveneonoccasion,butnotallthetime.Atthisverybasiclevel,thestructureand
incentivesmakeunjoined-upgovernmentthedefaultposition.Itispartlythisstructural
problemthatexplainswhyactioncanbeslowevenwhenitisurgentlyneeded–asinthe
caseofAfghanistanwhereittook13monthstosetupacross-departmentalstrategyteam.
Cross-governmentmechanisms
Oneresponsetothisproblemistocreatecross-departmentalmechanisms,suchasjoint
committeesorfunds.Oneofthestrikingfindingsfromourinterviewsistheextenttowhich
thesecross-Whitehallmechanismsalreadyexistinalltheareaswelookedat,andatevery
level,fromCabinetcommitteeslikeNSIDdowntojointunitsliketheDFID-BIStradepolicy
teamsandspecialistfundsliketheStabilisationFundandtheConflictPreventionPool.
Akeyquestionunderthesecircumstancesiswhetherrecommendingthecreationoffurther
cross-departmentalmechanismsisuseful.Someofourinterviewees,bothinsideandoutside
government,didsuggestthatanewhigh-leveloverviewbodyisneeded.Therewere
effectivelytwoversionsofthisproposal–oneframedintermsofnationalsecurity,andthe
otherintermsoffragilestates.Some,includingtheConservativeParty(2009),propose
creatinganew,Cabinet-levelNationalSecurityCouncilorCommittee,whichwould
coordinateUKGovernmentresponsesincaseslikePakistanandAfghanistan,where
developmentobjectivesareinvolvedalongsideotherstrategicconcerns.Anotherproposalis
tohaveaCabinet-levelcommitteespecificallyconcernedwithwhole-of-government
approachestofragilestatesmorebroadly,anapproachthattheDutchgovernmenthas
experimentedwith.WealsoheardsomeproposalsforaMinisterforFragileStateswithmore
thanonedepartmentalaffiliation,inthesamewaythattheAfricaMinisterisco-locatedin
theFCOandDFID.
Amorecommonviewamongthoseweinterviewedwasthatthecross-departmental
architecturewasalreadytoocrowdedandfragmented26 anditwouldthereforebeunwiseto
createanotherstructure.Theproblemisnotsomuchinwhetheropportunitiestocoordinate
andcommunicatearethere,asinhowmuchtheyareactuallyusedinpractice–something
thatisinpartabouttheincentivesfacingofficials,andinpartaboutpoliticalleadershipand
strategyfromministers.
Inthewordsofoneinterviewee:‘The[cross-departmental]structuresareinplace–the
questioniswhatpositionsdepartmentstakeinthosestructuresandwhatdeterminesthose
positions,andwhatmessagesthePMsendsout.’Thisviewisechoedincommentsmadeby
BillRammell,MinisterfortheArmedForces,in2009inevidencetotheSelectDefence
Committee.Talkingaboutthetri-partiteCabinet-levelcommitteeresponsibleforoverseeing
WhitehallarrangementsfortheComprehensiveApproach,hesaid:
Ultimately,thisisaboutpoliticalwill.ItisabouttherelevantSecretariesofState
comingtogetherandpushingandpersuadingtheirWhitehalldepartmentstobreak
downthebarriers,tocutthroughthebureaucracy,tochallengetheculturesandsay
‘youhavegottoworkthisway’.Noamountofstructuralre-orientationisa
substituteforthat. (HoCDefenceCommittee2009:Q340)

26.Forexample,thereisaCabinet-leveladhoccommitteeonnationalsecuritythatmeetsonlyveryoccasionally,theCabinet
OfficeNSIDCommitteewhichmeetsmoreoftenbutwhichinturnhasanumberofdifferentsub-Committees.
64 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Externalcommentatorsmakethesamepoint.Oneseniorandhighlyexperiencedinterviewee
argued,citingtheexampleoftheHornofAfrica,thatwhatislackingiswhole-of-
government(oratleastDFID-FCO)strategiesforkeyregionsandcountries:‘TheUKhasthe
instruments–CPP,SU,StabilisationFund–butnovisible,publiclyjoined-upstrategy’.
Jointcountrystrategies
Intervieweesfromallthegovernmentdepartmentswetalkedtoarguedfortheimportance
ofjointcountrystrategies,forseveralreasons.Giventhatoneofthekeydifferencesbetween
DFIDandotherdepartments(especiallytheFCOandMOD)isthatDFIDtendstotakesa
long-termandbroaddevelopmentperspectivewhileotherssometimeshaveamorespecific
orshort-termview,thecorevalueofjointcountrystrategiesisthattheybringboth
perspectivestothetable,andclarifyandforceagreementonthetensionsandtrade-offs
betweentheminanexplicitway.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee,theprocessof
developingjointcountrystrategies‘isallaboutgettingacommonunderstandingofwhatthe
problemis.Thepoliticalheatgetstakenoutofit.Thatgetsyou70percentoftheway
there.’
Byhelpingtoresolvetensionsattheplanningstages,jointstrategiesreducetheriskof
frictionsarisingatanoperationallevel.Theyestablisha‘frameworkunderwhichdifferent
leverscanbeemployedbydifferentdepartments,butinpursuitofcommonobjectives’.In
addition,suchstrategieswouldhelpallowjointcountrybudgetsthatworkmoreflexibly
betweendepartments.FromtheDFIDperspective,jointcountrystrategiesinconflict-
affectedandfragilestateswouldalsohelptoensurethatdevelopmentconcernsfiguresmore
highlyontheagendasofboththeFCOandtheMOD.
Currentlysomecountrieshavejointstrategiesandsomedon’t.IftheUKhasasubstantial
militarydeploymentsomewhere,thenajointstrategyismorelikely,althougheveninsuch
casesitcanbeslowtobeformed.ForcountriesfurtherdowntheNSIDprioritylist,joint
countrystrategiesarerarer.
The2009DFIDWhitePaperpledgesthattheGovernmentwillproducewhole-of-
governmentstrategiesforallfragilestateswheretheUKhasasubstantialaidprogrammeby
June2010,acommitmentthatistobewelcomedandindeedwassupportedbyallour
interviewees.Wewouldsuggestthattheprocessofjointstrategiesshouldalsobeextended
toallcountrieswheretheUKhasbothasubstantialaidprogrammeandsignificantstrategic,
commercialorsecurityinterests.
Cross-governmentthematicstrategies
Someintervieweesalsofearedthatjointcountrystrategieswillbeadhocandinconsistent
withouthigher-levelthematicjointstrategiesthatallrelevantdepartmentscanbuyinto,and,
crucially,thatcanbeconnectedtotheallocationofresources.Itisclearthatatthislevel,of
broader,cross-Governmentstrategies,theCabinetOfficehasakeyconveningrole,andthat
Number10mustalsoexertstrongpoliticalleadership.
Inthespecificareaofconflictanddevelopment,aCabinetOffice-ledprocessofproducinga
ConflictStrategywasongoingatthetimeofwritingandduetofinishbytheendof2009,
butitisunclear,sofar,howthiswillbeconnectedtojointcountrystrategiesforcountriesin
oratriskofconflict,orindeedtocountrybudgets.Someintervieweesalsoarguedfora
NationalSecurityStrategythatiswiderthantheMOD’sDefenceStrategy,andthatisjoined
upwiththethinkingsetoutintheDevelopmentWhitePaper.
Someofourintervieweessuggestedthatathematicwhole-of-governmentInternational
DevelopmentStrategywouldbeawayofensuringthatallrelevantdepartmentstooka
developmentperspectiveonboard,andthatDFIDengagedwiththeexpertiseandobjectives
ofotherdepartmentsmoreeffectively.Theyarguedtheneedtobringtogethermore
effectivelytheUKdevelopmentdebateandthebroaderstrategicdebateabouttheUK’s
widerroleintheworld–atbothofficialandpoliticallevels.The2009WhitePaperisastep
65 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

intherightdirection,but(incommonwithpreviousinternationaldevelopmentwhitepapers)
iswidelyseenasa‘DFIDWhitePaper’,whichseemslikelytolimititsimpactinother
departments.
Theprocessofdevelopinganewwhole-of-governmentstrategywouldneedtoinvolvea
systematicanalysisofthedevelopmentimpactsofUKpolicies(including,butnotlimitedto,
thosediscussedinthisreport),andanhonestassessmentofthetrade-offsinvolved–some
ofwhichhavebeenidentifiedinsections1–5above.Itwouldrequiretheinvolvementof
seniorofficialsandministersfromanumberofkeydepartments,includingDFID,theFCO,
DECC,BIS,theTreasuryandtheMOD,andcouldhelptodevelopasolid,cross-Whitehall
consensusoninternationaldevelopment.ItwouldbuildonrecentWhitePapers,butwould
needtohavestrongerownershipacrossgovernment,andastrongerfocusonnon-DFID
policylevers.
TheFCOalreadyhasaninternationaldevelopmentobjectivereflectedwithinits
departmentalobjectives,asdosomeotherdepartments,butanInternationalDevelopment
Strategywouldbeatamuchhigherandmorepolitically-visiblelevel.Thiswouldnot(and
shouldnot)guaranteethatdevelopmentobjectiveswouldalwayswinoutagainstother
governmentobjectives,butitwouldmeanthatthedevelopmentalimpactsareunderstood
anddecisionsaremadetransparentlyonthatbasis.ThiswouldprovideaframeworkforDFID
toengagemoreconfidentlyonissueswheretheUKfacesrealconflictsofobjectives,andin
particularinareaswhereUKpoliciesmightharm,ratherthanhelp,development.
Whateverjointstrategiesaredeveloped,withoutanaccountabilitymechanism,thereisa
highriskthattheywillnotbeimplementedinanysystematicway.Thekeyaccountabilityin
theUKsystemistoParliament,especiallyviaSelectCommittees.Amorejoined-upapproach
withmeaningthereforeneedsmorecoherencebetweencommittees–forexample,by
requiringtheForeignSecretarytoreportonhowtheFCOhascontributedtothe
Government’sinternationaldevelopmentobjectives.Tosomeextentthishasstartedto
happen,buttheresponsibilitiesofvariouscommitteesshouldbeclarified.Across-
governmentInternationalDevelopmentStrategywouldneedtoincludeclearlinesof
ministerialandofficialaccountabilitytoParliament.
Incentivesandtargets
Asnotedabove,departmentalstructurescanmeanthatWhitehall’s‘defaultsetting’isfor
workinginsilos.Civilservicecareershavebeenstructuredtorewardexcellenceincore
departmentalactivitiesandconcerns,ratherthaninter-departmentalactivities.Often,
workinginacross-departmentalunithasofferednoclearpromotionpath.Oneunintended
consequenceofsuccessfuljointunits(suchastheTradePolicyUnit)isthattheycanbecome
rathercutofffrommainstreamdepartmentalcareerstructures.Asoneexternalcommentator
putit,up-and-comingcivilservantsdonotviewcross-Whitehalldialoguesandmechanisms
ascareerenhancing:‘Cross-Whitehallmeans“wedon’tbother”.’
Inordertoovercomethesebarrierstojointworking,proactivestepsmustbetakento
changeincentives.Thiscanbeachievedsuccessfully,andthereareexamplesofsuccessto
drawon,suchasthedepartmentalcooperationonsocialexclusion.Thetwomostimportant
requirementsforreformarerewardstructures,andtheexamplessetbyseniorstaff,who
determinethecultureofthedepartment.Inarecentsurveyofcivilservantsoncollaborative
workingacrossgovernment,EmslieandGordon(2008)foundthatthetopfactoridentified
asmostlikelytohelpensurethesuccessofcollaborativeworkinginitiativeswas‘seeing
seniorcivilservantssettinganexampleinworkingcollaboratively’.Anotherimportantfactor
was‘havinganobjectiverelatingtocollaborationintegratedintoeveryone’stargets’.Indeed,
foractivitiessuchastakingpartincross-departmentalmeetingsandpreparingjoint
strategiestohappensystematically,theywillhavetobewrittenintobothpromotioncriteria
andappraisalobjectives.
66 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Thereareagainsomesignsthatthismaybehappening.Ontheexamplesetbyseniorstaff,
BillJeffrey,PermanentUnder-SecretaryattheMOD,hasconvenedagroupofDirector
Generalsfromanumberofdepartmentstogettogetherandstarttalkingaboutstrategy,
creatingaspacefordiscussionandthinking.AndaccordingtoseniorofficialsinDFID,
workingwithothersacrossWhitehallisnowwrittenintopromotioncriteria,asisthe
experienceofhavingworkedinafragilestate,requiringamorepoliticaloutlookandmore
jointworkingwiththeFCOandMOD–althoughotherintervieweesarguedthatthiswas
not,orhasnotconsistentlybeen,thecase.
Higher-levelincentivesprovidedbydepartmentalandcross-governmentaltargetsarealso
importantifpolicycoherenceistobeachieved.AsnotedintheIntroduction,someeffortsto
makePSAtargets(includingPSA29onprogresstowardstheMDGs)cross-governmental
havebeenmade.Inpractice,however,veryfewofourintervieweesoutsideDFIDfeltthat
PSA29appliedtothem,whileinDFID,PSA29seemedtodominatecorporatethinkingat
theexpenseofotherrelevantPSAs(suchasthoseonconflictandclimatechange).Thefact
thatPSA29isfocusedonprogresstowardstheMDGshasalsotendedtofavourpolicies
(especiallyaidpolicies)focusedontheimmediateandproximatedriversofthespecified
developmentoutcomes(forexampleinhealthandeducation),attheexpenseofbroaderor
morelong-termpolicyareas.IftheUKwantstodeliverpolicycoherencefordevelopment,
theGovernmentneedstoprioritiseandmeasuretherightthings.
Skillsandcapacity
Afinalpointisaboutthekindsofskillsneeded,bothinDFIDbutinotherdepartments,if
thereistobemoreeffectivecoherenceinpoliciesrelatingtodevelopment.Several
intervieweeswereoftheviewthatDFIDneededmorestaffwithexpertiseinpolitical(as
opposedtogovernance)analysis.Thisperhapsalsorelatestothesuggestionfromsomethat
DFIDistoo‘technocratic’.WhilemanyDFIDstaffhavehigh-levelpolicyexpertiseindifferent
areas,theyareoftendrawnfromprofessionaldevelopmentbackgrounds.Theresultingfocus
onresearch,evidenceandgooddevelopmentpracticehasbeenimportantinestablishing
DFIDasaworld-leadingdonoragency.However,itisalsothecasethatmanyDFIDofficials
lackexperienceofworkingelsewhereinWhitehall,andthatDFIDstaffareperceivedasa
slightly‘differentbreed’bythoseelsewhereingovernment.
Inadditiontoexperiencedconflictadvisers,DFIDalsoneedstobeabletodrawonpeople
whohavebeentrainedtoworkinconflictsituations,andwiththemilitary.Ifthiscannotbe
deliveredthroughcurrentchannels(specifically,thejointinitiativebetweentheArmyand
theStabilisationUnit),thenaseparatejointcivilian-militaryforceneedstobecreated.DFID
alsoneedsmorepeoplewithprivatesectorexperience,toensurecoherencewithtradeand
investmentpolicy.
However,otherdepartmentsalsoneednewskills.BISneedseconomistswhohavetrainingin
developmenteconomics.Giventhatpovertyreductionisnowanobjectiveofforeignpolicy,
FCOdiplomatsshouldbegivenmoreofabackgroundindevelopment.Thearmedforces
needpeopleskilledinworkingwithcivilians.
Ajoined-upapproachcouldalsobebetterdeliveredthroughamoreinformedsharingof
existingstaffskills.OneintervieweepointedoutthattheFCOhas50researchanalysts–
expertsonissuesandcountries.Notonlyisthisresourcenotsystematicallymadeavailableto
therestofWhitehall,butatpresentmanydepartmentsarenotevenawareofit.
Finally,DFIDfacesparticularchallengesassociatedwitharisingbudgetbutcappedorfalling
administrativebudgetsandcapacity.Althoughthereisnodoubtscopeforexistingresources
tobeusedmoreefficientlyandstrategically,itisalsoimportantthatDFIDhassufficientstaff
resourcestoengagemoreeffectivelyonawiderrangeofissuesinWhitehalland
internationally.Spendingonsuchcapacityshouldbeseenasastrategicinvestmentinwider
impact,notasanadministrativedrainonprogrammefunds.
67 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Policyintopractice:Joined-upgovernmentincountryposts
TheaccountsweheardofhowtheGovernment–mostlyDFIDandtheFCObutalso
sometimestheMOD,BISandothers–functionsinpostsindevelopingcountriesshowhuge
variation,involvingsomeofthebestandsomeoftheworstpractice.Withconsiderable
autonomygiventocountryoffices(especiallybyDFID),alotdependsontheindividuals
involvedandtherelationshipsbetweentheDFIDcountryheadandtheAmbassador/High
Commissionerinparticular.DFIDandtheFCOcanbejoinedupandworkingcloselyina
numberofareas,asisthecasecurrentlyinIndia27 orDRC.Inothercasestheseparate
locationofstaffhasmeantlittlecommunication.Particularlyinsituationsofacutestress,a
lackofmutualunderstandingbetweenpartsofgovernmentcanhaveseriousconsequences.
Atthesametime,becauseofitsdecentralisednature,DFID’sownpracticeishighlyvariable.
Forexample,somecountriesthatclearlyneedagoodunderstandingofconflictlackconflict
advisers.Equally,theimplicationsofclimatechangehavenotbeentakenonboardforall
programmes,andmanyDFIDcountryofficesarenotmuchengagedwithtradepolicy.
DFID’shighlydecentralisedmodelhasdeliveredsignificantbenefits–thefreedomafforded
tocountryheadshasallowedthemtoinnovate,andengageflexiblywithgovernmentsand
otherpartnersontheground.However,severalofourintervieweessuggestedthatthelack
ofclearcentralpoliciesinsomeareashadledtounnecessary‘wheelreinvention’atcountry
level.
Historically,theseparateorganisation(andoftenlocation)ofDFIDin-countryhasbeenan
importantpartofestablishingitsownidentityandindependencefromtheFCO.Somefelt
thatthishadbeenachieved,andthatorganisationalandphysicalseparationwasnow
unnecessary.However,otherssuggestedthatsharedanalysisandstrategy,explicitly
negotiated,asdescribedabove,wouldovercomemanyoftheproblems,withouttheneed
fororganisationalchange–thisisconsistentwithourfindingsatthelevelofcentral
government.
Therewasastrongsensethatsharedanalysisandstrategy(whetherintheformofjoint
countrystrategies,orwiderthematicstrategies)couldformthebasisofclearerrule-based
frameworksforcountryofficestoworkfrom,andformoreformalisedrelationshipsbetween
differentpartsofgovernmentoperatingatcountrylevel.Countryofficesshouldplayalead
roleindevelopingjointcountrystrategies,andshouldalsoplayanimportantroleinforming
widerthematicstrategies.
Jointstrategiesonparticularpolicythemesarealreadyemerginginareassuchasconflict,as
thenewWhitePaperfocusonpeace-buildingandstate-buildingwillrequireheadsof
countryofficestothinkmoreaboutconflict,andwillnecessitatethedevelopmentofan
over-archingcentralstrategyforthedeploymentofconflictadvisers.Specificareasoffocus
suchasthiscouldprovidethebasisforthedevelopmentofwidermodelsofbestpracticeto
covertherangeofissueswherecross-governmentalcoordinationatcountrylevelis
important.Policycoherenceatthecentre,basedonaseriousengagementwithcountry
offices,couldmakeDFID’sdecentralisedmodelworkbetter.
Thisdebatewillbeparticularlyimportantinthecomingyears,especiallyif,asseemslikely,a
changeofgovernmentpromptstherelationshipbetweenDFIDandtheFCOtobe
reassessed.TheConservativeParty’s2009policygreenpaperoninternationaldevelopment
notestheissueofvariabilityofin-countrypractice:‘Toooftenatthemoment,effective
cooperationisdowntopersonalrelationshipsandchemistrybetweenleadersandstaffofthe
departmentsineachcountry.Wewilllookatwaystoinstitutionalisebestpractice’

27.OneofourexternalintervieweeshadbeenheadofODAinIndiainthe1980s,andreportedagoodrelationshipwiththeHigh
Commissioner.ThecurrentrelationshipbetweenDFIDandtheHighCommissionalsoappearsgood,withjointworkinggroupson
climatechangeandtrade.However,thereisnoframeworkinplacethatwouldhaveguaranteedcloseworkingrelationshipsinthe
intervening20years.
68 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

(ConservativeParty2009:45).ItwasclearfromintervieweesclosetoorintheConservative
PartythataConservativegovernmentwouldexpectanoverallleadatcountryleveltobe
takenbytheFCO.Thepolicydocumentgoesontosaythat:‘DFIDshouldnotencroachon
theFCO’sroleinshapingandarticulatingBritishforeignpolicy.TherearetimeswhenDFID
appearstocomeperilouslyclosetopursuingitsownforeignpolicyagenda.’DFIDwillneed
toproactivelyworkwiththeFCOandotherstoimprovecoordinationatthecountrylevelto
ensurethatdevelopmentmaintainsthepriorityithasenjoyedinrecentyears.
Itiscrucialinthesecountry-levelrelationshipsthatallpolicies,includingforeignpolicy,
developmentpolicyandthedeploymentofaid,arebasedonastrategythathasbeen
devisedinaninclusivewayacrossgovernment,basedonasharedanalysis,andwith
commonbuy-in.Joined-upgovernmentatthecountrylevelisparticularlychallengingwhen
itimpliesachangeinthewaythatfunds(fromDFIDorothergovernmentdepartments)are
spent.Morejoined-upstrategiescannotignorethequestionofwhereUKresourcesshould
bedeployedforbesteffect:althoughDFIDshouldretainoperationalindependence,anda
strongpoverty-reductionfocus,itisimportantthatdecisionsmadeatcountrylevelabout
theallocationofaidresourcesreflectawider(andshared)analysisofhowbesttodeliver
developmentoutcomes.

Theaidbudget,theInternationalDevelopmentActandODA
Inthelastfewyears,anumberofproposalshavebeenmadeforchangestoDFIDandthe
UK’saidsystem,includingchangestothewaytheaidbudgetisallocatedacrossgovernment
andacrosspriorities,arewritingofthe2002InternationalDevelopmentAct,andevena
reabsorbingofDFIDbackintotheFCO.Therehavealsobeenongoingcontroversiesabout
theappropriatepurposesofaid,particularlyinthecontextofwhat‘counts’formeetingthe
0.7percenttarget(seeforexampleCONCORD2008).
AsdescribedinChapter1above,muchofthecontroversyhasfocusedonhowDFID
operatesincountrieswheretheUKisatwar,andIraqandAfghanistaninparticular.These
situations,whileveryimportantpolitically,representonlyasmallpartofwhatDFIDdoes.
Whilewedothinkthereareparticularproblemsthatariseinsuchsituations,oursuggestion
isthattheyrequiretargetedsolutions,ratherthansystematicchanges.Itwouldbeamistake
toreconfigureDFID’sentireapproachonthebasisofthedemandsoftheseparticularcases.
ThedivisionofresourcesbetweentheFCO,DFIDandtheMOD,andtheuseofthose
resources,liesattheheartofmuchofthedebate.Ofthethreedepartments,theFCOhas
thesmallestbudget,ofjustunder£2billionin2008–9.Aconsiderableproportionofthisis
spentonmaintainingtheUK’sembassiesaroundtheworldandsupportingtheBritish
CouncilandtheBBCWorldService,leavingrelativelylittleforprogrammefunding.TheMOD
hasthelargestbudget(around£37billionin2007–8)butintheatresofwaris
understandablyreluctanttodivertresourcesawayfromthecorerequirementsofpersonnel,
equipmentandarmaments.Inrecentyearsthearmedforceshavebeenstretchedwithtwo
majorconflictsinIraqandAfghanistan,confoundingexpectationsinthe1990sthat
demandsonthedefencebudgetwouldfallovertime.ThisleftDFID,withabudgetofover
£5billionin2007–8,facinghighexpectationsaboutitsspendinginsituationssuchas
AfghanistanandPakistanandbeyond.
ThefirstissueisaboutaidallocationandinparticularhowmuchDFIDshouldbespendingin
countrieslikeAfghanistanandPakistan.Ontheonehand,theviewfromtheforeign,
defenceandsecuritypolicycommunityisthatDFIDshouldbespendingmoreincountries
thatareapriorityfortheUKGovernment,wheretherearealsopressing
poverty/developmentconcerns.ThereisalsoaconcernthatDFIDisincreasinglydirectinga
largerpartofitsbudgetthroughmultilateralagencies,ratherthanthroughbilateral
programmes,becauseofasimultaneousincreaseinbudgetandadecreaseinstaff.Froman
MODperspective,thiscouldreduceevenfurtherDFID’sabilitytodirectresourcestoconflict
areaswheretheBritisharmedforcesareinvolved.AConservativegovernmentwouldalmost
69 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

certainlyincreaseDFIDspendinginthesecountries.Ontheotherhand,DFIDofficialspoint
outthatDFIDisalreadyspendingfarmoreinAfghanistanthanitwouldinacomparable
countryonthebasisofpovertyindicatorsalone.
ThesecondissueisaboutwhatisdonewithDFID’sspend.OneareaofcontroversyisQuick
ImpactProjects(QIPs):rapidprojects–oftenrepairingorbuildingschools,clinics,roads,
mosquesandsoon–inareasthathavebeensecuredbythemilitary.TheMODandDFID
frequentlyhavedifferentideasabouthowquicklytheseprojectscanandshouldbe
delivered,bywhomandwhatlevelofsecurityisrequired.
BeyondQIPs,therehasbeenconsiderabledebateaboutwhetherDFIDcanorshouldput
resourcesintoactivitieslikemilitarytrainingforhostcountryarmedforces,orforcounter-
terrorismprogrammes.Again,MODandFCOofficials,andsomeexternalobservers,argue
thatthesearenotonlyessentialactivitiesforachievingUKGovernmentobjectivesinforeign
andsecuritypolicy,butthat,throughpreventingfurtherconflict,theyareessentially
developmental.Meanwhile,thereisaclearconcernfromsomequartersaboutthe
‘securitisation’ofaid–forexampleinPakistan,thatresourcesforflagshipeducation
programmeswillbedivertedintocounter-terrorism.
Underlyingmanyofthesedebatesaredifferentanalysesandviewsonstrategy.Wereturnto
thispointbelow.However,forseveralintervieweesbothinsideandoutsidegovernmenta
keyissueisthe2002InternationalDevelopmentAct(whichlimitsDFIDspendingtopoverty
reduction)andtheofficialOECDDACdefinitionofODA(whichdetermineswhat‘counts’
towardsthe0.7percenttarget),andhowfartheserestrictDFIDspendingonthesekindsof
activities.OneMODsource,forexample,arguedthatinthepasttheActhas‘[played]intoa
particularculturewithinDFID…thatsaysthatthereareasetofmilitaryactivitiesthatare
completelyproscribed…relatedtotheOECDfundingrules…suchastrainingforeign
militariesandthingslikethat,eventhoughthatmightleadtogreaterstabilisation’.
However,DFIDofficialsarguethatthe2002Actwasdeliberatelydraftedtodrawthe
definitionofwhatcouldbefundedinabroadway,andsointheoryallowsanykindof
spendingthatreducespovertythroughcontributingtowelfareorsustainabledevelopment,
whichmaywellincludetrainingofmilitarypersonnel.28 TheissueforDFIDincomplyingwith
theActiswhetherareasonablecasecanbemadethatthekindsofactivitycriticswantto
seeDFIDsupportingreallydocontributetosustainabledevelopment.Thisisapowerfulway
toensurethattheUK’sinternationaldevelopmentobjectivesarenot‘hijacked’byother
interests.
Atthesametime,thereclearlyisaconcernwithinDFIDthatotherdepartmentswantto
makeuseofDFID’sresourcesandexpertisetosupportgovernmentobjectivesthatarenot
linkedtodevelopment,apressurethatwillonlyincreaseiflegislationlockinginthe0.7per
centtargetby2013getspassedinthisParliament,protectingtheaidbudgetatatimewhen
otherbudgetswillbesignificantlysqueezed.SomeinDFIDseetheActasprotectionagainst
this,butamorecommonviewinDFIDisthatitistheOECDDevelopmentAssistance
CommitteedefinitionofOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA),ratherthantheAct,which
restrictsthekindofspendingthatcancountasaid.TheDACdefinition,forexample,
excludesspendingonmilitarysuppliesorservices,anti-terrorismspending,andthe

28.TheuseoftheActrestsonthefinalsayoftheInternationalDevelopmentSecretary.Earlyon,accordingtooneinterviewee,
ClareShortdidcitetheActasareasonfornotsupportingcertainactivitiesinIraq,inawaythatsomesawasillegitimate,andthis
mayhavegivenrisetotheperceptionthattheActrestrictsDFIDspending.Infact,inJune2009,ClareShortrevealedthatinthe
wakeoftheinvasionofIraqin2003sheinstructedDFIDofficialsnottoworkwithFCOandMODonreconstructionplans.This
markedalowpointinrelationships,butwastodowithClareShort’sdoubtsaboutthelegalityofthewarinIraq.Thereisno
suggestionthatsuchanapproachhasbeentakenbyanysubsequentSecretaryofState,andwedidnotfindtheviewthattheAct
itselfwasthekeyissue,asopposedtotheODAdefinitionofDAC,widespreadwithinGovernment.Seealsotheevidencegivenby
DFID’sMichaelFostertotheHoCDefenceCommittee(2009,Q307),inwhichhearguesthattheActisnotabarriertoDFID
spendinginconflictzones.
70 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

enforcementaspectsofpeacekeeping.Crucially,spendingthatfallsoutsidetheODA
definitioncannotbecountedtowardsmeetingaidtargets.ThismeansthattheDAC
definitioncreatesapoliticalpressureontheGovernment(and,consequently,onDFID)since
anyresourcesspentontheseactivitiesratherthanofficially-definedODAwillnotcount
towardsthe0.7percenttarget.GiventhatthevastmajorityofDFID’sbudgetisODA,the
combinationoftheDACdefinitionandthepoliticalpressuretomeetthe0.7percenttarget
doesimposerealrestrictionsonwhatDFIDcanspendmoneyon,particularlyinsituationsof
conflict.
Someintervieweessuggestedthatacarefullywordedstatementthatelementsofmilitary
trainingordisasterreliefinvolvingthemilitarycouldfallinsidetheODAdefinitionswouldbe
veryhelpful.OthersarehighlyresistanttoopeninguptheODAdefinition,onthegrounds
thatitcouldcreatealoopholeforsomecountriestostartcountingconventionaldefence
spendingasaid.
Thetwodangerswiththisdebatearefirstlythatitbecomesquitefixatedontoolsand
mechanismsforachievingobjectives,ratherthanclarityaboutobjectivesthemselves,and
secondly,asaresult,thatitbecomesunnecessarilypolarised.
Ourstartingpointisthat,insituationsofconflictandfragilityasfoundinAfghanistanand
Pakistan,therewillbemultipledimensionstostabilisationefforts,andalsomultipleinterests
withintheUKGovernment,includingmilitaryoperationsandavoidinglossoflives,national
security,trade,relationshipswithinternationalpartners,long-termdevelopmentandsoon.
Insuchasituation,itiscriticaltohaveclarityaboutthemissionandobjectives,andan
agreedstrategyforthewholeofgovernmentbasedonsharedanalysis.Oncethereisclarity
ofasharedmissionandobjectives,thenitmakessensetoapplyprinciplesofflexibilityand
transparencyintheuseofresources.Governmentspendinginsuchcircumstancesshouldnot
beaboutastrugglebetweenthosewhowantto‘raid’theaidbudgetandthosewhowantto
defendtheaidbudgetatallcosts.Theimportantdistinctionshouldnotbebetweenwhat
spendingcancountasODAandwhichcannot,butbetweeneffectiveandineffective
spending.
Forexample,thismightmeanDFIDrecognisingthatsecurityobjectivesarelegitimatefor
povertyreductionaswellasforwiderUKinterests,andagreeingtospendonnon-ODA
categories,butthiswillalsomeantheGovernmentbeingclearthatthisexpenditurecannot
becountedasODA.
Atthesametime,whileweagreethatchangingtheODAdefinitionwouldopenthedoorto
widespreadblurringofwhatisaidandwhatismilitaryspending,theUKshouldlobbythe
OECDDACtobetterreportnon-ODAspendingonalimitedtypeofclearly-definedactivities
thatpromotedevelopment–togiveitbetterinternationalrecognitionandpoliticalcredit.
Transparencyisthekeyprinciplehere.Ifitisagreedaspartofajointly-ownedstrategythat,
forexample,trainingforeignmilitariesisnecessaryanddesirableforstabilisationand
development,thenmoneyshouldbespentonthis,butitshouldbemadeclearthatthisis
notODA.
SuchanapproachwillrequiremoreflexibilityintheuseandallocationofODAbudgets.Just
asotherdepartmentsarenowallocatedsomeODAspending,DFIDshouldhavemorenon-
ODAmoneyinitsbudgettospendmoreflexibly,perhapsthroughanexpansionofthe
ConflictPoolorotherappropriatemechanisms.ThiswouldallowDFID’sexpertisetobeused
morewidely,particularlyinpost-conflictandconflictsituations,aswellasenabling
programmaticspendinginareaswhereDFIDiscurrentlylimitedbytheDACdefinitionof
ODA.29 IftheUKwantstomeetcurrentcommitmentstogive0.7percentofGNIasODAby
2013,andincreasespendinginnon-ODAeligibleareas,thiswouldrequireadditional
spending(andperhapssignificantadditionalspending).
29.Seealsorecommendation88inipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury(2009)
71 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

ItalsoimpliesmoreflexibilityintheinterpretationoftheActwithrespecttothelimitsit
placesonDFIDspending,withawiderrangeofpotentialtypesofactivitybeingrecognised
asappropriate,aslongastheycontributedemonstrablytosustainabledevelopment.30 The
GovernmentshouldbroadenthescopeoftheActtoensurethatallODA-eligiblespendingin
otherdepartmentsmeetsthesamestandardsofpovertyreduction(sothattheActappliesto
allUKODA,aswellastoallDFIDspending).Webelievethat,farfrombeingacorruptionor
dilutionoftheAct,thisflexibilityandextensionwouldreturntheActtothevisionthatits
draftersoriginallyhadforit,nowthatDFID’sroleingovernmenthasbeenestablished,cross-
partyconsensusontheimportanceofpovertyreductionestablishedandtheimportantrole
ofotherdepartmentsrecognised.
Intheend,concernsaboutprotectingaidspendingforpovertyreductionandmaintainingan
appropriateallocationofDFIDspendingbetweencountriesarebestaddressedthrough
havingastrongDFIDvoicemakingthedevelopmentalcaseattheheartofgovernment.The
importanceofcoherentpoliticalandministerialstrategiesmustalsobere-emphasised.A
largepartofthereasonthatDFID’sinterpretationoftheActhassometimesbeenrestrictive
hasbeenapoliticalfocusontheimmediateconditionsofpoverty,andonbasicservicesin
particular.AmorecoherentandflexibleuseofDFIDandODAfundsmustrestonamore
wide-rangingandcoherentpoliticalanalysisofpovertyreductionpriorities.

RelationshipswithBritishcivilsocietyandmakingthepubliccasefor
development
Finally,achievinggreatercoherenceacrosstheUKGovernmentfordevelopmentoutcomes
alsohasimplicationsforhowDFID,andotherpartsofgovernment,relatetodifferentparts
ofcivilsocietyandtotheUKpublic.
Atpresent,thereisatendencyforeachdepartmenttohaveitsowndistinctcivilsociety
constituency.Since1997,DFIDhasbuiltupastrongrelationshipwithinternational
developmentNGOs,whichthemselveshavegrownintermsoftheirincomeandinfluence.
ThedevelopmentNGOscanoftenbesterncriticsofthedepartment,andplayanimportant
publicaccountabilityfunction,buttheyarealsoapowerfullobbyforincreasingthe
developmentbudget,andhavestrongviewsonwhataidshouldbespenton(oftenplacing
particularemphasisonbasicservices,forexample).MeanwhiletheFCOandMODhavea
smallerbutjustasinfluentialconstituency,consistingofretireddiplomatsandsoldiers,
journalistsandthinktanks.Foritspart,BIShasacloserelationshipwithindustry
associations.
Theproblemwiththeseseparateconstituenciesisthattheytendtoexacerbatetensions
betweendepartments(particularlyovertheallocationofspending)andcanworkagainst
coherence.ThussomeofourintervieweesinotherdepartmentswereoftheviewthatDFID
holdsbackfromworkingmorecloselywiththeFCOandMODbecauseoffearsofbeing
criticisedbyNGOs,andDFIDintervieweesweresimilarlyconcernedaboutthepressureson
otherdepartments.
ThisviewneedstobenuancedbythefactthatmanyNGOs,andinparticularthosethat
workonconflictandhumanitarianaid,seetheimportanceandnecessityofbetterinter-
departmentalcoordination.ItisalsothecasethatNGOcampaignshavehelpedtopush
developmentconcernstothetopoftheagendaonotherissues(forexample,ondebtwith
theTreasuryandontradewithDTI/BERR/BIS).
Nevertheless,ifitistomakeheadwaywithotherdepartments,DFIDcannotaffordtobe
seenasbeingheldhostagebyan‘aidconstituency’.GettingtheUKdevelopmentsectorto
understandandbettersupportcoherence(includingtherealtrade-offsfacedby
government)willbeimportant.

30.Asbefore,seerecommendation88,ipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury(2009).
72 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

TosomedegreetheNGOsandotherconstituenciesdiscussedabovereflectasomewhat
fragmentedandsometimessimplisticunderstandingofdevelopmentamongthepublic.As
notedabove,manyofthelimitationsonthepolicycoherenceagendaarepolitical,andmany
ofthesolutionsmustbesupportedbyhigh-levelpoliticalcommitments.Those(insideand
outsidegovernment)concernedwithsomeoftheissuesexploredinthisreportareoften
frustratedbyapublicandpoliticaldebatethatisfocusedona‘core’ofaid,basicservices
andtheMDGs.31 BothpoliticiansandNGOsrespondtopublicdemandsforpoliciesthat
deliverclear,quickresults.TheseresultsareconsideredkeyinjustifyingaidandDFID
spendingtotheUKpublic,andtoParliament.
Thismeansthatthekindofpolicycoherenceagendadiscussedinthisreportposesareal
challengeforgovernmentdepartmentsandforministers.Engagementonissuesthatare
complex,thatonlydeliverresultsinthelongtermandthatsometimesinvolvecomplicated
trade-offsandpolicytensions,isdifficulttomaintaininthecourtofpublicopinion.In
particular,themoreworktheUKdoesinfragileandconflict-affectedenvironments,the
harderitwillbetodemonstrateanyimmediateresults.
DFIDwillneedtofindawaytomanagetheirconstituencyinthisnewwayofworking,and
toproactivelycommunicatewiththepublicandwithParliamentinordertoexplainthe
complicatedrealitiesandambiguitiesofthedevelopmentprocess.Atthesametime,
however,thistensionbetweenshort-term,attributableresultsandlong-termstructural
changeappliestootherdepartmentsandtheirconstituencies.Iftheyarereallyinterestedin
achievingeffectiveoutcomesindevelopingcountries,theFCOandMODhavea
responsibilitytopromotethelegitimacybothofdevelopmentandofDFIDwiththeirown
constituencies.
Finally,UKcivilsocietyhasaroletoplayinsupportinggovernmenteffortstoengagewith
thecomplicatedandchallengingissuesraisedbythepolicycoherenceagenda.Thismeans
recognisingthelegitimatetrade-offsgovernmenthastomake,aswellasdemandingmore
systematicrecognitionofdevelopmentobjectivesacrossarangeofgovernmentpolicies.

Policycoherenceandchildwell-beingandrights
IntheIntroduction,wearguedthatgreaterpolicycoherenceinarangeofareaswould
benefitchildren,leadingtoagreaterrealisationoftheirrightsand,asaconsequence,
increasedwell-being.Whilethisisbroadlytrue,itisclearfromtheanalysisinthisreportthat
thisrelationshipiscomplex.
Policycoherencefordevelopmentisprimarilyaboutensuringthatallgovernmentpolicies
supportandcreatetheconditionsforeradicatingpoverty,includingbyendingconflict.In
someexamples,usuallywhereDFIDisworkingwithotherdepartmentsonprogrammesin
developingcountries,thiscanworkinadirectway.Therearesomeverypositiveexamplesof
howsuchajoined-upapproachcanrealisechildrightsandincreasewell-being,forexample
intheprogrammesfordemobilisationandreintegrationofchildsoldiersincountrieslike
SudanbythejointDFID-MOD-FCOConflictPreventionPool.
Butinmanycasestheimpactofpolicycoherenceonchildrenisindirect,workingatthe
macrolevel.Forexample,DECCworkingtosecureadealtomitigateclimatechangemight
haveanimpactthroughlimitingtheriskoffloodingordroughtinaregion.TheSerious
FraudOfficepursuingbriberycasesandreturningstolenassetswilladdresourcesthatcanbe
spentoneducation,healthorinfrastructure,andreducetheabilityofanti-developmental
elitestooperatewithimpunity.
However,positiveoverallimpactsofpolicydonotnecessarilytranslateautomaticallyinto
improvedwell-beingforchildren.Forexample,wenotedthatwhileanexpansionofexports

31.Theintroductionin2009ofthe‘UKaid’brandforUKaidspendingisagoodexampleofthisapproachtopublicrelationsfrom
DFID.
73 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

ofmanufactureshasalmostalwaysbeennecessaryforpovertyreduction(andforsustainable
gainsinchildwell-being),thishasinsomecountriesalsobeenassociatedwithincreasesin
childlabourandtheabuseofchildren’srights.Similarly,whileinternationalmigrationbrings
newopportunities,childmigrantsareoftenplacedinveryvulnerablesituations,andchildren
leftbehindwhenadultsmigratemaylosethesupporttheyneed.
Oneimplicationofthispictureisthatattemptstoincreasepolicycoherenceshouldalways
includeachildwell-beingandrightsperspective;itshouldnotbeassumedthatimproved
childwell-beingisanautomaticconsequenceofwiderpositivepolicyimpacts.Onsome
occasionsthisperspectivemaycomefromotherdepartments.Forexample,theFCOhasa
childrightsunitandstrategy,withprioritycountriesandissues(FCO2007).Butonmostit
willnot,whichmeansthatDFIDshouldbepromotingthisapproach,thinkingaboutthe
consequencesofthepoliciesofotherdepartmentsnotonlyfordevelopmentingeneral,but
alsospecificallyforchildren.ArecentreviewofthechildrightsclimateinDFIDcommissioned
byanumberofNGOsconcludedthatthedepartmentdoesnotyetadoptsuchanapproach
(Maguire2007).Thisrepresentsachallengeforcivilsocietyorganisationsthathaveastrong
childrightsfocus,likeWorldVisionUK.Inthenextfewyears,wehavearguedthattherewill
beaparticularvalueto(butalsoaparticularneedfor)makingthecaseforinternational
developmentandpovertyreductionwithotherpartsofgovernment.Keepingchildwell-
beingandrightsinthepicturewillbeanimportantpartofthisprocess.
74 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

7.Conclusionandrecommendations
Overthelast12years,theUKhasbuiltanimpressiveinternationalreputationasanaid
donorandasaleadinginnovatorindevelopmentpolicy.DFIDisastrong,independentactor
bothinLondonandinthecountriesinwhichitworks.Aconsensusisnowestablishedacross
much(ifnotall)ofthepoliticalspectrumforthedepartment’sexistence,thecommitmentto
meetthe0.7percentaidtarget,andthelegitimacyofthedevelopmentagenda.These
achievementsshouldbecelebratedandbuilton.
DFIDhashadgoodreasonstoholditselfslightlyapartfromtherestofgovernment–the
benefitsofitsindependenceareclearinthepovertyfocusofUKaidspending,andinDFID’s
enviableinternationalreputation–butthegainsmadeinthelastdecadeneedtobesecured
byadvanceintoawideragenda,notbyaretreatintoanarrowlydefinedaidagencyrole.We
seenoreasonwhyDFIDshouldnotcontinuetobeindependent,andtomakedecisions
basedonaclearsetofdevelopmentandpovertyreductionobjectives(particularlyaboutaid
programming)whilealsoengagingmoreeffectivelywiththerestofgovernmentatthepolicy
level,andontheground.
Itisclearfromtheevidencepresentedinthisreportthatdevelopmentaloutcomes–
particularlyforchildren–dependonarangeoffactorsoutsidethetraditional‘development’
field,includingarmedconflict,climatechange,trade,accountabilityandtransparencyof
business,andinternationalmigration.Onlyifthereisactionintheseareasbythe
internationalcommunity,includingtheUK,willtherebeasustainableexitfrompovertyfor
all.Aspovertybecomesincreasinglyconcentratedincountriesthatareatriskofconflict,
unabletotackleclimateimpacts,unabletotakeadvantageoftradeormigration
opportunities,andthataredependentonnaturalresourceexports,theimportanceof
coherentactionfordevelopmentacrossallpartsofgovernmentwillgrow.
Successfulpolicycoherencefordevelopmentmustbejustthat–fordevelopment.This
meansthatthereneedtobeclearmechanisms(bothpoliticalandofficial)toensurethatthe
UKGovernment’sdevelopmentobjectivesaresystematicallyconsideredacrossarangeof
policyareas,includingthosediscussedabove.Whenotherobjectivesorinterestslegitimately
supersededevelopmentobjectives,thisshouldbetransparent,andstepsshouldstillbe
takentominimiseharmandmaximisedevelopmentbenefits.Similarly,policycoherencedoes
notmeanabandoningpoliciesthatseekdevelopmentandpovertyreductionfortheirown
sake,butshouldbuildonthem(indeed,thestrongcoreofpovertyreductionpolicyand
programmingthatDFIDhasbuiltshouldbeprotectedinpartforthefoundationitprovides
forpolicycoherence).Butitdoesmeanbeingconfidentenoughtoengageonchallenging
issues,andrecognisingthatmessycompromisesarepartofmakingprogress.
Thereismuchatstake,butthereisalsothepossibilityfortheUKtobecomealeaderonthe
coherenceagenda.Asoneofourinterviewees,along-standingobserveroftheaid
relationshipinAfrica,putit:‘IthinkDFIDisinamarvellouspositiontobeagloballeader[in
ajoined-upapproach]because…bilateralagencieshaveabigadvantageoverthe
multilaterals,inthatthey’vegotamandatethatspanstradepolicy,governance,security,ina
waythat,say,theWorldBankdoesn’t.’
Thustherearehugeopportunitiesforgovernmentdepartmentstoworkinamorejoined-up
way.However,therearealsochallengesandrisks.Achievingcoherencefordevelopment
meansbringingdifferentpartsofgovernmenttogether,eachwiththeirownobjectivesand
perspectives.Thekeyrisktobemanagedisthatthedevelopmentagendagetslostor
downgradedrelativetootherissuesorinterests(forexamplesecurity),andthattheUK’s
coredevelopmentpoliciesbecomelesseffectiveasaresult.
Itisalsolikelythattheperiodafterthenextelectionwillseenewpoliticalandfiscal
pressuresthatcouldexacerbatethatrisk.Itisthereforeallthemoreimportanttomakeclear
75 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

thatthereductionofconflictandpoverty,bettergovernanceandtherealisationofrightsin
thedevelopingworldareallcrucialforachievingglobalsecurityandstability,andtherefore
fortheobjectivesofotherpartsoftheUKGovernment.Webelievethatthegainsmadein
theUKinestablishingaworld-classdevelopmentdepartmentinDFID,andinplacing
povertyreductionatthecentreofdevelopmentpolicywillbebestsecuredforthelongterm
byproactiveengagementbyDFIDandotherpartsofgovernmentwithawider,more
challenging,setofissuesbeyondthe‘core’ofdevelopmentpolicy.
Theresearchinthisreport,basedinpartoninterviewswitharound25civilservantsfroma
rangeofdepartments,aswellaspoliticaladvisersandexternalexperts,suggeststhatthe
Governmenthasmaderealstepstowardsgreatercoherence,especiallyinsomeareassuchas
trade,climatechangeandconflictresolution.However,thereisstillsomewaytogo.DFID
stillappearstohaveacorefocusonconventionalaidprogrammesandin-countryreform
processes,andiscriticisedbysomeforastilllargelytechnocratic(ratherthanpolitical)
approachtoputtingthedevelopmentcaseingovernment.Whileotherdepartments
increasinglyvalueDFID’sinput,theystillhaveawaytogoinreflectingtheimportanceof
internationaldevelopmentobjectivesintheirpoliciesandpractice.
Akeyconclusionofthisstudyisthatgreatercoherenceisnotusuallybeingpreventedbya
lackofcross-governmentmechanisms.Whileparticularbarrierstocooperationand
coordinationcanbeidentified,amoreimportantissueistheincentives(orlackofincentives)
ingovernmenttomakethesemechanismsworkwellinpractice.
Wearguethatthekeytocoherenceisagreedjointstrategy,basedonsharedanalysis,clear
politicalleadershipandaneffectivecasemadetothepublic.Mostofourinterviewees
emphasisedthatjointstrategiesforwhole-of-governmentactionsonparticularcountriesare
desirablebutoftenabsent.Ifthereisnosuchstrategy,itisverydifficulttoavoidtensionsor
conflictsbetweendepartmentsontheground.Broaderthematicstrategies,supportedby
clearpoliticalmandates,arealsoneededinordertotackleheadonthepotentialtensions
betweendifferentareasofUKpolicy.Whileitiscertainlynotthecasethatdevelopment
concernsshouldalwayswinout,theydoneedtobecarefullyconsideredandevaluatedinall
relevantpolicydiscussions.
Oneofthekeydividinglines,particularlybetweenDFIDontheonehandandtheFCOand
MODontheother,appearstobeabouttimeframes.DFID’sperspectiveandanalysesare
longterm,whereastheFCOisofteninterestedintheshorterterm,andtheMODoftenthe
immediate.Thesedifferencesareinevitable,butachievingcoherencemeansthatall
perspectiveshavetoberespectedandincorporated.
Finally,moretransparencyandflexibilityisneededabouttheuseofODAfunds,andthe
applicationofthe2002InternationalDevelopmentAct.ThecurrentdivisionbetweenDFID
spending–whichislimitedbothbytheDACODAdefinitionandbytheAct,andother
governmentspending–whichisoftenconstrainedbyneither,createstensionsbetween
differentpartsofgovernment.

Summaryofrecommendations
•Developmentconcernsandobjectivesshouldformakeypartofdecision-making
acrossthefullrangeofUKpoliciesthatimpactondevelopingcountries.Attemptsto
increasepolicycoherencefordevelopmentshouldalwaysincludeachildwell-being
andrightsperspective.Wheretensionsexistanddevelopmentobjectivescannot
appropriatelybegivenpriority,harmshouldbeminimised,developmentbenefits
maximisedanddecisionsmadeopenlyandaccountably.
•TheGovernmentshoulddevelopawhole-of-governmentinternationaldevelopment
strategy,andshouldcarryoutasystematicanalysisofthedevelopmentimpactsofUK
policies(including,butnotlimitedto,thosediscussedinthisreport–conflict,trade
andinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration).Thisshouldhavestrong
ownershipacrossgovernment,andastrongfocusonnon-DFIDpolicylevers.
76 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

•TheGovernmentshouldensurethatDFID,theFCO,theMOD,BIS,DECC,theUKBA
andotherrelevantdepartmentsagreejointUKGovernmentstrategiesforall
importantdevelopingcountrieswheretheUKhasbothasubstantialaidprogramme
andsignificantstrategic,commercialorsecurityinterests.Thesecountrystrategies
shouldbebasedonsharedanalysiscontributedtobyalldepartments.
•FCOpostsandDFIDcountryofficesshouldplayakeyroleintheprocessofforming
jointcountrystrategiesandwiderthematicstrategies.DFIDshouldretainoperational
independenceatthecountrylevel,butneedstooperatewithincross-governmental
strategicframeworks.
•Alldepartmentsshouldcreateincentives–forexamplethroughappraisalsand
promotioncriteria–forspendingtimeandresourcesoninter-departmentalworking.
Theseincentivesshouldextenduptoseniorlevels(includingviaPSAframeworks)to
encourageseniorcivilservantstoprovideanexampletomorejuniorstaffandcreatea
culturewhereworkingwithotherdepartmentsisvalued.Careerprogressionstructures
shouldalsoreflecttheimportanceofcross-departmentalworking.
•Alldepartmentsshouldreviewtheskillsoftheirstafftoensurethattheyare
appropriateforachievinggreatercoherence(forexample,DFIDshouldemploymore
politicaladvisers).
•DFID’ssolespendingfocusonpovertyreductionundertheInternationalDevelopment
Actshouldberetainedandevenstrengthened,butshouldbebasedonabroad
analysisofwhatdrivespovertyreduction.TherestrictionsoftheActshouldapplyto
ODAspendingacrossgovernment,notjustinDFID.ThedefinitionofODAshouldnot
bereopened,butDFIDshouldhaveaccesstomorenon-ODAfunds,particularlyin
ordertoengagemoreeffectivelyinsituationsofconflict.
•TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheOECDDACtoprovidebetterreportingon
non-ODAspendingonalimitedtypeofclearly-definedactivitiesthatpromote
development,inordertograntsuchspendingmorerecognitionandpoliticalcredit.
•Alldepartmentsshouldengagewiththeircivilsocietyconstituencies,andwiththe
public,ontheimportanceandvalueofthecoherenceagenda.DFIDinparticular
needstoproactivelycommunicatewiththepublicandwithParliamentinorderto
explainthecomplicatedrealitiesandambiguitiesofthedevelopmentprocess.Ifthey
arereallyinterestedinachievingeffectiveoutcomesindevelopingcountries,theFCO
andMODhavearesponsibilitytopromotethelegitimacybothofdevelopment,and
ofDFID,withtheirownconstituencies.
•Ministersandpoliticiansmustmakethepoliticalandpubliccaseforpolicycoherence,
andshouldhavetheconfidencetoengagewiththecomplexrealitiesofdevelopment.
77 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

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85 ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUK’sInternationalDevelopmentAgenda

Appendix:Listofinterviewees
Thisreportisbasedinpartoninterviewswitharound35academicsandindependent
experts,civilservants,specialadvisersandpoliticians.InterviewstookplacebetweenJune
andSeptember2009.Insomecases,intervieweesaskedtoremainanonymous,andwehave
notlistedthenamesofthe20-pluscurrently-servingcivilservantsandgovernmentadvisers
whomweinterviewed.Allotherintervieweesarelistedbelow.
•HughBayleyM.P.,Member,HouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentSelect
Committee;chair,AllPartyParliamentaryGrouponAfrica
•DavidBlair,DiplomaticEditor,DailyTelegraph
•MalcolmBruce,M.P.,Chair,HouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentSelect
Committee
•PaulCollier,ProfessorofEconomics,UniversityofOxfordandDirectoroftheCentre
fortheStudyofAfricanEconomies
•DenzilDavidson,advisertoWilliamHague
•SusanHawley¸Co-Director,CorruptionWatch
•LaurieLee,DeputyDirectorofExternalAffairs,GatesFoundation,previouslyNo.10
•BronwenMaddox,ChiefForeignCommentator,theTimes
•RichardManning,formerChair,OECDDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee
•SimonMaxwell,SeniorResearchAssociate,andformerDirector,Overseas
DevelopmentInstitute
•DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicy,SavetheChildrenUKandspecialadvisertoClare
Short,SecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopment,1999–2002
•SheilaPage,SeniorResearchAssociate,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute
•SusanProwse,ProgrammeLeader,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute
•SueUnsworth,Fellow,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofSussex
•PhilVernon,DirectorofProgrammes,InternationalAlert