Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G..R. No. 132424

May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997
decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492,
which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered
by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and
Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as
Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal
which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by
virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A"
and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by
building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully
surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to
heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case
amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File
Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken
before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C";
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to
engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal
demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the
said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
torture and moral erosion; x x x2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners
had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the
alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested
by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They
also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same
plus attorneys fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC,
in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10
March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to
show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated private respondents possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional elements
for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an
action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material
possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On
the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private

respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises,
which right has now [been] extinguished.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which
the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal
thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision
dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January
1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration5:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE
OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful
detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of
the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer.
They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the
owner if another occupies the land at the formers tolerance or permission without any contract
between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by
the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of

real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.

No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in
- and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary
in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action.18 (Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it
is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19
The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that
they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue
on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled23:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No.
C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action fails.
The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and
before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals

[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24 petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and
(2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding
that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at
the beginning of the possession. x x x
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would
substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2)
her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of action is for
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.25
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how
respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express
contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofilea with Associate Justices Artemon D.

Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.
2

Rollo, pp. 88-90.

Id., p. 91.

Id., pp. 152-155.

Id., p. 146.

Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572-573.

Id.

Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184 (2001).

Id.

10

Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.

11

Id., 572.

12

Id., p. 573.

13

Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.

14

Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.

15

Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September
2003, 410 SCRA 485, 490.
16

Id.

17

131 Phil. 365 (1968).

18

Id., 372-373.

19

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156 (1995).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Supra note 8.

23

Id., pp. 184-186.

24

Supra note 5.

25

Id., pp. 490-491.

26

Unida v. Heirs of Ambrosio Urban, G.R. No. 155432, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 68, 75.

27

Id.

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G.R. No. L-3756

June 30, 1952

SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO DE

FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.

First Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico C. Alikpala and Assistant Attorney

Augusto Kalaw for appellant.
Ramirez and Ortigas for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property (land and
warehouses) situated in Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for its occupation and
use. The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name the title was registered before
the war. On January 4, 1943, during the Japanese military occupation, the land was
acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho for the sum of
P140,00, and thereupon title thereto issued in its name (transfer certificate of title
No. 64330, Register of Deeds, Manila). After liberation, more specifically on April 4,
1946, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession,
control, and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40
Stat., 411, for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national. During the year
1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under
a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian (Exhibit G),
and when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein. The
Philippine Government made representations with the Office Alien Property
Custodian for the use of property by the Government (see Exhibits 2, 2-A, 2-B, and
1). On March 31, 1947, the defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on
the land, and actually spent thereon the repairs the sum of P26,898.27. In 1948,
defendant leased one-third of the warehouse to one Dioscoro Sarile at a monthly
rental of P500, which was later raised to P1,000 a month. Sarile did not pay the
rents, so action was brought against him. It is not shown, however, if the judgment
was ever executed.
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the
United States, but as this was denied, it brought an action in court (Court of First
Instance of Manila, civil case No. 5007, entitled "La Sagrada Orden Predicadores de
la Provinicia del Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas," vs. Philippine Alien Property
Administrator, defendant, Republic of the Philippines, intervenor) to annul the sale
of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The Republic of the
Philippines was allowed to intervene in the action. The case did not come for trial
because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by plaintiff that
the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was executed
under threats, duress, and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the
name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued;
that the claims, rights, title, and interest of the Alien Property Custodian be
cancelled and held for naught; that the occupant National Coconut Corporation has
until February 28, 1949, to recover its equipment from the property and vacate the
premises; that plaintiff, upon entry of judgment, pay to the Philippine Alien Property
Administration the sum of P140,000; and that the Philippine Alien Property
Administration be free from responsibility or liability for any act of the National

Coconut Corporation, etc. Pursuant to the agreement the court rendered judgment
releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability, but reversing to the
plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation reasonable
rentals for the use and occupation of the premises. (Exhibit A-1.)
The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August, 1946, the date
when the defendant began to occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it. The
defendant does not contest its liability for the rentals at the rate of P3,000 per
month from February 28, 1949 (the date specified in the judgment in civil case No.
5007), but resists the claim therefor prior to this date. It interposes the defense that
it occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals
for the use and occupation of the warehouse. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P3,000 a month, as reasonable
rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant vacates the premises. The
judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese
purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired
any right to the property, but that it held the same in trust until the determination
as to whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen. The trial court further declares
that defendant can not claim any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien
Property Administration, and that as defendant has used the property and had
subleased portion thereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its occupation.
Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed, the following assignment of
error having been made on defendant-appellant's behalf:
The trial court erred in holding the defendant liable for rentals or compensation for
the use and occupation of the property from the middle of August, 1946, to
December 14, 1948.
1. Want to "ownership rights" of the Philippine Alien Property Administration did not
render illegal or invalidate its grant to the defendant of the free use of property.
2. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring the sale by the
plaintiff to the Japanese purchaser null and void ab initio and that the plaintiff was
and has remained as the legal owner of the property, without legal interruption, is
not conclusive.
3. Reservation to the plaintiff of the right to recover from the defendant corporation
not binding on the later;
4. Use of the property for commercial purposes in itself alone does not justify
payment of rentals.
5. Defendant's possession was in good faith.
6. Defendant's possession in the nature of usufruct.

In reply, plaintiff-appellee's counsel contends that the Philippine Allien Property

Administration (PAPA) was a mere administrator of the owner (who ultimately was
decided to be plaintiff), and that as defendant has used it for commercial purposes
and has leased portion of it, it should be responsible therefore to the owner, who
had been deprived of the possession for so many years. (Appellee's brief, pp. 20,
23.)
We can not understand how the trial court, from the mere fact that plaintiff-appellee
was the owner of the property and the defendant-appellant the occupant, which
used for its own benefit but by the express permission of the Alien Property
Custodian of the United States, so easily jumped to the conclusion that the
occupant is liable for the value of such use and occupation. If defendant-appellant is
liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the four sources of obligations,
namley, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish
Civil Code.) Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it
entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had
the legal control and administration thereof, the Allien Property Administration.
Neither was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract
or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which
had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of
duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendantappellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of
the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Allien Property Administration had
the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of
the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law
(Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, 40 Stat., 411; 50 U.S.C.A., 189).
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a
trustee of then Government of the United States (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 249; 50 U.S.C.A.
283), in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the
enemy owner. (Youghioheny & Ohio Coal Co. vs. Lasevich [1920], 179 N.W., 355;
171 Wis., 347; U.S.C.A., 282-283.) From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant
took possession, to the late of judgment on February 28, 1948, Allien Property
Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the
Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise,
as though it were the absolute owner. (U.S vs. Chemical Foundation [C.C.A. Del.
1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were
liable to the Allien Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the
benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but to the United States Government.
But there is another ground why the claim or rentals can not be made against
defendant-appellant. There was no agreement between the Alien Property
Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property.
The existence of an implied agreement to that effect is contrary to the
circumstances. The copra Export Management Company, which preceded the

defendant-appellant, in the possession and use of the property, does not appear to
have paid rentals therefor, as it occupied it by what the parties denominated a
"custodianship agreement," and there is no provision therein for the payment of
rentals or of any compensation for its custody and or occupation and the use. The
Trading with the Enemy Act, as originally enacted, was purely a measure of
conversation, hence, it is very unlikely that rentals were demanded for the use of
the property. When the National coconut Corporation succeeded the Copra Export
Management Company in the possession and use of the property, it must have been
also free from payment of rentals, especially as it was Government corporation, and
steps where then being taken by the Philippine Government to secure the property
for the National Coconut Corporation. So that the circumstances do not justify the
finding that there was an implied agreement that the defendant-appellant was to
pay for the use and occupation of the premises at all.
The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals before it
obtained the judgment annulling the sale of the Taiwan Tekkosho may not be
predicated on any negligence or offense of the defendant-appellant, or any
contract, express or implied, because the Allien Property Administration was neither
a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho,
its title being based by legal provision of the seizure of enemy property. We have
also tried in vain to find a law or provision thereof, or any principle in quasi
contracts or equity, upon which the claim can be supported. On the contrary, as
defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability for
such use and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable
therefor. And as to the rents it collected from its lessee, the same should accrue to
it as a possessor in good faith, as this Court has already expressly held. (Resolution,
National Coconut Corporation vs. Geronimo, 83 Phil. 467.)
Lastly, the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a new right;
if no right to claim for rentals existed at the time of the reservation, no rights can
arise or accrue from such reservation alone.
Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences defendantappellant to pay rentals from August, 1946, to February 28, 1949, is hereby
reversed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be
against the plaintiff-appellee.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ,
concur.
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