REFORMING COMMUNITY BOARDS TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPACITY

AS VENUES FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PLANNING

By
Stephen Dyer Miller

2015 Stephen Dyer Miller

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Science City and Regional Planning
School of Architecture
Pratt Institute
May 2015

REFORMING COMMUNITY BOARDS TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPACITY

AS VENUES FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PLANNING

By
Stephen Dyer Miller

________________________________________________________Date___________
Thesis Advisor
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Thesis Advisor Name

________________________________________________________Date___________
Thesis Advisor
________________________________________________________
Thesis Advisor Name

________________________________________________________Date___________
Chairperson
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Chairperson Name

Thank you to my advisors, Eva Hanhardt and Eve Baron, and the individuals who gave
time for interviews and informal advice. Most importantly, thank you to the people who
help me get through it all: Susie Willis and my parents, Mary and Jeff.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1

Introduction
Issue Statement
Goal of Thesis
Objectives
Methodology
Potential Audience for Thesis

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6
7
7
8
8

Literature Review
Theory of Participation and Governance
Theory in Action at New York City Community Boards
History of Community Boards in New York City

9
9
12
16

CHAPTER 2

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What the City Charter Says About Community Districts and Boards
Service Delivery and Community Districts
Community Board Appointments
Duties of Community Boards

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20
22
26

Friends-of Groups
Current Reform Efforts
Related Forms of Participatory Engagement in New York City
Local Advisory Governance Models From Other U.S. Cities

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29
32
34

CHAPTER 3

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Case Study: Manhattan Community Board 9

About Manhattan Community Board 9
Manhattan Community Board 9 By-Laws
District Needs Statement
197-a Plan

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39
42
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Interviews
List of Interviewed Individuals
What Attracts People to Community Boards
Joining the Community Board
Impressions of the Community Board Process
Improving Staffing
Keeping the Public Involved
Balancing Politics and Service
Improving the Appointment Process

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53

CHAPTER 4

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Findings and Recommendations

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Improving Appointments and Membership

Standardized Application Process
More Information on Applicants and Appointees
Reform Council Member Recommendations
Open Public Recommendations to Other Elected Officials and Groups
Standardized Training for Board Members
Term Limits
Consider Longer, Staggered Terms

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59
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60
61
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Appointments and Membership: For Further Study

Should Board Members and Staff Review the Quality of Applicants?
Should Community Districts Be Remapped?
Should Community Board Members Be Elected, Rather Than Appointed?

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64
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Providing Adequate Staff and Technical Assistance to Community Boards

Community Board Budgets
Planners and Interns
311 and Other City Data
Centralized Outreach
Give Responsibility to Boards for Contributing to City Policy

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Issue Statement
Community boards were created in the 1975 City Charter revision to connect local
residents to municipal government service delivery as well as to provide a sounding
board and advisory planning mechanism for the New York Citys neighborhoods.
Members, appointed by the borough president, must weigh issues that affect the entire
district in which they serve, usually containing over 100,000 people with a diverse set of
needs.
Community boards serve an important role in New York City government. Often, they
are the only forum for a neighborhoods public to interface with municipal bureaucrats
and policymakers on a granular level about initiatives and projects affecting their
neighborhoods.
However, community boards do not always live up to their purpose as described by the
Charter. Undercut by their very advisory nature and their political home under the
borough presidents, who have themselves seen diminished power since the 1989 Charter
revision, they are severely underfunded and usually unable to engage in the proactive
planning and broad outreach necessary to serve their constituents. Boards can feel
inaccessible to the surrounding community more of a political club home to imperious
infighting than a welcoming and deliberative body.
This thesis grew out of my work as a reporter at Streetsblog, an advocacy journalism
outlet focused on reducing automobile use in urban environments. As part of my job, I
attend community board meetings across the city where street redesign projects are
presented and discussed by the Department of Transportation. I have seen community

boards as both effective venues for community feedback that can improve and strengthen
projects and as roadblocks to projects, even in the face of community need and support
from local residents.
Often, the ability of a community board to work with a city agency and secure the
changes its constituents need depends on the quality of board leadership. Sometimes, a
project can stall because of a lack of communication. Other times, political interference
plays a role in whether a project moves forward.
As a student of city planning and a believer in planning that balances community-based
approaches with the broader needs of New York City such as equity, safety, or
sustainability I found community boards to be one of the edges where local and
citywide interests intersect. In this thesis, I seek to irrespective of my personal opinions
on transportation projects Ive covered at countless community board meetings
determine what makes community boards work and what keeps them from working
effectively.
I hope to use this knowledge to make recommendations that can help improve the role of
community boards in serving as an interface between New York Citys neighborhoods
and its local government.
Goal of Thesis
Offer a series of immediate, intermediate, and long-term recommendations to improve
the ability of community boards to serve as the most local form of government in New
York City, both as a forum for community planning and as a mechanism to connect local
residents with government service delivery. These recommendations will aim to ensure
high-quality board membership, improve citizen participation, and give boards the
resources they need for effective planning and community service work.

Objectives
Research and understand the nature of public engagement and participation in
local government.
Examine the history of community boards and their role in New York City civic,
government, and political life.
Understand past and present reform proposals.
Speak with New Yorkers involved with and knowledgeable about community
boards across the city.
Make recommendations to improve the role boards can play as advisory bodies
and venues for community-based planning in New York City government.
Methodology
To achieve these objectives, this thesis examines research on participation in local
government, both in New York and across the United States. It analyzes the New York
City Charter to understand the role of community boards in the citys government. In
order to understand the experienced reality of community boards, it examines Manhattan
Community Board 9, which covers West Harlem. Interviews with, among others,
longstanding board members, new board members, and a local City Council member
informed how that board functions both as a connection between community members
and local government and as a political venue in the neighborhood. This base of research,
from previous literature and interviews, informs the recommendations in the thesis.
Potential Audience for Thesis
This thesis is directed at borough presidents and their staff, mayoral staff in charge of
funding and assisting community boards, council staff, staff of the public advocate, civic
reformers, non-governmental organizations in New York City, and any individual
interested in advisory local governance.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Theory of Participation and Governance
The desire for citizen involvement and control over government decision-making is
fundamental to American government and is rooted in the nation's founding documents.
This impulse was observed just decades after the United States declared independence by
Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835's Democracy in America, where he marveled at the
American impulse to involve oneself in town affairs and participate in town meetings and
discussions. To get involved in the government of society and to talk about it, he wrote,
that is the greatest business and, so to speak, the only pleasure that an American knows
(de Tocqueville 1835, 397).
A common modern theoretical base
for understanding what
participation means is Sherry
Arnstein's ladder of citizen
participation from 1969. There are
eight rungs on the ladder, from the
least inclusive and involved to
complete citizen control. The rungs
start with non-participation, with
manipulation at the bottom, followed
by therapy. Then the rungs move up
to tokenism, escalating through
informing, consultation, and
placation, before reaching citizen

Figure 1. The ladder of participation (Arnstein 1969, 217).

power, which includes, in ascending order, partnership, delegated power, and citizen
control.
Arnstein noted that citizen committees, such as community boards, ultimately keep the

final decision-making power away from those committees. They allow citizens to advise
or plan ad infinitum but retain for power holders the right to judge the legitimacy or
feasibility of the advice, she wrote (Arnstein 1969, 220).
Arnstein's ladder is a strong theoretical base for understanding the degree to which
citizens have control over the municipal decision-making process. The theory, however,
unfolds upon a varied terrain. Participation is not uniform between communities, even if
the avenues for participation are designed identically. For example, community boards
have identical structures as dictated by the New York City Charter, but have different
levels of community involvement.
One obvious factor in determining citizen participation is the wealth and resource level of
the community, but a less obvious factor, and one that is important for understanding
local-level participation in large cities like New York, is that participation varies based on
the size of a municipality. Using a 1990 survey of political participation across the United
States, Oliver controlled for education, age, income, length of residence, marital status,
homeownership, race, and sex to compare citizen participation with municipality size and
found a dispiriting result: People in big cities are less likely to be recruited for political
activity by neighbors and are less interested in local affairs. These differences occur
irrespective of the size of the surrounding metropolitan area and demonstrate the
importance of municipal institutions for fostering civil society (Oliver 2000, 361). This
is particularly relevant for New York City, which is, of course, the largest municipality in
the nation, and Oliver's finding lends credibility to the old adage that New York City is
too big to govern.
Yet even in large cities like New York, the impulse identified by Alexis de Tocqueville
continues. In 1961's The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs writes of
watching the public speak at Board of Estimate meetings at City Hall: The proceedings
are heartening, because of the abounding vitality, earnestness and sense with which so
many of the citizens rise to the occasion (Jacobs 1961, 407). However, Jacobs also notes
that the sheer scale of a big city like New York makes meaningful participation by the

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populace on a broad range of issues difficult and time-consuming. Citizens of big cities
are forever being berated for not taking sufficiently active interest in government, she
wrote. It is amazing, rather, that they keep trying (Jacobs 1961, 415).
Setting the stage for later developments, Jacobs, like other civic reformers before her
proposes dividing the city into uniform administrative districts, with service delivery and
citizen participation coordinated to those districts. Administrative districts in a big city
would promptly begin to act as political creates, because they would possess real organs
of information, recommendation, decision and action, she wrote. This would be one of
the chief advantages of the system (Jacobs 1961, 422).
As Jacobs notes, the disinclination of residents of large municipalities to become
involved in local affairs can be mitigated by local districts, which at their best form a
more accessible municipality, creating a manageable forum for residents to engage on
service delivery and community planning, and to exert political pressure. But community
boards are not, in fact, municipalities, and are appointed boards. Their local focus is not
necessarily enough to jump-start citizen participation; for that, these boards must be run
effectively, or citizens will see these advisory bodies as a waste of time.
Effective board governance and leadership, whether a community board or some other
advisory body, are central to its success. Lachapelle and Shanahan developed, delivered
and studied the impact of a curriculum for members of boards, commissions, and
advisory bodies in Montana. While that state deals with obviously different issues than
New York City, the lessons of board governance are widely applicable, if not always
universal.
Lachapelle and Shanahan found that when boards fail, it is not because of the individual
members but because of the board's overall approach to governance and understanding of
its role. This can weaken legitimacy and faith in government. Boards often fail, they note,
because there is a lack of training and evaluation for citizen boards. Poorly run public
boards increase apathy toward and mistrust in government, thereby decreasing effective

11

public participation, they wrote. Effective citizen boards offer an opportunity to

increase public participation, dissuade apathy, enhance trust, and create more robust and
well-functioning democracies (Lachapelle and Shanahan 2010, 404).
Theory in Action at New York City Community Boards
So, the question for New York City's community boards becomes: How can they be
effective boards that increase participation and enhance democracy? Research from
Arnstein, Oliver, and Lachapelle and Shanahan is not specific to New York City, but the
lessons to which they point can be seen at play in research and dialogue about local-level
citizen participation in New York.
The primary challenge in New York is that it is both a city of vibrant neighborhoods with
distinct and diverse needs, and a command center for the global economy. Tom Angotti
has studied the conflict between these two versions of New York, and notes that workingclass and low-income neighborhoods struggle to assert themselves against the capital and
political power of the city's economic elites, especially in the realm of real estate. In
many ways, this tension was clearest when Angotti published New York for Sale in 2008,
when Mayor Michael Bloomberg epitomized the domination of the pre-Great Recession
financial elite over the city's central levers of power (Angotti 2008).
But no matter who is in control at the mayor's office, there will always be a conflict
between central control and local influence. John Mudd, in examining the tension
between central and local control in large American cities, with a focus on New York,
was evaluating ways to elevate community decision-making without seeking total local
control. While citizen control is the top of Arnstein's ladder, Mudd argued that it wasn't
always the best outcome. He said that the best types of community-level engagement had
an advisory role to the centralized government to inform decision-makers, since most
community residents do not appear to want control over (and responsibility for) their
sanitation departments or their parks maintenance crews, he wrote. They want clean
streets and usable parks (Mudd 1976, 117).

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With the Charter revision, New York adopted this model, preferring local advisement to
local control. A few years later, Joseph Zimmerman looked at how well New York's
attempt to decentralize aspects of service delivery through the community board and
community district system was working. The bottom line, he found, is that success or
failure depended on the quality of interactions between community board chairs or
managers and representatives of city agencies, reinforcing points made in Montana by
Lachapelle and Shanahan. Should boards engage in only critical rhetoric and fail to
support the administrators, the boards will be of no value as advisory mechanisms,
Zimmerman wrote. The results of the new approach to citizen input into the city's
decision-making process undoubtedly will vary from district to district and will depend
upon the competence of the boards and district administrators (Zimmerman 1982, 19).
In 1989, Robert Pecorella offered a clear-eyed evaluation of community boards after a
decade of experience. If the board system has not evolved into community control in
New York City, neither has it left the pre-charter status quo undisturbed, he wrote. The
boards are merely advisory bodies, but they have opened the land-use process in New
York City to public scrutiny; the boards can neither raise revenues nor allocate resources,
but they have influenced the central-city process that does so. And even though the
boards have been unable to coordinate service delivery within their communities, district
managers serve as local ombudsmen for community residents (Pecorella 1989, 108).
Pecorella noted that the ability of board members and staff to be effective is limited by
the resources of that community, which is especially tragic since community boards were
intended, in large part, to strengthen the voices of residents in low-resource
neighborhoods in city affairs. It will be ironic indeed if the very communities whose
activism is most responsible for the movement toward decentralization in American cities
continue to be the communities least well served by the reforms, he wrote (Pecorella
1989, 108).
While resource levels were and continue to be destiny to a large degree at community

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boards, there is a hopeful counterpoint. Roger Sanjek's field work at Queens Community
Board 4, covering Elmhurst-Corona, from 1983 to 1996 showed not necessarily that lowincome communities can exceed the limits imposed by resource deficiency, but that new,
immigrant low-resource populations can be successfully integrated into the power
structure of a community board over time. Sanjek tracks the interaction between the
black, white, and Latino and Asian immigrant populations at CB 4, beginning with white
resistance, leading to entry of newcomers, innovations by female civic leaders, and
ultimately acceptance of shared quality of life goals. Without a community board there
would have been no public forum at which white, black, Latin American, and Asian
leaders had a place to interact, Sanjek wrote. Each racial and ethnic group in ElmhurstCorona would have confronted mayoral and permanent government power directly,
without the power of numbers and lubricatory expertise that CB 4 made possible. The
board was pivotal to the still-ongoing creation in this diverse neighborhood of... a
political 'community' (Sanjek 2000, 769).
Outcomes among community boards in districts with diverse and evolving populations,
however, are far from uniform. In 2003, Bass and Potter examined land use issues at
Harlem's three community boards, in ascending order of outcome quality:

In CB 9, Columbia University took an as-of-right dormitory project to CB 9

because of the history of resident opposition to expanded institutional uses in the
neighborhood. The community board opposed the plan, but it was fractured and
disorganized. This made the process more difficult at the community board but
ultimately did not succeed in stopping construction.

In CB 10, a market-rate residential tower on a stalled development site requested

a variance from the Board of Standards and Appeals. Community members
opposed height of the proposed tower, and the council member opposed the
inclusion of market-rate units in the project. The community board had proposed
downzoning the area before, but the Department of City Planning balked at the
idea and CB 10 rejected assistance from CIVITAS, a planning and advocacy
group from East Harlem, just outside CB 10. However, the community board had

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an idea of what it wanted for the site and could negotiate with developer for a
smaller, more contextual building. This set a precedent for future variances.

In CB 11, DCP had proposed rezoning East Harlem to protect against out-of-scale
towers. CIVITAS was on board and funded an inclusive planning process. DCP
went ahead with a less robust version of what the CIVITAS report recommended.

Each case, Bass and Potter explain, illustrates the varying outcomes from the community
board process even on boards within close proximity to each other. In all cases, the
community board's will is restricted by its advisory nature. But the ability to work with
other groups (for example, if CB 10 had accepted help from CIVITAS) and the ability to
hold organized meetings so the board can speak in a cohesive, clear voice (if CB 9 had
not been fractured) result in better outcomes that more closely match community interests
(Bass and Potter 2003).
Perhaps the most important observation about community boards, decentralization, and
local-level citizen participation in New York comes from John Mudd: The Achilles heel
of the New York approach to urban decentralization is its dependence on the active
backing of the chief executive, he wrote. With his support it can function; without it,
the system will flounder (Mudd 1976, 129). In the end, while he can be strongly
influenced by local political pressure generated by the boards, City Council members, or
other elected officials, the mayor is still in charge of service delivery and the city budget
determines the resources given to community boards.
New York's system of local advisement, instead of community control, means the buck
ultimately stops at the mayor's desk.

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History of Community Boards in New York City

1947: Citizens Union outlines administrative districts
1951: Borough President Wagners Community Planning Councils
1963: Charter (under Mayor Wagner) establishes Community Planning Boards
1965: City Council defeated Mayor Lindsays Little City Halls proposal
1971: Lindsays Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG) demonstration districts
1972: ONG abolished by Mayor Beame
1975: Charter establishes Community Boards
1989: Charter reforms: ULURP, 197-a, needs statements, and Fair Share provisions
Community boards in New York City arose from a desire to standardize the delivery of
city services, provide a neighborhood-level exchange between city agencies and citizens,
and provide an outlet for civic engagement among city residents. They arose not just out
of a desire to rationalize the city's bureaucracy, but to give local communities more
control over (or at least input regarding) central bureaucracies. It's no accident that the
rise of community boards in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with a time of crisis in the
city, when the faith of residents in the central bureaucracy was failing and urban
communities, especially low-income communities and communities of color, felt their
needs were not sufficiently represented by the city government.
In 1947, Citizens Union first suggested and mapped out administrative districts as a
model to rationalize the delivery of city services (Jacobs 1961, 420). That concept was
picked up by Manhattan Borough President Robert F. Wagner in 1951, when he
established 12 Community Planning Councils, consisting of 15 to 20 members each and
covering areas matching service delivery zones already determined by the Department of
City Planning. These councils were created to advise the borough president and the
mayor on local planning and budget issues. In 1963, during Wagner's third term as
mayor, the Charter was revised to create 62 Community Planning Boards across the
entire city for appointees to advise the borough presidents (Office of Manhattan Borough
President 2010, 3).

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In 1965, Mayor John Lindsay proposed Little City Halls to act as a point of access for
local communities to city government, but the plan was killed by the City Council, which
viewed it as an attempt by the mayor to build local political machines. Five years later,
Lindsay said 1970 was the year of the neighborhood and the following year established
the Office of Neighborhood Government. This office created eight demonstration
districts headed by managers appointed by the mayor, who were in charge of
coordinating service cabinets with representatives from various agencies. While
Community Planning Boards continued to live on, ONG was short-lived. In 1972,
Comptroller Abe Beame issued a report claiming that ONG misused city funds. ONG
was abolished when Beame became mayor (Office of Manhattan Borough President
2010, 4).
The setbacks for the Lindsay-era Little City Halls and ONG did not stop the trend toward
strengthening community-level planning boards. In 1975, voters approved a Charter
revision that replaced Community Planning Boards with the current community board
system of 59 districts, with members appointed by the borough presidents. The 1975
Charter revision also established the Uniform Land Use Review Process, giving
community roles an advisory role in that process, and established Section 197-a, allowing
community boards to put forth their own non-binding comprehensive plans (Office of
Manhattan Borough President 2010, 5).
The Charter was revised again in 1989, addressing shortcomings that hamstrung boards
during their first years after the 1975 Charter revision. The 1989 revision established
clear standards and procedures for 197-a plans, and put more of the onus for evaluating
the plans on the Department of City Planning. It also gave community boards a seat at the
table during environmental review scoping meetings between the city and a developer,
and required community boards to write annual district needs statements (Office of
Manhattan Borough President 2010, 5).
The 1989 Charter revision did much more than modify the duties of community boards: It

17

also restructured New York City government in the wake of the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris to rule the Board of
Estimate's voting composition unconstitutional. The Board of Estimate was comprised of
the mayor, the comptroller, and the City Council president, all of whom were elected
citywide and had two votes; it also included the borough presidents, each of whom had
one vote. The Court found that the equally-weighted votes of each borough president on
the Board of Estimate violated the constitutional doctrine of one person, one vote.
After the 1989 Charter revision, the borough presidents found themselves with much less
power than before, and with even less power after the Board of Education was abolished
in 2002 and with it, the power of borough presidents to make appointments to the board.
Like the community boards, the most significant role of a borough president is to
advocate for their borough, to weigh in on land use matters and, of course, to appoint
members of the community board (Friedlander).
In 2003, the mayor introduced 311, which handles public information and service
complaints through a phone line and an online site launched in 2009. The service, which
was initially created as a non-emergency police line, broadened to become an all-purpose
portal to city government. Now, if a resident has a service delivery issue, 311 can handle
much of what community boards were designed to do (City of New York). While
community boards, especially district managers, continue to handle constituent service
issues particularly ones that are knottier than the average 311 call the community
planning functions of community boards have become even more important than in the
past.

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CHAPTER 2
WHAT THE CITY CHARTER SAYS ABOUT
COMMUNITY DISTRICTS AND BOARDS
Community boards are legal creatures of the city's Charter, making it a natural place to
look for guidance on the boards and their roles. Before we can get to community boards,
however, we must first examine community districts. Community boards and community
districts are coterminous and related creatures. While boards are advisory governance
structures, districts form geographic boundaries for service delivery by city agencies.

Figure 2 A map of New York Citys 59 community districts (Brooklyn Community Board 13).

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Service Delivery and Community Districts

Chapter 69 of the New York City Charter, Community Districts and Coterminality of
Services, establishes districts to be used for the planning of community life within the
city, the participation of citizens in city government within their communities, and the
efficient and effective organization of agencies that deliver municipal services in local
communities and boroughs (New York City Charter, Section 2700). While these
districts are not the same as community boards themselves, and were created with a focus
on service delivery from city agencies, they share the same boundaries as community
boards and are integral to understanding the roles of the boards.
The districts are required to be nearly equal in population with each other and limited
to no more than 250,000 residents each. Every ten years, beginning in 1994, the mayor
may propose changes to the map of community boards and must consult with borough
presidents, city planning commission, community boards and other civic, community and
neighborhood groups and associations before submitting it to the city council for
approval (New York City Charter, Section 2702).
These districts are used for service delivery by city agencies. Services required to have
delivery organized at the community district level are: parks, recreation, street cleaning,
refuse collection, and social services such as community development and youth services.
Other services are allowed to operate at a larger scale. Those required to be coterminous
with one or more community districts are housing code enforcement, highway and street
maintenance and repair, sewer maintenance and repair, and health services other than
municipal hospitals. Agencies that are not subject to the requirement of hewing to
community districts must still organize local service delivery as closely as possible to
the boundaries of the community districts. The council and the mayor may also require
other city services to be delivered coterminous with community districts (New York City
Charter, Section 2704).
The Charter requires police patrol services to operate at the community district level, but

20

allows the mayor, in consultation with the police commissioner, to disregard that
requirement if he determines that it would be inconsistent with the most effective
delivery of such services. The council has the ability to override this decision, but only
within 60 days after first being notified of the decision. (New York City Charter, Section
2704)
The Charter also directs agencies to put staff, not just boundary lines, behind service
delivery at the community district level. Each agency is required to assign a manager at
the district level, with the ability to direct agency resources. Each agency is also required
to assign borough-level commissioners with line authority over agency programs.
Borough commissioners are required to regularly consult with borough presidents and
serve on the borough service cabinet. Borough presidents may issue annual reports
evaluating service delivery, but these are not required (New York City Charter, Section
2704).
The Charter establishes service cabinets for each borough, chaired by the borough
president and comprised of borough-level agency staff. Its role is to coordinate service
delivery, facilitate interagency coordination, and consult with residents about their needs
(New York City Charter, Section 2706). Service cabinets are also established at the
district level, comprised of local agency staff responsible for services in the district,
council members within the district, a representative from the Department of City
Planning, and the community board's district manager and chairperson. The district
service cabinet has the same roles as its borough equivalent (New York City Charter,
Section 2705).
If requested by borough boards or community boards, city agencies are required to
prepare annual statements by August 15 that outline their service objectives, priorities,
programs and activities for each community district and borough, made in consultation
with district service cabinets and community boards. Agencies must also report
expenditures within each service district no more than four months after the end of each
fiscal year (New York City Charter, Section 2707). Agencies must also provide

21

information to the borough presidents, as well as each community board and borough
board, current information on its operations and programs within each community
district and borough (New York City Charter, Section 2708).
The Charter required the mayor to appoint a task force evaluating community district
service delivery by December 1990, comprised of appointments recommended by the
council, comptroller, public advocate, and borough presidents. Twice a year, the mayor is
required to report to the council with an evaluation of local service delivery and
recommendations for changes (New York City Charter, Section 2704).
Community Board Appointments
After establishing community districts, the Charter continues with Chapter 70, City
Government in the Community, which establishes community boards for each of these
community districts. The boards are comprised of no more than 50 volunteers, each
serving a two-year term beginning on April 1. Half of appointments are made in even
years and half in odd years. Members are appointed by the borough president, with at
least half of the appointees nominated by local council members. The number of
nominations from each council member is in proportion to the percentage of the district's
population each council member represents, as determined by the City Planning
Commission after council redistricting is performed once every ten years. Council
members themselves sit on the boards as nonvoting members. Community boards, civic
groups and other community groups and neighborhood associations may submit
nominations to the borough president (New York City Charter, Section 2800).
Borough presidents have wide discretion in determining who sits on a community board.
Board members must have a residence, business, professional or other significant
interest in the district. The Charter says that no more than 25 percent of a board's
membership can be city employees and that the borough president must ensure adequate
representation from the different geographic sections and neighborhoods within the
community district and consider whether the appointed board fairly represents all

22

segments of the community (New York City Charter, Section 2800).

Although an application process for community board appointment is not mandated by
the Charter, each borough president has an application available to the public for new
members and those seeking another term. Each borough president has a different deadline
and process for soliciting community board appointment requests, though all have
application deadlines typically in January or February in advance of community board
terms beginning April 1. The Queens application is the least thorough. The other
applications are more substantive, with the Manhattan application taking a slight edge in
its comprehensiveness. All the boroughs other than Queens require similar information
from applicants, though there is no standard for questions asked, response formats, what
is required to be answered, and what notices are made on the application form by the
borough president's office.
With each borough having a different appointment process and different requirements for
applicants, there is the potential for great variability both in the quality of applicants and
appointees and in the expectations borough presidents might have for the people they
appoint. This leads to a great variation between the boards, leading to different levels of
citizen participation and different types of interaction with city agencies.

23

Table 1: Requirements of Applications for Each Borough President

Bronx

Brooklyn Manhattan Queens

Staten Is.

2015 deadline for applications

Feb. 6

Feb. 15

Jan. 30

Feb. 7

Not avail.

Contact information

Required

Required

Required

Required

Required

Employment information

Required

Required

Required

Required

Required

Character references

Required

Required

Required

Required

Age

Optional

Optional

Disability status

Optional

Optional

Military service

Optional

Gender

Optional

Optional

Required

Race or ethnicity

Optional

Optional

Required

Educational background

Required

Required

Required

Required

Required

Organizational affiliations

Required

Required

Required

Required

Required

Public service prior to CB service

Areas of Interest for committees

Required
Required

Required
Required

Resume or biography

Required

Required
Required

Required

Required

Required

Personal statement of interest

Required

Required

Required

Required

Identify whether the applicant resides or

works in district

Required

Required

Required

Required

Convicted felon?

Required

Required

Hours per mo. applicant can dedicate to CB Required

Has applicant attended CB meetings in past
year
Has applicant served as a public member

Required
Required
Required

Length of residence in borough and district

Member of a trade organization or union

Required

Required
Required

Required

Type of housing (NYCHA, Mitchell-Lama,

Required
private rental, owner)

Required
Required

Required

Asks if applicant is employed by city

Asks if employer of employers of family
might come before the CB

Required

Required

Required

Social media profiles

Party to a lawsuit against the city or its
agencies
Indiciate whether the applicant has read the
district needs statement
Indicate whether applicant attended CB
training sessions

Optional

Information on conflicts of interest rules

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Notifies that application subject to FOIL

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Required

Required

Required
Required
Required

Community board application requirements (Office of the Bronx Borough President, Office of the
Brooklyn Borough President, Office of the Manhattan Borough President, Office of the Queens Borough
President, Office of the Staten Island Borough President).

24

Because the Charter gives significant discretion to the borough presidents, the
appointment process can be opaque. For example, when a newspaper asked about her
appointment process in 2014, a spokesperson for Queens Borough President Melinda
Katz replied: It is our offices policy not to comment on the process of how community
board members are selected (Trangle 2014).
Former Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer implemented a series of appointment
reforms beginning in 2006 that have been continued and slightly modified under his
successor, Gale Brewer. Using Census data and consultations with community board
leaders and council members, Stringer's office developed recruitment strategies for each
board based on that board's strengths, needs and priorities, and recruitment was often
aimed at increasing the diversity and expertise of board membership. Stringer cites an
increase in Asian American representation on Manhattan Community Board 3, bringing it
closer to the demographics of the district's population, as proof that his recruitment
efforts are working (Office of New York City Comptroller 2014, 2).
One of Stringer's most significant reforms was the creation of an independent screening
panel comprised of good government groups, civic associations, and community-based
organizations including Citizens Union, NAACP, Hispanic Federation, NYPIRG and
the League of Women Voters. In addition to serving as recruitment arms, organizations
serving on the panel screened applications to ensure that only qualified candidates
proceeded to the borough president's consideration. All qualified applicants, including
members looking to be reappointed, were required to fill out an application and interview
with the borough president's office. The goal was to eliminate automatic reappointments,
in which existing board members have terms renewed without scrutiny, and Stringer's
office took attendance and participation into consideration when evaluating whether to
reappoint a board member. Because half all board members are appointed at the
recommendation of local council members, Stringer pointed out that their participation in
the reforms were key to their success, including devoting staff time to interviews for all
qualified applicants before making recommendations to the borough president (Office of
New York City Comptroller 2014, 3).

25

The selection process is entirely up to the borough president, and there is no reporting
requirement to ensure that a board's membership matches the Charter requirements.
Because of this, the public relies on information voluntarily released by the borough
presidents about their appointments, such as a press release from Manhattan Borough
President Gale Brewer announcing information about her appointments (Goldston 2015).
The Charter says a board member may be removed for cause, including substantial
nonattendance at board or committee meetings over a period of six months as
determined either by the borough president or a majority vote of the community board.
Vacancies must be filled promptly by the borough president. It's important to note that
substantial nonattendance and promptly are not clearly defined in the Charter (New
York City Charter, Section 2800). Stringer introduced a policy that he will appoint
someone to fill a community board vacancy within 30 days, a policy that has gained
support from Citizens Union (Office of New York City Comptroller 2014, 3).
The Department of Investigation can conduct inquiries into allegations regarding misuse
of a community board title. As public officers, board members are also subject to conflict
of interest laws (New York City Charter, Section 2800). Recently, two members of
Manhattan Community Board 2 have been fined by the Conflicts of Interest Board for
accepting gifts from a luxury club with business before the board (Greene 2015).
Duties of Community Boards
The Charter spells out 21 duties of community boards, beginning with considering the
needs of the district which it serves.
The board may hold public or private hearings, but can only take action at public
meetings. Meetings, which must include a period to hear from the public, must be held at
least once a month, except for July and August, and must be available for broadcasting
and cablecasting. The board may create committees, which can have public members

26

who are not members of the board but either live in or have an interest in the district,
though only board members can chair committees. Meetings of committees must be open
to the public (New York City Charter, Section 2800).
A majority of appointed board members must be present for there to be a quorum, and a
majority vote of the board members present for a quorum shall be considered the act or
determination of the board (New York City Charter, Section 2801).
The board must elect officers, though only a board chair is required under the charter.
Boards must also create their own by-laws, determine the duties of the district manager
and other staff, can hire consultants, and must ensure that minutes and other documents
are available to elected officials and the public. The district manager (who, interestingly,
can also be a member of the board so long as this person does not participate in the
selection process for a district manager) is responsible for processing service complaints,
presiding at meetings of the district service cabinet, and performing other duties as
prescribed by the board (New York City Charter, Section 2800).
The Charter also requires boards to cooperate with, consult, assist and advise agencies
and elected officials in manners concerning the district, including its capital needs. The
board must also request the attendance of agency representatives at meetings and prepare
comprehensive and special purpose plans on district growth and improvement. Boards
are required to send an annual report to the mayor, city council, and borough board. In
addition, they are required to compile an annual district needs statement that includes
recommendations for programs or activities from city agencies, assist agencies in
preparing agency service statements, and evaluate how well agencies are providing
services (New York City Charter, Section 2800).
In its listing of duties of community boards, the Charter focuses on capital projects.
Boards have duties to consult with agencies, conduct hearings, and provide estimates to
the mayor on the district's capital needs. The board shall also assist in the planning of
individual capital projects and review the scope and design for each capital project within

27

30 days of receiving it. Boards must also evaluate the progress of capital projects based
on updates from agencies (New York City Charter, Section 2800).
Boards are authorized to designate representatives to help shape the requirements of
environmental impact statements mandates for any projects in the district, conduct
hearings and provide recommendations to the City Planning Commission on land use
applications within the district, and conduct substantial public outreach that includes
maintaining a publicly-available list of community organizations (New York City
Charter, Section 2800).
Friends-of Groups
A few boards have established friends of 501(c)3 non-profits to supplement funds
provided by the city. One example is Friends of Brooklyn Community Board 6,
established in 2003 (Mooney 2005). It provides planning, advocacy, research and
administrative resources and has worked with the Southwest Brooklyn Industrial
Development Corporation to study the creation of an Industrial Business Improvement
District in Gowanus, partnered with Sustainable CUNYs NY Solar Smart to bring solar
panel programs to the district, and received a grant to complete a Brownfield Opportunity
Area study for two areas in Gowanus. The group is chaired by Gary Reilly, the chair of
CB 6, and its unpaid executive director is Craig Hammerman, who serves as district
manager of CB 6 (Friends of Brooklyn Community Board 6).
There is a risk that organizations and individuals with business before the board will
make contributions to the board's non-profit fundraising arm. Manhattan Community
Board 1 began a friends-of group in 2001, which received $484,497 that year to
supplement the board's $175,000 annual budget from the city. In a news article from
2004, board members questioned whether donations from architects and developers
working on the World Trade Center could pose a potential conflict of interest when
WTC-related issues came up at the community board. The article noted that as a 501(c)3
non-profit, the friends-of group is not required to disclose its donors (OBrien 2004).

28

Current Reform Efforts

There have been discussions about changing the community board system since the 1989
Charter revision, but few changes have been passed into law. The latest round of reform
discussions can be traced back to 2010, when the city last established a charter revision
commission. Numerous elected officials and good government groups urged the
commission to consider changes to the community board system (New York City Charter
Revision Commission 2010, 87).
There is general agreement among board members, district managers, city planners,
elected officials, and civic reform organizations that submitted recommendations to the
Charter Revision Commission that community boards suffer from a lack of resources,
could stand to have improved membership and operations, and are generally limited by
their advisory nature. While there is some agreement over specific reforms that are
needed, there are a few areas of disagreement.
In 2010, Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer recommended the Charter require
each board to have a full-time planner, improve the appointment process by creating a
citywide application standard that includes a written application, require annual reports
from borough presidents on their appointees and outreach efforts, and mandate specific
timelines for appointments to fill a vacant seat. Stringer also recommended the Charter
more clearly describe the responsibilities borough presidents have to provide support to
community boards and require written responses from agencies regarding each board's
district needs statement (Office of the Manhattan Borough President 2010).
Tom Angotti seconded Stringer's recommendation for a professional planner to be on
community board staff, and also urged the commission to set the total community board
budget at at least one percent of the city budget, effectively increasing it 500 percent from
current levels. Angotti urged term limits for board members, regular training for board
members from the mayor's Community Affairs Unit, changes that would make it easier

29

and more worthwhile for boards to undertake 197-a plans, and unspecified expansions of
the role of community boards in ULURP and budget processes (Angotti 2010). Many of
these suggestions were echoed by Citizens Union, Common Cause New York, and other
groups like the Pratt Center for Community Development and the Campaign for
Community Based Planning (New York City Charter Revision Commission 2010, 87).
Despite these recommendations, reforms to the community board process did not come
out of the commission and go before voters. Instead, the commission left larger changes
to government structure, including community board reforms, up to future discussion.
The issues resurfaced again in early 2014, when the City Council's Committee on
Governmental Operations, chaired by Council Member Ben Kallos, held hearings and
issued a report on community board reform. Many of the same issues were brought up by
many of the same parties that made recommendations to the Charter Revision
Commission four years prior. Stringer made recommendations in his capacity as
Comptroller, and his successor as Manhattan borough president, Gale Brewer, offered
recommendations that echoed many of the suggestions Stringer made in 2010.
Recommendations from Common Cause New York and Citizens Union were nearly
identical to the changes they had made in 2010, as well.
The report made a number of recommendations to improve outreach and recruitment,
standardize the application process, and restore the public trust by improving rules
governing appointed board members. In the year since the City Council committee issued
its report, three issues have come before the committee as potential changes to the
community board system, based on the recommendations of advocates, elected officials,
community board staff, community board members, and the results of the report: the
ability to appoint 16- and 17-year olds to community boards without special permission,
hiring city planning staff for community boards, and instituting term limits (New York
City Council 2015).
The least controversial of these changes is the appointment of 16- and 17-year olds to

30

community boards, which had been prohibited by the New York State Public Officers
Law. A bill amending the law passed the City Council and the state legislature in 2014,
and was signed into law by Governor Cuomo and Mayor Bill de Blasio (Malesevic
2015).
The second recommendation from the report to come before the City Council
governmental operations committee came in the form of Intro 0732-2015, which would
make urban planning professionals available to community boards through the office of
each borough president. At a hearing on the bill in April 2015, staff of Manhattan
Borough President Gale Brewer were joined by Citizens Union and Common Cause New
York in supporting the bill's intent to provide the boards with technical expertise but
expressed concern that providing staff to boards through the borough president's office
may create the potential for conflicts of interest, particularly on ULURP and other land
use issues where the boards and the borough president are supposed to offer separate
opinions. The groups urged the committee to consider ways to allow the community
boards themselves to hire technical staff. Gene Russianoff of the New York Public
Interest Research Group noted at the hearing that not all boards have the same needs for
city planning and land use technical staff, and may choose to use budget allocations for
city planning staff in a way that better suits their needs (New York City Council 2015).
The most controversial reform proposal to come before the committee, however, is a
proposal to enact term limits for community board members. Intro 0585-2014, from
Council Member Daniel Dromm, would apply a six-term, or 12-year, limit for new
members of community boards to hold voting positions on the board. It would not impact
people who currently sit on community boards. Nevertheless, it garnered a united front of
opposition from Brewer, as well as community board members and staff who testified
before the committee in April 2015. Opponents of the bill feared that it would decimate
institutional knowledge on the boards, particularly on difficult issues like land use, and
would penalize volunteer board members who would like to continue serving but would
be prohibited from further holding a voting seat. It was also pointed out that some
community boards are not presently operating at the full level of 50 appointed members

31

and struggle to attract new members, a challenge that would likely only be exacerbated if
existing members are term-limited out. Brewers staff noted that a strong and wellfunctioning appointment process renders term limits unnecessary (New York City
Council 2015).
The term limits bill was supported by Common Cause New York, Citizens Union,
Transportation Alternatives, and the New York Public Interest Research Group. The
organizations argued for an even stronger term limits bill that included a shorter term
limit. They noted that term limits can help board membership reflect the current makeup
of a neighborhood, an issue that is particularly important in areas with significant
demographic turnover, including immigrant neighborhoods. Term limits also provide an
opportunity, the groups said, to remove board members who may not be serving the
board particularly well yet are politically difficult to remove otherwise (New York City
Council 2015).
Related Forms of Participatory Engagement in New York City
While community boards are a prominent form of advisory, volunteer governance that
encourages citizen participation in New York City, they are not the only game in town.
Three other forms of neighborhood-level governance and advisement are products of city
government and play roles that both complement and overlap with those of the
community board.
Community education councils: Created by state law, CECs are constituted every two
years, in odd-numbered years. There are 32 community education councils, which are
advisory bodies with 12 volunteer appointed members each: Nine parents selected by
PTA leadership, two local residents or business leaders appointed by the Borough
President, and one non-voting high school senior who lives in the district and is
appointed by the Community Superintendent (New York City Department of Education
2015). Each CEC represents kindergarten through 8th grade public, non-charter school
students within its district, must meet once a month, and advises on, among other matters,

32

educational programs in the district and approving school zoning boundaries. There are
also four citywide education councils, on high schools, special education, English
language learners, and District 75, which works with children with severe challenges,
such as autism, cognitive and emotional hardships, or multiple disabilities (New York
City Department of Education 2014).
Precinct community councils: First Established by the NYPD in 1943, these 86 volunteer
councils advise each local precinct and public housing Police Service Area. Meetings are
held once a month and provide an opportunity for the public to engage with the
commanding officer and community affairs officers for each precinct. Membership on the
council is open to anyone who resides, operates a business, or is a member of a local
civic or religious organization within the precinct's boundaries. Every two years,
community council membership in good standing elects an executive board to operate
meetings and lead the council. Executive board members are term-limited to four twoyear terms. Councils have established committees on elections, public safety, event
planning, fundraising, and recruitment, and may raise funds independently but are limited
to $50,000 per year. NYPD also offers a neighborhood watch program called Civilian
Observation Patrol and a ride-along program where community members shadow
officers on duty. Precinct commanding officers can also nominate members of the public
to participate in the 14-week Citizens Police Academy, an in-depth training on a the
breadth of police work (New York City Police Department 2015).
Participatory budgeting: Begun in the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989, participatory
budgeting as implemented in New York City allows the public to vote on how a portion
of City Council discretionary capital funds are spent in participating districts
(Participatory Budgeting Project 2015). PB began in New York City in 2011-2012 with
four City Council districts; in 2014-2015, 24 of the City Council's 51 members launched
PB programs with at least $1 million on each district's ballot. Members of the public
volunteer as budget delegates to work with Council and city agency staff in developing
and honing a list of projects, such as upgrades to parks, schools, and streetscapes, that
will ultimately be placed on a ballot. Voting is over multiple days and open to all district

33

residents above age 16 (New York City Council 2015).

Local civic associations, tenants groups, religious groups, unions, and advocacy
organizations: These groups are meaningful conduits for civic life and often both
interface with and overlap with community boards, but are not established by the City of
New York as official mechanisms for community engagement and advisement.
Local Advisory Governance Models From Other U.S. Cities
New York is not the only city with local advisory governance. Other cities established
similar systems, typically beginning in the 1970s, to provide a bottom rung to local
government. Here are three examples:

Washington, D.C.: The District of Columbia has Advisory Neighborhood

Commissions (ANCs), which were created after the Home Rule Act of 1973 gave
increased power to locally-elected officials in the District. ANCs are drawn as
subdivisions of Council wards, with four to six ANCs per Council district. Each
ANC is subdivided into Single Member Districts, covering an area representing
approximately 2,000 people. ANC members are nonpartisan officials elected to
two-year terms (District of Columbia Board of Elections 2015). ANCs offer
advisory opinions and testimony to the mayor, Council, local commissions, and
federal agencies on a range of issues, including transportation, recreation, liquor
licenses, zoning, economic development, and policing (Government of the
District of Columbia 2015). Compared to Council and mayoral elections, ANCs
do not often receive significant attention from voters. A strong incumbent system
and a general lack of interest among potential competitors means that even the
worst advisory neighborhood commissioners can hang onto their seats for
decades, wrote Will Sommer in the Washington City Paper (Sommer 2013).

Seattle, Washington: Seattle's Department of Neighborhoods was established in

1987. Its director is appointed by the mayor and approved by the City Council,
and is in charge of coordinating and providing technical assistance to 13

34

neighborhood districts. Each district has a District Council, comprised of

appointed representatives from local non-profits, civic groups, and business
groups (Leman 2013). Each District Council also sends representation to the City
Neighborhood Council, a citywide advisory group (Seattle Department of
Neighborhoods 2015). This neighborhood advisory governance system contrasts
with Seattle's City Council, where all nine seats have been elected at-large.
Looking for a City Council more responsive to local issues, voters passed a ballot
measure in 2013 that changes the City Council to nine district seats and two atlarge seats. The change goes into effect in 2015 (Seattle Office of the City Clerk
2015). It leaves open the possibility of changing the boundaries of neighborhood
districts to match those of City Council districts.

Los Angeles, California: Established by a City Charter revision in 1999,

neighborhood councils are self-organizing bodies that must receive the approval
of the Board of Neighborhood Commissioners and the Department of
Neighborhood Empowerment (Los Angeles Neighborhood Council Coalition
2015). They vary in size, from 7 to 30 members. There are 96 Neighborhood
Councils in Los Angeles, representing a minimum of 20,000 people and an
average of 38,000 people. Each Neighborhood Council receives $45,000 in city
funds each year (Los Angeles County Bicycle Coalition 2015). The councils form
alliances around particular issues or geographies to speak with a louder voice; for
example, there is an alliance of Neighborhood Councils on river issues, another
focused on the Department of Water and Power, and another focused on
sustainability, among other issues (Los Angeles Department of Neighborhood
Empowerment 2015). The Department of Neighborhood Empowerment offers
trainings for Neighborhood Council members and administers elections for each
council.

35

CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY: MANHATTAN COMMUNITY BOARD 9
Despite having the same Charter-mandated responsibilities, New York City's community
boards vary widely. Some deal with significant land use and development issues; others
struggle with acute housing affordability problems; some deal with a heavy burden of
particular issues, such as liquor licenses; while others are regularly confronting
environment problems. The way the boards operate varies greatly, as well: Some have
well-resourced members who provide a wealth of technical knowledge and funding for
projects, while others struggle to keep board members engaged and educated on current
issues. Some boards have strict, regular schedules for committees and term limits for
chairs, while others meet on an as-needed basis and have a less formal environment.
Manhattan Community Board 9 deals with a wide variety of issues. Of particular note, it
engages with large educational institutions on a regular basis, struggles with affordability
and housing problems, welcomes a significant immigrant population, and faces
environmental justice issues. It has also taken advantage of the Charter's provision for
community boards to undertake their own non-binding comprehensive planning process,
known as 197-a plans. While it is not a high-resource board in a wealthy part of
Manhattan, neither is it anemic and struggling for community involvement. In other
words, CB 9 is a good case study because it has taken on a variety of tasks while striking
a happy medium between high-octane, resource-rich boards and more relaxed, informal
boards.

36

Figure 3: Map of Manhattan Community District 9 (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).

37

About Manhattan Community Board 9

Manhattan Community Board 9 has 50 members and covers 1.5 square miles in the West
Harlem area: Morningside Heights, Manhattanville, and Hamilton Heights, between
110th and 155th Streets. Its eastern border runs along Manhattan, Morningside, St
Nicholas, Bradhurst, and Edgecombe Avenues, which form the boundaries of a string of
parks: Jackie Robinson Park, St. Nicholas Park, and Morningside Park. Its western border
is the Hudson River (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
The district is home to City College of New York and Columbia University. It also
includes New York City Housing Authority properties: Grant, Manhattanville, and
Audubon Houses.
On its western shore, the district is home to Riverbank State Park, Riverside Park, the
North River Wastewater Treatment Plant, and the former 135th Street Marine Transfer
Center, which was closed in 1999 and awaits redevelopment (Ransom 2014).
Environmental justice is a longstanding issue in the neighborhood going back to the
establishment of the North River plant, which began planning in the late 1960s before
opening in 1986. Two years after the plant opened, local activists founded West Harlem
Environmental Action (WE ACT), which went on to produce its own plan for West
Harlem's riverfront in the 1990s (Angotti 2008, 136). The neighborhood's challenges
have created a vibrant ecosystem of community organizations that take on their own proactive planning processes, WE ACT chief among them.
The district is home to 110,193 people, according to the 2010 Census, and like many
New York neighborhoods has a majority non-white population, with a population that is
24.6 percent black, 23 percent white, 6.9 percent Asian or Pacific Islander, as well as
42.7 percent of Hispanic origin. More than 87 percent of occupied housing units are
rented (Department of City Planning 2012).

38

Figure 4 Race and ethnicity of Manhattan Community District 9 (Department of City Planning 2012).

Manhattan Community Board 9 By-Laws

Many of the rules laid out in the board's by-laws echo the rules and requirements as laid
out in the city Charter. However, the by-laws also include details and responsibilities that
are not specified in the Charter.
The board's by-laws were adopted in 1986 and amended six times, the latest in 2013. Its
by-laws take advantage of the Charter provision allowing boards to designate public
members, who are appointed to sit on committees by the CB 9 chair in consultation with
the committee chair. CB 9 by-laws require that the non-binding committee votes of
public members be entered into the minutes. The by-laws also add local state legislators
and Congressional representatives as ex-officio non-voting board members, in addition to
the City Council members that are designated non-voting members by the Charter
(Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
The by-laws specify that board members must serve in their capacity as private citizens
only and shall not be instructed by, or responsible to, any other organization or person
with which they may be affiliated. Board members who have a self-serving purpose or
conflict of interest must state it before speaking on an issue and are disqualified from
voting (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
Board members speaking in public are speaking as individuals and cannot make public
statements about the board's position unless formally approved by the board chair to do
so (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
39

The executive committee can remove a member for cause, including for poor attendance.
Board members can be excused from meetings by the chair of the meeting or the chair's
designee, and can be excused only for illness, employment obligations, death in the
immediate family, military service or other compulsory government service, religious
observance, or planned vacation. After three excused absences, board members may
request to be excused for up to six months. If, after six months the member cannot or
does not return, a vacancy will be declared. If within a 12-month span, a member has
three unexcused absences or a total of five absences, excused or not, the executive
committee may remove the board member. The executive committee must review all
vacancies each quarter and send recommendations for appointment to the borough
president (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
All meetings must be audio recorded. Profanity, threats, insults, physical confrontation
and/or intimidation are grounds for immediate removal from a meeting. Votes must be
taken by roll call, and board members differing with an official board position may issue
a minority report but must decide to issue such a report within 30 days after the board's
vote (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
General board meetings include reports from the chair, treasurer, district manager, the
borough president, committees, board members appointed to represent the board on
outside commissions or panels, followed by the public session, which includes reports
from elected officials and their representatives. This is followed by the board's business
before the meeting is adjourned. The meetings are governed by Robert's Rules of Order
and can be taken into executive session, from which the public is barred so the board can
discuss prescribed sensitive matters, with a majority vote of members (Manhattan
Community Board 9 2014).
The board shall have the following officers: Chair, First Vice-Chair, Second Vice-Chair,
Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer, serving for two-year
terms beginning July 1. The Chair, Secretary or Treasurer can serve or no more than four

40

consecutive years; the Assistant Secretary and Assistant Treasurer can serve for no more
than five consecutive years. Officers are elected by the board and can be removed at any
time by a majority vote of the board. If the Chair's seat is empty mid-term, the First ViceChair will ascend to the position. If any other officer position is vacant mid-term, a
special election must be held within 30 days, administered by a five-member elections
committee. Each officer has duties prescribed in the by-laws, and are elected at the June
meeting of the board (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
The board has nine standing committees (Manhattan Community Board 9 2015):

Arts & Culture

Health & Environment

Housing, Land Use & Zoning

Landmarks Preservation/Parks

Senior Issues

Safety, Uniformed Services, & Transportation

Strategic Planning (Ad Hoc Committee)

Economic Development

Youth & Education

It also has an executive committee, comprised of board officers and chairs of each
standing committee, which is required to meet once a month and is in charge of the
board's internal budget spending and makes recommendations to the full board regarding
the city's capital and expense budgets. The executive committee can act on behalf of the
board in emergency situations, in which action is required before the next regularly
scheduled board meeting (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
In addition to the elections committee and the executive committee, a five-member ad
hoc rules and ethics committee shall address ethics and parliamentary issues, with the
board chair serving as parliamentarian (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
Committee chairs are appointed by the board chair. One week before each full board

41

meeting, they must submit to the board records of committee meetings, including board
member and public attendance, resolutions adopted with a vote tally, and minutes of the
committee meeting. If 25 percent or more of a committee's membership is dissatisfied
with the committee chair's performance, they can raise the issue with the board chair,
followed by the executive committee, followed by the full board.
Board members appointed to represent the board on outside commissions and bodies are
chosen by a vote of the full board, with terms renewed annually.
The district manager, appointed by the board, has responsibility for hiring, reviewing, and
firing staff in consultation with the executive committee. The district manager must
preside at meetings of the district service cabinet, handle service complaints from
constituents, supervise the district office, oversee the board website, including the posting
of agendas, minutes, reports, and resolutions, present budget and financial reports to the
board Treasurer, and direct information to the appropriate committee chairs (Manhattan
Community Board 9 2014).
District Needs Statement
Each community board is required by the Charter to produce a district needs statement
each year to inform the city's budget priorities. CB 9's most recent needs statement, from
2014, is a 20-page document that covers the following subject areas: housing, economic
development, waterfront redevelopment and access, arts and culture, health and human
services, seniors, policing, sanitation, fire, parks, education/libraries, adult education and
literacy, environment, and transportation (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
Housing is both the first issue listed and the one where most attention is paid, followed
by economic development. The district has struggled with a loss of housing units since
1990, and is the community district with the smallest number of new units built from
1991 to 2001. In its statement, the board is concerned that the city is not developing cityowned property for affordable housing quickly enough. It is also concerned that tenants

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in many privately-owned buildings are not receiving needed repairs quickly enough, and
while the board supports city programs to encourage action by private property owners, it
questions whether the programs are effective at getting results for tenants. The board cites
concerns about displacement, and notes that a significant portion of the district's
population is rent-burdened, paying at least 30 percent of income for rent, and 23
percent of households are severely rent-burdened, paying at least 50 percent of income on
rent. The board also urges the end of vacancy decontrol, which makes it easier for
landlords to remove apartments from rent stabilization, and urges the preservation of
existing affordable units, including Mitchell-Lama and NYCHA properties within its
borders (Manhattan Community Board 9 2014).
The district needs statement urges additional job training for the district's unemployed
and underemployed adult population, and urges the city to work more closely with new
businesses (particularly large developments and chains) in the district to hire local
residents. It also calls for more city support of arts and cultural organizations, more pest
control units to address the district's rodent problems, and additional Department of
Sanitation pickup. From the parks department, it asks for improved parks maintenance,
additional Parks Enforcement Patrol officers, more street trees, additional lighting,
recreation center staff, and other amenities. The needs statement also makes specific
requests for road repaving and expanded bus service from the MTA (Manhattan
Community Board 9 2014).
197-a Plan
The Charter authorizes boards to develop advisory neighborhood plans in consultation
with the Department of City Planning and the City Planning Commission. CB 9 first
began work on a 197-a plan in 1991, and submitted a plan to DCP in December 1998.
The department returned the plan to CB 9 after preliminary review and it was never
adopted (City Planning Commission 2007, 1).
In 2003, CB 9 once again began the 197-a process, studying the entire community

43

district. CB 9 worked with the Pratt Center for Community Development to create a 197a plan that was approved by the board in October 2004 and submitted to DCP in August
2005. In October 2006, DCP determined that the plan met the basic threshold
requirements to proceed. CB 9 revised the plan in response to comments from DCP and
city agencies, and it was later sent out for public review in June 2007. It was approved by
the CB 9 full board in August 2007, 35-0, with no abstentions. CB 9 submitted its revised
197-a plan in September 2007, which included substantial changes focused on
community facility use near Columbia University. It was approved by the City Planning
Commission in November 2007 (City Planning Commission 2007 , 1).
The plan includes an introduction and a report on existing conditions, looking at
population; land use and zoning; urban design, open space and historic preservation;
transportation and transit; economic development; environmental protection and
sustainability; housing; and community facilities. It concludes with recommendations
for each of these subject areas. Recommendations include adoption of contextual zoning;
affordable housing preservation and creation mandates; forbidding using eminent domain
to convey private property to another private owner; establishment of a community
benefits agreement or a community land trust paid for by developers; development of a
park on the West Harlem piers; expanded landmark and historic district designations;
reuse the Amsterdam Avenue MTA bus depot for municipal parking; establishment of a
Zero Waste Zone and green building standards for new large developments in CB 9;
identify sites for new public schools and other community and cultural facilities. The plan
also has specific recommendations for a new special zoning district in Manhattanville,
including three sub-districts, with the goal of fostering light manufacturing uses and
maximizing waterfront access (City Planning Commission 2007).
The 197-a plan set the stage for the community board's work during the Columbia
University expansion proposal. During public scoping for the Columbia proposal, CB 9
requested that the 197-a plan be included as an alternative in analysis for the project's
environmental review. The 197-a alternative and a modified 197-a alternative were
included in the DEIS, completed in June 2007. CB 9 altered its 197-a alternative in

44

September 2007, and the revised alternatives were included for analysis in the FEIS.
In many regards, the rezoning requested by Columbia University conflicted with the
proposals laid out in the 197-a plan. The City Planning Commission referred both the
197-a plan and the Columbia rezoning to public comment on the same day: June 18,
2007. In its report on the 197-a plan, CPC said: The Commission believes that it has
been presented not with two radically different visions of land use in Manhattanville, but
instead with two different approaches toward how Columbia University can, and should
grow in Manhattanville. Based upon careful examination of the two plans during the
public review process, the Commission has modified both plans to make them more
consistent with each other with regard to how Columbia University can grow in the
future (City Planning Commission 2007, 14).
The 197-a plan also set the stage for a contextual rezoning of much of West Harlem,
between 125th and 155th Streets, which was approved by the City Planning Commission
and the City Council in 2012 (Department of City Planning 2012).
While development continues in West Harlem, particularly around Columbias
Manhattanville sites, many of the big decisions have already been made through the
rezoning and other land use actions. Construction on streetscape and private development
projects is underway in the neighborhood, and a new generation of board members who
didnt participate in the rezoning and land use debates of just a few years ago are
beginning to make their mark on the board.

45

Interviews
While civic advocacy and reform organizations, as well as many elected officials, have
issued reports, provided testimony, or made on-the-record statements about the
community board process and potential reforms that have already been covered in this
thesis, the voices of local community board members are not as prominent in city-level
discussions about boards themselves. For that reason, I interviewed people who are either
members of Manhattan Community Board 9, appoint its membership, or are involved in
neighborhood work that intersects with the board, to gain their perspectives from the
ground level on the roles the community board plays, what it does well, and what it
doesn't do well.
The interviews lasted between 30 and 120 minutes. Most interviews began with questions
that focused on each individual's personal history and interest in community boards, their
involvement with CB 9, and their assessment of the board's strengths and weaknesses,
before concluding by asking their thoughts for how community boards could be improved
or completely reconstituted.
List of Interviewed Individuals

Mark Levine, City Council District 10 and former Manhattan CB 12 member

Michael Levine, Manhattan CB 1 planning consultant and coordinator of the

community board fellows project at the Fund for the City of New York

Rev. Georgiette Morgan-Thomas, Manhattan Community Board 9 chair

Eutha Prince, Manhattan Community Board 9 district manager

Brad Taylor, Manhattan Community Board 9 member

Carolyn Thompson, chair of Manhattan Community Board 9 uniform services and

transportation committee

April Tyler, chair of Manhattan Community Board 9 housing, land use and zoning
committee

Martin Wallace, Manhattan Community Board 9 member

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What Attracts People to Community Boards

Each interviewee had a different path to joining the community board, but all of the
interviewees first interacted with boards because they were interested in community
affairs or to reach out to community members about a specific project. Michael Levine
first began attending Manhattan CB 2 meetings as a representative of the Department of
City Planning; he later joined the board as a neighborhood resident. Mark Levine, for
example, first started attending Manhattan Community Board 12 meetings in the 1990s as
a way to reach out to community members as he began a community development nonprofit credit union. Georgette Morgan-Thomas first started attending Manhattan CB 9 and
CB 10 meetings in the early 1990s on behalf of the non-profit supportive housing
developer she worked for. Carolyn Thompson began attending 30th precinct community
council meetings in the early 1980s because she was concerned about crime in the
neighborhood. This led her to community board meetings. For Brad Taylor, it was his
involvement in the Friends of Morningside Park that first brought him to CB 9.
Joining the Community Board
A second-place finish in a 2001 City Council race left Levine wanting to stay involved in
civic affairs and local politics. People involved in Upper Manhattan politics strongly
encouraged him to seek a seat on Community Board 12, and he thought being a CB
member might be a good way to prepare for a potential future run for office.
Others joined without higher political aspirations. Morgan-Thomas, for example,
attended so many community board meetings on behalf of her employer whether they
had business before the board or not that during a vote on a resolution at one board
meeting, board members asked her why she hadn't voted yet. She reminded them that she
was not a board member. Then-Borough President C. Virginia Fields asked her to serve
on CB 10, but Morgan-Thomas felt more connected with CB 9 and felt CB 10's meetings
were too dysfunctional, so she was appointed to CB 9 instead.

47

Similarly, joining the community board was a natural outgrowth of work Thompson was
already doing. Beginning with her work on the precinct community council, she became
more involved in neighborhood organizations, and was ultimately appointed to CB 9 in
the early 1990s.
Impressions of the Community Board Process
All interviewees had reservations about the board process, and most concerns hinged on
the personalities and behaviors of individual members. Mark Levine noted that board
meetings are pretty imposing to a novice and that while they may have the trappings of
power, boards have little actual power. Board members can feel protective of turf, or
easily offended by perceived slights, leading to a quagmire of inaction. Thompson and
Morgan-Thomas both said that CB 9 meetings in the 1990s often went for hours, driven
by members who believed that their appointment to the board gave them power to stop
projects or to raise a stink, rather than to cooperate with other members and come to a
mutually agreeable solution.
Mark Levine said this type of behavior on CB 12 quickly made him, in his words,
cynical about boards. Thompson and Morgan-Thomas both seemed frustrated by this
problem but less willing to become jaded about the community board process as a result.
Martin Wallace came to CB 9 because he had an idea to reduce the number of alternateside parking days that had already been implemented in CB 12. His first encounter with
the board was negative, he said, with long-time members finding reasons to dismiss his
idea rather than encourage it. Wallace signed up for the community board's email list, but
found he didn't start getting emails until months later. Wallace ultimately decided to join
the community board to make it more accessible to interested members of the public.
Not everything about boards is negative, of course. During his time on CB 12, Mark
Levine saw the board raise issues of concern to local residents to the attention of elected

48

officials and agencies, such as repeated noise problems. The board also represented the
opinions of local residents, he said; for example, it fought against a drug patient
rehabilitation center and opposed high-rise residential development in the neighborhood.
But the board was more than just forum to say no to projects, he said. A group of
Inwood residents came to the board to request bike lanes in the neighborhood, he said,
and that plan was eventually adopted by DOT.
On CB 9, Morgan-Thomas and Thompson both point to the board's work on the West
Harlem waterfront and the 197-a plan as leading examples of positive, proactive board
work. April Tyler pointed to park and environmental gains along the West Harlem Piers,
and affordable housing projects at 155th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue and at P.S. 186
on 145th Street, as examples of positive proactive work by the board. Eutha Prince
pointed to the board's work on youth issues, particularly involving young people from
Grant and Manhattanville Houses.
Improving Staffing
Boards are restricted in their ability to both engage the public and perform pro-active
work due to limited budgets, which results in limited staffing. The total budget for
community boards is 0.02 percent of the city budget (Angotti 2010, 15). Most boards
have a full-time district manager, and usually one or two assistants on staff. Manhattan
CB 9, for example, has a district manager, who supervises a community associate and a
community assistant. None of the staff have training in land use and housing
development issues, which are a primary concern for the board and the neighborhood.
Instead, the staff is tasked with the day-to-day operations of the board, such as
disseminating agendas, minutes, and constituent calls. There is no planner on staff.
We are Davids and we equip ourselves with slingshots, but it takes effort and it takes
dogged determination, said April Tyler. She is constantly looking for student interns for
the board, but often finds there isn't sufficient staff capacity to manage the interns.

49

Mark Levine noted that boards with wealthier, better-educated members often don't have
a need for non-administrative staff assistance. For example, in his capacity as chair of the
City Council parks committee, he has worked with members of Manhattan CB 5 on
issues related to shadows from skyscrapers near Central Park. They do not have
professional planning staff assisting them, but CB 5 members are knowledgeable and
skilled in the area. (For example, Raju Mann, the former chair of the CB 5 land use
committee, worked at the Municipal Art Society before taking a job leading the land use
unit at the City Council and stepping down from CB 5).
Information is power, April Tyler said. Not just money, not just resources.
CB 9 and many other boards typically don't have such sophisticated members leading
their committees. Particularly when it comes to land use, boards are often at a
disadvantage when it comes to technical firepower, compared to other ULURP parties,
such as the developer, the Department of City Planning, and the borough president's
office, which has its own planning staff. A bill from Council Member Ben Kallos would
staff the boards with dedicated city planners to help with ULURP and other land use
issues, but it's an open question right now as to where the planners would be housed and
how they would be assigned. One option is to have them work as employees of the
borough president, and to rotate to community boards based on need. While this is a more
flexible arrangement than simply hiring a planner for an individual board or a group of
boards, it raises potential conflicts between the interests of the community board, which
have their own say in the ULURP process and for whom the planners are working, and
the borough president, who has her own say in the process and would be the employer of
the planners.
Keeping the Public Involved
Community boards are meant to be advisory liaisons between communities and city
government. The purpose of community boards is to inform the city fathers about onthe-ground sentiment, April Tyler said. That's part of why they were created. Yet

50

while more than 100,000 people live in CB 9, it's common to see the same faces over and
over again at meetings. How can a board overcome this challenge to make sure it is
adequately connected to the community it serves?
The answers from Thompson and Morgan-Thomas were similar and simple, yet they
strike at the heart of what makes a community board effective or ineffective: The board
members themselves are the mechanism for involving the public, they said that's a big
part of why people are appointed to a board in the first place. Successful board members
are connected to other neighborhood social and civic networks beyond the board itself.
When an issue comes before the board that affects a certain part of the neighborhood or is
a topic of interest to particular residents, it's up to the board members who are connected
to those networks to reach out to members of the public who might be interested.
Thompson pointed to a recent issue before her committee as an example. DOT is
proposing a change to traffic flow on the Riverside Drive viaduct, changing that portion
of the street from two lanes in each direction to one lane in each direction to reduce
speeding and crashes. Key board members, including Thompson and committee member
Ted Kovaleff, are opposed to the change because they fear it will lead to traffic
congestion. There was little public turnout at the first committee hearing on the topic.
Thompson, who lives at Riverside and 150th Street, and Kovaleff, who also lives near
Riverside, but to the south, knew they had to reach out to tenants associations and co-op
boards along Riverside to make sure residents were aware of the proposed changes. They
posted notices in lobbies, spoke to individuals on the street, and sent out emails and
turnout at the next meeting was far higher, with most residents in attendance opposed to
the change.
Kovaleff and Thompson were both opposed to the change, so it's not surprising that the
individuals they reached out to were also opposed. About 30 people attended the second
committee meeting on the topic; while this was an improvement over the first meeting
and showed the value of outreach by board members, it's an open (and to a large degree,
unanswerable) question whether the views of the 30 meeting attendees accurately

51

reflected those of the thousands of affected residents.

Balancing Politics and Service
Unlike Kovaleff and Thompson, Council Member Mark Levine is a supporter of DOT's
proposal for Riverside Drive and made his opinion publicly known. His decision to
publicly support the plan while the board is still deliberating speaks to the political nature
of boards.
Mark Levine said that during his time on CB 12, he saw elected officials pressure board
members to vote a certain way on particular issues, such as liquor license approvals or
elections for board leadership. He said that, now that he is a council member, he will
make his views publicly known but will not call up individual board members to ask
them to vote a certain way. Its a balancing act, he said. The line's not entirely clear.
While Thompson and Morgan-Thomas both said they are motivated primarily by
community service goals, and not political ambition, they recognize that boards
necessarily engage in the political process, even if they as individuals are reluctant to
participate in that arena in a formal way. Sometimes, boards serve the political goals of
those who make the appointments. One example Thompson cited: One person had
complained to CB 9 about illegal hotel rentals facilitated through online services like
Airbnb hardly an overwhelming outcry in the neighborhood, Thompson said but the
board only passed a resolution against the practice after a request from Borough President
Gale Brewer, who has taken on illegal hotel rentals as a political issue.
Martin Wallace noted that certain elected officials have more sway at the board than
others. He cited Assembly Member Herman Denny Farrell, Jr., as an example. Often,
the Assemblyman or his staff will attend meetings and voice an opinion on a particular
issue that board members will then follow.
Brad Taylor and Morgan-Thomas, who had both been involved in a contest for chair, saw

52

the board as being comprised of various political factions bumping up against each other.
In CB 9, Taylor initially appointed by Council Member Inez Dickens but eventually
picked up by Council Member Levine is closer to the whiter, wealthier faction centered
on Morningside Heights, while Morgan-Thomas is more closely tied to the AfricanAmerican population around Hamilton Heights and West Harlem, which is more
connected to Harlem's black political establishment. These two factions often bump up
against each other in contests for leadership or on votes on particular issues. Notably,
there is little representation on the board from the area's Latino immigrant population.
Improving the Appointment Process
Political pressure from elected officials is a factor because board members are appointed
by the borough president, half at the recommendation of local City Council members. In
reality, however, the council members send a list of appointments to the borough
president that is almost always approved without question. Borough presidents and
council members are given great freedom by the City Charter in how they make
appointments, and any processes put in place by the Manhattan borough president do not
always apply to the council members.
Both Thompson and Morgan-Thomas expressed frustration with and skepticism about
board appointments by council members, saying many are often appointed primarily
because they are political supporters of the council member and not because they have
community service as a primary goal. Morgan-Thomas said one of the most difficult
board members she ever encountered was a council appointee; this person kept disrupting
meetings and being difficult with other board members, never wanting to seek a solution
to issues before the board. Morgan-Thomas wrote a letter to the council member and the
borough president arguing against this individual's reappointment, but was unsuccessful
in her pleas.
Not all pleas to elected officials are well received. Brad Taylor wrote an email to thenBorough President Scott Stringer in 2011 urging for more appointments from

53

Morningside Heights and for younger appointees to the board, which he argued were
under-represented. He later found that the email had made its way from Stringer's office
to other board members and was used against him during a race for board chair.
Eutha Prince expressed frustration that she as district manager and other individuals, as
board members had no formal mechanism to inform the borough president about how
effective an individual board member might be. After all, she said, district managers and
board members are the ones closest to the ground and can see whether an individual is
fulfilling his or her duties as a board member.
Mark Levine described his appointment process as a council member as super, super
informal. He gathers a list of names of people who have expressed interest to his office
and who he thinks would make good board members. There's no application process and
no interview process. While Levine says he does not pressure board members on specific
issues or votes while they are serving, he does look at a member's stance on particular
issues before appointing them.
Maybe it should be more formalized, Mark Levine said of the council member
appointment process. The process in place at the Manhattan Borough President's Office is
worth considering, Levine said. He also pointed to an analogous process at the City
Council, where members apply to the Speaker's office for discretionary funds. While
members make their own applications, the various caucuses also make supplemental
recommendations, which can give a boost to specific requests. Council members could
also play a similar role, sending applicants to the borough president's process and
providing a supplemental recommendation when the borough president considers the
application.
A proposal from Council Member Ben Kallos to enact term limits for board members has
run into resistance from borough presidents and community board members (Miller
2015). Thompson, Morgan-Thomas, and Michael Levine are all opposed to term limits
because they fear it would wipe out institutional knowledge on the boards. Mark Levine

54

was unsure about term limits. There are some advantages to term limits for board
members: While it may hurt institutional knowledge, it also keeps the boards from being
long-term bastions of power for some appointees, and may allow for the retirement of
board members that would otherwise be too politically challenging for elected officials to
decline to reappoint in the absence of term limits.
Perhaps bringing in additional sources of appointments could dilute the impact of
individual elected officials on the actions of board members. Michael Levine, MorganThomas, Tyler, and Thompson all saw community boards as fitting well within the orbit
of borough presidents, since both are largely advisory and relatively local in nature. Mark
Levine mused that bringing in appointments from State Senate, Assembly, and U.S.
Congressional elected officials might be beneficial, but would likely face opposition at
the city level.
In addition to the borough president, another largely advisory city-level elected official is
the public advocate. Michael Levine cautioned against appointments by the public
advocate, however, because unlike the borough president, the public advocate is a citywide elected office and is not as in touch with local issues as a borough president or
council member would be. Michael Levine also cautioned against an additional role for
the Mayor's Office or its Community Affairs Unit, which is both understaffed and
focused on putting out local political fires for the mayor an already-powerful position
whose interests could overwhelm local concerns at the community board.

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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are no easy fixes to improve the community board system. Most obviously, boards
are limited by a lack of resources, a lack of expertise, sometimes-dysfunctional board
meetings, and even by their very advisory nature. Many of these issues have roots in the
city's political structure, and face significant hurdles to implementation. Nevertheless,
they are worthwhile to pursue if community boards are to live up to their potential as
venues for community-based planning and as liaisons between city government and
neighborhood residents.
Some of these recommendations have roots in suggestions already made by elected
officials and civic reform groups, including in testimony to the City Council and the
Charter Review Commission. Others are based on the results of interviews conducted for
this thesis, reflect lessons from the literature review and borrow from local governance
structures in other cities.
The recommendations are split into two categories: reforming the appointment process
and providing adequate staff and technical assistance to boards. This thesis does not
seriously consider recommendations that change the fundamental nature of boards by, for
example, suggesting that they should have anything more than advisory power. Rather, it
is focused on improving the boards so they can better fulfill their missions as advisory
bodies to local government.
Improving Appointments and Membership
1.

Standardized Application Process: Presently, the City Charter grants borough

presidents great latitude in whom they can appoint and how they can structure the
appointment process. Changing the City Charter to require a standardized,
citywide application and interview process for all new and returning appointees,

56

in all boroughs, would significantly improve the appointment system and help
ensure that boards do not suffer from reduced quality due to an appointment
process that relies on each borough president to create his or her own set of
standards. Such an application process should cover appointments made directly
by the borough president and those made at the recommendation of local council
members, to ensure that politically-motivated and sub-par appointments don't slip
through a backdoor process of rubber-stamped council member nominations. A
centralized, citywide application process could be administered by the mayor's
office or the public advocate, which could launch a coordinated advertising
campaign to encourage and collect applications before the applications are handed
off to the borough presidents, who would conduct interviews and make
appointments. There are advantages and drawbacks to centralizing the application
process in either of these offices: the mayor has more budget authority to provide
adequate staff and launch a public awareness campaign, but also controls agencies
that regularly go before the boards. Giving these responsibilities to the public
advocate aligns more closely with the spirit of that office, but also threatens the
quality of outreach since the public advocate has no direct control over budget
allocations.
2.

More Information on Applicants and Appointees: At present, borough

presidents do not have to meet a specific standard for their board appointments.
Instead, the membership must merely have a residence, business, professional or
other significant interest in the district, have adequate representation from the
different geographic sections and neighborhoods within the community district,
and must fairly [represent] all segments of the community (New York City
Charter, Section 2800). While data on board membership is not always readily
available to the public from the borough presidents, it's clear to most people who
attend community board meetings around the city that board membership is often
not representative of a neighborhood's demographics. Due to the nature of their
positions as volunteer government appointees requiring knowledge of local affairs
and time to participate, board members tend to be wealthier, older, and more and

57

better educated than the neighborhood at large. While this isn't always the case, it
does often warp the point of view of boards when they weigh requests or
proposals before them, and segments of the population can be entirely left out of
discussions. Remedying this by applying specific standards to board appointments
for example, requiring the geographic or demographic distribution of
appointments to meet a specific mathematical equation is risky because it may
engender resentment among board members who are currently demographically
over-represented on the board and are threatened with removal due to their
demographics or place of residence. Rather than proscribing a set of
demographics for the board, the best solution in this case may be to bring more
sunshine. Annual reports should be required, releasing the names of all applicants
and appointees. (The information is already public record and subject to the
Freedom of Information Law.) The reports should collect and aggregate
information on the demographics of both applicants and appointees, including
location of residence and/or employment, age, race/ethnicity, income, residence
tenure, automobile ownership, employment status, and other information
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. These reports should be required to be
issued after each round of appointments, and must compare the demographics of
both applicants and appointees with the demographics of the district population at
large. While the borough presidents would be required to issue these reports under
the current system, if the mayor's office or the public advocate were given
responsibility for a citywide application process, that office could take over the
responsibility instead. Issuing the demographics report from a citywide elected
office, rather than from a borough-level elected office, would elevate the profile
of the issue of community board demographics among the press and the public
and create a productive tension of checks-and-balances by having one elected
official release a report watchdogging the work of another elected official. These
reports would also highlight areas in need of additional outreach in order to
ensure that underrepresented groups are not left out of the community board
appointment pool.

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3.

Reform Council Member Recommendations: Presently, half of all board

members the borough president appoints are at the recommendation of the local
council member. In reality, the vast majority of council member appointments are
handed over to the borough president on a list and accepted without question. This
nomination process is opaque, and lends itself to potential deal-making between
the borough president and the council member. It also encourages council
members to stack their section of the board with politically or ideologically
advantageous appointments. Nominees from council members should always go
through the standardized appointment and interview process, like the other
applicants. The council member recommendations shouldn't be a rubber-stamped
list. Rather, these recommendations should take the form of a public
recommendation' by the council member as part of the standardized application
process described in the first recommendation. A public recommendation would
require the council member to view the list of applicants and select individuals he
or she endorses for the borough president's consideration. The council member
can recommend people who have already applied, and can encourage individuals
to apply, but cannot submit his or her own list of names. As required by the
Charter today, half of all members the borough president appoints must come at
the recommendation of local council members, with each council member making
a number of recommendations proportional to the percentage of the community
district covered by his or her council district, a ratio already calculated by the
Department of City Planning. Applicants and appointees publicly endorsed by the
council member would be reported in the post-appointment report on board
demographics, so the public can track which board members have the backing of
the local council member.

4.

Open Public Recommendations to Other Elected Officials and Groups:

This public recommendation process should be extended to not just council
members, but also local state legislators, many of whom take an active interest in
their local community boards. The Charter could be amended to require a
percentage of board members to be appointed at the recommendation of area state

59

legislators, though this might hamstring the ability of borough presidents to

appoint boards of their choosing and introduce too much political interference
from legislators. Instead, these public recommendations could be non-binding and
would simply make public some of the recommendations that are already made
behind closed doors. Non-binding public recommendations could also be allowed
by citywide elected officials the mayor, comptroller, and public advocate but
this might dilute the local nature of community board appointments. Public
recommendations could also be opened up to civic groups, non-profits, and
individuals, allowing appointees to lobby organizations and individuals for public
recommendations that could influence a borough president's appointment
decisions. While this will not eliminate backdoor lobbying by elected officials or
special interests for a specific appointee, it will create a public process in which a
version of this lobbying can take place.
5.

Standardized Training for Board Members: Lachapelle and Shanahan point

out that training is key to a successful board or commission (Lachapelle and
Shanahan 2010). Currently, there is no Charter or statutory requirement that
training be offered to new or returning board members. Instead, there is a hodgepodge of orientations and trainings offered or required by individual boards,
borough presidents, and the Mayor's Office of Community Affairs. All board
members citywide should receive the same training, including instruction on the
role of community boards in New York City government, an introduction to city
and state agencies, a primer on procedures including ULURP and liquor license
applications, resolution writing, ethics, Robert's Rules of Order, and more. In
order for the appointees to all receive the same training, it should be administered
by the same body the mayor's office or the public advocate tasked with
overseeing the application process. Having this training administered by a
citywide office will also serve to further distance board members from the
borough presidents and City Council members who appointed or recommended
them, which can help foster independence amongst board members.

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6.

Term Limits: While this is easily the most controversial proposal up for
discussion at the City Council right now, and faces strong opposition from
borough presidents, board members, and board staff alike, it is worth pursuing.
Although community boards are appointed bodies that serve only advisory roles,
they do contain significant review and political power. Interviewees for this thesis
pointed out that board members often become focused on the power of the seat
they hold, leading to petty conflicts with other board members, as well as an
imperious attitude towards agency representatives and members of the public that
come before the board. While there are many board members serving well as
volunteers, some board members can over time come to see a seat on the board as
something they deserve, and get upset if, for some reason, they are not
reappointed. This behavior is counterproductive and discourages members of the
public from participating in the community board process. Term limits solve this
problem, by guaranteeing that members and their ideologies do not become
ossified. Bringing in a constant stream of new members allows for fresh
perspectives and new issues to gain currency on the board. There are two main
objections to term limits, both of which should be taken seriously but are not
significant enough to disqualify term limits from being implemented.'
A.

First, there is concern that, especially for boards that are not operating with a
full complement of 50 members, it will be difficult to find qualified
replacements for members who are term-limited. This is a red herring. Most
community districts have populations well above 100,000, larger than many
mid-sized cities. Even in low-resource neighborhoods, finding dozens of
qualified candidates interested in serving can be achieved with outreach and
cultivation of an applicant pool through involving the public in the board's
activities. In some ways, objecting to term limits because there is an
insufficient applicant pool is a self-fulfilling prophecy: In fact, there may not
be enough applicants in part because potential board members are turned off
by a body that is insular and difficult to deal with an issue that term limits
aims to address. A common theoretical argument against term limits is that
the voters are the term limits and will remove officials who are not adequate

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for the job. In the case of community boards, the borough presidents fulfill
this role. While borough presidents have refused to renew a board member's
appointment, these are exceptions to the rule. Incumbency has its advantages,
particularly in an appointed position without significant scrutiny from the
press or the public at large, and when the borough president making the
appointment is granted significant discretion in how appointments are made.
B.

The second concern about term limits is that it will decimate institutional
knowledge on the boards. This is a real threat, especially since boards rely on
volunteers and interact with agencies and corporations that are far betterresourced. It's important to remember, however, that once a board member is
term-limited out, they are not banished forever. Instead, they simply no longer
have the power to vote at general board meetings. Individuals are still free to
attend and testify at board meetings, and can even be appointed as public
members of committees covering areas in which they have expertise. Term
limits also help ensure that institutional knowledge is passed along. Rather
than one individual being the board's best source of knowledge on a particular
issue for years or decades, term limits force the boards to pass that knowledge
and experience to other members who take their place.

While all board members those already appointed and future members alike
should be subject to term limits, a good place to start is to term-limit board and
committee chairs. These positions are particularly important, since they hold
power over agenda items and resolutions considered by the board. This thesis is
not making a recommendation on the specific number of terms allowed, but there
must be a balance between the time it takes for board members to become expert
and knowledgeable and the time it takes for them to become stagnant in their
positions. For those reasons, a term limit somewhere between 8 and 12 years
seems appropriate.
7. Consider Longer, Staggered, Terms: Currently, board members are appointed
to alternating two-year terms, with half of the board up for appointment each year.

62

Appointees rarely outlast the last official who appointed them, and elected
officials making appointments have the opportunity to dramatically reshape the
board, if they see fit, within the span of two years. To address these threats of
political interference, longer terms for community board members should be
considered as part of a discussion about term limits. If, for example, board
members served staggered four-year terms, only a quarter of the board would
come up for appointment each year, and a larger share of board membership will
be able to serve after the elected official who appointed them has left office.
Appointments and Membership: For Further Study
8. Should Board Members and Staff Review the Quality of Applicants? Right
now, there is no formal mechanism for district managers, community board staff,
chairs, or rank-and-file board members to offer feedback on the performance of
board members up for reappointment or to weigh in on the quality of new
applicants with whom they may already be familiar. Board members, staff, and
chairs can and do correspond or speak with the borough presidents directly, but
this is an informal and opaque system which favors the opinions of those who are
already politically connected to the elected officials in charge of making
appointments, and may silence those who are not as well-connected. Just as the
mayor's office or the public advocate could act as a gateway for applications
before handing them off to the borough presidents, so too could either one of
those offices act as a venue for collecting reviews of applicants from board
members and staff using a standard report card or online poll. Individuals would
not have to rank all the applicants, but only those about whom they have an
opinion. That information could be anonymized, so participants can feel free to be
honest, before being handed off to the borough presidents to inform their
decision-making about appointments. However, it could also lend itself to
anonymous attacks by board members or staff against each other and should be
considered only with extreme caution.

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9. Should Community Districts Be Remapped? According to the Charter,

community districts are required to be nearly equal in population with each
other and limited to no more than 250,000 residents each. Every ten years, the
mayor may propose changes to the map of community boards and must consult
with borough presidents, city planning commission, community boards and other
civic, community and neighborhood groups and associations before submitting it
to the city council for approval (New York City Charter, Section 2702). In reality,
the districts have remained static. They serve not just as community board
boundaries, but as service districts for city agencies. One alternative regime for
determining community district boundaries could be to make them coterminous
with City Council districts. This would have the benefit of reducing overlapping
bureaucracies, but would mean that only one local council member could make
recommendations for appointment. It would also mean that city service districts
align with council districts, creating a stronger link between service delivery by
city agencies and the constituent service functions of a council member and the
overlapping community board. This could create a risk of duplication between the
council member and the community board, and deserves consideration in future
work.
10. Should Community Board Members Be Elected, Rather Than Appointed?
Finally, there should also be consideration of whether community board members
could serve in elected, rather than appointed, positions. This model would be
similar to the Advisory Neighborhood Commission system in Washington, D.C.
While it is tempting to think of democratically-elected officials as a panacea to
the issues that plague community boards, the experience in Washington, where
ANCs are regularly involved in power struggles, parochial politics, and ethics
scandals, shows otherwise. Making community board membership into an elected
position would, however, help promote independence from higher-level elected
officials. If even a portion of board membership were elected at-large from across
the community district, those members may be able to create political power
bases that could rival, but would be unlikely to exceed, those of City Council

64

members. If board membership were elected from districts, it would incentivize

accountability of board members to local constituents but also promote hyperlocal decision-making prone to Not In My Backyard concerns. There is also the
question of election administration, which would have to be performed by the
Board of Elections for thousands of districts across the city. If community board
members are elected, they may also be subject to the city's campaign finance laws
and could qualify for matching funds, a potentially significant expansion of that
program. Like the previous recommendation, elected board members would be a
radical change to the community board system as it exists presently, but it
deserves further examination.
Providing Adequate Staff and Technical Assistance to Community Boards
11. Community Board Budgets: A typical community board budget is between
$200,000 and $300,000, far less than other governmental bodies. The aggregate
budget for all community boards is about 0.02 percent of the city's budget (Paul
2014). Citizens Union recommends tying the budgets of community boards to be
equal to 30 percent of the City Council's budget, or about 65 percent of the total
funding for borough presidents. This is a recommendation this thesis supports.
Otherwise, community boards will continue to be subject to budget cuts because,
like the public advocate, they are government bodies without a significant voice
in the budgeting process.
12. Planners and Interns: Bass and Potter showed that community boards can
achieve results desired by their membership and the public if they have sufficient
technical assistance, like CIVITAS provided to Manhattan Community Board 11
in the East Harlem rezoning (Bass and Potter 2003). At the moment, the City
Council is considering Intro 0732-2015, a bill that would require the borough
presidents to provide city planners to perform work for each board, either through
a pool or by providing one planner per board. This bill has the right intentions and
would give boards resources they currently lack, but would create a conflict of

65

interest since the planners would be employed by the borough president yet work
for the community boards, both of which have a role in the ULURP process. In
addition, some boards do not deal with many land use issues and would not have a
need for a planner. The Fund for the City of New York currently operates an
internship program for city planning students to work on a project with a
community board, a program that is worthwhile but limited in the capacity it
offers to community boards. This report recommends creating a pool of planners
and other technical staff that can be dispatched to individual community boards as
needed, paid for through the budgets of community boards and administered by
an external body, such as the public advocate's office or the Fund for the City of
New York. This arrangement would reduce the potential for conflict of interest,
since the staff would be paid by the community board and under the umbrella of
the public advocate or the Fund for the City of New York, neither of which has
the same involvement in ULURP as community boards and borough presidents.
13. 311 and Other City Data: Today, much of the city's service-related data, such as
311 complaints, is available on the Open Data Portal. While this information is
accessible to community boards, they do not have the technical capacity to use it.
While improved budgets and added staff, as recommended in the budgets above,
would help solve this problem, there are intermediate steps that can be taken. Just
as the Department of City Planning issues reports on the demographics of each
community district, the Mayor's Office of Data Analytics should also be required
to issue annual reports on the various service-related issues in each district,
starting with a comprehensive analysis of 311 data and including internal
information from city agencies. Such a document would provide a baseline of
knowledge that most community boards currently lack.
14. Centralized Outreach: Members of the public often do not know that
community boards exist. Even if they are aware of their local community board, it
can be difficult to get information about what's happening at the board. Board
members and staff are often stretched thin, and information such as meetings and

66

agendas can be woefully out-of-date. Instead of each board managing its own
website and email lists, much of this work can be centralized at a higher level.
While the work can be done by the borough president's office, in order for it to be
uniform across the city, it should be coordinated by a city-level office ideally,
the same office tasked with coordinating the applications process. That way, there
can be a uniform citywide portal for accessing information about community
boards.
15. Give Responsibility to Boards for Contributing to City Policy: Boards are
often reactive to proposals that come before them from city agencies. When they
are proactive, for example through 197-a plans, their suggestions are often
ignored. This creates an often-unproductive tension between community boards
and other layers of government that have more power. Instead, community boards
should be used as venues to come up with suggestions in response to a citywide
policy. In 2014, for example, Borough President Gale Brewer asked community
boards to come up with a list of intersections and corridors in need of pedestrian
safety improvements as part of the de Blasio administration's Vision Zero agenda
(Miller 2014). This gave the boards a voice in the process, as opposed to feeling
put-upon when city agencies came with proposals as part of the initiative. This
type of consultation should be occurring more regularly and at the citywide level,
not just from the borough president's office. For example, boards should be asked
to come up with recommended locations for increased density and affordable
housing as part of a mayoral housing plan. While consultative planning doesn't
guarantee that there won't be conflict down the road, it can set the stage for more
productive discussions once an agency comes forward with a proposal to the
community board.
Some of these recommendations can be implemented immediately, while others will take
changes to local law, the City Charter, or agency procedures. Hopefully, these
recommendations can spur discussion and action on changes to that will improve the
ability of community boards to serve as the most local form of government in New York

67

City, both as a forum for community planning and as a mechanism to connect local
residents with government service delivery.

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