Social Vision, Volume: 2, Issue:1 April-June, 2015, Vishakapatnam, ISSN: 2349-0519, pp.

59-70

CHINA CHALLENGES AND INDO-U.S. STRATEGIC VISION

*Dr. Dasarathi Bhuiyan
The begging of the 21thcentury witnessed the ups and downs in the relations between Indi
a and China, the two giant neighbours in Asia. The relationship, however, was neither like the co
ld war between the two superpowers, nor like the hot war between India and Pakistan. The Sino-I
ndian relationship is maturing into one of the most important bilateral relationships in world polit
ics and their continuing economic growth are projecting them to influential positions within the g
lobal market. The evolving Indo-China relationship can be described as competition on some le
vels and co-operation on others, wherein some discomfort, ambivalence and hedging will alway
s remain, despite the level of engagement. [1]
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India detonated five underground nuclear devices in the desert
region of Pokhran, where one such explosion in 1974 had signaled Indias nuclear aspirations. A
week before the 1998 tests, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a controversial
television interview that China is potential threat number one. . . . The potential threat from
China is greater than that from Pakistan, and any person who is concerned about Indias security
must agree with that fact. Since Fernandes is well known to the defense and diplomatic
establishments in Beijing and New Delhi for his off-the-cuff statements, at the time these may
have been interpreted as regrettable remarks from an official known for his bluster. With the first
round of tests coming just one week on the heels of Fernandess remarks, it may appear that the
interview was well-timed to alert the international community. Subsequent investigations have
revealed that Fernandes in fact had been left out of the loop and was not aware of the
impending tests. [1] Indias underground detonation of five nuclear devices in a sequence of tests
in May 1998 brought Sino- Indian relations into vivid relief almost overnight. Just before the
tests, Indias defense minister explicitly singled out China as Indias number one security
threat. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee explained in a letter to President
Clinton that the nuclear tests were necessary in light of Chinas aiding and abetting Pakistans
nuclear ambitions. Indeed, Pakistan responded with nuclear tests of its own within weeks of the
Indian tests.[3]
1

Perhaps the most significant litmus test of Chinese views of South Asia in the two years
since the nuclear tests was Chinas stance on the India-Pakistan conflict in the disputed Kashmir
region in June 1999. As the conflict developed into a shooting war [4] between Indian troops and
Pakistani-backed Muslim insurgents in the high mountain passes of the Kargil area, the PRC
took a pronounced and extraordinarily neutral position. In a departure from its usual tilt toward
Pakistan in such incidents, Beijing not only followed a scrupulously neutral path but also played
the role of informal mediator by hosting separate visits from the Pakistani and Indian foreign
ministers. [5] Faced with mounting pressure from the world community and the United States to
withdraw support of the insurgents, Pakistan turned to Beijing, its normally reliable backer in
these cases. Pakistans foreign minister, followed by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, made
separate visits to Beijing, where their discussions resulted in nothing but official silence from
PRC officials regarding the Kargil crisis. The contrast with earlier statements from Beijing that
supported Pakistan was striking. When Sharif reached the United States just after his trip to
China, he announced his decision to order the pullback of Pakistani troops and to withdraw
support for the insurgents. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing shortly
thereafter, and the Kargil crisis was left aside in favor of discussions on the broader bilateral
relationship. While the official statement Beijing released on Kargil did not go so far as to blame
Pakistan for the intrusions, the fact that China gave no overt support for Pakistan was perceived
by India as a significant change in Chinas stance on the Kashmir issue. All indications are that
China regards India as a major power and a potentially important player in a putative multi-polar
world, noted an Indian specialist on relations with China. [6]
Not long after the Kargil crisis, a group of Pakistani generals known to be hard-liners
with respect to India removed Sharif from office and declared one of their own as chief
executivein effect the first-ever coup dtat to take place in a nuclear-weapon state. It remains
to be seen if Chinas neutrality in the Kargil crisis signals a major shift away from its historic
support for Pakistan. While China has hosted visits by Pakistani generals and may have lobbied
for President Clinton to include Pakistan on his South Asia visit in March 2000, there is reason to
believe that China is no longer willing to brook reckless behavior on the part of Pakistan. Given
Beijings own concerns over Islamic insurgencies and trans border arms and drug shipments into
Chinas western regions, there is strong reason to believe that China would want to avoid
extending diplomatic or other support to the Islamic militants in the Kashmir region. Chinas
2

official press maintained near silence on the Pakistan coup, simply quoting a foreign ministry
spokesperson on Chinas wish as a friendly neighbor for the restoration of normalcy.
Another significant development in the restoration of India-China relations has been the
convening of the first ever security dialogue between the two in March 2000 and the resumption
of other confidence-building measures. The security dialogue took place in Beijing, where Zhang
Jiuhuan, director general of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented
the Chinese side, and Rakesh Sood, the joint secretary for disarmament in the External Affairs
Ministry, led the Indian delegation. Neither side relented from previous stancesChina said that
it would continue to lead opposition to Indias nuclear program and India expressed its continued
concern that China was assisting Pakistans nuclear and missile production program. Following
the security dialogue, the PRC ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, said through the Indian
pressthat India and China should pursue a cooperative partnership to [7]
In April 1999 the Joint Working Group resumed the session that had been cancelled in
the wake of Pokhran II. While little of substance was accomplished during the 1999 round, its
resumption at least maintained continuity of a dialogue that had begun shortly after the
normalization of relations in 1988. A twelfth JWG met in April 2000 and expressed the usual
commitments to resolve border issues; of greater significance was the announcement that
seniorlevel military contacts would be resumed and ministerial and state visits planned for the
future. [8]
A final settlement on the disputed portions of the 2,500 mile Sino-Indian border remains
elusive. Even before the 1962 war, the delineation of the border along the Aksai Chin plateau in
the western sector and Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector had been one of the most
contentious issues in Sino-Indian relations. Presently, India claims that China has occupied over
125,000 square kilometers of its territory in these two sectors. While the border dispute is no
longer the obstacle to high-level dialogues and state visits that it once was, Indian and Chinese
officials have not yet been able to reach an agreement over the Line of Actual Control that might
serve as a basis for more formal negotiations on the international border itself. Indian officials
almost always list resolution of the border dispute as a top priority in relations with China,
whereas Chinese officials conventionally characterize it as a problem that should be treated with
patience and carein short, an issue whose resolution PRC officials could postpone indefinitely.

Nonetheless, the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group has established a progressive sequence of
confidence-building measures associated with the border and with the troops posted to guard it.
[9]

Much of this progress was made in the early 1990s after exchanges in high-level visits
between New Delhi and Beijing, culminating in Jiang Zemins trip to India in 1996. The border
dispute and its speedy resolution served as one of two major themes of Indian President K. R.
Narayanans state visit to Beijing in May 2000. (The other was the promotion of economic ties
and trade between India and China, whose bilateral trade stands at only $2 billion a year.)
According to Indian observers, one of the main purposes of Narayanans trip was to inject the
border dispute resolution process with a greater sense of urgency. [10]
While Narayanan conveyed the point on numerous occasions that the boundary dispute
could not be laid aside forever, Chinese leaders appeared less willing to push for a speedy
resolution of the border question. Jiang Zemin expressed the sense that the disputes over the
border should not prevent the development of bilateral relations yet he also stated that a
resolution of the border question should not be put off indefinitely. [11]
Any progress on the border issue arising from Narayanans discussions in Beijing will
await subsequent meetings of the Joint Working Group. A former Indian diplomat offered
perhaps a more realistic assessment of the boundary dispute when he noted that The border
issues are so complicated and difficult they could be set aside for a while as both countries
concentrate on areas of common interests. [12]
This appears to be the position officials from both sides have taken, with the expansion of
commercial tiesincluding a proposed road through Myanmar linking China and Indiaacting
as another form of confidence building. Even if China and India reach an agreement on their
disputed border, other important problems will remain in their bilateral relations. These include
Chinas military assistance to Pakistan, as well as Myanmar; the direction of Indias nuclear
program; the pursuit of strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia; the future of
Tibet and the Tibetan community in India; and more recently, Indias announced intention to
hold naval exercises in the South China Sea. Chinas assistance to Pakistan dates from
diplomatic agreements signed in 1963 that were themselves responses to the 1962 border war
and the flourishing ties between India and the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1960s, Beijing has
steadfastly supported the Pakistani position on Kashmir and served as Pakistans principal arms
4

supplier. Chinas provision of technical assistance and military hardware to Pakistan is welldocumented, as is the transfer of nuclear technology and intermediate range missiles to
Islamabad during themid-1990s. Jiang Zemins highly successful South Asia trip in
1996succeeded in positioning China in a less overtly supportive role of Pakistan as Chinas allweather friend. In a speech before the Pakistani senate, Jiang suggested that Islamabad should
put aside disputes with India over Kashmir and instead pursue economic development. [13] Since
then, Beijing appears to have drawn the line on support for insurgents in Kashmir, as the Kargil
episode of 1999demonstrated.The extent (and intent) of Washingtons pursuit of better relations
with New Delhi and Beijing has brought noticeable unease to officials in the other capital. The
visit of President Clinton to India in late March 2000 raised some concern within China over
warming U.S.-India tiesrevealing how absorbed Beijings foreign policy community has
become with American motivations. In a rare expression of concern over a state visit, PRC
officials questioned U.S. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger regarding Clintons India visit.
During the India visit itself, Clintons criticism of the Indian nuclear program was met with
vehement defense by Indian officials, including President Narayanan. While the United States
and China both have pressured India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, China has
taken a stronger posture than the United States on Indias nuclear weapons program, demanding
that India sign the CTBT as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States, which did
impose legally-mandated sanctions on India after Pokhran II, appears to have accepted Indias
pursuit of a minimal deterrent as a fact of life and now seeks to limit Indias ability to conduct
further tests. This is a strategy that has largely proven successful, in the eyes of some analysts,
who predict India and Pakistans imminent signing of the CTBT. [14] Ratification, a course that
neither the United States nor China has yet taken, remains another matter. Regardless of how
Indias commitment to nonproliferation regimes plays out, the prospects for India-China
relations involve a number of other sensitive issues. Missile technology and the testing of
intermediate- and long-range missiles, obviously inseparable from nuclear weapons, appear to be
proceeding apace in India, China, and Pakistan. China and India have not altered nuclear
doctrines since Pokhran II and will continue with plans to develop long-range missiles for
second-strike capabilities. [15]
Both will rely heavily on Russia for assistance in this project as well as for their pursuit
of conventional forces modernization. As Gary Bertsch and Anupam Srivastava of the Center for
5

International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia have noted in a recent article, a
crucial reason for India and China to proceed expeditiously with these ambitiousplans has been
the ready availability of advanced Russian arms and technologies. [16]
In fact, China and India together makeup 75 to 80 percent of all Russian arms exports. It
is difficult to tell how far Indias nuclear policy-makers wish to pursue nuclear weapons
development and deployment. After India conducted missile tests in April 1999, Prime Minister
Vajpayee said that India had now achieved a minimum nuclear deterrent with the successful
flight-test of its medium-range Agni II missile. [17]
China responded by expressing regret and concern, though it framed this concern in
terms of damage to Indo-Pakistani relations, not as a threat to China itself or to Sino-Indian
relations. [18] However, here it is doubtful that Beijings patience could be so elastic. Should India
decide to weaponize and deploy nuclear missiles, defense planners in China would probably
react with far more serious countermeasures than they have elicited to date, and depending on the
state of play in East Asia, could even roll back the PRCs commitment to arms control regimes.
[19]

The issue of Tibet has always been a very sensitive one in Sino-Indian relations, and after
Pokhran II, remarks by Indian officials regarding Tibet and Taiwan have drawn sharp reactions
from PRC sources. In early 1999, an Indian cabinet minister for urban development voiced his
support for an independent Taiwan, resulting in a scathing commentary by the Xinhua news
agency. It described the officials comments as a grave development and said that they
revealed that there is a force in India that is opposing the improvement of Sino-Indian relations
and attempting to split China. [20. ]
A similar reaction came from Beijing after Vajpayee met with the Dalai Lama in October
1998. Official commentary typically framed the meeting as an interference in Chinas internal
affairs.

[21]

The flight of the Karmapa Lama to India in early 2000 also raised the sensitive

question of India offering refuge for Tibetan spiritual leaders and exiles. The Karmapa Lama is
the third most esteemed figure in Tibetan Buddhism (after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas). The
sudden arrival in Dharamsala, India of the current Karmapa Lama, a 14-year-old youth, after he
apparently fled his monastery in Lhasa, has created a delicate diplomatic situation between New
Delhi and Beijing. India has delayed officially granting asylum tithe Karmapa Lama, and PRC
officials claim he is only there to retrieve the belongings of his predecessor, the 16th Karmapa
6

Lama. Indian foreign affairs officials find themselves in the unenviable position of trying to
improve relations with China while placating the large Tibetan community in Dharamsala. While
the Dalai Lama remains the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan exile community, the
choice of his successoras the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama and the leader of the Tibetan
exileswill quite likely embroil China and India in further disputes over Tibet and the question
of secular versus religious authority.
After the end of cold war and towards the end of 20th century, Asian politics has become
increasingly complicated as there are constant changes in the variables of a triangular
relationship: China, the US and Russia; or China, Japan and the US; or China, Russia and India;
or India, China and Pakistan.

But at present the global order is focused on the constant

interactions among India, China and the US. There are two defining characteristics of the
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of Cold War: First, the United
States has become the only superpower in the world today. It is also the most important external
power in Asia, and plays a key role in Asian security. Secondly, old rivals, China and India have
emerged as strong regional powers, as evidenced by impressive economic growth, the
development of nuclear arsenals, and demonstrated ambitions for influence in the Pacific and
South Asian regions. While Chinas role as an economic and geo-strategic player is more widely
recognized, India is slowly emerging as a regional competitor to be taken seriously. The events
of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath have further succeeded in providing new incentive to
bring these two countries together to share common security concerns. Further with the
unprecedented U.S. military presence in South Asia due to the war against terrorism, a third
playerthe worlds remaining superpoweris now more closely involved in the historic SinoIndian rivalry.
On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in
Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation. On August 3, 2007, both
the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement Since the end of the Cold War, The
Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, has requested
increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having
separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The

United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China, and a
potential client and job creator.
While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and
economically viable thorium, it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global
uranium reserves. Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a
steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers
on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research
into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood
utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle. Initially, there were reports of People's Republic of
China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its
position over the issue. On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People's Daily
expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India. India's National Security
Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he
would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue. It was also revealed that China
had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear
agreement. In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the
aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan. There were also unconfirmed
reports of India considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi. However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister
will be welcomed "as an honored guest". The Times of India noted that China's stance could have
a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.
There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu
reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final
draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement. In an interview to the
Hindustan Times, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands
India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation." Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN, "We didn't do anything to block it [the deal]. We
played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards
agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports". During a press conference in
New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached,
8

China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG]
statement." Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us [India
and China] work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."
In the post cold war period there is no doubt that China is the biggest challenger among
emerging powers from the perspective of the US, and India is not as big as China as of now.
Therefore US considered a triangular strategy that is suitable for the present situation. Some
scholars believed that the tendency of the relationship among the US, India and China is like a
romantic triangle, which means that one country tries to benefit from the tensions between the
other two, and if the relationship between India and China deteriorates, the US will benefit from
the deterioration and enjoy curry and Peking duck in the same meal. But, long-standing border
disputes between China and India continue to cause friction between the two countries despite
ongoing border talks. Chinas interest in consolidating its hold on Tibet and its perceptions of
Indias expanding global influence and closer ties to the U.S. have led Beijing to harden its
position on its border disputes with New Delhi over the past few years. China has increasingly
questioned Indian sovereignty over the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and
has stepped up probing operations along different parts of their shared frontier. The Chinese are
also building up military infrastructure and expanding a network of road, rail, and air links in the
border areas. [22]
The Chinese threat can be traced back to comments made by the Chinese ambassador to
India, referring to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, in the run-up to
President Hu Jintaos November 2006 visit. The most important of them concerns the emergence
of Jammu and Kashmir as a new issue area between the two. The Chinese decision to provide
stapled visas for Indians from the State of Jammu and Kashmir that indicated it considers it
'disputedin line with Pakistans positionhas become a major diplomatic problem. This
problem was compounded in August 2010 when China denied visa to Lt. Gen Jas Pal,
Commander, Northern Command, since he is based in Jammu and Kashmir. The lack of
diplomatic sensitivity and protocol on the Chinese side was stark since the Lt. Gen was invited
by the PLA. India has suspended all high-level military exchanges with China in retaliation and
till the issue is sorted out to its satisfaction. It also cancelled the visits of Chinese high-level
military visits to India. [23]

Chinas remarks on the visits of the Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh to
Arunachal and the Dalai Lama to Tawang were highly sensitive. Chinas claim was totally
provocative and hostile in nature. Arunachal has always been part of India and many Prime
Ministers have visited the province. So why make the Manmohan visit such an issue? Similarly,
the Dalai Lama has been in exile in India since 1959 and as a religious head travels to all parts of
India, including the Buddhist monasteries such the one in Tawang. This too is not new. India
expects China to directly talk with the Dalai Lama so that the over 100,000 Tibetans in exile may
return to Tibet. They are a responsibility of China and they are in exile because they do not feel
that the political and religious conditions are conducive for them to return home. The Tibetan
issue is not an Indian creation and must not be made to look as such. [24]
The threads of the present Indian-Chinese rivalry are diverse and intricate. The rivalry is
also driven by the rapidly expanding resource requirements of each country, whose economies
continue to grow steadily despite the global economic downturn. Competition over energy and
water resources will increasingly shape the contours of their competition, as will each countrys
efforts to expand trade and economic relations with countries that are in the others traditional
sphere of influence. While Chinas economy is several times larger than Indias and its
conventional military capabilities today outstrip Indias by almost any comparison, Beijing has
begun to take notice of Indias growing global political and economic clout, as well as the broadbased American support for expanding strategic ties with India.
India is always distrustful of Chinas close relations and military support for Pakistan.
India apprehends an increased Chinese presence in northern Pakistan and expanded civil nuclear
cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad as particularly worrisome. Indian military strategists
believe they must plan for the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China even as
they actively seek dialogues with both to diminish the chances of such a dire scenario. [25]
At the same time, Chinese assessments of Indian military planning suggest a view in
Beijing that New Delhi sees China as a major threat. One Chinese assessment concludes that the
Indian military sees Pakistan as the main operational opponent and China as a potential
operational opponent. It also describes the Indians as seeing China and Pakistan as closely
aligned in threatening India. China is slowly gaining more influence with other South Asian
states. In addition to developing a port facility in Sittwe, Burma, China has invested in the
development of ports in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan, and has offered
10

assistance to Bangladesh in developing its deep-sea port in Chittagong. Because China imports
about 70 percent of its energy requirements, its interest in developing these ports is primarily to
help ensure uninterrupted access to crucial energy supplies. [26]
China has already invested about $200 million in the Gwadar Port facility in the
southwest part of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan off the coast of the Arabian Sea. China also
uses military and other assistance to court the smaller South Asian nations and to help them
enhance their autonomy vis vis India. Beijing has sold modern missile boats to Bangladesh and
provided extensive military aid to Sri Lanka to help it win the war against the Tamil Tigers in
2009. At a time when Pakistan is under intense scrutiny about its role in fighting extremism and
terrorism, the world has been watching to see how Beijing decides to deal with Islamabad.
Despite Pakistans growing diplomatic isolation in recent months, Chinas support has been
steadfast, at least publicly. Two weeks after the May 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden,
Pakistans Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani went to China on a four-day visit to celebrate the
60th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Of course, there
is much to celebrate in a bilateral relationship that Pakistans ambassador to Beijing has
described as higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than
eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on. [27]
While Pakistan presents the most immediate threat to India, Indian strategists
increasingly view China as the most important long-term security challenge. Long-standing
China-Pakistan security ties are a continuing source of angst in New Delhi and reminder of a
potential two-front war. While India seeks to avoid conflict with China, Indian military planners
also assess that they need to develop sufficient capabilities to deter an increasingly powerful and
assertive China. As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obamas
relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N.
sanctions against Irans nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multibillion dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch
satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more
peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access
to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean. In 2005,
India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement that expanded joint military exercises,
increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India
11

have conducted more than 50 military exercises since 2002, demonstrating how far the military
partnership has progressed in a relatively short period. India and America are both peacefully
engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither
India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed its hard to imagine a
peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.
A U.S.-India military alliance has always been a strategic nightmare for the Chinese, and
the ballyhooed Indo-U.S. global strategic partnership triggered alarm bells in Beijing. The
partnership, though, falls short of a formal military alliance. Still, the high-pitched Indian and
American rhetoric that the new partnership represented a tectonic shift in geopolitical alignments
apparently made Chinese policymakers believe India was being groomed as a new Japan or
Australia to America a perception reinforced by subsequent arrangements and Indian orders for
U.S. arms worth $3.5 billion in just the past year.
Since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), till the end of the Cold War,
Chinas relations with the United States were overshadowed by ideological rivalry in the context
of the East-West balance of power.[28] Sino-American tensions lessened in the 1970s following
the Sino-Soviet rift of late 1960s and the opening up of China by the efforts of Nixon-Kissinger
duo. Despite the beginning of the economic modernization programme under Deng Xiaoping
after 1976, Sino-U.S. bilateral relations continued to be plagued by U.S. complaints about
Beijings human rights policy, neglect of environmental problems, weapons transfers and arms
sales to Iran, Pakistan and others and maintenance of protectionist trade policies. The Chinese
leaders on the other hand continued to criticise the United States on international platforms as
being hegemonic. The Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 remained a pivotal event in the
chronicle of Sino-U.S. relations. It fundamentally changed the way in which bilateral
relationship between the two countries has been managed since President Nixons historic 1972
visit to China. [29] With the collapse of Soviet Communism, the Chinese role in countering Soviet
expansionism lost its rationale and the fundamental incompatibilities between the two systems
became more pronounced. However, with the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of
the Sino-U.S. relationship was further strengthened and the policy to engage China for the
greater purpose of global peace and stability was undertaken by the Clinton administration.[30]
His regime specifically sought to revitalize relations with China through closer economic

12

cooperation by encouraging Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other
global conventions. The Presidents policy was based on the neo-liberal presumption that
Chinas inclusion in global economic and political regimes would encourage Beijing to moderate
its internal political behaviour and conform to international standards.
The Bush administrations China policy has taken a significant departure from that of his
predecessor.[31] During the 2000 presidential campaign, the Bush campaign on several occasions
characterized China as a strategic competitor and a future challenger to critical U.S. interests in
the Asia-Pacific region. [32] Thus, the maxim that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only
interests (Morgenthau, 1985) can be invoked to describe Sino-US relations. A certain group of
academicians in America believe that neither idealism or imperialism, nor engagement or
containment can be appropriately applied to the U.S. Policy towards China. The US
administration cautioned that: We don't have a strategic partnership or alliance with China. But
we need to have constructive relations, there needs to be a continuing dialogue. [33] As the U.S
Department of State Press Release on July 10, 2005 of the speech of the U.S. Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice emphasized that the relationship between the United States and China is
complex (U.S Department of State, 2005) with areas of divergent opinions like human rights
and religious freedom particularly related to Tibet, Taiwanese independence, military build-up
and arms transfers to Iran and Pakistan and favourable balance of trade towards China in the
economic sector. However, both the countries have pursued cooperative strategies on issues like
nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula, counter-terrorism measures and an active
economic engagement despite its complications. In recent years the sale of Patriot PAC-3
missiles worth about US$1 billion to Taiwan, Obamas meeting with Dalai Lama in February
2010 and the constant irritant, the human rights issue, have seriously undermined the US-China
relations.
On the other side of the scene, according to the United States National Intelligence
Council Report on emerging global trends, by 2015, international community will have to
confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India.

[34]

Historical evidence shows that although China has been a major security concern for India, the
Chinese were less wary of India and concentrated more on the pattern of superpower rivalry
existing between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

13

Bothe China and India are concentrating its resources to expedite internal economic
development, carries out an independent foreign policy and strives for a peaceful international
environment. China is a big power in East Asia while India is a big power in South Asia.
The United States could be a positive factor for Sino-India relationships, if it tries to
promote regional stability in South Asia and help China and Indias economic modernization. It
could, as well, cast itself in a negative role when it plays the India card in its dealings with
China; or plays the China card in developing its relations with India. As both China and India
have come to be important players in regional and global decision-making and given their rising
economies which have come to be characterized as soft power, [35] it remains to be seen how
the United States accommodate the future actions and policies of these two nation-states within
the sphere of its own national interests.
Conclusion:
While U.S. considers China as its potential adversary of the 21st century, U.S.India
relations have witnessed a rapid improvement. Many Chinese analysts view this remarkable
development in IndiaU.S. relations with concern, wondering if India could really forge an
alliance with the United States against China. Although both India and the United States have
indicated that the development of IndiaU.S. relations was not aimed at any third country, China
will be on the alert against any changes in its peripheral security environment. Despite many
miscalculations it is almost certain that India-U.S. co-operations will be broadened and
deepened. There is less possibilities that India will never enter into a formal alliance with US
against China. The reasons are many:
China as a close neighbor, the geography itself mandates that India should have friendly
relations with China. India cannot afford to have a hostile and resentful China on its borders. It
has therefore little to gain by entering into an antiChina alliance. The United States is unlikely
to be willing to underwrite the costs of guaranteeing Indian security. It would also be strange
enough for India to entrust her security to a superpower with global interests. For the United
States, India and her concerns will always remain only one among many factors that go into
policy making towards China and other issues. India has always attached the highest value to
maintaining the independence of her foreign policy making and sovereignty. It is extremely
unlikely that India will sacrifice that independence now that it is much stronger economically,
militarily and politically. Any pressure or coercive policy towards China only create more
14

suspicions and distrusts on India and will definitely have adverse repercussions in the bilateral
relations. An enduring friendly relationship between the two giant neighbors can only be built on
the basis of mutual trust and mutual interests. Nothing else.
References:
1. Sun Shihai, China-Indian Relations in the 21stCentury, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS
2. George Perkovich, Indias Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1999, p. 415. Perkovich chronicles the run-up to the tests and their aftermath in
Chapter 15 (pp. 404-443).
3. A report on Fernandes interview can by found in Agence France- Presse, China Bigger Threat to India than
Pakistan: Defense Minister, May 3, 1998. (Hereafter AFP.)
4. B. Raman, Sino-Indian Relations: A Chronology.
5.

For an analysis of Chinas apparent policy shift, see Swaran Singh, The Kargil Conflict: Why and How of

Chinas Neutrality, Strategic Analysis, vol. 23, no. 7 (October 1999), pp. 1083-1094.
6. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjee, Beyond Kargil: Changing Equations, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, China
Related Issues, no. 224 (July 10, 1999).
7. Shao Zongwei, Nation Calls for Normalcy in Pakistan, China Daily, October20, 1999.thwart efforts by the
United States to create a unipolar world.99 AFP, Chinese Envoy Urges Close Partnership with India for Mutual
Security, March 12, 2000.
8 . India, China to Resume Military Ties, The Hindu, April 30, 2000.
9. Rosemary Foot, Chinese-Indian Relations and the Process of Building Confidence: Implications for the AsiaPacific, Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (1996), pp. 62-65.
10. C. Raja Mohan, Let Us Make It a Friendly Border, Says Narayanan, The Hindu, May 31, 2000; India-China,
The Hindu, May 8, 2000.
11. Shao Zongwei, Border Issues in Focus, China Daily, May 30, 2000;
President Jiang Makes 4-Point Proposal on Sino-Indian Relations, Peoples Daily, May 30, 2000.
12. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Rivals Slowly Seeing Sense in Synergy, South China Morning Post, March 31, 1999.
13 Todd Crowell, Charm Offensive, Asiaweek, December 13, 1996.
14 Gaurav Kampani, CTBT Endgame in South Asia? Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, January 2000.
15. Ming Zhang, Chinas Changing Nuclear Posture, p. 33.
16. Gary K. Bertsch and Anupam Srivastava, Weapons Proliferation and Export Controls in the Former Soviet
Union: Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia, AccessAsia Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (December 1999), p. 52.
17. AFP, No Arms Race in South Asia: Indian FM, April 14, 1999.
18. AFP, China Denounces Indian Missile Test, Warns of Regional Arms Race, April 12, 1999.

15

19 . Ming Zhang, Chinas Changing Nuclear Posture, pp. 37-52.

20. AFP, China Raps India over Indian Ministers Comments on Taiwan,
January 1, 1999.
21. AFP, India Criticizes China for Comments on Dalai Lama-PM Meeting,
October 23, 1998.
22. Lisa Curtis and Dean Cheng, The China Challenge: A strategic vision for U.S.-India relations, Expert Zone
Straight from the Specialists, JULY 20, 2011
23. P. Stobdan, "Chinese Checkers in the Himalayas," Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, June 13, 2008.
24. Brahma Chellaney, U.S. factor in Sino-Indian relations-A need to dissuade Beijing from any resort to force,
Washington Times, October 28, 2009
25. Ananth Krishnan, Chinas fighter jets for Pakistan, The Hindu, November 11, 2009,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article46605.ece.
26.

Pakistan

Profile,

Nuclear

Threat

Initiative,

February

2011,

http://www.nti.org/e_

research/profiles/Pakistan/index.html.
27. Pakistan and China: Sweet as Can Be? The Economist, May 12, 2011, http://www.
economist.com/node/18682839.
28. Hook, 2005: 34). Hook, Steven W., 2005, Sino-American Trade Relations: Privatizing Foreign Policy, in
Carter Ralph G., (ed.) Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: from Terrorism to Trade, 2nd ed., CQ Press,
Washington DC.
29. Lampton, 2001). Lampton, David M., 2001, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations,
1989-2000, University of California Press, Berkeley.
30. Christopher, 1998: 516). Christopher, Warren, 1998, The United States and China: Building a New Era of
Cooperation for a New Century, address at Fudan University, Shanghai, 21 November, 1996, in Christopher,
Warren, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, Stanford University Press.
31. Sidhu and Yuan, 2003: 87). Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-dong, 2003, China and India:
Cooperation or Conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
32. Council on Foreign Relations, Campaign 2000: The Candidates, their Supporters, and Experts Debate Foreign
Policy, available online http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/index.html accessed on 14th March 2011
33. Grier and Thurman, 1999). Grier, Peter & Thurman, James N., 1999, US-China Spy Spat: Why It's Not Cold
War, 27 May, The Christian Science Monitor, online available http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0527/p1s3.html
last accessed 14/03/11.
34. The report Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernmental Experts, National
Intelligence Council is available online http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf accessed on

16

14th March 2011. This paper was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
35. Rajamony, 2002) Rajamony,Venu, 2002, India-China-US Triangle: A Soft Balance of Power System in the
Making,

15

March,

Centre

for

Strategic

and

International

Studies

http://venurajamony.com/pdf/rajamony-publication-ind-us-triangle.pdf last accessed 10/02/11.

*Lecturer, P.G. Department of Political Science

Berhampur University, Berhampur-760007
Odisha

17

(CSIS)

Paper,