VILFREDO PARETO AND THE

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
BY BRIGITTE

BERGER

Jl areto's monumentalsociological opus, largely through the

good officesof Talcott Parsons,has come to be acknowledgedas
a classic in the field. Apart from the incorporationof some
Paretian themes within Parsons1own theoreticalsystem,this
canonizationof the opus mainly expressesthe fact that nobody
since Pareto's
reallyknowswhatto do withit. This is regrettable,
Trattato(known to Americansociologistsas Mind and Society)
can be usefulfora number of problemsof sociologicalanalysis,
particularlyin political sociology.1It is the contentionof this
article that Pareto's sociological approach can be particularly
usefulin thearea commonlydesignatedas thesociologyof knowledge and, indeed, that it is possible to obtain a much clearer
of the Paretianopus
of the theoreticalsignificance
understanding
of
the
if it is thuslinked with
sociology knowledge. Conversely,
a utilizationof the Paretianapproachmay lead to a theoretically
more comprehensive
conceptionof the sociologyof knowledge.
Parsonshimself,who has identifiedthe sociologyof knowledge
with the rathernarrowconceptionof Karl Mannheim,has discussed Pareto's theoryof ideology.2 The connection between
iThe whole of Pareto's sociologicalwritingshas been published in three
languages:VilfredoPareto,Trattatodi SociologiaGenerale,(Florence,1916),2nd
ed., 1923;VilfredoPareto,Traite de Sociologiegnrale,2 vols.,(Paris,1917); and
VilfredoPareto,Mind and Society,4 vols., (New York: Harcourt,Brace & Co.,
1935),and 2nd edition,2 vols., (New York: Dover, 1963). The Englishedition
this articleand followingestablishedpracticecitations
has been used throughout
fromthe Trattatoreferto the paragraphratherthan the page number.
2 Talcott Parsons,Structureof Social Action (Glencoe: The Free Press,1949),
pp. 269-277.Cf. Talcott Parsons,"An Approachto the Sociologyof Knowledge",
Transactionsof the IVth World Congressof Sociology,(Louvain: International
SociologicalAssociation,1959).

266

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

Paretoand a more generalsociologyof knowledgehas been seen

GerardDeGr and WernerStark.3DeGr
by two commentators,
discussesin some detail the possibilityof relatingPareto to the
sociologyof knowledge,thoughhe argues that Pareto's approach
needs to be supplementedby structuralconsiderations.Stark is
muchmorenegativein his evaluationand concludesthatPareto's
approach to the sociologyof knowledgeleads into a blind alley.
Neither DeGr nor Stark developed the implicationsfor a sociologyof knowledgefoundin Pareto'sown presuppositions.
There have, of course, been widely divergentconceptionsof
the sociologyof knowledge. It cannot be the purpose of this
article to arbitrateamong these. The broad definitiongiven by
Robert Mertonwill serve,however,as a workingone for these
considerations,
namely,that the sociologyof knowledgeis "concernedwith the relationsof knowledgeand otherexistentialfactors in societyor culture."4 Against the background of this
definition,it is possible to follow throughPareto's own treatmentof the forcesactive in societyand, by a slight"translation"
of his oftenbizarreconceptualizations,
to arriveat a much more
positivepicture of his theoreticalcontribution.
Societyis essentiallyinterpretedby Pareto throughan analysis
of "knowledge,"thatis, of the manifoldand commonlydeceptive
ways in which society interpretsitself. Pareto's original work
was in economics,that most "logical" of social sciences. His
turningaway in later life from the field of economics proper
was motivatedby his insight(which developed particularlyduring his studyof socialisttheories)that the reasonsmen give for
theiractionsare not at all the real reasons.5Pareto's sociological
3 Gerard L. DeGr, Societyand Ideology: an Inquiry into the Sociologyof
1943);WernerStark,Sociologyof
Knowledge,(New York:ColumbiaU. Bookstore,
Knowledge,(Glencoe:The Free Press,1958).
* Robert K. Merton,Social Theoryand Social Structure,(Glencoe: The Free
Press,1957),p. 456.
VilfredoPareto, Les SystmesSocialistes,Paris, 1902-1903,and also G. H.
Bousquet,The Work of VilfredoPareto (Minneapolis:SociologicalPress, 1928),
pp. 22-23.

VILFREDO

PARETO
267
' factorsat
'
opus is essentiallya quest for the real, 'underlying*
workin societyand history.These factorsturnout to be largely
"non-logical"ones. Pareto'sturningfromeconomicsto sociology
entailedthedevelopmentof a methodologyof radical debunking.
To findthe "real" social forcesone must explode the "unreal"
ones. It is for this reason that Pareto returnsover and over
again to scathingdemolitionsof theoriesand beliefsof all sorts
in the course of the Trattato,which could, among other things,
be well describedas a compendiumof human fictionsand follies.
In thisdebunkingprocedurePareto not only standssquarelyin
but in a long line of sardonic
the traditionof the Enlightenment,
Italian thinkersthat stretchesback at least as far as Machiavelli
and thatalso includesGiovanni BattistaVico. Through his procedureParetodevelopedwhatcould be called a theoryof ideology
(even thoughhe does not use this term),in the sense of ideology
of social reality. However,as Mannas a distortiveinterpretation
a
heim pointed out, theoryof ideology is only the necessary
preamble to the sociologyof knowledge. By way of his theory
of ideologyPareto is thrusttowardsthe more general question
of the relationshipbetweenhuman thoughtand human society.
It is thisquestionwhich is the centralone throughoutthe Trattato, a fact aptly caught in the title given to it by its English
translators.One maysay,then,thatalreadyin the startingpoint
ofhis sociologicalthinkingParetois pointedtowardsthesociology
of knowledge (a startingpoint, it may be added, that is far
removedfromthose of such other "classic" sociologistsas Durkheim and Weber).
of manParetostudiessocietyby wayof the mentalconstructs
theories,propositions,theologies,ethics,and so forth. These
mentalconstructs,
however,are never studied in themselves,but
alwaysas expressionsof specificsocial situations.6In orderto cut
massof seeminglydisparatematerialto
throughtheoverwhelming
arriveat the basic forcesat workin society,Pareto developed two
eVilfredoPareto,Mind and Society,op. cit.,7-11.

268

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

- the distinctionbetweenlogirelated,yetdistinctsetsof concepts

cal and non-logicalactions,and the distinctionbetween derivationsand residues. The firstdistinctionis the centerof Pareto's
theoryof ideology,the secondof his sociologyof knowledge.
The firstdistinctionis developedfortheanalysisof therelationthataccompany
shipbetweensocial factsand theverbalstatements
them.7 Using a multiplicityof historicalillustrations,Pareto
shows that human actions, which have their root motives in
various irrationaldrives, interestsand fantasies,are constantly
"rationalized"(in the literalsense of the word) by means of verto fullydevelbiage rangingfrommythologicalinterpretations
oped philosophicalstatements.8That is, non-logicalactions are
made to appear logical by means of mental constructs. This
implications. Logical action is depropositionhas far-reaching
finedby Pareto as action in whichmeansand ends are conjoined
logically(thatis, rationally),both in the mind of the actorand of
the scientificobserver.9It followsthat the greatmass of human
actionsare non-logicalin character. It also followsthat human
actionsare farless influencedby ideas and othermentalconstructs
than is usually thought.10This in itselfis not such a surprising
propositionand others before Pareto have stated it more eloquently. What is new in the Paretian analysisis the degree to
which he attributesnon-logicalroots to human thoughtand activity. Pareto's is the only one among the great sociological
systemsthatanalyzessocietyas, above all, a giganticconstruction
and obfuscations. Even more radiof deceptions,self-deceptions
cally than Marx, Pareto understandsthe greaterpart of human
actionsas takingplace in "falseconsciousness." The greaterpart
of humanthought,then,is the expressionof human beings' "very
conspicuoustendencyto paint a varnishof logic over theirconduct."
7Ibid., 7, 12-14.
s Ibid., 160,216-217,249-367,410.
9 Ibid., 150.
io ibid., 146.
ii Ibid., 154.

VILFREDO

PARETO

269

Paretois not content,however,to stopwiththe debunkingpart

ofhis searchforthebasic forcesofsociety.Having satisfiedhimself
thattheself-interpretations
of humanactorsare mostly"rationalizations'*(thatis, ideologicalin character),he goes on to ask what
it is thatis actuallybeing "rationalized/*The theoryof derivationsand residuesis intendedto answerthis question.
Through a processof reductionPareto thinksthathe can show
thatnon-logicalactionsoriginatechieflyin what he calls psychic
and feelingsof whichthe actor is not
states,thatis, in sentiments
aware.12 By contrast,logical actionsare the resultof deliberate
reasoning. The investigationof psychic states is the proper
provinceof psychology.The sociologisthas to take psychicstates
as data, withoutenteringfurtherinto an analysisof them.13 Indeed, the sociologist'smethodmakespsychicstatesinaccessibleto
him.14 However,thepsychicstatesmanifestthemselvesin various
patternsor constellationsof human motivesthat(or so Pareto believes)appear as constantsin social actions. These recurringpatternsPareto calls "residues."15 The termis chosen to indicate
thatthesepatternsremainaftersociologicalanalysis(preciselythe
debunkingoperationreferredto above) has cleared away the accidental circumstancesand the obfuscationsof particularsocial
actions. The residues(whichPareto classifiedin greatdetail and
with the use of an exceedinglycumbersometerminology)are,
the fundamentalmotorforcesin society.
therefore,
Pareto triesto show how the seeminglymost diverse theories
about one social phenomenoncan alwaysbe reduced to a certain
underlyingstructureof residues. For instance,the firstclass of
residuesin Pareto's scheme,comprisingthe residuesof what he
calls the "instinctof combination,"expressthe human tendency
to indulge in puttingtogetherall sortsof things,partlyfor the
12/fcfU,161.
is Compare Talcott Parsons, Structureof Social Action
(Glencoe: The Free Press,
1949), p. 199, n. 4.
i* Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society,op. cit.y170.
io Ibid., 161-170, 189-248, 269, 306-367.

270

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

pleasureof it, partlybecause thereis an inborndrive to do so.16

It is thisresidualconstellationwhich,among otherthings,is the
basic forceof innovationin history,of great importance,therefore,forPareto'stheoryof social change. The operationof this
that is, is also
force is essentiallyhaphazard and unsystematic,
Yet
various
theories
are
constructed
to
make actions
non-logical.
springingfromthesemotivesappear to be logical suchas theories
of progressor of revolution. These explanationsof conductcan
accordingto Pareto'sprocedure,
onlybe understoodsociologically,
if they are reduced to their non-logical,residual substratum.
Again, the second class of residuesis subsumedby Pareto under
the categoryof the "persistenceof aggregates/'expressingthe
residues of an instinctto refrainfrom tearingapart what the
instinctof combinationhas put together.17This class of residues
expressesa principleof social inertia,of greatimportanceforthe
cohesionand continuityof social institutions.18Once more,these
residuesare non-logicalin character,though elaborate explanations (such as various theoriesof conservatism)are concoctedto
give theman appearanceof logicality.
At thecenterof Pareto'sconceptionof social actionis a formula
comprisingthreeelementswhich he has also expresseddiagrammatically/9All social phenomenaconsistbasicallyof givencombinationsof residues(A), the constantelement,which findvarying
of social actions(2?)on the one hand,
expressionsin a multiplicity
as well as a multiplicityof theories(C) on the otherhand. Both
social actionsand theoriesare merelyexpressionsof the constant
called "derivations."20The
element,theresidues,and are therefore
derivationsexpressthemselvesin ever new formsand are subject
to continuouschange. What is crucial here is thatsocial actions
and theoriescannotbe understoodsociologically,eitherin themselvesor in relationwith one another,exceptby way of the resixe/Wd., 864 ff.

vlbid., 993ff.
i*Ibid.t 1076.
i Ibid., 162.
20ibid., 163-291.

VILFREDO

PARETO

271

dues thatformtheircommonsubstratum. In termsof the formula, no direct5-C relationshipscan be analyticallyestablished.

or directlyobfuscating.The
are eitherarbitrary
B-C relationships
meaningfulrelationships
only analytically(that is, scientifically)
are A-B and A-C. In otherwords,"beliefsand conductare not
independent,theircorrelationlies in theirbeing two branchesof
the same tree."21 Pareto concedes the possibilitythat occasionallybeliefs(C) mayinfluenceactions(B), but thiscan onlyhappen
indirectly
by wayof theresidues(A). Verystrongbeliefsmayact
upon the residues,reinforceor change their combination,and
consequentlyinfluenceactions. These casesare rare. More commonly,the derivationsof type(C) are the workof man's mind in
accountingforthe residuesas constituted.22
For Pareto,social structuresare enveloped by a web of essentiallydistortiveideation. The basic fiberof thisweb is language,
whichis the everydayvehicle forthe "rationalization"of human
actions.23Then thereare religion,mythology,
morality,political
of social life thatare capable
theoriesand all otherinterpretations
of giving reasons for human actions. This situation,however,
is not a transitory
phenomenonof a particularhistoricalmoment
(as is, by comparison,Marx's localizationof "falseconsciousness"
in the capitalistphase of historicaldevelopment). It is endemic
to society. It is repetitivein history. This does not mean that
Pareto'sview of societyis ahistorical. On the contrary,Pareto is
very much aware of the historicityof human social existence.
The uniformities
of human natureand theirarticulationsin human thoughtand social ordersare constantlymovingin time,rethemselvesin ever-novelways.Both
combiningand reconstituting
the derivationsand the residues change in their combinations
and recombinations. Pareto even concedes that there may be
21ibid., 166.
22Ibid., 850.
23Ibid., 158, 958-965. The implications of Pareto's
theory of ideology for the
sociology of language has been clearly perceived by Heinz O. Ziegler, "Ideologienlehre," Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaftu. Sozialpolitik, Heidelberg, 1927, vol. 57.

272

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

genuine historicalchange in human consciousnessas such. All

thesame,the scientific
analysisof historyand societywill, accordto
to
ing Pareto,bring lighttherecurringcontentsthroughwhich
alone the kaleidoscopeof changescan make sense.
A slight" translation"of Pareto'sconceptsmaynow be helpful
in explicatingthe significanceof his approach for the sociology
of knowledge. The centralParetianformulaforthe relationship
ofresiduesand derivationsmaybe expressedby sayingthatit concernsthe relationshipof pre-theoretical
consciousness(A), social
conduct(B), and theoreticalconsciousness(C). Further,the relationshipsenvisagedby theformulamaybe understoodin termsof
a dialectic. The dialecticalmovementoriginatesin the firsteleconsciousness. To put this difment,that is, in pre-theoretical
both human societyand human thoughtare expressions
ferently,
of an underlyinghuman nature,which remainsconstantin its
fundamentalconstituents. It would be erroneous,therefore,to
regardthe othertwo elementsin the formulaas nothingbut reflectionsor epiphenomenaof the first. Rather,both social conduct and theoreticalconsciousness"act back" upon the pretheoreticalconsciousnessfrom which they have emerged. In
otherwords,the relationshipsin questionare trulydialecticones.
Conductemergesfromthe residues,but as it resultsin changes
in the social structureit again influencesthe residues. Even the
of theoreticalconsciousness,certainlythe weakest
configurations
link in thischain,have the capacityin time to influencethe residues. Both these processesof "acting back" have been clearly
illustratedin Pareto'stheoryof class circulation.24The interpretationof theseprocessesas a dialecticbetweensocial conductand
the two levels of consciousnessthus staysclose to Pareto's own
formulations.As Pareto himselfputs it, "logical interpretations
of non-logicalconductbecome in theirturncauses of logical conduct and sometimeseven of non-logicalconduct; and theyhave
25
to be reckonedwith in determiningthe social equilibrium."
2*VilfredoPareto,Mind and Society,op. cit.,the entire4th volume.

25Ibid., 260.

VILFREDO

PARETO

273

The same point is made even more explicitlyin the following

statement:"Erroneous [is] the idealistictheorythat regardsthe
residues as the cause of the facts. Likewise erroneous,but at
timeslessso, is thematerialistictheorythatregardsthe factsas the
cause of the residues. In realitythe factsreinforcethe residues,
and the residues the facts. Changes occur because new forces
come into play to affecteitherthe factsor the residuesor both
occasionchangesin modes
factsand residues- new circumstances
26
of life."
Pareto's analyses of concretesocio-historicalsituationshabitually begin with the derivationsof theoreticalconsciousness,
despitethe factthathe considerstheseto be weakestin initiating
changes. Pareto is pushed towardsthis procedureby the use he
makes throughouthis work of historicalsources,that is, of the
made of the situationin questionby its theoretical
interpretations
most of themdistortive,
"definers." From these interpretations,
Pareto then proceedsto "dig down" to the underlyingrealities.
While this procedure is a debunking one (which particularly
suited Pareto'spolemic inclinations),it is importantnot to conreductionin one formor another. Not
fuseit withpsychologistic
only the residuesbut the psychicstatestheyare supposed to express are definedby Pareto in termsthat can hardlybe called
- namely, as products of varieties of social, ecopsychologistic
nomic and political circumstances.27Further,not only are the
psychicstatesproducedby social processes,but the psychologyof
the individual can only be understoodas resultingfrom the
characteristics
of the group to which he belongs.28 It would be
to interpretPareto in termsof a psychologistic
wrong,therefore,
reductionism. Rather,it is appropriateto speak of constellations
of consciousness,understoodas being in an ongoing dialectic
relationwith social conduct. Even those parts of the Paretian
are thoroughly
socioopus thatcould be called a social psychology
26Ibid., 1014.
27Ibid., 167.
28/M., 171.

274

SOCIAL RESEARCH

logical in orientationand can more properlybe called a sociology

- thatis, a sociologyof knowledge.
of consciousness
Pareto contendsthat thereare empiricaluniformitiesin these
processesof consciousness. He has been especiallyattackedon
this score.29 This attack,however,is typical of the criticisms
made againstsociologyas a whole by historians,philosophersand
others coming from humanisticdisciplines. If Pareto can be
attackedhere,so can the entiresociologicaltradition. Once the
sociologicalpoint of view is adopted, the possibilityof establishing recurringregularitiesin the interactionbetweenhuman consciousnessand the course of human affairsis already conceded.
Pareto standsjust as much in the main streamof the sociological
traditionin his interestin the consciousnessof groupsratherthan
individuals.
On the basis of his sociologyof consciousness,Pareto understandssocial change or historyas essentiallya successionof constellationsof conciousness,in cyclicalrepetition. The distinction
and theoreticalconsciousnessshould make
betweenpre-theoretical
it veryclear thatthisdoes not mean an understandingof history
of
as the movementof "ideas." The latter,as crystallizations
theoreticalconsciousness,constitutebut one momentin a much
morecomplexdialectic,and the weakestmomentat that. Thus,
or
while Pareto's systemis not reductionisticin a psychologistic
relatedsense,it is also not idealistic. If one acceptsPareto'ssocioof historyis a tempting
his understanding
logicalpresuppositions,
one, providinga readyschemefor the orderingof a bewildering
multitudeof data. This scheme is especiallyplausible if one
looks at historyover long periods of time and on the level of
abstractionfromparticulareventsthat Pareto's approach exacts.
It becomes more problematicwhen one applies scrupuloushissituations.30
toricalmethodsto specificsocio-historical
2 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1961), pp. 197 ff.
so For instance, when one compares Pareto's interpretation of the history ot
Rome as a whole with detailed historical analyses of various periods of Roman
historyseen from differentperspectives.

VILFREDO

PARETO

275

Pareto'sview of the relationshipbetweensocietyand consciousness may be put in greaterrelief by comparingit with other
"classic" approaches to this problem in sociological theory. A
comparisonwithDurkheim,Weber and Marx is particularlyclose
at hand. Pareto shareswith thesescholarsa broad conceptionof
sociologyin its relationshipto the humanities,a rejection of
of societyand history,an interestin the
idealisticinterpretations
foundations
of sociologyand a rejectionof psychomethodological
logisticapproachesto social phenomena.
Of thesethreethinkersDurkheimat firstappears as the closest
to Pareto.31 Like Pareto,Durkheimhas been labelled as "positivistic"and "sociologistic." But more importantly,
phenomena
of consciousnessalso occupya centralplace in Durkheim'ssociology. Durkheimstressesthat,in its essence,societyis a product
and theircongealmentin the
ofmind. Collectiverepresentations
collectiveconsciousnessare the vital cement that holds society
together. Indeed, societyessentiallyis thatassemblageof collective representations.Further,all thought,includingthe fundamentalcategories(such as time,space,number)are expressiveof
the social structurewithinwhich theyoriginate. Durkheim insists, however, that society,once established,is a reality sui
generis,whichnot onlycannotbe reducedto the realityof its individual membersbut whichis independentof theseindividuals,
havingan existenceabove and in oppositionto them.By contrast,
Pareto remainsconstantlyaware of societyas a human drama,
producedand continuously"staged" by individuals. Societyhas
no being except that which individuals bestow on it. In this
of social realityPareto is actually
rejectionof any hypostatization
closerto Weber than to Durkheim. There is anotherimportant
difference.While both Pareto and Durkheim stressthe social
rootsand "locatedness"of human consciousness,thereis lacking
in Durkheima conceptionof "falseconsciousness"or "ideology."
ai Emile Durkheim,The Rules of SociologicalMethod (Glencoe: Free Press,
1950),and Emile Durkheim,The ElementaryFormsof ReligiousLife (Glencoe:
Free Press,1947).

276

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

The notionthatthe collectiveconsciousnessof a societycould be

a mesh of delusions and fantasies,many of them concocted to
serve specificvested interests,is alien to Durkheim's optimistic
(and, one may suspect,profoundlybourgeois)spirit. Pareto has
no use for this kind of optimism,scorns the liberal-bourgeois
ideologyto which it gave birth,and forthisreason cannotagree
to a sociological"functionalism"thatprovidesa cognitiveif not
ethical legitimationof ideas by virtueof the factthat theywork
of societythat
to hold societytogether. The veryhypostatization
is endemic to Durkheimiansociologyappears as an ideology in
the Paretian perspective. It may, then,be maintainedthat the
similaritybetween Pareto and Durkheim is superficial,actually
misleading. Completelydifferentorientationsanimate the two
systems.
Pareto shares with Weber a strongconcern with the role of
thoughtin historyand society.32Further,for both theoreticians
any specificsocial structureis always understoodas a historical
product. In Weber's case, this is directlyrelated to the understandingof societyas restingon individual meanings and the
concomitantrejection of any hypostatization
of social reality
'
Weber'ssociological 'nominalism,"as againstDurkheimian"realism."33 Pareto clearlysharesthe firstof thesetwo generalorientations. Also, like Pareto, Weber rejects any one-sidedcausal
explanationof therelationshipof ideas and society,as is indicated
particularlyin his concept of "elective affinity"
(Wahlverwandtto
the
manner
in
which
ideas
and
social proschaft),referring
cesses"seek each otherout" in history.34The similaritybetween
Weber and Pareto in thesemattersis clear. So is the difference,
however; Weber's approach to sociology,while lacking Durk32Especially Max Weber, Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft(Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr,
1951).
ss Cf. Werner Stark, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).
34 Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 202, 713, 732.

VILFREDO

PARETO

277

heim's "functionalist"optimism,also lacks Pareto's debunking

animus. It would, indeed, be possible to glean fromWeber's
worka theoryof ideology,especiallyby way of an analysisof his
conceptof "legitimation."But theseaspectsof social realityare
muchless centralin Weber'sworkthan in Pareto's. This means,
undoubtedly,that Weber's sociological systemis broader,more
balanced,less infectedwith the passionsof special pleading. By
the same token,Pareto's systemis more directlyand more massivelyrelevantto the sociologyof knowledge.
The most remarkablesimilaritiesare to be found between
Paretoand Marx,especiallyif one concentrates
one's attentionon
theview of societypresentedin Marx's earlywritings.35The two
theoreticiansshare a basic intentionof showingup the fictions
as Marx likes to call them) that overarchthe
("mystifications,"
social structure.More importantly,
both are concernedto show
the social rootageof all thought. In Marx's work,thisconcernis
shownmostclearlyin thesub-and super-structure
scheme. In the
at least,it is clear thatthesetwostructures
standin
earlywritings,
a dialecticrelationshipwitheach other. The sub-structure
is not
just the productiveforcesof societyin the narroweconomicsense
(as it came to be understoodin later Marxism),but the whole
realm of human activity,includingthe structuresof society,by
whichman produceshis own realityand finallyproduceshimself.
If one understandsthe Marxian sub-structure
as the whole range
of man's social activity,and then understandsthe super-structure
as the domain of consciousnessbeing producedand in turnprowith the Paretian
ducing this social activity,then the affinity
- except for the not unimportant
schemebecomesquite striking
fact that, in Paretian terms,the firstmoment of the Marxian
dialecticlies in social conduct(B) ratherthan in a pre-theoretical
consciousnessthat is an expressionof a constanthuman nature
(A). It is here, despite all theoreticalsimilarities,that the two
as Karl Marx, Die Fruehschriften,(Landshut edition, Stuttgart: Kroener, 1953).

278

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

spiritsdivide, with the fundamentallyrevolutionaryMarx concludinglogicallythathuman natureitselfis a productof human

conservativePareto mustmainactivity,while the fundamentally
tain that human nature remainsthe same no matterwhat men
do.86
It is pertinentthat Pareto knew Marx's work and respected
Marx as a sociologist(thoughnot much as an economist). Pareto
had, of course,no use for the revolutionaryand Utopianaspects
a greatlydifferent
of Marx'swork. Again,despitethesimilarities,
spiritanimateseach system. Pareto also lacks Marx's philosophical interestsand would, indeed, regardtheseas having no place
in a scientificsociology. All the same, of the three "classical"
thinkersbrieflycompared here with Pareto, it may be maintained thatit is to Marx thatthe latteris closest. Pareto'swork
gains interestif one accepts this view, because it then indicates
some ways by which certain Marxian insights (especiallythose
concernedwiththe dialecticrelationshipof societyand consciousness) mightbe incorporatedinto a comprehensivesociologyof
knowledge,unburdenedwith the utopianismof the intellectual
traditionderivedfromMarx.
If, in conclusion,Paretois comparedwiththe two theoreticians
who conceived and developed the sociologyof knowledgeas a
out
special field,Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, he stands
above all by thewayin whichhe copes withthe problemsassigned
to thisfieldwithina comprehensivesystemof sociology.37This
was done neitherby Schelernor by Mannheim. For Scheler,the
that
seActuallyit is an interesting
problemfor the sociologyof knowledge
conservative
social theoriestend to regardhuman natureas given,while revolualso be possibleto say that
tionarytheoriestend to denythis givenness.It may
of human nature.
resist
dialectical
tends
to
interpretations
conservative
thought
Pareto followsthis patternto the extentof havinga dialecticalview of history,
humannaturefromit.
but exempting
und die Gesellschaft
(Bern u. Muenchen:
7Max Scheler,Die Wissensformen
York:
Francke,2nd ed. 1960),and Karl Mannheim,Ideologyand Utopia (New
Harcourt,Brace & Co., paper,n.d.).

VILFREDO PARETO

279

ofknowledge
on a muchmoregeneral
wasa way-station
sociology
of whichwas to be the
philosophical
journey,the destination
foundationof a philosophicalanthropology
firmlyprotected
historical
More
than
else, Scheler's
against
anything
relativity.
sociologyof knowledgewas intendedby him to cope withthe
and to get it out of theway,so thatthe
problemof relativity,
reproperphilosophicaltaskcould begin. Such philosophical
flections
are completely
alien to thespiritof the Trattato.Also,
Scheler's
ofthesociology
ofknowledge
reallyleavesno
conception
roomfora notionof "falseconsciousness."Each typeof conon theone truth
sciousness
is "true"insofar
as it is a perspective
froma particular
socio-historical
standpoint.For Pareto,sucha
notion of truthis "metaphysics"
and in itselfan ideology.
Scheler'sapproachleads towardsthegeneralphilosophical
problems of consciousness,
Pareto'stowardsan empiricalstudyof
withinthe generalframespecificphenomenaof consciousness
workof sociology.
In thisinterest
Paretois closerto Mannheimthanto Scheler.
Whatdistinguishes
himfromMannheimas muchas fromScheler
is his emphasison the pre-theore
ticalaspectof "knowledge"in
reasonsto be foundin theGerman
society.For understandable
intellectual
milieuout of whichbothScheler'sand Mannheim's
thinkingcame,theirinterestin "knowledge"was centeredin
"ideas." Paretorealizedmuchmoreclearlythatideationis,after
all, onlya smallpartof thesumtotalofmentalconstructs
operativein humansociety.
Botha Scheler-oriented
and a Mannheimorientedsociology
ofknowledge,
differdespitevariousimportant
on thehistory
as sociological
ences,appearprincipally
perspectives
ofideas.38Amongotherthings,
thisexplainswhya sociology
of
thusorientedhas remainedmarginalto thesociologiknowledge
cal enterprise
as a whole. The utilization
of theParetiansystem
forthe sociologyof knowledgeovercomesthis limitation. In
38For the differencesbetween Scheler and Mannheim cf. Werner Stark, The
Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit.

280

SOCIAL RESEARCH

Mannheim'slaterworkthereappearsan interestin placingsocio"reconstruction."

logyat theserviceof democraticand reformistic
to
would
have
been
This, of course,
repugnant Pareto's view of
theuses ofsociology.
,
In sum, Pareto's Trattato expounds a notion of sociologyin
whichthe problemsof the sociologyof knowledge (providedthat
one understandsthese as spanningthe levels of theoreticaland
pre-theoretical
consciousness)are central. Social conduct and
consciousness. It is not
institutions
are foundedin pre-theoretical
but all three
social
conduct
and
ideas thatgenerate
institutions,
of the same underlyingcomkinds of factorsare manifestations
plexes of human nature. Societyis not the deliberaterealization
of certainideas, nor is it a "functional"organizationof certain
activities. Rather,societyis a haphazard,unintendedand largely
unreflectedphenomenon,having its roots in the strugglesand
manipulationsof everydayexistence. Intellectualactivitiesspring
fromthe same roots,as men tryto "explain" theirexistenceto
one anotherand (not least) to themselves,therebysystematically
obfuscatingwhat has actuallytaken place. Societyis thus more
a fabricof fantasyand follythan eitheran ideationaldesign or a
functioningsystem. Indeed, men's ideas are generallythe proand the societydefinedby theseideas funcductsof irrationality
tions preciselybecause men are foolishenough to believe their
own irrationalities.It is thisimage of societythatPareto'ssociology of knowledgeevokes. Pareto's work is useful because the
of thisimagein sociologicaltheoryis important.
preservation
More specifically,Pareto provides a sociology of knowledge
with far-reaching
implicationsin several areas. The Trattato
showshow a conceptof social stratification
may be developed in
the perspectiveof a sociologyof knowledge. Social strataare not
primarilyseen as determinedby economic or other external
factors,but as constellationsof consciousness.39Pareto also deIn Paretian terms class consciousness is due to a differentconstellation of
residues in differentsocial classes.

VILFREDO

PARETO

281

velopsa comprehensivetheoryof social change based on his sociology of knowledge. Change in societymeans above all change
in the consciousnessof social groups. This conceptionis developed in Pareto'swell-knowntheoryof thecirculationof elites,but
there is no theoreticalnecessityof confiningit to this special
problem.40In its broadestaspect,the Trattatoshowshow a general sociologicaltheoryof historycan be attempted. Since it is
preciselythe divorce from historical perspectiveand method
which is one of the most serious theoreticalweaknessesof contemporaryAmericansociology,both Pareto's sociologicalsystem
in generaland his sociologyof knowledgein particulardeserve
fargreaterattentionthan theycurrentlyreceive.
oThroughoutthe fourthvolumeof Mind and Societyone becomesaware of
this possibility.