ILLUSTRATION BY JAYACHANDRAN

History As Politics
Links between knowledge and ideology do not justify the passing off of political agendas as knowledge
as is being done in the rewriting of history by the present central government; and that too of a kind not
based on the understanding of history current among historians.
ROMILA THAPAR

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[This is substantially the text of the Professor Athar Ali Memorial lecture, organised by the
Aligarh Historians Society, at the Aligarh Muslim University on 8 February 2003, titled History
and Contemporary Politics in India. Incidentally, Professor Thapar has recently been named
by the Library of Congress in Washington as First Holder of the Kluge Chair in Countries and
Cultures of the South]

It has long been recognized that there is a link, between

theories of knowledge and the lens of ideas through which
the authors of these theories view knowledge.
This has an application to scientific advances as well as the
formulations of the social sciences. However, such links
between knowledge and ideology do not justify the passing
off of political agendas as knowledge as is being done in the
rewriting of history by the present central government ; and
that too of a kind not based on the understanding of history

This method of
creating an identity
through doctoring
history is familiar to
us from the
treatment of history
in Pakistan and
Bangla Desh as well,
although the
identities thus forged
are different.

current among historians. Far from advancing knowledge, this new history on the contrary, is
being used for forging an identity that can be exploited to support political mobilization. As a
historian therefore, I am deeply concerned with what is essentially an assault on history, and
the use to which it is being put is, at the same time, an abuse of history.
Some of the organizations that constitute the Sangh Parivar have, since their inception, used
education to forge this identity. It is in some ways ironic that these organizations took
education as a means of ideological imprinting far more seriously those who were committed
to the values of an independent, modern society. This method of creating an identity through
doctoring history is familiar to us from the treatment of history in Pakistan and Bangla Desh
as well, although the identities thus forged are different. The tragedy is that in India there has
been a strong tradition of independent historical writing of an extremely high quality that is
now under attack.
The attempt in India is currently focused on history, but it raises the broader issue concerning
the nature and quality of the new educational curriculum now introduced at school level, and
with the intention of extending a similar interpretation of history to university level as well.

The tragedy is that in

India there has been
a strong tradition of
independent
historical writing of
an extremely high
quality that is now
under attack.

Defending history assumes importance because the attack is

not confined to history alone since the nature of the attack
suggests that the social sciences in general will now be
targeted. Furthermore, the defence of the discipline of history
as an exploration of knowledge is also part of the defence of
the idea of India as a democratic, secular society.

The aim to establish democracy, secularism and social justice

became the ambition of the independent state of India in
1947. The debate on democracy was encapsulated in the
discussions on adult franchise and the holding of regular
elections. A secular society implied that there would be no discrimination on the basis of
religion and to that extent the state would distance itself from religion. Secularism assumes
the right to follow the religion of one's choice, a right stated in our constitution. Social justice
requires that there be an equality of citizenship and a priority for human rights. Earlier
governments endorsed these values, and even if their
practice was inadequate, the goal was clear. Negating these
We have had
values was unheard of even if they were problematic for
Hindutva equated
some sections of society.
The undermining of democracy today lies in insisting that
Indian society is constituted of communities identified only by
religion.Since in a democracy the wishes of the majority
prevail, it is said that the Hindus being the majority
community in terms of numbers, should determine public
decisions. This of course makes a mockery of democracy,
since a democratic majority is not a pre-determined majority
and decisions can and do cut across identities of religion and
other identities. It is also a refusal to concede that actually
Indian society in the past had multiple identities - of caste and
social hierarchy, of occupation, of language, of religious sect
and of region. Religion was only one amongst these. The
focus of each identity was dependent on the issue in question.

with Hinduism. This

equation is
unacceptable to
many Hindus for
whom Hinduism is
not an aggressive
ideology, and the
Hindu religion does
not require to be
defended by
organizing the killing
of Muslims and
Christians.

Pre-modern societies tend to regard social hierarchies as normal and although there was

some questioning of these, this was not an axiom of social organization. Questioning
hierarchies is fundamental to modernization. Nor was there in the earlier past any significant
concern with issues of human rights, whether they related to the availability of justice,
employment, education, health, welfare or other minimum facilities. In the process of
modernization and particularly after independence, these were seen as the necessary
foundation to the development of the nation. But today, with the reversal of the values that
Indian independence stood for, they are of little consequence.

Hindutva has also

rather perversely,
been described as
secularism. And now
we are told that
Hindutva is cultural
nationalism. But we
are not told whose
culture is being
made the national
one out of the many
hundreds of
distinctive cultural
communities that
constitute India.

They are under attack from state policies, from the leaders of
industry and business houses that are supposed to provide an
alternate leadership, and from those supporting a nationalism
that gives priority to the Hindu citizens of India, rather than
maintaining the equal rights of all citizens. This change is
encapsulated in the notion of Hindutva, claiming to be guiding
force of Indian nationalism. It is constantly referred to and
continually redefined as and when it becomes necessary.

Hindutva is becoming the primary example of what has

elsewhere been called, 'double-speak'. It started as a political
slogan in the writings of Savarkar and since then has been
explained in every expedient way possible. So we have had
Hindutva meaning Hindu Rashtra, that is India or as recently
explained, Indianness. We have had Hindutva equated with
Hinduism. This equation is unacceptable to many Hindus for
whom Hinduism is not an
aggressive ideology, and the Hindu religion does not require
I am not suggesting
to be defended by organizing the killing of Muslims and
that if belief is not
Christians. Nevertheless, Hindutva has a following, and an
rigid it brings about
influential following at that, among middle-class Hindus. It has
tolerance, although
given a new shape to what it describes as the Hindu religion
this may be so, but
and despite its hostility to Islam and Christianity, it borrows
rather, that a
substantially from these religions in its structure and
distinction has to be
organization. This makes it different from earlier Hinduism.
made between
I have elsewhere referred to Hindutva Hinduism as a form of
Syndicated Hinduism.

intolerance inspired
by religious agendas
and that inspired by
the rules of social
organization.

Hindutva has also rather perversely, been described as

secularism. And now we are told that Hindutva is cultural
nationalism. But we are not told whose culture is being made the national one out of the
many hundreds of distinctive cultural communities that constitute India. Because cultural
nationalism implies choosing a single culture and defining it as national, the inevitable choice
will be upper-caste Hindu culture. This is a contradiction in India where the Indian identity has
grown out of multiple cultures across the social spectrum. As is normal to all cultures these
constantly mutated and changed, within the changing historical process.
Despite its initial geographic and ethnic meanings, the term Hindu finally settled as the name
of a religion. It has been argued that the early religions of India were essentially religions of
orthopraxy of conservative ritual practice, rather than orthodoxy, of conservative belief.
Religion in India was a mosaic of juxtaposed cults and sects. Some of these had an inherent
and close identity with particular social groups, others deliberately cut across groups. There
was no single label by which they described themselves and they were identified as

Vaishnava, Shaiva, Shakta, Lingayat and so on. Belief ranged from animism to the most
sophisticated philosophy. This permitted a flexibility of belief, although not a flexibility of social
identity.

In the past, changes

of interpretation
grew out of intense
debates and
discussions, as well
as critical enquiries
into the historical
data and the
generalizations
derived from it. The
so-called new
history that is
currently being
propagated has been
introduced in entirely
different ways.

I am not suggesting that if belief is not rigid it brings about

tolerance, although this may be so, but rather, that a
distinction has to be made between intolerance inspired by
religious agendas and that inspired by the rules of social
organization. There was more of the latter than the former.
The form taken by the Semitic religions in their Indian
manifestations, particularly at the popular and regional level
were also characterized by similar tendencies.
The new form now being given to Hinduism is at the root of
the particular view of Indian history and culture of the current
ideology of the Sangh Parivar. This is evident from the
attempt to replace existing views that range over many
historical explanations by a single view, supporting this
ideology.

This new attitude among those now in power is not

unconnected with their trajectory of knowledge. I shall try and
demonstrate this with reference to the way in which history is being projected. Let me preface
this by saying that the updating of knowledge is necessary to the advancement of
knowledge. This involves the constant assessment and
rewriting of studies that advance knowledge, as for example,
standard works in history. Indian history has been rewritten
Not only is it a
with each advance in knowledge. The rewriting has moved
borrowed history
from an initial colonial interpretation largely drawn from
from colonial writing
Oriental research and the requirements of the colonial state,
but it endorses the
worst aspects of
to the questioning of this interpretation by historians
Orientalism. Colonial
sympathetic to the national movement.
This in turn was questioned by historians of the last fifty years
who were intellectually wide-ranging Liberals, Marxists,
vehement non-Marxists, and such like. They covered a range
of opinion. The most striking aspect of this rewriting was that
the changes of interpretation grew out of intense debates and
discussions, as well as critical enquiries into the historical
data and the generalizations derived from it.

history is being
dressed up as a new,
original,
authentically Indian
version of history,
without even the
sophistication of
colonial authors.

The so-called 'new' history that is currently being propagated has been introduced in entirely
different ways : through mangling existing school textbooks by insisting on absurd deletions ;
through surreptitiously introducing new textbooks without going through the normal
procedures of having them vetted by educationists and historians ; through trying to control
the history syllabus of all Indian universities by mandate of the University Grants Commission
; and through imposing the authority of the party in power by arbitrary actions preventing the
publications of research institutions such as the ICHR. This change is not the result of
investigating new theories of history ; it is the imposition of propaganda.
I would also like to argue that the theories being expounded in the Hindutva version of Indian
history are a jump backwards to nineteenth century colonial history - the history that had

been questioned by nationalist historians and discarded by more recent historians. Not only
is it a borrowed history from colonial writing but it endorses the worst aspects of Orientalism.

Mill argued that the

Hindu civilization
was stagnant and
backward, the
Muslim only
marginally better and
the British colonial
power was an
agency of progress
because it could
legislate change for
improvement in
India. In the Hindutva
version this
periodisation
remains, only the
colours have
changed.

Fundamentalist histories of various kinds in ex-colonies, base

themselves on the initial colonial theories about the history of
their colonies. In this the Hindutva version of history is no
exception. We are now being forced to return to nineteenth
century colonial history. This is being dressed up as a new,
original, authentically Indian version of history. It is none of
this. It merely repeats much of what was said in colonial
histories of India and without even the sophistication of
colonial authors.

The colonial interpretation was carefully developed through

the nineteenth century. By 1823, the History of British
India written by James Mill was available and widely read.
This was the hegemonic text in which Mill periodised Indian
history into three periods - Hindu civilization, Muslim
civilization and the British period. These were accepted
largely without question and we have lived with this
periodisation for almost two hundred years. Although it was
challenged in the last fifty
years by various historians
writing on India, it is now being reinforced again. Mill argued
What earlier
that the Hindu civilization was stagnant and backward, the
historians failed to
Muslim only marginally better and the British colonial power
emphasize was that
was an agency of progress because it could legislate change
conversion is seldom
for improvement in India. In the Hindutva version this
a break with the
periodisation remains, only the colours have changed : the
previous way of life.
It invariably carries
Hindu period is the golden age, the Muslim period the black,
many of the culture
dark age of tyranny and oppression, and the colonial period is
ways of the earlier
a grey age almost of marginal importance compared to the
identities. Not all the
earlier two.
This also echoes the views of Sir William Jones and Max
Mueller. It allows a focus on the Hindu and Muslim periods
which as we shall see was part of the political stand of the
religious nationalisms of the early twentieth century.

Muslim migrants
were invaders since
most came as
pastoralists, traders,
adventurers and
associates of Sufis
and other such
sects.

Anti-colonial nationalist historians, often referred to as secular

nationalist historians, had initiated a critique of the colonial
period, but tended to accept the notion of a Hindu 'golden
age'. They did not distance themselves to assess the validity of such descriptions. Many
were upper caste Hindus, familiar with Sanskrit and sympathetic to the idea of a glorious
Hindu past. This was in some ways an attempt to assuage the hurt of having been reduced
to being a colony. Similarly, the argument that the Muslim period was based on Persian and
Arabic sources tended to attract upper-caste Muslims to this study and they too were
sympathetic to what was stated in the sources without questioning them too closely. Even
those who critiqued Mill's periodisation merely changed the nomenclature from HinduMuslim-British to Ancient-Medieval-Modern in imitation of the periodisation of European
history. There was a debate over colonial interpretations, but with less effort to change the

methods of analysis or the theories of explanation.

Mill's projection was that the Hindus and Muslims formed two uniform, monolithic
communities permanently hostile to each other because of religious differences, with the
Hindus battling against Muslim tyranny and oppression.

V.D.Sarvarkars definition of
an Indian required that he
be a person
whose pitribhumiand puny
abhumi had to be within the
territory of British India.
M.S. Golwalkar stated
unambiguously that nonHindus could not be
citizens.

This was the view of many colonial writers on India and in

terms of presenting historical sources is exemplified in Elliot
and Dowson's, History of India as Told by her Own
Historians,published in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Chroniclers of the medieval courts writing in Persian
and others writing in Arabic are included, the assumption
being that there was no writing of Indian history prior to the
coming of Islam. Nor was there concession to segmentation
within the communities in terms of varying histories of castes
and sects.

This view was further reinforced in the colonial theory that the
Muslims of India were foreign and alien. The subject was
treated as if Muslims were - one and all - migrants, all claiming descent from the Arabs,
Turks, Afghans, Mongols and what have you, who settled in India. This may have held true
for a fraction of the elite, but as we know the vast majority of Muslims was Hindus converted
to Islam. The few claims to an origin beyond the frontiers of the sub-continent were more
often claims to status rather than a statement of ethnic origins. The regional and linguistic
variations among Muslims in India gave rise to many cultural and sectarian differences that
militated against a uniform, monolithic religious community. Groups labelled as Hindu were
also treated as if they were identical and conformed to a single, homogenous culture.
Aziz Ahmed for instance, writing in 1963 characterized the sources of medieval history as
being the Muslim epics of conquest in Persian and the Hindu
epics of resistance in Hindi.
Hindutva sets aside
the efflorescence of
Hinduism through
Bhakti - the
devotional
movements, which
began in the preIslamic period in the
peninsula but
became more
widespread in the
north in later times.

These are the concepts now used in the new textbooks.

There was conquest and there was some resistance but
there was much else besides that should be discussed. The
conquest and the resistance were more frequently over
territory, political power and status. Religion was not the
dominating factor as is clear from studies of these epics. The
fading away of formal religious boundaries was particularly
evident in the non-elite sections of society - in effect, the
majority of the people. But their religion was regarded as
inferior and set aside, even by historians. What earlier
historians failed to emphasize was that conversion is seldom
a break with the previous way of life. It invariably carries
many of the culture ways of the earlier identities. Further, not all the Muslim migrants were
invaders since most came as pastoralists, traders, adventurers and associates of Sufis and
other such sects.
The views establishing what is now the Hindutva version of history are reflected in the
writings and beliefs of the founding ideologues of the RSS and of Hindu nationalism.
V.D.Sarvarkar's definition of an Indian required that he be a person whose pitribhumi (the
land of his ancestors) and punyabhumi (the land of his religion) had to be within the territory

of British India.

Muslim nationalism
aspired to and
eventually
succeeded in
establishing
Pakistan. Hindu
nationalism is
aspiring to make
India into a Hindu
Rashtra. The twonation theory was
essential to both the
Muslim League and
the Hindu
Mahasabha in the
early twentieth
century.

This for him disqualified the Muslims, Christians and Parsis and he added the Communists to the list as well. M.S.
Golwalkar stated unambiguously that non-Hindus could not be
citizens. Further, that there had always been a single Hindu
society and culture rooted in Vedic Brahmanism. Islam
intervened and tried to destroy it therefore Islam should be
expunged. No concession was made to the many religious
movements in pre-Islamic India that questioned and
challenged Vedic Brahmanism both in debate and in rituals.
The Buddhists, Jainas, Shakta and Tantric sects, the
Lingayats and many others, expressed their religious
commitments very differently from the Vedic. Hindutva sets
aside the efflorescence of Hinduism through Bhakti - the
devotional movements, which began in the pre-Islamic period
in the peninsula but became more widespread in the north in
later times. These were in many cases the coming together of
Hindu, Islamic and other religious strands.

In the early twentieth century two new kinds of nationalism,

other than the mainstream anti-colonial nationalism, acquired visibility. These were religionbased national groups for whom the identity of an
independent nation-state was to derive from the religion of
The beginnings of
the majority community in the proposed state. Religion-based
Indian history have
nationalism, whether Hindu or Muslim, drew directly from the
to be rewritten to
colonial interpretation of Indian history and catered to the
establish the genesis
ambitions of a section of the Indian middle-class.
It projected imagined uniform, monolithic religious
communities and gave them a political reality. There was an
entwining of communal historiography and religious
nationalism. Muslim nationalism aspired to and eventually
succeeded in establishing Pakistan. Hindu nationalism is
aspiring to make India into a Hindu Rashtra. The two-nation
theory was essential to both the Muslim League and the
Hindu Mahasabha in the early twentieth century. It continues
to be essential to the communal movements of today. These
nationalisms were not primarily anti-colonial. They accepted
the colonial views of the past and what they were opposed to
was the other religious community.

of Indian society as
Hindu, and Hindu as
defined in the Vedic
corpus. The Indus
civilization as the
earliest record of a
sophisticated culture
in the Indian subcontinent is now
being read as having
been authored by the
Vedic Aryans.

Thus for Muslim nationalism history became significant only with the conquest of India by
various Muslim rulers and the establishment of Muslim rule. This is the point when the study
of history is taken seriously in Bangla Desh and Pakistan. Despite having a vast treasury of
sources in Sanskrit - both texts and inscriptions - they no longer have younger scholars to
read these and integrate them into their view of the past. For Hindu nationalism, Hindu
civilization was the sole identity of India. The Muslims in conquering India are said to have
attacked the earlier civilization and the result was a permanent conflict. The history of the
second millennium AD was seen as that of Muslim conquest and Hindu resistance, and there
is a falling off of interest in this period at many universities because they see it as the Muslim

period.

Calling it the
Sarasvati civilization
evokes Vedic
connections. The
contradictions in this
argument are many.
The date of the
Rigveda generally
taken to be 1500 BC
at the earliest has, in
this view, to be taken
back to 3000 BC
which is untenable
on the existing
linguistic evidence.

This nineteenth century colonial interpretation of Indian history

is being projected once again, this time by Indians, in the new
history textbooks for schools.

The proponents of Hindutva object to the history that has

been written in the last fifty years. There is an insistence on
calling it 'Leftist history' assuming that this will discredit it. In
fact this history incorporates a range of opinions, based on
intensive research and analysis and the range enriches the
understanding of the past. Its main concern was to ensure a
valid historical method and exploration as the basis of this
understanding. Many historians made extended analyses of
some of the themes initiated by anti-colonial nationalism, such
as the questioning of Mill's periodisation and the colonial
concept of Oriental Despotism as the dominant political
economy of India. Other historians have explored facets of the
social, economic and cultural history of India. A number of
new and relevant questions have been raised and sources used in fresh ways to answer
these questions. The field of history has widened out to include the study of economies,
technologies, the theories of state-formation, the social context of religious sects,
environment and ecology, gender studies and social history - in fact the normal components
of what today is regarded as good history. Research of this kind established the legitimacy
and recognition of the multiple voices and cultures that go into the making of the past and the
plurality of religions in India for all periods.
This has resulted in Mill's scheme being replaced by an
alternate periodisation : Pre-history and Proto-history, Early
Historical, Early Medieval, Medieval and Modern periods.

In order to maintain
that the Hindus are
Aryans and all others
are non-Aryan and
therefore foreigners,
it has to be argued
that the Aryans and
their language IndoAryan, are
indigenous to India.
This view is taken to
such lengths that
there was even a
computer distortion
of a Harappan seal
attempting to pass
off a single-horned
animal as a horse.

The attempt has been to bring history into the purview of the
social sciences and this extends the scope of history as also
the methods of analyses. This change began with debates
about a variety of Marxist and non-Marxist interpretations,
some readings of the French Annales School, and the use of
the comparative method in history. What this meant was that
theories developed in relation to other societies were not
applied directly to Indian data, but were used for asking
questions of the Indian data. The reading of texts as sources
is not limited to a literal reading and there is a questioning of
texts for new kinds of information that helps delineate the
details in our understanding of the past. Historical research in
recent times has introduced new features that included more
intensive testing of the reliability of the evidence and not
taking all sources at face value ; encouraging a critical
enquiry into the data ; and seeking rational analyses on which
to base historical generalisations. This is far removed from the politically motivated, monocausal view of history that Hindu nationalism is propagating.
Another area of debate, crucial to the ideology of Hindutva, relates to the question of Indian

origins and identities.

Here the attempt is to reformulate these so as to prove the
primacy of the Hindus, which primacy they could evoke in
One is reminded of
order to enable them to claim priority as the citizens of India.
the parallels in the
The beginnings of Indian history have to be rewritten to
Nazi abuse of
establish the genesis of Indian society as Hindu, and Hindu as
archaeology in the
defined in the Vedic corpus. The Indus civilization as the
1930s to prove the
earliest record of a sophisticated culture in the Indian subAryan origins of the
Germans. The
continent is now being read as having been authored by the
associations become
Vedic Aryans. Calling it the Sarasvati civilization evokes Vedic
much closer now
connections. The contradictions in this argument are many.
that it has been
The date of theRigveda generally taken to be 1500 BC at the
established that both
earliest has, in this view, to be taken back to 3000 BC which is
Savarkar and
untenable on the existing linguistic evidence.
Golwalkar had
The Rigveda depicts a
connections with the
typically agro-pastoral culture
Fascists in Italy and
and does not reflect an
Germany.
Hindu Arya - in which
advanced urban civilization
category the
Buddhist, Jainas and
that is characteristic of the
Sikhs are subsumed
Indus civilization. The archaeological and the linguistic
- is indigenous and
evidence in this reconstruction is incompatible, therefore the
therefore the
supporters of this new view ignore the linguistic evidence and
inheritor of the land ;
interpret the archaeology according to their own ideas.
and other religious
Archaeological data is nevertheless, described as 'scientific'
groups are
and therefore irrefutable, arguing that the data speaks for
foreigners. The
itself. But of course the data is dependent on the person who
theory of Savarkar
is interpreting it.
provides the
framework for this
Pottery and beads do not speak.
analysis.

The insistence on this interpretation is in order to claim that

the Hindus have had an unbroken, lineal descent for five
thousand years. In order to maintain that the Hindus are Aryans and all others are non-Aryan
and therefore foreigners, it has to be argued that the Aryans and their language Indo-Aryan,
are indigenous to India. This view is taken to such lengths that there was even a computer
distortion of a Harappan seal attempting to pass off a single-horned animal (generally
identified as a rhinoceros or the mythical unicorn) as a horse. This was done in order to
establish that the horse - associated with Aryans - was known to the Indus civilization. These
views are attempts to endorse those of Savarkar on the question of who qualifies to be an
Indian. Aryan consciousness thus, has become the key to Indian civilization.
One is reminded of the parallels in the Nazi abuse of archaeology in the 1930s to prove the
Aryan origins of the Germans. The associations become
much closer now that it has been established that both
Those supportive of
Savarkar and Golwalkar had connections with the Fascists in
the Hindutva
Italy and Germany. Savarkar repeatedly expressed his
versions have not
admiration for Fascism and ridiculed Nehru for opposing it.
over the years
There was admiration for Hitler's solution to the Jewish
produced any
population in Germany and parallels were drawn with the
theoretical critiques
Muslim population in India, both being described as Semites.
of a seriously
historical kind in
refuting mainstream
history - perhaps
because such
critiques require
wide reading and an
intellectual
understanding of
historical problems.

B.S. Moonje, mentioned with respect in the RSS shakhas,

was greatly impressed by the organization of the Italian fascists when he visited Italy in 1931,
and these became the models for the organisation of similar groups in India.
But even this theory of the Aryan identity and the Vedas being the bedrock of Indian
civilization, is a return to nineteenth century views. Among Indologists, both European and
Indian, Aryanism in its racial dimension was the prevailing theory in explaining the origins and
inter-relations of societies in Europe and parts of Asia. The most influential writing linked to
Aryans and India was that of Max Mueller who postulated the coming of the Aryans, and their
bringing civilization to northern India at the expense of the local, autochthonous people. The
centrality of the Aryan, of Sanskrit and of the Vedas, is of course taken from Max Mueller, but
the theory is turned upside down by arguing that the Aryans were indigenous to India, as also
was their language. They originated in India.
Interestingly even this insistence on the Aryans and their language being indigenous, and of
India being the cradle of world civilization, has an ancestry that goes back to the nineteenth
century, to western, non-scholarly but influential sources.
Madame Blavatsky, who together with Col. Henry Steel Olcott
It is of course much
and others, founded the Theosophical Society in 1875,
easier to merely
propounded similar views.
insist on a theory
than to discuss its
implications,
particularly if the
new theory replacing
the old fantasizes
wherever it chooses
to, rather than
remaining within the
boundaries of
history, and casually
dismisses existing
theories.

They spoke of the dark-skinned Aryans from Oudh / Avadh,

civilizing Egypt in pre-Vedic times. The Egyptians, Jews and
Arabs were all said to be such Aryans and the migration even
went to pre-Columbian America. Olcott was closely
connected with the brief merger of the Theosophical Society
with the Arya Samaj of Dayanand Sarasvati, a merger that fell
apart quite quickly. Dayanand wrote of a migration from Tibet
into Aryavarta / north India, and the Indian Aryan nation
civilizing and ruling over the rest of the world. Their
technology was said to be superior to all others. The Aryans
were projected as virtually indigenous. A much discussed
question at that time was whether the British and the Indian
could be related by blood, since they both belonged to the Aryan race !

Madame Blavatsky established many centres, especially in Europe, where theories of the
occult in Hinduism and Buddhism were becoming increasingly popular. Such theories were
said to give Indians a pride of place as through her contacts Hinduism was being honoured in
the west. In some circles, this was projected as support for the aspirations of Indian
nationalism. Few however, followed up what was actually being said in the name of Hinduism
and the use that it was being put to. In recent years there have been studies showing the
links that these centres had with the germination of the Nazi ideology. There was therefore, a
cross-current of Aryanism that linked up a variety of European and Indian groups.

The Hindutva version

of history is a
sledge-hammer
history reducing
everything to a
single reading,
narrowly defined
according to its own
choice. The teaching
of this history
therefore, takes on
the form of a kind of
catechism - one
question, one answer
and no discussion.

The projection of Aryanism generated similar political

ideologies.
At the time when Olcott was maintaining that the Aryans were
indigenous, Jyotiba Phule writing in Marathi, had a different
take on the theory. Regarded by Dalits as a mahatama and a
founding thinker, Phule supported the theory of an Aryan
invasion which he saw as an invasion of alien brahmans
speaking Sanskrit, and as a result of which the existing
indigenous inhabitants were subjugated, oppressed and

relegated to lower caste status. For him the lower castes were the rightful inheritors of the
land but were denied this right by the brahmans. The conflict therefore was over the
establishment of caste, which became the process by which the foreign brahmans
appropriated the rights and the land of the indigenous peoples.
The Hindutva version on the other hand follows the views of Col. Olcott and the Arya Samaj
and goes to the other extreme. It had a long gestation period with some ambiguities about
the status of various groups of people. In the Hindutva version, the crux of the theory is not
the difference in caste, as in the theory of Phule, but the difference in religion. The Hindu
Arya - in which category the Buddhist, Jainas and Sikhs are subsumed - is indigenous and
therefore the inheritor of the land ; and other religious groups are foreigners. The theory of
Savarkar provides the framework for this analysis.
We may well ask why the proponents of Hindutva are going back to colonial ideas of the
nineteenth century and claiming them as new and indigenous ? Is it because of their
intellectual barrenness and their intention of pursuing history as propaganda ? It is assumed
that Indian society and culture did not change in past times. This was axiomatic of and
central to, colonial views of Indian history. Indian society was said to have been so static that
it did not even have a consciousness of history, since history assumes the recognition of
change. In the Hindutva adaptation of this perspective the Hindu period was one long,
unchanging golden age. The notion of an unchanging Indian society was questioned in the
historical writing of the last century and was discarded as a generalization even about Hindu
civilization. But it is back again in the new textbooks.
Those supportive of the Hindutva versions have not over the years produced any theoretical
critiques of a seriously historical kind in refuting mainstream history - perhaps because such
critiques require wide reading and an intellectual understanding of historical problems. They
have little familiarity with even the minimalist historical method that we demand from our
history students - namely a familiarity with the historical process of change, an awareness of
the complications in handling source material and of the theories of historical explanation.
Their only refutation consists of publicly abusing a few selected historians who are invariably
described as 'leftists' and have even been referred to as academic terrorists by the Minister
for Human Resource Development.
Going back to the views of the nineteenth century means that no attempt is made in the
Hindutva version to understand the important historical question of the interface of cultures
and societies and how these get transformed and evolve. This has a direct relevance to the
study of society and culture as depicted in the Vedic corpus, the texts that are being quoted
as the foundations of Indian civilization, but which it would seem are not being studied by
those who claim to be using them in this manner. For example, there is no concern with
analyzing the varying processes through which languages spread, or, how crucial these
variations are to understanding change within cultures, or for that matter, acculturation
through juxtaposition with other societies.
That there was an Aryan invasion was once held as the explanation for the arrival of the
Indo-Aryan language in the northwest of the sub-continent. Few support this today. The focus
has shifted to seeing the coming of the Indo-Aryan language through a series of migrations,
probably small-scale ones at that. Such migrations would introduce some new facets of
culture that are interwoven, together with the languages, into the emergence of societies
whose presence is recorded in the Vedic corpus. The interweaving of languages is evident
from the presence of Dravidian and Munda linguistic forms in the Rigveda. The cultural facets

require a more careful evaluation of archaeological evidence and that of language.

The Hindutva version dismisses the arguments supporting the Aryans having come from the
Indo-Iranian borderlands. Furthermore, there is no recognition that invasion and a graduated
migration are two different processes, and particularly so in the impact they have on existing
cultures and societies. Those historians that argue for migrations are continually branded as
supporters of the theory of an invasion. Cultural change is a complex subject, requiring
control over varieties of data and some familiarity with explanations of such change.
Migration is a graduated process and change may be manifested in a slow transformation of
language and in aspects of social organization. Invasions are serious disturbances where
change is relatively sudden and widespread. None of these are issues for discussion in the
Hindutva version. It is of course much easier to merely insist on a theory than to discuss its
implications, particularly if the new theory replacing the old fantasizes wherever it chooses to,
rather than remaining within the boundaries of history, and casually dismisses existing
theories.
History does not move through Either/Or generalizations as there are many areas between
the two that have to be investigated. There are many nuances and negotiations that are
involved in how societies accommodate internal contradictions and external interventions.
But the Hindutva version of history is a sledge-hammer history reducing everything to a
single reading, narrowly defined according to its own choice. The teaching of this history
therefore, takes on the form of a kind of catechism - one question, one answer and no
discussion - as is evident from the history textbooks used in schools in Gujarat and in the
schools run by the RSS - the Shishu Mandirs.
The intention of the present central government is to rapidly introduce their new Hindutva
version of history, to become the only version since other interpretations are being reviled
and abused. This intention has been projected at every level of the educational system as I
have said. Perhaps the most offensive part of the suppression of the earlier school textbooks
in history, was the refusal to allow any discussion on the portions that were deleted. These
significantly include seminal questions such as the eating of beef in early India, and the
origins and history of caste. In a society where caste remains a predominant factor it is
ridiculous not to allow a discussion on the subject in schools. These are not subjects that can
be dismissed unless the intention is to close the Indian mind.
Let me conclude with the question of how we should defend not only the discipline of history
but also the future of education in India, so essential to the kind of society that we set out to
build in 1947. We shall have to continually critique the propagandist versions of history as in
some of the new NCERT textbooks, where there are factual errors and there is a revival of
colonial prejudices in interpreting Indian history. We not only have to explain to the public
what we object to in the books and why, but also what professional history is actually about
and how it differs from the Hindutva version. The scrutiny would include what is taught in the
schools run by a variety of religio-cultural organisations - the Shishu Mandirs, the
Madrassahs, the mission schools, and other such schools. Huge amounts of money are
being channeled into these schools, and after Gujarat it has become essential that there be
transparency and accountability of the funding for and the syllabi used, in all these schools.
We shall have to try to re-establish the earlier procedures involving consultation and
discussion through professional bodies and educational institutions, and reduce if not
eliminate, the possibility of decisions about education being taken arbitrarily by any politician
who happens to be in power. It will be an absurd situation if the educational curriculum has to

be changed each time the government changes.

The intention of the new educational curriculum is to produce a generation of pliant,
unthinking Indians. Significantly this echoes the agenda of colonial education. However this
will affect the aspirations of the Indian middle class. So far, it has been notoriously
unconcerned with what is actually taught in school. Well-to-do sections of the middle-class
can send their children to private schools to prepare them for study and jobs abroad. Schools
for other sections of society are therefore allowed to deteriorate. But with larger circles of
rising expectations and competition, parents have to start inquiring into the quality of what is
being taught, and not remain content with only the scoring of marks.
It is not just a coincidence that increasing religious fundamentalism in India - Hindu, Sikh and
Muslim - was contemporary with the induction of India from the 1980s into the economies of
globalization. The rising aspirations of the middle class are generated by the visions held out
by globalization and by the success of a small fraction of this class. But the downside is that
for the majority of the middle-class these aspirations are not met, and there is a widening
disparity between the suddenly affluent fraction and the rest who remain on the margin. The
latter are caught up in intense competition over employment and suffer from insecurities with
the breaking down of earlier forms of broad-based community living. The propagation and
glamourising of hate, and the easy availability of deadly weapons, serves to heighten the
uncertainties. The new communities created by globalization are supposed to be modern but
where modernization fails them they use religious identities as a cover for a barbaric cult of
terror and fear.
Together with this is the constant search for ways of upward social mobility, one of which is
seen as recruitment into the well-financed, religio-political organizations of narrow
nationalisms, often parading as cultural organizations. The past is distorted by them and
used to enhance the hatreds generated in the present. The process has been fuelled by a
wealthy section of the Indian diaspora- Hindu, Muslim, Sikh - that has no intention of
returning to India but acts as an incendiary by financing and supporting the politics of
religious fundamentalisms and of violence, as happened recently in Gujarat and earlier in
Punjab, and which is still continuing in Kashmir.
There are bigger and broader issues involved in these changes which go beyond history or
the educational curriculum. They are altering the principles of our society. Democracy,
secularism and equal rights for all citizens are fast becoming receding values. Some citizens
are more equal than others now, and they determine the past, the present and the future in
accordance with what they regard as a homogenous, integrated view of the Indian state and
society. History, when not controlled by this ideology is a barrier to this view because history
discovers and retrieves multiple pasts that underline the pluralities of our society. This
plurality is also essential to exploring and advancing knowledge. Hence the assault on
pluralities and on knowledge. The deliberate eradication of knowledge, motivated by a fear of
knowledge, is often a prelude to massive political violence and oppression. We have to
commit ourselves to continuing the exploration and endorsing of the plurality. We have to
ensure that there will be no closing of the Indian mind.
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