BAYOT v SB

Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100
counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan.
The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of
the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with
some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the
teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious
TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp resulting in
damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on
july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was
elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a
decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one
of the thirty two cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee
against an ex post facto law.
Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through
falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is
a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment
and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a
penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the
official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the
constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently
occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable.
The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from
office. The use of the word office applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was
charged.

G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989

173 SCRA 409 - Deloso vs Sandiganbayan
This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso
(accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial governor of
Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.
Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local
elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a
certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him
of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act
3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the
Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the
Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter,
thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.
HELD
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner
to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his
services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly
extending beyond his entire term.
The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer
under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90)
days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service
Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.
The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons
and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The preventive suspension was limited to 90 days. After,

may assume office.

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
233 SCRA 163
Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena
Ponente: J. Vitug
FACTS:
Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a
former member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.
He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena
(Respondent), a qualified
replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives
as a member of the said
body.
In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their
respective public position and office
for ninety (90) days.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of
Suspension if executed
shall affront the petitioners right for due process; [2] the suspension would
assault his covenant to the
people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be
prevented by the suspension no
longer exist.
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts
supposedly committed
while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now
that he is the duly
elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is
valid?
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any
office which the officer
charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under
which he was charged.
The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office
is "a public agency or trust,"
petitioner invokes.
Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYANs decision is affirmed.
Berona v Sandiganbayan
Petitioners were public officers and employees of the Provincial Health Office of
Bangued, Abra (Health Office). Dr. Demetrio Beroa (Dr. Beroa) was Provincial
Health Officer II, Dr. Romulo Gaerlan (Dr. Gaerlan) was Provincial Health
Officer I, Aurie Viado-Adriano (Viado-Adriano) was resident auditor and Vida
Labios (Labios) was an accountant. Petitioners were among the seven[if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) before the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 23521. The accusatory portion of the Information reads in
part:
x x x, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of
their official functions, and through bad faith, conspiring and confederating with
each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously release to
Alexander Siddayao, the total amount of P99,987.77 representing payment for
the improvement of the Main Health Center in Malibcong, Abra when in fact,
said Alexander Siddayao is not the labor contractor for the project, resulting to
the non-payment of the salaries due the laborers who worked for the completion
of the above-said project, causing them undue injury.
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. On 30 April 1999, the
prosecution filed an Amended Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente Lite
pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 (Section 13). The motion sought the
suspension of petitioners from any public office which they may be occupying
pending trial.
After the pre-suspension hearing held on 6 July 1999, the Sandiganbayan
suspended the petitioners from office for 90 days. The Sandiganbayan held that
preventive suspension is mandatory under Section 13 upon the courts finding that

a valid information charges the accused for violation of RA 3019 or Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving public funds or property or
fraud on government. The Sandiganbayan observed that a preliminary
investigation was duly conducted before the filing of the Information, which the
Sandiganbayan found sufficient in form and substance. The first Resolution
ordered thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Dr. Demetrio Beroa, Dr.
Romulo Gaerlan, Aurie Viado, Esther Barbero and Vida Labios are hereby
suspended as Provincial Health Officer II, Provincial Health Officer I, Resident
Auditor, Cashier and Accountant, respectively, all of the Provincial Health Office
of Bangued, Abra, and from any other public office which they may now or
hereafter be holding for ninety (90) days from receipt of this resolution. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director, Department of Health, Region
I, San Fernando, La Union for the implementation of this suspension. He is
requested to please inform this Court of his action thereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
The suspension of the accused shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration
of the ninety (90) day period from the implementation of this resolution
(Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128
SCRA 383).
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
In the second Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Petitioners would now have this Court strike down the first and second
Resolutions as supposedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that at the time of their preventive suspension
they were no longer holding the positions they were occupying when the
transactions, subject of the Information in Criminal Case No. 23521, happened.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Beroa
resigned from the Health Office on 27 March 1995. He ran and won as the
Municipal Mayor of Pilar, Abra. Dr. Gaerlan resigned from the Health Office and
briefly engaged in private practice. He re-joined the government service, but no
longer at the Health Office. Viado-Adriano became resident auditor of the Land
Bank of the Philippines, Bangued, Abra. Labios obtained an appointment as
accounting clerk in the Provincial Government of Abra.
The only issue posed for resolution is whether Section 13, which qualifies the
public officer as incumbent, applies to petitioners since they are no longer
occupying the positions they held when they were charged under RA 3019.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
This issue is neither new nor controversial. In a long line of cases,[if !supportFootnotes][5]
[endif]
we have rejected the same arguments petitioners now raise. As in previous
cases resolving the same issue, the answer will not change.
The Information charged petitioners under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 13 of the same law reads:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid Information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement, and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute
the same to the government.
Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended
court rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution under
RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no ifs
and buts about it.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information. The court can then have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.
That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of
a motion to quash.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] In this case, the Sandiganbayan had
determined the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted
for that purpose. Hence, petitioners suspension is unquestionably mandatory.

Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently
holding
Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan has no legal basis to suspend them
because they are presently occupying positions different from those under which
the Information charged them. We have long settled this issue. In Libanan v.
Sandiganbayan,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the petitioner similarly claimed that the order
of suspension, based on his indictment as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
could no longer attach to him, as he was already the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Rejecting his thesis, the Court explained:
In Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by
Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was
already occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor
that he held previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law.
Prior to Deloso, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then Cavite Mayor
Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as
government auditor of the Commission on Audit.
The Court reiterated this doctrine in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
in this wise:
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a
valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials;
or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service. It applies to a Public High School Principal; a Municipal Mayor; a
Governor; a Congressman; a Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
non-career Project Manager; a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to
any office which the officer might currently be holding and not necessarily
the particular office in relation to which he is charged. (Emphasis supplied)
Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office
Petitioners other contention that there is no longer any danger that petitioners
would intimidate prosecution witnesses since two of the latters witnesses had
already completed their testimonies in court is also untenable. Equally futile is
their claim that Dr. Beroas suspension would deprive his constituents in the
Municipality of Pilar the services and leadership of their highest elected
municipal official to the greater detriment of public service.
These reasons cannot override the mandatory character of Section 13. The
possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or hamper their
prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. Another is to
prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
Thus, we held in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] that x x x, the fact that petitioners preventive suspension may deprive the people of
Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a
sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by
law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as
governor. Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more
than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus
rejecting the view expressed in one case that members of the legislature could
not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of
removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of
representation.
The period imposed by the Sandiganbayan is also in accord with our previous
rulings limiting to 90 days the period of preventive suspension under Section 13.
[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]

Section 13 reinforces the principle that a public office is a public trust. Its
purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from hampering his prosecution
by intimidating or influencing witnesses, tampering with documentary evidence,
or committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Petitioners last feeble
argument that the prosecution evidence is weak misses the point. They lose sight
of the fact that preventive suspension is not a penalty. The accused public
officers whose culpability remains to be proven are still entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature which the court will
pass on after a full-blown trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. We
AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 8 September 1999 and 4 February 2000 issued
by the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23521.
SO ORDERED.

Talaga v Sandiganbayan
Criminal and administrative complaints were filed by Elan Recreation, Inc.
(ELAN) against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaints
alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Lucena, had
unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo
games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants. [2]
On May 23, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
recommended the dismissal of both the criminal and administrative complaints. [3]

However, the Ombudsman approved the dismissal of the administrative case but
denied the dismissal of the criminal case.
As a result, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of three
criminal charges for violation of R.A. No. 3019:
1.
Criminal Case No. 27737. For causing undue injury to complainants
when petitioner as mayor of Lucena City vetoed an ordinance granting a local
franchise to the complainants to operate bingo games in the city;
2.
3.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation [4] questioning the
finding of the Special Prosecutor. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Office of the Ombudsman.
On May 17, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to quash the three informations. [5] On
February 9, 2004, the Sandinganbayan issued a Resolution [6] quashing the
Informations in Criminal Cases No. 27737 and 27739. However, it sustained the
Information in Criminal Case No. 27738. In the said Resolution, respondent
referred Criminal Case No. 27738 back to the Office of the Ombudsman and
ordered the latter to conduct further preliminary investigation to determine the
possible liability of the members of the City Council which passed Ordinance
No. 1963 in said case.[7]
An Amended Information[8] and Second Amended Information[9] were filed by
the prosecution in the Sandiganbayan. The first included the members of the City
Council of Lucena City (City Councilors), as additional accused, while the
Second Amended Information (Information) alleged conspiracy between
petitioner and the City Councilors. Over the opposition [10] of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan admitted both amended informations.[11]
On February 21, 2005, petitioner and the City Councilors filed a Motion to
Quash[12] the Information on the ground that there is no valid information on
which the Sandiganbayan has a finding of probable cause because the second
amended informations allegations do not constitute an offense, there being no
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 771 as it has no applicability to bingo
operations and P.D. No. 771 has been superceded by P.D. No. 1869 and R.A. No
7160. The Sandiganbayna denied[13] the petition and it likewise denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[14]
On June 29, 2005, petitioner and the City Councilors were arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 27738 and all pleaded not guilty.
On July 5, 2005, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend the Accused
Pendente Lite.[15] Petitioner and his co-accused filed an Opposition[16] to the
motion. Thereafter, respondent ordered the suspension of the petitioner and his
co-accused, to wit:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the prosecution's motion for suspension pendente
lite is hereby GRANTED, and accused Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr., Godofredo V. Faller, Danilo R.
Zaballero, Salome S. Dato, Simon N. Aldovino,
Wilfredo F. Asilo, and Aurora C. Garcia are hereby
directed to CEASE and DESIST from further
performing and/or exercising the functions, duties,
and privileges of their positions as City Mayor, and
City Councilors of Lucena City, respectively, or
any other positions they may now or hereafter be
holding effective immediately upon receipt hereof
and continuing for a total period of ninety (90)
days.[17]
Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari with an urgent application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on November 9, 2005 enjoining public respondents from implementing the
suspension of petitioner.[18]
Assailing his suspension, petitioner alleges:

I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IN ABDICATION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
DUTY TO RESOLVE A JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY, IT IS
MINISTERIAL DUTY TO ISSUE A PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
ORDER AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND THERE ARE NO IFS AND
BUTS ABOUT IT.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION IS MANDATORY, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER AS SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 3019, WHICH FORMS THE BASIS OF THE ORDER OF
SUSPENSION, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE GROUND THAT IT
IMPINGES UPON THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE
JUDICIARY.

III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF HEREIN
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS NO VALID
INFORMATION UNDER WHICH PETITIONER STANDS CHARGED. [19]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner argues that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when in
imposing the sanction of suspension, it only relied on the mandatory provision of
Section 13 insensate to the weight and cogency of the peculiar circumstances of
the case before it. [20] Moreover, petitioner argues that the bare reliance of
respondent on Section 13 without calibrating the weight of diverse and dueling
evidence pertinent to the issue of appropriateness of ordering his suspension is a
clear abdication of respondent's constitutional duty to exercise its judicial
function.[21] In addition, petitioner contends that respondent should have looked
into the environmental circumstances of the case and thus it was unwarranted to
apply the presumption in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[22] that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both.
Petitioner asks this Court to first look into the circumstances of the case and
thereafter determine the propriety of issuing a suspension order. The Court could
not be more explicit than its ruling in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[23] thus:
Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these
resolutions because supposedly rendered in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court will not do so. In no sense may the
challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly
capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously
erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for
invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
On the contrary, in promulgating those resolutions,
the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear
command of the law and what it calls a mass of
jurisprudence emanating from this Court,
sustaining its authority to decree suspension of
public officials and employees indicted before it.
Indeed that the theory of discretionary
suspension should still be advocated at this late
date, despite the mass of jurisprudence relevant
to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering
on contumacious disregard of the solemn
magisterial pronouncements of the Highest
Court of the land.[24]
xxxx
While petitioners concede that this Court has almost consistently ruled that
the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is

mandatory in character, they nonetheless urge the Court to consider their

case an exception because of the peculiar circumstances thereof. They assert
that the evils sought to be avoided by separating a public official from the scene
of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated -- e.g., to
preclude the abuse of the prerogative of (his) office, such as through intimidation
of witnesses,or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will not occur in the
present situation where:
1. The Project has been canceled.
2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in
any manner,
to
the
prequalificati
on
of
contractors
dealing with
NPC. Neither
are they now
involved in
any bidding
for
or
awarding of
contracts, **
it
(being)
emphasized
(in
this
connection)
that
they
were merely
designated as
ad
hoc
members of
the
Committee
without
additional
compensation
for
their
additional
duties.
3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been
either
submitted to
the
Ombudsman
or to the
Honorable
Sandiganbaya
n.
They conclude that their preventive
suspension at this point would actually be
purposeless, as there is no more need for
precautionary measures against their abuse of the
prerogatives of their office.
The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in
earlier cases. They will again be so rejected in this case.
The Courts pronouncements in
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, are germane:
x x x
The fact is that the
possibility that the
accused
would
intimidate witnesses
or otherwise hamper
his prosecution is
just one of the
grounds
for
preventive
suspension.
The
other one is, to
prevent the accused

from
committing
further
acts
of
malfeasance while
in
office.[25]
(Emphasis supplied)
Ineluctably, the theory of petitioner that environmental circumstances of the case
should first be explored has no leg to stand on.
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery
is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment,
he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Beroa v. Sandiganbayan,[26] the Court explicitly ruled:
Section 13 is so clear and explicit
that there is hardly room for any extended court
rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally
mandates the suspension of a public official from
office pending a criminal prosecution under R.A.
3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving public funds or
property or fraud on government. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is
mandatory, and there are no ifs and buts about it.
As early as Luciano v. Mariano,[27] the Court has set out the
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension, to wit:
xxxx
(c) By way of broad guidelines for
the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged
under a valid information under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to
section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that
upon the filing of such information, the trial court
should issue an order with proper notice requiring
the accused officer to show cause at a specific date
of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory
provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an
order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges
the validity thereof, such show-cause order of
the trial court would no longer be necessary.
What is indispensable is that the trial court duly
hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or
withhold such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid
down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and

adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of

the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he
has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation, the act for which he stands charged
do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of
the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under Section
13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash
the information on any of the grounds provided in
the Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory
suspension decreed by the act upon determination
of the pendency in court or criminal prosecution
for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery
under a valid information requires at the same time
that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension
envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say,
finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not
to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to
issue the suspension order upon its upholding the
validity of the information and setting the same for
trial on the merits.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Stated differently, the purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is
to determine the validity of the information so that the court can have a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or
withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. [29] In this case,
respondent had determined the validity of the Information when petitioner filed
his Motion to Quash. The hearings or proceedings held thereon, in effect,
constituted a pre-suspension hearing. Respondent has followed the dictates of the
law.
This brings the Court to petitioners third assigned error that there is no valid
Information under which petitioner stands charged.
In effect, petitioner is stating once again that the allegations in the Information do
not constitute an offense. Petitioner is holding on to a thin straw in claiming that
the Information is fatally defective since it failed to allege that petitioner by
enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963 had caused injury to any party,
whether the government or private party, an essential element in the crime
charged.
The Information reads:
That on or about June 5, 2000, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Lucena
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
RAMON TALAGA , JR., being the City Mayor of
Lucena, Quezon and GODOFREDO V. FALLER,
VICTOR U. PAULO, DANILO R. ZABALLERO,
SALOME S. DATO, SIMON N. ALDOVINO,
WILFREDO F. ASILO, PHILIP M. CASTILLO,
AURORA C. GARCIA, ROMANO FRANCO C.
TALAGA, being members of the City Council of
Lucena City, while in the performance of their
official
and/or
administrative
functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally, with evident bad faith and/or manifest
partiality, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping such other, give unwarranted benefit to
Jose Sy Bang of Lucena City, by then and there,
in conspiracy with each other, by enacting and
approving Ordinance No. 1963, series of 2000
dated June 5, 2000 granting unto the said Jose
Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo
business in Lucena City in violation of
Presidential decree No. 771. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged,

provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the
information must allege that the acts in question caused injury to any party,
whether the government or private party. The presence of the word or clearly
shows that there are two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First,
causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, and, Second,
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference.
Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,[30] the Court ruled that violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
xxxx
1.
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination
of the validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information, to wit:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense
charged. The raison detre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare
his defense.[32]
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises
petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of
evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City,
petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose
Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of
unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local
franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws.
These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
Finally, petitioners second assigned error deserves scant
consideration. The validity of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 may no longer be put at
issue, the same having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. [33] Basic is the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. [34]
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes
that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal
charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the
discharge of court functions - including preventive suspension should be
acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance
thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in
that acknowledgement.[35] As earlier mentioned, the court must first determine the
validity of the information through a pre-suspension hearing. But once a proper
determination of the validity of the information has been made, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension.[36]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, there being no showing
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of
October 3, 2005, preventively suspending the petitioner for ninety (90) days. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated November 9, 2005 is lifted.

SO ORDERED.