1. ABAKADA GURO PL v PURISIMA (2008) J.

Corona

revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has

been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order
to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from

implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of
2005)

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight

committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and

collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.

Held: Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder

not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he
holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all
government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the
needs of the people they are called upon to serve.

The fund is sourced from the excess of their revenue targets each year. The
Boards in the BIR and BOC will prescribe the rules for the distribution of
the fund and set the criteria for removing from the service officials and
employees whose collection falls short of the target.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law
be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of
incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes
and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and

employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure
only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is
accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for
disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The action for removal is also
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the

3 categories of congressional oversight functions

a. Scrutiny- funtion is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation

of government activities.
b. Investigation
c. Supervision- connotes continuing and informed awareness on the part of
a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or
an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of
law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the
proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto
provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law
after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently,
the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress
affirmatively approves it.

unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that

may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an
appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.
3. CUENCO v FERNAN (1988) Per Curiam
Facts: Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former Member of the Philippine House of
Representatives from the province of Cebu prayed for judgment ordering
the disbarment of Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Chairman of the Third
Division of this Court.
In 1952, Vito Borromeo died without any forced heirs, but leaving behind
extensive properties situated in the province of Cebu.
a Petition for probate of a one-page document purportedly the last will
and testament of the decedent was filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Those instituted under said will as the sole heirs of the
late Vito Borromeo were Fortunato, Tomas and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo. In 1960, the probate court rendered a Decision declaring the will
to be a forgery. That decision became final in 1967 after being affirmed by
this Court. In the intestacy proceedings that ensued, nine (9) individuals
were declared by the trial court as the rightful successors to the decedent
Vito Borromeo's estate.

Oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily

constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to
the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the overaccumulation of power in the executive branch.
To forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,
including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation.

In 1987 the Third Division rendered a decision setting aside decisions of the
former judge. Cuenco filed a complaint for disbarment against Justice
Fernan who he claims appeared as counsel for Fortunato Tomas and Amelia
and despite being already an AJ of the SC, continues to be counsel for the
heirs.; that he operated to fabricate the fictitious heirs; that he exerted
efforts to land the case with the Third Division.
Held: The complaint is totally unsupported by facts and evidence on record.
He did enter his appearance for Tomas and Amelia but he withdrew as
counsel in 1968. His involvement ceased long before his appointment to
this Court in 1986. Besides, prior to the appointment of J. Fernan, the
consolidated petitions had been assigned to the ponente J. Gutierrez in the
First Division, which he brought with him when he transferred to Third
Division. (COINCIDENCE). Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from
participating in the deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in

Violates bicameralism and presentment. (only oversight comittee and w/o

presentment to the president)
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 (joint congressional
oversight committee for approval of IRR) should be struck down as

fact, did not take part in the resolution thereof; this was made explicit by
the annotation appearing beside his signature: "No part I appeared as
counsel for one of the parties"

which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty
service of which would amount to removal from office.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it
Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are
entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior.
What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court
Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer
either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.

There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)
(1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be
removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution).
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran
afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same
situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI
[8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI
[2], id.), and the members of the Commission on audit who are not certified
public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are
constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence

and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial
independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of
the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants
or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might
seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer
should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a
Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance
is to file impeachment proceedings.

4. In re RAUL GONZALEZ (1988) Per Curiam

Facts: There was Indorsement from Special Prosecutor Gonzalez to Justice
Fernan a letter-complaint from concerned employees of SC with telegram
of Cuenco, for comment. The anonymous letter referred to charges for
disbarment vrought by Cuenco against J. Fernan asking him to do
something about this. The second attachment is a telegram of Cuenco
addressed to Gonzalez referring to pleadings he filed with the Court then
encouraging the latter to file pleading to comply with the Petition of
Concerned Employees of SC. SC referred Gonzales to its previous decision.

5. FRANCISCO JR v HOUSE of REPRESENTIVES (2003)

Facts:

Held: It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here

involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following
terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him
and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence

SECTION 3 Article XI
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a

majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.

same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

The 12th Congress House Rules on Impeachment.

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases
where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or
a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding
of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed
or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members
of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time
of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.

Thus the petitions against HoR assailing constitutionality of the Second

Impeachment complaint.
Speaker De Venecia by special appearance asserted that the Court had no
jurisdiction to hear much less prohibit the House from the performance of
the constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment proceedings.
Issues:
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance
with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into
the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which

directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The
complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003

Held: In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional

organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"but voted to dismiss the

Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and

17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5)
of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term
"initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is
the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on
it.

6. GUTIERREZ v HoR (2011) J. Carpio Morales

Facts: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010
or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo
Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao filed an impeachment
complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Representatives Bagao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the
impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr (Reyes group)
filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner. On even date, the
House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. Speaker Belmonte who, by
Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.

The sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,

Commissioner Florenz Regalado agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to
file," which he as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the
act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1,
2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile,
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress
was published on September 2, 2010. After hearing, public respondent, by
Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both
allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.

Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus
of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists
of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint
and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one
year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.

The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent

two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke

judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted

prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that
only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.

The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to OMB Visayas office and then

installed an OIC. Ombudsman directed an investigation on the matter. The
Committee of Peers(COP) initially recommended that the investigation be
converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this
recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful study, and
following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the
Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through
impeachment.

Held: Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco states that the term

"initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial
action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the

complaint as criminal and administrative cases. (RA 3019, anti-sexual
harassment act, dishonesty, grave misconduct, etc)

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment

complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of
a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick.
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can
no longer rekindle the candle.
Dismissed.

The complainants filed a Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive

Suspension, claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica
was charged warranted removal from office, the evidence against him was
strong, among others.
Mojica went to CA asking for TRO and asserting among others that he is an
impeachable official. CA ordered status quo but still on June 19, 2000, the
COP directed Mojica to answer a different set of charges. OMB pointed out
that the writ of prelim injunction does not apply here and that Mojicas term
of office had already expired and he could no longer invoke his alleged
immunity from suit.
The appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations thereon, and the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate
that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, it was
nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Courts
past rulings.

7. OMBUDSMAN v CA (2005) J Chico-Nazario

Facts: On 29 December 1999, twenty-two officials and employees of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two
directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed
the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2. Mulcting money from confidential ; and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits
of OMB-Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for
release.

In Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, the Court, citing

its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto, dismissed, in a minute resolution, the
complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent Mojica in
his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, stating that:
Anent the complaint for disbarment against Mojica in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer
whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office
held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with
disbarment during his membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, [1988];

Cuenco vs. Fernan, [1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs.
Desierto (1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be
removed from office via impeachment before they may be held to answer
for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in
disbarment proceedings.

Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with

Bagong Buhay Publishing Company.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for
lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution.
After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled
that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. According
to the court, while PPSB is a subsidiary of Phil. Postal Corp., which is a
GOC, the same is not created by a special law but under Corporation Code
and formed primarily for business.

Held: Based on the reading of the records of the Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that the Ombudsmanwho may be removed only by
means of impeachment refers only to one man and not his deputies.
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable
officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and
his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter dictum, that as
with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also
constitutionally required to be members of the bar.

OSP in this petition argues that PPSB is a GOCC as defined in

Administrative Code of 87.
Held: Section 2(13) of EO 2926 (Adm Code) defines government-owned or
controlled corporations as follows:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined Unless the specific words of the text or the
context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination

of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point.
Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we
likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.

(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the government directly or indirectly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock: provided,
that government owned or controlled corporations maybe further
categorized by the department of the budget, the civil service commission
and the commission on audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge
of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to
such corporations.

8. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN (2005) J Corona

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the
provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative position in this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Efren L. Alas
contends otherwise, together with the respondent court.

From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a GOCC, and organized and
incorporated under the CC as a subsidiary of the PHILPOST. More than
99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government
while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were
themselves officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly
sanctioned by Section 32 of the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of,
among others, "to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit
of savings among the general public, especially the youth and the

Facts: Tthe Office of the Ombudsman filed with Sandiganbayan two

separate informations for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on November 17, 1999 against Efren
L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising
contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief

marginalized sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal service

by "receiving collections and making payments, including postal money
orders.

Issue: Whether or not the general power of the Civil Service Commission to
administer civil service cannot validly curtail the specific discretionary
power of appointment including the grant of security of tenure by the Office
of the Ombudsman

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from that of

the CSC, which embraces inter alia, GOCCs with original charters. The
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Article XIII, Section 5 of
the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation, thus:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense committed by
public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law.
Granted.

Held: Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987

provides persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential
appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer
III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as
provided in Article IX of the Constitution.
To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the
CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility
before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either
in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in
violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not
occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

9. OMBUDSMAN v CSC (2005) J. Carpio Morales

To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the
Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES
or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it
would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in
the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a
position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code.

It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes
the CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except
those specified therein, its authority is limited "only to [determine] whether
or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate
eligibility, nothing else. "It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES
or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft
Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification
Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant
the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent
effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear
encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as
appointing authority. It goes without saying that the status of the
appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE
eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003,
should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

Facts: Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus,
Jr., were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the
appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of
tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive Service (CES). The
Ombudsman requested to the CSC for the change of status from temporary
to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus,
emphasizing that since the Office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the
Career Executive Service Board, security of tenure can be granted despite
the absence of CES eligibility. CSC changed the status of Carandangs and
Clementes appointments to permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on
the ground that he "has not met the eligibility requirements. Hence, this
petition for ceritiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman seeking to
nullify the CSC Resolution.

10. GONZALES III v OP (2012) J. Perlas-Bernabe

Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional

grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the
President dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a
finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.

Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the Incident

Investigation and Review Committee IIRC eventually identified petitioner
Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the
IIRC made the following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed
rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross,
considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.

The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The second case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside (1) the Order requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or
omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea
Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos
F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,
both issued by the Office of the President, the administrative case initiated
against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether or not the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
Held: Yes. Congress passed Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of
1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full
administrative disciplinary power over public officials and employees. But
while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. Thus:
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman, and after due process.

On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio

Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman.
On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the
foregoing Decision, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the
pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review
and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis
L. Garcia, who released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for appropriate
action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn,
signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27,
2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010,
petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final
approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23,
2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions

in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the
executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of
such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be

observance of due process. Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

involved and the Payees, the six (6) amended informations filed by Special
Prosecutor Officer III Roger C. Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations, viz:
That on or about November 1985, the accused, CDR. Rodolfo Guanzon,
being then the Procurement Officer, Philippine Navy, LCDR. George Uy,
being then the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Comptrollership and Lt. Teddy
O. Pan, being then the Naval Group Inspector, Philippine Navy, all
committing the offense in relation to their office, through evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to the Government, and
in the exercise of their separate official functions, to wit: accused Guanzon
initiated/prepared the Abstract of Canvass and Recommendation of Awards,
Certificate of Emergency Purchase and Reasonableness of Price, signed the
PO, DV, validated PO No. . . ., accused Uy signed the DV in behalf of the
Assistant Chief of Naval Comptrollership, accused Pan as N6 conducted the
pre-audit and affixed his signature on the same P.O., the Sales Invoice and
Technical Inspection Report which documents said accused had the duty
to check/verify/examined, thereby "acting or omitting to act" in a situation
where there is a duty to act, in that only 100 seal rings were ordered at a
unit price of P98.70, yet 1,000 pieces appear to have been sold with total
price of P98,700.00, hence there was gross error in multiplication as shown
on the face of the aforesaid PO and other supporting documents, resulting to
an overpayment of P88,930.00 to . . ., thereby depriving the
Government/Philippine Navy of the use thereof until its remittance/return to
the Government/Philippine Navy by . . . in December, 1991.

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable

for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short
of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust,
tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and
gross exercise of discretionary powers.
However, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of
dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty
or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence,
the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public
trust.
11. UY v SANDIGANBAYAN (1999) J. Pardo
Facts: Petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was
designated by his immediate supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez,
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership, to act on the latter's
behalf, during his absence, on matters relating to the activities of the Fiscal
Control Branch, O/N6.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that
it is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try
petitioner.

On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of

official documents and one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused.

Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused.

Held: Sec.1 of R. A. No. 7055 (w/c took effect on July 13, 1991) reads:
Sec. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons
subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal law, or local government
ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims,
or offended parties which may be natural or judicial persons, shall be tried
by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the

Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration the Special Prosecutor

issued an Order dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more names
from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution, and recommending
that six (6) separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019,
as amended, be filed against the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and
LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in the Purchase Order numbers

10

offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the

Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
courts.

It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain

jurisdiction over petitioner's case since the offense for which he is charged
is "service-connected." The second paragraph of Section 1 of R. A. No.
7055 limits the nature of "service-connected crimes or offenses" to those
defined only in Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and 95 to 97 of Commonwealth
Act No. 408 as amended.

They argue that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in
said Section 1 and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the
alleged commission of the offense for which petitioner is charged with is
"service-connected ."

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers
only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at

the time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law .

UY v SANDIGANBAYAN (2001) J. Puno

Republic Act No. 8249 the latest amendment to P. D. 1606 creating the
Sandiganbayan provides the prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
xxxxxxxxx
(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;

This is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and
resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving
public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as
well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and
Section 11 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 89). Section 15 vests the
Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter's supervision
and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the
offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua
non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case.
In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e)
of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of
the Sandiganbayan Law, his position as Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.)
of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains and all officer of
higher rank" as prescribed. Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement
stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the
regular courts. Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has
jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of

11

any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be

illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal
act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any
crime committed by a public officer or employee.

Held: Petition lacks merit. A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the

Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original
passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a preexisting one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative
intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in
Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date
of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.

The Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution
dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial
powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no

declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine
long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an
erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in
the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been
held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial
processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the
Information against petitioner.

12. CASTRO v DELORIA (2009) J. Austria-Martinez

Facts: On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman
before the Regional Trial Court Guimaras, with Malversation of Public
Funds. The accused is a Revenue Officer of BIR in Guimaras who
allegedly misappropriated more than 500k worth of her collections/
accountabilities.

13 DOJ v LIWAG (2005) J. Azcuna

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued
that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon
which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,
petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary
grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.

Facts: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on
January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M.
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials
of the PNP, and several private individuals. The Ombudsman found the
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus
required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the
charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counteraffidavits and prayed that the charges (kidnapping, murder)against them be
dismissed. Ong executed similar statements before the NBI.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the
Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the
Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Courts
ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court
dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made
applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional
provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to

Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the witnesses sworn
statements. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested that
the DOJ should dismiss the complaint filed by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts
against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to
the Courts ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has primary

12

jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in

the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such
as private respondents.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting
the Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation
against Lacson and Aquino.

The Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the Constitution to serve

as the principal and primary complaints and action center for the
aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this
purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to
prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against
a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government
agencies and public servants based on reports in the media and those which
come to his attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of
filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and
inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient
information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The
ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public
agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint
acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis other prosecutors, the
exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is
given preference over other bodies.

Issue: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary

investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint
involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
Held: The Administrative Code described the functions of the DoJ which
includes investigation of crimes and prosecution of offenders. Furthermore
PD 1275 created the National Prosecution Service which is placed under the
supervision and control of the SoJ.
Lacson claims that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases
filed aginst them to the exclusion of any other agency. They rely on the
doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials. They
likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already
taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are
already pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused,
facts and circumstances.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct

preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised
Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power
and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints
specifically directed against public officers and employees. The Office of
the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional
independence granted to the Ombudsman.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would
not promote an orderly administration of justice. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. When one is hailed before an investigative body on
specific charges, the very act of filing for preliminary investigation
immediately exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation
and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before
two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases;

13

who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency
or body where the same complaint was filed. There is yet another
undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two
bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure
of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of
Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.

required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
A thorough review of the records showed that the subject affidavits of Beck
and Terencio (facilitator) were not even identified by the respective
affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident
Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear during
the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements
despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently
dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge
against the petitioner "was not supported by any evidence". Hence, Beck's
affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner
in the first instance.

14. TAPIADOR v OMBUDSMAN (2002) J. De Leon Jr.

Facts: Walter Beck a U.S. citizen filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
angainst Renato Tapiador, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Special
Investigator. The complaint alleged that Tapiador demanded and received
from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos in exchange for the
issuance of an alien certificate of registration which was subsequently
withheld deliberately by the petitioner, unless the latter pay an additional
amount of Seven Thousand Pesos.

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said
amount directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually
received the same, but he did not. This significant omission in his affidavit
is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of the petitioner.

After investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found

the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules and regulations
as well as penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and
administrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Upon review of the
case, the criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of
evidence; however, the Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave
misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the
penalty of dismissal from the government service. Tapiador filed petition
for review with SC.

The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to

prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively
liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the
petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position
in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the
public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In

Lieu of Comment on February 20, 1998
which essentially recommended that the petitioner be exonerated from the
subject administrative charge on the ground that the assailed resolution of
the Ombudsman was rendered in violation of procedural due process and
that it was not supported by substantial evidence.

15. LEDESMA v CA (2005) J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts: Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First
Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto
Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two
foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving,

by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is

14

TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities. As a result, the FIIB, as

nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint .

interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over

immigration matters.

In the resolution of the administrative cases, Atty Ledesma was

recommended to be suspended for 1 year for conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service. In the meantime, respondent Ombudsman approved a
Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica,
dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of
evidence.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that
emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its
investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case

alleging that the Board of Commission which reviews all applications for
TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued
that it effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in
order and waived any infirmity thereon.

Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning;
that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than
one having any binding effect.

Issue: Wether or not Ombudsmans findings are merely recommendatory.

For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue
that the word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase
"and ensure compliance therewith".

Held: In his attempt to escape liability, he undermines his position in the

BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But it appears
that the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its
supporting documents, but more importantly, it interviews the applicants
and evaluates their papers before making a recommendation to the BOC.
The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, it
executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the
regularity and propriety of the applications. Petitioner being the Chairman
of the First Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings.
Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in the
TRV extension applications are so patently clear on its face.

We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons

militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point
of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present
substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The
statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best,
merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation,
is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination.

Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner questions the Court of
Appeals pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman "may not be
said to be merely recommendatory" upon the Immigration Commissioner.
He argues that to uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the authority
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs
counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, particularly Tapiador v.
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner submits that the Ombudsmans
findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect

The proviso which qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee -that the refusal, without just
cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is
a strong indication that the Ombudsmans "recommendation" is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
16. ESTARIJA v RANADA (2006) J. Quisumbing

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Facts: On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the

Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied
Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against
petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.

Issue: WoN the Ombudsman Act of 89 is unconstitutional and the

Ombudsman does not have any constitutional direct and immediate power,
authority to remove, suspend, demote, etc govt officials.

The complaint alleged that Estarija who issues berthing permits for docking
in Davao Port had been demanding monies for issuance of permits. On
August 6, with the NBI, Estarija was caught in an entrapment operation.

Second, same as in Ledesma v CA, RA 6670 is consistent with the intent of

the framers of the Constitution. The Constitution does not restrict the
powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, but
allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically
Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and
the Judiciary.34 To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to
render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective.
Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary.

Held: First, there was valid entrapment and conclusive substantial evidence
in support of his dismissal.

Ombudsman ordered his suspension and filed a criminal case with the RTC
Davao for violation of RA 3019. On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman
rendered a decision8 in the administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct dismissing him from service.
Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman
did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials,
whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He
maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans
administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional
powers that are not provided for in the Constitution.

17 OMBUDSMAN v VALERA (2005) J. Callejo Sr

Facts:

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