Mondano v.

Silvosa
Facts: Mosende filed a complaint against Mondano, mayor of the municipality of Mainit,
province of Surigao with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of
(1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting
with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant
Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared
before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of
the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the
provincial governor issued AO 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the
Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his
objection. The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against
him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect. On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for was issued after filing and approval of a bond for P500.
Issue: WON the provincial governor may issue an order of suspension.
Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has
been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the
power of general supervision as may be provided by law.
The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of
the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided
by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local governments" is to
be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of
the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or
difference between the power of control and that of supervision.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and
specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving

moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the
officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." 3
Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
Lacson vs. Roque: the power of the President to remove officials from office as
provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done
"conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he
"may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the
Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal
must be exercised conformably to law.
In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary
requested immediate investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint
indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by the
provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the
Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to
investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive,
but the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for
in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges
preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated
or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and
concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do
they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form
of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the
provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must
precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial
board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn
complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of concubinage
cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse.4 The
charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of
Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
Alvarez v. Guingona
Facts: HB 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the HoR,
subsequently passed by the HoR, and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817,
SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to
and signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July
13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue: Constitutionality of RA 7720. SC: YES, petition denied, presumption of
constitutionality, no clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti.

WON Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) must be included in determining the

average annual income for purposes of conversion.YES
For a municipality to be converted into an independent component city, its
average annual income for the last two consecutive years (at that time, based on
1991 constant prices) must be at least 20M. Petitioners contend that the IRAs
must be deducted from the municipalitys income because they are not income
but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the NG and that they fluctuate depending
on different factors.
The court in its discussion of what an LGU is said that:
a it is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.
b It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended,
however, to be an imperium in imperio
c It is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
Since the LGU is given broadened powers and increased responsibilities, it now
operates on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more
expenses. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is
accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its
powers and effectively carry out its functions.
Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every LG unit of
(1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be
allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal
revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within
its territorial boundaries.
The court held that the IRAs were properly included because they are items of
income and form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the LG unit. They thus constitute income which the
LG can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
LGC, Sec 450 (c): "the average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income."
DOF Order 35-93: ANNUAL INCOME: revenues and receipts realized by provinces,
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including
the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Secs 284, 290 and
291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national
aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others.

WON considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA
7720 can be said to have originated in the HoR. YES
Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the HoR.
Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate,
it cannot be said to have originated in the HoR.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr
1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec,
and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of
local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as
the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the HoR, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of
local application should originate in the HoR, for as long as the Senate does not
act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Tolentino v. SoF: what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the HoR on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill.
Basco v. PAGCOR
Facts: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. To attain
its objectives (centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games
of chance, generate additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic project, expand
tourism, minimize evils prevalent in conduct and operation of gambling clubs) PAGCOR is
given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all
laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are
accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
Issues:
1 WON PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes
and legal fees. NO
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right
to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it." Its "power to tax"
therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which has
the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers." Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGs. And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of LGs to regulate gambling thru the grant
of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested
exclusively on the NG. Only the NG has the power to issue "licenses or permits"
for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license
fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer
vested in the City of Manila.
LGs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the NG. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares
of stocks are owned by the NG. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II,
PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate
and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it
in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt
from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere LG.

 The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or

in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.-->
"supremacy" of the NG over LGs.
Holmes: absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way
(taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of
what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise
using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"
2

WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by PD 1869. NO.
Art x Sec 5, Consti: Each LG unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the LG.
power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is subject to "limitations" which Congress
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause"
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of LGs to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of
local autonomy.
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make LGs sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio."
LG: political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, LGs can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an
imperium in imperio. LG in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government.

Vilas v. City of Manila

Facts: Vilas, Trigas, and aguado are creditors of Manila as it existed before the cession of the
Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them, under its present
charter from the Government of the PI is the same juristic person and liable upon the
obligations of the old city. PI SC: different entity.
Issue: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a reincorporation of
the city, present municipality liable for obligations of old city. YES
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old
city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of purpose
between Sp and Am charters and substantial identity of municipal powers, area,
and inhabitants.
Argument against liability: ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporation entity
created by the Sp government . when the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality,
ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent, death of
principal=death of agent
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations:
1 Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state
2 Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. Stands for the
community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of
the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred
In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason
for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military
occupation or territorial cession.

 McKinleys instruction: relinquishment or cessioncannot in any respect impair

the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property
of all kinds
Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were safeguarded. The
cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal
entity survived both military occupation and cession. The corporate identity and
liability of the city was not extinguished.
TVA: entitled to proceed to judgment.