G.R. No.

193960

January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, 1 Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in
the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13,
20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal
Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioners Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the
complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262. 4
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence,
RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had
lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible
for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioners motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior

dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against
women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered
by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the

offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm
was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical
harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to
purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such
as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to
amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged
defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.
1wphi1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are
AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is
directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161090

July 4, 2012

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO

PLOPENIO,Petitioners,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 161092
EDUARDO LL. PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO PLOPENIO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
In these consolidated Rule 45 Petitions, we rule on the proper mode of appeal from the decision of a
Regional Trial Court (RTC) designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
In G.R. No. 161090, petitioner-spouses Romeo Ll. Plopenio and Rosielinda Plopenio assail the
Decision1 and Order2 of the SAC-RTC Branch 23, Naga City, in Civil Case No. 2003-007.
In G.R. No. 161092, petitioner Eduardo Ll. Plopenio (Eduardo) questions the Decision 3 and Order4 of
the same court in Civil Case No. 2003-004.
THE FACTS
Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, while
petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same locality. In 2000, the land of
their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was valued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at P51,125.60 per hectare in DARAB
Case No. V-LV-040-CS-00. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.5
On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication
valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at
P23,485.00 per hectare6 and that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare. 7 Dissatisfied with
Land Banks offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter
to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary administrative
proceedings.8
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5 September 2002, a
copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002. 9
On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. 10 The
PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21
December 2002.11
Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after
their receipt of the PARADs Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15

days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day
fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January
2003.12
In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality after
the lapse of the 15-day period, counted from petitioners receipt of the PARADs Decision. Thus, it
argued that the SAC-RTC should no longer entertain the Petitions. 13
In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained
finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. The lower court thus dismissed the
appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing this court finds merit in [respondent Land Banks] special and
affirmative defense, that the filing of these petitions is now barred by prior final and executory
judgment hence wanting of a valid cause of action.
The petitions therefore are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of valid cause of action.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the SAC-RTCs Decision, but their motions were denied for
lack of merit.15
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for
Review directly before this Court. On 24 July 2006, we resolved to consolidate the cases at bar,
considering that the factual milieu and legal issues involved in both cases are similar in nature.
THE COURTS RULING
At the outset, we rule that the consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible because petitioners
resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this Court.
Section 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides:
Section 60. Appeals. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by
filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of
the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the
DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, following the letter of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, petitioners should have
appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners propose to carve out an exception to this rule by arguing that because the instant
Petitions raise only pure questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is via a Rule 45 Petition to this
Court.16

We do not agree. While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions
of RTCs are taken to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courtsdesignated as SACs
are only appealable to the Court of Appeals.
We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right
must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing
its exercise.17 The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof.
That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without
making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with
questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal from decisions of
the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review 18 to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as
to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Furthermore, even if we were to allow the appeals to prosper, we find that the Petitions before the
SAC-RTC were filed out of time.
Under the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (1994 DARAB Rules), which were effective during the
pendency of this case before the PARAD, the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and on
the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall be brought directly to the SAC
within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.19 Parties aggrieved by the adjudicators decision are
allowed to file one motion for reconsideration. 20
In the event of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, the 1994 DARAB Rules provide:
SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period
within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall
have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party
shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his
appeal. 21
While a petition for the fixing of just compensation filed with the RTC-SAC is not an appeal from the
PARADs decision, but an original action before the court a quo,22 the rule in Section 12 of the 1994
DARAB Rules should find analogous application. A party aggrieved by the PARADs decision is
given 15 days to file the original petition before the SAC-RTC. The pendency of a motion for
reconsideration of the decision suspends the running of the period within which the petition may be
filed before the RTC-SAC. Consequently, upon receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration, the reglementary period for filing the petition before the
RTC-SAC again commences to run.
In this case, petitioners received a copy of the PAIZAD Decision on 27 September 2002.

23

They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on 11 October 2002, or 14 days from their receipt
of a copy of the Decision. 24 On 21 December 2002, they received the Order denying their
motion. 25 Hence, petitioners only had one more day within which to file their Petitions with the SACRTC for the determination of just compensation for their respective properties. Since 22 December
2002 tell on a Sunday, they had until 23 December 2002 to file their Petitions. However, they only
filed their Petitions on 6 January 2001, or 16 days after they received the Order denying their Motion
for Reconsideration. Clea1ly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.

From the foregoing discussion, \W therefore find that the instant Petitions should be denied.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for Review are hereby DENIED,
and the assailed Decisions and Orders of the Special Agrarian Court-Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and 2003-2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167304

August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal
Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at
the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in
the amount ofP71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the
Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995,
or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As
such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMBVisayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation
of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon
review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information 3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante
of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND
NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office,
for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate

intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice
of the government in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the
said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated
November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated
September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent
Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which
at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the
process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who
was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused
holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of
settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established
during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante
since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to
the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against
Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED
IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE
FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the
former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner,
Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the

offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment 8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law
was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the
exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that
the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary
grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies
other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a
position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction
over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision 9 of this Court where it was
held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be
fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by,
any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
1avvphi1

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in
Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section
4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this
Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this
Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
at all times accountable to the people. 13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsodunder Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A.
No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about
December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where
it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in
this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No.
8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads;
officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and
air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and

prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her
office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically
including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials
enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the
Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are
the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration,
jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under
Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general
qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the
proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade
'26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section
89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is
not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the
instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under
Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid
section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with
salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the
accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
1avvphi1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of
the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the
Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said
case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition
on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses

involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are
those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in
relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it
was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x
x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner
herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged
petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter
had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing" and that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege
speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during
said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense
was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to
extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could

assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand,
and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office
on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the
offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough
that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees'
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office,
this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of
the term "offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle laid down
in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized
in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an
offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if "the offense cannot
exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x 20
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, let the case beREMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183137

April 10, 2013

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K.

LOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

The principal issue in this case is the scope of authority of a province to impose an amusement tax.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
December 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court,- Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet in Civil
Case No. 06-CV-2232 be reversed and set aside and a new one issued in which: ( 1) respondent
Province of Benguet is declared as having no authority to levy amusement taxes on admission fees
for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, tourist spots, and other places for recreation;
(2) Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 is declared null and void;
and (3) the respondent Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 59,
Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005.
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for
recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. It is located at Asin,
Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet.
On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax
Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance").
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross
receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."
Specifically, it provides the following:
Article Ten: Amusement Tax on Admission
Section 59. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied a tax to be collected from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, cockpits, dancing halls, dancing
schools, night or day clubs, and other places of amusement at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the
gross receipts from admission fees; and
A tax of ten percent (10%) of gross receipts from admission fees for boxing, resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is likewise levied. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
Section 162 of the Tax Ordinance provided that the Tax Ordinance shall take effect on January 1,
2006.
It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement tax on gross
receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots
is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of Benguet. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the
Secretary of Justice on January 27, 2006.
The appeal/petition was filed within the thirty (30)-day period from the effectivity of a tax ordinance
allowed by Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
(LGC).1 The appeal/petition was docketed as MSO-OSJ Case No. 03-2006.
Under Section 187 of the LGC, the Secretary of Justice has sixty (60) days from receipt of the
appeal to render a decision. After the lapse of which, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Treating the Secretary of Justice's failure to decide on its appeal/petition within the sixty (60) days
provided by Section 187 of the LGC as an implied denial of such appeal/petition, Pelizloy filed a

Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232.
Pelizloy argued that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance imposed a percentage tax in violation
of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units (LGUs) under Section 133 (i) of the
LGC. Thus, it was null and void ab initio. Section 133 (i) of the LGC provides:
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on
goods or services except as otherwise provided herein
The Province of Benguet assailed the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction as an improper
remedy. It alleged that once a tax liability has attached, the only remedy of a taxpayer is to pay the
tax and to sue for recovery after exhausting administrative remedies. 2
On substantive grounds, the Province of Benguet argued that the phrase other places of
amusement in Section 140 (a) of the LGC3 encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots since "Article 220 (b) (sic)" of the LGC defines "amusement" as
"pleasurable diversion and entertainment x x x synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or
fun."4 However, the Province of Benguet erroneously cited Section 220 (b) of the LGC. Section 220
of the LGC refers to valuation of real property for real estate tax purposes. Section 131 (b) of the
LGC, the provision which actually defines "amusement", states:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:
xxx
(b) "Amusement" is a pleasurable diversion and entertainment. It is synonymous to relaxation,
avocation, pastime, or fun On December 10, 2007, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision
dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit.
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. On the validity of Section
59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance, the RTC noted that, while Section 59, Article X imposes a
percentage tax, Section 133 (i) of the LGC itself allowed for exceptions. It noted that what the LGC
prohibits is not the imposition by LGUs of percentage taxes in general but the "imposition and levy of
percentage tax on sales, barters, etc., on goods and services only." 5 It further gave credence to the
Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots are encompassed by the phrase other places of amusement in Section 140 of the LGC.
On May 21, 2008, the RTC denied Pelizloys Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10, 2008 on pure questions of law. It assailed
the legality of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as being a (supposedly) prohibited
percentage tax per Section 133 (i) of the LGC.

In its Comment, the Province of Benguet, erroneously citing Section 40 of the LGC, argued that
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance does not levy a percentage tax "because the imposition is
not based on the total gross receipts of services of the petitioner but solely and actually limited on
the gross receipts of the admission fees collected." 6 In addition, it argued that provinces can validly
impose amusement taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots,
these being amusement places.
For resolution in this petition are the following issues:
1. Whether or not Section 59, Article X of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise
known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005, levies a percentage tax.
2. Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees
to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being
"amusement places" under the Local Government Code.
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty," 7 and as such, inheres in the State. Such, however,
is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they are not the sovereign; 8 rather,
they are mere "territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines". 9
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, muncipalities and barangays is summarized
in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:10
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the
municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in the interpretation of
the taxing power of a municipal corporation. 11 [Underscoring supplied]
Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is delegated to it
either by the Constitution or by statute. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution is clear on this
point:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments. [Underscoring supplied]
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other
charges."12 Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide".13
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 14 Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local
taxation and fiscal matters.
Relevant provisions of Book II of the LGC establish the parameters of the taxing powers of LGUS
found below.

First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of
LGUs:
1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;
b. be levied and collected only for public purposes;
c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of
trade.
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to
any private person.
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the
benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other
imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC.
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Specifically,
Section 133 (i) prohibits the levy by LGUs of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters
or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided by the LGC.
As it is Pelizloys contention that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levies a prohibited
percentage tax, it is crucial to understand first the concept of a percentage tax.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Citytrust Investment Phils. Inc.,15 the Supreme Court defined
percentage tax as a "tax measured by a certain percentage of the gross selling price or gross value
in money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings derived by any
person engaged in the sale of services." Also, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in Section 125, Title V,16 lists amusement taxes as among
the (other) percentage taxes which are levied regardless of whether or not a taxpayer is already
liable to pay value-added tax (VAT).
Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the gross receipts incurred by certain
specified establishments.
Thus, applying the definition in CIR v. Citytrust and drawing from the treatment of amusement taxes
by the NIRC, amusement taxes are percentage taxes as correctly argued by Pelizloy.
However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a
form of percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of the LGC prohibits the levy of percentage taxes "except
as otherwise provided" by the LGC.
Section 140 of the LGC provides:

SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from
the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia,
and other places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts
from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their
proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the gross
receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of
the cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting and art exhibitions, flower
shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop, rock, or similar
concerts shall be exempt from the payment of the tax herein imposed.
(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner, terms and conditions for
the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
may impose such surcharges, interests and penalties.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared equally by the province and the
municipality where such amusement places are located. [Underscoring supplied]
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in Section 133 (i).
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and
other places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those
places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus,
the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase other places of
amusement encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned." 17
The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National Power Corporation
v. Angas18as follows:
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words,
by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is
embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on
the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted
sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only
general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400]. 19
In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals, 20 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
interpret a starkly similar provision or the counterpart provision of Section 140 of the LGC in the
Local Tax Code then in effect. Petitioner Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) contended that it
was subject to the imposition by LGUs of amusement taxes (as opposed to amusement taxes

imposed by the national government). In support of its contentions, it cited Section 13 of

Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, (which is analogous
to Section 140 of the LGC) providing the following:
1wphi1

Section 13. Amusement tax on admission. - The province shall impose a tax on admission to be
collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls,
circuses and other places of amusement xxx.
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court rejected PBA's assertions and noted
that:
In determining the meaning of the phrase 'other places of amusement', one must refer to the prior
enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their
common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of
entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. 21 [Underscoring supplied]
However, even as the phrase other places of amusement was already clarified in Philippine
Basketball Association, Section 140 of the LGC adds to the enumeration of 'places of amusement'
which may properly be subject to amusement tax. Section 140 specifically mentions 'boxing stadia'
in addition to "theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses" which were already mentioned
in PD No. 231. Also, 'artistic expression' as a characteristic does not pertain to 'boxing stadia'.
In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory construction.
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition of amusement places:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:
xxx
(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances [Underscoring supplied]
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common
typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the
holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an
audience. Accordingly, other places of amusement must be interpreted in light of the typifying
characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing
the show or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows,
exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22 show means "a spectacle or display of
something, typically an impressive one";23 while performance means "an act of staging or presenting
a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment."24 As such, the ordinary definitions of the words
show and performance denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things)
but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to,
and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by

seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people
are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively
display, stage or present shows and/or performances.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same
category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the other places of amusement contemplated by Section 140 of
the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.
At this juncture, it is helpful to recall this Courts pronouncements in Icard:
The power to tax when granted to a province is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the province.
Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in the interpretation of the taxing
power of a province.25
In this case, the definition of' amusement places' in Section 131 (c) of the LGC is a clear basis for
determining what constitutes the 'other places of amusement' which may properly be subject to
amusement tax impositions by provinces. There is no reason for going beyond such basis. To do
otherwise would be to countenance an arbitrary interpretation/application of a tax law and to inflict an
injustice on unassuming taxpayers.
The previous pronouncements notwithstanding, it will be noted that it is only the second paragraph
of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance which imposes amusement taxes on "resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots". The first paragraph of Section 59,
Article X of the Tax Ordinance refers to "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, cockpits, dancing
halls, dancing schools, night or day clubs, and other places of amusement". In any case, the issues
raised by Pelizloy are pertinent only with respect to the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance. Thus, there is no reason to invalidate the first paragraph of Section 59, Article X
of the Tax Ordinance. Any declaration as to the Province of Benguet's lack of authority to levy
amusement taxes must be limited to admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs and tourist spots.
1wphi1

Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance is not limited to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots but also covers admission fees
for boxing. As Section 140 of the LGC allows for the imposition of amusement taxes on gross
receipts from admission fees to boxing stadia, Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance must be
sustained with respect to admission fees from boxing stadia.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section
59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005, in so far as it imposes amusement
taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is
declared null and void. Respondent Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing the
second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with
respect to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155344

January 20, 2004

ROLANDO N. CANET, Petitioner,

vs.
MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049,
Series of 1998,1authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit
in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur.
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, entitled "An
Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the
Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions
Thereof."2 Upon transmittal to respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena of the said municipality, it was
noted that the Ordinance does not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting and other related
game fowl activities and a separability clause. The Ordinance was returned to the Sangguniang
Bayan. In Resolution No. 078, Series of 1999, Sangguniang Bayan resolved to withdraw, set aside
and shelf indefinitely Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999. 3
Meanwhile, petitioner, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang
Bayan, filed an application for a mayors permit to operate, establish and maintain a cockpit in Sitio
Cabuya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. Respondent Mayor Julieta Decena denied the
application on the ground, among others, that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the
authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the
regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang
Bayan.4
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same.
On July 26, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint 5 against respondent Mayor with the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI, which was docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-84-99,
for Mandamus and Damages with Application for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Respondent
moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
A Resolution was issued by the trial court on January 27, 2000, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. Let a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issue upon the posting of an injunction bond by the plaintiff in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) executed to defendant to stand for all the
damages which she may sustain if it should be finally found that plaintiff is not entitled thereto, said
mandatory injunction ordering and commanding herein defendant, incumbent Mayor of the
Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur to approve and issue forthwith the Mayors Permit and to accept
the fees therefor for plaintiff to establish, maintain and operate a cockpit in Cabaya, San Roque,
Bula, Camarines Sur. Upon finality of this resolution, let the main case be set for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.6

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on February 1, 2000. 7

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 57797.8 On April 3, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order,9 directing petitioner and the presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on February 1, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. P-8499.
On June 3, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the questioned January 27, 2000 Resolution and
February 1, 2000 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court
on July 10, 2000 is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated
August 2002.11
Hence, this petition for review.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not respondent, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can
be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance
which would empower her to do so.
The pertinent provision of law in contention is Section 447 (a) (3) (v) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160), which reads:
SEC. 447. Powers, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Bayan as the legislative
body of the municipality shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22, and
shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances levying
taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks:
Provided, That existing rights should not be prejudiced.
Petitioner admits that there is no ordinance in Bula, Camarines Sur which authorizes the grant of a
mayors permit to operate and maintain a cockfighting arena. However, he invokes Resolution No.
049, S. 1998, wherein the Sangguniang Bayan authorized him to operate a cockpit. Furthermore, he

cites Municipal Tax Ordinances Nos. 01, S. 1989, and 05, S. 1993, which generally provide for the
issuance of a mayors permit for the operation of businesses.
Municipal Tax Ordinances Nos. 01, S. 1989 and 05, S. 1993 contain general provisions for the
issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees
to be paid in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl activities.
It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 which provided for the collection of application filing fees, ocular
inspection fees, mayors permit fees, filing fees for the institution of complaints, entrance fees and
special derby assessments for the operation of cockpits. 12 This Ordinance, however, was withdrawn
by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit, Resolution No. 049, S.
1998, authorizing petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur
cannot be implemented. Suffice it to state in this regard that to compel respondent to issue the
mayors permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on respondents
administrative prerogatives.
Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied upon by petitioner objects which were neither
specifically mentioned nor enumerated would be to run afoul of the dictum that where a statute, by
its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.13 In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the
oft-repeated maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius. 14Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare
tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. 15 The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither
could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat. 16Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 17 Courts are not authorized to insert into
the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have
supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. 18
1wphi1

Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature,
nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law.19 Nor may they interpret into
the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. 20 Where a statute contains no limitations in
its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any.21 And where a provision of law expressly limits
its application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions by
interpretation.22 To do any of such things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to
invade the legislative sphere.23
It should, furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting although authorized by law is still a form of
gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and
self-reliance.24 As has been previously said, a statute which authorizes a gambling activity or
business should be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather than
expand the powers and rights claimed by franchise holders under its authority.25

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57797 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169435

February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between
municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the
carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do. 1
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain
extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that
originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute
between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the boundary
line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao." 4 By this extension of Marcos'
eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized
as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte,
united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos
Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be
derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,
Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence,
if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of
territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries
as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the present
adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a
single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and
Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14,
1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao,
was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao.
Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is
the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the
middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning
was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary,
part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years, 7 or only on
March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015. 8 Said resolution was
entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on
the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A.
No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, its
eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was
coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern

boundary should extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant
to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. 10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into
two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and
contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but
that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion 11 of Nueva
Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were
within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged
that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an
indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos
must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No.
3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should
comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios. 13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be aligned
and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based
on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos. 14 This was
the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it
hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400
hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva
Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. 17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon a
portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed
Mountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because the province,
specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by the Province
of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province.
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the light
of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the
benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)

The SP further explained:

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is
important. When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of
its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to
have this absurd situation to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This
body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code,
so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded from the
ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by
expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentioned
are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios
comprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City,
the court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio
Central as part of Davao City.
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothers
and sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich
customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Era
have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this common ancestral heritage
which unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and
citations omitted)
RTC Decision
On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision 20 of March 19, 2001.
The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its
boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.
On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of the
Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with the position of
Nueva Era.
xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753
(House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez,
2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:

EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present barrios of
Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipality
of Dingras of the same province. The seat of government will be in the sitio of San
Magro in the present barrio of Ragas.
xxxx
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected too
much because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to comply with
its obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will not be diminished nor
its operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in both the mother
and the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion
might have been different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality of
Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the
Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may be
harmonized by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review 24 of the
RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a Government
Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly
created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is separated from
Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality of
Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25
The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules
Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos,
was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.

Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its
own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the
description of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was
entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when
Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law
required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.26
In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions
of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDEinsofar as they made the eastern boundary of the
municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another
is rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the
province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMED with
respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion
of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality
of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is
only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to
extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for
equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the
Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and
Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South
by the Padsan River, which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary
between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos
and refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do. Both the
SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era and
merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it provided
that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it
would be cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be
applied. Dura lex sed lex!29

The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao;
and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao,
to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line
between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of
the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1,
which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and
Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into the provinces of KalingaApayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the
south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which
is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while KalingaApayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary
of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra. 30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA
ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from its
mother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and
north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as defined
by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claim to it to be
integrated into its territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarily
substantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by
law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may substantially
alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the
boundary of a barangay in relation to another barangaywithin the same municipality for as
long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in
dispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although
separated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. 31
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case
to it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its
pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it as
one for certiorari, to wit:

A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissing
outright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for
review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government Code provides
for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not any
further appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it
is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right of
further appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or among local
government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of the
RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional
issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special
civil action for certiorari.32
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal,
since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that "An appeal to the
Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional Trial Court,
without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petition
for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that
MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras.
That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit
(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not
Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by
Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of
Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
Our Ruling
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the
disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement. 34

The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP
judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however,
lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.
The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled
that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local
Government Code35 which provides:
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed
area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no
longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be
exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting
authority."36
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of the
transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating
the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by
law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A.
No. 7902,38vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under
Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition
for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented
by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local
government unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected. 40

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the
sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA
revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of
the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to
democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with
the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. 42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory 43 plebiscite requirement for the creation of a
local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory
should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.
However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions
and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government
unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no
plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 44 It is the basic norm that provisions
of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its
retroactive application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue, the
Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been
ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969. 47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that
created it. Its creation was already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further
require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a
prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise,

rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the
absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution. 48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in
R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and
natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. 51 The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have
been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of
the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only
Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. 54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still
contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries,
a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,

by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a
portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the
Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva
Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its
northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.
We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.
Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description
of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and
contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.
The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. 55 We thus
uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled
by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only
a particular provision thereof, should be considered. 56 Every section, provision or clause of the
statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated
by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law,
and every part of the act is to be taken into view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very
purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of
statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid
such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 59
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161081

May 10, 2005

RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental

Mindoro, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Ramon M. Atienza, in his capacity as
Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72069. The assailed
decision dismissed the petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Atienza which had sought to enjoin the implementation of the Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and
July 1, 2002 issued by Jose T. Villarosa, Governor of the same province.
The present case arose from the following undisputed facts:
Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of
the Province of Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor received the
Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor concerning the
"AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S],
INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THESANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN."
The said memorandum reads:
For proper coordination and to ensure efficient and effective local government administration
particularly on matters pertaining to supply and property management, effective immediately,
all Purchase Orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials and
equipment[s] including fuel, repairs and maintenance needed in the transaction of public
business or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project or activity of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, this province, shall be approved by the undersigned in his capacity as the
local chief executive of the province.
The provision of DILG Opinion No. 148-1993 which states that the authority to sign Purchase
Orders of supplies, materials and equipment[s] of the Sanggunian belongs to the local chief
executive, serves as basis of this memorandum.
For strict compliance.2
In reply to the above memorandum, the petitioner Vice-Governor wrote the respondent Governor
stating that:
We are of the opinion that purchase orders for supplies, materials and equipment are
included under those as authorized for signature by the Vice-chief executive of the
Sanggunian on the basis of the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed by the COA Opinions
on June 28, April 11 and February 9, 1994 and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is
no longer necessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA 7160 already provides for the
separation of powers between the executive and legislative. Such authority even include
everything necessary for the legislative research program of the Sanggunian. 3

Unimpressed, the respondent Governor issued the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 relating to the
"TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER EMPLOYEES AND
REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES." The said memorandum reads:
For faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution of laws and issuances and to
promote efficiency in the government service, effective immediately, all existing contract of
employment casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees entered
into by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza are hereby terminated for being unauthorized.
Aside from being signed by the unauthorized signatory, the following facts regarding the
appointments were considered:
1. The appointment of 28 clerks on top of existing permanent employees is a clear
manifestation of an excessive and bloated bureaucracy;
2. The appointment of an X-ray Technician detailed at the Provincial Health Office and some
clerks detailed at various offices in the province were not proper to be assigned by the ViceGovernor;
3. The appointment of 30 messengers, utility workers and drivers ran counter to COA
Opinion as cited in the letter of the undersigned dated 28 June 2002, addressed to the ViceGovernor.
However, in order to accommodate the Vice-Governor and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the undersigned, in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province,
will allow four (4) casual/job order employees to be assigned to the Vice-Governor and one
(1) casual/job order employee to be assigned to each member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
The Vice-Governor and all the Sanggunian Members are hereby directed to submit
immediately the names of their recommendees to the undersigned for immediate approval of
their respective appointments.
Please be guided accordingly.4
On July 3, 2002, the respondent Governor issued another Memorandum regarding the
"ENFORCIBILITY (sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON JUNE 20, 26 AND JULY 1,
2002." It provides that:
Please be properly advised that the Memoranda dated June 20, 26 and July 1, 2002 issued
by the undersigned regarding the issuance of permit to travel and authority to sign Purchase
Orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is to be strictly adhered to for compliance.
Likewise for strict compliance is the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 with reference to
the Cancellation of the Appointment of Casual/Job Order Employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members/Office of the Vice-Governor previously signed by Vice-Governor
Ramon M. Atienza.
Please be guided accordingly.5

In his Letter dated July 9, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor invoked the principle of separation of
powers as applied to the local government units, i.e., the respondent, as the Governor, the head of
the executive branch, and the petitioner, as the Vice-Governor, the head of the legislative branch,
which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner Vice-Governor reiterated his request for the
respondent to make a "deeper study" on the matter before implementing his memoranda. The
request, however, went unheeded as the respondent Governor insisted on obliging the department
heads of the provincial government to comply with the memoranda.
The petitioner Vice-Governor thus filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for prohibition assailing
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the respondent Governor's Memoranda dated
June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002. The petitioner Vice-Governor claimed that these memoranda
excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991, and its implementing rules and
regulations. It was prayed that the respondent Governor be enjoined from implementing the assailed
memoranda.
The appellate court, in its Decision dated November 28, 2003, dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Citing Section 3446 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the CA upheld the authority of the respondent Governor to
issue the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 as it recognized his authority to approve the purchase
orders. The said provision provides in part that "approval of the disbursement voucher by the local
chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed."
The CA explained that Section 466(a)(1)7 of the same Code, relied upon by the petitioner ViceGovernor, speaks of the authority of the Vice-Governor to sign "all warrants drawn on the public
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan." In
declaring this provision inapplicable, the CA reasoned that the approval of purchase orders is
different from the power of the Vice-Governor to sign warrants drawn against the public treasury.
Section 3618 was, likewise, held to be inapplicable ratiocinating, thus:
[R]equisitioning, which is provided under Section 361 of RA 7160, is the act of requiring that
something be furnished. In the procurement function, it is the submission of written requests
for supplies and materials and the like. It could be inferred that, in the scheme of things,
approval of purchase requests is different from approval of purchase orders. Thus, the
inapplicability of Section 361.
Anent the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002, the CA ruled that the issue on whether it could be
enjoined had already been rendered moot and academic. The CA pointed out that the subject of the
said memorandum could no longer be enjoined or restrained as the termination of the employees
had already been effected. It opined that where the act sought to be enjoined in the prohibition
proceedings had already been performed and there is nothing more to restrain, the case is already
moot and academic.
The petitioner Vice-Governor now seeks recourse to this Court alleging that the appellate court
committed reversible error in ruling that it is the Governor, and not the Vice-Governor, who has the
authority to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and
maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner Vice-Governor, likewise, takes
exception to the holding of the CA that the issue relating to the July 1, 2002 Memorandum had been
rendered moot and academic. He points out that the appointment of casual/job order employees is
exercised by the appointing authority every six months in the case of casual employees and per job
order as to job order employees. Thus, while the July 1, 2002 Memorandum had already been
implemented, what is being sought to be enjoined is the respondent Governor's continued

usurpation of the petitioner Vice-Governor's authority to appoint the employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawiganunder the pertinent provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160.
For his part, the respondent Governor maintains that his Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July
1, 2002 are valid. He asserts that the approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the
Vice-Governor to sign warrants drawn against the provincial treasury under Section 466(a)(1) of
Rep. Act No. 7160. Rather, he insists on the application of the last clause in Section 344 which
states that the approval of the disbursement by the local chief executive is required whenever local
funds are disbursed.
The respondent Governor likewise defends the validity of the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002
stating that it was issued upon finding that the petitioner Vice-Governor appointed, among others, 28
clerks on top of the existing permanent employees resulting in an excessive and bloated
bureaucracy. He concedes the appointing power of the Vice-Governor but submits that this is limited
to the employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and that he is not authorized to appoint officials
and employees of the Office of the Vice-Governor.
As correctly presented by the appellate court, the issues for resolution in this case are:
A. Who between the petitioner and the respondent is authorized to approve purchase orders
issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel,
repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
B. Does respondent Villarosa, as local chief executive, have the authority to terminate or
cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Members and the Office of the Vice-Governor? 9
Before resolving the foregoing issues, it is noted that petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa had
ceased to be the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro
effective June 30, 2004 when the newly-elected officials of the province took their oaths of offices.
The petitioner Vice-Governor did not run for re-election during the May 2004 elections while the
respondent Governor did not succeed in his re-election bid. The expiration of their terms of offices
has effectively rendered the case moot. However, even in cases where supervening events had
made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public. 10 In this case, there is
compelling reason for the Court to resolve the issues presented in order to clarify the scope of the
respective powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
To resolve the substantive issues presented in the instant case, it is well to recall that Rep. Act No.
7160 was enacted to give flesh to the constitutional mandate to "provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units." 11
In this connection, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160 are anchored on principles that give effect to
decentralization. Among these principles are: [t]here shall be an effective allocation among the
different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources;
[t]here shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic
organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service

requirements of its communities; [p]rovinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; and [e]ffective
mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents
shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership. 12
With these guideposts, the Court shall now address the issue on who between the Governor and
Vice-Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement
of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
We hold that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.
Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan13and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer.14 Being vested with legislative powers,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacts ordinances, resolutions and appropriates funds for the
general welfare of the province in accordance with the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. 15 The same
statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on
the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. 16
Further, Section 344 provides:
Sec. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers. No money shall be disbursed unless
the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made
for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local
treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be
certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative
control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and legality of the claim involved.
Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such
as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and
telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the GSIS, SSS,
LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of
the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever
local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of
the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the
officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall be fully responsible
therefor.
Reliance by the CA on the clause "approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive
himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed" of the above section (Section 344) to
rule that it is the Governor who has the authority to approve purchase orders for the supplies,
materials or equipment for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan is misplaced. This clause
cannot prevail over the more specific clause of the same provision which provides that "vouchers
and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has
administrative control of the fund concerned." The Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body. Accordingly,
it is the Vice-Governor who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On this point, Section 39 of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System for Local
Government Units, prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), is instructive:
Sec. 39. Approval of Disbursements. Approval of disbursements by the Local Chief
Executive (LCE) himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed, except for
regularly recurring administrative expenses such as: payrolls for regular or permanent
employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to
government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR, PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the
DBM and others, where the authority to approve may be delegated. Disbursement vouchers
for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the
provincial Vice Governor, the city Vice-Mayor or the municipal Vice-Mayor, as the case may
be.17
While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign
all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto
necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the
doctrine of necessary implication. This doctrine is explained, thus:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the
rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.
And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the
maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.18
Warrants are "order[s] directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay money out of funds in city
treasury which are or may become available for purpose specified to designated
person[s]."19 Warrants of a municipal corporation are generally orders payable when funds are found.
They are issued for the payment of general municipal debts and expenses subject to the rule that
they shall be paid in the order of presentation.20
The ordinary meaning of "voucher" is a document which shows that services have been performed
or expenses incurred. It covers any acquittance or receipt discharging the person or evidencing
payment by him. When used in connection with disbursement of money, it implies some instrument
that shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been made, or that
services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. 21
Purchase order, on the other hand, is "an authorization by the issuing party for the recipient to
provide materials or services for which issuing party agrees to pay; it is an offer to buy which
becomes binding when those things ordered have been provided." 22

When an authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the
entries therein, among others: that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting
documents are complete and the availability of cash therefor. Further, the person who performed the
services or delivered the supplies, materials or equipment is entitled to payment. 23 On the other
hand, the terms and conditions for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment, in particular,
are contained in a purchase order. The tenor of a purchase order basically directs the supplier to
deliver the articles enumerated and subject to the terms and conditions specified therein. 24 Hence,
the express authority to approve disbursement vouchers and, in effect, authorize the payment of
money claims for supplies, materials or equipment, necessarily includes the authority to approve
purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for
the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the purchase orders to
cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well
as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and includes the authority to
approve purchase orders for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment necessary
for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Anent the second issue, the appellate court likewise committed reversible error in holding that the
implementation of the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 had rendered the petition moot and
academic. It is recognized that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
"capable of repetition yet evading review."25 Even if the employees whose contractual or job order
employment had been terminated by the implementation of the July 1, 2002 Memorandum may no
longer be reinstated, still, similar memoranda may be issued by other local chief executives. Hence,
it behooves the Court to resolve whether the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the
appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the
Vice-Governor.
We hold that the Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority.
Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section 465 of Rep. Act No. 7160 are:
Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The
provincial governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial
governor shall:

(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or
mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint.

On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor the power to, among others:
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically
provided in this Code.
Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are
paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the
same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.
The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials and employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact that the salaries of these employees are derived from the
appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body. Indeed, the budget source of their
salaries is what sets the employees and officials of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan apart from the
other employees and officials of the province. Accordingly, the appointing power of the ViceGovernor is limited to those employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as well as those of the
Office of the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. As a corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged against
the provincial funds, even if this employee reports to the Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office,
the Governor retains the authority to appoint the said employee pursuant to Section 465(b)(v) of
Rep. Act No. 7160.
However, in this case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job order employees, whose
appointments were terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 issued by the
respondent Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said memorandum cannot be upheld because it
absolutely prohibited the respondent Vice-Governor from exercising his authority to appoint the
employees, whether regular or contractual/job order, of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganand restricted
such authority to one of recommendatory nature only.26 This clearly constituted an encroachment on
the appointment power of the respondent Vice- Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No.
7160.
At this juncture, it is well to note that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code
prior to Rep. Act No. 7160, the Governor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan:
Sec. 205. Composition. (1) Each provincial government shall have a provincial legislature
hereinafter known as the sangguniang panlalawigan, upon which shall be vested the
provincial legislative power.
(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang
panlalawigan and the kabataang barangayprovincial federation who shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines.

Sec. 206. Sessions.

(3) The governor, who shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan, shall
not be entitled to vote except in case of a tie.

With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises
different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery
of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. 27
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of Rep. Act No. 7160, explained that "the ViceGovernor is now the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The City Vice-Mayor
presides at meetings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Municipal Vice-Mayor at the sessions
of the Sangguniang Bayan. The idea is to distribute powers among elective local officials so that the
legislative, which is the Sanggunian, can properly check the executive, which is the Governor or the
Mayor and vice versa and exercise their functions without any undue interference from one by the
other."28
The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the
Governor of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 of the
respondent Governor, which effectively excluded the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing the purchase orders for the procurement of supplies,
materials or equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as from
appointing its casual and job order employees, constituted undue interference with the latter's
functions. The assailed memoranda are clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep. Act No. 7160
and their implementation should thus be permanently enjoined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002
issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.