How Chile's Socialist Government Used Cybernetics to Regulate the Economy

Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics in Allende's Chile
Author(s): Eden Medina

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Aug., 2006), pp. 571-606
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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j Lat.Amer.Stud.38, 57i-6o6 ? zoo6 CambridgeUniversityPress

doi:io.ioI7/SoozzzI6Xo6ooI 179 Printedin the United Kingdom
571
Designing Freedom, Regulating

a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics
in Allende's Chile*
EDEN
MEDINA
Abstract. This article presents a history of 'Project Cybersyn', an early computer

network developed in Chile during the socialist presidency of Salvador Allende
(1970-1973) to regulate the growing social property area and manage the transition
of Chile's economy from capitalism to socialism. Under the guidance of British
cybernetician Stafford Beer, often lauded as the 'father of management cybernetics',
an interdisciplinary Chilean team designed cybernetic models of factories within
the nationalised sector and created a network for the rapid transmission of economic data between the government and the factory floor. The article describes the
construction of this unorthodox system, examines how its structure reflected
the socialist ideology of the Allende government, and documents the contributions
of this technology to the Allende administration.
On 12 November i971 British cyberneticianStaffordBeer met Chilean

PresidentSalvadorAllende to discuss constructingan unprecedentedtool
for economic management.For Beer the meeting was of the utmost importance;the projectrequiredthe president'ssupport.During the previous
ten daysBeer and a smallChileanteam had worked franticallyto develop a
plan for a new technologicalsystemcapableof regulatingChile'seconomic
transitionin a mannerconsistentwith the socialistprinciplesof Allende's
presidency.The project, later referredto as 'Cybersyn' in English and
Eden Medinais AssistantProfessorof Informaticsin the School of Informaticsat Indiana
Universityand is affiliatedwith the IndianaUniversityCenter for Latin Americanand
CaribbeanStudies.
* The authorwishes to thankthe SocialScienceResearchCouncilandthe AmericanCouncil
of Learned Societies for supporting this research through an SSRC International
PredissertationFellowshipas well as the Adelle and Erwin Tomash Fellowshipin the
Historyof InformationProcessingawardedby the CharlesBabbageInstitute.Partof this
materialis based upon work supportedby the NationalScienceFoundationunderGrant
No. 0322278.Any opinions, findingsand conclusionsexpressedin the materialare those
of the authorand do not necessarilyreflectthe views of the NationalScienceFoundation.
This work has benefitedfrom the insightand criticismprovidedby David Mindell,Peter
Winn, Hugh Gusterson,ChappellLawson,membersof the MIT STS writingworkshop,
and the anonymous reviewers.
572
Eden Medina
'Synco' in Spanish,1would networkeveryfirmin the expandingnationalised

sector of the economy to a central computer in Santiago,enablingthe
governmentto graspthe statusof productionquicklyand respondto economic crisesin real time. AlthoughAllendehad been briefedon the project
aheadof time, Beer was chargedwith the task of explainingthe systemto
the Presidentand convincinghim that the projectwarrantedgovernment
support.
Accompaniedonly by his translator,a formerChileanNavy officernamed
RobertoCafiete,Beer walkedto the presidentialpalacein La Monedawhile
the rest of his teamwaitedanxiouslyat a hotel baracrossthe street.'A cynic
coulddeclarethatI was left to sinkor swim,'Beerlaterremarked.'I received
this arrangementas one of the greatestgesturesof confidence that I ever
received;becauseit was open to me to say anythingat all.'2The meeting
went quite well. Once they were sitting face to face (with Cafietein the
middle,discreetlywhisperingtranslationsin each man'sear),Beer beganto
explainhis workin 'managementcybernetics,'a fieldhe foundedin the early
in
At
heartof Beer's
195osand cultivated his subsequentpublications.3 the
work stood the 'viable system model', a five-tier structurebased on the
human nervous system, which Beer believed existed in all stable organisations- biological,mechanicaland social.Allende,havingtrainedpreviously
as a pathologist,immediatelygraspedthe biologicalinspirationbehindBeer's
cyberneticmodel and knowinglynodded throughoutthe explanation.This
reactionleft quitean impressionon the cybernetician.'I explainedthe whole
damnedplan and the whole viablesystemmodel in one singlesitting... and
I've never workedwith anybodyat the high level who understooda thing
I was saying.'4
Beer acknowledged the difficulties of achieving real-time economic
control, but emphasisedthat a system based on a firm understandingof
cyberneticprinciplescould accomplishtechnicalfeats deemed impossible
in the developedworld, even with Chile'slimited technologicalresources.
Once Allende gained a familiaritywith the mechanicsof Beer's model, he
began to reinforce the political aspects of the project and insisted that
and antithe system behave in a 'decentralising,worker-participative,
manner'.5WhenBeerfinallyreachedthe top level of his systembureaucratic
atichierarchy,the placein the model Beerhad reservedfor Allendehimself,
1 'Cybersyn'comes from a synthesisof the two concepts drivingthe project,'cybernetics'
and 'synergy'.The abbreviation'Synco' conveyed the objectiveof the project,namely
'Sistemade Informaci6ny Control'. The projectname has also appearedas 'Sinco' or
'Cinco'.
' StaffordBeer, BrainoftheFirm(New York, 1974),p. 257.
Wiener himself christened Beer the 'father of management cybernetics'.
March 2001.
4 Stafford Beer, interview by author, Toronto, Canada, I
1-I6
5 Beer, Brain of the Firm, p. 257.
DesigningFreedom,Regulatinga Nation
573
the presidentleanedbackin his chairand said,'At last, elpueblo.'6

With this
succinct utterance,Allende reframedthe project to reflect his ideological
convictions and view of the presidential office, which often equated his
politicalleadershipwith the rule of the people. By the end of the conversation,Beer had securedAllende'sblessingto continuethe project.
At face value, a meeting between a British cyberneticianand a Chilean
one as controversialas Allende,seems most unusual.7
president,particularly
The briefpresidencyof the UnidadPopular(UP) has arguablyinspiredmore
historicalscholarshipthan any other moment in Chileanhistory. Despite
this wealth of literature,little is known about the Chileangovernment's
experimentwith cyberneticsduringthis period and less about its contribution to the UP's experimentin democraticsocialism.8The natureof the
meeting between Beer and Allende suggests that writing technology into
one of the most widelystudiedperiodsof LatinAmericanhistorywill bring
to light an unstudiedfacet of the Chileanrevolutionand, in the process,
demonstrate the value of this framework for analysis. In part, documenting
the constructionof this systemprovidesinformationon the extentof Chile's

technologicalcapabilitiesduringthe earlyI970s. Moreimportantlyhowever,
the project provides a window for viewing new tensions within the UP
coalition,Chile, and the internationalcommunityat large.The impressions
6 Ibid.,p. 258. The meetingbetweenAllendeandBeer constitutesone of the most
popularly
printedanecdotesof the Cybersynproject,alwaysconstructedfrom Beer'saccount.Here
I have retold the storydrawingfrom Beer'saccountin BrainoftheFirm,an interviewwith
Beer, and an interviewwith RobertoCafiete,Vifiadel Mar,Chile,16Jan. 2003.
7 The biographyof SalvadorAllendeGossens is well known,but it warrantsa brief synopsis
here. Although he had run as the presidentialcandidatefor the left in the previoustwo
presidentialelections,he first attractedworldwideattentionin 1970 after he defeatedhis
opponent, the rightistcandidateJorge Alessandri,by a slim i.3 % marginof the popular
vote. His election markedthe arrivalof Chile'sfirst democratically-elected
socialistleader
and the first to attemptsocialisttransformationthroughpeacefulmeans.A socialistsince
the age of twenty-four,Allendeenteredpoliticsfightingfor his cousin MarmadukeGrove
Vallejo,the Air Force Commanderwho becameChile'sfirstsocialistpresidentfor a shortlivedtwelvedaysin 1932. Afterestablishinga branchof the socialistpartyin his hometown
of Valparaiso,Allende quicklyrose through the ranks of the party and was elected to
Congressin 1937.Alwaysin favourof socialistreformthroughexistingdemocraticpractices, unlikemany of his more radicalcontemporaries,Allendeconsistentlypushed for a
leftist agendafrom the senateand laterfrom the presidentialpalace.
8 This should not imply that the project has not been documented.Beer publishedhis
accountof the projectin the last five chaptersof Brainof theFirm,as well as in the last
chapter of Platform
for Change(New York, I975). Other references include Armand
Mattelartand Hector Schmucler,Communication
& Information
Freedom
Technologies:
of Choice
for LatinAmerica(Norwood, 1985). Project participants,such as Rall Espejo, Herman
Schwemberand Roberto Cafiete have also published their accounts of Cybersynin
internationalcyberneticsjournals.Discussions of the project have similarlyappearedin
and Data Systems.
Datamation
These, however, are all
publicationssuch as New Scientist,
publicationsdedicatedto science and technologyand not to the documentationChilean
historyduringthe Allendeperiod.
574
Eden Medina
and aspirationsexpressedby variousprojectparticipantsfurthermorereveal

an alternativehistoryof the UP eragroundedin technologicaloptimismand
the merging of science and politics to bring about social and economic
change. This article arguesthat the UP experimentwith cyberneticsand
computation constitutes another innovative, yet unexplored, feature of
Chile's democratic road to socialism. For this reason, examining this
technologicalprojectpromisesto enrichour understandingof this complex
moment in Chileanhistory.
Knowledge of this technologicalundertakingmoreover contributesto
the literaturein the history of science and technology, particularlywith
respectto studiesof cyberneticsand the historyof computing.The meeting
between Beer and Allende suggests that cybernetics,an interdisciplinary
science encompassing'the entire field of communicationtheory,whether
in the machineor in the animal',achieveda level of importancein Chile
during this period, and that Allende's Chilean revolution was open to
these cyberneticideas and theirapplication.9However,most discussionsof
cyberneticsto date focus on the evolution of these ideas and their applicationwithin the USA and the Europeancontexts and do not addresshow
they migratedto other parts of the world such as LatinAmerica.Chilean
history provides a clear of example of how alternativegeographicaland
politicalsettingsgave rise to new articulationsof cyberneticideasand innovative uses of computertechnology,ultimatelyillustratingthe importance
of includingLatin Americanexperiencesin these bodies of scholarship.10
This articlewill first present an explanationof how cyberneticsentered
Chileanconsciousness,attractedthe attentionof the nation'spresident,and
guidedthe constructionof this singulartechnologicalsystem.
From a different angle, the meeting between Beer and Allende also
illustratesthe importanceof both technologicalsoundness and political
ideology in Cybersyn'sconstruction.Although the projectwas technically
ambitious,from the outsetit couldnot be characterisedas simplya technical
endeavour to regulate the economy. From the perspective of project
team members,it could help makeAllende'ssocialistrevolutiona reality'revolutionarycomputing'in the truestsense. Moreover,the systemhad to
accomplish this goal in a mannerideologicallycongruentwith Allende's
politics.As this articlewilldemonstrate,the tensionssurroundingCybersyn's
design and constructionmirroredthe strugglebetween centralisationand
9 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics:
in theAnimalandtheMachine
Or Controland Communication
(Cambridge, 1948), p. i i.
10
Although little attention has been paid to cyberneticsin Latin America,scholarshave

addressed the development of cybernetic ideas in the Soviet Union, most notably
A History of SovietCybernetics
Vyacheslav Gerovitch, From Newspeakto Cyberspeak:
(Cambridge,
2002).
a Nation 575
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
decentralisation that plagued Allende's dream of democratic socialism.
Throughout Allende's presidency, Chile's political polarisation strongly influenced the perception of the project and its role in Chilean society. The
interplay of cybernetic ideas, Marxist ideology and computer technology
found in the project illustrates how science and technology contributed to
Chilean ideas of governance during the early 1970s and altered the possibilities for socialist transformation. Explicating this multi-faceted relationship
constitutes the final focus of this article and demonstrates that studies of
technology can expand our knowledge of historical and political processes
within the Latin American region.
ChileanCybernetics
The origin of cybernetics has been well documented elsewhere." Previous
scholarship has shown that cybernetics grew out of a WWII project to create
anti-aircraft servomechanisms capable of accurately aiming weapons at
the future position of an enemy aircraft.This problem led Norbert Wiener,
Julian Bigelow, and Arturo Rosenblueth to develop a theory of feedback
control capable of making predictive calculations from an incomplete set
of information, which later evolved into a theory for self-corrective control
that many believed could be applied in both machines and organisms.
Attempts to bridge the mechanical and the biological appeared as early as
1943 when Rosenblueth et al. wrote, 'a uniform behaviouristic analysis is
applicable to both machines and living organisms, regardless of the complexity of the behaviour.'12 This conviction laid the foundation for cybernetics, a new interdisciplinary science that strove to apply concepts from
mathematics and engineering - such as statistical modelling, information
theory, and the feedback loop - to a myriad of systems, including those
outside the mechanical and biological domains.
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela provided one of the initial
links between Chile and the cybernetics community, although Maturana
never identified himself as a cybernetician.a3Born in Chile in 1928, Maturana
of the originof cybernetics,
see PaulEdwards,TheClosed
n Fora morein-depthtreatment
World
(Cambridge,
1996)andSteveHeims,TheCybernetics
Group
(Cambridge,
I991).An
alternative
of thefield'sevolutionis presented
in DavidMindell,
Between
Human
and
reading
Machine:
andComputing
Feedback,
Control,
Cybernetics
(Baltimore,
2002). It is alsoworth
before
of whichBeerwas part,placeda greater
notingthatthe Britishcybernetics
community,
ideasoutsidethe laboratory
thantheirAmerican
emphasison applyingtheircybernetic
SeeAndrewPickering,
andtheMangle:Ashby,Beer,andPask,'
counterparts.
'Cybernetics
Studies
Social
vol. 32,no. 3 (2002), pp.413-37.
ofScience,
12ArturoRosenblueth,NorbertWienerand JulianBigelow,'Behavior,Purpose,and
vol. io (I943), PP.I 8-24.
Teleology,'Philosophy
ofSdience,
3laHumbertoMaturana,
interview
de Chile,8 September
by author,Santiago
zoo2003.
576 EdenMedina
studiedmedicineat the Universityof Chile and later pursuedhis graduate
studiesin the Biology Departmentof HarvardUniversity.In 1959,he coauthoredthe importantpaper 'What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain'
alongwith WarrenMcCulloch,JeromeLettvin,andWalterPitts,allof whom
were importantfiguresin the cyberneticsfield.14After the completionof
his PhD Maturanareturnedto Chile and assumeda position in the biology
departmentof the Universityof Chile,the most respectedpublicuniversity
in the country.Here, he continuedhis work on the optic nerve, but more
broadlytried to uncover the organisationalstructureof living organisms.
Varelabeganhis studiesunderMaturana'stutelageat the Universityof Chile
and followed his mentor's footsteps to the doctoral programin biology
at HarvardUniversity.Like Maturana,he accepted a faculty position at
the Universityof Chile upon his returnto Santiago.The title of their first
seresvivos(On MachinesandLivingBeings),
co-authoredbook, De maquinasy
illustratesthe continued presence of cyberneticideas in their biological
studies.15Here, the authorspresentedtheir groundbreaking
theoryof selforganisingsystems,knownas autopoiesis.
However, their contributionto Chilean cyberneticsduring the I96os
and early 1970s did not extend beyond the laboratory.On occasion,
Maturanawould lateradviseBeer on the theoreticalaspectsof the systemhavingtravelledin the same circles,Beer knew of Maturana'swork before
Allendecame to powerand the two were able to strengthentheirties during
Beer's time in Chile. Maturanaand Varelalater deliveredseverallectures
to the core membersof the Cybersynteam, but they alwaysdid so in an
unofficialcapacity.16Although these biologists provided one of the first
bridgesbetweenChileandthe internationalcyberneticscommunity,they did
not contributeto the Chileangovernment'sfamiliarityand applicationof
cyberneticsduring Allende's presidency.Beer himself would unwittingly
providethis connection.
The scope of this articledoes not permit a full biographyof Beer, but
a brief sketch will enable the readerto appreciatethe unorthodoxnature
of his characterin both businessand cyberneticcircles.Unlike manyof his
contemporariesin the cyberneticscommunity,Beer himselfnever received
a formal degree; his undergraduatestudies in philosophywere cut short
by militaryservicein the BritisharmyduringWorldWarII. Followingthe
war,Beer enteredthe steelindustryandascendedrapidlyto the management
14
15
Jerome Lettvin et al., 'What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain,' Proceedings
of theInstitute
of RadioEngineers,vol. 47, no. ii (1939), pp. 1940-51.
de
Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, De maquinasyseresvivos:una caracterizadcn
la
(Santiago, I973). This book was later translated into English as
bioldgica
organizacidn
Autopoiesisand Cognition:TheRealizationof theLiving (Boston, 1980) with an introduction by
StaffordBeer.
16
Beer, interview.
a Nation 577
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
level. In I95o a friend serendipitouslyhanded Beer a copy of Norbert
Wiener'sgroundbreaking
publication,Cybernetics.
Readingthe book changed
Beer's life and spurredhim to write an enthusiasticletter to the famous
MIT mathematiciandetailinghis applicationof cyberneticprinciplesto the
steel industry.Wiener, unfamiliarwith the business world and intrigued
by this new applicationof his work, invitedBeer to visit him at MIT. Beer
eventuallybecamean informalstudentof MIT biologistWarrenMcCulloch
and a friend to Wienerand Universityof Illinois electricalengineerHeinz
Von Foerster.An independentthinker,Beer once gave a paperentitled'The
Irrelevanceof Automation'at an internationalautomationconference,an
occasionthat reportedlyconvincedVon Foersterthatthe Britishdid indeed
possess a sense of humour.17In line with his beliefs as an 'old-fashioned
leftist', Beer triedusing his understandingof cyberneticprinciplesto bring
about social change,as evidencedby a series of lectureshe gave between
1969 and 1973 that he later publishedas the volume Platform
for Change.18
Known for his long beard,the ever-presentdrinkin his hand,and his habit
of smoking30 cigarsa day,Beer cultivatedan imagethat,in one journalist's
words,resembleda 'cross between Orson Wellesand Socrates'.19
After serving for a number of years as the directorof cyberneticsand
operationsresearchat United Steel,the largeststeel companyin the United
Kingdom,Beer left to assumethe helm of Sciencein GeneralManagement
(SIGMA), a French-ownedconsulting company that applied operations
research(OR) techniquesto business problems.Beer recalledthat he was
tryingto use OR 'to changeindustryand governmentin the same way that
the army,navy, and air force had been changed[duringWWII] by making
mathematicalmodels'.20 This was quite an ambitiousgoal consideringthe
numerouscontributionsOR techniqueshad made to the Allied anti-aircraft
and U-boat effortsduringthe war.21
SIGMA'sreputationgrew, and graduallythe companybegan to attract
an internationalclientele. In 1962 the director of Chile's steel industry
requestedSIGMA'sservices.Beerrefusedto go himself- he had neverbeen
to South America and his hectic schedule made the lengthy transit time
seem unreasonable- but he put together a team of English and Spanish
employees to travel to Chile in his place. SIGMA's work in the steel
industrygraduallyexpandedto includethe railways.Due to the largeamount
of work, the ChileanSIGMAteam often employedstudentsto pick up the
17 Ibid.
and Beer,interview.
18 Beer, Platform
for Change,
ioo Auust
Nficael
'Beer:The Hope of Chile,' TheDaily Telegraph
MichaelBecket,
eckt,,
973
a!Zie,
August '973,
Magagjne,
p. 7.
2UBeer, interview.
21 See for
example Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas Parke Hughes, Systems,
Experts,and
TheSystems
and Engineering,
WorldWarII and After
Computers:
Approachin Management
(Cambridge,2000).
19
578
Eden Medina
slack, and among these was Fernando Flores, a young Chilean who was
studying industrial engineering at the Catholic University in Santiago.
A workaholic by nature, Flores devoted himself to mastering the
principles of cybernetics and operations research practiced at SIGMA and
became familiar with Beer's work after reading Beer's book Decisionand
His knowledge of operations
Controland later Cybernetics
and Management.22
research led to a teaching position at the Catholic University and by his
twenty-seventh birthday he had become the Acting Dean of the Department
of Engineering Science. Like many of his contemporaries, Flores was active
in academic and political circles. In 1969 a group of young intellectuals at
the Catholic University, which included Flores, broke from the Christian
Democratic party and established the Movement of Popular Unitary Action
(MAPU), a political party of young intellectuals who were critical of the
Christian Democrats and aligned with the Communists and Socialists of
the UP coalition. The addition of the MAPU to the UP, combined with the
inability of the right and the Christian Democrats to form a winning
coalition, played a major role in Allende's narrow victory in the i970
presidential election. As an acknowledgement of his political loyalty and
technical competency, the Allende government appointed the then twentyeight-year-old Flores as General Technical Manager of the Corporaci6n de
Fomento de la Producci6n (CORFO), the state development agency that
Allende had charged with nationalising Chilean industry. It was the third
highest position within CORFO, the highest position within the state
development agency held by a member of the MAPU, and the management
position most directly linked to the daily regulation of the nationalised
factories.23
Allende believed the nationalisation of major industries deserved the
utmost priority and later referred to the task as 'the first step toward the
making of structural changes'.24 The nationalisation effort would not only
restore foreign-owned and privately-owned industries to the Chilean people,
it would 'abolish the pillars propping up that minority that has always condemned our country to underdevelopment' - a statement Allende made in
reference to the industrial 'monopolies' controlled by a handful of Chilean
families.25The majority of the UP coalition believed that by changing Chile's
22 Stafford Beer, Decision and Control
(New York, 1966); Stafford Beer, Cyberneticsand
Management(London, 1967).
23 Fernando Flores, interview by author, Vifia del Mar, Chile, 30 July 2003; Oscar Guillermo
Garret6n, interview by author, Santiago de Chile, 4 August 2003.
24 R6gis
Socialism
in Chile(London,1971), p. 85.
Debray,Conversations
withAllende:
25
addressin the National

SalvadorAllende,'The Purposeof Our Victory:Inaugural
Roadto Socialism
Stadium,5 November1970,' in RichardGott (ed.),Chile's
(Baltimore,
1973), P. 59.
a Nation 579
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
economicbase, theywould subsequentlybe able to bringaboutinstitutional
and ideologicalchange within the boundariesof Chile's pre-existinglegal
framework,a facet that set Chile's path to socialism apart from that of
other socialistnations.26
After Allende's inaugurationin November i970, the governmentused
the first few months to implement policies grounded in structuralist
economics and Keynesian 'pump priming', whereby economic growth
would be achievedthroughincreasedpurchasingpower and higheremployment rates in order to pull the Chileaneconomy out of the recession that
had inherited.Landreformprogrammesand the
the Allendeadministration
of
inception government-sponsoredassistanceto ruralworkersaugmented
the purchasingpower of individualsin the impoverishedagrariansector,
while workersin Chileanfactoriesenjoyed a 30 per cent averageincrease
in realwages duringAllende'sfirstyearin office.27Initially,these initiatives
to redistributeincome succeeded in creating a growing segment of the
population with money to spend, stimulatingthe economy, increasing
demand, raising production and expandingthe popular base of support
for the UP coalition. In the government's first year GDP grew by
7.7 per cent, production increased by I3.7 per cent and consumption
levels rose by I1.6 per cent.28These economic policies, however, would
quicklyreturnto haunt the UP governmentin the form of inflation and
massiveconsumershortages.
On the production front the government wasted no time expanding
the existingnationalisedsector and pushingit to a new level. By the end of
1971 the governmenthad transferredall majormining firms and 68 other
privatecompaniesfrom the privateto the publicsector.29The rapidpace of
the government'snationalisation
programme,coupledwith its lackof a clear,
consistentstructureand delimitation,exacerbatedthe fears and insecurities
expressed by owners of small- and medium-sized Chilean businesses.
Promises of social change, moreover, helped provoke a revolution from
below whereworkerssometimesseized controlof theirfactoriesagainstthe
Less than a quarterof the firms
presidente.
explicitwishes of their compauero
had
been on the government'slist
Allende's
first
year
expropriatedduring
for incorporationinto the publicsector.30
Foreign investors in Chilean copper mines and telecommunications
companies(for example,ITT) furthercomplicatedthe situationby opposing
nationalisationwithout sufficientmonetary compensation.31In July 1971
26
inDemocragy
SergioBitar,Chile:Experiment
1986).
(Philadelphia,
andChile'sRoadtoSocialism
TheYarurWorkers
PeterWinn, Weavers
ofRevolution:
(New York,
in Democragy,
"~ Bitar,Chile:Experiment
p. 52.
1986), p. 142.
ofRevolution,
p. 228.
"' Ibid.,p. 45.
30 Winn, Weavers
31 NathanielDavis, TheLast TwoYears
(Ithaca,NY, 1985), pp. 23-6, 67-71.
ofSalvadorAllende
27
58o
Eden Medina
the alienated ChristianDemocrats accused the government of abusing

legislativeloopholes to acquiredesirableindustriesand proposedan amendment thatwould requirecongressionalapprovalfor all acts of expropriation.
They claimedthat the governmenthad invoked a law written duringthe
GreatDepressionto preventlayoffsand plantclosuresas a meansof nationalisingfactoriesonce workersalignedwith the left had gone on strikeand
interruptedproduction. They proposed an amendmentthat would curb
the pace of nationalisationby requiringCongressto pass a law authorising
every new factory acquisition,a legislative manoeuvre that would have
considerablyweakenedAllende'sexecutivepower if the presidenthad not
contestedits legality.
Moreover,the rapid growth of the nationalisedsector quicklycreated
an unwieldymonster.The combinedincreasein the numberof industries
under state control and the number of employees within each industry
presentedthe governmentwith the difficulttask of managinga sector of
the economy that became harderto monitor with each passing day. In
accordancewith a decreepassedin 1932, the governmentsent 'interventors'
to replacepreviousmanagementand to governactivitieswithinthese newly
These representatives,however,often creatednew
nationalisedindustries.32
problems. Although many were competent and dedicated to their jobs,
some were completelyunqualifiedfor the positionsand otherswerecorrupt.
The problem of effective managementof the new 'social propertyarea'
(APS- Area de PropiedadSocial)was exacerbatedby the decision to distributeappointmentsequallyamong the politicalpartiesregardlessof the
level of competence found in their respective talent pools. Even parties
within the UP coalitioncriticisedAllende'schoice of the interventors.For
example,membersof the CommunistPartyarguedthat some interventors
merelyserved as replacementsfor the managerswho had precededthem,
occupyingsimilarhouses and drivingsimilarcars.33From the Communists'
perspective,not only did these representativesfail to provide an adequate
meansof bringingproductionunderthe controlof the people, but theyalso
helped veil the social realityof a continuingstatus quo. Daily operations
within the factories suffered further from the political strife caused by
interventorswho saw themselvesas representativesof theirparty.At times,
workersin some enterprisesrefused to listen to managersfrom political
partiesother than their own; this in turn gave rise to a frustratingprocess
of partymeetingsand negotiations.34
32 Allende'sadministrationused the word 'interventor'to refer to the
politicallyappointed
officialswho replacedthe previous factorymanagersand literallyintervenedin factory

productionpracticesby bringingeachnewlynationalisedfactoryunderthe controlof state.
Chile(Baltimore,1978), P. 66.
Regimes,
33 ArturoValenzuela,TheBreakdownofDemocratic
34 Ibid.,p. 62.
a Nation 581
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
As the bliss of the honeymoon period began to fade, the long-term
instabilityof Allende's approach became apparent.Politicallymotivated
reforms,such as the income redistributionchampionedby the UP, emphasisedlong-termstructuraltransformationover short-termeconomicmanagement. Consumption started to outstrip production, inflation began to
skyrocketand governmentdeficit spendingcontinuedto grow, all of which
were exacerbatedby shrinkingforeign reservesand the denial of foreign
credits.By July 197I inflationhad climbed by 45.9 per cent, and it would
continueto rise to unprecedentedlevels throughoutAllende'spresidency.35
From a productionstandpoint,the UP programmeof industrialexpansion
throughmassivehiringinitiallyhelped factoriesto increasetheiroutput and
attainfull productivecapacity,but once that installedcapacitywas reached
the numberof employeesbeganto exceedthe amountof work availableand
productivitybegan to fall. Valenzuela'sretrospectiveobservationthat the
'economic crisisduringthe Allendeperiodclearlybecamethe government's
chief unsolvableproblem' succinctlycharacterisesthe magnitudeof Chile's
economic decline.36
However, at the time the governmentviewed the economic situationas
far from 'unsolvable'.On 13 July 1971 Beer receiveda letter from Flores
statingthathe was familiarwith Beer'sworkandwas 'now in a position from
which it is possible to implementon a nationalscale- at which cybernetic
thinkingbecomes a necessity- scientificviews on managementand organization'.37He askedfor Beer'sadviceon applyingcyberneticprinciplesto the
managementof the nationalisedsector.Beer'sresponsewas enthusiastic:
I simplymustaskyou whetherI couldplaysomepart,althoughI do not know
whatto suggest... Believeme,I wouldsurrender
contractsI now
anyof myretainer
havefor the chanceof workingon this.Thatis becauseI believeyourcountryis
reallygoingto do it.38
One month later, Flores flew to England to meet the man whose work
he studiedduringhis yearsworkingfor SIGMA.The two met at Beer'sclub
in London, the Athenaeum.Flores did not speak much English and Beer
did not speakany Spanish,but the two men managedto communicatein a
mixtureof French, English and Latin. Flores informed Beer that he had
assembleda smallgovernmentteam and askedthe cyberneticianto travelto
Chile and directtheir effortsto applycyberneticprinciplesto the nationalisationeffort.In November i971 Beer arrivedin Santiago.
36 Ibid.,p. 6 .
5 Ibid.,p. 55.
Letter from FernandoFlores to StaffordBeer, 13 July 1971, box 55, The StaffordBeer
Collection,LiverpoolJohn Moores University.
38 Letter from StaffordBeer to FernandoFlores, 29 July 1971, box 55, The StaffordBeer
Collection,LiverpoolJohn Moores University.
3'
582
Eden Medina
Constructing
Cybersyn
Beer landedin Chile on the day Allende celebratedthe first anniversaryof
his election.Beforea packedaudienceat the NationalStadium,the president
informedthe crowdthat now 'more than ever one has to be awareof what
Chileanlife is and of the path that is authenticallyours, which is the path
of pluralism,democracy,and freedom, the path that opens the doors of
socialism'.39It was a speech of celebration,promiseand nationalpridethat
electrifiedthe nation.Shortlythereafter,the ministerof financeannounced
that Chile'sannualborrowinghad topped $ioo million, far exceedingthe
predicted$67 millioninflow for the year.40
During his initialten-dayvisit Beer met variousinfluentialpeople in the
Chileangovernment,includingPedro Vuskovic, the economics minister,
and Allendehimself.Flores assembleda handpickedChileanteam to begin
work with Beer that included representativesfrom various academicdisciplines.41This set the tone for the interdisciplinarycollaborationthe
CybersynProjectwould require.Most of these earlyteam memberswere
friendsof Flores.'It was veryinformalat the beginning',Floresnoted, 'like
most things are. You look for support among your friends.'42Given his
position as the generaltechnicalmanagerof CORFO, one of the largest
governmentagenciesof the time, Flores controlleda wealth of resources.
OperatingthroughCORFO, Flores was able to put together the funding
needed to pay Beer's considerablefee of $500oo
a day as well as securethe
other material and personnel resources that the project demanded.
Moreover,the CORFO connectiongave Flores the power to recruitindividualswho possessed expertisenot found in his networkof friendships.
Creditinghis leadershipabilities,Flores boasted,'I didn'tneed to convince
people. I had a lot of power to do so ... given the amount of resources
I managedin all aspects of the economy. We [CORFO]were so immense
comparedwith [the CybersynProject]... it was a very small amount of
money comparedwith who we were and what the stakeswere.'43Former
Cybersynteammembersalso highlightedthe importanceof Flores'personality in getting the project off the ground, describinghim as a 'smooth
operator'and a 'wheelerdealer'.
While Beer learnedabout Chileaneconomics and politics, each member
of his team read the manuscriptversion of his book Brain of the Firm
39 SalvadorAllende, 'First Anniversaryof the Popular Government, National Stadium,
Reader
Santiago,November4, 1971', in JamesD. Cockcroft(ed.), TheSalvadorAllende
(New
40 Bitar, Chile:
York, 2000), pp. 123-4.
Experimentin Democracy,p. 65.
41 Roberto Cafiete, 'The Brain of the Government: An Application of Cybernetic Principles

to the Management of a National Industrial Economy,' 22ndAnnualNorthAmericanMeeting,
andMaximizjng
SocialOpportunities:
TheGeneralSystems
AvoidingSocialCatastrophes
Challenge
43 Ibid.
42 Flores,interview.
(Washington, DC, February 1978), pp. 516-25.
583
and made the language of Beer's managementcyberneticstheir lingua

franca.44The book outlinedthe 'viable system model', a system that Beer
believed could describe the stability found in biological, mechanical,
social, and politicalorganisations.Cybersyn'sdesign cannot be understood
without a basic graspof this model, which playeda pivotalrole in merging
the politicsof the Allendegovernmentwith the designof this technological
system.
The viablesystemmodel that firstappearedin BrainoftheFirm(1972)still
standsas one of the guidingconcepts behindBeer'swork.45It is definedas
'a systemthat survives.It coheres;it is integral... but it has none the less
mechanismsand opportunitiesto grow and learn,to evolve and to adapt.'46
The valueof the system'variables'(inputs)determinedthe system'sresultant
'state'; Beer referredto the numberof possible states as the system's'variety', a direct reference to Ross Ashby's important 'Law of Requisite
Variety'.47A system able to maintainall criticalvariableswithin the limits
of systemic equilibriumachieved 'homeostasis', a qualitydesired by all
viable systems. From these principles,Beer constructeda five-tiermodel
for viable systems,which he based on the humanneurosystem.In spite of
the model's biologicalorigins,Beer maintainedthat the abstractstructure
could be appliedin numerouscontexts, includingthe firm, the economic
enterprise,the body and the state.
In its most basic form the viable system model resemblesa simple flow
chart connecting the five levels of the system hierarchy.In his writings,
however, Beer switches freely among metaphors drawn from machines,
organisationsand organismswhen describingthe purposeand functionality
of each level. Given the purpose of this article,the viable system model
will be explainedhere only as it applies to the Chileanindustrialsector,
focusing specificallyon the five-tiercyberneticmappingof Chileanenterprises within the social propertyarea (shown in Figure i). It is perhaps
easiest to understandthe model at this level, though it should be borne
in mind that the Cybersynprototype operated initiallywithin CORFO's
managementstructure,a higher level of the hierarchythan the model
of the individual enterprisediscussed here. Although Beer hoped one
day to restructureenterprise management to reflect this model, the
Beer,BrainoftheFirm,p. 249.
45 'Ten Pints of Beer: The Rationale of Stafford Beer's CyberneticBooks (1959-94),
44
Discussionwith StaffordBeer',Kybernetes,
vol. 29, no. 5/6 (2000),pp. 558-69.
46 Beer, TheBrainoftheFirm,p. 239. This statementillustratesa reoccurringcharacteristicof
Beer's work, namely the synthesisof metaphorsdrawn from biology and engineering
characteristicof work in the field of cybernetics.
47 This lawholds thatthe varietyin the controlsystemmustmatchthe varietyin the systemto
to Cybernetics
be controlled.See W. Ross Ashby,An Introduction
(London,1956).
584
Eden Medina
DE UNA EMPRESACUALOUIERA
MODELODE ORGANIZACION
5
CONSEJODEADMINISTRACION
INTERVENTOR
GERENTE,
GENERAL
GENERAL
SUBGERENCIA
PARA
DE
ASUNTOS
DESARROLLO
GERENCIA
DE
OPERACIONES
UNIDAD DE
DE
OPERACION
SISTEMASDE
1
SPLANTA
DIRECCION
PLANTA
PLANTA 2
PPLANTA
PLANTA 3
INFORMACION
DIRECCION
2
DIRECCION
PLANTA
3
drawnas a five-tierviablesystem.Source: CORFO,Proyecto

Fig. i. TheChileanStateEnterprise
Synco conceptos y prictica del control; una experienciaconcreta:la direcci6nindustrialen
Chile (Santiago,
de Fomento
de la Produccidn,
fromthe Corporacion
1973).Imageusedwithpermission
Santiago.
hypotheticalchain of managementpresentedin the following paragraphs

does not reflectthe documentedmanagementpracticesof the nationalised
enterprises.
a Nation 585
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
The model drew a distinction between the bottom three levels of the
hierarchy that governed daily operations (systems I, 2 and 3) and the upper
two levels of management (systems 4 and 5), which determined the future
development and the overall direction of the enterprise. At the bottom of
the hierarchy, individual plants within each enterprise interacted with the
outside environment (represented by the cloud-like figure on the left-hand
side of the drawing) and through these flows of material inputs and outputs
generated low-level, system i production indices. Factors such as energy
needed, raw materials used, or even employee attendance could constitute
such an index. Each plant behaved in an 'essentially autonomous' manner,
restricted only the operational limits needed to ensure the stability of the
entire enterprise. System 2, which Beer equated to a cybernetic spinal cord,
transmitted these production indices to the various plants and upward
toward the director of operations (system 3). By assuming responsibility
for the normal functioning of the plants within the enterprise, these lower
three levels prevented upper management from being overwhelmed with
the nuances of daily production activity. However, in the case of a serious
production anomaly, one which could threaten the stability of the enterprise
and that after a given period of time could not be resolved by the director
of operations, or system 3, the next level of management was alerted and
asked to provide assistance.
Systems 4 and 5 only intervened in production under these circumstances.
Unlike the other levels of management outlined in Beer's hierarchy,
system 4 required the creation of a new level of management dedicated to
development and future planning that would provide a space for discussion
and decision-making. This level did not exist within the vast majority of
Chile's state enterprises nor, as Beer noted, in the management configuration
of most firms in operation during the 1970s. In the drawing it appears as
the sub-directorate for development. System 4 also provided the vital link
between volitional and automatic control or, in the case of industrial
management, between centralised or decentralised regulation. Under normal
circumstances, it allowed the lower levels to behave autonomously, but
could trigger intervention from upper management if necessary. Securing
this balance between individual freedom and centralised control proved vital
when attempting to align the Cybersyn project with the political ideals
promoted by the UP coalition, a theme that this article will discuss at greater
length below. The final level of the model, system 5, represented the 'chief
executive' position held by the appointed interventor, who determined the
overall direction of the enterprise and the requisite levels of production.
In Beer's mind, this five-tier system not only provided the characteristic
skeleton for all viable systems; it also existed recursively in each of the five
levels. Beer writes: 'the whole is always encapsulated in each part ... this is
586 EdenMedina
a lesson learned from biology where we find the genetic blue-printof
the whole organismin everycell.'48The state,the firm,the workerand the
cell all exhibited the same series of structuralrelationships.Applyinghis
vision to Chile,Beerwrote,'Recursivelyspeaking,the Chilean
organisational
nation is embedded in the world of nations, and the government is
embeddedin the nation ... all these are supposedlyviable systems.'49This
propertyallowedthe team to design a systemof managementthat theoretically could function anywherefrom the factory floor to the presidential
palace.
Once armedwith Beer'smodel for cyberneticcontrol and convincedof
its utilityto Chile'seconomic transition,the team examinedtheiravailable
resources.By 1968 threeUS companies- NCR, Burroughsand IBM- had
fewer than o50computersinstalledin Chile, the largestbeing an IBM 360
Chilehad fewer
Accordingto the tradepublicationDatamation,
mainframe.50
than
Colombia
and
The previous
Brazil,Argentina,
computers
Venezuela.51
ChristianDemocratic government had encouraged US investment and
business with US companies,but high import duties combinedwith the
alreadyhigh price tag madecomputertechnologya less attractiveoption to
Chileanindustriesthanto theirNorth Americancounterparts.The National
Enterprisefor Computersand Informatics(ECOM),a centralisedgovernment agency establishedin the 196os to oversee the purchaseof Chilean
computing technology and offer data processingservices on state owned
mainframes,moreover tried to maintain its monopoly on computing
machinesby frequentlydenyingrequestsfrom universitiesand privatefirms
who wished to acquireadditionalcomputingresources.52The government
owned few mainframecomputers and could allocate time on only one
machine to the Cybersynproject.53The project leaders originallysecured
time on the top-performingIBM 36o/5o, but later transferredthe project
to a less heavilyused Burroughs3500 mainframewhen processingdelays
on the 36o/5o exceededforty-eighthours.54
The team simultaneouslysearchedfor a way to enable communications
amongfactories,stateenterprises,sectorcommittees,CORFOmanagement,
and the central mainframehoused in CORFO headquarters.Eventually,
48 Beer,BrainoftheFirm,p. 156.
49 Ibid.,p. 249.
5o Aaron Finerman, 'Computing Capabilitiesat Argentine and Chilean Universities,'
Communications
oftheACM, vol. i2, no.8 (August1969),p. 427.
vol. i6, no. 5 (May1970), p. 98.
51 BarryBoehm, 'Computingin SouthAmerica',Datamation,
52 Raimundo
Beca,interviewby author,Santiagode Chile,9 September2003.
53 ECOM owned three IBM mainframes(two 360/40 models and one 360/5o) and one
Burroughs3500 mainframe.Notes on availableECOM computingresources,ii Nov.
1971,box 55, The StaffordBeer Collection,LiverpoolJohn MooresUniversity.
54 A 48-hourprocessingdelayon the IBM machineprohibitedreal-timeanalysisand caused
much frustrationamong the Cybersynteam members.
a Nation 587
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
they settled on an existingtelex networkpreviouslyused to tracksatellites.
Unlike the heterogeneousnetworkedcomputersystemsin use today, telex
networks mandate the use of specific terminals and can only transmit
ASCIIcharacters.However,like the Internetof today,this earlynetworkof
telex machines was driven by the idea of creatinga high-speedweb of
informationexchange.The telex networkwould laterprove more valuable
to the governmentthan the processingmight of the mainframe,reaffirming
a belief sharedby both Flores and Beer that 'informationwithout action
is waste.'55
Havingidentifiedthe existinghardwareoptions, the team worked frantically to design a feasible schema for the entire system with a finish date
optimisticallyset for October 1972.56The eventualdesignconsistedof four
Checo,and Opsroom.Workon each of
sub-projects:Cybernet,Cyberstride,
these projectswould span from 1971-1973, duringwhich time Beer would
make i i trips to Chile,each lastingapproximatelytwo weeks.57When Beer
arrived in Chile for the second time in March 1972 the onset of shortages
and risinginflationrateshad transformedthe problemof economic control

into a strongpoliticalissue. AlthoughFlores'smallteam remainedmarginal
within the overallstructureof CORFO, Flores was able to rouse sufficient
interest among his web of government contacts to obtain the resources
he needed and continuework on the project.It was at this time that the
team first appliedthe name 'Cybersyn'to describethe entire scope of the
system.A synthesisof 'cybernetics'and 'synergy',the projectname firmly
illustratedthe team'sbelief that the whole system exceeded the sum of its
parts.
The firstcomponentof the system,Cybernet,expandedthe existingtelex
networkto includeeveryfirmin nationalisedsector,therebyhelpingto create
a nationalnetwork of communicationthroughoutChile'sthree-thousandmile-longterritory.Cybersynteam membersoccasionallyused the promise
of freetelex installationto cajolefactorymanagersinto lendingtheirsupport
to the project.58 StaffordBeer's earlyreportsdescribethe system as a tool
for real-timeeconomiccontrol,but in actualityeach firmcould only transmit
data once per day."9This centraliseddesign may appearto run counter to
the UP commitmentto individualfreedom, but coincides with Allende's
56 Beer entitled one of the earlierproject schedules,'Project Cybersyn,ProgrammeBeat57
the-Clock'.
Beer, interview.
Cafiete, interview. Cafiete also noted that he received several inquiries from private factory
owners of who wished to join the Cybersyn project in return for free access to telex
technology.
59 Reminding factory managers to send data on a daily basis proved to be a great source of
frustration for the project team. Isaquino Benadof, interview by author, Santiago de Chile,
58
I0 April 2002.
588 EdenMedina
statement:'We are and alwaysshallbe in favourof a centralisedeconomy,
and companieswill haveto conformto the Government'splanning.'60
the secondcomponentof the Cybersynsystem,encompassed
Cyberstride,
the suite of computerprogrammeswrittento collect,process,anddistribute
datato and from each of the state enterprises.Membersof the Cyberstride
team created 'quantitativeflow charts of activitieswithin each enterprise
that would highlight all important activities',including a parameterfor
'socialunease',measuredby the proportionof employeesabsenton a given
day of work in comparisonto the number of employees on the factory
Cyberstrideperformedstatisticalfiltrationon the 'pure numbers'
payroll.61
from
the factory models, discardingthe data that fell within the
output
acceptablesystem parametersand directingthe informationdeemed important upward to the next level of management.Equally important,
the softwareused statisticalmethods to detect productiontrendsbased on
historicaldata, theoreticallyallowingCORFO to prevent problemsbefore
they began. If a particularvariablefell outside of the range specifiedby
Cyberstride,the system emitteda warning,known as an 'algedonicsignal'
in Beer's cyberneticvocabulary.Only the interventorfrom the affected
enterprisewould receive the algedonic warninginitiallyand would have
the freedom,within a given time frame,to dealwith the problemas he saw
within this
fit. However, if the enterprisefailed to correctthe irregularity
timeframe,membersof the Cyberstrideteam alertedthe next level management, the CORFO sector committee (e.g., Comite Textil). Beer argued
that this system of operationgrantedChileanenterprisesalmost complete
control over their operations,while still permittingoutside interventionin
the case of more seriousproblems.He furtherbelievedthis balancebetween
centralisedand decentralisedcontrol could be optimisedif one selectedthe
correct period of recoverytime given to each enterprisebefore alerting
highermanagement,ensuringmaximumautonomywithinthe overallviable
system.
Cyberstriderepresenteda jointeffortbetweena teamof Chileanengineers
headedby IsaquinoBenadof,one of Chile'sleadingcomputerexpertsand
the head of researchand developmentat ECOM, and a team of British
consultantsat ArthurAndersenin London. The Britishteam, led by Alan
Dunsmuir,designed and coded a temporarysuite of programmes,which
they gave to the Chileanteamin March 972 for finalrevisions.Meanwhile,
Chileanoperationsresearchscientistsand engineersfrom CORFOand the
StateTechnologicalInstitute(INTEC)visitedplantsthroughoutthe country,
met workersand managers,selectedapproximatelyfive criticalvariablesof
60
WithAllende(New York,
Conversations
RegisDebray,TheChileanRevolution:
I972),
el Beer,BrainoftheFirm,p. 2 53.
p. I I i.
a Nation 589
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
production, created flowchart models of factory operation, and translated
these models into computer code that was read into the mainframe with
punch cards.62They also determined the optimal amount of recovery time
allotted to each firm before allowing an algedonic signal to percolate up the
system hierarchy,a process Beer referred to as 'designing freedom'.63Project
notes reveal that the team planned to have thirty enterprises on line by
August 1972, a figure that would rise to include 26.7 per cent of all nationalised industries by May 1973 (more than ioo industries).64
CHECO (CHilean ECOnomy), the third part of the Cybersyn project,
constituted an ambitious effort to model the Chilean economy and provide
simulations of future economic behaviour. Appropriately, it was sometimes
referred to as 'Futuro'. The simulator would serve as the 'government's
experimental laboratory' - an instrumental equivalent to Allende's frequent
likening of Chile to a 'social laboratory'. The bulk of the work on CHECO
occurred in England, under the direction of electrical engineer and operations research scientist Ron Anderton. The simulation programme used
the DYNAMO compiler developed by MIT professor Jay Forrester, a
technology that was reportedly one of Anderton's areas of expertise.
However, the Chilean team, headed by a chemical engineer Mario Grandi,
kept close tabs on Anderton's model, laboriously checking his calculations,
asking detailed questions about the model and the computer tools used in
its implementation, and sending a young Chilean engineer to study with
Anderton in London. The CHECO team initially used national statistics to
test the accuracy of the simulation programme. When these results failed,
Beer and his fellow team members faulted the time differential in the
generation of statistical inputs, an observation that re-emphasised the perceived necessity for real-time data.
The last of the four components, Opsroom, created a new environment
for decision making, one modelled after a British WWII war room
(Figure 2).65 It consisted of seven chairs arranged in an inward facing circle
flanked by a series of projection screens, each displaying the data collected
from the nationalised enterprises. In the Opsroom, all industries were
62
CORFOcreatedINTECin September
research
in Chile
1968to promotetechnological
and studythe developmentof new industrialproducts.In MarchI97I the Allende
governmentappointedFlorespresidentof INTEC, a positionFloresleveragedto
secureresourcesfortheCybersyn
Project.
63 Stafford
Freedom
Beer,Designing
(NewYork,1974).
64 Mensaje
Presidente
Allende
anteCongreso
Pleno,21/Mayo'7; (Santiago,1973), PP. 412--I 3.
65 Theideaof waroccursfrequently
theprojectnotes,andcertainly
thereis more
throughout
to be saidaboutthisrelationship
thanthescopeof thisarticleallows.Beerinvokedthewar
roomanalogyasa meansof conveying
theimportance
of visualdisplaysof information
in
but also as a meansof remindingparticipants
that they were
rapiddecision-making,
fightingan economicwarwheretimewasof theessence.
590
EdenMedina
Room.Source:Personal
Walker.
archive
Fig. 2. TheCybersyn
Operations
ofRodrigo
Walker.
Imageusedwithpermission
fromRodango
meantto facilihomogenisedby a uniformsystemof iconic representation,

tatethe maximumextractionof informationby an individualwith a minimal
amount of scientifictraining.Beer recognisedthat the men sittingin the
chairswouldnot possess skillsas typists- an occupationtypicallyperformed
by female secretaries.Therefore,in lieu of the traditionalkeyboardthe
Opsroom team designeda series of large 'big-hand'buttons as the input
mechanismthat one could 'thump' to emphasisea point. Beer felt this
design decision would allow the technology to facilitatecommunication,
Beer made
eliminating'the girl between themselvesand the machinery'.66
this last comment in referenceto the traditionalneed for female typists.
However,it also revealsthe genderedassumptionsbuilt into the design of
the system.Moreover,Beer claimedthe big-handdesign made the room
appropriatefor eventualuse by workers'committeesas opposedto a 'sanctum
sanctorum
for a governmentelite'.67A prototypeof the roomwas constructed
in Santiagoduring 1972, using projectionequipmentprimarilyimported
from the UK. Althoughit neverbecameoperational,it quicklycapturedthe
imaginationof all who viewed it, includingmembersof the military,and
becamethe symbolicheartof the project.68
66
6"
67 Beer,BrainoftheFirm,p. 270.
Beer,Platformfor
Change,
p. 449.
GeneralCarlosPrats,head of the Armed Forces and later Secretaryof the Interior,expressedinterestin the CybersynOperationsRoom for its potentialmilitaryapplications.
a Nation 591
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
CORFOExecutive Vice
President
Overall direction of CORFO
System 5
Vice-Presidentof Development
and Planning
Futureplanning
The Operations Room and the
Economic Simulator (CHECO)
System 4
Outside
Environment
CORFOGeneral Management
Day-to-day operations
System 3
Telex
--
Sector Committee
e.g. Textiles
I
Sector Committee
and
Data
Processing
System 2 analyzes
production indices and
coordinates activities
among sector committees,
enterprises, and CORFO
generalmanagement.
Cybernet and Cyberstride
System 2
e.g. Forestry
Network
Sector Committee
e.g. Steel
,I
Within
each committee, indices
I
from the various enterprises are
generated and collected.
1
System 1
m
moo
Source:Imagedrawnbytheauthor.
Fig. 3. CORFOdrawnas a ViableSystem.
An idealisedcorrelationof Cybersyn'sintendedarchitecture,the organisation of CORFO, and Beer's five-tier viable system model appears in
Figure 3 - it should be noted that this diagramoutlines Cybersyn'stheoreticaldesign,ratherthanits actuallevel of functionalityandimplementation.
At this level of recursion,the sector committees collected and sent productiondatadailyusingthe telexnetwork,whichrelayedthe informationto a
dataprocessingcentrelocatedwithinECOM (system2). A staffof computer
technicians processed the data using a single mainframe computer and
592 EdenMedina
specialisedsuiteof computerprogrammes,which searchedfor
Cyberstride's
in productionperformance.If a sector committee
trendsand irregularities
a productionirregularityon its own, ECOM
failed
to
resolve
(system i)
alertedmembersof CORFOgeneralmanagement(system3). In the case of
a particularlydifficult or urgent problem, members of CORFO general
managementwould convene with higher-rankingCORFO officialsin the
OperationsRoom (system4) to discussthe problemand possiblyreallocate
resourcesor plan a new approachfor managingthe social propertyarea.
CHECO also operatedat the system4 level, and permittedCORFOmanagementto test their ideas prior to implementation.If lower management
still could not solve the problem,CORFO senior management(system 5)
then used the dataprovidedby the cybernetictoolbox to makean informed
decisionon how to intervenein production.
The original plans called for similar managementhierarchiesat the
level of the individualplants,state enterprises,and the sector committees,
althoughthese ideasnevercameto fruition.Beeralso beganworkon a series
of trainingprogrammesaimed at presentingthe system to workers'committees and trainingthem to use these new managementtools to increase
and coordinate their participationin factory operations. Perhaps the
ambitiousscope of this 'work-in-progress'accounts for the discrepancies
and
betweenthe model of operationspresentedin the precedingparagraphs
involved
Chilean
recounted
the regularoperationalpractices
by
engineers
with the project. For example, Benadof recalledthat his office received
informationfrom the individualenterpriseseveryafternoonand, afterrunning the numbersthrough the mainframecomputer,later transmittedthe
resultsto the telex controlroom at CORFOwithoutnotifyingthe individual
interventorsor passing throughthe algodonicprocess outlinedby Beer.69
This riftbetweentheoryandpracticewill receivefurtherconsiderationin the
followingsection.
In spite of these inconsistencies,work on each of the systemcomponents
advancedrapidly.The pre-existingtelex infrastructurecontributedsignificantly to the early operationof the Cybernetnetwork, the first and only
Cybersyn component used regularlyby the Allende government. The
Cyberstridesuite generatedits first printout on 21 March 1972, at which
time Beer sent an enthusiastictelex to Anderton:'Cyberstridesuite really
works ... The whole thingwas impossibleandwe did it.'7oDue to problems
in locatinga suitablespace for construction,and delaysin receivingequipment from the British company Electrosonic, the Opsroom prototype
69 Benadof, interview.
70
Telex from StaffordBeer to Ron Anderton,21 MarchI972, box 66, The StaffordBeer
Collection,LiverpoolJohn MooresUniversity.
a Nation 593
Freedom,
Designing
Regulating
did not reach completion until late December i972 and even then had a
The economic simulator never passed the
very limited functionality.71
Since
work
on the projectwas cut short,it is impossible
experimentalstage.
to say how the finishedsystem might have furtheredChile'srevolutionary
process.
However,Cybersynprovedinstrumentalto the UP even in its unfinished
form. The new infrastructurefor communicationprovided by Cybernet
proved vital to the governmentduringthe opposition-ledstrikeof October
In response to the strike,which threatenedthe
1972 (Parode Octubre).72
government'ssurvival,Florescreatedan emergencyoperationscentrewhere
membersof the Cybersynteamand other high-rankinggovernmentofficials
monitored the two thousand telexes sent per day that covered activities
from the northernto the southernends of the country.73
The rapidflow of
messagesover the telex lines enabledthe governmentto reactquicklyto the
strike activityand mobilise their limited resourcesin a way that lessened
the potential damage caused by the Gremialistas.
Gustavo Silva, executive
of
in
CORFO
at
the
time
of
the
strike,creditedthe network
secretary energy
for coordinatingthe 200 trucksloyal to the governmentagainstthe effects
of 40,000 strikingtruckdrivers.74
Although the resolutionof the October
Strikehad negativeconsequencesfor the UP government,among them the
incorporationof three seniormembersof the militaryin Allende'scabinet,
the governmenthad survived.The value of the telex network duringthe
October Strikehelped to establishFlores as both a technicalexpert and
a vital contributorto the survivalof the UP. This, in Flores' opinion,
motivated Allende to appoint him minister of the economy.75It also
the
publiclydemonstratedCybersyn'sutilityto the government,particularly
telex network.Severalweeks afterthe end of the strike,Cybersynparticipant
Herman Schwemberremarked,'The growth of our actualinfluence and
power has exceededour best imagination.'76
Followingthe strike,the telexnetworkpermitteda new form of economic
mappingthat enabled the governmentto collapse the data sent from all
71 Letter from StaffordBeer to RobertSimpsonof Electrosonic,i Oct. 1972,box 62, The
StaffordBeer Collection,LiverpoolJohn Moores University.
72
The Gremialista
movement began in protest to governmentnationalisationefforts and
gained considerablemomentum in October 1972 after a 40,ooo-memberindependent
truckingassociationtriedto preventthe creationof a parallelstate-ownedequivalent.The
October strikeattemptedto shut down the Chileaneconomy by mobilisingtruckdrivers,
shopkeepers, professional and economic associations, bank clerks, and even several
studentand campesinoorganisations.
74 GustavoSilva,interviewby author,Santiagode Chile, Sept. 2003.
5
75 FernandoFlores, 'FernandoFlores habla sobre el Proyecto Synco,' TheClinic,vol.
5,
no. io8 (July2003),p. 9.
76 Letterfrom HermanSchwemberto StaffordBeer, 6 Nov. 1972, box 66, The StaffordBeer
Collection,LiverpoolJohn MooresUniversity.
594 EdenMedina
over the country into a single report, written daily at CORFO, and hand
delivered to La Moneda. The detailed charts and graphs filling its pages
provided the government with an overview of national production,
transportation, and points of crisis in an easily understood format, using
data generated several days earlier.The introduction of this form of reporting represented a considerable advance over the previous six-month lag
required to collect statistics on the Chilean economy, and allowed the UP
to track the dips and spikes of national production through to September
1973.77
Allende would continue to support Cybersyn's construction throughout
his presidency. On 8 September I97 3 - a mere three days before the military
coup that would end his dream and his life - he sent a communication to
the Cybersyn team asking that the Operations Room be moved to the
presidential palace in La Moneda.
Computing
'Revolutionary'
Flores' success with the gremiostrike put him in a unique position as the newly
appointed minister of the economy. Relatively unknown to the opposition,
Flores believed he had a chance of increasing his support by 'building a
different personal image' based upon 'a certain myth around [his] scientific
qualifications'.78However, the new challenges he confronted as minister in a
situation of extreme and growing economic dislocation convinced him that
technology could only play a limited role in saving Chile from a political and
economic breakdown. As Flores began to distance himself from the project
to assume his new duties in Allende's cabinet, Beer remarked that their
relationship, which 'was going great when [Flores] became undersecretary'
had 'almost wholly collapsed'.79
Flores' reaction, however, should not imply that Cybersyn's designers had
neglected the complexities of Chile's largerpolitical context in the creation of
this new technological system.80 From its early stages the project operated
under the joint leadership of a Scientific Director (Beer) and a Political
Director (Flores). Beer, however, often stepped outside the bounds of his
scientific duties and recognised the utility of combining Marxist rhetoric with
77 Comando Operativo Central, 'Situaci6n General del Pais', 3 Sept. 1973, private collection
of Roberto Cafiete.
78 Letter from Herman Schwember to Stafford Beer, 12 Nov. 1972, box 64, The Stafford Beer
Collection, Liverpool John Moores University.
79 Letter from Stafford Beer to Herman Schwember, 21 Feb. 1973, box 66, The Stafford Beer
80soAlthough it does illustrate the increasing instability of Chile's economic and political situation, which by 1973 overshadowed the gains made by the Cybersyn system.
a Nation 595
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
that of modernisationto create a 'powerful politicalinstrument'able to
garner outside support.81He often used phrases such as 'the people's
science' to stress the anti-technocraticnatureof the Cybersynproject.In
his public speeches, Beer emphasised that Chile's best scientists were
creating'a new systemof management'and refrainedfrom mentioningthe
contributionsof his British colleagues.82At Beer's request, the famous
ChileanfolksingerAngel Parracomposed an originalsong entitled'Litany
for a Computerand a BabyAbout to Be Born' for use on the factoryfloor.
The 'baby' in the title refers to the rebirth of Chilean people through
socialist transformation.The chorus of the song similarlyconveyed the
politicalintentionsof the project:
Hay que parar al que no quiera
que el pueblo gane esta pelea
Hay que juntar toda la ciencia
antes que acabe la paciencia.83
(We must stop those who do not want
the people to win this fight
We must bring together all of science
Before we run out of patience)
The song demonstratedthe importanceof technology in bringingabout

social change,and its potentialfor eliminatingpoliticalcorruption.Its lyrics
issued a rallyingcry as well as a propheticwarning.
The politics of the project extended beyond propagandaor rhetoric,
shapingthe very design of the system. Understandingthe correlationbetween the design of Cybersynand Allende'spolitics requiresa closer examinationof the President'splan to transformChileinto a socialiststate.
Socialism
Cybernetic
Allende'sinterpretationof Marx'swritingsemphasisedthe importanceof
respectingChile'sexistingdemocraticprocesses in bringingabout socialist
Unlikeprevious
reform,a possibilityalludedto by Marxbut neverrealised.8s4
socialist revolutions, such as those in Cuba and in the Soviet Union, Chile's
transitionto socialismwas to be democratic,includingrespect for election

results,individualfreedoms(suchas the freedomof thought,speech,press,
81
83
84
Stafford Beer, 'The Extension of Cybernetic Management Systems to the Enterprises: A

Reconsideration of the Political Context', 14 Oct. 1972, box 57, The Stafford Beer
82 Ibid
Lyrics 'Letania para una computadora y para un nifio que va a nacer', box 64, The Stafford
Beer Collection, Liverpool John Moores University.
Karl Marx, 'The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution,' in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The
Marx-EngelsReader(New York, 1978), pp. 522-4.
596
Eden Medina
assemblyand rule of law),and publicparticipationin governmentdecisionmaking through elected representatives.At one point, Allende promised
that, 'we would not be revolutionariesif we were to limit ourselves to
maintainingpoliticalfreedom.The governmentof the UnidadPopularwill
extend political freedom'.85However, it is crucialto note that Allende's
notion of individualor politicalfreedoms did not coincide with individualism,which he associatedwith capitalistselfishnessthat detractedfrom the
collectivewell being of the Chileannation.86 In contrastto the centralised
planning found in the Soviet Union, Allende's articulationof socialism
stressed a commitmentto decentralisedgovernancewith worker participation in management, reinforcing his professed belief in individual
freedoms.Yet, he also admittedthat in the face of politicalpluralitythe
governmentwould favourthe 'interestof those who made theirliving by
their own work' and that revolutionshould be broughtabout from above
using a 'firmguidinghand'.87
The tension inherent in Beer's model between individualautonomy
and the welfare of the collective organismmirrorsthe strugglebetween
competing ideologies found in Allende's democratic socialism. Both
emphasisethe importanceof individualfreedomsand the need for decentralisation,while recognisingsituationswhen 'the needs of one division
must be sacrificed... explicitlyto the needs of other divisions'.88 Thus, the
collectivewelfareof the stateor the homeostasisof the systemtakespriority
over the mechanismsdevised to ensure autonomy,freedom, and liberty.
Accordingto Beer, this conflict of values can only be resolvedat the top,
a belief supportedby Allende'sdeterminationthat the Chileangovernment
would favour policies protectingthe rights and interests of the workers
in spite of the legislative provisions that granted equal rights to the
opposition.
However, the strikingsimilaritybetween Allende'sarticulationof socialism and the cyberneticmodel guiding Cybersyn'sconstructionshould not
come as a completesurprise.Cybersynwas intentionallydesignedto provide
an instrumentalembodiment of Chile's socialist politics. As Schwember
wrote, 'The feasibilityof anyconceivableschemeof participationis strongly
dependenton prevailingideology.'89Marxismnot only guided the design
SalvadorAllende, 'The ChileanRoad to Socialism:First Annual Messageto Congress,
RoadtoSocialism
21 May 1971,'in RichardGott (ed.), Chile's
(Baltimore,1973), P. 149.
86 Debray,TheChilean
Revolution,
p. 87.
87 Allende,'The ChileanRoad to Socialism,'p. 15o; Winn, Weavers
ofRevolution,
p. I85.
88
Beer,BrainoftheFirm,pp. i6o-i.
89 Herman Schwember,'Cyberneticsin Government: Experience with New Tools for
andToolsof ComputerManagementin Chile 1971-1973,'in HartmutBossel (ed.), Concepts
AssistedPoliyAnalysis,Vol.I (Basel,1977), P. I136.
85
a Nation 597
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
of the system, it provided the essential hegemonic force needed for
Cybersyn'scontinuedfunctionality.
The Marxistslant in Cybersyn'sdesign appears clearlyin two system
diagramslater drawnby Schwember,both of which illustratethe centrality
of workerparticipationto Cybersyn'soperation(Figure4). The firstimage
depictsthe nation, the centralgovernment,industry(CORFO),and the individualfirms as nested viable systems,each one located recursivelyinside
the other. The figure of a worker appearsat the heart of these systems,
reinforcingthe perceivedimportanceof workersto the Chileannation.The
second diagramshows a modifiedrenderingof Beer'sfive-tierviablesystem
modelwith the figureof a workerinsertedinto the structureof both systemI
and system 5. Here, the workercontributesboth physicallyandmentallyto
the productionprocess,an illustratedresponseto Marx'scritiqueof alienated
labourin capitalistsocieties,where the worker'does not develop freelyhis
mental and physicalenergiesbut is physicallyexhaustedand mentallydebased'.9oThe idea of alienatedlabourappearedfrequentlyin Cybersynteam
discussionsand,in Beer'sopinion,constitutedone of Marx'smost influential
ideas.91
At a more concretelevel the system'soriginaldesigncreatednew channels
for workerparticipation,such as invitingworkersto lend their expertiseto
the creationof factorymodels. Plans to place low-tech versions of the operationsroom in each of the nationalisedfactoriessimilarlystrove to augmentworkerparticipation.
These simplifiedrooms,with blackboardsinstead
of projection screens, would assist worker decision-makingthrough facilitatedcommunicationand greatervisualisationof factoryoperations,and
would createa mechanismfor enteringthe commandchainof highermanagement.Accordingto an interventorfromMADEMSA,a makerof electric
appliances,mappingthe vital indices of productionprovided a source of
motivationfor employeeswho used the figuresas a basis for bonuses and as
a meansof promotingcollectiveproductioninsteadof individualoutput.92
The correlationbetween Allende'sMarxismand Beer's cyberneticswas
intentional,but it would be wrong to classify cyberneticsas a Marxist
science, just as it would be wrong to call Cybersynan inherentlyMarxist
technology.Accordingto Beer, cyberneticsprovideda scientificmethod for
uncoveringnaturallaws and remainedneutralin its conclusions. 'Proper
use of science', Beer wrote, 'is really the world's brightesthope for a
90
andPhilosophic
Ibid.,pp. 86, 13 5 ; KarlMarx,Economic
of r44(New York, 1964),
Manuscripts
"I Beer,interview.
p. 125.
9" Beca, interview.Beca, who was both directorof ECOM and interventorin MADEMSA
duringthe governmentof the UP, noted that the use of the system depended strongly
on interventorsupport.For example,MADEMSAdiscontinuedall work on Cybersyn's
implementationafterBeca left the factory.
598 EdenMedina
THE WHOLENATION
12
THE CENTRALGOVERNMENT
:
cc
0o
THE STATE ECONOMY

INDUSTRY(CORFO)
8
LINE(MEAT)
O
z
3
D
zM
it
ONE BRANCH(CONSUMPTION- PERISHABLES)

ONE SECTOR (FOOD)
61--ONE
THEFIRM
DEPARTMENT
oU"3,
r
WORKSHOP
CREW
z1w
Z D
0I0
33
_m
I4
,10
L_5
Source: HermanSchwember,
Fig. 4. Worker
drawnas a systemdiagram.
'Cybernetics
particdpation
in Government:
in Chile1971-973', in Hartmut
Bossel(ed.),
withNew Toolsfor
Management
Experience
ConceptsandTools of Computer-Assisted
usedwith
PolicyAnalysis,Vol. I (Basel,z977).
Images
permission
fromBirkhauserVerlag.
a Nation 599
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
stable government... with cybernetics,we seek to lift the problems of
organizationalstructureout of the ruck of prejudice- by studyingthem
The strengthof cybernetics,therefore,is that it 'providesa
scientifically.'93
languagesufficientlyrich and perceptiveto make it possible to discuss the
As a neutral language,cybernetics
problem objectively,without heat'."94
'should not develop its own ideology; but it should attest to one'.95This
is an importantpoint - Beer recognisedthat his cybernetictoolbox could
createa computersystemcapableof increasingcapitalistwealthor enforcing
fascist control, a moral dilemmathat would laterplague the projectteam.
In Beer's opinion, cyberneticsmade Marxismmore efficient through its
abilityto regulatesocial,politicaland economicstructures.Marxism,in turn,
gave cyberneticsa purposefor regulatingsocial action.
theRevolution
Regulating
Beer and Allende both sought to change the Chileansystem of economic
governance.For Allende,transformingChile from a capitalistto a socialist
countrynecessitatedstructuraltransformationand a systematicdismantling
of previous productionpractices.Beer's work similarlyaimed to provide
tools for transformingChile's system of factory control by restructuring
the industrialsector to adhereto his five-tiermodel, eliminatingwhat he
perceivedas unnecessarybureaucracy,and grantingfactoryworkersa new
means of participatingin factoryregulation.In one of his earlierreports
dated October 1972, Beer wrote, 'The targetis to transformthe whole of
industrialmanagement,and to make Chileanindustryfully effectivein one
year.'96
However, Beer's goal quicklytranscendedits initialobjectiveof factory
regulationand expandedto addressnumerousfacetsof the Chileanpolitical
system, includinga project to install algedonicmeters in a representative
sampleof Chileanhomes thatwould allow Chileancitizensto transmittheir
pleasureor displeasurewith televisedpoliticalspeeches to the government
or television studio in real time.97Beer dubbed this undertaking'The
People's Project' and 'Project Cyberfolk'because he believed the meters
would enablethe governmentto respondrapidlyto public demands,rather
than repress opposing views.98Barely one month later, Beer wrote to
94 Beer, Brain of theFirm, p. 18o.
95 Ibid.,p. 260.
96 Stafford Beer, 'The Extension of Cybernetic Management Systems to the Enterprises,' p. 3.
Beer did not elaborate much on how these signals would travel from Chilean homes to the
97
Chilean government, but the effect seems similar to the current practice of monitoring
focus group reactions to political speeches.
98 Stafford Beer, 'Project Cyberfolk', March 1972, box 6i, The Stafford Beer Collection,
Liverpool John Moores University.
p. 425.
93 Beer,Platform
for Change,
6oo EdenMedina
CybersynProjectDirector RauilEspejo, 'We are only beginningthe reformationof the whole process of government.I do not exaggerateto saythat
the total conceptis of two ordersof magnitudebiggerthan cybersynergy.'99
By December 1972, two months after the October strike,Beer had completely revised the scope of the project, drawingtwo levels of recursion
ratherthanthe singleviablesystemthatinitiallycharacterised
Cybersyn.The
technical
was
a
now
new
original
overarchingproject
project
eclipsed by
of state regulationthat began with the Chileanpeople and ended with the
ministryof the economy; in this schematicCybersynprovided one input
ratherthan a systematicwhole.
Although Beer's ambitious ideas continued to command the respect
of his Chilean teammates- they often referredto him as a genius- he
frequentlymet resistancefrom those who claimed they were 'politically
unrealistic'.This complaintresurfacedamong membersof his team,some
of whom preferredconstructingtechnicalsolutions to redefininggovernment operations.In response to one of Beer'slaterreports,Espejo wrote,
'Withinthe governmentin the short term,I thinkthe ideologicalproblems
are in a second place ... we can do models for effectiveproblemsof the
Througheconomy .... Throughthemwe can dismantlethe bureaucracy.'100
out 1973 Beer grew increasinglyfrustratedwith Espejo's technocratic
leanings;this passagesuggestsEspejo'saffinityfor technicalproblemsrather
than ideological ones.101
From 1971to 1973Beerexpandedthe projectgoal from one of economic

transformation.
However,the success
regulationto one of political-structural
of the project depended upon members of the industrialsector and the
Chileangovernmentacceptingthe system in its entirety.As Beer himself
acknowledged,adoptingindividualcomponentscould prove disastrousand
result in 'an old system of government with some new tools ... For if
the inventionis dismantled,and the tools used are not the tools we made,
This having been said,
they could become instrumentsof oppression.'102
observers from within Chile, around the world and even within the
projectteam tendedto view Cybersynas a set of technologicalcomponents
ratherthan a synergisticwhole - in effect separatingthe technologyfrom
the ideology behind its creation.Accordingto Beer, membersof Chilean
opposition parties wrote congratulatoryletters embracing Cybersyn's
design- minus,of course,its emphasison workerparticipation.The centrist
99 Telex from Stafford Beer to Radl Espejo, 6 Nov. 1972, box 66, The Stafford Beer
o00 Letter from Ratil Espejo to Stafford Beer, 22 May 1973, box 66, The Stafford Beer
IUI Beer, interview.
Decybernation:A Contributionto CurrentDebates,' 27 April 1973,

box 64, The StaffordBeer Collection,LiverpoolJohn MooresUniversity.
1U* StaffordBeer, 'On
a Nation 60I
Freedom,
Regulating
Designing
Chilean newsmagazine Ercilla separated the project from its socialist objectives in a different way, publishing an article in January I973 entitled
'El "hermano mayor" de Mr. Beer' - an obvious allusion to the totalitarian
world depicted in George Orwell's I984.103 Equally sinister commentary
appeared in the rightist magazine Que Pasa under the headline, 'La UP nos
controla por computaci6n'.104
Internationally, similar perceptions provoked criticism from British
for People,both of which accused the
publications New Scientistand Science
system of being overly centralised and abusive of the Chilean population.105
Similar criticism came from the United States, particularlyfrom mainframe
computing guru Herb Grosch of the National Bureau of Standards, who
refused to believe that 'Beer and his team could put together a major new
model, in a strange and primitive hardware and software environment, in
a few months'. In a scathing letter to the editor of New ScientistGrosch wrote,
'I call the whole concept beastly. It is a good thing for humanity, and for
Chile in particular, that it is only a bad dream.'106Throughout 1973 Beer
received invitations from the repressive governments in Brazil and South
Africa to build comparable systems. Considering the political context of
each of these nations during the early 1970s, it is easy to sympathise with
Beer's lament, 'You can see what a false position I am in.'107
According to Beer, the success of the system hinged on its acceptance as
a system,a network of people as well as machines, a revolution in behaviour
as well as in instrumental capability. However, in practice quite the opposite
occurred. Not only were the tools not accepted in the manner in which
they were designed, but members of the Cybersyn team themselves failed to
understand fully the cybernetic principles behind their development, and
proved unable to convey the rationale behind the system to members of the
industrial sector. From the perspective of many Chilean engineers involved
103 'El "hermano
mayor"de Mr.Beer,'Erdlla,no. 1958(23-30Jan.1973),p. II.
104'PlanSecreto"Cyberstride":
LaUP nos controlapor computaci6n,'
Qu'Pasa(i Feb.
1973),P. 7.
105JohnAdams,'Everything
underControl,'Science
no. 21 (April-May
forPeople,
1973),PP.
vol. 57,no. 833
4-6; JosephHanlon,'ChileLeapsinto Cybernetic
Future,'NewScientist,
(15February15 1973), PP. 363-364.
106HerbGrosch,'ChileanEconomicControls,'NewScientist,
vol. 57,no. 837 (15March
character
withinthe historyof
1973),pp. 626-7. Groschhimselfis a ratherinteresting
'Grosch'sLaw',whichgovernedthemainframe
circles,firstforhisself-coined
computing
cancomputingindustryduringthe i96os and 1970s,and secondfor his notoriously
in NewScientist
tankerous
Whilehis harshcommentary
to
personality.
maybe attributed
thelatter,it is alsothecasethatGroschhadtravelled
to Santiago
duringthelateI96osto
of EduardoFreiMontalva
advisethegovernment
on waysto improveChile'scomputer
capabilities.
107 Telex from Stafford Beer to Ratil Espejo, I March 1973, box 66, The Stafford Beer
602
EdenMedina
with the project,masteringcybernetictheoriestook second placeto seeking

to ordereconomicchaos or developingnew technologies.Contraryto Beer's
view of the project, a number of the engineers describedtheir work as
primarilytechnical,ratherthan political,and saw the end goal as creatinga
new tool for economic management.One of the membersof the Chilean
team, who was chargedwith creatingfactorymodels of the textile sector,
poignantlysummarisedthe situation:
is not accepted,nor even
... the finalobjective,'the revolutionin management'
understood.... I haven'tseen a singlemanagerreallymotivatedby the central
concept,andwhatis worse... [of]theteamthathasdevelopedtheworkonlya very
few presentthe conceptsinvolved... Ultimately
yourworkis acceptedas longas
it providestools to achievea moreeffectivetraditional
It is not even
management.
a halfwayrevolution,it is a mixture,whichif not adequately
caredfor mightend
up meaninga newincreasein bureaucracy.108
To put it anotherway, these new technologiesserved to entrenchfurther
manyof the managementpracticesthathad disempoweredworkerspriorto
Allende'spresidency,ratherthan to bringabout revolutionarychange.
On the factory floor technocracyregularlyeclipsed ideology.Although
Cybersynengineers received explicit instructionsto work in conjunction
with workercommitteesin developingquantifiablemodels detailingfactory
productioncapabilities,often the converseoccurredand the engineerwould
treatthe workerwith an airof condescensionratherthancooperation,or he
would ignore the workersaltogetherand deal directlywith management.109
Moreover, they frequentlyhid or overlooked the political facets of the
projectin favourof emphasisingits technologicalmerits,therebyavoiding
potentiallabour conflicts.Although the projectteam did drawup training
programmesfor educatingworkerson how to use these new management
tools to increaselevels of participation,these efforts were cut off before
they could bear fruit.As a result,most workersremainedunawareof the
Cybersynsystemand the managementtools it offered.
Instead of promoting social transformationand augmentingworker
participationat every level of government,a principleupheld on paperby
Beer and CORFO, these interactionsbetween Cybersynengineers and
workersin the nationalisedsector reflectedChileansocialand culturalhierarchiesgenerallyand reinforcedthe project'stechnocraticimage.The new
role createdfor the scientificexpertwas latersummarisedin a paperwritten
by a memberof the projectteam.Accordingto the author,'The individual
[workers]shouldhave effectiveorganicfeedbackchannelsto all niveaus[sic]
10s Letter from Tomis Kohn to Stafford Beer, I9 April 1973, box 63, The Stafford Beer
109 Tomis Kohn, interview by author, Santiago de Chile, 5 Sept. 2003.
603
of the system',but at the same time learnto accept expertadviceand even

demandit when necessary.This would help them 'avoid confusionof their
role'.11The designof the Opsroomfurtherconfirmedthat Cybersynwould
maintainthe existing power relationssurroundingproduction instead of
transformingthem. By decidingto remove the keyboardand 'eliminatethe
girl' betweenthe userand the machine,as well as by designingthe systemto
reflect and encouragemasculineforms of communication,the Cybersyn
team demonstrateda complicit understandingthat state power would
remainlargelyin the hands of Chile'smale population.This design choice
similarlyillustratesthat'worker'would continueto referexclusivelyto those
employedin factoriesand not expandto includethose performingclerical
tasks.
Cybersyn'ssuccess, as described by Beer, hinged on creating a new
structureof economic managementthat fundamentallyalteredthe relations
betweenworkers,managers,engineersand public sector employees.However, reachinga state of homeostasis,or stability,dependedon controlling
the numberof variablescentralto Chile'seconomictransition.This premise
createdtwo immediateproblems.First, makingBeer's model a functional
realitynecessitatedtransformingthe existingpolitical,economic and social
structure,a near impossible task in Chile's fracturedpolitical context.
Revolutionthroughdemocracy,ratherthan throughviolence, restrictedthe
potential avenues for change and after much frustrationcaused Beer to
wonder, 'Does it take more courage to be a cyberneticianthan to be a
gunman?'in Second, althoughmembersof the project team designedthe
factorymodels with a degree of structuralflexibilityat the industrylevel,
Cybersynas a whole did not possess the capabilitiesneeded to effect the
transition of Chile's economy from capitalismto socialism or control
the unforeseen events that marked Chile's unprecedentedpath toward
revolution.Ratherthan regulatingtransformation,Cybersynfell victim to
the instabilityaccompanyingAllende's programmefor socialist reform.
Project engineersfound themselves attemptingthe impossible:modelling
an economic systemthat refusedto remainconstantusing only a subset of
the variablesneeded to understandthe system. Production,as gauged by
flows of raw materialsand finishedgoods, constitutedonly one aspect of
the Chilean economy- one that increasinglypaled in comparisonto the
economic dislocationsof inflation,consumershortages,politicalinfighting,
US foreignpolicy,black-market
hoarding,labourstrikesand increasedsocial
110
Schwember,'Cyberneticsin Government,' p. 88. It is interestingto note that Beer

divergedfrom this view as the projectprogressedandeventuallydraftedboth a reportand
a letterto PresidentAllendeemphasisingthe importanceof the workerslearningto create
the models themselvesratherthan looking to the adviceof technocraticexperts.
111 Beer, 'On Decybernation', p. 6.
604 EdenMedina
unrest.Labour,in particular,did not behave as just anotherfactorof production,but ratheras a corpusof self-consciousindividualsable to criticise
and resist state operations.In hindsightBeer wrote, 'The model we were
using ... couldnot adequatelyrepresentchangesthathad come aboutduring
Allende's term ... because these were changes in economic management
that had nothing to do with ownershipin the legal sense.'112Ratherthan
Beer
transformingChile'seconomythroughthe massivesocialrestructuring
to
the
envisaged,Cybersynstruggledmerely regulate day-to-dayoperations,a
taskthat becameincreasinglydifficultby 1973.
However, this should not imply that the systemwas a complete failure,
justas the ideologicalcongruencebetweenthe systemandAllende'splan for
reform does not qualifyit as a success. Regulation,like transformation,
playedan importantrole in keepingthe Allendegovernmentafloatand, as
Chile's socio-economic situation slid into chaos, the necessity for social
and politicalregulationgraduallyeclipsed the earlierpriorityattributedto
structuraltransformation.
AlthoughBeer maintainedthat the systemwould
in
function
its
only
entirety,componentsfrom the prototypeconproperly
tributedsignificantlyto the government'sabilityto counteractand manage
strikeactivityas well as its capacityto map complexeconomic fluctuations
using recentlygenerateddata.By May 1973 26.7per cent of the nationalised
industries,responsible for 50 per cent of the sector's revenue had been
incorporatedto some degreewithin the system.113
Following the strike of October 1972 CORFO founded a Directorate
of Informaticschargedwith expandingthe scope of the industriesconnected
to the systemand increasingthe use Cybersyndatawithin state operations,
a technicalundertakingsupportedby CORFOpresidentandformerMinister
of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic.114
These regulatorycontributionsof the
the
assisted
economic
day-to-day
system
operationsof the Allendegovernment - if less skilfullymanaged, the October strike, or any number of
Chile'sother economic crises,could have shortenedthe life span of the UP
and furtherrestrictedtheirpoliticaloptions. In one of his final reportson
the project, Beer summarisedhis views on the importanceof regulation
to Chile'sdemocraticroadto socialism:
of revolution.
I meanthat'TheWay
[I]... envisionourinventionas aninstrument
of Production'is still a necessaryfeatureof the Chileanrevolution,but that
of a complexworld not
'The Way of Regulation'is an extra requirement
byMarxor Lenin.115
experienced
112 Beer, Brain of theFirm, p. 323.
AllendeAnte CongresoPleno,
1s MensajePresidente
2z/Mayo '73,pp. 41 2-1 3.
114
Alberto Martinez, telephone conversation with the author, 7 October 20zoo03.

Martinez
served as CORFO director of planning during Vuskovic's appointment as CORFO
president.
"' Beer, 'On Decybernation,'p. 5.
a Nation 605
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Designing
Regulating
In the light of Beer'sexperienceof the applicationof cyberneticprinciples
to the Chileanpolitical situation,his new interpretationof revolutionis
understandable.However, it seems more plausible that this newfound
emphasison regulationdid not stem from a changein world complexityor
from an oversightin Marx'sphilosophy.Ratherit reflectshow science and
technology can influence and redefine our conceptualisationsof political
order and the tools availablefor orchestratingsocial change. The history
of the Cybersynsystem furtherillustratesthat politicalideologies not only
articulatea worldview,but can also contributeto the designand application
of new technologiesthat politicians,engineersand scientistssubsequently
use to createand maintainthese new configurationsof state power.
Cybersyndemonstrateshow the study of technology can advanceour
understandingof historicalevents and processeswithin the LatinAmerican
region. Given that the creationof a technologicalsystem requiresdiverse
assemblagesof actors,in this case politicians,foreignexperts,engineersand
factoryworkers, a scholarlyanalysisof such a system can illustratehow
membersof each grouparticulatedthe challengesthey faced and theirplace
within the world they were creating.Disagreementsover implementation
(such as the level of worker involvement),contradictoryreadingsof its
potentialfor control,and the politics of everydaydesign decisions (such as
whetherto use a keyboardin the OperationsRoom), did not simplyreflect
ideas on technologicalfeasibilityand soundness.Instead,they revealedclass
resistanceto economic and social change,the scope of Cold Warideology,
and the limitationsof the redistributionof power within Chile's socialist
revolution.Furthermore,the system brings to light the as yet unstudied
value attributedto science and technology duringthis period of Chilean
history and provides a concrete articulation of the UP ideological
programmefor economic transformation.
The historypresentedhere demonstrates,moreover,the singularnature
of Chile's socialist experiment.Not only was this project unique in the
mannerin which it appliedcyberneticscience to economic regulationand
stategovernance,but its emphasison decentralisedcontrolalso resultedin a
technologythatreflectedthe distinguishingfeaturesof the UP government.
Althoughwe mayquestionthe exactmagnitudeof the contributionmadeby
this system in staving off Chile's mountingpolitical,social and economic
upheavals,its historydoes offera new perspectiveon the Chileanexperience.
In contrastto the chaoticimagesof shortages,strikes,andproteststhathave
come to characterisethe era,Cybersynpresentsan alternativehistory.Here
we see membersof CORFO,INTEC, ECOM andtheirBritishinterlocutors
strugglingto realisea differentdreamof socialistmodernity,technological
capability and regulated order. It would be a dream some Cybersyn team
members continued to pursue up until the day the military imposed a very
60o6 EdenMedina
differentform of order on the Chileanpeople and membersof the project

with projectdocumentstuckedundertheir
team fled CORFOheadquarters
armsin orderto preservethem for the future.116
On the morningof i i September1973 the Chileanmilitarylauncheda
coup againstthe Allendegovernment.It beganin the city of Valparaisoand
continuedto gatherstrengthas the militarytravelledsouth towardSantiago.
By 2 p.m. Allendewas dead,his dreamincineratedby the flamesengulfing
the presidentialpalace. Following the coup, the militarymade several
attempts to understandthe theoreticaland technologicalaspects of the
CybersynProject.When these efforts failed,they decided to dismantlethe
operationsroom.
Almost every Cybersynparticipantwho contributedto this study has
claimed that the project changed his or her life. Most now hold high
positionsin eitheruniversitiesor tech-relatedindustries,and havecontinued
to use knowledgeacquiredfrom the projectto this day. However,despite
Cybersyn'scontributionto Chile's technologicalhistory as well as to the
politicalhistoryof this well-studiedperiod,untilvery recentlyit had all but
vanishedfromwiderChileanmemory.Likethe manyother casualtiesof the
Pinochetdictatorship,Cybersyndisappeared.
116
Guillermo Toro, email correspondencewith author, 5 June 2004. Toro, who began
workingas the Cybersynprojectcoordinatorin June I973,vividlyrecallsriskinghis life by
with ProjectDirectorRadiEspejo on the day of the coup
leavingCORFOheadquarters
with four packagesof photocopied Cybersyndocumentsthat Espejo still holds in his
possession. In Toro's words, the documentation,'debe ser salvadoparacontarlo'.

How Chile's Socialist Government Used Cybernetics to Regulate the Economy

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Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics in Allende's Chile

Author(s): Eden Medina

j Lat.Amer.Stud.38, 57i-6o6 ? zoo6 CambridgeUniversityPress

Designing Freedom, Regulating

Abstract. This article presents a history of 'Project Cybersyn', an early computer

On 12 November i971 British cyberneticianStaffordBeer met Chilean

'Synco' in Spanish,1would networkeveryfirmin the expandingnationalised

the presidentleanedbackin his chairand said,'At last, elpueblo.'6

the constructionof this systemprovidesinformationon the extentof Chile's

and aspirationsexpressedby variousprojectparticipantsfurthermorereveal

Although little attention has been paid to cyberneticsin Latin America,scholarshave

addressin the National

the alienated ChristianDemocrats accused the government of abusing

officialswho replacedthe previous factorymanagersand literallyintervenedin factory

41 Roberto Cafiete, 'The Brain of the Government: An Application of Cybernetic Principles

and made the language of Beer's managementcyberneticstheir lingua

drawnas a five-tierviablesystem.Source: CORFO,Proyecto

hypotheticalchain of managementpresentedin the following paragraphs

and risinginflationrateshad transformedthe problemof economic control

meantto facilihomogenisedby a uniformsystemof iconic representation,

The song demonstratedthe importanceof technology in bringingabout

transitionto socialismwas to be democratic,includingrespect for election

Stafford Beer, 'The Extension of Cybernetic Management Systems to the Enterprises: A

THE STATE ECONOMY

ONE BRANCH(CONSUMPTION- PERISHABLES)

From 1971to 1973Beerexpandedthe projectgoal from one of economic

Decybernation:A Contributionto CurrentDebates,' 27 April 1973,

1U* StaffordBeer, 'On

with the project,masteringcybernetictheoriestook second placeto seeking

of the system',but at the same time learnto accept expertadviceand even

Schwember,'Cyberneticsin Government,' p. 88. It is interestingto note that Beer

111 Beer, 'On Decybernation', p. 6.

Alberto Martinez, telephone conversation with the author, 7 October 20zoo03.

"' Beer, 'On Decybernation,'p. 5.

differentform of order on the Chileanpeople and membersof the project

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