2

a.

No. The admitting physician is not liable for the fault made by the
fellow physician who conducted the surgery without the formers
supervision and control. Therefore, Captain of the Ship Doctrine is
not applicable in this case because it is well established that the doctor
was outside the country for some valid reasons while the surgery was
conducted. In the said doctrine, it is the liability of the physician
vicariously for the negligent act of the employees working under his
supervision as if a captain of a ship on the sea is liable for the wrong
committed by his fellow men.

b. No. This cannot be considered a quasi-delict because Art. 2176 of the

New Civil Code defines a quasi-delict in this manner: Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
It clearly states the requisites to qualify the said wrong doing, to wit:
1. There must be an act or omission;
2. Such act or omission causes damage to another;
3. Such act or omission caused by fault or negligence; and
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
In this case, it lacks the fourth requisite because it clearly states that
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, to wit:
the surgery made by the reliever physician.
c. I would prosecute this case by filing a complaint based on culpa
contractual because there is a pre-existing obligation between the
parties. In addition, the negligence committed by the physician was
only incidental to the performance of an existing obligation based on a

contract. Hence, the client assumes that the physician knows

everything regarding the profession.
d. No. Res ipsa loquitur does not apply to all tort cases or even to all
personal injury cases. Rather, doctrine appears only with the type of
injuries that do not occur unless someone is negligent. Requisites of
Res Ipsa Loquitor:
1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someones negligence;
2. The instrumentality which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control and management of the person charged with negligence;
and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured; absence of
explanation by the defendant.
In this case, it does not show that the doctor is negligent during the
anesthesia phase. Furthermore, no materials or equipment found on
the patients body or that caused damage to the latter. Therefore, the
doctrine would not apply in this case because the court assumes that
the doctor exercised an utmost and extraordinary diligence over the
patient, except the proper standard is whether, the physician if a
general practitioner, has exercised the degree of care and skill of the
average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances in the
profession. A physician who holds himself out as a specialist should be
held to the standard of care and skill of the average member of the
profession practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in
the profession
3.
4.

a. Yes. Experts and professionals, they should exhibit the care and skill of one
who is ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he is in. When a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of
one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
Moreover, an expert will not be judged based on what a non-expert can
foresee. The rule regarding experts is applicable not only to professionals
who have undergone formal education. Therefore, even without the presence
of the engineer, he is still liable for negligence.
5.
a. Yes. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, this persons, corporations,
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public is called a common carrier. What is clear
from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage between the Bus
Company the passenger of said vehicle.

As a common carrier, it is bound to

carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common
carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact,
there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence.

Furthermore,

ur

new

Civil

Code

amply

provides

for

the

responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For

purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the

vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra
ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the

diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the

act or omission.
b. No. Under ART. 1763 of the NCC. A common carrier responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission. Hence, it clearly shows that it was only the bus
company to be held liable for the damage suffered by the passenger.

6
a. Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
b. The signing of a waiver would negate the schools liability,
wherein the parents agree to the terms and conditions of the
said waiver, especially when the school would not take any
liability with the child in case of accident.