SYNOPSIS:

Just this/last September 2015, a tripartite meeting had transpired between the MNLF, GPH, and the OIC.
The purpose of such is to revisit the agreements among the parties during the previous tripartite meetings and
tackle present issues in order to arrive at prospective resolutions in the ensuing quest for political emancipation by
the Moros.

In particular, they have tackled the current status of the BBL (as reported by the GPH panel), the
implementation of BDAF, the significance of the TIMC (Tripartite Implementation and Monitoring Committee), the
idea of Co-Management of Strategic Minerals between the Moro Government and the GPH, and, essentially, the
idea of Convergence of all previous Peace Agreements entered by the parties.

Given the agenda set forth in the said tripartite meeting, it can be inferred that the emerging resolution
chosen by the parties (as of the present) is to resume the passage of the BBL with its corresponding modifications.
In essence, as stressed by the MNLF panel, the latter aims that all previous Peace Agreements (especially the
1996 FPA) be incorporated in the said autonomy bill. Among the relevant points in the FPA is the implementation of
the ideal Bangsamoro territory which will eventually materialise if the plebiscite process of the BBL will be
strengthened. Moreover, the parties had also recognised the significance of the TIMC which shall function during
the transitory period of the Bangsamoro government envisioned in the said autonomy bill.

As a whole, it can be assumed that the fundamental resolution reached by the parties during the said
Tripartite meeting is to remain faithful in the implementation of the BBL, amidst its present legal constraints.
Although the meeting was attended by the MNLF group, it seems that the latter concedes towards the autonomous
plight despite the fact that the organization essentially fights for Moro self-determination and of the fact that such bill
was authored by the MILF and the GPH. There are still manifest as well as salient aspects of this Moro quest that
must first be attended before moving towards the present institutional process undertaken by the parties. Of prime
among these is the attainment of equal and genuine representation of the Moro people in the negotiating panel in
order to overcome the existing divided Muslim community which continues to hamper any diplomatic relations that
ensue between the GPH and the Moros. Moreover, given the ensuing confusion as to the identify of the
mainstreamed Moro groups, there is also a great need that they must first define their identity and objectives before
they present themselves as the voice of the Moro people.

In the end, given the present situation, finding concrete and substantial resolution would remain unattained
for as long as existing socio-political and institutional discrepancies are not abridged. Until the framers and key
actors wont arrive at a common ground and a genuine objective, table talks (and hopefully not bullet talks) would
continue to ensue, finding no end and meaning/direction. The quest would become an endless cycle wherein the
Bangsamoro dream of attaining political emancipation would continue to be unrealised at the expense and
detriment of the Moro people.