ELECTRONICALLY FILED

3/8/2010 9:58 AM
CV-2009-900019.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
LOWNDES COUNTY, ALABAMA
RUBY JONES, CLERK

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOWNDES COUNTY, ALABAMA

Cornerstone Community )
Outreach, Inc., et al, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CV-2009-9000019
)
)
Bob Riley, et al, )
)
Defendants. )

_________________________________________________________________

State of Alabama, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CV-2009-9000027
)
)
Chad Dickie, et al, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER

This order comes after consideration of the parties’ filings made in response to the
prior order of February 11, 2010, in these related cases.

In the first of these cases, Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., et al, v. Riley
(CV-09-900019)(hereafter referred to as the “Declaratory Judgment Action”), this
Court, though retired Justice Mark Kennedy, previously entered a preliminary
injunction that was thereafter appealed. The following facts come from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., ---
So.3d ----, 2009 WL 3805712 (Ala., Nov. 13, 2009):

On December 30, 2008, Governor Bob Riley issued Executive Order No. 44
creating the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling (“the Task Force”). The
order stated that the purpose of the Task Force was “promoting and supporting
uniform statewide enforcement of Alabama's anti-gambling laws and to carry out
the Alabama Constitution's strong public policy against lottery schemes and illegal
gambling.” The order created a special prosecutor to serve as the commander of
the Task Force, who, in that capacity, is empowered to “have statewide
jurisdiction” to “conduct investigations, attend any regular, adjourned or special
session of any circuit court . . . for the investigation of or the prosecution of any
criminal case or the prosecution or defense of any case related to gambling
activity in the State of Alabama.” Governor Riley appointed former Jefferson
County District Attorney David Barber as Task Force commander.

Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc. (“Cornerstone”), obtained a license from

the Town of White Hall in Lowndes County to operate a bingo-gaming facility,
which is known as the White Hall Entertainment Center (“the EC”). An LCD
screen outside the EC advertises that the EC offers “HOT SLOTS!” for its
customers. The EC contains several hundred electronic gaming machines that are
played by hundreds of customers every day. Cornerstone purportedly obtained its
license so that it could operate charity bingo games in accordance with
Amendment No. 674, Ala. Const. 1901 (Local Amendments, Lowndes County, §
3, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.)).

Pursuant to its mandate, the Task Force on March 19, 2009, executed a search
warrant on the EC and confiscated approximately 105 electronic gaming
machines, the servers to which those machines were attached, over $500,000 in
proceeds from the games played at the EC, and various records kept by
Cornerstone.

Id. at *1.

Evidence presented in the preliminary injunction hearing also showed that neither
the Alabama Attorney General nor any member of his staff was on the Task Force
that conducted the raid, and that Lowndes County District Attorney John Andrews
was not involved, either. District Attorney Andrews, in fact, has recently submitted
an affidavit in which he testified to the following:

1. He inspected the bingo machines in question before the White Hall

Entertainment Center opened, and spoke with various individuals about how

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 the machines worked;

2. He exercised his prosecutorial judgment not to bring any criminal charges

relating to the operation of the machines;

3. He has never been contacted by anyone connected with the Governor’s Task
Force to discuss investigating or closing the White Hall facility; and

4. He did not even know of the Task Force raid until it had been accomplished.

Also brought out during the preliminary injunction hearing was evidence that the
raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant signed by the Lowndes County
district judge. The warrant was based on an affidavit provided to the judge by Mike
Reese, who is a Lieutenant with the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board,
Enforcement Division. Once the warrant was obtained, members of the ABC and
the Alabama Bureau of Investigation conducted the raid.

Again quoting from the Supreme Court’s Cornerstone opinion:

In the early afternoon on March 19, 2009, Cornerstone filed an action in the
Lowndes Circuit Court against Governor Riley, in his official capacity, Barber,
in his official capacity as the Task Force commander, and certain other members
of the Task Force in their official capacities (collectively “the Riley defendants”).
Cornerstone sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief regarding the seizure of the electronic gaming
machines by the Task Force. Specifically, Cornerstone requested a judgment
declaring that its bingo operation at the EC is permitted under Amendment No.
674, Ala. Const.1901, and whether the electronic gaming machines seized by the
Task Force constitute illegal “slot machines” under § 13A-12-27, Ala.Code 1975.
Cornerstone requested a preliminary injunction restraining the Task Force from
any further interference with its operation at the EC during the pendency of this
action and directing the Task Force to return all the seized machines, servers, and
records based on its belief that the machines are legal under Alabama law.

Freedom Trail Ventures, Ltd. (“FTV”), subsequently filed a motion to intervene

in the action, alleging that it owned at least some of the machines seized by the
Task Force and that it had leased those machines to Cornerstone. The trial court
granted FTV's motion for the limited purpose of allowing it to participate in the
preliminary-injunction phase of the proceeding.

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Id. at * 1-2.

In response, the defendantsin theDeclaratory Judgment Action filed an Answer and

Counterclaim, on April 20, 2009. The defendants’ counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that the games being played at the White Hall facility constituted illegal
gaming rather than bingo under Amendment 674, that the machines used were
illegal gambling devices, and that the items seized during the raid are properly the
subject of forfeiture proceedings.

The defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim was signed by “David Barber,

Supernumerary District Attorney, Special Prosecutor and Commander of the
Governor’s Task Force on Illegal Gambling and Gubernatorially Appointed
Attorney, on behalf of all Defendants.” Recently, John M. Tyson, Jr., Martha
Tierney, and Edgar Greene filed a notice of appearance as “Special Prosecutors for
the Governor’s Task Force on Illegal Gambling.” (The Court understands from
media accounts that David Barber is no longer with the Governor’s Task Force,
although Mr. Barber has not yet filed a motion to withdraw).

Also pending before the Court is the related case of State of Alabama v. Chad
Dickie, et al (CV-09-900027), which is a forfeiture action brought pursuant to Ala.
Code §13A-12-30 (referred to hereafter as the“Forfeiture Action”). The complaint,
which seeks the forfeiture of both money and gambling devices, was signed by
“David Barber, as Commander and Special Prosecutor of Governor’s Task Force
on Illegal Gambling and as Supernumerary District Attorney with Authority
Conferred by Gubernatorial Appointment, ex rel. State of Alabama.” In this case
as well, John M. Tyson, Jr., Martha Tierney, and Edgar Greene recently filed a
notice of appearance as “Special Prosecutors for the Governor’s Task Force on
Illegal Gambling.”

Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., and Freedom Trail Ventures, Ltd., as the
defendants in the Forfeiture Action, have filed motions to dismiss the complaint.
Each motion asserts, inter alia, that “Petitioner and its counsel lack the legal
authority to assert this forfeiture petition.” The motions remain pending.

This Court must eventually address the extent to which further proceedings in these
actions are affected by the Supreme Court’s Cornerstone decision and its
subsequent decision of Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., --- So.3d ----,

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2010 WL 415271 (Ala., Feb. 4, 2010). Even before reaching those issues, however,
this Court must address whether counsel of record for the Governmental Parties
(i.e., the defendants in the Declaratory Judgment Action and the State of Alabama
in the Forfeiture Action) can in fact appear and represent those parties.

This inquiry begins with Executive Order 44, which Governor Riley signed on
December 29, 2008. The Executive Order generally provides the following:

1. The Governor’s Task Force on Illegal Gambling is created “for the

purpose of promoting and supporting uniform statewide enforcement of
Alabama’s anti-gambling laws and to carry out the Alabama Constitution’s
strong public policy against lottery schemes and illegal gambling.” The
Director of the Department of Public Safety and the Administrator of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, and such agents as each may designate,
are included in the Task Force. Among the responsibilities of the Task
Force are to serve “as a resource for local prosecutors and law enforcement
officials who request assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
gambling-related offenses” and to “provide technical assistance,
investigative support, law enforcement personnel, and any other assistance
requested by local authorities reasonably necessary to enforce Alabama’s
anti-gambling law.”

2. A supernumerary district attorney is designated as a Special

Prosecutor and Commander of the Task Force. Pursuant to Ala. Code § 12-
17-216, this Special Prosecutor “shall have statewide jurisdiction and is
hereby authorized, with the support of the Task Force, to conduct
investigations, attend any regular, adjourned or special session of any circuit
court, in anyof the judicial circuits of Alabama for the investigation of or the
prosecution or defense of any case related to gambling activity in the State
of Alabama.”

The statute cited therein, Ala. Code § 12-17-216, provides the following:

Supernumerary district attorneys shall take the oath of office prescribed by the
constitution for judicial officers and shall have and exercise all the duties, power
and authority of district attorneys ofthe judicial circuits or circuit courts and shall,
upon request of the Governor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the
Attorney General, conductinvestigations, attend anyregular, adjourned or special

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 session of any circuit court in any of the judicial circuits of Alabama for the
investigation of or the prosecution of any criminal case or the prosecution or
defense of any case in which the state is interested. The Governor, any member
of the Supreme Court or courts of appeals or the Attorney General may request a
supernumerary district attorney to perform duties as those prescribed for assistant
attorneys general, either in their respective offices or at such other places within
or without the state as such officials may assign him. When on such special
assignment at the request or designationof one of the aforementioned officials and
performing duties as those prescribed for assistant attorneys general, the
supernumerary district attorney shall have all the powers and authority of an
assistant attorney general and shall be entitled to the same amount of sick leave
and annual leave that accrues to an assistant attorney general; and, while
performing such duties at the request of the Attorney General, he shall be
designated as a special assistant attorney general.

Governor Riley signed Amendment 1 to this Executive Order on January 25, 2010.
Among other things, this amendment recognizes the Governor’s authority to appoint
district attorneys or assistant district attorneys to serve as Special Prosecutors
pursuant to Ala. Code § 12-17-184(10), which provides as follows:

It is the duty of every district attorney and assistant district attorney, within the
circuit, county, or other territory for which he or she is elected or appointed:

* * *

(10) To go to any place in the State of Alabama and prosecute any case or cases,
or work with any grand jury, when called upon to do so by the Attorney General
or the Governor of the State of Alabama, and to attend sessions of courts and
transact all of the duties of the district attorney in the courts whenever called upon
by the Attorney General or the Governor to do so.

(The Court understands that the basis for this amendment is the fact that Mr. Tyson
– recently appointed by the Governor to serve as the Commander and Special
Prosecutor of the Task Force – remains the current District Attorney for Mobile
County, thus rendering the supernumerary district attorney statute inapplicable).

Certain goals of the Executive Order, as amended, appear uncontroversial, such as

coordinating investigative efforts of various executive agencies and serving as a
resource for local law enforcement authorities. That certain personnel connected
with the Task Force participated in the raid of March 19, 2009, moreover, does not
concern the Court at this juncture because there is independent statutory authority

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enabling personnel to act as peace officers in obtaining and executing on the search
warrant.

As discussed above, for example, the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant
issued to Mike Reese, with the ABC Board, an executive agencywith statewide law
enforcement authority. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 28-3-43(a)(6)(ABC Board may
appoint agents, inspectors or investigators and commission them to make arrests and
execute search warrants). The warrant was executed by ABC agents and Alabama
State Troopers, who are under the direction of the Alabama Department of Public
Safety, also an agency with defined law enforcement authority. See, e.g., Ala. Code
§ 32-2-22 (state troopers have statewide powers of peace officers); see also Roberts
v. State ex rel. Cooper, 253 Ala. 565, 568, 46 So.2d 5, 7 (Ala. 1950)(dealing with
a predecessor provision of Ala. Code§13A-12-30, the Supreme Court held that “the
members of the highway patrol named, while acting under the written authority
given by the governor, were clothed with authority as peace and law enforcement
officers to seize said gambling devices and report their seizure to the solicitor of the
county wherein they were seized and on such report he was authorized to file suit
seeking their condemnation and destruction”).

On the other hand, this Court is concerned with the Governor’s efforts to appoint
a Special Prosecutor as defined in the Executive Order, as amended. In considering
the impact of such efforts, it is necessary to focus on the office of the State’s
Attorney General. The duties of the Attorney General are generally spelled out by
statute. For example, “[h]e or she shall also attend to all cases other than criminal
that may be pending in the courts of this state, in which the state may be in any
manner concerned.” Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2). Moreover, “[a]ll litigation concerning
the interest of the state, or any department of the state, shall be under the direction
and control of the Attorney General.” Ala. Code § 36-15-21.

Beyond this statutory authority, the Court’s attention turns to Ex parte Weaver, 570
So.2d 675 (Ala. 1990), which is particularly instructive sincethat case also involved
a dispute between the Governor and the Attorney General, as the following
describes:

The plaintiffs in the original case are subscribers for health care benefits with
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (“Blue Cross”). They brought a class
action seeking a declaratory judgment and an order directing refunds of excess
reserves alleged to be held by Blue Cross. The plaintiffs claimed that Blue Cross

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 had “accumulated an illegal and/or excessive profit and/or reserve and surplus in
excess of the amount allowed by statute in Alabama, or required for the solvency
of the plan” and that Blue Cross's board of directors was not a representative
cross-section of the population, as is required by statute.

Blue Cross moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging, among other things, that the
subscribers had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in the Alabama
Insurance Department and had failed to join the Alabama Insurance Department.
In response to the motion, the subscribers amended their complaint and added the
Insurance Department as a defendant.

In March 1989, the circuit court entered orders certifying the plaintiffs' class;
directing the Insurance Department to perform certain tasks under certain
procedural rules and to report to the court; entering partial summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs; and denying all other pending motions. The partial
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was entered by the trial judge on the
issue of liability, i.e., he held as a matter of law that Blue Cross was illegally
calculating reserves.

Blue Cross filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or both, in the
Court of Civil Appeals. Mike Weaver, as Commissioner of Insurance, in June
1989 filed an appeal or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of mandamus from
the Court of Civil Appeals to vacate the trial court's order.

Attorney General Don Siegelman filed a motion on October 12, 1989, in the Court
of Civil Appeals to dismiss the appeal and the alternative petition for writ of
mandamus brought by the Department of Insurance. Briefs were filed and oral
argument was held on November 14, 1989, in the Court of Civil Appeals on the
issue of control of litigation of the Insurance Department. The Court of Civil
Appeals granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the attorney general has the
power to manage and control all litigation on behalf of the State of Alabama and
all of its departments.

The petition for writ of mandamus before us seeks to vacate the decision of the
Court of Civil Appeals. We must determine whether the attorney general of the
State of Alabama has the authority to move to dismiss the State Insurance
Department's proceedings in the Court of Civil Appeals over the objection of the
commissioner of insurance.

Id. at 676-77.

After an extensive review of both Alabama law and decisions from other
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court denied the mandamus petition filed by the

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Commissioner of Insurance:

We have carefully reviewed the law and the precedents in this case. The
overwhelming authority supports the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals that
the attorney general has the power to manage and control all litigation on behalf
of the State of Alabama. We hold that the attorney general of the State of
Alabama has the authority to move to dismiss the State Department of Insurance's
proceedings in the Court of Civil Appeals over the objection of the commissioner
of insurance.

We recognize that there may be times when the Governor disagrees with the
attorney general about matters in litigation. Although we determine that the
attorney general is authorized to direct the course of all litigation involving the
State and its agencies, the Governor, as “chief magistrate” of the State, may
intervene in any such litigation. Rule 24, A.R.Civ.P. As an intervenor, the
Governor may express his views and take positions contrary to those argued by
the attorney general.

Id. at 684.

Even though the Governor was not a named party in the Weaver litigation, the
holding is persuasive here. Rejected there was the argument that the Governor – as
the State’s chief magistrate – has the right under the Constitution to hire counsel
other than the Attorney General to represent the Commissioner of Insurance. See
570 So.2d at 678. Further, as Justice Houston recognized in dissent, the positions
taken by the Commissioner are to be regarded as those of the Governor:

Under this constitutional and statutory structure, the Governor, as the supreme
executive responsible under the Constitution for the execution of the laws of this
State, acts by and through agency and departmental heads, who serve as vehicles
by which the Governor carries out his constitutional mandate. By executing his
power to appoint and to remove, the Governor ensures that the executive
departments and agencies implement his decisions and adhere to his policies and
his interpretations of the laws so that his decisions may be faithfully executed.
The act of any of these subordinate executives is the act of the Governor himself.

Id. at 685 (Houston, J., dissenting).

The Weaver decision was recently cited in Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So.2d 972
(Ala. 2007), in addressing the Attorney General’s ability to moot a pending dispute
involving the Secretary of State by assuming an interpretation of the Alabama

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Constitution in line with the plaintiffs’ position. The following excerpt for the
Gooden opinion reflects the Supreme Court’s continued regard for the Attorney
General as the State’s lead lawyer:

However, “ ‘[t]he attorney general is . . . the chief law officer of the state, and on
him are conferred various authorities and duties in connection with instituting and
prosecuting, in the name of the state, suits and other proceedings . . . for the
preservation and protection of the rights and interests of the state.’ ” Ex parte
Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 679 (Ala.1990) (quoting State ex rel.Carmichael v. Jones,
252 Ala. 479, 484, 41 So.2d 280, 284 (1949)) (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Ala.Code 1975, § 36-15-21. Essentially “ ‘all litigation concerning the interest of
the state or any department thereof [lies] under the direction and control of the
attorney general.’ ” 570 So.2d at 679-80 (quoting State ex rel. Carmichael, 252
Ala. at 484, 41 So.2d at 284).

That the attorney general has the “power to formulate legal policy” for the State,
and, in connection therewith, the power to bind state officers and departments in
litigation is well established. 570 So.2d at 681 (discussing with approval Feeney
v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 368, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (1977)). In Ex
parte Weaver, supra, this Court held that the attorney general had “the authority to
move to dismiss the State Department of Insurance's [appeal/mandamus petition]
in the Court of Civil Appeals over the objection of the commissioner of insurance.”
570 So.2d at 684. In so doing, it relied on State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones:

“In [Jones], the attorney general brought a mandamus action to

compel the trial court to enter a consent judgment in a case
pending between the State Department of Revenue and several
defendants. The question presented was whether the attorney
general was authorized and empowered to settle a pending suit by
the State filed by him in his official capacity for the collection of
an unliquidated tax claim, by taking a consent judgment in the
cause for less than the amount sued for and claimed to be due by
the revenue department. This Court held ‘that the attorney
general, as the chief law officer of the state, was fully empowered
to make any bona fide disposition of the cause as in his judgment
might be deemed to be to the best interest of the state unless
inhibited by organic law.’ ”

Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d at 679 . . . .

Gooden, 974 So.2d at 988.

The Court now returns to Ala. Code § 12-17-216. The Governmental Parties assert

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that this statute is no longer in play given that attorneys Tyson and Tierney,
respectively the District Attorney and the Assistant District Attorney for Mobile
County, are acting pursuant to Ala. Code § 12-17-184(10). The Court disagrees,
because the Answer and Counterclaim in the Declaratory Judgment Action, and the
Petition in the Forfeiture Action, were filed by attorney Barber whose appointment
to act ostensibly on behalf of the State of Alabama, and officials thereof, was
pursuant to Ala. Code §12-17-216.

In its order of February 11, 2010, this Court mused about possible constitutional
infirmities of this statute. Certainly, if interpreted broadly enough, complications of
a constitutional magnitude could arise. The Court agrees with the parties, however,
that it should if possible avoid constitutional questions. After careful consideration,
the Court concludes that it need not wade into a constitutional quagmire. Rather,
proper interpretation of the statute allows it to skirt past anyconstitutional challenge
while at the same time preserving the proper role of the State’s constitutional
officers, as described above.

While several officials have the apparent right to request or designate a

supernumerary attorneygeneral to perform duties under Ala. Code §12-17-216, this
Court concludes that any such person so designated may perform such duties only
subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General. This statute does not
enable a supernumerary district attorney to act beyond the Attorney General’s
authority. It must be remembered that the Attorney General may direct and control
the actions and positions of district attorneys throughout the State. See, e.g., Ala.
Code §§ 36-15-14, 36-15-15 & 36-15-21; see also Graddick v. Galanos, 379 So.2d
592,594 (Ala. 1980). To somehow give a supernumerary district attorney unfettered
independence from this control makes no sense.

Indeed, to use Ala. Code § 12-17-216 in an effort to create a new kind of prosecutor,
who acts purportedly on behalf of the State but who is answerable to anyone other
than the Attorney General, would fly in the face of authorities such as Weaver,
Gooden, and the above-referenced statutes conveying broad powers to the Attorney
General over litigation involving the State. Given such powers as have historically
been given to the Attorney General, which Ala. Code § 36-15-1.1 explicitly
confirms, such an interpretation of Ala. Code § 12-17-216 is untenable.

While the Attorney General has not appeared in these actions, this Court has

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reviewed the Attorney General’s amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme
Court. From that, the inescapable conclusion is that in filing the Answer and
Counterclaim in the Declaratory Judgment Action, the Petition in the Forfeiture
Action, and all other filings in these actions, attorney Barber did so without express
authorization of the Attorney General. Such filings must thus be regarded as a
nullity, just as if they had been filed by a private citizen who claimed to represent the
State.

Further, while the appearance of attorneys Tyson and Tierney in these cases is under
a different statute, Ala. Code 12-17-184(10), the same result applies. Lowndes
County has a District Attorney who has not recused himself and who has in fact
looked into this matter, deciding not to pursue litigation. The only officer who can
second-guess the district attorney in this regard is the Attorney General. The
Governor lacks the authority to create his own prosecutor whenever a district
attorney takes a legal position that is not to his liking. While Ala. Code § 12-17-
184(10) authorizes the Governor to designate a district attorney (or an assistant
district attorney) to go anywhere in the statein theperformance of statutorily-defined
duties, it again must be remembered that the Attorney General retains ultimate
authority, as discussed above. Particularly when a district attorney is requested to
go into another county, the orderly exercise of such authority is crucial to avoid the
chaos arising from conflicting legal positions.

Accordingly, the attorneys who have appeared for the Governmental Parties may not
continue to represent these parties in the Declaratory Judgment Action, nor may they
prosecute the Forfeiture Action, unless the Attorney General expressly ratifies what
they have done up to this point and authorizes them to continue in this
representation.1

The Attorney General has – for whatever reason – assumed a curious stance. While
complaining of the Governor’s actions in the Supreme Court, and in the media, the

The Governor does have the authority under Ala. Code § 36-15-21 to employ personal counsel to
represent his interests. As the Supreme Court recognized in Weaver, 570 So.2d at 684, even
though the Attorney General has the power to direct the course of litigation involving the State and
its agencies, the Governor may intervene to express his views and take positions that may be
contrary to those of the Attorney General.

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Attorney General has made no effort to defend the State’s interests in these cases.
He is under a duty to do so. Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2) provides in part that the
Attorney General “shall attend to all cases other than criminal that may be pending
in the courts of this state, in which the state may be in any manner concerned . . .”
(emphasis added). Further, under Ala. Code §36-15-21, “[a]ll litigation concerning
the interest of the state, or any department of the state, shall be under the direction
and control of the Attorney General” (emphasis added). Especially since these cases
involve claims raised against the Governor and the headsof two state agencies, these
statutory obligations may not be ignored.

The Attorney General is therefore directed to assume “the direction and control” of
the State’s interests in these cases. This Court, of course, may not dictate what the
Attorney General’s decisions must be; as the Weaver decision makes clear, such
decisions are pursuant to the Attorney General’s prerogative. This Court can,
however, direct the Attorney General to come in off the sidelines and decide how the
State’s interests are best represented in these cases.

Accordingly, by March 22, 2010, the Attorney General is to advise the Court and
the parties of his position, in view of this order and of his statutory duties described
above. The Court will thereafter determine the course of further proceedings in
these related cases.

DONE and ORDERED on this 8th day of March, 2010.

/s/ Robert S. Vance, Jr.

Circuit Judge

copies:

The Honorable Troy King

Counsel for the Parties

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