Sexual Callousness Re-Examined

a critique by Ferrel Christensen

It is a commonplace that prior beliefs, especially those involving values,
are a perpetual threat to objectivity in science. The history of science is
strewn with examples of this propensity, from extreme cases like “sluggish
schizophrenia” and culturally biased IQ testing to the moderate ones we
all see in others but don’t acknowledge in ourselves. In “Pornography,
Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape” (Autumn 1982), Dolf
Zillmann and Jennings Bryant have suggested that a liberal bias toward
sexual explicitness in the media has prevented researchers from seeking or
finding negative social effects from pornography. On the basis of their own
research, they conclude that such materials are in fact harmful and that,
specifically, they produce calloused attitudes toward women. But I main-
tain that the shoe is precisely on the other foot: Zillmann and Bryant’s own
value-beliefs have evidently biased their interpretations of the data and led
to this unjustified conclusion.
Perhaps the most publicized aspect of their experiments was their
finding that college youths of both sexes who had been shown large
amounts of filmed erotica in a laboratory setting suggested appreciably
shorter prison sentences for the rapist in a particular case than those who
had not. The researchers interpreted this result to indicate an increased
“sexual callousness toward women” (7, p. 14; apparently “callousness” is
to mean a lack of concern for the desires or the pain of another person). But
that conclusion does not follow from the data. To begin, just exactly how
might erotic presentations promote a calloused attitude toward women, in
men and women alike? The antipornography groups who have been
publicizing this result have a standard answer: it makes people think of
women as mere “objects” for men’s pleasure. Zillmann and Bryant them-
selves do not endorse that explanation, however, noting that the films they
showed portrayed no inequalities of power or the like (8,p. 134). The most
detailed rendering of what seems to be their preferred way of accounting
for the result appears in Zillmann’s book Connections Between Sex and
Aggression (6, p. 192):
I t can only he speculated at this point that any hostile action against
w o m e n that is mediated b y men’s callous dispositions ultimately derives
f r o m t h e pornographic portrayal of w o m e n as socially nondiscriminat-
ing and without personal involvement or attachment. . . . Characteris-
tically, the f e m a l e i n pornography yearns f o r sexual and pseudosexual
stimulation f r o m any male i n the vicinity, responds euphorically t o any
stimulation f r o m anybody, and shows n o loyalties. W h e t h e r or not a

9
u‘
valid representation of “female nature,” such a portrayal makes w o m e n
appear unworthy of trust and special attention. Callous attitudes, then,
would seem appropriate i n the sense that a n y investment into a n

40 extended relationship is misplaced. Caring f o r a w o m a n and empathy

Ferrel Christensen is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy,

0 University of Alberta.

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 f o r a woman’s distress appear to be venti1re.s without utility. The
inhihitiori of hostile action tliat is usualhl niediated h y protectiw
reactions is jeopardized as ci consequence. Potenticilly hostile s e x u d
exploitation becomes intelligent defensive behncior, in .fiict, us it rnirri-
mize.p both the effort put into gaining sexual uc‘ce,s.yciritl distressf r o m tiw
loss o j a valued relationship.
The idea that caring and tmpathy exist only where they have utility, or
that exploitation should in any circumstances simply be intelligent hehav-
ior, strikes me as highly cynical; it even secwis to he taken for granted that,
in a woman, a high sex drive arid a willingness to enjoy a variety of partners
are deserving of hostility and disrespect. Siich feelings are comiimii
enough in persons and cultures with high levels of sexiial jealoiisy and
possessiveness, but they arc far from universal even i n this society. At their
age, in fact, male students might well tend to Iinve very positive feelings
toward women like that. It is also odd to posit that seeing a few movies
overrides a person’s own abundant experience and thus “convinces even
females of the hyperpromiscuous, accepting naturc of women” (8, p. 134).
Biit whether a weak effect in this direction occurs will be discussed later.
The internal logic of the reasoning here also raises problcms. Although
the above passage ignores the fact, the men i t i pornography are a l s o
generally portrayed as highly sexed and promisciioiis. Yet there is some-
thing very strange about the idea that movies which portray men and
women as alike should lead to a negative view of only one sex. Perhaps, on
the one hand, the suggestion is that coining to think of wornen in this way
destroys a pre-existing feeling of protectiveness toward them that does not
exist toward men. In that case it merely makes for a more egalitarian
attitude (which many would consider a good thing), so it is a misstatement
to describe it as creating a special callousness toward women. On the other
hand, the claim may be that such a concept of women does create a special
hostility or lack of caring toward them that is not felt toward men. Biit given
the equality in the pornography shown, this assunies a pre-existing double
standard. In that case, surely, it is the prior attitude that is at fault. Either
way, even if such beliefs about women (arid men) are created by pornog-
raphy, it is odd to blame it for the alleged affective response to the beliefs.
There is another explanation for the results of the rape test that seems
much rnore plausible. It is a matter of common experience (and psycholo-
gists’ practice) that becoming better acquainted with an anxiety-inducing
entity tends to reduce the level of anxiety. (The opposite effect can also
occur, of course, if the original level is too high.) In this society, with its
ambivalent attitudes toward sexuality, the amount of anxiety young people
are raised with in regard to that subject is great. Hence the open and
accepting sexuality of erotic. movies often tends to allay such feelings--an
effect that is put to good use by sex therapists and is feared b y those who
charge that pornography corrupts morals. One etfect of these sexual fears
traditionally has been to make activities that harm no one (e.g., oral-genital
sex) into crimes and to make assaults that involve sex widely regarded as
especially heinous. As a consequence, it stands to reason that simply
coming to have a lower level of anxiety about sex itself would reduce the
perceived seriousness of sexual assault. It needn’t be a “loss of compas-

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 sion” for the victim’s suffering, or even, a s Zillrnann and Bryant suggest (8,
p. 134), a decreased perception o f t h e amoiint of that suffering (though the
latter could be a concomitant of reduced anxiety, as might also be a
reduced antipathy toward thc rapist).
Of course, to identify this as the cause of the attitude shift is not to deny
that the effect is bad; it is an independent question whether the longer or
the shorter suggested prison term (M1/3 years vs. 51/4 years on average for
the case in question, which was not described) is more appropriate to the
crime. (Zillmann and Bryant a s s l i m e without argument that it is the former,
claiming the latter reveals that rape has lieen “trivialized.”) But it is
pertinent to note that since the harmfill effects of rape are mostly emo-
tional, a less negative virw of sex in general is apt to reduce those effects.
Evidently rape is most traumatic in cultures where any sort of “unchaste”
sex is seen as “spoiling” the woman or as resulting in a metaphysical loss
of some sort, and least so in sex-positive cultures, where it is reportedly
regarded more like any othcr bodily assault (see, e.g., 1).In a similar vein,
students who study the crime of rape in an academic setting might also
assign it lrss harsh punishments than before, simply as a result of reduced
fear of the unknown. In any case, I hope no one would suggest that society
seek to minimize the occurrence of rape by maximizirig either ignorance of
it or the fear of sex. Even aside from the other harms this would do (and
does), it would counterprodiictively make the crime even more traumatic
to the victims. The answer lies not in such things as repressing sexual
explicitness, but i n educating people that for the victim, rape is not
anything like real sex.
********
The rape sentence results were not the only evidence cited by Zillmann
and Bryant in support of their charge of increased sexual callousness. The
students on average also indicated reduced “support for the women’s
liberation movement” (worded in another article [ 8 ] as “the female
liberation movement”) in rough proportion to the amount of filmed sex
they had been shown. The experimenters interpreted this to “exhibit a loss
of faith in women-by females and males alike” (8, p. 134) and to suggest
that exposure to pornography occasions “a loss of compassion for women
per se.” Again I maintain that such claims are not supported and that clear
alternatives are ignored.
It is totally unjustified to equate support for “women’s liberation” with
faith in or concern for the welfare of women. Surely not all proponents of
traditional gender roles lack compassion for wornen. To identify support
for women’s liberation with belief in equality between the sexes is another
error. Many women who regard themselves as strict egalitarians d o not
make such an equation. One often hears things like “I’m not a women’s
libber, but I believe in equality.” The movement designated by that name
is perceived by many-whether rightly or wrongly is riot germane to the
point here-as being often characterized by man-hating and various other

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sorts of extremism. Even the yonng women students not exposed to erotic
films in the experiment accorded the statement an average of only 79
percent support; surely they weren’t saying, “We have only 79 percent
faith in women.”
This does not yet address the question of why viewing sexually explicit
movies should have led to a dccrease in support for the variegated social
movement in question. Might it after all have been d u e to a genuine
change in belief about gender equality? It is hard to see how this could be
the case. Once again, Zillmann and Bryant reported no inequality between
men and women in the particular films they showed. That being so, a
differential decrease in regard for women’c rights and stature, in the minds
of women as well as men, seems implaiisible; we need another explana-
tion. And w e have one, based in part on the alternative interpretation
already proposed for the first experimental resnlt: that exposure to sexual
explicitness reduces negative feelings toward sexuality. In particular, it
reduces such feelings toward sexual explicitness itself, as the experiment
also confirmed (p. 16). Many feminists have been highly outspoken
opponents of pornography; consequently, coming to have a higher opinion
of sexual explicitness would naturally be accompanied by decreased
support for this aspect of the movement.
But the matter goes deeper than this. The feminist attack on pornography
is only part of-or, what is just as good for our purposes, is widely
perckived as being part of-an attack on sexual openness and sexual
freedom in general. I n the words of one eminent specialist in sex and
gender, many feminists are “out-Victorianing the Victorians” ( 2 ) .To take
just one example, their influence on the public lexicon has been such that
“sexist” is often virtually synonymous with “sexually frank” (e.g., even a
complimentary remark about someone’s physical attractiveness). Of partic-
ular interest in this regard is the fact that these persons have attacked the
sort of sexuality that is more typical of males, especially young males:
desired for its own sake (i.e., not redeemed by love or “a relationship”),
nonmonogamous, visually cued by the sex organs of the opposite sex, and
just plain strong. (It is precisely these tendencies that make pornography a
much greater attraction to men than to women.) Like traditionalists, though
for somewhat different reasons, snch feminists think this sort of sexuality is
by its very riuture calloused toward women. For instance, some have
characterized the “sexual revolution” as a male plot. Unfortunate though it
is that male and female needs are riot better matched, I suggest, neither
type of‘ need is intrinsically more noble than the other. But the point here
is this: it would hardly be surprising if the viewing of uninhibited sex
should lead, not just to a more positive view of such sex, but also to a less
positive one of its detractors. And this eEect could be especially strong in
young men like those involved in the experiment, as they reassert the
validity of their own sexual feelings.
Once again, all of this is quite compatible with there having been no
decrease in their regard for genuinely equal rights and dignity between the

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 sexeq. But given the human tendency toward guilt by association, a
backlash effect against other things that “women’s liberation” stands for is
also certainly possible.

********

What may be considered the trump card in the thesis I am criticizing has
yet to be mentioned. A questionnaire designed by Donald Mosher ( 3 ) to
reveal sexually calloused attitudes in men toward women was also given to
the male students in this study. The scores on this test were appreciably
higher among those who had been exposed to the sexually explicit films
than among those who had not. “Doesn’t this prove directly that pornog-
raphy causes such feelings?” it might be asked. Zillmann and Bryant
themselves say it “clearly promoted sexual callousness toward women” (p.
18).But I regard the test in question as highly inadequate for showing the
claimed attitude change.
One major problem is that the survey contains so many Anglo-Saxon
“four-letter words”; the shock value of the questions’ wording is apt to
confound the responses to their cognitive content. That content itself also
presents a number ofproblems. Many of the items on the questionnaire do
indeed reveal an unfeeling attitude toward women or a concomitant
willingness to use exploitative means to get sex; e.g., “You don’t ask girls
to screw, you tell them to screw.” (Note that those who affirm them would
probably be calloused toward other men as well.) But a high percentage of
the questions, by my lights, do not reveal any such thing. Some just show
an adventurous, positive attitude toward sex or else reflect personal tastes
which, if mutual, are not in the least insensitive or exploitative. For
example, there is, “You can fuck on a bicycle if you have to” and “That old
saying, ’variety is the spice of life,’ is particulary true when it comes to
sex.” Comments of this ilk can be found in many a sex manual for loving
couples. Various other questions verbalize a desire for a variety of sex
partners (as the one just quoted can be interpreted as doing); but to judge
from biological evidence and cross-cultural reports (see, for instance, the
data marshaled in 5 ) , this is a common and natural feeling for young men.
Once again, I suspect all these questions got included as a result ofthis
culture’s traditional view: a lusty interest in sex for its own sake automat-
ically shows a lack of respect for women. In any case, those who announce
results from this questionnaire ought to inform readers that such things are
part of what they mean by “sexual callousness.”
Yet another category of items on the list-about a third, by my count-are
merely generalizations involving the sexual proclivities of various sorts of
people. Some of these are wishful myths, and some are arguably just true-
for instance, “A woman who is used to getting laid needs it as much as a
man does,” “Foreign women really know how to fuck,” and “You never
know when you are going to meet a strange woman who will want to get
laid.” Aside from the way they are worded, which some sensitive souls
would consider callous in itself, such statements reveal no indication of
unfeeling attitudes toward anyone.

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 Other questions are terrilily ambiguous or else contain more than one
proposition to which the reader might give or deny assent, so that an
affirmative answer may or may not be to the callous one. Consider this case:
“Women who fight a little make a roll in the hay more fun.” Mock fighting
is found to be sexually enjoyable by a high percentage of both sexes; but,
of course, an affirmative answer could also reveal a penchant for forcing sex
on a genuinely unwilling partner. How should the reader see it? In
summary, a fairly high proportion of questions on the “sex callousness”
survey need not be seen as revealing any such attitude.
As a consequence of this, an increase of scores on that test is not good
evidence of an increase in genuinely callonsed attitudes. There are other
likely explanations, notably the one I have already repeatedly invoked. For
if the uninhibited portrayal of sex in pornography does indeed reduce
sexual anxieties in some people, it would surely enhance their scores on
the questions reflecting sexual desires which in and of themselves are not
exploitative. A second possible influence here involves the category of
statements about the sexual wishes and practices of others: all that
exposure to sexual activity might simply lead the viewers to regard certain
desires and practices as being more widespread than they had previously
thought. This possiblity is in fact borne out by another part of Zillmann and
Bryant’s experiment: the more pornography the students had watched, the
more common they estimated various sexual activities (e.g., oral-genital,
group sex) to be in real life. Finally, there is yet another way in which
reduction of sexual anxieties could lead to higher scores, even on ques-
tionnaire items revealing genuine sex-calloused attitudes, without having
actually enhanced such attitudes: the items’ employment of socially
tabooed words creates an inclination to answer them in the negative,
independently of their content; conversely, reducing the shock value of

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those words by lengthy exposure to explicit sex would b y itself increase the
likelihood of positive answers.
In my view, these influences are quite adequate to account for the
reported results. Whether they constitute the right explanation depends
largely on just which items on the questionnaire received enhanced scores.
(Better still, a new version of it without shock words should be adminis-
tered.) Of particular interest, in light of the hypothesis that pornography
leads to women being seen as promiscuous and therefore “socially irre-
sponsible,” would b e the responses to a few questions that seemingly
reveal jealousy-produced hostility toward women, notably “The only time
to trust a woman is when she is pregnant, barefoot, and on the edge of
town,” and “A wife should submit to her husband from duty not from
delight.” Note also that even a genuine increase in a calloused willingness
to exploit, should it have occurred, might be only the result of the
generalization of taboo-breaking: “Sex for its own sake isn’t so bad after all,
so perhaps neither is exploitative sex.” But I would see this as an
indictment of the original sex-negative attitudes, not of pornography that
portrays no exploitation.
********
Underlying Zillmann and Bryant’s “loss of faith in women” explanation of
all the results, and also of concern to them on other grounds, is their
contention that much pornography offers a “misleading portrayal of
women,” that it shows women a s being much more highly sexed (“hyster-
ically euphoric,” to use their term) and more interested in sexual variety (in
both partners and practices) than really is the case. As others have done,
they express the conviction that resulting misperceptions of female nature
will cause men to expect too much of them sexually, hence leading to
abusiveness or at least conflicts between the sexes (pp. 19-20).
There is something very strange about the implied proposal that fantasy
should simply mirror reality. Surely an essential motive for fantasizing in
the first place is to imagine things as being better, vis-5-vis the imaginer’s
yearnings, than they actually are. Women are shown that way liecause
males who seek out pornography already fantasize about that kind of
woman. Moreover, the women and men of pornography are surely no less
realistic than those of much other fiction. Especially worthy of note in this
regard are the ubiquitous romantic love stories, which many women dote
on and which certainly idealize their characters. That only pornography is
damned for the sin of dreaming about things that are not smacks of pretext
and reflects this culture’s traditional feeling that sexual desire is less than
legitimate.
In any event, I think the danger ofbeing misled by this sort of fantasy has
been much exaggerated (e.g., remarks in 7 , p. 19, coinparing a sex movie to
a documentary). Once again, it seems unlikely that a lifetime of experience
with real people could be so easily overridden (in normal persons, that is;
the existence of individuals who have an unclear grasp of reality to start
with makes violent pornography a matter of special concern). It is true, as
already noted, that the students shown the sex films estimated various
sexual practices as being significantly more comnion than the other
students did. T h e exact reason for this is not clear. however; it too may
have been mediated partly b y lowered anxiety, not simply by confusion of
the movies with reality. Moreover, those laboratory siilijects were exposed
to far more erotica in a short period tlian the ordinary person would ever
voluntarily seek out. But perhaps the most fiintlarnental point here is this:
the change counts as distortion only i f the resulting beliefs are fkrther from
the facts than they were before. And this, Zillmann and Bryant found, was
in general not the case for the sexual activities shown. They initially charge
( 7 , p. 12) that the women in pornography “are typically shown, in f k t , to
encourage and actively solicit the specific sexual behaviors that are clear to
men but not necessarily to women (e.g., fellatio, a i i a l penetration).” But
this rings very hollow when it is later admitted that the more the students
watched sex movies, the inow realistic their frcclnency estimates for these
very activities evidently became.
This latter fact helps to reveal the real problcm in cases where fiction
misleads people about reality: lack of adequate prior knowledge. In spite
of the huge importance of sexuality in life, our culture continues to try to
keep young people ignorant about it. As long as people are kept in
ignorance of a subject, projection and wishful thinking, rumor and myth
will rush in to fill the void-porn or no porn.
Another question that must be raised in response to the “reality” charge
is what reality is seen to consist in. Zilltnann arid Bryant’s concept of it,
evidently, simply coincides with the current mores of this society. I n
sex-positive cultures such as those of Oceania, where children are not
raised with the guilt and fear toward sex they are commonly taught in this
one, the women are sexually uninhibited and assertive. (And the large
amounts of sexual dysfiinction found in this culture are seemingly absent.)
To the women of some siieh places even today, Zillniann and Bryant’s
“perfectly sensitive women” would seem repressed indeed. So perhaps it
is not pornography but this society that “misrepresents reality” vis-8-vis
female sexuality. Is the sexiial confiict between men and women, with
which we are all painfully familiar, more the product of f d s e expectations
or of sexual repression? If it is the latter, perhaps graphic depictions of
uninhibited sex are just what- we need most.
As a rnatter of fact, the increased openness of the “sexual revolution”
brought greater sexual fulfillment to many who hat1 beeii suffering in
ignorance. And I suggest that it did much to narrow the sexuality gap
between women and men that existed before, partly by making women
more willing to experiment and more assertive a h i t their own sexual
desires. I n fact, many couples have reported that sexually explicit books
and movies have played a direct role in this, reviving flagging relationships
They evidently d o this hy overcoming inhibition, arousing
the partners in preparation for sex, arid (11.b.)introducing teclrniqiies that
bring freshness to a stale routine. T h e message of pornography need not b e
taken as “women are like this” but rather as “it’s all right for women to he
sexually uninhibited.”
None of this is nic,ant to imply that “sexiial lilxration” doesn’t also
trigger problems, given the other social circumstances that exist. More
specifically, the raising of false hopes can indeed lead to conflicts. But this,
once again, applies to many things besides pornography. How many

181
 ordinary males can measure up to certain movie actors’ artificial images,
images of men who behave in ways that are dear to the hearts of women but
not necessarily to men? (I suspect the real problem here is not mispercep-
tion of what people actually do, not poor knowledge of social statistics, but
becoming aware of what they might have been or might yet be.) But even
at that, must dreams be denounced because they make people dissatisfied
with the status quo? After all, they are the stuff social change is made of, for
better and worse. (Once again, all the talk about misrepresenting reality
ignores the possibility of changing it.) The right answer lies in learning to
discern the better changes from the worse ones. And finally, if some use
callous means in the attempt to realize their awakened desires, that is no
reflection on what awakened them.
********
None of the foregoing important considerations is anywhere acknowledged
by Zillmann and Bryant: relationships and sex-lives helped by pornogra-
phy, the possibility that entrained sexual anxiety or ignorance is the
ultimate source of sexual conflict between men and women, and so on. All
this leads me to suspect an ideological bias on their part, one that can only
impede understanding of scientific and social issues. Their own value-
beliefs involving the subject are in fact directly expressed throughout the
article under discussion, with its inflammatory rhetoric and the obligatory
charges of exploitation and objectification. There is of course nothing
wrong with having strong moral views; it is allowing them to direct one’s
scientific or moral reasoning (rather than the other way around) that is
worthy of blame. Further evidence of this sort of bias, once again, lies in
their interpretations o f t h e data, in the form of ignoring important alterna-
tive explanations. More specifically, their “loss of faith in women” account,
for which no direct test was made, looks very like a projection of their own
moral views toward certain types of sexual behavior. (By contrast, once
again, the old Polynesian attitude was just the reverse. With that culture’s
negative view of private property and positive one of sexual pleasure, it is
the jealous, possessive person that they would have regarded as “socially
irresponsible.”) A similar prejudice, once again, clearly influenced the
content of the questionnaire on “sex-calloused attitudes.”
What makes such biases as these particularly difficult to detect is the fact
that they are so pervasive in our culture. This is also borne out, I suggest,
by Zillmann and Bryant’s seeming lack of awareness of the widespread
aversion to sexual explicitness. For example, they mention the possibility
that the students’ more positive attitude toward pornography might have
been partly an artifact of its being presented to them by authority figures,
but they discount this on the grounds that
this f o r m of legitimization closely parullels w h a t happens outside the
laboratory: pornogruphy is culturally legitimized b y the lack of censure.
I f the students inferred innocuousness f r o m the researchers’ tacit sanc-
tion, the so-called m a n i n the street is likely t o infer innocuousness f r o m
the f a c t that no one in any position of authority objects t o people being
liberally exposed t o pornography in public movie theaters und else-
where (p. 18).

182
I find this an incredible claim. About the best thing most politicians dare
say in defense of pornography is that it is evil h i t cerisorship is worse. By
a vote of 60 to 5, at the height of the “sexual revoliition,” the U.S. Senate
rejected the positive concliisions of its blue-rihbon Commission on Ob-
scenity and Pornography. As Zillinann and Bryant are well aware, scicn-
tists since that time have been engaged in laboratory cxpcriinents to
discover whether exposure to nonviolent sexual materials induces or
facilitates violent behavior-something no one had thought to do regarding
presentations of other normal forins of pleasure. As has so long been the
case, people are continually being fined and imprisoned for commercial
involvement with sexually explicit materials, one of a very few sorts of
expression not considered fully protected by the First Amendment. In-
deed, even the most horrific (nonsexual) violence is not so proseciited.
Public opinion polls continiie to show a majority saying that pornography
is degrading and should be kept from yoiing people. All this is “lack of
censure”? Perhaps they just mean that the general level of aversion is
lower than their own.
The foregoing social conditions lead 11s to my own moral reasons for
alarm about Zillmann and Bryant’s pronouncements. Their blind spots are
not only bad for science; they have serious conseqiiences for society as
well, owing to its perception of scientific authority. Scientific claims with
a high potential for social harm (e.g., those on race and IQ), I suggest,
should be subjected to especially careful scrutiny before being promul-
gated to the general public. And we have many historical examples, such as
the antimasturbation hysteria of earlier years, to show what harm this
culture’s traditional sexual fears can do. Distressingly, some scientists
perceive only social good as coming from their opposition to pornography.
Zillmann and Bryant have reported their conclusions to antipornography
rallies, seemingly heedless of the forces of political and social repression
they might help to unleash. It is not only flatly false but socially irrespon-
sible to announce that it has been “dernonstrated” (6, p. 191) that pornog-
raphy produces sex-calloused attitudes toward women. (It is also dishori-
est, by my lights, not to tell their readers about Mosher’s own opposite
result [4]on the “sexual callousness” test, even though I find their data
more believable than his.)
This is not a call for censure; the priiicipal author ofthe study in question
has made some excellent contributions to the science of its subject. Rut it
is an urgent appeal to all those concerned about the impact of science on
society to demand higher standards of objectivity than have been demon-
strated in regard to pornography in this case.

REFERENCES

1. Marshall, Donald S . “Sexual Behavior o n Mangaia.” I n I>. S. Marshall and R. C.

Suggs (Eds.) Humcin Sexual Belinoior. Ncw York: Basic Books, 1971.
2. Money, John. Personal communication, 1983.
3. Mosher, Donald L. “Sexual Attitudes Toward Womcn.” Forms A, B, C , and D.
Sent to the author by request.

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 4. Mosher, Donald L. “Psychological Reactions to Pornographic Films.” In Tech-
nical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Volume 8.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
5. Symons, Donald. T h e EGoZution of H u m a n Sexuality. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1979.
6 . Zillmann, Dolf. Connectioris Between Sex and Aggre.ssion. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbauin, 1984.
7. Zillmann, D. and J. Bryant. “Pornography, Sexual Callousness, and the
Trivialization of Rape.” Journal of Communication 32(4), Autumn 1982, pp.
10-21.
8. Zillniann, D. and J. Bryant. “Effects of Massive Exposure to Pornography.” In N .
Malamuth and E. Donnerstein (Eds.) Pornography untl Sexual Aggression.
New York: Academic Press. 1984.

a response by Dolf Zillmann and Jennings Bryant

Quite predictably, allegations of moral partiality and inobjectivity have

come our way again for reporting findings that, in the perception of many,
question the merits of easy access to pornography (7). They come, as is
characteristic, from a person who is enlightened to a point where specu-
lation and interpretation reign supreme over empirically ascertained cir-
cumstances and where only the arguments ofothers are believed to be bent
in self-serving ways.
In efforts to place us into the company of those who may have committed
racial discrimination by using culturally biased IQ tests, our accuser
proclaims that the history of science is strewn with examples of the
propensity for inobjectivity. What h e conveniently overlooks is the fact that
this same history is also cluttered with accusations, such as his, of‘ “poor
science” whenever findings have gone against firm beliefs and vested
interests. It takes considerable naivett? and arrogance to suggest, as h e
does, that in matters of pornography and sex the work of others is
hopelessly value-entangled while his own perceptions and interpretations
are above such value involvement, making them pure and objective. Our
accuser argues, of‘course, not from a position of value independence, but
from an extreme value stance; and there can be no doubt that he has a
vested interest in the issue at hand.
I n this brief‘ response to his accusations, we shall address the clash of
values and vested interests in pornography, because we feel that this part
of the argument transcends the effort to reinterpret our particular findings.
T h e controversy should be of general interest. But before we come to this
matter, we would like to correct at least some of the erroneous statements
and outrageous contentions in our accuser’s paper.

Dolf Zillmann is Professor of Psychology, Communication, and Semiotics at the

Institute for Communication Research, Indiana University. Jeniiings Bryant is
Professor and Head of RTV in the School of Communication, University of
Houston-University Park.

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Our accuser has challenged the interpretation that the diminution of
prescribed punishment for rape, resulting from extended consumption of
pornography, is mediated by increased sexual callousness toward women.
H e has offered an alternative explanation that runs as follows: (a) People
are sexually repressed; and this repression manifests itself, among other
things, in sexual anxiety (i.e., an uneasiness about sex, at the very least).
(b) Extended consumption of pornography removes this anxiety, allowing
people to respond more positively, or less negatively, to sexual endeavors.
(c) Rape is deemed a lesser transgression because its sexual component
seems less abominable after than before consumption of pornography. (We
shall conic back to this value-laden part of the rationale.) If so, it is argued,
the respondents in our study did not become more callous toward women,
but merely more positive toward sex. It is correctly pointed out that the
investigation under consideration contains no information to rule out such
a reinterpretation. Perceptual and attitudinal responses to the victim of
rape have not been ascertained in this study. However, such responses
have been assessed in subsequent studies conducted by Linz, Don-
nerstein, and Penrod (4;see also 2 , 3 ) . These studies show that extended
consumption of pornography fosters a loss of empathy with, or sympathy
for, victims of rape. 111 particular, women are considered to suffer less from
rape; at the same time, their general worth depreciates. We are inclined to
consider this loss of compassion for trailmatized women an increase of
callousness toward women. If we are not alorie in so doing, and if our
implicit definition of callousness is accepted by many, w e can consider the
claim faulted that the punitive recommendations for rape in our study
simply reflect more positive attitudes toward sex arid are not mediated by
increased callousness toward women. Had our accuser bothered to ac-
quaint himself with the recent research literature, as h e should have, these
clarifications would not be necessary.
********
We have no argument with the contention that our findings on the
trivialization of rape pertain to values. They obviously do. Elsewhere (6),
w e have explicated that research on human sexuality, mainly because the
behavior in question invariably has been subjected to regulation of some
kind (l),cannot b e explored arid discussed in a value vacuum. T h e most
detached work on incest, pedophilia, homosexuality, or zoophilia will
offend and potentially infiiriatc, many who f&elthat some of the evidence
gathered is inconsistent with their I)eliefs and damaging to their predispo-
sitions for conduct in the sexual realm. N o matter exactly what is estab-
lished, there will b e those alleging foul play-and poor science. Research
on common heterosexual relations may seem innocuous enough. Riit any
reference to sexual proniisciiity or to faithfiiln among intimates, to
possible gender differences in libido, or to such matters as sodomy is also
likely to alienate those who see their convictions anti preferences threat-
ened. Using a seemingly iioiicoiitroversial concept such as the American
family is not without risk either. Anyone who would show, say, that
pornography undermines traditional family values, would surely b e put to

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 the stake by those who deem this social arrangement decadent and strive
for social changes in which the family is nonessential or superfluous.
All this is to make clear that social scientists who study human sexuality
had better be cognizant of the fact that whatever they d o and say has value
implications and that, because of‘the enormous diversity of values in this
realm, it will make them targets for attack from one quarter or another.
What can they do under these circumstances? One solution is to study
another phenomenon. If they are not thusly inclined, they will tend to
bring their work in line with prevalent values. As long as pedophilia, for
example, is deemed an aberration, clinicians are likely to publish their
work in these terms. Should children become acceptable sexual partners,
a s some advocate they should, merely considering research on pedophilia
would smack of treason-or, at least, of decadent morality. In short, sex
researchers operate within societal morality. There is no escaping it. And
the best they can do is to make sure that the values they endorse, explicitly
or implicitly, are consensually held by a sizeable number of people, if not
by a large majority.
We do not disagree, then, that our findings pertain to sexual values and
that our research may have been inspired by value-related proposals. What
we resent is our accuser’s insinuation that researchers necesssurily hold
the values that their research supports. Such an insinuation is extremely
cynical, as it projects that social scientists look for and find confirmation of
their personal and private value-distorted proposals. This certainly makes
a mockery of the social sciences. The insinuation suggests, for instance,
that only homosexuals can find and will report something positive about
homosexuality; and it makes everyone who failed to find positives a person
who is dead set against this sexual preference. Likewise, our findings on
pornography consumption and rape evaluations brand us as porn fighters
and, presumably, religious fiindanientalists. Our accuser was so confident
in his inference of motives from findings that he asserted that w e speak to
antiporn rallies. We consider such assertions malicious and irresponsible.
Neither one of us has ever attended or addressed an antiporn rally. In
contrast to others who have studied pornography effects and who seem to
see a mission in telling the largest possible audience about their findings,
w e have strictly adhered to a no-interview policy and turned back a great
many requests from the media.
Our accuser might, of course, find little comfort in this and argue that the
damage to his cause was done by our conducting arid reporting the study,
because the findings now could be used by groups that he fears in efforts
to bring changes that h e dreads. We just learned that Rev. Jerry Falwell
cited our research on a national network, and our accuser’s nightmare may
have come true. But we feel that Falwell is just as entitled to use social
science infbrmation as are the lawyers of the pornography industry who,
without anybody griping, cite such information whenever it appears to
support their causes. Our accuser seems to suggest that social scientists
ought to look at how their findings might be used (to quote him: these
scientists should pay attention to “the forces of political and social
repression they might help to unleash”) before they commit them to print.
We couldn’t disagree more strongly. To illustrate: The research under
consideration here was inspired by feminist contentions about the impact

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of pornography. It was designed to test whether these contentions have any
merit. Should we have anticipated what, assuming positive findings, these
groups and others might do with the data? Dependent on the outcome of
such possible presumptions, should we have considered suppressing the
findings? We don’t think so. The social sciences cannot and, morally
speaking, should not make themselves subservient to social causes and the
values they imply. On the other hand, if our decision to determine the
veridicality of the potentially value-laden feminist proposals reflects sym-
pathy with these causes, and if being sympathetic in these terms is
considered a social science felony, we might have to plead guilty.
There is another element in our accuser’s writing that offends us greatly.
It is the aura of objectivity in the face of unmistakable advocacy for social
change. There is the attack on sexually repressed societies such as ours.
There are assertions of greater sexual fulfillment brought by the so-called
sexual revolution. There is, of course, the hint at the Polynesian paradise.
There is the assertion that erotica inspire nothing but wholesome libidinal
urges. Arid there is the never-failing final proof of pornography’s benefits:
the testimony o f a few aging couples who have experienced the marvel of
sexual revival. This is not exactly a balanced presentation. On every count,
there is another side that could have been mentioned. The bottom line is
this: How can anyone with such obtrusive and extreme values and political
partialities believe to be “objective” and dare to lecture others on bias?
********
Our accuser’s extreme values surface very clearly in his discussion of rape,
too. We are bewildered to learn that whatever spoilage or loss rape inflicts
on victims is metaphysical and that, ifour culture were more sex-positive,
the societal problems with rape would diminish and the issue resolve
itself. What should we make ofthe statements that crimes involving sex are
regarded as especially heinous, that any suffering is mostly emotional, and
that lowered sex anxiety would reduce the perceived seriousness of sexual
assaults? In connection with the interpretation that any loss incurred by
the victim lacks reality and substance (i.e., is metaphysical), rape seems to
be viewed as an assault in which penetration is to be discounted and in
which only accompaniments such as cuts and bruises should matter in any
criminal prosecution o f t h e rapist. It is reassuring to learn that sex in rape
is not considered anywhere near real sex-although we are inclined to
consider this difference rather metaphysical as far as our accuser’s argu-
mentation goes.
The belittlement of rape that these arguments convey shows little
compassion for the plight of traumatized women, indeed. As the purpose of
our discussion here is to reveal that our accuser’s reasoning is permeated
by his own, extreme values, we shall not comment further. We would hope,
however, that wonien would respond to what they must consider a
self-serving male gospel that reads: Be sex-positive, accommodate our
libido more fully, match us in sex drive, and we shall not have to violate
you anymore!
********
Do we see anything of redeeming value in the attack? Yes, we do. The
criticism of Mosher’s ( 5 )sex-callousness scale is quite convincing. We shall

187
 continue to consider it callous in itself, rather than indicative of great
sensitivity, when males endorse sayings like “When they are old enough to
bleed, they are old enough to butcher!” And we will remain concerned
about the possibility that snch verbiage promotes callous, non-empathetic
behavior toward women. However, we do not know of compelling dem-
onstrations that sexually callous language fosters sexually callous behavior;
and because of this, we think it prudent not to infer the latter from the
former. To the extent that we may have made snch inferences earlier, we
stand corrected and resolve never to use the scale again. This is not to say,
however, that we embrace our accuser’s suggestion that sexually callous
language reflects nothing but wholesome libido in youths and adults. The
callous language in question is more than a paraphrase of: Let’s go get ’em!
It is too close to the lingo of hostility and seems designed to drown
empathy that might get in the way of consummatory behavior. But be this
as it may, all along we have treated the scale data as merely complementary
to other measures, and our willingness to dismiss these data does in no way
alter or weaken the findings regarding the trivialization of rape as the result
of extended consumption of pornography.
REFERENCES
1. Davenport, W. II. “Sex in Cross-Cultural Perspective.” In F. A. Beach (Ed.)
Humun Seriiulity in Four Per.spectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1976, pp. 1 1 5 1 6 3 .
2. Donnerstein, E. “Effects of Pornography.” In D. Scott (Ed.) Symposium on
Media Violence und Pornography: Proceedings and Resource Book. Toronto:
Media Action Group, 1984, pp. 7‘3-94.
3 . Linz, D. “Sexual I’iolence in the Media: Effects on Male Viewers and Iniplica-
tions for Society.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1985.
4. Linz, D., E. Donnerstein, and S. Penrotl. “The Effects of Multiple Exposures to
Filmed Violence Against Women.” Joornal of Commiinication 34(3), Summer
1984, pp. 13C147.
5 . Moslier, D. L. “Sex Callousness Toward Women.” In Technical Report of the
Comniissiori o n Obscenity and Pornography, Volume 3. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 313-325.
6. Zillmann, D. Connections Bettoecw S e x atid Aggression. Ilillsdale, N.J.: Lawr-
ence Erlbaiim, 1984.
7. Zillmann, D. and J. Bryant. “Pornography, Sexual Callousness, arid the
Trivialization of Rape.” Joiiriial o i Conimunication 32(4), Autumn 1982, pp.
L(k21.

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