Getting the talk atmospherics right

In the meeting in Ufa, Russia, between the Indian and

Pakistani Prime Ministers, Narendra Modi and Nawaz
Sharif, held on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation conclave in July 2015, the leaders agreed to,
among other things, talks being held in New Delhi between
the National Security Advisers (NSA) of India and Pakistan,
which was billed as the most important takeaway.
However, no one in India possibly no one in Pakistan as
well should mourn the demise of talks that were not held
in the end. Strident rhetoric emanating from both capitals,
which was further embellished by the media in both
countries, had threatened to convert the talks into a theatre
of the absurd. Hence, it was almost providential that
Pakistan called off the talks.
Talks between India and Pakistan suffer from certain inbuilt
defects. India, far more than Pakistan, has always been keen
to engage in direct talks with the latter. Pakistan prefers
instead to talk to the rest of the world, if only to accuse India
of perfidy, especially when it comes to Kashmir.
Pressures and outcomes
Indias desire to periodically up the ante for talks stems from
a combination of international and domestic pressures to
which India succumbs from time to time. Much of the
international pressure comes from lobbies in the West,
including the United States. The domestic peace offensive

tends to be equally persuasive in pushing the envelope

regarding holding talks. Pakistan has far fewer stakes, or for
that matter qualms, about the outcomes where talks are
concerned. Hence, it has far greater latitude in this regard,
including of sabotaging talks if and when they are held.
Pakistans real problem is that it is the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and the Army that determine when to talk,
and even on how to marshal arguments, often with little
regard to the truth.
Of late, there has also been an unfortunate trend of the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan holding bilateral meetings on
the sidelines of global meets or events whether they relate
to issues that are of economic and strategic importance or on
any other aspect. This is accompanied by pressures for
significant outcomes, irrespective of whether the times are
propitious for such talks or the regional and geo-political
situation lends itself to holding such talks. Preparations tend
to be a casualty in these circumstances and, inevitably, such
meetings result in less than favourable outcomes. Prime
Ministerial meetings in recent years Lahore (1999), Agra
(2001) and Islamabad (2004), during Atal Bihari Vajpayees
time; Havana (2006) and Sharm el-Sheikh (2009), during Dr.
Manmohan Singhs time; and now Ufa (Narendra Modi), are
best remembered for what they failed to achieve than for
their results.
The reasons are fairly obvious. Operating under the glare of
international observers and the world media, pressures are

generated to come up with path-breaking initiatives. These

result in ignoring reality and real concerns which can only be
circumvented through careful and detailed groundwork,
including preparation of position papers and the like.
Without this, possibilities of forward movement are indeed
limited and more likely doomed. Nevertheless, attempts do,
and will continue. Intrinsic to this is an element of
grandstanding that leaders indulge in an essential
concomitant of summit-level diplomacy.
With the announcement of the NSA-level talks, without due
preparations being made, it might have been anticipated that
it contained the seeds of its own failure. Furthermore,
statements and agreements reached between the heads of
government require careful vetting so as to leave no scope
for differing interpretations, as has arisen in the present
instance. This is especially important when the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan meet since only a very small
window of opportunity exists.
The timing of the initiative was again rather unfortunate. By
its constant shelling across the Line of Control, Pakistan had
already demonstrated that it was in no mood for talks.
Subsequent to the announcement of NSA-level talks came
the terror attacks in India in Gurdaspur (July 2015) and
Udhampur (August 2015) which only seemed to reinforce
Pakistans intentions. The Pakistani High Commissioners
high jinks later, and the Pakistan NSA Sartaj Azizs
insistence on holding talks with the Hurriyat prior to the

NSA-level talks, further confirmed Pakistans disinclination

for holding talks.
Terror strikes and Kashmir
Hence, India, as the prime mover of the talks, should have
taken particular care to deny Pakistan an opportunity or
excuse to derail the talks. The very fact that Pakistan agreed
to talk about terror at the NSA level, which would have
given India an opportunity to put on the table factual details
of Pakistans failure to deal with terrorists on its soil
including not taking action against those responsible for the
26/11 Mumbai terror attack, such as its mastermind Zaki-urRehman Lakhvi should have alerted India about
Pakistans possible perfidy.
Presuming that India wanted the NSA-level talks to succeed,
then Indias logic of trading charges even before the talks
were held which was carried out through the medium of
leaks from voluminous dossiers prepared by India to
confront Pakistan was a flawed one. It was also clearly
futile to try and pit Indias carefully prepared documents
against Pakistans tissue of lies, as there could be no
winners. Rather than confront Pakistan with these facts,
India would have done well to put forward ideas and
concepts that would try and help narrow the differences and
keep the door open for another round of talks at a more
propitious moment.

Again, India must have been extremely naive to believe that

there could be an India-Pakistan dialogue without Pakistan
making Kashmir its centerpiece, even if it did not form part
of the Ufa agreement, as stated by the Union Minister of
External Affairs and Overseas Indian Affairs, Sushma
Swaraj. The K word is a part of Pakistans DNA, and
anyone who has dealt with that country over the past half a
century, would know that Kashmir is always the 400 pound
gorilla in the meeting room. India should have anticipated
this and resorted to some flanking moves of its own to
ensure that the talks did not get derailed. This smacks of a
suspension of belief about the nature and record of the
Pakistani state, and a case of gross amnesia on Indias part.
India had more to lose by the talks not being held. In the
short term, Pakistan has obtained a fair idea of how much
India knew about developments in Pakistan, including the
whereabouts of Indias No.1 fugitive, Dawood Ibrahim.
Indias hope that the talks would pave the way for a
conducive climate in which some of the critical aspects of
terror could be addressed, has, meanwhile, proved to be a
non-starter. It has left Pakistan laughing all the way to the
Arabian Sea. The more serious casualty is the setback to any
such future problem-solving approach. In all this, India
seemed to come out second best.
Gains for the sword-arms

There are several other negative fallouts as well from the

aborted NSA-level talks. Both factions of the Hurriyat
Pakistans acknowledged fifth column have gained a
degree of prominence when their fortunes were almost at
their nadir. This constitutes a setback to Indias efforts over
the years to marginalise them. It will give Hurriyat
supporters fresh grist to indulge in violent demonstrations in
places like Srinagar and Baramulla. The recent spurt in
Islamist radicalisation in the Valley is also likely to get a
fillip and become infused with new vigour.
Pakistan-based terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT) can also be expected to exploit the so-called
breakdown in relations, and India should brace itself to
confront a fresh wave of terror attacks. As it is, the graph of
militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has been going up of late,
and the latest events should aggravate matters. The LeT,
being the recognised sword-arm of the ISI and the
Pakistani state, will be the main gainer.
Meanwhile, there are several lessons to be learnt from the
latest mishap. Negotiations with Pakistan, especially at
senior levels, clearly demand more careful thought and
planning. Talks should not be launched on the basis of
pressure exerted by those on the periphery, and from those
who constantly applaud Indias determination to talk on
terror despite Pakistans belligerence. Detailed planning for
the success of any such talks should include measures to
minimise the fallout if talks fail. Every opportunity should

be provided, if talks fail, to revive or restart them at an

appropriate time. Most important, talks at this level need to
be held when the regional and geo-political situation is
suitable for negotiations, and Pakistan demonstrates some
inclination to resort to negotiations, rather than engage in
provocations.
Decision delayed is defence denied
Each day the government delays the implementation of the
One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme, a demand that is 42
years old, it risks playing with fire. It is safe to assume that
the serving service Chiefs have conveyed as much to the
government. The public manifestation of the rapidly
spreading and quickly deepening levels of disenchantment
came when the daughter of Gen. V.K. Singh, former Army
Chief of Staff and a serving Minister of State, sat with the
Jantar Mantar agitators in an open show of support.
Mrinalini Singhs husband is a serving Army officer. This is
a categorical indication that both Gen. Singh and Col.
Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, another Minister, would no
doubt have pointed out to the government the consequences
of not being able to deliver on a promise already made
several times over.
Uncertain future
Roughly 60,000 people retire from the armed forces every
year. Some retire before they are 35, and as many as 87 per
cent of servicemen retire between the ages of 34 and 48.

Soldiers, sailors, airmen at the lowest level are the hardest

hit because after a near nomadic life in the armed forces,
they most likely do not own too many assets, a home nor
have an alternative income stream. They have no clear
prospect of a second lease of working life either.
Soldiers retire early because they need to be fighting fit to be
in the forces and hence, the armed forces need young blood.
The retirement policy affects an estimated 25 lakh exservicemen. Counted along with their dependents, the
number swells to roughly three times that or 70 lakh people.
Also, a large section of the armed forces has family members
who are either still serving or have retired from the forces. In
normal conversations, the situation is bound to occupy their
mindspace. Those in service know that sooner or later, they
will become veterans and inherit the same situation their
fathers did before them, an inheritance of loss.
The problem has been exacerbated because of the way in
which the then BJP prime ministerial candidate, Narendra
Modi, appropriated and espoused the cause at the 2014
hustings and his subsequent repeated assurance, both on the
floor of Parliament and elsewhere, that OROP was a settled
matter and the solution had his imprimatur. Consider also
Mr. Modis unparalleled political heft in the Lok Sabha and
the fact that the Supreme Court has, as long ago as
December 1982, underlined the need for OROP. If the
agitators feel let down, it is because the delivery of the

promise has so far been in inverse proportion to the

articulation of the promise itself.
Deliberately tangled
As many as ten retired service Chiefs have deliberately used
the word imbroglio, a word of Italian origin that has
elements of confusion, entanglement, bitterness, and
complication all rolled into one. It accounts for the growing
feeling that in the real OROP narrative, Narendra Modi,
whom none other than the Vishwa Hindu Parishads Ashok
Singhal acknowledged as BJPs Iron Man, is helpless. His
inability to deliver stems from his being a victim of either
intra-party politics or from him having been ensnared in a
web made by intransigent bureaucrats.
The discourse in New Delhi circles suggests that a section of
the bureaucracy wants to dovetail the OROP with the
Seventh Pay Commission. This would effectively scupper
the plan because it would postpone the resolution and rework
the rationale and framework of the OROP as well. Lt. Gen.
Syed Ata Hasnain, who retired as Military Secretary of the
Army, writes in the July issue of Fauji India that the
bureaucracy is living up to its promise to complicate the
issue to such an extent that it [OROP] is once again shelved
without decision.
The procrastination has escalated the situation to a standoff
between the veterans and the government. Mr. Modis
inability to act quickly and effectively has allowed other

political parties space where none need have been conceded.

The issue is now open to political hijack. There has been a
steady stream of contradictory noises emanating from the
government, most notably from the Finance Ministry, asking
ex-servicemen to lower expectations.
The implication is that the government is having trouble
coming up with the money. It has not gone unnoticed among
the veterans that Mr. Modi, the politician, had no difficultly
promising Rs. 1.25 lakh crore for Bihar in what amounts,
scandalously, to pre-election sops. For OROP, the figure
being talked about is roughly Rs. 8,300 crore, a fraction of
the Bihar pledge.
Soldiers cannot go on strike like bank employees do, but
patience now seems in short supply. Since June, the veterans
have resorted to black armband protests, bike rallies, candlelight vigils, petitions, the return of service medals, and
hunger strikes in an attempt to force the government to focus
on the implications. They know more than others that all it
requires is a small spark to set off a blaze. If something has
been building up for a long time and is looking for release,
even something as inconsequential as a slap can have an
enormous ripple effect.
We need to remember the mutiny witnessed after Operation
Blue Star. Given that the veterans are already on hungerstrike and writing petitions in blood, all it needs is a
momentary provocation to set off that dreaded spark.

When Hamid Gul offered India peace

Former head of Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
Gen. Hamid Gul, who died recently, has been described in
the Indian media as a monster, the originator and perpetrator
of terrorism against India. Yet, there is another side to his
personality which needs to be disclosed.
In early 1988, Pakistan President, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq,
expressed concern that the Pakistan Army, by consuming
almost 48 per cent of the nations budget, was unfairly
depriving citizens of funds which could raise their standards
of living. He was particularly concerned about the
expenditure on the operations in Siachen and was convinced
that an agreement with India was possible to cut down on
these expenses.
Gen. Zia was anxious for a meeting between the Intelligence
Chiefs of the two countries to explore possibilities and
approached the then Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan to speak
to the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and facilitate a
move forward.
Intelligence chiefs meet
Prince Hassan conveyed the proposal to Gandhi, who
promptly agreed. The two Intelligence Chiefs then met at
Amman under the aegis of Prince Hassan. What could be
done was broadly discussed. They met again at Geneva after
political endorsement of their confabulations at Amman from

their Chiefs. The Foreign Offices and other elements of

government on both sides were kept out of the loop though it
must be assumed that Gen. Zia would not have embarked on
this initiative without sounding out his Corps Commanders.
The final agreement between the two Intelligence Chiefs
envisaged: a) withdrawal of the Pakistani forces to the west
to the ground level of the Saltoro mountains; b) giving up of
Pakistani claims to territory from NJ9842 to the Karakoram
pass; c) the Line of Control to run North from NJ9842 along
the western ground level of Saltoro exactly North till the
Chinese border; and d) reduction of Pakistani troop strength
by two divisions with some corresponding adjustments on
the Indian side.
In confirmation of this understanding, Gen. Hamid Gul sent
a GHQ Survey of Pakistan map where the new line of LoC
north of NJ9842 and the western foot of Saltoro was clearly
demarcated. After the receipt of this map, steps were
undertaken on the Indian side to convert the covert operation
to an overt process. First, the Director of Military
Intelligence was asked whether a new Line of Control on the
western foothills of Saltoro would be agreeable to the Army
to bring about a solution to the Siachen question. He was
sceptical of the Pakistani military accepting such a line but
said that an effort could be made. Thereafter, the proposal
was made into a Government of India proposition with the
Ministry of Defence also giving their assent. No one was, of

course, told about the ground work done earlier by the

Intelligence Chiefs of the two countries.
The two Chiefs had also agreed to remain in close contact
with each other over the public telephone, using code words
and names. One rewarding development of this relationship
was that Gen. Hamid Gul decided, on his own, to return the
four Sikh soldiers who had defected to Pakistan, angered
over the Army assault on the Golden Temple. Over the
telephone, he conveyed to his Indian counterpart that four
soldiers would be released in a specific geographical area on
a certain date.
The information was immediately passed on to the Border
Security Force (BSF). The four were taken into custody by
the BSF from the specified location on the date agreed. The
BSF was given no inkling about how the release had been
made possible .
Sudden end
A meeting of the Defence Secretaries of the two countries
was already scheduled. It was decided that India would put
forth the proposal for demilitarisation of Siachen from its
side and await Pakistani reactions. The Defence Ministry had
no idea that the proposal already had been agreed to by the
Pakistani top authority at the covert level.
On the designated day, the Indian defence delegation left for
Pakistan but a supreme tragedy occurred simultaneously. It

was announced that Gen. Zia-ul-Haq had been killed in a

plane crash. Thereafter, Pakistan turned down the Indian
formulation. It has not been heard of since.
On the Pakistani side, the secret operation, as it moved
forward, was known only to the Pakistani High
Commissioner, Niaz Naik. Sometime later, he also died in
mysterious circumstances. After Gen. Zias death, a civilian
government took office in Pakistan. Gen. Hamid Gul was
removed from the post of Director General of ISI.
When the Indian authorities made efforts to pick up the
threads of the covert operation, they were told that no such
operation was ever carried out and there was not a single
paper in the Pakistani records which would testify to its
existence.
Gen. Zias was a major effort to break out of the psyche
prevailing in Pakistan at the time but apparently his Corps
Commanders had not realised the extent of compromise he
would be ready to make to start a new beginning with India.
Once they were informed about the exact terms, they became
uneasy and wanted to stop the progress of these
developments at any cost.
Could it be reasonable to speculate that Gen. Zias death in
the air crash was actually a planned assassination, planned at
the highest levels of the military hierarchy by those who
were opposed to a policy of reconciliation with India? The

new Zia line, of which Gen. Gul was the principal architect
in Pakistan, was never consummated.
Rajivs regret
Barbara Crossette, correspondent of New York Times in the
early 1990s, following an interview with Rajiv Gandhi on
May 21, 1991, hours before he was assassinated, quoted him
as saying that during Gen. Zias tenure, India and Pakistan
were close to finishing agreement on Kashmir. We had the
maps and everything ready to sign.
It is thus clear that Pakistani generals will go any extent to
prevent a new page opening up in Indo-Pakistan relations.
This was evident also from the recent collapse of the
National Security Advisor (NSA)-level talks. Two generals
like Gen. Zia and Gen. Hamid Gul, who believe in taking
unorthodox steps to solve disputes with India, are unlikely to
emerge in Pakistan easily.
A charitable view could be taken that Gen. Hamid Guls
subsequently donning on a mantle of extreme hostility
towards India was just to save his skin and whitewash his
role in the secret talks between the two countries.
India should assume a more assertive role
The worlds most important climate talks are coming up at
the end of this year in Paris. The French presidency is
leading an unprecedented climate diplomacy drive
working tirelessly to bring countries together beforehand in

the hopes of making progress towards a global deal. The

latest such consultations took place last month as informal
ministerial consultations that brought together 40
delegations and 30 Ministers.
To limit the global rise in temperature to two degrees
Celsius, considered the benchmark for dangerous climate
change, countries have agreed to submit their intended
nationally determined contributions or INDCs. INDCs are
bottom-up commitments from nations defining the extent of
their emissions reduction contribution towards this global
goal. Nations were requested to submit their INDCs by the
end of March 2015, but not later than October 2015. Initial
calculations suggest that total submissions account for only
56 per cent of global emissions.
The most significant development in the discussions is the
concept of a peaking year. A peaking date is a time in
the future until when emissions are expected to grow, and is
likely a function of anticipated growth plans and energy use.
China, the worlds largest emitter, says its emissions will
peak in 2030. The European Union (EU) is committed to its
previously announced target of 20 per cent cuts off 1990
levels by 2020. Ethiopia, one of the worlds poorest nations
is set to reduce its total emissions starting 2030. The
announcement of a peaking date has been extensively
applauded as countries more specifically, Chinas
willingness to act as a major player in climate change
mitigation.

But where is Indias INDC? What will Indias position in

Paris be? Like others, India committed to INDCs in 2009.
They are expected to soon be reviewed and released, in time
for Paris summit.
India is the fourth largest emitter and despite our $2 trillion
GDP, over 30 per cent of the population does not have access
to electricity. Some 21 per cent lives below the poverty line.
This means India needs a lot of headroom emissions to
grow before it we can think of slowing down.
But, we are also seen as a major economic player. We should
act the part. Especially since there is so much happening at
home.
Consider just these initiatives: Indias total green energy
commitment is 175GW over five times the current
amount. The Indian Railways has announced several energy
conservation measures. Urban metro transport is being
contemplated as part of the smart cities project. Cars are
moving to Bharat-VI emissions norms. The point is, it all
adds up. All of this could be bundled into an INDC and
become the first step in climate diplomacy. But, to what end?
We should keep our eyes on the ball. A two degree goal
means that global emissions must peak by 2020. INDCs
should therefore be developed with this target in view.
Peaking years are a function of economic growth, energy
use and population increases.The concept of a peaking
year is an important step in climate negotiations, not

because it sets a particular date per se, but because it begins

a conceptual shift away from the current outdated
classification of nations under Annex-I (so called
developed economies) and Non-Annex-I (so called
developing countries). According the U.N.s classification,
China the worlds largest emitter is in the same non-Annex
I bucket as Congo, possibly the worlds poorest country. If
the current discussion is on climate finance then a new
benchmark must be set for determining reduction rigour.
Per capita GDP as the basis
GDP per capita would perhaps the most logical way of
determining a new benchmark. For a diverse country like
India, its leadership quotient could be a sum of all actions
currently being undertaken to meet its infrastructure needs;
and its additional quotient could seek financing for
meeting the incremental costs of greening more basic energy
needs to cater to say, the segment of India without basic
energy access.
Either way, it is time that India assumed a constructive role
in the international arena. It is time it began to move away
from traditional alliances such as like minded developing
countries and crafted new links that are more in sync with
the countrys growth plans. Formulating a credible INDC is
the first and most basic step. Working towards developing a
meaningful peaking year is the next. We have no dearth of

skills and institutional capacities to do this, and it should be

our imperative as a strong, emerging economy to do so.
The politics of backwardness
If political mobilisation could win for it the fruits of
reservation in employment and education, the massive shows
of strength over these last few days in Gujarat should have
yielded results for the Patel community by now. Their
agitation to get the community included in the Other
Backward Classes list has brought the State almost to an
administrative halt. Not only Chief Minister Anandiben
Patel, but also Prime Minister Narendra Modi and leaders of
parties in other States have been given a rude awakening to
the intensity of the demands of the agitators. However, even
if the Gujarat government wanted to, it cannot extend
reservation benefits to the Patel community merely on the
basis of an executive order. Inclusion of more communities
in the reservation list is already a highly controversial issue
and fraught with procedural and legal obstacles. Not only
would communities that are already enjoying reservation
benefits oppose any move that would shrink their pie, but
other communities currently excluded from the OBC list
would demand to be treated on a par with the Patels. More
importantly, any decision to extend reservation benefits to
new claimants might not pass judicial scrutiny. Recently, the
decision to include Jats in the OBC list was overturned by
the Supreme Court, which ruled that the perception of a selfproclaimed socially backward class of citizens cannot be a

constitutionally permissible yardstick for determination of

backwardness. Indeed, the court specifically warned against
a caste-centric definition of backwardness, and called for
new practices, methods and yardsticks to be evolved to
identify socially disadvantaged groups for extending the
benefits of reservation. Like the Jats, the Patels will not find
it easy to meet the specified criteria for social and
educational backwardness.
For the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is in power both at the
Centre and in the State, the Patel agitation is a fresh political
headache. The party, which counts the Patels among its key
constituencies, will need to be seen as having backed the
agitation to the full in order to arrest any erosion in its
traditional vote-bank. For Prime Minister Modi especially, to
envision the loss of the BJPs political hold in Gujarat would
be particularly distressing. There is simply no way to
appease the Patels without alienating some of the other
backward class communities in the State. Moreover, the BJP
finds itself dealing with a new, youthful leadership of the
community focussed on jobs and livelihood concerns, and
not political power. In a situation where it can neither
support nor antagonise the agitators, the BJP and its
governments in the State and at the Centre must resist the
temptation to grant the demand of the Patels in principle and
deny it in practice. It would be cynical to merely wait for the
movement to somehow lose steam with time, and not
confront the issues that are at stake.

A chronicle of our times

Events as they have played out in the rapidly unfolding
drama surrounding Indrani Mukherjea and her murdered
daughter Sheena Bora, would put a Bollywood scriptwriter
to shame. The story involves money, fame, love, secrets and
a corpse, but these are not just the elements of a potboiler.
Rather, they are striking pointers to a once-traditional
societys speedy metamorphosis into an acquisitive FMCG
economy with its attendant attributes of obsessive ambition
and ruthless self-indulgence. And like fast-moving consumer
goods, this lifestyle too revolves around a use-and-throw
philosophy. The personality of Indrani Mukherjea that is
surfacing from media reports suggests a woman eager to
leave behind the humdrum middle-class life of a homemaker
in small-town Guwahati and transform herself into a jetsetting society lady in the countrys commercial capital. She
appears to have had no qualms in abandoning her first
husband and two young children in her search for the good
life. Her second husband Sanjeev Khanna, too, was
jettisoned quickly. He has said that they parted ways since he
did not want to stop her from realising her ambitions. She
then met future husband and former Star India CEO Peter
Mukherjea, who finally allowed her to find the social
reputation and wealth she sought.
It is interesting that Ms. Mukherjeas chronicle and the new
mores she could be seen as representing reject the one value
so dear to old India the sanctity of motherhood. Ms.

Mukherjea is accused not only of abandoning her young

children but also of strangling the daughter she thought
might unravel her hard-won life of a social butterfly. And, in
what appears to be an attempt to conceal her age and a
humble past, she told her first-borns that she could not
jeopardise her social status by revealing their existence and
would therefore introduce them to the world as her siblings.
Even more disturbing is the second motive that the police are
suggesting for the brutal murder, that of money. If there is
one thing that could be said to characterise the consumerist
economy most, it is the insatiable hunger for more more
money, bigger cars, swankier homes, or more fame. And the
newly emerging social praxis endorses individuals who show
a single-minded determination to acquire all of this at any
cost. But in this particular case, at least the avarice has
culminated in a tragic denouement.