Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
125172
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this
petition for review of the Decision 1 dated January 30, 1996 and the
Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court and
denying reconsideration, respectively.
2.
Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie
Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
The latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built
their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining
neighbors of the Corpuzes.
3.
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989.
She was trying to look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter.
She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila
however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, . . . on March 11,
1990. Plaintiff's departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle East
was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12,
1990; p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom
went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his
place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a
cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College,
Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time
working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes.
Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was
going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14,
Sept. 6, 1991.)
1.
Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1,
1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement" dated March 16, 1990
(Exh. "B") as null void and of no effect;
2.
Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and
possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the remaining one-half portion
of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
3.
Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants
Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS
corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor of
Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing one-half of
the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9, Block
8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon computed from
the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of
the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as follow:
6
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is
hereby AFFIRMED by this Court. No costs considering plaintiffappellee's failure to file her brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed
Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for
reconsideration of Our decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a
mere rehash of the same issues which we have already passed upon in
the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the
same, this Court RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private
respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her
husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal
peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood.
The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of
Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court as
follows: 8
1.
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally
married spouses. They were married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod
City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio
xxx
xxx
(2)
Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper
action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2,
refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which
were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of
sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. Gilda
Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11
Q
were?
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q
Q
Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem
which arose concerning the ownership of your residential house at
Callejo Subdivision?
A
When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which
arose regarding my residential house and lot because it was sold by
my husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the teo
lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip
properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disgreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
(Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the
trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above
provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It
becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent.
The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void.
It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul
the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
700,000.00
1,600,000.00
18th month
500,000.00
Taytay Property
Makati Property
6th month
P200,000.00
P300,000.00
12th month
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real
estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's
signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her
that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed
"spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration.13 Petitioner
reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already
been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would
unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts
prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and
damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma
Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss14 was filed by respondents which was denied by
the trial court in its Resolution of July 21, 1992.15
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim,
alleging that it was an agreement between herein petitioner and
respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties
was still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife Norma
Camaisa.16 Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the
sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.17
The checks issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and
she accepted the same without any objection.18 Respondent further
claimed that the acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner
signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject
properties.19 Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in
the negotiations for the sale of the subject properties and that she
gave her consent and conformity to the same.20
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment21 asserting that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the
parties considering that the wife's written consent was not obtained in
the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to
respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment
dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the
Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in
the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to
give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice
of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and
(464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos.
295976 and 295971 of the Registry of Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma
and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral
Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fees.
assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-0512802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife.3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter
to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed
on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions,
including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place
without the knowledge and consent of respondent.4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its
vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on
June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In
one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its
premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on
the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil
Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October
18, 1997. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of
evidence the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the
plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993
executed before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register
entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo
Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the
defendant
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.10
In essence, petitioners assail the appellate courts declaration that the
sale to them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and
void. However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine:
(1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an
exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its
sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns
consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was
the exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through
barter or exchange.11 They allege that the subject lot was acquired by
Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties.
Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange
their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472,
respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the property of
Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674,
was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot
remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or
purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471,
which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him
before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No.
T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary
Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12 Petitioners bare
assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No.
T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is
conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had
even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed
by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to
be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the
wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court.
Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the
assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10)
years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of
the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5)
years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.13
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of
sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the
deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the
conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No.
T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can
dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and
his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the
time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However,
Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that
petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the
exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer
of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase
the property without Mary Anns written consent. Moreover, the
respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of
the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the
time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest
in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to
the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has
been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any
contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized
and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance
with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at
anothers expense, we sustain the appellate courts order directing
Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for
the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements
for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina
made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time
when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.18
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that,
"(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."19
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding
damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which
respondent and her children were removed from the family home
deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out
and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance
with the petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal
belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to
enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned
pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."22 When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform
with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible.
Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages caused.23 It is patent in this
case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil
law standards.
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo,
represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas),
filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to
the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them
upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They presented Atty.
Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit
at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted,
however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four
months later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses
pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she
alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for
nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting
experts at the trial. Comparing Rosarios standard signature on the
affidavit with those on various documents she signed, the Rocas
expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same
person. Making the same comparison, the spouses expert concluded
that they were.8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case.
It ruled that the action had already prescribed since the ground cited
by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed
under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In
this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from
the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds
and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997,
almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on
January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of
the fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not
conclusive proof of forgery.10 The RTC ruled that, although the Rocas
presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by
his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same.
Atty. Plagatas testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of the
affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not
require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither
does the irregularity vitiate Rosarios consent. She personally signed
the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The
CA found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to
Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in
Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the
questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted
significant variance between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been
living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion
that her signature had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded
that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under
which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal
consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10
years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas,
her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989
sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and
Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled
the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest
computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since
the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were
entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of
the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award
damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorneys fees
to the Fuentes spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this
court by petition for review.14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As
lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled,
among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the
P200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid,
chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in
entering the land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom
the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the
transaction, represented that he got Rosarios signature on the
affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that
the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way
of knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her
consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the
requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly
made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months earlier
on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the
Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In
fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the documents
submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new
title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these
had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is
deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code,
who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no
obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal
interruption by a final judgment against them.24 What is more, they
are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they
introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of
the Civil Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of
the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property
may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca
executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes,
as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses
pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca,
married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid
Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully
paid, chargeable against his estate;
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to
indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their
expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or
pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of
those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention
of the land until the indemnity is made; and
November 9, 2006
respondents Sps. Manuel M. Ferrer and Virginia Ferrer, and Sps. Ismael
M. Ferrer and Flora Ferrer in the aforesaid Civil Case No. MC02-1780.
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the
respondent to enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement[s] on the subject property. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the same should be made and directed in the
settlement of estate of her deceased husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant
to Article 12912 of the Family Code. Such being the case, it appears
that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against the
petitioners, the latter not being the proper parties against whom the
subject action for reimbursement must be directed to. A complaint
states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are
absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Albeit the respondent
herein has the legal right to be reimbursed of the cost of the
improvements of the subject property, it is not the petitioners but the
estate of her deceased husband which has the obligation to pay the
same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for failure to state
a cause of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the
respondent is not without any further recourse as she may file her
claim against the estate of her deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action.13
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
However, on 17 December 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Resolution14 denying the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner submits the following grounds for the allowance of the
instant Petition, to wit:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE PROPER
PARTIES AGAINST WHOM THE SUBJECT ACTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT
MUST BE DIRECTED TO.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT, HON. RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE [RESPONDENTS]
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.15
Both arguments raise the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.
Section 1(g) Rule 1616 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it
clear that failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in
the complaint warrants the dismissal thereof. Section 2, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict
or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.17
A cause of action has the following essential elements, viz:
(1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and
(3) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.18
A complaint states a cause of action only when it has the three
indispensable elements.19
In the determination of the presence of these elements, inquiry is
confined to the four corners of the complaint. Only the statements in
the Complaint may be properly considered.20 The absence of any of
these elements makes a complaint vulnerable to a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of a failure to state a cause of action.21
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic
exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to
reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the
construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated
August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the
regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent,
decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the
partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created
and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a
court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part.
To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate
Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that,
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge
of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot
in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to
him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money
to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that
said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any
part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in
full settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the
owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a building thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the
Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall
be for the defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the
defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full
settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation
of other conjugal properties that have not been mentioned;
xxxx
The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise
Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.2
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002,
praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of
the Compromise Agreement.
G.R. NO. 155409
June 8, 2007
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002,
denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in the assailed Order dated
February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed
grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement
dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7,
2002 that the Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off
period; (3) when it denied petitioners Motion to Repudiate
Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings
without the appearance and participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor.4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
The CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of
adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property, especially considering that she had only been sentenced with
the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter
vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the
effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation,
respectively, do not apply, considering, too, that the Petition for the
Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by the respondent invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is
premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that,
although adultery is a ground for legal separation, nonetheless, Article
63 finds no application in the instant case since no petition to that
effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the
spouses voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise
Agreement with court approval under Article 134 of the Family Code;
that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the voluntary
separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects because it
had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that, furthermore,
even if it were true that the petitioner was not duly informed by his
previous counsel about the legal effects of the Compromise
Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of
the lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts
to gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the part of his
client; that these exceptions are not present in the instant case; that
the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple
language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the
consequences thereof, hence, petitioners claim that his consent was
vitiated is highly incredible; that the Compromise Agreement was
made during the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was
submitted during the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage; that the application of Article 2035 of the Civil Code is
misplaced; that the cooling-off period under Article 58 of the Family
Code has no bearing on the validity of the Compromise Agreement;
that the Compromise Agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, and public policy; that this agreement may not
be later disowned simply because of a change of mind; that the
presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable to
the execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the
purpose of his presence is to curtail any collusion between the parties
and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, and, with this in mind,
nothing in the Compromise Agreement touches on the very merits of
the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of
any possible collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is
merely an agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal
properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR
ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE
CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND
LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL
SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF
EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND
PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE
OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES
CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have
been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law and public policy;
that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there
being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the
Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the
respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified
from sharing in the conjugal property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of
property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void
because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who
was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the
conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the
petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the
common child under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the
spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property;
and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final
and executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and
argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the
Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are
inapplicable to the instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article9 shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall
be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed.
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of
marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right
to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should
be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos.
Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently
and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the
compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was
not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the
voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent,
as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the
settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright
deprivation of one's property through a technicality." x x x x13
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise
Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and
other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
December 3, 2012
not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall
not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto,
under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to
an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on
the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case
also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code
which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by
the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It
may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in
rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money
he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the
early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds
at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of,
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."34
(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his
foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only
to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which
were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to
partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to
conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court
is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October
8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged
error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-9212539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in
dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971.
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22
June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in
its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1)
The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2)
The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin
and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay
with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
(3)
The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined
by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of
Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with
their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family
home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the
family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art.
147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above
extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that
(a)
Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his
or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other,
during the period of cohabitation; and
(b)
In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or
declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband
and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage.
If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of
the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently
nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage
a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned
in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted
void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical
for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16
of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to
be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title
V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless
of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
MELO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of a Decision of the
Special Former Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered on
February 19, 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 08249-SP (Reyes, Sundiam [P], and
Cortez, JJ; Rollo, [pp. 22-28) ordering the dismissal of the complaint in
Civil Case No. C-6095 filed by herein petitioners against Lorenzo Caia.
Francisco Caia-Rivera, the National Housing Authority (formerly
PHHC). Francisco M. Custodio, and respondent Manotok Realty, Inc.,
before then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City.
The relevant antecedents, as narrated by respondent court, are as
follows:
(1)
During his lifetime, Julian Caia, was the occupant and
tenant of a parcel of land, owned by the Republic of the Philippines but
administered at first by the then Rural Progress Administration and
later by the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
described as Lot 20 of Consolidated Sub-division plan LRC Pcs-1828,
and in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 365557 of the Registry of Deeds
of Caloocan City, with an area of 25,776 square meters;
(2)
The Republic of the Philippines acquired the aforesaid lot,
together with other lots in the Gonzales Estate by Expropriation to be
resold to qualified and bonafide tenants-occupants and, to achieve this
end, the President of the Philippines, on August 30, 1961, designated
the PHHC with the task of selling and transferring the said lots to
qualified tenants concerned and/or their lawful heirs;
(3)
Julian Caia had a brother, Justo Caia. The latter had three
children, namely, Emeteria Caia Buenaventura, Lorenzo Caia and
Francisca Caia. Emeteria Caia Buenaventura died as early as July 11,
1937 and was survived by Maria Buenaventura and Narciso
Buenaventura, the Private Respondents in this case;
(4)
However the Gonzales Estate still had to be sub-divided into
lots; but before the subdivision of the property and the subdivision plan
thereof could be approved and said lot transferred to Julian Caia, the
latter died on December 17, 1961. Justo Caia, the brother, died later
on May 3, 1962;
(5)
Thus, at the time Julian Caia died, he was survived as his
sole heirs, by his brother, Justo Caia and the latter's children, Lorenzo
Caia and Francisca Caia: also surviving him were the private
respondents Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura, the
children of Emeteria Buenaventura who died earlier in 1937;
(6)
On November 4, 1965, the People Homesite and Housing
Corporation executed a 'Deed of Absolutes Sale' over the said lot to
Lorenzo Caia and Francisca Caia-Rivera, as the sole heirs and
successor-in-interest of Julian Caia for and in consideration of the
purchase price of P96,048.80 (a certified xerox copy of the aforesaid
Deed is hereto attached as Annex 'A' hereof):
(7)
By virtue of the said sale, Lorenzo Caia and Francisca
Caia-Rivera were issued, on November 5, 1965. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 21013 over the said lot by the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City (certified xerox copy of the aforesaid title is hereto attached as
Annex "B" hereof);
(8)
On January 26, 1966, Lorenzo Caia and Francisca CaiaRivera executed a 'Deed of Absolutes Sale' over the said lot in favor of
Francisco M. Custodio after which the latter was issued on January 26,
1966. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21484 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City (a certified xerox copy of the aforesaid Deed of Absolute
Sale and Transfer Certificate of tile are hereto attached as Annexes "C"
and ''D" hereof respectively);
(9)
On January 26, 1966, Francisco Custodio executed a 'Deed of
Absolute Sale' over the said lot in favor of the Petitioner for which the
latter was issued on January 26, 1966. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2145 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (a certified xerox copy
of the said Deed of Absolute Sale and Title are hereto attached as
Annexes "E" and "F" hereof respectively);
(10)
On December 24, 1976, Private Respondents [now
petitioners] filed a complaint with the respondent court docketed as
Civil Case No. C-6095 entitled 'Narciso Buenaventura and Maria
Buenaventura vs. Lorenzo Caia, Francisca Caia, National Housing
Authority (formerly PHHC). Francisco M. Custodio. Manotok Realty, Inc.'
for Annulment of Titles, Contracts and/or Sales. Reconveyance and
Damages (a copy of the aforesaid complaint attached hereto as Annex
"G" hereof);
(11)
The Petitioner [now private respondent Manotok Realty]
subsequently filed with the Respondent Court a 'Motion to Dismiss' the
aforesaid complaint on the ground of, inter alia, prescription (a copy of
the aforesaid motion is hereto attached as Annex "H" hereof);
(12)
The Private Respondents, however filed their Opposition to
the aforesaid motion of the Petitioner (a copy of the aforesaid
opposition is hereto attached as Annex "'1"' hereof);
(13)
On July 28, 1977, the Respondent Court issued an Order
denying the aforesaid Motion of the Petitioner (a certified xerox copy of
the aforesaid order is hereto attached as Annex "J" hereof);
(14)
The Petitioner thereafter filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration'
of the aforesaid Order, to which the private respondents filed their
opposition. The petitioner however, filed its Reply to the aforesaid
opposition of the private respondents despite which the respondent
court, on July 21, 1978 issued an order denying the aforesaid motion of
the petitioner (a copy of each aforesaid motion, opposition and reply
are hereto attached as Annexes "K","'L" and "M", hereof respectively;
while a certified xerox copy of the aforesaid Order is hereto attached
as Annex 'N' hereof). Decision, pp. 1-3: rollo, pp. 22-24.).
Aggrieved by the rules of the trial court, herein private respondents
filed a petitioner with the Court of Appeals which later granted the
petitioner and ordered the dismissal of the complaint of then private
respondents, now herein petitioners, on the ground that their action
has already prescribed. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
to no avail.
Hence, the instant petition.
Both sides offer conflicting opinions on the applicability of Article 1410
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, in directing the dismissal of the complaint filed
by they petitioners in the court of origin, held that Article 1410 of the
Civil Code on imprescriptibility of actions is not applicable because
fraud in the transfer of the property was alleged in petitioner's
complaint. The Court of Appeals was, of course, referring to paragraph
20 of the Complaint which reads:
20.
That in executing the said 'Deed of Absolute Sale' over Lot
20 in favor of defendants Lorenzo Caia and Francisca Caia-Rivera,
defendant NHA acted with evident bad faith, gross negligence and
carelessness, while defendants Lorenzo Caia and Francisca Caia
acted with false representations, fraud and deceit and the three
defendants connived, conspired and schemed to deprive the plaintiffs
of their rights over 1/3 portion of Lot 20 of the Gonzales Estate
administered by defendant NHA, to the damage and prejudice of the
herein plaintiffs; (Rollo, p. 17).
Respondent court further stated that due to the allegation that fraud
was supposedly employed in the execution of the deed of sale and
thereafter in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21484,
there was created in favor of then private respondents, now
petitioners, an implied or constructive trust, such that the action for
reconveyance must be filed by the defrauded party within the a period
of ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the title, otherwise, the
action prescribed. Consequently, respondent court held that because
the complaint in Civil Case No. C-6095 was filed only on December 28,
1976 or after more than ten years from the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title on January 26, 1966, the assertion for recovery of
property based on fraudulent transfer and registration can no longer be
entertained (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue otherwise. They claim that the
action for reconveyance is based both on the grounds of fraud and
simulation of contracts, hence, it cannot be made subject to the rule on
prescription of action. (Rollo, p. 15).
We agree with respondent court.
Petitioners' allegation in their complaint filed in the court of origin, that
fraud was employed in the execution of a deed of sale and
subsequently, in the issuance of a transfer certificate of title, renders
their action for reconveyance susceptible to prescription either within 4
years or 10 years. In the present case, even if one bends backwards
and considers the circumstances alleged as having created an implied
or constructive trust, such that the action for reconveyance would
prescribed in the longer period of 10 years (Duque vs. Doming, 80
SCRA 654 [1977]; Cerantes vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 514 [1977];
Jaramil vs. Court of Appeals 78 SCRA 420 [1977]), still petitioners'
action is plainly time-barred. Considering that the deed of sale
executed by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation in favor
of Lorenzo Caia and Francisca Caia-Rivera was executed on
November 4, 1965 and on the following day, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 21484 was issued in favor of the vendees (private respondents),
the party allegedly defrauded in the transaction, herein petitioners,
had only 10 years or until September 5, 1975 within which to file the
appropriate action. In the instant case, the action was filed only on
December 28, 1976, which was beyond the prescribed period set by
law.
Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover
situations such as the case at bar, where there have been a series of
transfers to innocent purchasers for value. To set aside these
transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept on his rights
is anathema to good order.
Independently of the principal of prescription of actions working
against petitioners, the doctrine of laches may further be counted
against them, which latter tenet finds application even to
imprescriptible actions. Thus, in Rafols vs. Barba (199 SCRA 146
[1982]), We find the following words of wisdom:
In the least, plaintiffs-appellants are already guilty of laches as would
effectively derail there cause of action. While it is true that technically,
the action to annul a void or inexistent contract does not prescribe, it
may nonetheless be barred by laches. As was stated in Nielson & Co. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601. December 17, 1966, 18
SCRA [1040]:
The defense of laches applied independently of prescription. Laches is
different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with
the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on the same change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription is based on fixed time; laches is
not.
The essential elements of the principle of laches are all present herein,
to wit:
... (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint for which
the complaint seeks a remedy: (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held barred.
(Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589.)
The defendant-appellee purchased the parcel of land in question giving
rise to the complaint of herein plaintiffs-appellants. The latter delayed
the assertion of their supposed right to annul the sale for a period of
over fifteen (15) years despite knowledge or notice of such sale. They
had all the opportunity within that period of time to take action to set
aside or annul the sale. Defendant-appellee was never apprised of any
intention on the part of plaintiffs-appellants to annul the sale until this
action was filed. Finally, the defendant-appellee stands to lose the
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She
managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee of
the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse.
Hence, they decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they
executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although
signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John
shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of
P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. On the
same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66
by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of
P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment
beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof,
John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sarisari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit
against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction
of the annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed
from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the
structure was under his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive
ownership of the subject structure, which thereby gave him the right to
eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to pay the agreed
balance due him under the aforementioned Memorandum of
Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated
thru their common funds and that the subject structure annexed
thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original
residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of them in
common.
In a decision2 dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the
money used in the construction of the structure in question solely
came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the
latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction therefrom, including the
sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession
thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and
against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in
litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of
the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of
P2,500.00 a month from the time she withheld possession of the store
in litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over
possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the
Plaintiff by way of Attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995,
affirmed that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24,
2000,3 reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet
Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and maintain therein her
business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they
acquired certain properties which must be divided between them upon
the termination of their common law relationship.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter
alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal
partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their
separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira
Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and
the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs)
on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No.
156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan
were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying
RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson
purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of
Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed
therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their
loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999,
initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended,
before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently,
Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues
of Remate.3 At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank
emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28,
2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity
of the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No.
00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson
alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,4 alleged
that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was
paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage
in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and,
hence, was subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001,
judgment finding for Nicholson. The fallo reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real
estate mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings
thereon null and void.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, raising the following issues for consideration:
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of
nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of
property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an
innocent purchaser for value.7
Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code
providing that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. To Metrobank, Art.
116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch
as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Citing Manongsong v. Estimo,8
Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under
Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for
the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be
adduced to prove that not only was the property acquired during the
marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a
burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property,
Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals9 and Jocson v. Court of
Appeals,10 among other cases, where this Court held that a property
xxxx
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver
or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver
executed by Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the
conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the
properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage,
without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete
separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues
to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we
apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in
application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185)
of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the
relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the
conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its
liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.17
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern
the property relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed
lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation
of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property
relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the
aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or
even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property
even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion
that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson
indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found
by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly
executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the
marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore
his forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A
spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may
become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for
value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and
as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to
the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to
Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro
indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the
partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership."18 This disposition is in line with the
well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.19
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor
of Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or
not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the
nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general
rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond
the four corners of the title is inapplicable.20 Unlike private individuals,
it behooves banks to exercise greater care and due diligence before
entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or
condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the
mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part of the
banks operation.21 A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot
be accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,22 as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with
the due diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest
purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some
interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision
of the CA dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered
by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby
declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia
thereon is concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property
covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and
all proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the
undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but
VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to
Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are
DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that
the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion
and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and
the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.5
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that
there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the
case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on
the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner
was able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial
court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly
made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The
trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent
failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under
Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married
another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of
the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of
all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask
for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no
way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing
upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second
or bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she
made the admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of
the opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her manifestation, even
though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that
Rubina cannot collaterally attack a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration17 filed by Salas. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision
ordering the partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the property in
Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in
not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court
cannot order a division of the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.19 Thus, the
settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.20
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has
the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.21 Salas
alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no
conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during
their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that
Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived
Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas]
as the properties allegedly registered in the name of [Aguila] are
merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court
cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These are
the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu,
Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan
Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan
Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing,
Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married
to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by
Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas,
certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement)
listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September
17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the
presumption of regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in
the name of [Aguila], certified true copies thereof should have been
the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption
that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in
the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes.22
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were
acquired by Salas during their marriage.1wphi1 Both the RTC and the
CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name
were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the
Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September
2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage. In
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,23 we held that the question of whether
the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue.
Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are
binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in
this case.24
On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to
attend the hearing of Aguilas manifestation, we find the allegation
untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We
hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposition
to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the
Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious.
The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly
issued.25 The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner.26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially
dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to
the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas
supported Rubinas statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in
the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case.
The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action."27
In Dio v. Dio,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in
this case. Article147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint
efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.29 In the present
case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the
ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we
held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by coownership.30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as
ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated16
March 2012 and the Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the
petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin
Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on
18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at
the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of
his wifes death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968,
Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley,
Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining
portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf
sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban
operated small business establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).6
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to
Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According to
Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he
decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline.
Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2)
properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which
Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the
purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her
father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the
Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.8
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed
away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto,
discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila.
Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent
because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros
prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null
and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or
interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.9
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban
was void from the beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was
the governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were married,
provides:
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not
conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and
Esteban in the properties. It found that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St.
Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it
was first acquired by her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968
when he purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970,
she x x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining property
occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the
National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered
in her fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to
"11" x x x. These documents prove that that she has been an occupant
of the said property in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro
Torres got married in June, 1980.14
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del
Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978,
before her father met Socorro Torres and before the construction of the
BLISS Project thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of canvas
(lona) and a sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del
Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating Vangies
Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was
evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her
favor on 09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was
constructed in 1980, the property became known as Units D-9 and D10. At first, her father [paid] for the amortizations for these two (2)
parcels of land but when he got sick with colon cancer in 1993, he
asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x x.
[Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the
37 pieces of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount of P188,596.09
for Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 receipts x x x.15
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for
the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a
co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and
Delpan properties.16
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of
the RTC-Manila. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged
Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article
148 of the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code.
Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and
a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that
it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good
faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of
the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline
shouldered some of the amortizations.28 Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del
pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA
found that the Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of
Esteban and Socorro.29 Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase
price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment
was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires
the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the
creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the
parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing
payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property.1wphi1 On the
other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s
alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant
who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia)
Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the
ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of
petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he
took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at
the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months
after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel
and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was
in 1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he
stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife
and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel
had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his
second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda,
as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an
area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on
September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No.
143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case
filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia
Palang. 4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang,
born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted
of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on
February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de
la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil
Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland
covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and
Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son
Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot covered by TCT
No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid
properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to
Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June
30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little
evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal
property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher
Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
1)
2)
Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the
residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house
standing therein;
3)
Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that
piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced by
TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4.
Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his
deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural
land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT
No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the former
(Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision becomes final
and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to
annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal
properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang,
dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel
Palang will have to be settled in another separate action;
5)
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the
following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby
REVERSED and another one entered:
1.
Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in
question;
2.
Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the
properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3.
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in
lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffsappellants.
No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the
validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the
house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay
and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner
contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring
Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus
entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent court erred,
according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading
and evidence that Kristopher A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should
be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the
trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199. 8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent
provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and
affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of
property subject of this action. Petitioner assails the validity of the
deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no
dispute that the transfer of ownership from the original owners of the
riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses
Cespedes, respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel
and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the
Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage
on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by
the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded
as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares. 9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she
is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store 10
but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of
age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to
conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, 11 there being no proof of the
same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before
Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought,
said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date
when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of
co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would
still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed
to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in
1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal partnership." 12 Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. 13 The judgment which
resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same
for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years
old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as
the vendee. 14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but
one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, 15 for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. 16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as
an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor
of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in
making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation
"inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate
of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper
probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession." 17
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang
should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following
the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not
been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had
submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad
litem. 18 The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother,
Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved
in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher
to file another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been
discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for probate
proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and
Kristopher's successional rights has been pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired
during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof
of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1
(CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). 2 The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned
orders of the court a quo dated October 7, 1997 and November 11,
1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the court
a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondents.3
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997
affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby
reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of the
[MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case. 4
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an
action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos,
and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said
spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendantsprivate respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last
seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it
was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos
will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied
with by the said defendants; that they have demanded several times
[that] the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as they are in need of
the property for the construction of a new building; and that they have
also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos
representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00
from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the
said demands went unheeded. They then prayed that the defendants
be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated
unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to
the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the
MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence
on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days
from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her
affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996, while the [respondents]
filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their
marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the
Contract to Sell over the disputed property. The MTC thereafter
promulgated its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants
alleged in their memorandum on appeal that [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was
further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building
with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the
other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario]
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was also during
the early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being
unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants
further averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was
temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short,
their presence there [was] only transient and they [were] not tenants
of the Fernandez spouses.
On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC.
The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration on July 3, 1997, alleging that the decision of
affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point
out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was
based vis--vis the statements of issues they have raised in their
memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the Contract to Sell
presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as "Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez," should not
be given credence as it was falsified to appear that way. According to
them, the Contract to Sell originally named "Guillerma Fernandez" as
the spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the
[respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage
contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Such
facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner
thereof, and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order
to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized
by law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by
private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject
property[.]
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented,
the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be
presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. . . .1wphi1.nt
In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC
instead presumed that Guillerma and her children needed support from
[Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly
presented before the trial court (MTC).
With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close
perusal of the records shows that they did not file any responsive
pleading. Hence, judgment may be rendered against them as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein, as provided for in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. There was no basis for the public respondent to
dismiss the complaint against them. 7 (emphasis in the original)
The Issues
Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents'
action for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property
with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC,
she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse.
The MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim. The
RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she had been
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented
before it, 17 ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced
before the RTC could no longer be considered because they had not
been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded
that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven . . ." 18
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the
evidence presented before it. Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she
was a co-owner of the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on
Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence
presented by petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not
raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during
appeal. 19
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues
belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. The defense invoked
by petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner. To support
her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986,
which stated that Mario Fernandez was legally married to her. The
allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of
her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on
considerations of fair play. Respondents never objected when the
assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot
claim unfair surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC,
we cannot accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the
disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. 20 As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the
Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article,21 only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man
and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, 22 or to
one in which the marriage of the parties is void 23 from the beginning.
24 It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife. 25
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario
Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was
legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily
admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent
Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out 26 that "[t]he Family Code has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its
held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the action for
partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among
co-owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant,
as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in
question. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93656.
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this
petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of
November 7, 1996, was correct in applying the Roque ruling and in
rejecting respondent's claim that she was the sole owner of the subject
properties and that the partition suit was a collateral attack on the
titles; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that
Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-ownership between the
parties, hence, the complaint for partition is proper; (3) with respect to
the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty, respondent
admitted ownership thereof and, at the very least, these properties
could simply be excluded and the partition limited to the remaining
real and personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals erred in not
holding that under the Civil Code, there is an implied trust in his favor.
12
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in
accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the
negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment
is proper only when, based on the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it is shown that except
as to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any
material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. 1 Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, i.e., an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
sham, fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently
unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. 14
In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist.
Petitioner anchors his claim of co-ownership on two factual grounds:
first, that said properties were acquired by him and respondent during
their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from their
brokerage business; and second, that said properties were registered
solely in respondent's name only because they agreed to that
arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in accordance with
Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied
by respondent. She denies that she and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife. She also claims that the properties in question were
acquired solely by her with her own money and resources. With such
conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain the truth is obviously
through the presentation of evidence by the parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually
lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code
can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to
marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist
between them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man
and a woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without
impediment to marry each other, 15 or in which the marriage is void ab
initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the
Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where
the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this
case were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they
were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned
properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a
co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides
that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the
couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein.
Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and
whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership are genuine and material. All but one of the properties
involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired
before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was really
acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be
excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff
assisted by defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out
of the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and personal
properties which were, upon agreement of the parties, listed and
registered in defendant's name with plaintiff as the unregistered coowner of all said properties. 17
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant
to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more
persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal
title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is
created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the
interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of
the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family
Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their
actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall
constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
co-owner is a trustee for the other. 18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and
Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust
relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under
Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the
ground that the same amounted to a collateral attack on the
certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner's action does not challenge the validity of
respondent's titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed itself and
affirmed the trial court. It noted that petitioner's complaint failed to
include a prayer for the alteration, cancellation, modification, or
changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the appellate court
ruled that a declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition would
involve an indirect or collateral attack on the titles. We disagree.
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding
from this, P.D. No. 1529, 19 48 provides that a certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or
canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an attack on
a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or
proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 20
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque
regarding the nature of an action for partition, petitioner seeks first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second,
the conveyance of his lawful shares. He does not attack respondent's
titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that
would justify a review of the registration decree in respondent's favor.
His theory is that although the subject properties were registered
solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement between them as
well as under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties and
as such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the premise
that he is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of the
properties in co-ownership and the conveyance to him of his share.
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel of land bequeathed
in a last will and testament was registered in the name of only one of
the heirs, with the understanding that he would deliver to the others
their shares after the debts of the original owner had been paid, this
Court ruled that notwithstanding the registration of the land in the
name of only one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in
"such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition
the estate of the testator." 22
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the
ground that to order partition will, in effect, rule and decide against
Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, both
strangers to the present case, as to the properties registered in their
names. This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the majority of
the properties involved in the present case are registered in
respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner.
Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition
of a substantial amount of personal properties consisting of motor
vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's
complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, the
appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove
ownership over the claimed real and personal properties. The dismissal
of petitioner's complaint is unjustified since both ends may be amply
served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties
registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May
7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the
two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between
the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263,
which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted
two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he
had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan
Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying,
inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of
the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the
trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral
of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of
money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without
the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent
presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."31 Proof of
actual contribution is required.32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because
this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code.33 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted,
there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in
a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.34
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez,36 which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of
the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,37 we ruled
that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of
the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense.38 This applies
with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.39
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint
that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts41 in her name for
the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase
the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account
with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the
absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of
which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein
is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On
the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private
respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the
amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction
thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should
be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the
Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00
and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is
ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent,
failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private
respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the
judgment of the appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as
co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the fishpond could validly
lease his interest to a third party, respondent Atienza, independently of
his co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his other
undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could likewise
by mutual agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with
said third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have
substituted him as his heirs) therefore stands liable on his express
undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to him by the lessee on
the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of the coowner's lease to elude such liability.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the Manila court of first instance ordering therein defendant-appellant
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. (now deceased and substituted by above-named
petitioners as his heirs) "to return to the plaintiff (respondent) Gregorio
Atienza the sum P2,500.00 with legal interest from the date of the
filing of complaint until fully paid plus the sum of P250.00 as attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit", found the following facts to undisputed:
On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de
Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26
hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196450 of the
registry of the property of Bulacan. The lessors are co-owners in equal
shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term of the lease was for
five years from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year, the first
year's rental to be paid on February 1, 1956, the second on February 1,
1957 and the rental for the last three years on February 1, 1958. The
first year's rental was paid on time.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and
annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exh. A)
was signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and defendant
shows that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, widow of Tomas de Castro, was
intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity as representative
of the heirs of Tomas Castro.
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
"2.
Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin
ang nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin
ni Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay
GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang P5,000.00
na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na ang
nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa amin sa o bago
dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956."
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did not
pay the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit
A, he should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment
was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail,
hence the present action.
On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between
them would attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de
Castro (widow of Tomas de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of
the lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate court found that "the
testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.) ... supports the
contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio
who was interested and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was
accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had
no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of
1984 there were no more foreigners coming because of the situation in
the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She
was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave.,
Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress that she
met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself
and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He
made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English
language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of
additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were
abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled
every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of
the family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few
months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a
decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the
children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at
that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as
the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to
construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her redirect examination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her
minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in
the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments
was in postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never
opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment
payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two
children for ten months, where she was completely under the support
of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner,
bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect,
if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual
findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the
couples cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that coownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply.19 In the
instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no coownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the
name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the
disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now
is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It
is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice