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Revolution of Weaponry System

Ghita Yoshanti 0706291281


Riris Dwi Adianti 0706291382
Tangguh 0706291426
• Hi-tech gadgetary
• Professional military
Iraq • Battles won by the U.S.,
managing to drive out Iraq
• Lack of institutionalization • Badly trained soldier from Kuwait
of RMA • Advanced military • Saddam Hussein had yet to
technology, still not better be defeated
than the U.S.’s
• Miscalculation towards the
U.S.

U.S. Result
 Al Qaeda waged netwar
 U.S. response to al Qaeda’s rise was weak and ineffectual:GBU-31: Mk84 bomb fitted with JDAM
 World had changed—and U.S. had not yet changed sufficiently

 Most important advance in U.S. capabilities:


 JDAM
 UAVs (RQ-1A Predator & RQ-4 Global Hawk)
 Siprnet

 In the past, civilian casualties were regarded as routine; RQ-1 / MQ-1 Predator

now those were a major scandal  Growth of precision-


guided munitions
 Most important offer from U.S.: air power
 Victory still required close cooperation of air & ground action
 Heavy air strikes defeated Taliban

RQ-4 Global Hawk


First air strike: a failure  Best weaponry in the world was not much use without
adequate intelligence
U.S. forces had grown since Desert Storm: technology, doctrine & organization
 Use of information technology had improved; Decision-making far more quickly, Transmission of
short messages became useful, Locating enemies far easier
 Army-marine coordination & “jointness”
Battle won, favorable political outcome couldn’t be achieved
 Fall of Saddam’s police state  disintegration of law & order
 Failure to stop fleeing Baathists dissipating to communities
 Shortfall of coalition troops forces: fast conventional attack, failed reconstruction effort
 No planning for Phase IV—stability operations after Saddam’s fall
 Army of insurgents: Baathists and other Sunni Arabs with “classic guerilla-type campaign”
 U.S. soldiers not trained for “nation-building” and “peacekeeping”
U.S. troops facing dead end
 Isolated “inside the wire”—the Green Zone
 Threat of IEDs
 Lack of “up-armored” Humvees, supplies, and small equipments like the Interceptor system
 U.S. soldiers being a hierarchy fighting the insurgents being a network
 Frustrated battling a vicious enemy  U.S. forces abused
4th generation war
 Political struggle: Ideological war, State vs. non-state, Private security /
military company
 Operation: asymmetric war; Political interaction, Bureaucratic
interaction, Media’s war
 Tactical; People: win heart and mind of the supporting mass, Protracted
war / long war

World had changed


 Cold War: bipolar world with visible & predictable threats
 Post-Cold War: threats from multiple sources, unpredictable

Emergence of netwar by networked, decentralized organization


 Modern communications & transportation technology: In the past,
terrorists abroad had little ability to inflict damage far from home;
now they have