III.

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. Justifying Circumstances- Art.11
1.

Self-defense
a.People v. Boholst-Caballero (199)
Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI
of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her husband,
Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956
and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's
gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused
his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958,
Cunigunda went caroling with her friends one night and when she was on her
way home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and
accused her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held
her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the
ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her.
Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while
holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting
knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above
the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound. Then she
ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to
the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night before.
Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate selfdefense Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted. [unlawful aggression, reasonable
necessity of the means employed, no sufficient provocation].
Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground
then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes
unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked,
Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it
into husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not
depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient when proportionate
to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that she
did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her
husband was to be out caroling at night.

b.People v. Decena
Facts:
On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., daughter of the Jaime
Ballesteros, victim), saw Decena rushing towards her father with a long
bladed weapon prompting her to warn her father. Decena, however, stabbed
him on the right chest causing his death.
Narration of the defense:
At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no apparent reason, he held the
appellant by the neck and poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod
intervened and advised the appellant to go home. Appellant left but was later
followed by Jaime (victim).
Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he saw Jaime attacking the
appellant with a balisong. Appellant was able to parry the blow, and
overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body.
Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in killing Jaime
Ballesteros absolving him from criminal liability.
Held: No.
Ratio:
In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which may
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
However, upon invoking self-defense, the accused admits that he killed the
victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he really acted in
self-defense.
Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked
attack that placed the life of the accused in danger forcing him to inflict
wounds upon his assailant
According to the defense, the unlawful aggression started when the
victim started poking the appellant with a fork
Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It
follows that when appellant and Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay
tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since the aggression no longer
existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to
attack the appellant
Defense: continuing aggression
Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the
testimony of the wife)
Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked the victim
could not have persisted in attacking the appellant with his current state.
Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness

c. People v. Jaurigue (189)

i. A man placed his hand on the upper thigh of a woman seated on
abenchj in a chapel where there were many people and which

was well-lighted, there was no reasonable necessity to kill him

bec. There was no danger to her chastity or honor.
Facts: Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist Church, Amado
Capina sat beside the appellant and with the greatest of impudence,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this
highly improper and offensive conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of
her personal dignity and honor, pulled out a fan knife and stabbed
Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck
Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Appellant
Avelina Jaurigue was subsequently tried and convicted of the crime of
Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the legitimate
defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all
criminal responsibility
Held: No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression
sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense inasmuch as a
woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
more than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who,
thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for
her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1
Viada,Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare,
62 Phil., 504). As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a
woman is justified in killing her aggressor in the defense of her honor.
When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the same
bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the
upper portion of her right thigh without her consent, the said chapel
was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people
inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant
and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being
raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at his neck,
inflicting upon him a mortal wound and causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her
honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances
of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from
criminal liability.

d.People v. Narvaez (186)

i. No necessity of the course action taken. While there was an actual

physical invasion of appellants property when the deceased chiseled
the walls of his house and closed appellants entrance and exit to the
highway, which he had the right to resist, the reasonableness of the
resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense or defense of ones rights. When the appellant fire his shotgun
from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was
disproportionate to the attack.
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a
fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over
certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still
pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and
Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to
avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his
house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez
was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for
moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite
the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights
to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30
of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to
the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is
accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he
acted in defense of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is

applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6
months and he should have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of
the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired
through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In
the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself.
Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the
deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is
unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of
the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months
arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary
imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been
detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled
with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was
not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since
he has served more than that, he should be released.

e. People v. Dela Cruz

That on or about the 27th day of May, 1996, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one DANIEL MACAPAGAL, by shooting the
latter with the use of an unlicensed Caliber .38 snub nose firearm, with
Serial No. 120958, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on
different parts of his body, which caused also his death.[1]
The victim Daniel Macapagal, a married man, had been a live-in
partner of prosecution witness Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for about two
to three years before San Antonio took appellant Roberto de la Cruz,
widower, as lover and live-in partner. At the time of the incident on
May 27, 1996, appellant and San Antonio were living in a house being
rented by San Antonio at 094 Valino District, Magsaysay Norte,
Cabanatuan City (pp. 2-3, TSN, July 6, 1996).
At around 6:00 oclock in the evening on May 27, 1996, San Antonio
and appellant were resting in their bedroom when they heard a car
stop in front of their house and later knocks on their door. San
Antonio opened the front door and she was confronted by Macapagal
who made his way inside the house holding a gun in his hand, despite
San Antonios refusal to let him in. He seemed to be looking for
something or somebody as Macapagal walked passed San Antonio and
inspected the two opened bedrooms of the house. He then went to
the close bedroom where the appellant was and banged at the door
with his gun while yelling Come out. Come out (p. 4,
Ibid.). Appellant then opened the door but he was greeted by
Macapagals gun which was pointed at him. Appellant immediately
closed the door while Macapagal continued banging at it. When
appellant again opened the door moments later, he was himself armed
with a .38 caliber revolver. The two at that instant immediately
grappled for each others firearm. A few moments later shots were
heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor.Appellant told San Antonio to
call the police on the phone. After a few minutes police officers arrived
at the scene. They saw the dead body of Macapagal slumped on the
floor holding a gun. San Antonio met them on the door and appellant
was by then sitting. He stood up to pick his .38 caliber revolver which
he surrendered to SPO3 Felix Castro, Jr. Appellant told the police that
he shot Macapagal in self-defense and went with them to the police
station.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would
presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent

danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or

intimidating attitude[8]- but most importantly, at the time the
defensive action was taken against the aggressor. True, the
victim barged into the house of accused-appellant and his live-in
partner and, banging at the master bedroom door with his firearm, he
yelled, come out. Accused-appellant, however, upon opening the door
and seeing the victim pointing a gun at him, was able to prevent at
this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could
have stopped there. Instead, accused-appellant, taking his .38 caliber
revolver, again opened the bedroom door and, brandishing his own
firearm, forthwith confronted the victim. At this encounter, accusedappellant would be quite hardput to still claim self-defense. [9]
The second element of self-defense would demand that the means
employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and
necessary. The number of the wounds sustained by the deceased in
this case would negate the existence of this indispensable component
of self-defense.[10] The autopsy report would show that the victim
sustained four gunshot wounds which would, in fact, indicate a
determined effort to kill.
It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that
there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. When accused-appellant, opening the bedroom
door the second time confronted, instead of merely taking
precautionary measures against, the victim with his own gun he had
taken from the cabinet, accused-appellant could no longer correctly
argue that there utterly was no provocation on his part.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
considered in favor of accused-appellant. Immediately following the
shooting incident, he instructed his live-in partner to call the police and
report the incident. He waited for the arrival of the authorities and
readily acknowledge before them his having been responsible for the
shooting of the victim.[16]
The aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm being
effectively offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender,[17] the penalty prescribed by law for the offense should be
imposed in its medium period.[

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accusedappellant ROBERTO DELA CRUZ y ESGUERRA is hereby held guilty of
HOMICIDE with the use of an unlicensed firearm, an aggravating
circumstance that is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and he is accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

2.

Defense of Relatives
a.People v. Madrid
Accused-appellants insist on their version of the incident. Jesus
Madrid claims that he was a victim of the attack initiated by Antonio
and merely acted in self-defense when he assaulted him. Jesus denies
having stabbed Camilo Malacad, much less ordered his execution.
William Madrid invokes defense of a relative and explains that he
merely acted in aid of his uncle Jesus who was fleeing from Antonio
and Camilo. Jill Madrid and Hilarion Tinao Jr. maintain that they were
not present during the encounter between Camilo and William as they
(Jill and Hilarion) only came in the jeep that was hired to take Jesus to
the Romblon Provincial Hospital.
On the other hand, the version of the defense is clear and
convincing. The attack was a result of Camilo Malacad's coming to the
aid of his nephew Antonio Tasis who had earlier stabbed Jesus Madrid
for what he perceived to be an insult on his honor. The fate of Camilo
sufficiently shows that an incident triggered the attack, contrary to the
version of the prosecution that Camilo was attacked and killed without
any reason. In providing a reason for the attack, the defense was able
to fill in the missing pieces in the puzzle.
William Madrid likewise invokes self-defense as well as defense of a
relative. However, for self-defense and defense of ones kin to prosper,
the following elements should be proved by clear and convincing
evidence The defense maintains that Camilo committed unlawful
aggression when he tried to wrest from William the possession of the
knife handed to him by Jesus.
We do not agree. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not
merely an intimidating attitude. It must be noted however that Camilo

was not armed during the confrontation and no convincing evidence

was shown proving that he was intent on inflicting harm on Jesus and
William as to put their lives in imminent danger.
Granting that William discerned an attack from Camilo, his response
went beyond the perceived threat. The nature and number of wounds
inflicted by William upon Camilo - four (4) incised wounds, six (6) stab
wounds - reveal an intent to deliver serious harm which renders his
plea of self-defense and defense of a relative unavailing. Likewise,
the third element is lacking. The sight of William armed with a knife is
sufficient provocation on the part of Camilo to take on an aggressive
posture and engage William in a fight.
WHEREFORE, the Decision[4] appealed from finding all four (4)
accused-appellants guilty of Murder is MODIFIED. WILLIAM MADRID
Y VICTORIANO is held guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an
indefinite prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to sixteen (16) years two
(2) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum, plus the accessory penalties provided by law. For failure to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants JESUS
MADRID Y YAP, JILL MADRID Y VICTORIANO and HILARION TINAO JR.
Y MATEO, they are ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

b.People v. Gonzales
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Inocencio Gonzales, Jr.,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 139542
June 21, 2001, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and
herein accused-appellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost
collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off,
disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales. Altercation then
ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in
defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out
the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father,
Gonzalezs daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his
hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance
and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noels wife, was shot to death
while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and
two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death.

Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs.
Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez. Hence, an automatic review or this
case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found
treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense
of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as
mitigating circumstances.
RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse
killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded
by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of
attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by
reason of the victims provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden
attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or
acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior
of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently
forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack
must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and
without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation
of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide
and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and
none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary
surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.
Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong
committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime
committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards
the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not
sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing
and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful
aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime

committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and
the injury sustained by the victim. The appellants use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably
placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The
use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.

3.
4.

Defense of Strangers
Avoidance of Greater Evil
a. People v. Ricohermoso
March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de
Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a
parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked
about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to
taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano
could collect the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by
Ricohermosos house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter
answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens.
Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement),
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal
got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place,
Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito.
They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed
out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he
carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.
The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the
case.
Issue:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of a greater evil or injury
Held:

No. Juan Padernals reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous

because his act in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and
Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the
killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not an
act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to
forestall any interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the
appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with
respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed. (Note: Severo Padernal withdrew
his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecutions version of the case
and trial courts finding of guilt.)

b.People v. Norma Hernandez (212)

FACTS:
Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma
Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant finally accepted
Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her
home so that they could talk about their marriage.
When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought
chickens and goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas,
shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncles roof.
While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be
found. Vivencio and his parents waited but she never showed up thus
causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but
that she wasnt really in love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her
to accept the proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to
her parents and the uncles insistence.
Before Vivencios parents came to their home, she already counselled
them not to bring the chickens and that they should not regret whatever
may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasnt honestly in love with
Vivencio and so she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the
marriage. Appellants parents also corroborated her testimony.
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely
and deliberately fled to prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
HELD:
Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.
RATIO:

Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasnt been proven.

There is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She
was merely exercising her right not to give her consent the marriage
after mature consideration.
Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the
complainant & appellant before the incident. There always existed
good relations between them for they were neighbours so it cannot be
sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in
deliberately frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to
marry and it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by
deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If
she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her
to go into a marriage without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4, RPC)

5.

Fulfillment of Duty
a. People v. Delima (215)
Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from jail where he is serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman, Felipe Delima, who was looking
for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed
piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender.
The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman
dodged it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet
did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his
weapon. The peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver,
this time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted by the CFFI of homicide
and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties.
Held:
The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased
was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading
service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a
wespon in his hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such
extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by
the circumstances.

Article 8, No. 11 of the Penal Code 9 (Art. 11, Par. 5 in the RPC)
being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with costs de oficio.

b.People v. Lagata (216-217)

Facts:
When the guard called his order to assemble, one of the prisoners was
missing. So, he ordered the others to look for him. The other prisoners
scampered. The guard fired at two of the prisoners, wounding one
(Abria) and killing the other (Tipace). His reason was to prevent the
attempt of prisoners to escape.
Held:
As regards the shooting of Abria and Tipace, the Court is
convinced that the facts were as narrated by the witnesses for the
prosecution. Abria was shot when he was only 3 meters away from the
guard and the defense has not even shown that Abria attempted to
escape. Tipace was also shot when he was about 4 or 5 meters away
from the guard. The latters allegation that Tipace was running,
conveying the idea that the said prisoner was in the act of escaping,
appears to be inconsistent with his own testimony to the effect that
Tipace was running sidewise, with his face looking towards him 9the
guard), and with the undisputed fact that Tipace was hit near one
axilla, the bullet coming out from the opposite shoulder. If Tipaces
purpose was to escape, the natural thing for him to do would have
been to give his back to the guard.
It is clear that the guard had absolutely no reason to fire at
Tipace. The guard could have fired at him in self-defense or if
absolutely necessary to avoid his escape.
Five Justices believed that the prisoner who was killed was not
escaping while 4 thought otherwise. All Justices agreed that the guard
is justified in shooting an escaping prisoner.

c. People v. Tan

6.
Obedience to a lawful order of a
superior
a. People v. Beronilla
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Abra, convicting the accused
of murder.

Facts: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and
continued to serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944
accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by
Lt. Col Arnold. Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by Arnold
authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of
treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet
government officials of Abra, with a memorandum instructing all Military
Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints.
Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and asked
residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury
composed of Labuguen as chairman and others, plus Alverne and Balmaceda
were prosecutors; Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Inovermo as counsel for
the accused, later Atty. Barreras voluntarily appeared as counsel for Borjal.
The jury found Borjal guilty on all counts and imposed death penalty. Mayor
Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to Headquarters of Infantry for
review. Records were returned on April 18, 1945 with approval of Arnold. On
the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Immediately after the
execution, Beronilla reported the execution to Arnold, the latter
complementing Beronilla.
Two years later, Mayor Beronilla and others involved in the Borjal case were
indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating
in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to
all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of
resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. All the accused (except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by
the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission,
which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by purely
personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On July 10,
1950 Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as conspirator
and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed.
Issue: WON accused appellants are guilty of murder; and WON they should
be granted amnesty.
Held: The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the
orders of the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that
there was a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the
illegality of Borjal's execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it
was known to Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving
the decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise. The testimony of Rafael
Balmaceda, relative of Borjal was also unreliable.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against late Borjal, but
court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they were
impelled by malice. In fact, prior to the execution, Beronilla sent the decision

for review. The lower court also found that Borjal was really guilty of
treasonable acts. The court held that the accused-appellants just acted upon
the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established.
Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not be
denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after actual
liberation of the area from enemy control. The court held that any reasonable
doubt as to whether a given case falls within the amnesty proclamation shall
be resolved in favor of the accused.

b.Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
Issue: Tabuena and Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated
October 12, 1990, as well as the resolution dated December 20, 1991
denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article
217 of the RPC.
Facts:
On January 10, 16 and 30 year 1986, TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS
(25), TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), and FIVE MILLION PESOS (5),
were withdrawn (from PNB extension office) respectively by principal
accused, Luis A. Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International
Airport (MIAA). This purportedly as partial payments to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), for unpaid obligations. All the
above withdrawals were done by way of cash placed in peerless boxes
and duffle bags, laded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same
day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez (secretary of Pres. Marcos), to which
she issued a receipt only on the last day of delivery January 30, 1986 (5
million).
Why did Tabuena withdraw the said amount? What authority
allowed him to withdraw the amount?
It was an order by President Marcos: 1) over the phone 2) another by
way of memorandum (see below)
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the
following essential antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly
to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied,
"Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe
Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential
Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS
Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, to
wit:
"Office of the President of the Philippines

Malacaang
January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, through this Office, the sum of FIFTY
FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of
MIAA's account with said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of
Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly
approved by this Office on February 4, 1985. Your immediate compliance
is appreciated.
(Sgd.)
FERDINAND MARCOS."[4]
It must be noted that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA
for the months of January to June 1986.
Based on the following findings, which will be listed below, the Supreme
Court acquitted Tabuena and co-accused Peralta, the dispositive portion
says:
Final decision of this case; held: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized
under Article 217
Why did the court acquit the accused? (herein petitioners,
Tabuena and Peralta).
1) On the reason of good faith, a valid defense in a prosecution
for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of
the accused.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential
directive, Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior.
2) Tabuena did not have to observe all auditing procedures
of disbursement (all disbursement above 1000should be made in check,
payment of all claims against the govt. had to be supported with
complete documentation)
Tabuena did not have the luxury of time to observe all the procedures of
disbursement considering that the MARCOS memorandum enjoined his
"immediate compliance", with the directive that he forward to the

president's office the P55 Million in cash.

3) The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already
converted and misappropriated the P55 million when he delivered the
same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC.
It must be stressed that the MARCOS memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay
immediately the PNCC, through this office, the sum of 55M pesos" Tabuena did
exactly as the memorandum ordered, he was acting in good faith when he
delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez.
4) Even assuming that the sole purpose of the Marcos Memorandum was or the
personal benefit of those in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to
Tabuena
Why? For the very simple reason that no conspiracy was established between
Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 million.
5) Finally, the most compelling reason of all is the violation of the accused's
constitutional right to due process.
The court revealed its biased nature during its numerous questioning over the
witnesses (Monera, Peralta, and Tabuena), alarmingly even exceeding the
number of questions of the cross-examiner. In addition the questions of the
court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of probing,
confrontation and insuation.