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A general theory of generic

modelling and paradigm shifts:
part 3 the extension
Maurice Yolles

Generic
modelling and
paradigm
shifts: part 3
311

Business School, Liverpool John Moores University,

Liverpool, UK, and

Gerhard Fink
IACCM, Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Vienna, Austria
Abstract
Purpose Anticipating behaviour and responding to the needs of complexity and problematic issues
requires modelling to facilitate analysis and diagnosis. Using arguments of anticipation as an imperative
for inquiry, the purpose of this paper is to introduce generic modelling for living systems theory, and
assigns the number of generic constructs to orders of simplex modelling. An nth simplex order rests in an
nth order simplex cybernetic space. A general modelling theory of higher orders of simplexity is given,
where each higher order responds to every generic construct involved, the properties of which
determining the rules of the complex system being that is represented. Higher orders of simplexity also
explain greater degrees of complexity relatively simply, and give rise to the development of new
paradigms that are better able to explain perceived complex phenomena.
Design/methodology/approach This is Part 3 of three linked papers. Using principles that arise
from Schwarzs living systems set within a framework provided by cultural agency theory, and with
a rationale provided by Rosens and Dubois concepts of anticipation, the papers develop a general
modelling theory of simplex orders. They show that with the development of new higher orders,
paradigm shifts can occur that become responsible for new ways of seeing and resolving stubborn
problematic issues. Part 1 established the fundamentals for a theory of modelling associated with
cybernetic orders. Using this, in this Part 2 the authors established the principles of cybernetic
orders using simplex modelling. This included a general theory of generic modelling. In this Part 3
the authors extend this, developing a fourth order simplex model, and exploring the potential for
higher orders using recursive techniques through cultural agency theory. The authors also explore
various forms of emergence.
Findings Cultural agency theory can be used to generate higher simplex through principles of
recursion, and hence to create a potential for the generation of families of new paradigms. The idea
of conceptual emergence is also tied to the rise of new paradigms.
Research limitations/implications The use of higher order simplex models to represent complex
situations provides the ability to condense explanation concerning the development of particular
system behaviours, and hence simplify the way in which the authors analyse, diagnose and anticipate
behaviour in complex situations. Illustration is also given showing how the theory can explain the
emergence of new paradigms.
Practical implications Cultural agency can be used to structure problem issues that may
otherwise be problematic, within both a top-down and bottom-up approach. It may also be used to
assist in establishing behavioural anticipation given an appropriate modelling approach. It may also be
used to improve and compress explanation of complex situations.
Originality/value A new theory of simplex orders arises from the new concept of generic modelling,
illustrating cybernetic order. This permits the possibility of improved analysis and diagnosis of
problematic situations belonging to complex situations through the use of higher order simplex models,
and facilitates improvement in behavioural anticipation.
Keywords Behaviour, Adaptation, Cybernetics, Emergence, Complexity, Systems theory
Paper type Research paper

Kybernetes
Vol. 44 No. 2, 2015
pp. 311-328
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0368-492X
DOI 10.1108/K-12-2014-0303

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Introduction
In Part 1 of this paper we discussed the modelling of complexity, and argued that we
could formulate simplex substructures for any complex living social system that could
compress complexity. In Part 2 we formulated a number of simplex model orders, each
assigned to a particular cybernetic space having rules/properties. The first order simplex
model was deemed to be positivist, the second order radical constructivist and instrumental,
and the third order constructivist.
In addition we created a general theory of simplex order modelling that had both
recursive and incursive properties. Recursive properties are represented by formal
modelling approaches, while incursive properties represented informal inferences that
could influence model building through constraints and conditions.
In this paper we shall create a fourth order simplex model sitting in a fourth order
cybernetic space. We originally suggested that simplex substructure models could be
shown to be responsible for paradigm shifts that are able to reduce complexity. In this
Part 3 we demonstrate this attribute. Using cultural agency theory, we also show how
recursive techniques can be used to formulate orders of simplex model.
Fourth order simplex modelling
It is possible to formulate a statement of fourth order cybernetics in terms of the higher
levels of relationship between observed and observing systems as an extension of
Boxer and Cohen (2000). However, a more pragmatic and satisfactory (Ashby, 1968)
approach allows one to respond to the variety in a complex situation with an invariant
generic construct more capable of generating requisite variety. Higher orders of simplex
modelling have this capability since they provide new ways of explaining complexity
by representing external influences as internal imperatives, thereby creating greater
complexity for the immanent agency dynamics, but reducing undecidability. To explain
the use of higher order models, rather than use observers relationships, a more minimal
way is to adopt a concept of generic loop learning as an extension of Agryris (1982), even
if this redirects us away from von Glasersfelds tenet of adaptability. Here then, fourth
order cybernetics could be represented as triple loop generic learning (beyond the double
loop generic learning of third cybernetics), referring to the way in which knowledge is not
only acquired but also identified. Another way to express this is that an n-level generic
learning loop plus generic feedback gives an (n + 1) order simplex model. Learning can
also be seen as a control process that embraces the dialectic of deviation-counteracting
and deviation-amplifying (Maruyama, 1963).
Fourth order simplexity sits in a fourth order cybernetics space, lies beyond
constructivism and is post-constructivist (Osborne, 1996; Aviram, 2000). It should be
seen as social constructivist (Boudourides, 2003), and adopts socio-cultural perspectives
(Duit and Treagust, 1998) that embrace the socio-cultural setting during the construction
of knowledge (Treagust and Duit, 2008). It is therefore a reflection of Vygotskys (1962)
view that knowledge is socially created, now seen as a fourth order cybernetic process in
contrast to Piagets third order process. This is distinct from the current wisdom that
Vygotsgys theory is constructivist (Lund and Sjvoll, 2009). This recognition creates
logical harmony between Piagets and Vygotskys theories of the knowledge creation
process, overturning the idea that the two models are in conflict.
While the social is important to both fourth and second order simplex modelling, its
role in social constructivism is different from that of radical constructivism. In the
former case the social is part of the frame of reference and central to internalised
modelling through R(4), providing formal explanations for the influence on R(1). In the

latter the social is only part of the environment for R(1), facilitating informal explanations,
including social filtering of virtual knowledge. There is also a connection between
Piagets R(3) knowledge self-creation, and the internalisation of the social imperatives
that occur for Vygotskys social knowledge creation in R(4). While we shall explore this
internalisations more fully shortly, it is worth note that Wertsch (1979) explains how
Piaget and Vygotsky views on this differ. Piagets interest lies in how the child
abstracts and internalises certain features of actions carried out within the physical
world. In contrast, Vygotskys interest is in how the child internalises features of
certain social and cultural activities.
We present a fourth order simplex model in Figure 1 which arises from Figure 4
(in Part 2 of this series of papers) by taking n 3. Here, the ((n + 1) 4) referent system
is a defining system that has a third order invariant generic construct linked to its
lower order coupling. Figure 1 involves a particular superstructure that provides
epistemic content. The generic model differentiates referent system orders by
distinguishing between a cognitive and defining system. It does this by suggesting
that it is through the defining system that agency develops its attribute of social
self-identity (Turner, 1976; Hogg et al., 1995; Grandey et al., 2005). It is also here where
defining information originates. The connecting channel between the defining system
and the rest of the model occurs through the invariant generic construct we call
autogenetesis: coming from genetic meaning relating to or determined by the
origin, development, or causal antecedents of something. So autogenetesis refers to
a self-defining network of triple generic learning loop of simplex processes.
Other well-known system self attributes beyond identity (as shown in Figure 1)
formally include self-identity (arising from the collective consciousness), self-reference,
self-regulation and self-organisation, as well as cognitive attributes of influence,
significance, purpose and intention. While these are functionally relative to the defining
(referent) system, the epistemic natures of the variant generic constructs in Figure 1 are
understood from context. The manifestation of information between these occurs
through the levels of generic learning loop in a way that is pathology dependent.
Originating information from the internalised social is directly manifested to the
cognitive system and the autopoietic coupling, but coded information may also be
taken indirectly through the autogenetic coupling to the autopoietic coupling. Figure 5
(in Part 2 of this series of papers) also constitutes an autogenetesic coupling. Each of
these autopoietic orders has the potential to generate a new family of paradigms. These
are capable of simplifying complexity through new higher order generic constructs.
So this too constitutes a process of emergence. The consequence of Figure 4 (in Part 2 of
the series) is that such emergence can occur through recursion.
Identity and the many selves
Just as Boudourides (2003) recognises that third order constructivism requires
a self-referential process for maintaining self-identity, so fourth order social constructivism
requires social reference for maintaining social identity. Bozicnik and Mulej (2011) take
such social reference of fourth order cybernetics to be seated in holism. However, social
reference may more generally be seen in terms of Durkheims collective consciousness,
which explains how autonomous agency comes to identity within its embracing social
environment (Piepmeyer, 2004).
This coming to identity develops through a process of internalisation: an agency
embraces external phenomena and represents it internally. To explain internalisation
we find it useful to create a synergy between three sources of theory that together make

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Cognitive
significance

Cognitive
influence

Autogenetesis
feedback

Self-reference
Defining
information

Self-identification
Originating
information

Figure 1.
Illustration of a
fourth order simplex
(viable system)
model, introducing a
new level of generic
learning loop called
autogenetesis/
self-defining; each
coupling is marked
by a dotted line
Cognitive system

Cognitive purpose

Self-regulation
Strategic
information

Figurative system

Autogenesis
feedback

Autogenetic
Coupling

Autogenesis

Autopoiesis
feedback

Autopoiesis
Coupling

Autopoiesis

Cognitive
intention

Self-organisation
Operative
information

Operative system

314

Defining system

Autogenetesis

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the explanation more suitable to this paper: motivation, knowledge scripting and
psychological learning theory. These explanations will be sparsely peppered with
insertions to create greater synergy to satisfy the method of open coding for theory
construction as part of Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). We use curved
brackets to insert material from other theories, or from our own theoretical development,
so as to maintain sources.
For Deci and Ryan (2009) internalisation begins with extrinsic motivation, this
referring to instrumental activities on an environment that relate to some operationally
separable consequence. Four degrees of this are identified, ranging from purely external
imperatives towards behaviour, to those that have been internalised. Internalisation is
responsible of intrinsic motivation, and there are degrees of this that relate directly to
degrees of autonomy in enacting behaviour. Underpinning this Wertsch (1979) notes that
agencies are not just passive receivers of input from the external environment, but
are always directed towards an object or motive. Activity motivated by a goal motive (an
intrinsic motivation), is mediated by physical and psychological tools (including
language) that allows and even leads to the creation of types of activities that would not
otherwise exist. These instrumental activities have at their basis the values, behaviours
and opinions that they encounter. Deci and Ryan note that agencies maintain a natural
tendency to take these in. For Boje (2004) such external phenomena can be expressed
through knowledge scripts. These emerge from social rules that have materialised and
gained traction through social interactions, and which in turn influence how social
relationships are enacted (Sanders, 2010). In other words it is not only values, behaviours
and opinions that matter, but more generally social rules/scripts that underpin these. The
internalising of the scripts constitutes a means by which agencies are influenced by
knowledge-based information relating to its social environments.
Identifying the process of internalisation does not explain how it occurs. For
Verenikina and Gould (1998) internalisation is the transition in which external
processes with external material objects are transformed into processes that take
place mentally at the level of consciousness. During this transition these processes
(adopt knowledge scripts which are integrated, and) become generalised, verbalised,
abbreviated; importantly, they become the means for further development that
transcends what is possible with external activity (thereby effecting epistemic
emergence). For Wertsch (1979) it is through external (motivational) social activities
that a plane of consciousness is constructed (i.e. ontologically emerges). It is possible
to envisage that many of these levels may be created as can be modelled by the (n + 1)
referent systems of Figure 4 (in Part 2 of this series). This links with Lucass (2002)
exploration of plural levels of cognitive consciousness, and offers an explanation for
the ontological emergence of higher simplex orders, and the recognition that
consciousness is a social phenomenon (Shanon, 1993; Praetorius, 2000).
So, internal representation is not just a transmission of knowledge from an external
social plane to the internal psychological plane, but it rather occurs through (the
emergent assembly of generic learning loop networks of ) processes by which the internal
plane is actually constructed (Davydov et al., 1983, p. 34, cited in Coupland, 2004). In this
internal plane psychological operations develop as higher and qualitatively new forms
of mental function (Vygotsky, 1978, cited in Coupland, 2004). For Vygotsky all higher
mental functions are internalised social relationships. This allows for a variety of analytic
and related processes to occur that begin with abstraction. In Piagets theory of learning,
a process of abstracting actions allows an agency to replace perceptual judgments for
those based on reasoned internalised actions (Elkind, 1976).

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These abstractions work through information that arises, as explained by Boje

(2004), where there is a will towards historically constituted and informationally
scripted patterns of knowledge. Thus, an agency becomes part of a knowledge script
system that responds to and generates informational consequences (that are structured
figuratively as schemas). The schemas are activated through intrinsic motivation, and
occurs as a reflection of an agencys inner interests (or pressures), providing volition
and a sense of choice (or relief) relating to autotelism (Deci and Ryan, 2009).
An illustration of internalisation due to Froebel (cited in Elkind, 1976) is that during
periods of early learning, the external cultural world may be made internal by
incorporating cultural knowledge. The internalisation of cultural knowledge into a plane
of socio-cultural consciousness results in imperatives that are of such fundamental
importance that their orientations dominate the agency entirely during periods of
cultural stability. They result in immanent agency socio-cultural dynamics (Sorokin,
1937-1942/1962) that anchors social processes, explains large scale adaptation,
establishes cycles of stability and instability and enables the exploration of viability
over macroscopic periods of time.
Agency theory and higher simplex orders
Due to the autonomy of living systems, it is possible to use simplex modelling orders
recursively. This is permitted through an extension to Beers (1979) proposition on
recursion: that every viable living system (Figure 3, in Part 2 of this series of papers)
contains and is contained in a viable living system.
The third order simplex model of Figure 3 can be used recursively (Yolles and Fink,
2011), since it is a core model for the viable living system (Schwarz, 1994). We can now
model the cognitive agency by increasing generic order and highlighting a potential
family of paradigms through invariant generic constructs (Figure 2). Consistent with
Duit and Treagust (1998), this model should be seen to be one of social constructivism,
with collective identity and cultural self-reference.
The cognitive fulcrum for the dynamic invariant generic constructs of Figure 2 is
the personality operative system. Now, Piaget and Inhelder (1973) considered that
intelligence takes on a transformative function in respect to perception and the creation
of knowledge. This is reflected in Figure 2 where the invariant generic constructs of
Figure 1 are now referred to in terms of the equivalent Piagetian intelligences. While
the use of these intelligences as invariant generic constructs is relatively new (Yolles,
2007, 2009a), adopting cultural figurative intelligence as a third order construct is quite
new (Yolles et al., 2011) and represents autogenetesis. This agency model also includes
variant generic constructs of cultural, personality and agency operative systems, the
personality being a recursion of Figure 3. This process of recursion can do two things.
First, shift focus down the system hierarchy to examine particular systems and explore
greater detail. Second, we have found that in exploring personality (Yolles and Fink,
2014a, b), certain unexpected properties of attraction emerge in a third order simplex
model that influence the rest of the system. In the case of a relatively simple model of an
organisation with a culture, the culture has an unmistakable influence on the strategic
and operative dimensions of the organisation that is more pronounced than is
attributed to cultural norms, aiding behavioural anticipation.
To arrive at Figure 2 we need to return to Figure 1. There are three steps:
(1) One needs to realise that the personality operative system is a natural fulcrum
connecting structured personality that determines decision making, with agency

I 1,1

I 1,2

Structures that create

operational
performance as
efficient and effective
directed action under
structural facilitation/
constraint
Agency selforganisation
Social orientation
trait

Agency
Operative System

Imperative for
operative intelligence
adjustment

I 4,2

I 4,1

Social
Environment

Notes: Intelligences Ii,j,order i=1,4 have feedforward/feedback j=1,2 and pathologies through intelligence limitation and impeded
efficacy

Impulses for cultural adjustment

I 2,2

Operative orientation trait

Figurative orientation trait

Operative Intelligence
adjustment imperatives

Operative System
Operative information and
structures facilitating decision and
policy-making behaviour
Cognitive conscious and selforganisation

Operative Intelligence

I 2,1

Agency Operative
intelligence

Social/behavioural
intelligence

Figurative System
Figurative information as
schemas (e.g. goals) that include
appreciative information, ethics,
feelings and decision imperatives
Cognitive subconscious and selfregulation

Figurative Intelligence
adjustment imperatives

Cognitive system
Attitudes, directed emotion/
temperament and conceptual
information (e.g. goal
imperatives)
Cognitive unconscious and selfreference
Cognitive orientation
trait

I 3,2

Agency Personality

Cultural figurative
intelligence

Figurative intelligence

Cultural Environment
Cultural beliefs and values
Collective unconscious,
Identity and cultural self-reference
Cultural orientation trait

I 3,1

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Figure 2.
A generic agency
(viable system) model
involving a
personality, the
implied dotted
arrows creating a
higher cognitive
simplex order

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structure that determines behaviour. It also allows us to distinguish between the

left and right hand sides of the figure.

318

(2) We extrapolate agency operative intelligence to the operative system of the

agency personality (dotted I4 arrows both feed-forward I41 and feedback
I42). This is because the conscious operative system directs the structural
processes of the agency, so distinguishing the agency operative system from
the rest of agency.
(3) The personality operative system can take on the second cybernetic role of the
agency metasystem connected with the agency operative system. This shows
how reducing the simplex order of the model (by assigning the cognitive
structures of personality and culture to a horizon of influences) limits generic
explanations for operative processes in the personality and hence agency
anticipation.
In the cultural system symbolic epistemic material (knowledge) is manifested (as types
of information) to the personality and to the agency operative system (as behavioural
norms with trait influences). Dotted arrows occur between I3 and I2 showing that
symbolic epistemic material may be directed to the operative system (and back as
supportive/unsupportive imperatives) using this manifestation route. This enables I3
to be seen as a third order invariant construct of the personality permitting it to emerge
as a cognitive (culture and personality) fourth order simplex model.
The I3 constructs are called cultural figurative intelligence, an agency capacity to
represent cultural values/beliefs as a coalescence of normative ideological, ethical and
behavioural standards that ultimately indicate social legitimacy. Where the intelligences
operate with efficacy, system viability is improved. So under a plurality of competing
cultural factions efficacious cultural figurative intelligence can moderate the potential for
conflict and hence increase system viability.
That we have been able to identify a fourth order simplex model in Figure 2 provides
interest, when comparing it to the general fourth order simplex model of Figure 1. The
cultural environment takes on the philosophical function of social constructivism, with its
implied social reference and social identity. This is consistent with the view that and that
fourth order cybernetics is socio-cultural (Duit and Treagust, 1998; Treagust and Duit,
2008). Replacing the term social with cultural gives us cultural constructivism, cultural
reference and cultural identity, and the latter two terms are frequently used cultural
theory. There is another implication: since Vygotskys fourth order activity theory of
learning is a socio-cultural theory (Vuorinen, 2009), embracing its cultural content may
enhance Sorokins (1937-1942/1962) theory of socio-cultural dynamics.
Paradigm shifts and generic constructs
We can now argue that the generic learning loops of autopoiesis, autogenesis and
autogenetesis constitute a basis for a family of paradigm shifts since each offer
new ways of seeing. There is a significant support in the literature that this has
happened. In particular autopoiesis has caused a paradigm shift (e.g. Li et al., 2010).
There is no clear view that autogenesis constitutes a paradigm shift (Schwalbe and
Schwalbe, 1991), probably because of the lack of agreement concerning its nature
(Paecht-Horowitz, 1973; Csnyi and Kampis, 1985; Drazin and Sandelands, 1992).
However, the functional equivalents to autopoeisis/autogenesis, defined as Piagets
operative/figurative intelligences, have constituted a paradigm shift (DeVries, 1991).

This brings us to autogenetesis, an unsupported newly proposed term that requires

a little closer examination. Through recursive modelling and the use of Piagets
(1950/1972) intelligences, autogenetesis takes the contextually sensitive name cultural
figurative intelligence. So has this triple-level generic learning loop the potential to
generate a family of paradigms creating greater simplicity in complexity?
At this point it is useful to reflect again on Vygotskys third-level network of
processes. There appears to be no clear generic learning loop that facilitates the social
learning process indicated. If we assign this social constructivist process to the cultural
environment, then we can similarly identify cultural figurative intelligence as the
network of processes that facilitates this level of learning. While there is no place to
pursue this here, it would be interesting to further explore this.
A reduced form of cultural figurative intelligence is called Cultural Intelligence
(Earley and Ang, 2003, p. 3; Thamas and Inkson, 2009). For Ang et al. (2011) this offers
an agency an ability to adapt to change while at the same time having an ability to
function efficiently under cultural diversity. If Cultural Intelligence is a basis of a new
family of paradigms, then so is the broader cultural figurative intelligence.
Cultural Intelligence was introduced by Earley and Ang (2003) and conceived
during a period of unprecedented globalisation and interconnectedness (Held et al.,
1999) that Ionescu (1975) indicates represents an increasingly complex centrifugal
society. However, the attendant increase in intercultural interactions enhances the
probability of cultural misunderstandings, tensions and conflicts (Ang et al., 2011). The
concept of cultural intelligence can now provide compressed explanations for resolving
such situations, thus creating a simpler view of complexity and contributing to the rise
of new paradigms (Seed and Tomasello, 2010; Chen et al., 2012). For Blum (2009) the
multiple cultural perspectives highlighted by cultural intelligence do constitute a
paradigm shift.
Support for this construct as the basis of new paradigms may take time to
materialise social support, and may currently be a virtual paradigm (Yolles, 1999) on
the way to become a paradigm.
Exploring cultural agency
We can also explore Figure 2 in broader terms. The modelling concept for this is
bedded on recursive principles of systemic hierarchy (Boulding, 1956; Heylighen, 1992).
Here living systems are structured as a hierarchically nested set of recursively
embedded systems, one within another, creating more complexity in the modelling
process, but with more explanatory power. This improves the potential for requisite
variety, and increasingly bounds undecidability.
The agency model consists of a cultural system, a personality system a normative
supersystem with its own interconnected cognitive system with culturally based
identification information; figurative system with strategic elaboration information;
and operative system with execution information. At both levels, the higher agency
level and the lower recursive normative personality level, the same principles apply
for self-identification, self-regulation and self-organisation.
The generic framework of Figure 2 allows complex bottom-up interpersonal
interrelationships to be modelled through a multiplicity of interconnected reasons that
are often taken as a principle of emergence or emergent causation. Lower level
interactions, i.e. countless repeated petty acts, cause higher order systemic forms to
emerge, where complexity becomes reduced to an invisible horizon of meanings. Under
normal circumstances, under the legitimisation of selected patterns of behaviour

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(e.g. by institutions), top-down influences can constrain the nature of the interactions at
the lower level. However, such constraints may become ineffective in post-normal
situations where uncertainty is experienced due to the system being at the edge of
stability (Dempster, 1999; Tognetti, 1999). Thus, the modelling approach adopted for
Figure 2 can represent networks of processes at the individual and small group level, as
well as having impact on the higher level social influence networks of processes and
vice versa (Yolles, 2006).
This now brings us to further consideration of the capacity to anticipate patterns of
cultural agency behaviour. The generic model of Figure 2 represents a plural agency
which is durable (and hence viable) when it maintains a stable culture, and embraces
learning and development through its cybernetic processes; with a normative personality,
an operative capacity, and a social environment. The agency operates through invariant
generic constructs of Piagetian intelligences that facilitate learning, adapts to changing
situations, and creates and implements its own policies. It enables specific relationships to
be introduced within and across systemic domains, as necessary and according to the
logical processes that may be proposed within socio/economic/political situations. The
cultural orientation traits orient agency behaviour towards cultural norms of the cultural
environment, which can be followed or neglected; and the social orientation traits towards
the social environment within which the agency interacts with other agencies. Here,
countless repeated petty acts are performed, which in the end constitute cultural practices
within a social frame.
The intelligences we have referred to are susceptible to pathologies (Yolles and Fink,
2014c). Pathologies in systems emerge when important processes within the agency are
neglected and dysfunctional behaviour emerges. In Figure 2, generic pathologies are seen
as a function of neglect indicated by grey bars, e.g. the bar at I3,1 indicates that the
second order agency element does not comply with the cultural norms of the higher order
social whole. The bar at I4,1 indicates that the deployed behaviour, i.e. the action of the
normative personality, does not conform with behavioural rules in the social frame.
The traits belonging to the state systems of Figure 2 may take epistemic bipolar
values. Without higher order invariant generic construct pathologies, cultural trait
values directly influence the other agency trait values. These values contribute to
formative anticipation of patterns of behaviour, while emotive components can impact
on these patterns. Thus, cultural trait values adopted by an agency can act as
attractors for the other traits, resulting in the agency tending towards becoming either
individualist or collectivist in its cognitions and behaviours (Yolles and Fink, 2013,
2014a, b, d). This enables some significant capacity to anticipate patterns of behaviour
given known social environment contexts (Yolles and Fink, 2013).
This is reflected for instance in the finding by Bogilovi et al. (2014), that there is an
inverse relationship between cultural intelligence and collective creativity. Cultural
intelligence is a biased measure which gives too much weight to agency adaptation.
Creativity, it seems, has more of an Individualist bent, while adaptation has a more a
collectivist one. This highlights the need for balanced orientation, where both creativity
and adaptation are needed, and where one is able to take measures of cultural
intelligence expectation about the potential for behaviours that are created.
At this stage it is worth having some reflection on control. Second order cybernetics
is represented here through within system control, where the executives within a
system control the operative domain. However, executives ( participant observers who
control operations) are also subject to systemic higher order influences, which are
beyond their control. Thus, higher order cybernetics (beyond second order cybernetics)

models these influences as agency internalisations that create immanent dynamic

imperatives for the system that cannot be ignored unless influenced by appropriate
pathologies. Interaction with these systemic higher order influences is possible, for
instance, through related legitimacy management processes and the feedback loops to
the cybernetic higher order domains (Dauber et al., 2012). In Figure 1 the autogenetesic
feedback has such a function, and as indicated in Figure 2, impulses for cultural
adjustment are a reflection of these processes through which executives might try to
influence the cultural environment.
Conclusion
This paper begins by discussing social complexity and the need to model it generically.
While cybernetic orders provide a propositional environment that guides model
building, this paper develops a general theory of generic modelling that satisfies the
representation of conceptual emergence.
Exploring the needs of anticipation, the idea of generic structuring developed.
Linking this with Cohen and Stewarts wish to reduce complexity, the idea of orders of
simplex modelling was introduced. A simplex order model has a generic structure
that is housed in a cybernetic space. Higher order simplex models come about through
the conceptual emergence of invariant generic (axiomatically accepted) constructs.
The idea of conceptual emergence is also tied to the rise of paradigms. This enables us
to formulate a general theory of generic modelling, set within the framework of orders
of simplex modelling, which has its seat in the work of Dubois (1998) on incursive and
hypericursive anticipatory systems. This work is useful in particular for the modelling
and simulation of future behaviours represented by variables, given historical and
current data associated with those variables.
A general theory of cybernetic orders has been proposed using generic simplex orders,
calling on recursive representation to do so. Each system in a recursive supersystem can
be populated with particular testable models, while the incursive systems generate
qualitative inferences. These particular models normally have quantitative variables that
can be used for simulation. In our agency theory we developed a personality theory
having trait variables, but other of particular models are also possible.
On the way to developing our general theory, the paper gave examples of first,
second, third and fourth order simplexity. Higher orders of simplex modelling under
complexity exist through the conceptual generic concepts that define them. This is the
result of conceptual emergence, important to processes of systemic modelling. So far we
have not attempted to move beyond fourth order simplexity, awaiting for new concepts
able to generate fifth and higher orders of simplexity. However, we have shown that
higher order simplex models can be generated through the use of recursion.
It should be recognised that the creation of higher orders of simplexity is not an
arbitrary process Rather it is a function of a capacity to convincingly argue that certain
observable processes, that may be seen as seriously influencing agency behaviour, do
so through processes of agency internalisation when the domain of influence becomes
an imperative for immanent agency dynamics. By the word convincing is meant that
while it may be easily possible to suggest that certain influences can be represented as
variant generic constructs, they must be associated with invariant generic constructs
(generic learning loops) that operate as a network of processes to manifest the
influences to the rest of the agency. The nature of these processes should be recognised
and their interconnections should also be explored. This is important since it is through
such the emergence of such invariant generic constructs that paradigm shifts develop.

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The convincing theory provided by Vygotsky school of thought on the internalisation

of external motivational influences on behaviour is important. It explains epistemic
emergence where new agency capabilities develop, as well as ontological emergence
where new orders of conscious facility develop. The latter is enabled by the emergence of
new networks of processes. When represented by a simplex model, these can be shown to
create new ways of seeing complex phenomenal environments.
The base approach in the development of a theory of generic modelling arises from
the principles of cultural agency theory that sits on the earlier work of Eric Schwarz
(1994). It is from this theory that a recursive generator for higher order simplex models
can result. Each order is also a potential generator of a family of thematic paradigms,
since each order is able to simplify explanations that relate to observed complex
phenomena.
In discussing increasing simplex orders, we have also briefly considered something
of their philosophical nature, and since simplex orders have cybernetic order
environments, such considerations are also pertinent to the latter. As a result, we have
been able to classify first order simplex models as positivist, second order as radically
constructivist (denying formal knowledge self-creation but allowing it informally), third
order as constructivist, and fourth order as social constructivist. Each simplex order
resides in a (simplex) cybernetic space of the same order.
The general model for nth order simplex models was mapped into a cultural agency
context. This created a generic model that facilitates the structuring of particular
modelling components. It does this through propositions that can be explored through
model building activities or empirical investigation. Thus for instance, propositions could
be raised concerning shifting contexts, exogenous agency problems or endogenous
issues like that of inefficacy in the intelligences. Relating this to our particular personality
modelling, any of these factors will have an impact on agency trait values with a
consequential impact on its patterns of behaviour. To make issues more problematic,
emotive attributes could be introduced since these condition, which energise an agency
towards or away from, particular patterns of behaviour. Following Bradley et al. (2001,
p. 276), they also create a regulatory influence on cognitive thinking processes.
Elaborating on this particular model, so far only the cognitive attributes of culture
and personality of a cultural agency are representable by fourth cybernetics. The
knowledge embedded in the cultural system is of course related to the cognitive
information of the personality. The distinction between them is that knowledge is a
structured pattern of symbolic concepts at some horizon that can provide cognitive
meaning when sampled. In contrast information is a concrete selected context-sensitive
symbolic pattern of epistemic concepts that has been manifested to the personality.
This recognition compresses complexity and provides more powerful ways of
explaining, analysing and diagnosing problematic issues.
We will recall that autopoiesis/self-producing/operative-intelligence is a network of
instrumental first order generic processes, autogenesis/self-creating/operative-intelligence
is a network of cognitive second order generic processes. The fourth order simplex model
is consistent with the cognitive component (involving culture and personality). This means
that culture and personality operate together as a fourth order simplex model. This creates
a potential for a new family of paradigms. It enables complexity to be simplified through
the new autogenetesis/self-defining/figurative-cultural-intelligence invariant generic
construct, which can become the basis of a new family of paradigms.
Von Glasersfeld was interested in at least two significant things in his cybernetic
journey. One was relativism and the other adaptation. These together formed a core for

his radical constructivism. Relativism in relation to the observer provides the basis for
a discussion about the observer and the observed, which is all very well as far as first
and second cybernetics is concerned, but for higher cybernetic orders the use of this
language become clumsy and problematic. Perhaps this approach actually draws away
from the core of constructivism as indicated by Taber (2006), embracing rarefication
away from Piagets original conceptualisation. In exploring higher cybernetic orders
with their related simplex models, it is so much easier to return to learning loops and
hence discuss relativism and adaptation in other terms. This still allows one to embrace
the essences of cybernetics. Here, then the concepts of self-production (second cybernetics),
self-creation (third cybernetics) and even self-definition (fourth cybernetics) can be used to
highlight principles that underlie knowledge development and acquisition.
This paper has recognised the importance of adaptation, viability and anticipation,
but we have rather explored these concepts from the perspective of learning that
reflects on increasing boundedness on undecidability. In respect of this approach, we
may recall that in Part 1 of this paper we asked three questions:
(1) How many levels of learning loops actually exist, and what might higher order
loops mean for cybernetic modelling?
(2) What is the role of the learning loop, in particular as a control and discovery
process for cybernetic modelling, and how does it enhance our understanding
of reality?
(3) How can one select starting points for learning loops?
The answers are now apparent. In respect of (1), the number of level of learning are a
function of the complexity of the system and its capacity for emergence. The meaning
of higher level loops is a function of the emergence that has occurred. In respect of (2),
the role of a learning loop is to establish higher orders of meaning and control that
reduces undecidability and improve viability. In relation to (3), starting points for
learning loops are determined by the allocation of a fulcrum of examination in a
complex systems model, in order to satisfy perspective and context.
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Corresponding author
Dr Maurice Yolles can be contacted at: prof.m.yolles@gmail.com

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