1.

Quimiguing vs. Icao

FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times
under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant
and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees.
The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD: Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
2. Pe et al. vs. Pe
Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man,
frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted
clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued
just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the
defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court
dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Held: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was
he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her
and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolitas
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
3. Wassmer vs. Velez
FACTS: In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954.
And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels,
and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he
will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent
another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never
returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of
Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further argued that
he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may
be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of
promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. Because
of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in
part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded
by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show
that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.
4. Zulueta vs. nicolas
FACTS: Plaintiff filed libel charges against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff of Philippine Free Press. Defendant
investigated on the complaint and rendered an opinion that there was no prima facie case; that the alleged libelous statements
were made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the best interest of the public; and that in consequence the fiscal
absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff from the crime of libel.
Because of such finding, plaintiff sues defendant for dereliction of duty.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: W/N Zulueta has a cause of action against Nicolas.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO CAUSE OF ACTION: The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which provides
that"any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employeerefuses or neglects without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an actionfor damages and other relief against the latter." But as we said in Bangalayvs. Ursal, 50
Off. Gaz. 4231, this article "contemplates a refusal or neglect without just causeby a public servant or employee to perform his
official duty." Refusal of the fiscal toprosecute when after the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish aprima facie
case is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. Thefiscal has for sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes where
there is no evidence tojustify such action. But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after theinvestigation he has become
convinved that the evidence available is not enough toestablish a prima facie case. The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of
thecomplainant in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists.
Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence tojustify the filing of corresponding the
information and having control of theprosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from theoffended
party (People vs. Liggayu , et al., 97 Phil., 865, 51 Off Gaz., 5654;
People vs. Natoza, 100 Phil., 533, 53 Off Gaz., 8099). Having legal cause to refrain fromfiling an information against the person whom
the herein plaintiff wants him tocharge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or neglected without just
cause to perform his official duty. On the contrary, it would appear thathe performed it
5. PNB vs. CAtipon
FACTS: Catipon bought onions from Ramirez in 1951. The son of Ramirez told Catipon that the only way he could get the onions is
for him to sign a trust receipt from PNB. Catipon at that time had no knowledge or intention to be bound by the trust receipt but he
signed it anyway so that he could get the onions he already paid for. Catipon subsequently disposed of the onions by selling them.
Ramirez later became insolvent and the trust receipt went unpaid and since it was in Catipons name, PNB sued him for estafa for

misappropriating the merchandise (onions). The lower court acquitted Catipon because his guilt was not satisfactorily established.
Now PNB filed an action for recovery against Catipon. Catipon assailed the civil suit and he argues that PNB did not reserve its right
to file a separate civil action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Catipon is still liable regardless of his acquittal in the criminal case.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal was because of the fact that his guilt was not satisfactorily established hence his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt and under the law, such acquittal does not preclude a suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission,
under Article 29 of the new Civil Code. This is even if there was no prior reservation by PNB to file a civil suit. Catipon is ordered to
pay PNB without prejudice to Catipons rights against Ramirez.
6. National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor Union of the Phils. vs. San Miguel Brewery
7. Pal Supervisors Assoc. vs. Jimenez
8. Daywalt vs. La Corporation de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos
Facts: Teodorica Endencia obligated herself to sell a parcel of land to the plaintiff. It was agreed that the final deed of sale will be
executed when the land was registered in Endencias name. Subsequently, the Torrens Title for the land was issued in her favor but
in the course of the proceedings for registration it was found that the land involved in the sale contained a greater area than what
Endencia originally thought and she became reluctant to consummate the sale of the land to the plaintiff. This reluctance was due to
the advice of the defendant which exercised a great moral influence over her. However, in advising Endencia that she was not bound
by her contract with the plaintiff, the defendant was not actuated with improper motives but did so in good faith believing that,
under the circumstances, Endencia was not really bound by her contract with the plaintiff. In view of Endencias refusal to make the
conveyance, the plaintiff instituted a complaint for specific performance against her and, upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that
she was bound by the contract and she was ordered to make the conveyance of the land in question to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
then instituted an action against the defendant to recover the following damages: (a) The amount of Pesos 24,000.00 for the use
and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle therein during the period that the land was not conveyed
by Endencia to the plaintiff; (b) The amount of Pesos 500,000.00 for plaintiffs failure to sell the land in question to a sugar growing
and milling enterprise, the successful launching of which depended on the ability of Daywalt to get possession of the land and the
Torrens Title. The lower court held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land in question
and condemned the defendant to pay the plaintiff Pesos 2,497.00 as damages. The Supreme Court affirmed this adjudication of the
lower court. With respect to the claim of Pesos 500,000.00 damages, the Supreme Court.
Held: The most that can be said with reference to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract for
the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff was
prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the property which he was entitled to exert and was
meanwhile unable to dispose of the property advantageously. The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be
determined in the light of the situation in existence at the time the contract is made; and the damages ordinarily recoverable in all
events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts then known to the contracting parties. Where the
purchaser desires to protect himself, in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give possession, from the possibility
of incurring other damages than such as are incident to the normal value of the use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted
in the contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to be paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession; and no case has
been called to our attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the purchase
in excess of the normal value of use and occupation.
The damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense,
necessary damage; and (2) special damages. Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where there are no special
circumstances to distinguish the case especially from other contracts. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an
instance of this sort of damage. In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such
a breach, according to the usual course of things. In cases involving only ordinary damage, it is conclusively presumed from the
immediateness and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the
breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties. Special damage, on the other

hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. It is only found in cases where some external condition,
apart from the actual terms of the contract exists or intervenes, as it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way
that the promissor, without actual notice of the external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee.
Plaintiffs right chiefly as against Teodorica Endencia; and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the
damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in
question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly,
because said damages are too remote to be subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to
recover such damages from the defendant corporation for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica Endencia not to perform the
contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract. Our conclusion is
that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
9. Ramos vs. ca
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy (removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of
Dr. Orlino Hosaka. He wasaccompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an anesthesiologist which Dr. Hosakarecommended
since Ramos (and her husband Rogelio) did not know any.The operation was schedule at 9am of
June 17, 1985 but was however delayed forthree hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
Dr. Gutierrez subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at around 3pm,Erlinda was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care
Unit (ICU). The doctorsexplained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed inthe ICU for a month. She
was released from the hospital only four months later oron November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in
comatosecondition until she died on August 3, 1999. Petitioners filed with the RTC a civil case for damages; the present petition is
the 2nd MR of the private respondents in the SC, the main decision was rendered inDecember 29, 00.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: W/N the private respondents should be held liable for the injury caused to Erlinda and her family?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. On the part of Dr. Gutierrez, her failure to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient
through the non-performance of the preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation. The injury incurredby petitioner
Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube.
As was noted in our Decision, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka. Thus the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can be applied
in this case.
Such procedure was needed for 3 reasons: (1) to alleviate anxiety; (2) to dry up the secretions and; (3) to relieve pain. Now, it is very
important to alleviate anxiety because anxiety is associated with the outpouring of certain substances formed inthe body called
adrenalin. When a patient is anxious there is an outpouring of adrenalin which would have adverse effect on the patient. One of it is
high blood pressure, the other is that he opens himself to disturbances in the heart
rhythm, which would have adverse implications. So, we would like to alleviate patientsanxiety mainly because he will not be in
control of his body there could be adverse results to surgery and he will be opened up; a knife is going to open up his body.(Dr.
Camagay)
On the part of Dr. Hosaka, while his professional services were secured primarily for their performance of acts within their
respective fields of expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not exercise control over the other, they
were certainly not completely independent of each other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he represented to petitioners that
Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever
Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of
Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gaveinstructions to call for another anesthesiologist and
cardiologist to help resuscitateErlinda. Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs.Hosaka and

Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their duties intersect with
each other.It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner Erlinda promptly, for
he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the scheduled operation. The cholecystectomy was set for June 17, 1985 at9:00 a.m.,
but he arrived at DLSMC only at around 12:10 p.m. In reckless disregard for his patients well being, Dr. Hosaka scheduled two
procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals. Thus, when the first procedure
(protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda was kept in a state of uncertainty at the DLSMC.
On the part of the hospital (DLSMC), since there was NO employer-employee relationship between the hospital and Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka established in this case, the hospital cannot be held liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.The contract of the
hospital with its consultants is separate and distinct from the contract with its patients.
10. De La Rama Steamship Co. Inc. vs. Tan
Facts: An agreement was entered into on 1949 between the De la Rama Steamship Co. Inc. and the National Development Company
(NDC) whereby De la Rama undertook the management of the three vessels known as "Doa Aurora," "Doa Nati" and "Doa Alicia"
which had been purchased by the Philippine Government from Japan with the advise and technical supervision of De la Rama. In the
management contract, it was provided that De la Rama had the option to buy the vessels at the fifth year ff. the purchase and
delivery of each of the vessels at a price which is to consist of the cost price of each vessel, plus such expenses as De la Rama may
have incurred in connection with the construction, outfitting, provisioning and operation thereof; but should De la Rama fail to
exercise the right of option it should be reimbursed of the expenses it incurred in manning, equipping, fueling, overhauling and
repairing the vessels, and the payment of loading commission discharging commission, overriding commission sub-agent's
commission, etc.
The NDC cancel the general agency that it had granted to De La Rama upon one years notice. This was opposed by De La Rama,
which alleged that it had been granted the option to purchase the vessels. The Court however upheld the right of the NDC to cancel
the management contract and the option of De la Rama to purchase the vessels was rendered ineffective.
Issues: Whether De la Rama can demand from NDC to refrain from using the names of the three vessels?
Ruling: Yes. To permit NDC to continue using the names would be to countenance the unlawful appropriation of the benefit of a
goodwill which De la Rama has acquired as a result of the continued usage and large expense; it would be tantamount to permitting
NDC to grab the reputation or goodwill of the business of another.
11. Janda vs. lepanto
12. Saba vs CA
13. Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino
FACTS: On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the vessel he was on board ran a ground and sank
near Sabtan, Batanes. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation. The parents of the deceased claiming that
the untimely death of their son was due to the negligence of the petitioner sued the petitioner in the CFI for damages. By way of
affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents had already been compensated by the Workmans
Compensation Commission (WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies
against the same employer under the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmens Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for
work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code.
HELD: In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the
exclusivity rule. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmans Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant
to the Civil Code. Another view is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance
with Section 5 of WCA. The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing

themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Code for higher damages from the employer by
reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other
remedy. The Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA. As thus applied to the case at
bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner
under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and
had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that the respondents had not only opted to
recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled
to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof; he should no longer be allowed to exercise the
second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until
the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.
14. Virata vs. Ochoa
FACTS: In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters death. The heirs of
Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their
right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again
reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere
accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on
quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to
recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code
or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.
15. German Marine vs. NLRC
FACTS: Froilan de Lara was hired by German Marine Agencies, Inc. to work as a radio officer on board its vessel, M/V T.A. VOYAGER.
While the vessel was docked at the port of New Zealand, de Lara was taken ill which was brought to the attention of the master of
the vessel. However, instead of disembarking him so he may receive immediate medical attention, the master of the vessel
proceeded to Manila, a voyage of ten days. Upon arrival in Manila, he was not immediately disembarked but was made to wait for
several hours until a vacant slot in the Manila pier was available. It was only upon the insistence of de Laras relatives that
petitioners were compelled to disembark him and finally commit him to a hospital. He was confined in the Manila Doctors Hospital,
where he was treated. After being discharged from the hospital, he demanded from German Marine thepayment of his disability
benefits and unpaid balance of his sickness wages, pursuant to the Standard Employment Contract of the parties. De Lara filed a
complaint with the NLRC for payment of disability benefits and the balance of his sickness wages. Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in
favor of de Lara.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: W/N German Marine is guilty of negligence thereby liable for damages?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. There is no doubt that the failure of petitioners to provide private respondent with the necessary medical care caused the rapid
deterioration and inevitable worsening of the latters condition, which eventually resulted in his sustaining a permanent disability.
Negligence not only exists but was deliberately perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal to commit the ailing de Lara to a
hospital in New Zealand or at any nearest port. Such deprivation of immediate medical attention appears deliberated by the clear
manifestation from petitioners own words which states that, the proposition of the complainant that respondents should have
taken the complainant to the nearest

port of New Zealand is easier said than done. The deviation from the route of the vessel will definitely result to loss of a fortune in
dollars.
NOTE: Main issue of this case is whether German Marine is liable for disability benefits and sickness wages which hinges on the
question of who must declare the disability of the employee, whether an accredited doctor/hospital or not. Court affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter to give more weight to the doctors who treated de Lara, even if they were not accredited with the
POEA.
16. People v. Agustin

17. Coca Cola Bottlers Phil. v. Roque

18. PCIB VS. CA

Business Organization Corporation Law Liability of a Banking Corporation for Wrongful/Tortuous Acts Committed By Its
Employees
FACTS: In 1977, 1978, and 1979 Ford Philippines was assessed a tax liability in the amounts of P4.7 million, P5.8 million, and P6.3
million respectively. To pay said tax, Ford issued three Citibank checks in the said amounts. The checks named payee was the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The checks are in the nature of payees checks which are only supposed to be deposited to the
CIRs bank account which is with Metrobank. However, Fords accountant, Godofredo Rivera, deposited said checks with the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (then called IBAA). The latter accepted the same and eventually, the checks were cleared
by Citibank but the checks never reached the CIR hence the Bureau of Internal Revenue notified Ford of the nonpayment of the tax
liabilities. This forced Ford to issue new checks to satisfy its tax liabilities. Ford then sued PCIB and Citibank in order for the two
banks to refund them the amounts of the checks earlier issued.
An investigation ensued and it was found out that Godofredo Rivera, Fords accountant, was a member of a syndicate. He conspired
with other members of the same syndicate who were also ranking employees of PCIB in order to facilitate the fraud. Apparently, a
PCIB manager (Remberto Castro) who was also a member of the syndicate, set up a fictitious savings account to help facilitate the
fraud. After they successfully carted with the money, they vanished and became fugitives of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCIB and Citibank are liable for the tortuous acts of their employees.
HELD: Yes, but also Ford for its contributory negligence.
Citibank is liable because as per its agreement with Ford, the payees checks are only supposed to be deposited with the CIRs
account which is with Metrobank, yet Citibank when PCIB indorsed the said checks, Citibank cleared them without verifying with
Ford.
PCIB has no hands in the embezzlement but since it was its employees that mainly facilitated the fraud, it is likewise liable under the
above stated principle. PCIBs and Citibanks liabilities are fixed on a 50-50 basis, hence they must equally shoulder the paying of the
checks amounts to Ford with interest.
As a general rule, banking corporations are liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of their officers or agents within
the course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within
the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of
which malice is an essential element.
But since Ford is also negligent, as when it failed to diligently check its books of accounts which could have avoided further loss, the
interest rate upon which the two banks are to pay is lowered from 12% to 6% per annum. Fords negligence is only contributory

because it was not the proximate cause of the embezzlement. Further, it was shown that Riveras act of depositing the checks with
PCIB was not confirmed by the Board of Directors of Ford.
19. Almeda v. Carino

20. Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Court of Appeals

21. Araneta v. Bank of America

22. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
FACTS: In February 1963, Ilagan was driving a bus owned by Batangas Laguna Tayaban Bus Company along Manila South Super
Highway. He sped pass a big cargo truck thereby taking the opposite lane and he hit the car driven by a certain de los Reyes which
resulted to the latters death and the latters nieces death and causing serious injuries to the other car passengers. Ilagan was sued
for homicide through reckless imprudence and while the case was pending in the CA the victims sued Ilagan and BLTB for damages
via an independent civil action based on Article 2180. BLTB assailed the suit as it invoked the opinion penned by Justice Capistrano
inCorpus vs Paje which states that under Article 33 of the Civil Code it excludes criminal negligence as one of those which an
independent civil action can be filed, hence homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general
rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action; and based on this, BLTB wanted the
dismissal of the civil suits pending the criminal suit in the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil suit can be filed independently of the criminal negligence case pending before the CA.
HELD: Yes. The opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje is not controlling because it is not doctrinal this is because the
majority of the court did not agree with it. Also, the Corpus case was different because the damages claimed there were based on
the same criminal negligence. But in the case at bar, the damages sought to be recovered were based on quasi-delict or Article 2176
& 2180 of the Civil Code which is an independent civil action.
23. Cangco v. MRR
Civil Law - Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract
FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was
given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even
though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the
door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as
the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact
that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day
without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while

the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of
contract [of carriage]:
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not
liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does
not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but
by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
24. Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA & Fule
Facts: Mrs. Fule purchased three round trip tickets for herself and two children from Sabena; the route: Manila-Brussels-BarcelonaMadrid. During the trip, they encountered inconveniences, such as, walking under the drizzle after disembarking; delayed
connecting flight to Barcelona; and a missing luggage, among others. They allegedly incurred medical and hotel expenses. Thus, Mrs.
Fule made a letter-complaint to Sabena office. The Madrid Office offered to pay about half of what she was asking, that the rest
would be paid by the Manila Office. A certain Yancha made her sign a document in French language which she did not understand. It
turned out that the document was a quitclaim. The trial court awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages, among others.
CA modified the decision by reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages.
Issue: WON Sabena is liable to the Fules for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage.
Held: Yes. In the imposition of moral damages, the defendants act must be wrongful or wanton or done in bad faith. Here, there is
no finding that the carriers delay in delivering Mrs. Fules luggage was wrongful or due to bad faith. While there is failure on the
part of the carrier in protecting Mrs. Fule et al from the rain, its neglect was not so gross as to amount to bad faith or wantoness.
What is involved in this case is simple negligence, considering that the rain through which Mrs. Fule et al had to walk was a slight
drizzle.
Nonetheless, there is still bad faith in making Mrs. Fule sign a quitclaim without informing her of its contents.
---------------------"[W]ith respect to moral damages, the rule is that the same are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract
of carriage only where (1) the mishap results in the death a of passenger and (2) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and
bad faith, even if death does not result." (Ibid, at p. 13) As the appellate court found the petitioner guilty of bad faith in letting the
respondent sign a quitclaim without her knowledge or understanding and contrary to what she was planning to do, the reduced
award of moral and exemplary damages is proper and legal.
25. Calalas v. CA
Facts: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the

jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven
by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of
contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking
cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues: (1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is
res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held: (1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable
for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver
took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding
an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutescaso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one
of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases
in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage.

26. Equitable Leasing Corp. vs. Suyom, et al.

Facts: A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a house-cum-store in Tondo, Manila. Part of the house was destroyed. Two people
died and four were injured. Tutor was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.
Verification with the Land Transportation Office revealed that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation
who leased it to Edwin Lim. The relatives of the victims filed a civil case for damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled against Equitable
and ordered it to pay damages to the victims relatives. Upon Equitables appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC. Equitable
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages
Held/Ratio: Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed. As the registered owner of the
tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the acts of Raul Tutor even if he was actually the employee of Equitables former lessee,
Ecatine Corporation, who became the actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not registered with the LTO. Regardless
of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of the
registered owner/operator. The principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Failure to register the deed of sale should not
prejudice victims, who have the right to rely on the principle that the registered owner is liable for damages caused by the
negligence of the driver. Equitable Leasing cant hide behind the allegation that Tutor was Ecatine Corps employee, because it will
prevent victims from recovering their loss on the basis of Equitables inaction in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is
Equitables fault, which should face the legal consequences thereof.