MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs.

TAN
G.R. No. 131724
February 28, 2000
SERVICE OF SUMMONS; JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
FACTS: Petitioner MICC executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its real
property in favor of respondent Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment
of petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the amount of P2 million, without
monthly interest, but which, at maturity date on June 10, 1995, was payable in the
amount of P4 million.
Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the
Regional Trial Court. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, as "a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the
highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive
processes of the Court."
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no
valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and
contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was
invalid as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be
served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.
Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the complaint against it on the ground that it
had satisfied its obligation to respondent when the latter opted to be paid in shares
of stock under the stipulation in the mortgage contract.
Petitioner further prayed for "other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the trial court for failure of petitioner
to raise any new ground. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate court ruled that although
petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it, its actual
receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss,
hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been substantially achieved.
Moreover, it was held, by including the affirmative defense that it had already paid
its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A MERE DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT
ONE OF THOSE UPON WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN CASE OF A DEFENDANT
CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS VALID.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN A
MOTION TO DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED
UNDER PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
HELD: First. NO. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is
notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the court is
conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is a
corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will
realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
received by him.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that
service of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the
general rule. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons
on persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be
actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of
the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person
served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the
summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is
through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on the service of summons is
attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled.
With respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion
to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and
the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches
actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In
contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was direct
evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons
by the corporation through the person upon whom it was actually served. The

question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the

corporation through the person on whom summons was served. We hold that it
cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a
corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint
against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the
service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present
case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of
summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the
sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a
draftsman employed by the corporation. The appellate court was, therefore, in error
in giving weight to respondent's claims. Receipt by petitioner of the summons and
complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.
Second. NO. We now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals held that by raising the affirmative defense of payment
and by praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner in effect waived
its objection to the trial court's jurisdiction over it. We think this is error.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this question.
The rule prior to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges
grounds for dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This rule no
longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be
unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La Naval:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion
to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be
construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.

Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to
Dismiss. In De Midgely v. Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the
allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be deemed
"appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however, must
be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must
be unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner
unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by
seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the only relief that it can
properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint against it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint
against petitioner is DISMISSED.

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407
January 17, 2005
MANNER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACTION IN PERSONAM; STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
FACTS: On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for
forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 879. The summons and the
complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out
of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother,
Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno,
who received the same.
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latters behalf to
vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual
damages, attorneys fees, and exemplary damages.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was
issued on September 27, 1999.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before
the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and
summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged therein that the service of the
complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno,
was improper because of the following: (a) when the complaint in Civil Case No. 879
was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of
Oslo, Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the
summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she
was in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served; (c)
her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and
was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and
summons; and (d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and
the complaint for and in her behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the
subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and
complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on
the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since her brother

Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao,

Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and
summons on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that
she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for
and in her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which, on May 6, 2003, rendered
judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in
rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out
of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there
was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the
Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was
really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent, the
defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 879 ON THE RESPONDENT HEREIN WHO WAS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE SAID CASE. THE RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER IS ANCHORED ON
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONER IN THE MTC
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM OR QUASI IN REM.
HELD: The ruling of the CA that the petitioners complaint for forcible entry of the
petitioner against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in rem, is
erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in
personam.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to
fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from

a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is
in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties
who joined in the action.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary

for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a
resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said
barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9, 1999,
ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner
categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having
left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC.7.Substituted service.If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot

be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.34 The statutory requirement
of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.35 As the
Court held in Hamilton v. Levy
. . . The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise,
any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.

As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the
house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the
respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain
where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the
occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in
the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a
person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the
residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily
stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno dated June 15, 1997 wherein he
declared that he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan,
as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macasalda cannot
prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo
Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the
respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo
Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on April 5, 1999.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the
decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

YAO vs. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828
October 24, 2003
REQUISITES TO FILE A MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner
before the HLURB against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private respondents husband.
The HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner
and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner and to pay damages.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its
managers, and referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for
enforcement.
Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the
names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The
property was scheduled for public auction.
Private respondent filed before the RTC, a petition for prohibition with prayer for
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Bagabaldo from
proceeding with the public auction. On even date, public respondent Judge issued a
72-hour temporary restraining order and set the case for raffle and conference on
March 22, 2002.
The case was eventually raffled to RTC, presided by public respondent judge. Public
respondent judge issued resolution granting private respondents petition for
prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.
On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the
resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However,
public respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of May 10, 2002.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION FOR INTERVENTION SHOULD BE GRANTED
HELD: NO. Accordingly, private respondent acted well within her rights in filing a
petition for prohibition against the deputy sheriff because the latter went beyond his
authority in attaching the subject property. This right is specifically reserved by
Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who
is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be
impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as the judgment creditor in the HLURB case,
petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the petition for prohibition
and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to
do so.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and

there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a)

Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without

basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as
respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it
must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor
was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property.
Records reveal that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the
defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the
right to intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and
within the period prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only
on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution
granting private respondents petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the
subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of
15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.
Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the
trial courts resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant
petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to
correct its errors, if any.
Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court
fails to find grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent judge in
rendering the assailed resolution and order.

People vs Webb
G.R No. 132577
August 17, 1999
MODES OF DISCOVERY; DEPOSITION; DEFINITION; PURPOSE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
FACTS: Respondent Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case for Rape with
Homicide pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed a Motion To
Take Testimony By Oral Deposition before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court
alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not
therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction
over them.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the
aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly material and
indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.]
Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule
119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 119,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the
conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
RTC denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by
Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
MR likewise denied by the trial court.
Dissatisfied, respondent Webb elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of
a petition for certiorari.
The People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge may be
considered merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due
time.
In his Comment, private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the
petition.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment granting the taking of deposition (in
favour of Webb).
The People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY ORAL DEPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES WHICH WOULD BE USED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE HER COURT.
HELD: NO. As defined, a deposition is -

"The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written

interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to
take testimony issued by a court, or under a general law or court rule
on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly authenticated, and
intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or
criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party
(through his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other party or of a
witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is called the
deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court room,
usually in one of the lawyers offices. A transcript - word for word account - is
made of the deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing, under oath
or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or
interrogatories x x x.

And the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to
the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.]
Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and
defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts
which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the
parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate
both preparation and trial. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in
keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not
during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly on the defense of alibi,
which is respondents main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the
court below - states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that
person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the
time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the
deposition of the foreign witnesses is to foreclose any objection and/or
rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits 218
and 219. This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and academic
by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial
court in its order dated July 10, 1998.
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only
serves to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be
taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or
cumulative in nature and in denying respondents motion to take them, the
trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous
exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add
to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. In this regard, it
bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence
upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the

trial judge. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of
respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or
oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious,
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in
other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence
of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction,
and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power for it to prosper.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must
clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers
to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed
to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy
for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a
court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are
reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove
his innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings would be
dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven
(57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits,
many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the
proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition
that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that
the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not
possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no

showing or allegation that the American public officers and the bicycle
store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person
mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this
petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom
they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the
United States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.