The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial

Approach to Command and the Adoption of Auftragstaktik

(Mission Comamnd)
EITAN SHAMIR
Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israel

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and

adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept
denotes a decentralize command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and
allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it
according to the emerging situation. The paper first traces the approach origins in the
historic Prussian-German army. Then it examines the US command approach prior to
mission command which is influenced by corporate management practices which
inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the
US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.
While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been
less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. It was found that the gap was due
partially to the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist.
Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this
approach.
Key Words: Mission Command, Auftragtsaktik ,US Army, Adoption and
Adaptation, Managerial Approach,

The German concept Auftragstaktik often translated as mission command 1 denotes

decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates
initiative in all levels of command directly involved with events on the battlefield. It
allows and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to
demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgment in pursuance of their mission
while maintaining alignment through the concept of the commanders intent. The
approach presupposes the existence of trust in the individual's ability to act wisely and
creatively when faced with unexpected situations, independently from higher
authority.
The primary objective of this article is to explore the process of adoption,
adaptation, and praxis of mission command in the US, army, since its 'rediscovery' in
the 1980s. The paper main argument is that while committing itself to the mission
command approach through doctrine, in reality the US Army encounters difficulties in
its implementation due to an existing legacy of a managerial approach to command
which often clashes with the new imported approach. The managerial approach is
characterizes by centralization, standardization, detailed planning quantitative
analysis and aspires for maximum efficiency and certainty. In contrast mission
commands' approach is based on the realization that 'no plan survives the first contact
with the enemy' and therefore a good plan represents a central idea that allows
maximum freedom to decide and act according to the emerging situation and
changing circumstance. This approach aspires for maximum efficiency.
1

Of the various translations offered for the term Auftragstaktik, Mission Command is the most
common, and the one used in American field manuals (FMs).

While a number of works have investigated the adoption of mission command,

it has usually been discussed within the context of more general doctrines, such as
maneuver warfare or the operational level of war. In addition, they have focused on
either the Americans reforms instituted during the post-Vietnam era or on the Bagnall
reforms in Britain.2 However, as an approach, mission command transcends specific
doctrines or historical periods and is regarded as such by modern militaries. Indeed, it
is considered relevant regardless of the sweeping changes that have transpired over
the past two decades in the character of warfare.
An investigation of mission command is bound to encounter serious
challenges as the concept is quite elusive. Indeed, the meaning accorded to
Auftragstaktik in nineteenth and early twentieth century Prussian-German writings
was different than that accorded to it today.3 In a manner similar to Blitzkrieg, while
mission command was practiced, the term itself was absent from official doctrinal
publications. The principles of mission command were incorporated into German
military doctrine during the nineteenth century. Many historians believe that mission
command had reached its highest form when practiced by the Prussian-German Army.
Indeed, according to many, the Wehrmacht owed its effectiveness and achievements to
its reliance on Auftragstaktik.4 This concept was largely neglected by mainstream
Western militaries until the second half of the Cold War. At that time the West began
to seek means to counterbalance the Red Armys quantitative superiority. The search
led the Anglo-Americans to re-examine the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht; they
discovered the pivotal role played by mission command in securing Germany an edge
over its rivals.
On a more practical level, the Anglo-Americans considered mission command
crucial for the practice of manoeuvre warfare. The latter had been developed by the
Americans and the British and later adopted by NATO as a doctrinal response to the
Soviet threat.5 Though the Cold War has receded into the pages of history, and despite
the shifting focus of military operations, mission command has demonstrated
significant staying power. Some argue that it is the method of command best suited
for coping with unconventional warfare scenarios such as Low Intensity Conflicts
(LIC), peacekeeping operations and counterinsurgency.6 Mission command is also
believed to have retained its validity in spite of the new digital command and control
(C2) technologies which have increased micromanagement.7 According to a different,
somewhat more cynical outlook, mission command in the US Army has become
another managerial fad,8 similar to a score of others examined and discarded, such as
For example: Richard Lock-Pullen, US Army Innovation and American Strategic Culture After 2
Vietnam (Oxford: Rutledge, 2006); Rodler F. Morris et al., Initial Impressions Report: Changing the
Army (Fort Leavenworth: Centre for Army Lessons Learned, 1996). Concerning the British see:
Sangho Lee, Deterrence and the Defence of Central Europe: The British Role from the Early 1980s to
.the End of the Gulf War, PhD Dissertation (London: King's College, 1994)
3
Antullio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 38.
4
Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 (New Jersey:
Prentice, 1977), 268, 307.
5
Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01 British Defence Doctrine (2001), 3 -5.
6
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC,
2006), 1-26, 7-4; Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations, Army Code 71819 (2005), 115.
7
Jim Storr, 'A Command Philosophy for the Information Age', in: David Potts (ed.) The Big Issue:
Command and Combat in the Information Age (Washington DC: Command and Control Research
Program, 2003), 77 - 94.
8
Daniel Hughes, Auftragstaktik, in: Trevor N. Dupuy (Ed.) International Military Defence
Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 A-B (London: Macmillan, 1993), 332.

Management by Objectives (MBO), Total Quality Management (TQM),

Reengineering or 'Just in Time' (JIT) produced primarily by corporate America.9
However, mission command is firmly rooted in military theory. This
foundation may account for its enduring popularity and near mythical canonization
among officers. These accolades notwithstanding, the degree to which it has been
implemented and practiced by modern militaries is unclear.
The Origins of Mission Command
Mission command origins are usually traced to the reforms instituted in Prussia
following the humiliating defeat at Jena (1806). The reformists concluded that the
rigid, mechanistic army of the Ancien Rgime was incapable of facing the challenges
posed by Napoleonic warfare. The size, composition and tactics of modern armies had
rendered obsolete the traditions of old. New technologies introduced by the midnineteenth century Industrial Revolution (primarily the rail, telegraph and breech
loading gun) also called for new agile and flexible military organization and
command systems.
Though decentralized command was practiced by many commanders
throughout history, it had been more a reflection of an individual style. In contrast the
Prussian-German army systematically developed it into a comprehensive body, and
integrated it into doctrine and practice. Auftragstaktik was the German response to
both the genius of Napoleon and the unavoidable friction and fog inherent to the
phenomena of war. By successfully adapting these ideas into their military culture, the
Germans were able to transcend personal style, units and time.10 The fact it emerged
in Prussia was due to a specific Prussian and German historical circumstances and
forces that produced a unique strategic mind-set and military culture. It has developed
top down by the German Genral Staff as well as bottom up through tactical
innovation. It was also cultivated in the famous military academy the
Kriegsakademie.Daniel Hughes was probably correct in stating that Auftragstaktik
was more than a system of command; it was part of a particular life style typical of
Prussian officers for more than a century. 11 This latter point is crucial to
understanding the difficulties faced by contemporary modern Western militaries,
possessing different traditions of command and historical experiences, attempting to
revive and adopt this style of command.
It was Helmuth von Moltke the Elder who recognized the need to
revolutionize command in a time of great technological and social changes. During
his tenure as the Prussian Chief of Staff Moltke has done more than anyone else to
embed mission command in the Prussian military culture and to articulate its essence.
According to Moltke, subordinates should be told what to do and for what purpose,
not how to do it. Superiors specify the mission objectives and constraints and allocate
resources leaving the rest to their subordinates. The latter's skills, creativity, and
commitment, or lack there off, will ultimately determine the battle plan and its
execution. Auftragstaktik is therefore not merely a technique for issuing orders, but a
type of leadership.12 Subordinates were not relegated to the status of simply following
orders, but rather regarded as individuals capable of making independent judgments.
On the adoption of modern day corporate practices by the US Army see: Francis Fukuyama and 9
.Abram N. Shulsky, The Virtual Corporation and Army Organization (California: RAND, 1997)
10
Walter von Lossow, Mission-Type versus Order-Type Tactics, Military Review 57:6 (June, 1977).
11
Hughes, Auftragstaktik, 332.
12
Werner Widder, Auftragstaktik and Innere Fhrung: Trademarks of German Leadership, Military
Review 82:5 (September-October), 4.

Within its unique historical, strategic and social context the Prussian-German army,
combined military theory and praxis that enabled it to practice Auftragstaktik.
However, when other militaries came to emulate this practice they have
discovered that as it involves delegation of authority and decision it requires also a
change of organizational culture.13. A number of authors have listed cultural and
organizational elements necessary for mission command. The most common element
is trust, respect between commanders and subordinates as well as acceptance of
responsibility and acceptance of risk. Trust is acquired through professional
development aiming at developing confident leaders who would not hesitate to
exercise initiative.14 Indeed Auftragstaktik was enabled by a German military culture
which strongly emphasized initiative, aggressiveness, and subordinate freedom of
action; it valued personal initiative even at the cost of disobedience calling instead
for adhering to a higher intent. Subordinates were expected to demonstrate sound
judgment grounded in military professionalism, inculcated through training and
education.15
The Rise of the Managerial School in the US Army
Though it fought well, by the end of the War of Independence, the Continental Army
had been reduced to some 600 men. 16 A professional army was rejected because the
Founding Fathers believed it would pose a threat to liberal ideals and since they
abhorred the central (federal) authority it served.17 Indeed, until the end of the
nineteenth century Americans considered the military profession as a necessary evil.
The militia system was believed to embody the American ideals.18
The few military professionals of the nation were trained at West Point.
Established in 1802, West Point was primarily an engineering school modeled after
the French cole Polytechnique.19 A small enclave representing the closest thing to
military professionalism. The most popular and influential military theorist in the
academy was the Swiss officer Antoine Jomini. West Point emphasized character
building and such virtues as loyalty, honor and courage. However, there was no
intellectual questioning, no real curiosity. or curiosity to seek out new fields of
knowledge. Mathematics was by far the most important subject; other topics were
studies through memorization.20 Following the American Spanish War (1898) The
Doge Committee established to investigate the failings of the army during that war,
recommended a number of reforms, including the formation of a general staff system.
21
Influenced by Emory Upton's survey of the Prussian general staff, Secretary of War
13

Hughes, Auftragstaktik,, 332.

David Schmidtchen, Developing Creativity and Innovation through the Practice of Mission
Command, Australian Defence Force Journal 146 (January-February, 2001), 7 11 and Ad L. W.
Vogelaar and Eric-Hans Kramer, Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions, Armed Forces
& Society 30:3 (spring, 2004), 409 431.
15
Antulio J. Echevarria, Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective, Military Review 66:10 (October,
1986), 50 - 56.
16
David E. Johnson, Commanding War: The Western Origins of American Military Hierarchy
(California: RAND, 2004), 157-158.
17
Benjamin Amidror, 'Forward', in: Bruce Catton, The American Civil War, trans. Shimshon Inbal
(Ma'arachot: Tel-Aviv, 1979), 12. [Heb]
18
Ibid., 14, 18 - 19.
19
Johnson, Commanding War, 161.
20
Stephen E. Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1975), 106.
21
Ronald Barr, 'High Command in the United States: The Emergence of a Modern System 1898 1920', in: G. D. Sheffield (ed.) Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience since 1861
(London: Brassey's, 2002), 57.
14

Elihu Root accepted these recommendations.22 With the support of President Theodor
(Teddy) Roosevelt he introduced the 1903 General Staff Act which: strengthened
executive control over the army and promoted greater professionalism. 23 However,
effectiveness of the general staff was further reduced by the 1916 National Defence
Act which restricted its activities to war planning. 24 Thus, the new act served to widen
the gap between the American general staff system and its Prussian equivalent.
The Root reforms also introduced a new combined arms education system for
officers and reorganized the Fort Leavenworth General Service and Staff College. In
contrast to the Kriegsakademie, American higher military education institutions did
not require entrance exams and selection to the Staff College, was based on
recommendation and efficiency reports rather than an examination system. It was
intended that the college would prepare officers for divisional and higher staff
positions. But attendance was considered only important rather than crucial for one's
career. Despite efforts, the college failed to reach the Prussian level of training and its
graduating Captains were considered pale copies of the lieutenant colonels produced
by the Kriegsakademie.25 The American colleges were also encouraging
contemporary industrial management ideas emphasizing efficiency through
centralized control processes. Similarly, they did not become a screening tool for
promotion and failed to attain the high status required for attracting the best
candidates.26
Another expression of the managerial approach was the American adoption of the
five-section French general staff system (G1 - G5). The section chiefs were directly
subordinate to the Chief of Staff.27 The Chief of Staff in the French system was 'first
and foremost was a manager whose function was to coordinate and supervise the
functioning of the assistant chief of staff.' 28 In contrast, the German organizational
structure subordinates all activities to operational planning. The status of the
operations officer (Ia), is first among equals, reflects the German emphasis on
operational planning and combat activity relegating other staff responsibilities to the
status of support.
Interwar American military academies devoted little time to the study of large
unit leadership. Rather, they concentrated on managerial tasks such as mobilization,
organization and supply. Consequently, graduates understood the science of
management rather than the art of war. 29
World War Two also strengthened American reliance on business oriented
techniques. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall patterned army
organization on the ideas of American business.30 The managerial focus allowed the
Americans to excel at such aspects of war as large scale mobilization, logistics and
deployment; it was less helpful in the realm of combat command.
By 1941 the Americans had recognized the advantage of the German practice
of command and based the new Field Service Regulations on the 1933/4 Leadership
22

J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its Origin and Development (Westport: Greenwood, 1975), 196 - 204.
Barr, 65.
24
Ibid., 72.
25
Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers (New York: Free Press, 1990), 61.
26
Ibid., 62 - 63, 66.
27
Hittle, 210. (G -1 Administrative; G-2 Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Supply; G-5 Training).
28
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939-1945 (London: Arms
and Armour, 1983), 51.
29
Johnson, Commanding War, 186.,5
30
Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crises in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1979), 18.
23

of Troops. Nevertheless, the Americans failed to capture the essence of the German
approach that was based on friction and chance and considered war as a free creative
activity. Instead they sought to control war through efficient planning and execution
processes. Thus for example, the US Army regulations emphasized loyalty as opposed
to independent action.31
The American regulations reflected a society assured of its material superiority
and an understanding that success depended upon the ability to bring it to bear against
an enemy. A German commentator stated after the war that these regulations reflected
a tendency to underestimate the importance of surprise, maneuver and
improvisation.32 Though ostensibly aspiring to mission command, the overly detailed
regulations attempted to foresee many different situations.33
The managerial orientation was evident also in army practices such as the
mechanized, centralized and mathematical nature of American personnel
management. The preferred solution for most problems came in the form of improved
managerial control based on reports or statistics.34 Processes such as selection were
conducted as an assembly line operation. Training was conducted en masse,
disregarding the needs of parent units. It was based on engineering principles,
breaking each task into smaller components and emphasizing automatic drills. The
replacement system was also based on mathematical optimization models. A higher
priority was given to administrative requirements than to the psychological dimension
of war.35 Essentially, the American approach attempted to streamline core processes
through industrial principles striving for efficiency while sacrificing the human-moral
dimension. War was not regarded as a clash of wills but as a contest of machines and
resources. The impact of individual judgment was set aside. 36 Accordingly, the
Americans constructed a centralized organization requiring vast amounts of
information in the form of statistical reports. Reliance on superior resources and
firepower often resulted in mediocre tactical performance.37
Some forces, such as the Ranger and the airborne units, demonstrated superior combat
command capabilities. Similar to the Stosstruppen of the Great War, these units could
boast of higher individual motivation and training and greater reliance on initiative.
However, most Americans units were plagued by mediocre tactical command, and
merely ordinary operational level command.38 The Germans often exposed their
flanks and took risks knowing that the Americans lacked the skill to exploit such
opportunities. On the whole, the American Army proved neither aggressive nor
flexible enough to exploit several opportunities to destroy the Wehrmacht. The famous
operations of General George C. Patton were the exception that proved the rule. 39 In a
sense, Patton had more in common with Guderian and Rommel than with Allied

31

Creveld, Fighting, 31 - 33.

Ibid., 40.
33
Ibid., 38.
34
Ibid., 63, 73; Donald Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution of Human
Affairs (California: Presidio, 2002), 56 - 63.
35
Creveld, Fighting, 127 - 146.
36
Edward N. Luttwak and S. L. Canby, Mindset: National Styles in Warfare and the Operational Level
of Planning, Conduct and Analysis (Washington DC: Pentagon Reports, 1980), 4 - 5.
37
Creveld, Fighting, 168.
38
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 (Macmillan: London, 2005), 32 33.
39
Martin Blumenson, General George S. Patton', in: Michael Carver (ed.) The War Lords (Boston:
Little Brown & Co, 1976), 383 - 384.
32

generals.40 In France he refused to halt his advance, constantly pushing forward,

exploiting opportunities and lamenting the cautiousness of the planners.41
The Impact of the Vietnam War
By and large, the American approach to command during the Cold War was
influenced by the experience of the decade-long Vietnam War. In that war, the
managerial approach to war became ever so dominant. Its extreme application in that
period became an absurdity.42 The driving force behind the shift was Secretary of
Defence Robert S. McNamara, a former Corporate America executive. He believed
that the army had to adopt corporate procedures in order to succeed in the modern
world. McNamara embraced statistical and quantitative measures for better control. 43
Consequently, the officer corps adopted a managerial ethos, at the expense of the
unique military experience. One indication of this trend was the number of officers
who took business degrees during that period. American officers adopted corporate
jargon, attitudes and values substituting the ethos of shared responsibility and selfsacrifice for the greater good with self serving practices designed to promote
individual careers. This trend was shared by most of NATO but the Americans
embraced it most enthusiastically. War was viewed through the prism of balance
sheets and accounting principles; quantitative methods and models were used to
assess unit effectiveness. For example, daily statistics were submitted concerning the
ratio of enemy killed and captured daily against number of enemy units operating in a
given area.44
This approach also dominated tactical and operational command and
leadership. Centralized control was practiced and decisions were made on the basis of
quantitative information gathered through the new communication and information
technologies.45 At the same time the signal and communications units grew
exponentially. Satisfying system requirements for analysis necessitated vast amounts
of information. The result was at times absurd:
A helpless company commander engaged in a fire fight on the ground was
subjected to direct observation by the battalion commander circling above,
who was in turn supervised by the brigade commander circling a thousand or
so feet higher up, who in turn was monitored by the division commander in
the next higher chopper watched by the Field Force (Corps) Commander.
With each of these commanders asking the man on the ground to tune in his
frequency and explain the situation.46

The hunger for information at the top produced an information overload resulting in
long lead times needed in order to prepare and launch operations. Hence, the
Americans ability to respond quickly to the fast paced Guerrilla warfare was severely
curtailed. The obsession for quantitative data across the chain of command resulted in
indiscriminate loads of information being transmitted between hierarchal levels and
an eventual paralysis caused by information overloads.47
Centralization and managerial command were also fostered by an increasing
dependency on firepower. The availability of artillery and air power support made it
40

Hastings, Armageddon, 587.

Creveld, Fighting, 37; Idem, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 214 - 215.
42
Gabriel and Savage, 17 - 22; Vandergriff, 95 - 105.
43
Ibid. ,18-19.
44
Michael Goodspeed, When Reason Fails: Portraits of Armies at War: America, Britain and Israel
and the Future (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 15 - 16.
45
Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 238 - 251.
46
Ibid., 256.
47
Ibid., 259.
41

standard practice to call for fire support at the beginning of an engagement. During
the inevitable tactical pause, commanders focused on coordinating fire support and
answering to superiors instead of directing troops and consequently losing the
initiative.48 Also, commanders came to prefer rearward positions which facilitated
communications with superiors rather than forward positions which afforded a better
sense of the unfolding situation. 49 The following anecdote illustrates this point. While
visiting troops in Vietnam, Moshe Dayan joined a patrol of the famous 1 st Cavalry.
The patrol was soon pinned down under hostile fire and the Captain was horrified to
learn that his guest had disappeared. He located him atop a grassy hill and asked him
what he was doing. What are you doing? Was Dayan's answer, get youre a** up
here, and see what this battle is all about. 50 According to Dayan, B-52 bombers were
often called upon when soldiers met resistance, not for lack of courage but due to
faulty doctrine and command. As a result of micromanagement, officers were less
inclined to exhibit initiative and originality.51 This situation was compounded by other
issues. A six-month tour of duty as opposed to the thirteen-month tour of enlisted men
and NCOs did not increase officer popularity and hindered the creation of
organizational memory and lessons learned. Administrative policies impeded officers
attempts to develop esprit de corps and trust within their units. As the popularity of
the war declined so did the quality of the officers and the number of assaults against
officers (fragging) increased. Between 1969 and 1971 the army reported 730
instances of confirmed assaults, 83 of which were fatal.52
The experiences of Vietnam served to strengthen American inclination toward
business management methods rather than the Moltkean style of command. One
historian summarized the 'American Way of War'53 as a:
Grinding strategy of attrition: the strategy employed by Ulysses S. Grant to
destroy Robert E. Lee's army in 1864-65, by John J. Pershing to wear down
the German army in 1918, and by the U.S. Army Air Force to pulverize all
the major cities of Germany and Japan in 1944-45. In this view, the Civil
War, World War I, and World War II were won not by tactical or strategic
brilliance but by the sheer weight of numbers -- the awesome destructive
power that only a fully mobilized and highly industrialized democracy can
bring to bear. In all these conflicts, U.S. armies composed of citizen-soldiers
suffered and inflicted massive casualties. 54

On the tactical level it meant using superior firepower to suppress the enemy. 55
The command approach derived from this way of war sought efficient ways to
manage American resources in order to bring them to bear and exhaust its opponent.
Colin Gray has summed up the American way of war as one that has always
emphasized firepower, large scale operations and logistically focused.56 These traits
call primarily for efficiencies, and who knows more about efficiencies other than the
corporate sector?
48

John English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 156 - 160.
Gabriel and Savage, 18, 176 - 177.
50
Martin van Creveld, Moshe Dayan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2004), 119.
51
Roger Beaumout, Perspectives on Command and Control, in: Jon L. Boyes and S. Andride (eds.)
Principles of Command and Control (Washington DC: AFCEA International Press, 1987), 4.
52
Gabriel and Savage, 33.
53
The phrase was introduced by: Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
States Military Strategy and Policy (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973).
54
Max Boot, 'The New American Way of War', Foreign Affairs 82:4 (July-August, 2003), 41 - 58.
55
Martin van Creveld, Kenneth S. Brower and Steven L. Canby, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare
(Alabama: Air University Press, 1994), 8.
56
Colin S. Gray, The American Way of War, in Anthony D. McIvor (ed.) Rethinking The Principles of
War, (Annapolis Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 27.
49

The Adoption of Mission Command

Adoption of mission command by the American army was carried out as part of the
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. The epicenter of these reforms was the development
of a new doctrine designed to combat Soviet quantitative superiority. The 1976 Field
Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, though still espousing the principles of Active
Defence, was the first such attempt. Its successor, the 1982 FM Operations, advocated
the principles of Manoeuvre Warfare and the new AirLand Battle doctrine. Inspired by
the Germans, Israelis as well the Red Army, the new doctrine substituted mobility for
attrition. It also marked the introduction of mission command into the American army
command doctrine.57 Indeed, mission command was a central tenant of AirLand
Battle and a prerequisite for its execution.
The AirLand Battle was an intellectual reaction to the 1976 field manual, which
many believed to be inadequate. When the former was first introduced by commander
of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) General Starry, it was described as
merely evolutionary in order to minimize resistance to it. 58 Today, however, many
agree that the doctrine posed a greater break than hitherto assumed. 59 According to
Richard Lock-Pullan, the new doctrine emphasized out-thinking instead of out
slugging. [The reforms] were aimed to develop a culture of a highly skilled
sophisticated and capable army. 60 The 1976, 1982 and 1986 editions of field manual
100-5 Operations were tailored to unique characteristics of the European battlefield
and the Soviet adversary. The experience of Vietnam proved irrelevant in the face of
Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.61 Recognizing their numerical inferiority, planners
sought a qualitative advantage. Consequently, the army began instituting a series of
reforms one of which was the establishment of a joint body for training and doctrine
(1971). The new body, TRADOC, was created in order to facilitate integration of
doctrinal developments, training, force structure, and weaponry.
The first commander of TRADOC, General William E. DePuy, understood
that the army might be forced to fight a short decisive war while outnumbered and
outgunned. His primary objective was to re-establish fundamental tactical skills which
required highly trained soldiers capable of forming manoeuvre-oriented combined
armed teams.62 Reinforced by the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, DePuy
implemented these ideas in his 1976 manual.63 The challenge, according to DePuy,
would be to destroy many targets in a short period of time.64
Some observers criticized its basic tenets. They argued against the emphasis
on the defensive and the first battle; the preference of firepower over manoeuvre, and
physical over the psychological aspect of war; oversimplification of Soviet doctrine;
lack of tactical reserve; and the feasibility of DePuys 'concentration tactics. 65 The
57

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington DC, 1982), 2-1, 2-3, 2-7.
Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London:
Frank Cass, 1997), 292.
59
Richard Lock-Pullan, 'How to Rethink War: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine',
Journal of Strategic Studies 28:4 (August, 2005), 680.
60
Ibid., 681.
61
Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
62
Saul Bronfeld, Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U. S. Army,
Journal of Military History 71:2 (April, 2007), 471.
63
Bronfeld, 472; Naveh, 254; Suzanne Christine Nielsen, Preparing for War: the Dynamics of
Peacetime Military Reform, PhD Dissertation (Boston: Harvard University, 2003), 250.
64
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington DC, 1976), 5-13 - 5-14.
65
Nielsen, 284 - 285.
58

most vocal opposition was voiced by civilian experts such as William S. Lind,
Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. Canby, Paul Bracken and Jeffrey Record. 66 They
argued that the manual reintroduced the traditional American preference for head-on
collisions and reliance on superior resources. They considered army officers:
hidebound bureaucrats cultivating managerial skills over leadership, being wedded to
archaic methods, ignoring the study of military history and theory, and turning to safer
technology instead of innovative military art. They concluded that the Army
compensated for lack of imagination with high technology and a tendency to treat
military challenges as if they were simple engineering problems. 67 Lind, who
developed a theory of maneuver warfare on the basis of Air Force Colonel John
Boyds ideas, was probably the most influential of the group. He emphasized the
psychological benefits of creating an unexpected and unfavorable operational
strategic condition, not to kill enemy troops or destroy their equipment. 68 Lind
advocated Boyd cycling the enemy until he can no longer fight as an effective
organized force,69 explaining that:
Conflict can best be understood as time competitive cycles of observing,
orienting, deciding, and acting whoever can go through the this 'Boyd
Cycle' or 'OODA Loop' consistently faster gains a tremendous advantage
primarily because by the time his opponent acts his action has already
changed the situation as to make the opponent's action irrelevant. 70

According to Lind, effective fighting within the chaos of battle requires combatants to
be consistently faster than their adversaries and their ability to strike directly at the
enemy centre of gravity [which] if shattered will bring him down. 71 Achieving the
necessary tempo of operations requires decentralization of command and not only
accepting but rather generating chaos.72 Central to his theory are the following
interdependent concepts: Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), Schwerpunkt (Main
Effort), and Lucken und Flachen (Surfaces and Gaps).73 The use of German
terminology reveals Linds intellectual inspiration and signifies his recognition of the
origins of these concepts.
Lind described a dynamic environment wherein enemy strong and weak points
cannot be predetermined as they are temporary and changing. Authority must
therefore be delegated down to the lowest level, so that small unit commanders can
find gaps and immediately exploit them without delay. 74 Once the main effort is
conveyed through the commanders intent, reconnaissance forces locate and create
gaps between enemy surfaces. Once identified, the main force is pulled through these
gaps. Crucial to this process are subordinate initiative, boldness, and quick
66

Huba Wass de Czege, From Vietnam to the 1991 Gulf War: The Struggle to Get the Doctrine
Right Enough (Unpublished Monograph, 2006). A similar version was published as: Idem,
Lessons from the Past: Making the Army's Doctrine "Right Enough" Today (Arlington: Institute
of Land Warfare, 2006).
67
Czege, From Vietnam, 3.
68
William S. Lind, Some Doctrinal Questions to the United States Army', Military Review 57:3
(March, 1977), 58.
69
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 6.
70
William S. Lind, The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare, in: Richard D. Hooker Jr., (ed.)
Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (California: Presidio, 1993), 3.
71
Ibid., 3.
72
Lind, Handbook, 7.
73
Ibid., 73.
74
Ibid., 76.

10

decisions.75 Exploitation of gaps and maintenance of primary effort depends on

effective execution of mission command, rapid decisions and quick actions. In Lind's
theory, mission command is a:
Series of contracts between superior and subordinates. The superior, in his
contract, pledges to make the result he desires crystal clear to his
subordinates to leave the subordinate maximum latitude in determining
how to get the result, and perhaps the greatest change - to back him up when
he makes mistakes.76

According to Lind, the subordinate ensures that his actions serve the commander's
intent; self discipline is substituted for imposed discipline and initiative is constantly
rewarded. The focus is on the situation, the enemy and the final outcome rather than
on processes and procedures. Missions are defined in terms of the desired effect on
the enemy. When changed circumstances preclude the realization of the commanders
intent through the original mission, subordinates are expected to revise their plans
accordingly.77
Lind was inspired primarily by the historic Prussian-Germans and the British
military intellectuals Liddell-Hart and Fuller.78 Indeed, twelve of the twenty books he
recommended for further reading were written either by German generals or about the
German military.79. These radical ideas were first adopted by the Marines Corps which
was then undergoing their own transformation.80
The transition from tactical to operational doctrine is credited to TRADOC
commander General Don A. Starry.81 Starry, who replaced DePuy, adopted the
aforementioned criticism and revised the doctrine.82 According to General Huba Wass
de Czega, one of the developers of the new doctrine, army commanders became
convinced as a result from their field training and war games that they would be
unable to defeat the Soviets using the doctrine of 1976.83
Starry revisited the lessons of the 1973 Yom Kippur War through the prism of
the operational art. He was particular impressed by Musah Peleds counterattack deep
behind the Syrian lines, on the third day of the war, which had thrown the Syrian and
Iraqi forces completely off balance.84 The war reaffirmed his operational idea that
without initiative the outnumbered forces are doomed to lose. 85 Starry's ideas were
inspired by his experience in World War Two and Korea. From retired Wehrmacht
generals he garnered a more comprehensive understanding of mission command,
manoeuvre and the operational art. For example, he held a four day conference (1980)
exploring Wehrmacht experience in Russia with generals Balck and von Mellenthin. 86
The purpose was to derive lessons for a modern defence of Europe against a Soviet
75

Ibid., 91.
Lind, Theory', 11 - 12.
77
Ibid.
78
Richard Lock-Pullan, 'The Modern Sources of Maneuver Warfare Doctrine', The British Army
Review 137 (summer, 2005), 12.
79
Lind, Handbook, 58 - 66.
80
Terry Terriff, Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the
United States Marines Corps', Journal of Strategic Studies 29:3 (June, 2006), 475 - 503.
81
Naveh, 11.
82
Ibid., 251.
83
Huba Wass de Czega and L. D. Holder, 'The New FM 100-5, Military Review 62:7 (July, 1982), 53.
84
Bronfeld, 28,
85
Ibid., 31.
86
Generaloberst Herman Balck (1897-1982) served in the Wehrmacht. as commander of Army Group
G. Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellethin (1904-1997) served as the Operations officer of the
Afrikakorps.
76

11

invasion.87 The Germans told him that they had emphasized the human element and
expounded on mission type orders and the culture prevailing in the Wehrmacht that
had enabled reliance on them. They explained that German superior battlefield
performance derived from the individuality of the German fighting man, his freedom
to take initiatives and the system which engendered these policies and attitudes. 88
According to Balck independent action along the line of the general concept was
praised and accepted.89 Mission command, he explained, depended on shared
experiences, doctrine and training. Mellenthin remarked that:
Commanders and subordinates start to understand each other during war. The
better they know each other, the shorter and less detailed the orders can be.
To follow a commander or an order requires that it is also thought through on
the level from which the order was given.90

The new mode of fighting was centred on seizing and maintaining initiative
rather than the traditional attrition strategy. The new doctrine four basic tenets were
initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. 91 Fighting depended on maintenance
of tempo and aggressive execution relying on superior command and training rather
than on resources or technology. The new doctrine developed, AirLand Battle,
required skilled and adaptive forces and leaders capable of recognizing critical events
as they occur and act to avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy vulnerabilities.92
A revised edition of the manual appeared in 1986 wherein the technical
operational level was replaced by the dynamic 'operational art'. It instructed
practitioners to identify an opponents operational centre of gravity and concentrate
combat power against it.93 Thus, the Clausewitzian centre of gravity became the focal
point of maneuver theory, commanders were instructed to ensure a unified,
aggressive quick, precise, agile and synchronized effort throughout the force.94
Maneuver warfare advocates believed that the necessary characteristics were
embedded in the American national character and had to only be rediscovered. 95 This
style of command emphasized high-quality, flexible and fluid command, in contrast to
the traditional top down approach. The theory advocated rapid completion of OODA
loops as a means of disrupting the enemys decision making capabilities. Central to
the new 1986 manual were the mission command principles of clear intent, brief
communications across the chain of command and synchronization. 96 The latter
denoted the unity of effort of all forces towards single aim via a clear intent. 97 It
depended on implicit rather than explicit coordination achieved if all forces involved
fully understand the intent of the commander. 98 However despite these doctrinal
innovations some still remained unconvinced and stated that: :
The developers of AirLand Battle flirted with maneuver but have been
unable to shake American military traditions of the past. While AirLand
87

William DePuy, Generals Balck and von Mellenthin On Tactics: Implications for NATO Military
Doctrine (Munich: Bundeswehr University, 2004), 3.
88
Ibid., 14.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid., 19.
91
FM 100-5 Operations 1982, 2-1.
92
Ibid., 2-2.
93
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington DC, 1986), 10.
94
Ibid., 2-6.
95
Lock-Pullan, Modern, 6.
96
Naveh, 308.
97
Lock-Pullan, 'Rethink War, 691.
98
FM 100-5 Operations 1986, 17

12

Battle represents an attempt to break with doctrinal problems of the Vietnam

era, the irresistible song of technology, fire and mass destruction continue to
lure American thought back to battle calculus of attrition. 99

Debates and Interpretations

The decision to adopt mission command led to debates concerning three major issues.
One issue debated in the years following the adoption was the morality of adopting a
technique employed by the Nazis. The second concerned the feasibility of adapting a
foreign concept developed within a specific historical context.100 It devolved from the
broader issue of whether German military performance warranted emulation. The
third debate concerned the translation and interpretation of the concept as well as
identification of its various comprising elements and their relation to a broader theory.
The debate concerning German military excellence, in which both officers and
academics partook, raged over the pages of practitioner journals such as Military
Review, Infantry or Armour. The issue transcended the mere historic; it had a direct
impact on the practice of their profession. For instance, writing on the German mystic,
Roger Beaumont challenged the American and British fascination with Wehrmacht
performance. He argued that not only had the German army been greatly influenced
by Nazi ideology but even its early victories were more image than substance. 101
Moreover, he asked, if they were so good, how come they lost? Similarly, Daniel
Hughes cautioned against borrowing German concepts of warfare, as not all
professionals share this respect for the Wehrmacht.102 In contrast, Martin van Creveld
held that the Wehrmacht was more than a bunch of fanatics hence, though Nazi
influence existed, its degree should not be overstated. He argued also that victory is
neither the only nor even the most important yardstick for combat prowess. Indeed, an
analysis of battlefield performance reveals that German tactical and operational
performance was indeed exceptional though not perfect. 103 Some have argued that
imitative was always the hallmark of American soldier:
Maneuverists act as if they are unaware of the American military heritage
particularly in the area of leadership initiativethey prefer to use the
German term Auftragstaktik, and act like they have found another piece of
the True (Iron) Cross. [while it actually] typified the American military
since 1775 Put a lieutenant in the jungle with a radio and he will ask
forgiveness not permission. Try to micromanage him and he will find the off
switch from the revolution to the gulf that has been the American
method.104

In contrast some felt that mission command could not transcend the cultural and
historic context in which it was developed. There was little agreement concerning its
comprising elements or their precise meaning. 105 Hence, it was unclear if
99

Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (California:
Presidio, 1991), 186.
100
For instance: Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third
Reich (Lawrence: University Press Kansas, 2005), 307 - 311.
101
Roger A. Beaumont, On the Wehrmacht Mystique, Military Review 66:7 (July, 1986), 48.
102
Daniel Hughes, Abuses of German Military History, Military Review 66:12 (December 1986), 6676, details the arguments against emulating the German army.
103
Martin van Creveld, On Learning From the Wehrmacht and Other Things, Military Review 68:1
(January, 1988), 62 - 71.
104
Daniel P. Bolger, Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered, in: Richard D. Hooker Jr. (ed.) Maneuver
Warfare: An Anthology (California: Presidio, 1993), 19.
105
For example see the debate concerning the concept of intent: David A. Fastabend, The Application
of the Commanders Intent, Military Review 67:8 (August, 1987), 60 - 68; Edward J. Filiberti,

13

Auftragstaktik should be translated as mission type orders, directive control or mission

command. Indeed, despite many efforts, the Americans have yet to reach universally
accepted definitions of the various elements of mission command. Others drew
attention to the fact that the in the updated 1993 FM advocates employing mission
command primarily if direct communications fail.106 To them, the overriding
importance accorded to synchronization suggested that explicit coordination was
required of commanders..107
The authors of the revised 2001 FM edition attempted to improve and clarify
mission command related terminology and other German concepts.108 Nevertheless,
confusion abounded as indicated by the issuance of a field manual devoted to
command in general and mission command in particular, merely two years later. 109 It
was issued because US Army doctrine has been relatively sparse in its higher
doctrinal literature which led to multiple versions of C2 doctrine. 110 The new
publication also failed to achieve uniformity and additional literature has continued to
appear. One such essay was written by Marine General (Ret.) Paul van Riper. Riper
attempted to clarify the concept of 'intent' designating the higher purpose rather than
the desired effect - the why of the mission. Commenting on prevailing confusion
Riper remarked that 'The paragraph [of intent] often becomes an unfocused discussion
of many unrelated items'111
The difficulties in the comprehension and application of Auftragstaktik that arose led
critiques to question its usefulness. Indeed, some even raised the concern that it had
mutated from doctrine to dogma: It is a religion. Detailed control is unmanly,
sinful, and blasphemous' said one. 112 . Others, like historian Robert Citino, argue that
the historic concept is simply incompatible with the social realities and technological
complexities of the modern battlefield.113 On the opposite side, scholars such as van
Creveld opined, its adoption and adaptation was feasible:
Thus, although it is certainly true that the method of Auftrag and Weisung has
deep roots in German military history, it is not necessarily true that a non
German armed force has to traverse that history in its entirety, to understand
and apply that method.114

Most scholars and practitioners continue to believe in its utility, disagreeing

primarily about the best means of implementing it. They argued that popularization of
the German concept and insufficient attention to its organizational and historic context
Command, Control and Commanders Intent, Military Review 67:8 (August, 1987), 54 - 59; Russell
W. Glenn, The Commanders Intent: Keep It Short, Military Review 67:8 (August, 1987), 49 - 53.
Concerning the centre of gravity see: Dale C. Eikemier, Centre of Gravity Analysis, Military Review
84:4 (July-August, 2004), 2 - 5; Milan Vego, Centre of Gravity, Military Review 80:2 (March-April,
2000), 23 - 29.
106
Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, The Virtual Corporation and Army Organization
(California: RAND, 1997) 42 - 43.
107
Citino, 310.
108
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington DC, 2001), Chapter 5,
paragraphs 4 - 9, 61 - 63, 71 - 72; Chapter 6, paragraphs 37 - 39.
109
Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army
Forces (Washington DC, 2003).
110
Comments made by the author of the field manual: William M. Connor, 'Emerging Army Doctrine:
Command & Control', Military Review 82:2 (March-April, 2002), 80.
111
Paul van Riper, Planning for and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms (Carlisle:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 13.
112
Leonhard, Fighting, 117.
113
Citino, 310.
114
Creveld, Learning, 70.

14

had rendered it impotent.115. One such critic, Daniel Hughes remarked that adoption
was hindered by a careless and superficial application of German terms and concepts
to current practices [and] a general failure to place individual German methods and
experiences in their proper historical context.116 A full decade later he was still
convinced that:
... As long as Western armies regard Auftragstaktik simply as a policy of
short general orders, rather than a fundamental principle governing all
requiring decisions and judgment, their officers will not understand what the
principle entails, let alone implement it on the battlefield. 117

Another soldier-scholar voiced his concerns:

Auftragstaktik reflected a deep tradition of encouraging initiative and
allowing freedom of action to subordinate leaders. It was the tradition that
came first. to accomplish this, Army training manuals and publications
must be congruent with the spirit of FM 100-5, and the use of the school or
approved solution must be avoided.118

Despite these debates mission command has prevailed as a doctrinal concept during
the turmoil that followed the Cold War and the transformations of the American army.
Considered well suited for the 21st century, it reflects democratic and individualistic
values.119 Maybe not less important, it is congruent with contemporary management
theory that emphasis empowerment, flat organizations and the complexities of
modern battlefields.120
The US Army Application of Mission Command
Following the official adoption of mission command into doctrine (1982) discussed in
the previous section, the following section will examine whether the US Army
employed mission command. The case-studies include two major operations in which
US ground forces were heavily involved since the adoption of the doctrine; Dessert
Storm (1991) and Iraqi Freedom (2003) both invasion and occupation.
Operation Desert Storm
Many, who followed the American armys conduct in Desert Storm, believed that it
had executed a nearly perfect AirLand Battle operation. Though confronting merely
the Iraqi army rather than the feared Soviets, the Americans had successfully adapted
to the new theatre of operations. The swift one-hundred-hour Blitzkrieg-like
campaign demonstrated their adherence to the tenets of the AirLand Battle doctrine,
including mission command. The deep thrust into the desert, rapid envelopment of
Iraqi forces and relatively few casualties suggested excellent doctrine and execution.
The Americans had demonstrated what the doctrine advocated: initiative, depth,
agility, synchronization, and combined Arms.121 According to Shimon Naveh, Desert
115

Daniel Hughes, Auftragstaktik, in: Trevor N. Dupuy (Ed.) International Military Defence
Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 A-B (London: Macmillan, 1993), 332.
116
Hughes, 'Abuses', 67.
117
Hughes, Auftragstaktik, op cit.
118
Echevarria, Auftragstaktik, 50 - 56.
119
David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, Auftragstaktik or Directive Control in Joint and Combined
Operations, Parameters 89:3 (autumn, 1999), 118 - 133; Joseph S. McLamb, The Future of Mission
Orders, Military Review 77:5 (September-October, 1997), 71 - 74.
120
Fukuyama and al.'Military Organization', 329, 340.
121
Stephen Badsey, Coalition Command in the Gulf War, in: G. D. Sheffield (ed.) Leadership and
Command: The Anglo-American Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey's, 2002), 198; Department of

15

Storm exemplified this doctrine, marking it as the first battle in modern history where
maneuver substituted the Western predisposition toward attrition.122 He opined that the
operation was a superb application of offensive maneuver relying on 'depth,
simultaneous operations and synergy, disruption and intellectual tension between
tactical and operational poles of command, and synchronization'.123
These elements combined with the large scale rapid maneuvers, led some to
conclude that mission command had been practiced to its fullest potential, just as the
Germans had done against France in 1941. Indeed, some accounts of the war have it
that the large double envelopment had been accomplished through short orders issued
on the move: mission type orders.124 Tacticians were described as having had the
'remarkable ability to maneuver and to respond to changing situations'. 125 The
Americans had greatly improved their technical and tactical skills, and their ability to
exploit what Lind termed 'surfaces and gaps'. Lind, a long time critique of the US
Army and a devout proponent of mission command, agreed: In Desert Storm, the
American ground forces, Army and Marine Corps, on the whole practiced maneuver
warfare. 126 The operational planning was done by the 'Jedi Knights', a group of
officers, graduates of the new Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
modeled after the idea of the German General Staff academy.127
However, after the dust had settled, analysts began to question the actual
extent to which maneuver and mission command had been applied in this conflict.
Robert Leonhard opined overall the campaign reflected the same old practices:
Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down. There was
no room for initiative, or even significant maneuver options, below corps
level. Commanders at all level were instructed where and when to move and
were not permitted to find their own way to their objectives. In essence the
coalition forces simply lined up and swept forward, careful to maintain
contact with the friendly forces on their flanks, like rigidly disciplined
Macedonian Phalanx, divisions and brigades had to march and stay dressed to
the flanks throughout the advance, crashing through both strong and weak
points in the enemy defenses.128

Leonhard, agrees that the coalition forces maneuvered, but argues that mission
command is not a prerequisite for maneuver warfare. In fact, he explains, as the
Soviets had demonstrated during World War Two: maneuver on the operational level
is possible without using mission command.129 That said, the curtailment of the
freedoms afforded by mission command posed two primary problems: One is our
own perception of ourselves as a democratic and free society. But even more

Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington DC, 1992), 329.
122
Naveh, 329.
123
Ibid., 326.
124
For instance, General Franks testimony in: Tom Clancy and Fred Franks, On The Ground in Iraq:
Into the Storm, A Study in Command (New York: Berkley, 2004). 465.
125
Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in The Twentieth Century (Kansas: University Press
Kansas, 2001), 273.
126
Lind, 'The Theory ', 15.
127
Richard J. Dunn III, 'From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping with Revolutionary
Technological Change in Land Warfare', McNair Paper 13 (Washington DC: Institute for National
Strategic Studies, 1991), 85.
128
Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 269.
129
For further details of the Soviet practice see: Leonhard, Fighting 52 - 58; Richard Simpkin, Race to
the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brasseys, 1985), 288 - 292.

16

dangerous is that if the US is engaged with a better rival that is capable of showing
initiative in every echelon of command, this might prove disastrous.130
Harsher criticism was offered by Steven Canby and Martin van Creveld who argued
that while US forces were well trained and cohesive, Desert Storm had been:
More a movement than maneuver given the Iraqi passivity the notion of
entering into the enemy's OODA loop never came into play. At a critical
junction VII corps was apparently more interested in synchronizing the
moves of its own forces than vigorously exploiting battlefield success by
sending spearheads forward.131

In practice, they argued, the system of command remained essentially centralized. 132
Robert Citino opined that the complex communication and weapons systems actually
increased dependency of action on all levels of command. He contended that
centralized control of the American maneuver during Desert Storm allowed
commanders no deviation from the plan.133 . Unnecessary caution and risk-aversion
on the operational level hampered the ground offensive. Command centers functioned
as information depots rather than as distribution points.134
Rupert Smith, who commanded the British 1st Armored division, likened the
differences between the British and American headquarters to those between football
and rugby. While the Americans fight set-piece, highly organized, well rehearsed and
centralized wars, the British conduct a more dynamic and fluid operation wherein
anyone can pick up the ball and lead.135 These characteristics are reflected also in the
headquarters structure: the American headquarters is substantially larger than its
British counterpart. The additional manpower in the American headquarters is used to
plan and rehearse for every possible scenario, leaving little room for improvisation
later on.136 Smith noted that headquarters are often a reflection of two different
models:
In the first model a small staff, headed by a chief of staff, is charged with
developing and disseminating the course of action decided upon by the commander.
They often issue short mission type orders dictating the desired end-result rather than
the means of accomplishing it while subordinates are required to work out the details.
This type of system requires a unifying doctrine. 137 In the second method, staffs
prepare a number of alternate courses of action from which the commander will later
choose. The process is more formal and the planning detailed. During the 1990s a
single operational order emanating from division headquarters could run to 1,000
pages; supplementary plans of subordinate units totaled thousands more. 138 During
Desert Storm British headquarters was designed along the lines of the first model. It
was smaller than its American counterpart who was a:
130

Leonhard, The Art 270.

Creveld and al.Air Power, 214.
132
Ibid., 219
133
Citino, 310.
134
Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 99 - 101.
General (Ret.) Sir Rupert Smith, Commander of 1st British Armored Division (First Gulf War), 135
.Interview with author, 1 September 2006, Brussels, Belgium
136
Ibid.
137
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Penguin, 2006),
93 - 94.
138
Adam Grissom, To Digitize an Army: The US Army Force XXI Initiative and the Digital Divide,
1993-2003, PhD Dissertation (London: King's College, 2008), 7.
131

17

Function of national preference and philosophy. It took us some time to learn

that the many plans emanating from the superior US Corps HQ were but
contingencies. I had one staff officer to deal with all this paper work where
an equivalent US HQ had a branch of about five officers. as a general rule
responsibility and authority were found lower in the British HQ. 139

Friction, which mission command is designed to overcome, then prevented the

destruction of the Republican Guard, the designated centre of gravity. 140 A gap in the
situational understanding began to develop between the actual tactical situation and
the operational understanding at Schwarzkopf's HQ. This gap was widened through
imprecise reports.141 There followed a physical gap compounded by adverse weather
conditions and the unanticipated Iraqi preference for flight over fight. Consequently,
the Republican Guard escaped nearly unscathed. 142 As one analyst concluded: 'once
again, the US did not know how to conduct a deep thrust into its enemy's rear'. 143 The
misguided attempt to control friction demonstrated a misunderstanding of both the
concept and the utility of mission command. Thus, the First Gulf War experience
revealed little of the Americans decentralization capabilities. 144 The failure to destroy
the Republican Guard secured Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq and led to an
American incursion in 1998 and a second full invasion in 2003.145
Operation Iraqi Freedom
The execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) satisfied some of the criticisms
raised previously by proponents of maneuver warfare.146 A clear preference for speed
over mass was revealed when the ground and air campaigns were begun
simultaneously and directed toward the Republican Guard and the city of Baghdad. In
addition, the number of Allied divisions employed was half that deployed during the
previous campaign.147 Undoubtedly, the march to Baghdad, which constituted the first
phase of the campaign, validated the doctrine of speed and maneuver. According to
historian John Keegan, the disintegration of the Iraqi Army should not diminish the
American success.148 The finest examples of mission command-based maneuvers
were the two 'thunder runs' (swift and unexpected massive armored deep penetrations
designed to unbalance the enemy) directed toward Baghdad.149 As one analyst has it,
these were 'the most important and decisive actions of the war'. 150 The army had taken
139

Smith, 94.
Vandergriff, 150 - 151.
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in 141
the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1995)., 380 - 381; Richard M. Swain, Lucky War:
Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth: Army Command and General Staff Press, 1994), 238,
.247; Schwarzkopf, 429
142
Barry D.Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, (Washington DC: Institute for National
Strategic Studies, 1996), 49 50, note 39; Schwarzkopf, 546.
143
Robert H. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (London: Brassey's, 1994), 254.
144
Vandergriff, 153.
145
Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Windenfeld & Nicolson, 2005),
94; Watts, 51.
146
Van Creveld, Brower and Canby, 213 - 219.
147
Rodney Ben, US puts tactics before tanks with a fraction of Schwarzkopfs force, Daily Telegraph,
16 March 2003.
148
John Keegan, The Iraq War (London: Hutchinson, 2004), 5 - 6.
Dr. Bruce R. Nardulli, RAND, Senior Analyst, Expert on Operations. Interview with author, 7 149
.September 2006, Washington DC
150
Mark Bowden, 'Forward', in: David Zucchino, Thunder Run: Three Days in the Battle For Baghdad
(New York: Grove, 2004), xi.
140

18

a tactical risk which had paid off handsomely. 151 These penetrations constituted a
change in the battle plan introduced as a result of battlefield developments. 152 3rd
Division recognized the Iraqi inability to deal with attacks from unexpected directions
and directed thunder runs toward the Iraqi rear. Consequently, Baghdad was taken
earlier than anticipated and with less casualties.153 David Zucchinos account of the
thunder runs indicates a successful adoption of maneuver warfare and mission
command during the decade following the First Gulf War. 154 To him, the evidence
demonstrated a marked improvement in tactical command as well. Criticism was
raised, however, regarding operational and strategic performance as well as the
counterinsurgency phase that followed.
The old habit of the Armys zest for over planning was has remerged when
following the fall of Baghdad General Franks estimated it would take ten days to
transfer an armoured Brigade to the vicinity of Tikrit. When Marine Task Force
Tripoli received this assignment it began rolling less than twelve hours later.
Similarly, the first Battle of Fallujah (April 2004), initiated following the killing of the
American Blackwater employees, was a slow, set-piece battle, which had allowed the
enemy to escape. The battle was described as 'deliberate, even incidental, almost
unwanted, and conducted against the advice of the local commander General
Mattis'.155
An additional source of disappointment was the new digital system designed
to increase tactical unit situational awareness by providing accurate real-time
intelligence concerning the location of friendly and enemy forces. Digital systems are
designed to reflect organizational priorities in terms of information flow. In the
American case, the system reflects a cultural bias towards centralization . . The hope
was that the army would be able to retain mission focused command and control with
its inherent decentralization while moulding the Armys digital technology and
tactical design to form a solid framework to support how we fight.156 However a
study of the development of US army digitization found a discrepancy between the
original intentions and the current product. Thus, the Army promised to create a
vertically integrated digital information system for which it 'would reform its
doctrine and force structure to emphasize decentralized high-tempo manoeuvre and
precision firepower'.157 Yet, the final product transfers information primarily to the
higher echelons rather than to tactical commanders, thereby created what some called
the 'digital divide'. The shift in the system objectives was reflected also in the name
chosen for it. The original Army Battle Command System (ABCS) was replaced in
1999 by Blue Force Tracker (BFT). As the new name suggests, the system no longer
provides tactical tools but rather means by which senior command can track tactical
units. The Blue Force Tracker, both its designation and actual application, provided
151

Thomas E.Ricks Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006),
125.
152
Nardulli, interview.
153
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq (London: Atlantic, 2006), 430 - 431; Ricks, 126.
154
Zucchino, op cit.
155
Douglas Macgregor, 'The Failure of Military Leadership in Iraq, Fire the Generals!', in:
Counterpunch!, available at: http://www.counterpunch.org/macgregor05262006.html accessed: April
2007.
Ibid.
156
Jack Kammerer, Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control, available at:
http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev, accessed: 29 September 2003.
157
Grissom, Digitize, 2.

19

senior command with an additional micromanagement tool.158 Many complained that

the system intelligence was significant only for senior command. Frustration soon
ignited a controversy, transforming the digital divide into one of the primary
criticisms of Army performance during the invasion.159
The most serious flaws were uncovered in aftermath of the invasion. While the
new RMA doctrines of Effect Base Operation (EBO), Network Centric Warfare
(NCW) and Shock and Awe, had proved somewhat effective in the regular phase of
the war, they proved rather unsatisfactory in the counterinsurgency phase that
followed. The Army had been unprepared for either the lengthy counterinsurgency
campaign or the nation building measures.160 Indeed, a report published in 2008
concluded that the Army had relied on faulty planning assumptions; units were
inadequately trained; headquarters were unprepared; and planners had failed to
account for some fundamental contingencies.161
British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, attached to US forces in Iraq, observed
that:
Whilst the US army may espouse mission command, in Iraq it did not
practice it. Commanders rarely if ever questioned authority and were
reluctant to deviate from precise instructions. Each commander had his
own style, but if there were a common trend it was for micromanagement
Planning tended to be staff driven and focused on process rather than end
effect. The net effect was highly centralized decision making... [which]
tended to discourage lower level initiative and adaptability. 162

Aylwin-Foster also remarked that the Americans strong 'can do' ethos occasionally
resulted in inaccurate reports calculated to ease pressure from above and satisfy
superiors.163 This tendency undermines the principle of trust critical to armies in
general and to mission command in particular. Responding to Aylwin-Foster, one US
officer stated that 'his assessment is off target. 164 Based on the testimonies of officers
from the 1st Cavalry division, he argued that mission command had indeed been
practiced.165 Though, he added:
One might argue that I only spoke with exceptional officers, and while this
might be true, what is also true is that commanders will deal with subordinates according to their estimate of the subordinates abilities.166

TRADOC commander General William Wallace stated that while he disagreed with
some of the Aylwin-Fosters criticism, they were indeed 'of concern'. Nevertheless:
From my experience this is not indicative of the U.S. Army. To the contrary, I have
seen the remarkable ability of leaders and organizations to adapt and decentralize. 167
158

Grissom, Digitize, 12.

Ibid., 2.
160
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 162.
161
Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II:
Transition to the new Campaign, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 77 - 80, 160 - 161.
162
Nigel Aylwin-Foster, 'Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations', Military Review 84:6
(November-December, 2005), 7.
163
Aylwin-Foster, 7.
164
Kevin C. M. Benson, OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Replay to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster, Military
Review 86:2 (March-April, 2006), 61.
165
Ibid., 63 - 65.
166
Ibid., 65.
167
William S. Wallace, TRADOC Commander, TRADOC Commander's Replay to Brigadier AylwinFoster, Military Review 86:2 (March-April, 2006), 117.
159

20

Another commentator, a long time red team analyst, found Aylwin-Fosters

assessment 'enlightening, if somewhat painful, critique of U.S Army in Iraq'. And
further:
It is much easier to dismiss Aylwin-Fosters assessment as limited or
altogether wrong than it is to make changes in response to it. From an
American perspective, it is difficult to see how our optimistic, actionoriented, technologically advanced, and command-centric military culture
could have downsides. But Aylwin-Foster demonstrates that in a
counterinsurgency, these attributes do not necessarily contribute to success.168

Retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor, whose Breaking the Phalanx is said to

have inspired Rumsfelds concept of deploying small forces in Iraq, blames the
military rather than civilian leadership, for the debacles in Iraq. According to him
Senior command was: 'overly bureaucratic, risk averse, professionally inadequate
and, hence, unsuited to the complex military tasks entrusted to them. Whats more,
Macgregor argued, little had changed over the decade following the First Gulf War, as
headquarters remained improvised uncoordinated single-service organizations.169
In conclusion, despite a doctrinal revolution and major reforms, mission
command has only been partially implemented. Twelve years that had elapsed since
the First Iraq War and three successive field manuals espousing mission command,
had failed to bring about the desired result. A lack of trust and clear objectives
coupled with a type of war the US army was unprepared for had come at the expense
of mission command.
The Impact of Officers Development Practices
Some of the failure to exercise mission command could be explained through
examination of the education, training and personal policies during the decade after
mission command was adopted. A study conducted almost a decade after mission
command was formally adopted demonstrated the difficulties inherent to the adoption
process. Examining tactical level mission orders doctrine, the study revealed great
diversity as to the understanding of the term mission, the comprising elements of
mission command and experience in its application. It concluded that while the
doctrine exists it was not commonly known nor, by inference, understood by those
officers surveyed'.170 Evidence indicates that it is still plagued by personnel, education
and training deficiencies hindering efforts to practice mission command. Donald
Vandergriff maintained that while the Germans encouraged inventive solutions,
American officers even toady, are confronted with check lists and scripted scenarios
that have evolved little since the advent of Active Defence. Adherence to detailed
processes is favored over the achievement of results. Indeed, though Army education
has come a long way since the 1960s, officers are still not taught to think holistically,
or to make decisions and pursue them in the face of adversary.171 According to
Vandergriff: rather than encourage free thought the focus in the programs is on the
confined use of template processes, pre-determined phases, matrixes, laundry lists and
pages of commander's guidance.172
168

Susan Craig, 'Aylwin-Fosters Critique', Military Review 86:2 (March-April, 2006), 118.
Macgregor, 'The Failure'.
170
John D. Johnson, Mission Orders in the United States Army: Is the Doctrine Effective (Fort
Leavenworth: Army Command and General Staff College, 1990).
171
Vandergriff, 139 - 140.
172
Ibid., 138.
169

21

In terms of training, Vandergriff argued that due to the zero-defect mentality

and the Army blue on red exercises was limited to scripted duels from the 1980s
through the 1990s. Thus, the Blue (guest) force was assigned a large maneuvering
zone of operations allowing it to flank the Red Team. And even then, most
commanders failed to exploit this opportunity and many who did were better equipped
to synchronize their forces than to make rapid decisions. They issued detailed plans,
in the spirit of the mission training plan (MTP) checklist, which was deemed more
important than accomplishing the mission. Success is measured against the question
'did we follow doctrine and execute the process?'173 Reports from the NTC and the
Joint Readiness Centre reveal that battalion and brigade commanders continue to
exhibit a safe course including a slow advance, erection of a hasty defense and a
prayer that the enemy falls into the obvious trap.174
Training is intimately linked with personnel policies such as selection and
promotion. McGregor identifies three major problems with the selection and
promotion process. First, the process is overseen by select individuals; the lack of
diversity ensures that similar thinking officers are chosen. Second, selection for
promotion is decided upon within the various branches, consequently narrowing the
fields of necessary experience, third, to a large extent selection is dependent upon
'who you know'; this system encourages nepotism and personal relationships rather
than merit.175 According to him: The system rewards 'efficiency and control in an
artificial centralized decision making environment rather than professional
competence.176 Thus: 'we talk about initiative and agility but we reward officers who
follow a rigidly prescribed path to success we don't reward risk takers officers
are often told to do what they are told and not ask questions'. 177 A recent RAND study
confirmed these observations: individuals are promoted on the basis of position
availability rather than on their ability to perform the necessary duties. The authors of
the report also concluded that the Armys efforts to prepare future senior commanders
have met with mixed results.178
Thus, despite reforms, the personnel system continues to present challenges to
the institution of mission command. The managerial cultural legacy inspired by
corporate practices persists in spite of the new doctrine and the post-Cold War
reforms. The army's fundamental organization policies and training methods have not
sufficiently changed and the army continues to promote micromanagement and a zero
defects mentality that are reflected in these policies.
Final Verdict: Has it been Successful? What can we Learn?
The story of the adoption of mission command demonstrate that good intentions and
the dedication of significant resources to the adoption of a foreign practice may not be
sufficient in order to overcome what one the organizational researcher Alan Wilkins
defined as imperfect imitability. This phenomenon denotes the difficulty of identifying
the contributing factors to the success of the organization being emulated, or the tacit
infrastructure that supports it. Whereas much of the literature on military innovation
and adaptation has been devoted to dimensions such as top-down/bottom-up
173

Ibid., 142 - 143.

MacGregor Tranformation., 205.
175
Ibid., 196 - 197.
176
Ibid., 199.
177
Ibid.
178
David E. Johnson, Preparing Potential Senior Army Leaders for the Future: An Assessment of
Leader Development Efforts in the Post Cold Era (Virginia: RAND, 2002), 27.
174

22

innovation or the impact of external/internal groups on the organization, 179 there has
been little discussion of emulating a best practice. 180 In contrast, the discussion of
this practice in the corporate world has been sufficiently extensive to warrant the
coining of the term 'benchmarking', the systematic comparison of successful
organizational practices and the adoption of the best of them.181
According to Alan Wilkins organizations usually attempt to effect cultural
change through one of the following: a piecemeal imitation of a successful
organization; importation of a new culture or fostering of a revolution. In the first
option, a particularly worthy idea or practice is adopted along with the skills, habits,
institutional memory, and individual commitment of another organization. Wilkins
warns, however, that the execution of that concept requires adaptation through trial
and error and cannot be rushed by applying quick fixes or blind imitation. 182 Indeed,
in most cases, such a process entails a transformation of the organizations basic
cultural assumptions.
Mission command has both procedural and cultural dimensions. The former
are relatively easy to emulate, as armies often adopted foreign tactics. In contrast, the
latter stem from national character and organizational traditions and are therefore
more difficult to transfer. Efforts to adapt the necessary cultural dimensions often
result in the creation of the cognitive and praxis gaps. Hence, the adoption of mission
command really calls for Wilkins third approach. A crisis must occur shaking the
faith in the methods of the old guard followed by the introduction of new ideas and
practices by new leaders. Success must then be attributed by the organization to the
new methods. This condition was met to varying degrees in the US Army case during
the reforms of the 1980s. Finally, the change is institutionalized through a revised
reward system including selection, promotion, etc. If the process is not completed, as
was often the case with mission command, people tend to learn how to resist the new
ways while appearing to support them'. In order to overcome these difficulties, the
organization should not limit its focus to embedding the new culture. Rather it should
seek inspiration, instruction and the enduring principles from its own history,
promote hybrids' and find the 'current success examples within the organization'. 183
Thus creating a natural link between mission command and their particular culture of
command.
In the final analysis, Mission command is a complex, elusive and multifactorial phenomenon, not easily quantified, measured or institutionalized. Therefore,
any conclusions regarding its implementation must be taken with a grain of salt.
Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the US Army has been so far unable to
institutionalize mission command fully. On the positive side, the evidence also
suggests that while this system of command has not fully taken root, it has been a
driver for significant developments in the realms of doctrinal development, officer
training and education, and actual battlefield performance. Moreover, despite the
changes in the nature of operations that hinder mission command, it will maintain its
179

For a comprehensive review of the literature concerning military change and innovation: Adam
Grissom, 'The Future of Military Innovation Studies', Journal of Strategic Studies 29:5 (October,
2006), 905 - 934.
180
One exception is: Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason (ed.) The Diffusion of Military Technology and
Ideas, (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
181
Robert C. Camp, Benchmarking: The Search for Industry Best Practices That Lead to Superior
Performance (Portland: Productivity, 2006).
182
Alan L. Wilkins, Developing Corporate Character: How to Successfully Change an Organization
Without Destroying It (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 7 - 19.
183
Ibid., 52

23

allure as it promises to enhance operational effectiveness. Additionally, the emphasis

mission command lays on maximizing the potential of every individual to the fullest
is congruent with modern western values.
These points were illustrated by a directive issued by General James Mattis
commander of the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). In a memo
dated 14 August 2008, he declared that doctrines such as Effects Based Operations
(EBO), Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and System of Systems Analysis (SoSA),
which essentially contradict mission command, have failed to deliver their advertised
benefits.184 Consequently, he called for a return to to time honored principles such as
mission type orders.185 Mattis recognized the enduring nature of mission command
and conceded that the search for new and exciting concepts over the past two decades
may have hindered its proper adoption by the United States army. A more recent
acknowledgment of the centrality of mission command is the latest version of the
Army's Capstone Concept which mentions mission command 15 times in different
contexts.186
These official documents serve as an acknowledgment that the journey toward
the realization of mission command has not been completed. Nevertheless, the
promise of mission command will continue to galvanize the US Army, as well as
other western military organizations, into adopting and adapting mission command
for the foreseeable future.
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