CASE TITLE: Domingo v.

Rayala
DATE: February 18, 2008
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
DIGEST BY: John Michael Gabriel N. Vida
SUMMARY:
Domingo, then a stenographic reporter in the NLRC, filed a
complaint for sexual harassment against Chairman Rayala of
the NLRC.

The SC first cited the application of the three-fold liability

rule in the law of public officers, which states that wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can
therefore proceed independently of the others. In the case
of sexual harassment, the same applies with full force.
It is true that Section 3, RA 7877, calls for a demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not
necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from
the acts of the offender. All of the acts of Rayala resound
with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.

DOCTRINE:
Three-fold liability rule: wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can therefore
proceed independently of the others.
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes Domingo, previously a Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual
harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio Rayala
with the DOLE. According to Domingos affidavit,
Rayala made several unwanted sexual advances to
her person, such as suddenly massaging her while
she was performing her duties as stenographer to

Rayala. The advances reached to a point where she

was molested by Rayala, leading to her filing for a
leave of absence and request for immediate transfer,
and her subsequent filing of a complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala, on the basis of the IRRs
of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law).
Upon receipt of the complaint, the Office of the
President ordered then-DOLE Secretary Laguesma to
form a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in
accordance with RA 7877. Said Committee heard the
parties and received evidence, and on March 2000,
the Committee submitted its report, finding Rayala
guilty of the offense charged. The penalty was,
however, erroneously held to be only for suspension
for 6 months. Secretary Laguesma, however,
recommended that the penalty be suspension for 6
months and 1 day, in accordance with RA 7877.
The Office of the President issued Administrative
Order 119, which stated that it recommends the
dismissal of Rayala from the service due to the
aggravating
circumstance
that
Rayala
took
advantage of his position of the superior of Domingo.
Furthermore, Rayala occupied the highest position in
the NLRC, hence it was incumbent upon respondent
to set an example to the others as to how they
should conduct themselves in public office, to see to
it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance
with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to
provide them with healthy working atmosphere
wherein co-workers treat each other with respect,
courtesy and cooperation.
Rayala filed an MR with the OP, which was denied. He
then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65, however the same was dismissed for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Another MR was
filed, which was resolved by the Supreme Court in
favor of Rayala, and referred the same to the CA.
CA: There was sufficient evidence on record to create
a moral certainty that Rayala was indeed guilty of

sexual harassment. The CA also held that Rayalas

dismissal was proper, pointing out that Rayala was
dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct, a
violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). CA
initially affirmed the penalty of dismissal but later
modified it into the penalty of suspension from the
service for 1 year.
All three parties (Domingo, the OP, and Rayala all
filed Petitions for Review:
o DOMINGO: The power to remove Rayala, a
presidential appointee, is lodged with the
President who has control of the entire
Executive Department, its bureaus and
offices. The OPs decision was arrived at after
affording Rayala due process. Hence, his
dismissal from the service is a prerogative
that is entirely with the President.
o

OP:
Rayalas
acts
constitute
sexual
harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute
unwelcome or improper gestures of affection
and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature,
which are generally annoying or offensive to
the victim. Also, although AO 250 provides
only a 1-year suspension, it will not prevent
the OP from validly imposing the penalty of
dismissal on Rayala. Even though Rayala is a
presidential appointee, he is still subject to
the Civil Service Law, which provides that
disgraceful and immoral conduct constitute
grave misconduct punishable by dismissal
from the service.
RAYALA: Citing Aquino v. Acosta, for sexual
harassment to exist under RA 7877, there
must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement
of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a precondition to hiring, re-employment, or

continued employment; or (c)

thereof results in discrimination
employee. Domingo failed to
establish that any sexual favor,
request was made for her
employment or promotion.

the denial
against the
allege and
demand or
continued

ISSUES:
1. WON Rayala committed acts that constitute sexual
harassment.
2. WON dismissal is the proper penalty for Rayalas offense.
HELD:
1. YES.
2. NO. The maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala
is suspension for 1 year.
RATIO:
1. The SC first cited the application of the three-fold liability
rule in the law of public officers, which states that wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can
therefore proceed independently of the others. In the case
of sexual harassment, the same applies with full force.
RA 7877 defines work-related sexual harassment as:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring
or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying

the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive

or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or
privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive environment for the employee.

RA 7877 also provides for the criminal and civil aspect

(Section 7 in relation to Section 6), as well as the
administrative aspect (Section 4, in relation to Section 3) of
the case for the unlawful act of sexual harassment.
Therefore, Rayalas culpability can be determined through
different aspects, and he can therefore be charged
administratively, separate from the other actions that may
be filed against him.
Nevertheless, even if Section 3 of RA 7877s standards were
applied, Rayala may still be held administratively liable.
While the provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor", it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable
sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Furthermore, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondents acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee. The acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and
hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the
common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the
OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an

officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of

absence and requested transfer to another unit.
2. Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.
On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that
the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age
of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided
by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of
the office.
In this case, it is the OP, as the proper disciplining authority,
who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the
removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however,
is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law."
Thus, when the OP found that Rayala was guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the OP did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. The imposable
penalty for the first offense of either the administrative
offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year. Accordingly, it was wrong for the OP to impose
upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, since
it can only be imposed upon commission of a second
offense.
And even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala
took advantage of his high government position, it still could
not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,

taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be

considered as an aggravating circumstance and where only
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is
suspension for one (1) year.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises

considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840,
and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.