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Fragility Analysis of Corroded Pipeline

Sirous F. Yasseri, Safe Sight Technology , London, UK


ABSTRACT
Pipelines are exposed to corrosive environment causing various types of degradation. The most important
degradation experienced by pipelines is gradual wall thinning that causes the pipe to leak or burst. The
failure pressure (FP) models are used for the assessment of corroded pipelines. Examples of the FP
models are the DNV RP F101, Modified ASME B31G, RSTRENG and PCORRC. Each FP model is
governed by input parameters of pipe outer diameter (D), wall thickness (t), minimum yield strength
(SMYS) or ultimate tensile strength (UTS), longitudinal extend of corrosion (l) and corrosion defect
depth (d). Equations in these codes are calibrated using large data bases. These codes use safety factors
and hence giving them a deterministic appearance. Codified models have helped to avoid unnecessary
repairs and replacements, yet some researchers commented on their excess conservatism.
Allowing a degraded pipeline to continue operating requires decision to be made under a great deal of
uncertainty that may lead to a finite risk of exceeding the limit states of burst. In order to minimise risks,
conventional factors of safety and deterministic analyses methods are used in the design. The purpose is
to develop, test, and illustrate a simple spreadsheet-based probabilistic procedure that can be used by
pipeline engineers to assign conditional probabilities of failure to corroded pipelines as a function of
internal pressures. Such probabilities can be used to estimate benefits to be derived from any proposed
de-rating or improvement. The proposed approach only uses the pipeline wall thickness data that are
usually being collected during pipeline inspection.

KEY WORDS: pipeline; corrosion; probability of failure; inspection; integrity; B31G; DNV-RP-F101

1.

INTRODUCTION

Aging pipelines are affected by a number of


corrosion mechanisms, which would lead to a
reduction in wall thickness and eventual failure;
see references at the end this paper, especially
(Teixera et. al (2008), Ahammed (1998), Netto et
al (2005) and Ahammed and Melchers (1996)).
Thus inspection and corrosion prevention
strategies play a large role in economics of
pipelines (Ainouche (2006)).
Since corrosion is a complex phenomenon, the
prediction of safe operating limit has always been
a challenge for pipeline operators. To account for
the uncertainties, DNV RP-F101 has incorporated
safety factors, which accounts for defect
dimensions. ASME B31G and PCORRC also
follow a similar approach. These codes are
designed to assess the condition of the pipelines at
the time of inspection owing to constant partial
safety factor.

Structural reliability methods were used to assure


the safe operation of corroding pipelines, some of
more recent contributions are listed in at end of
this paper. Probabilistic approaches for the
integrity assessment of corroding pipelines are
useful due to the uncertainties associated with inline-inspection (ILI) tools, corrosion growth rate,
pipeline geometry, material properties (Ahmad
and Melchers, 1996). Operating pressure can be
monitored and controlled over any desired period
of time. From this data, the reliability of a
corroded pipeline can be determined on a
quantitative basis, e.g. by calculating its
probability of failure using structural reliability
methods (Caleyo et al (2002), Vieth (2002)). The
probability of failure can be determined for the
entire pipeline, ranked by segment between joints
or for a given characteristic length. Then, it can be
compared with target probabilities which are
recommended by code; or, established either from
historic failure rates or from risk criteria
(Zimmerman and Chen (1996), Hallen (2002) and
Kiefner and Vieth (1990)). This comparison
allows the operator to formulate cost effective

strategies for the future safe operation of the


pipeline.

2.

greater than 50% of the original pipe wall


thickness and the circumferential extent is greater
than 1/12 (8.33%) of the circumference (Escoe,
2006).

FAILURE PRESSURE

The failure pressure (FP) models are used for the


assessment of corroded pipelines. Examples of the
FP models are the DNV-RP-F101, Modified
ASME B31G, Shell, RSTRENG and PCORRC
(Table 1 at the end of this paper). These models
were originated from the original B21G criterion
but they later evolved along different paths. Most
of these codes use safety factors and hence giving
it a deterministic appearance.
Each FP model is governed by input parameters of
pipe outer diameter (D), wall thickness (t),
minimum yield strength (SMYS) or ultimate
tensile strength (UTS), longitudinal extent of
corrosion (l) and corrosion defect depth (d). These
models have helped to avoid unnecessary repairs
and replacements; yet some researchers
commented on their excess conservatism (e.g.
Escoe, (2006) and Mustaffa and Gelder (2010)).
These models use single simple corrosion
geometry and the corrosion circumferential width
(w) is not considered (Fu and Kirkwood, (1995)).
Generally, it is agreed that the longitudinal extent
of corrosion is always of greatest importance,
compared to the circumferential width. Defects in
the longitudinal direction have been reported to be
the most severe since they alter the hoop stress
distribution and promote bulging. Hoop stress is
the dominant stress for internal pressure and hence
the parameter d and l have become the important
inputs for the FP models (Chouchaoui and Pick
(1994)). On the other hand, researchers have
shown that the influence of corrosion
circumferential width (w) to failures was not that
significant (Batte et. al. (1997)).
The current practice tends to deal with the
parameter w separately at the later stage when the
most severe defect has been identified. The
parameter
w
becomes
important
when
qualitatively assessing the interaction of a colony
of defects under the Fitness-for-Service approach.
The circumferential extent of damage is only
become priority when depth of the corrosion is

3.

BURST PRESSURE

Modern pipeline codes assume that each design


criterion attempts to avoid a particular failure
mode, i.e. each design criterion is the limit state
for a given failure mode. For the pressure
containment case, this means the bursting capacity
must be determined fairly accurately and with
consistency, i.e. the prediction should be a close
lower bound of the actual burst pressure.
Recommendations of DNV, B31G or similar
codes serve this purpose.
The difference between prediction and test results
may be due to:
The inability of the equations to accurately
predict behaviour.
Errors in yield or tensile strength determination;
different methods of measurement and subsequent
calculation may cause large variation.
Difference can exist along circumferential and
longitudinal directions, so that conventional
tensile test results may not capture the minimum
properties which determine failure in practice.
Burst tests were reported by Coulson (1990),
Chouchaoui (1992) Vieth and Kielher (1994),
Benjamin et al. (2000), Bjornoy et al. (2000) and
Batte et al. (1997) among others. Cronin and Pick
(2000) performed burst tests on corroded pipelines
which were removed from service due to corrosion
defects.
There are numerous equations for the prediction of
pipe burst pressure. Some of these equations have
theoretical basis, but most include a correction
factor (see e.g. Bea 1999) which are calibrated
against a data base. DNV and B31G are compared
with results of previously reported burst tests from
a number of sources. The actual and predicted
burst pressures are given in Table 2, in Appendix.
The modified B31G predictive models for pipe
rupture or DNV approach are designed to be
conservative. Statistical information is provided

on the relationship between the predicted failure


stress and actual failure stresses obtained from
pipe burst tests in the modified ASME B31G are
shown in Table 2. As Table 2 shows, no
predictive method gives the exact burst pressure.
The ratio of the true burst pressure to the predicted
value is known as the model bias and defined as:
=

(1)

The test results were normalised using the


predicted values and the average and standard
deviation for these percentages are shown in Table
3.
The bias of DNV predicted to actual failure stress
ratio, in these tests was found to have a mean
value of 1.09 and a standard deviation of 0.101.
Bjornoy et all (2001) compared the DNV equation
for corroded pipeline against a selected data base
and suggested the bias is about 1.02 and the
standard deviation is 0.135. It should be
remembered that, measured values determined by
experiment are not necessarily true values or
actual value under the field condition.
Checking DNV equation against Bathe et all
(1997) gives a bias of 1.05 and COV=0.095. The
maximum COV reported in literature is 22% (Bea
RAM project 1999) and the minimum is 5% (Law
2002).
Table 3 Statistics of burst tests of Table 2
Standard
Code
Bias
Deviation COV
ASME
1.036
0.086
0.083
DNV
1.093
0.101
0.093

4.

RELIABILIY INDEX

For a corroded pipeline subjected to an internal


pressure, the probability of failure
can be
expressed as a function of the pressure and other
factors including defect size, outside diameter,
wall thickness and material properties. The
conditional probability of failure can be written as:
=

|! " =

! , $% , $& , , $ " (2)

In the above expression, the first term (denoting


probability of failure) will be used as a shorthand
version of the second term. In the second term, the
symbol | is read given and the variable IP is the
Internal pressure. In the third term, the random
variables$% through$ denote relevant parameters
such as material strength, pipe diameter, thickness,
defect dimensions, etc. Equation (2) can be
restated as follows: The probability of failure,
given an internal pressure, is a function of the
pressure and other random variables. This study
will focus on developing the conditional
probability of failure function for the internal
pressure, which will be constructed using
engineering estimates of the probability functions
or moments of the relevant variables.
In the capacity-demand model, the probability of
failure or unsatisfactory performance is defined as
the probability that the demand on a system or
component exceeds the capacity of the system or
component. The capacity and demand can be
combined into a single function (the performance
function), and the event that the capacity equals
the demand taken as the limit state. Reliability is
the probability that the limit state will not be
reached or crossed. The performance measure is
taken as the pipe burst.
Assuming the capacity, C, and demand, D, are
lognormal random variables, then ln +" and
ln ,"are normally distributed. Defining the safety
factor-. = + , , then 0-. = 0+" ln ," and
0-. is normally distributed. Defining the
reliability index as the amount that 0-. exceeds
zero, then:
2=

45

6"

7 89:;89<"

3=

4 6 ">

789 :<"

?@"

789AB

(3)

From the properties of lognormal distribution:


%
C 0+" = 0C +" & D & 4
(4)
Where

& "
D & 4 = 0 1 + G?4

(5)

Similar expressions apply to CH 0,I and D

The expected value of the log of the safety factor


is:
3

C 0-." 0CH+I 0H,I = 0 K

3H4I

3H6I

The reliability index,2, is defined as:

2=

N :"OPQRS
<

N <"OPQRS
:

=%UV:S >U

L (6)

(7)

=%UV<S >

Codes equations can be put in the form of the


safety factor and capacity and demand are not
explicitly separated. The reliability index has to be
determined using C -." and D?@ which calculated
using multiple runs.
Thus, the reliability index is determined as
follows:
7AB
G?@ = 3 ?@"
(8)
D

?@

& "
= W 0 1 + G?@

(9)

&
C 0-." = 0C -." & ln 1 + G?@
" (10)

2=

?@"

789AB

X3

S Z
?@"YO%UVAB
S >
=%UVAB

(11)

In this study, the model uncertainty is added as


another random variable in determining the
reliability index. Alternatively one could use
Equation (7). However, due to small coefficient of
variation, there is not much difference between
alternatives.
In this study we use the codes safety factor as a
measure of criticality.

5.

RELIABILIY ANALYSIS

A simplified reliability analysis includes the


following steps:
1.
A deterministic model to determine the
corroded pipeline response.
DNV-RP-F101
corroded pipeline and modified B31G methods are
used in this study.
2.
Important variables with sufficient inherent
uncertainty are taken as random variables and

characterized by their expected values, standard


deviations- correlations are neglected in this paper.
3.
A performance measure, or a limit state,
-.
4.
The expected value and standard deviation
of the performance function are next calculated. In
principle,
this
involves
integrating
the
performance function over the probability density
functions of the random variables. However,
approximate values are obtained using the Taylor's
series method.
5.
The reliability index 2 is calculated from
the expected and standard deviation of the limit
state function. The reliability index is a measure of
the distance between the expected value of 0 -."
and the limit state.
6.
Assuming a suitable distribution of failure,
e.g. normal distribution, the probability of failure,
"calculated
6.

TAYLORS SERIES METHOD

The moments of the performance function are


estimated from the moments of the random
variables. Methods such as direct integration,
Taylors series, point estimate methods, and
Monte Carlo Simulation (Vose 2008) can be used
to determine the mean and standard deviation of
the performance function. In direct integration, the
mean value of the function is obtained by
integrating over the probability density function of
the random variables (Melchers 1999).
In order to estimate the variability of design
results in terms of their mean and standard
deviations, the First Order Second Moment
(FOSM) method that involves approximation
based on Taylor expansion are employed in this
paper. C -." can be expressed as:

CH-.I = -. CH$% I, CH$& I, , CH$ I"

(12)

where $ = 1,2,3, " represents the random


variables such as material yield strength, wall
thickness, outside diameter, defect size and so on.
If Taylor series expansion for a performance
function of several random variables, C -." , is
performed about the mean values of the random
variables and only first order terms are retained,

approximate variance of the function can be


expressed as:
`-. & &
G H-.I = ] ^_
a b Dcd
`$
`-. `-.
+ 2]^

bg
D D
`$
`$f cd, ch cd ch
(13)
When the random variables in function -. are
assumed uncorrelated, Equation (13) can be
presented in a simpler form as follows:
G

H-.I = jk

l?@ &
lcd

m n Dc&d

(14)

It is quite common in engineering to encounter


non-closed form of the performance functions.
When -. is a non-closed form function, the partial
derivatives of -. can be estimated numerically
using the finite difference method, i.e.:
?@HcdQ I5?@Hcd; I

lcd

H-.I p% k

l?@

cdQ 5cd;

(15)

where $ 5 and $ U represents the random


variable $ taken at some increment above and
below its expected values (e.g. 1D or 2D ).
Theoretically, an extremely small increment gives
the most accurate value of the derivative at the
expected value. This FOSM method allows the
engineer to see the contribution of each random
variable to the total uncertainty in the -. function.

7.

?@HcdQ I 5?@Hcd; I
&

m (16)

EXAMPLE

Table 4 gives details of a corroded pipeline. Six


random variables are considered, the defect
dimensions, the material properties, pipe outer
diameter and thickness. The assigned probabilistic
moments for these variables are given in the Table
4. For the DNV method the critical value of the
safety factor is taken to be 1/0.9=1.111 and for the
modified B31G is-. = 1.

Table 4 shows the values of the six variables used


in this example. In addition the coefficient of
variation of both models is assumed to be another
random variable in order to account the model
uncertainty.

For the first analysis (RUN1), the seven random


variables are taken at their expected values (Table
5, (& Table 6) in Appendix).
For the subsequent analyses, one variable is taken
at a time and its value is assumed to be the
expected value plus and minus one standard
deviation, while other three variables are kept at
their expected values. Results obtained from these
analyses are used to calculate the total variance
related to the Safety Factor, FS. For instance:
G

-.H$ U I -.H$ 5 I
H-.I X
Z
2
1.448 1.424 &
=_
a
2
= 0.000458859
&

Table 4 Design data for the case study


Symbo Variable
Unit Mea Standard
l
n
Deviatio
n
d
Depth
mm 4.44 0.444
l
Longitudinal
mm 250
25
length
w
Circumferentia mm 40
4
l width
D
Diameter
mm 273. 13.6
1
t
Wall thickness mm 11.1 0.111
SMTS Specified
MP 455
45.5
minimum
a
Tensile
strength
Po
Operating
Mp 12 - 1.4 3.0
Pressure
a
48
When the variance components are summed, the
total variance will be: 0.094339698. Taking the
square root of the variance gives the standard
deviation of 0.3071.

The Safety Factor, -. , is assumed to be lognormally distributed random variable with the
expected value (first moment) C -." = 1.424
and D?@ = 0.307 . Using the properties of the
lognormal distribution, the equivalent normally
distributed random variable has the following
parameters:
5

1
C 0-." = 0CH-.I D & ?@ = 0.33087
2
And
= O 0 1+

?@

1
0.9

= 0.2157

The critical safety FS is assumed to be 1.111 (for


DNV RP-F101). The probability of failure is
given by:
=
0-. > 0-. "
The probability is determined assuming the
normal distribution by calculating the standard
normalised variable z (analogous to2):
2=

0-.

5C

0-."

0.10536 0.33087
D ?@
0.2157
= 1.0576463

Probablity of failure

& "
G?@

Conditional Probability of Failure Determined by DNV-RP-101 and


Modified B31G

For this value, the cumulative distribution will be


- z" = 0.1451084,
which
represent
the
probability that the safety factor is below the
critical value. The probability that the safety factor
is above the critical value is:
= 1 - {" = 1 0.1451084 = 0.8548916

These analyses were repeated for a number of


pressures from 12 to 46 MPa. The resulting
conditional probability of failure is shown in
Figure 1.

Probability of failure

0.500

35

40

45

DNV-RP-F101

CONCLUSIONS

This approach identifies the load carrying capacity


of all sections of a pipeline. These capacities are
reduced to a common basis by considering such
factors as the degree of conservatism inherent in
the analysis, whether failure of a section would
have major consequences. The fragility curves
relating the probability of pipeline failure to
pressure demand were estimated.

0.300
0.200
0.100
0.000
45

25
30
Internal Pressure (MPa)

The fragility of a corroded pipeline is defined as


the conditional probability of its failure for a given
level of internal pressure. These fragility curves
can be used to de-rate a pipeline in order to stay in
service longer.

2.

0.400

40

20

Figure 2 Comparison of Conditional Probability of Failure


for the example problem using DNV and B31G.

0.600

35

15

Modified B31G

0.700

30

0.3

10

0.800

25

0.4

0.900

20

0.5

0.1

1.

1.000

15

0.6

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3.
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The same procedure was repeated for the modified


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on the previous result in Figure 2.

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Table 1 Failure Pressure According to four codes


Failure Pressure
Model

Failure Pressure Expression, FP

2.0.|}.~
H1 1 ~"|I
,
.|}. .|. F 68.95
-=

Modified ASME
B31G

DNV RP F101

SHELL-92

RSTRENG

2.0.|}.~ 1 1 ~"
^
b
,1~
1 1 ~"|

Folias Factor
&

! , W ^2/,~ 50
&

3.3 F 0.032 X Z
,}
! , W ^2/,~ x 50
|

1.8.|}.~ 1 1 ~"
^
b
,
1 1 ~"|

2.0.|}.~
H1 1 ~"|I
,

1 F 0.6275 X Z 1 0.003375 X & & Z


,~
,

&

1 F 0.31 X Z
,~
&

1 F 0.805 X Z
,~
&

1 F 0.6275 X Z 1 0.003375 X & & Z


,~
,

Table 2: Burst tests complied from literature


Test Cae

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

YS

509

624

532

555

534

441

512

501

517

458

509

427

636

563

607

619

622
716

TS

572

624

608

580

653

585

600

581

559

546

605

578

645

589

630

716

eu

0.09

0.01

0.12

0.09

0.11

0.15

0.12

0.13

0.09

0.1

0.11

0.14

0.05

0.1

0.14

0.09

0.1

14.81

13.49

19.99

19.99

15.9

15.9

15.9

15.9

19.05

19.05

19.05

19.05

19.05

19.05

19.05

14.12

14.1

508

543.6

762

762

609.6

609.6

609.6

609.6

914.4

914.4

914.4

914.4

609.6

609.6

609.6

1117.6

1117.6

0.09

0.013

0.112

0.087

0.105

0.135

0.112

0.126

0.089

0.097

0.104

0.135

0.046

0.095

0.127

0.09

0.091

Ro

254

271.8

381

381

304.8

304.8

304.8

304.8

457.2

457.2

457.2

457.2

304.8

304.8

304.8

558.8

558.8

Ri

239.2

258.3

361

361

288.9

288.9

288.9

288.9

438.2

438.2

438.2

438.2

285.8

285.8

285.8

544.7

544.7

K = Ro/Ri

1.06

1.05

1.06

1.06

1.06

1.06

1.06

1.06

1.04

1.04

1.04

1.04

1.07

1.07

1.07

1.03

1.03

Sec Mod

6080

47993

5153

6371

5882

4032

5083

4337

6012

5353

5503

4017

13715

5894

4667

7577

7537

V eff

0.49

0.45

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.5

0.49

0.49

0.5

0.49

0.49

YT

0.89

0.87

0.96

0.82

0.75

0.85

0.86

0.92

0.84

0.84

0.74

0.99

0.96

0.96

0.86

0.87

D/t

34.31

40.3

38.12

38.12

38.34

38.34

38.34

38.34

48

48

48

48

32

32

32

79.14

79.28

Test result

35.8

33.8

30.6

32

34.8

31.8

31.7

30.2

24.8

23.1

25.8

23.2

40.7

36.4

39

21.8

21.7

ASME

34.1

31.6

32.6

31.1

34.8

31.1

32

31

23.7

23.1

25.6

24.5

41.3

37.8

40.4

18.3

18.2

DNV

32.4

31.7

30.7

30.6

31.8

27.5

29.8

29

22.9

21.4

23.7

21.4

41.3

37.2

39.9

17.1

17.1

Table 5: Summary of inputs and results for the case study (DNV-RP-F101)
DNV RP-F101
l mm
Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

250
225
275
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250

Operating Pressure

20

Mpa

t mm

SMTS

Model
STD

Pf
(Mpa)

FS

273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
259.4
11.1
286.7
11.1
273.05 9.99
273.05 12.21
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1
273.05 11.1

455
455
455
455
455
455
455
455
455
455
455
413.64
500.5
455
455

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.92
1.08

2.719
2.486
2.956
2.719
2.719
2.719
2.719
2.780
2.662
2.847
2.610
2.719
2.719
2.719
2.719

28.484
28.953
28.096
29.867
27.051
28.484
28.484
29.936
27.173
23.889
33.071
25.894
31.332
26.205
30.762

1.424
1.448
1.405
1.493
1.353
1.424
1.424
1.497
1.359
1.194
1.654
1.295
1.567
1.310
1.538

d mm w m D mm
4.44
4.44
4.44
3.996
4.884
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44

40
40
40
40
40
36
44
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40

E(FS)= 1.4242
Var(FS)= 0.0943
Sigma(FS)=0.3071
V(FS)= 0.2157

E(ln FS)= 0.33087

Varaince
Normalised
Component

0.000458859

0.0048639

0.004956224 0.05253594
0

0.004772806

0.0505917

0.052689577 0.55850906
0.018481065 0.19589913
0.012981167 0.13760026
0.094339698
1
Z=
-1.0576463

Sigm(ln FS) 0.21322


Pr(f)= F(Z ) 0.1451084

I(crit)

Ln(FScrit)= 0.10536

1.1111

Pf=1-F(Z )

0.8548916

Table 6: Summary of inputs and results for the case study (BG31G)
Modified BG31G
Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

Operating Pressure

l (mm)

d (mm)

w
(m)

250
225
275
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250

4.44
4.44
4.44
3.996
4.884
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44
4.44

40
40
40
40
40
36
44
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40

20

D (mm) t (mm) SMTS


273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
259.4
286.7
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05
273.05

11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
9.99
12.21
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1

427
427
427
427
427
427
427
427
427
427
427
388.2
469.7
427
427

E(i)= 1.268
Var(i)= 0.055
Sigma(i)= 0.235
V(i)= 0.185
I(crit)

Mpa

Mode
l STD

Pf (Mpa)

FS

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.92
1.08

3.5309
3.2418
3.8093
3.5309
3.5309
3.5309
3.5309
3.6044
3.4622
3.6830
3.3976
3.5309
3.5309
3.5309
3.5309

25.3545
25.5977
25.1585
26.3795
24.3073
25.3545
25.3545
26.6308
24.1985
21.6635
29.0252
23.0495
27.8899
25.3545
25.3545

1.2677
1.2799
1.2579
1.3190
1.2154
1.2677
1.2677
1.3315
1.2099
1.0832
1.4513
1.1525
1.3945
1.2677
1.2677

E(ln)=

0.220392

Varaince
Componen Normalised
t

0.00012052

0.00219065

0.00268376 0.048779991
0

0.00369758 0.067207258
0.03387237 0.615663874
0.0146434

0.266158227

0
0.05501764
z=

0
1
-1.2012511

Pr(f)= F(z)

0.1148269

Pf=1-F(z)

0.8851731

Sigm(ln i) 0.183469

Ln(I crit)=

11

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