Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v.

Villareal
G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15
Cuevas, J.
FACTS:
Respondents are applicants for the registration of two agricultural lands
located in Rizal. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing
that the property applied for, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662,
have a total area of 26,015 sq. m. These lots originally belong to one Maria Certeza
and that upon her death, the property was involved in litigation between her
grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza, and that the lots were given by the latter to
Justice de Joya as the latters attorneys fees. The lots were then sold by de Joya to
Filomeno Sta. Ana, who in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and
Ignacia Guillermo in 1939. Sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold the
lots to herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The spouses
Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia
Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes thereon. Prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo
had the two lots surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955.
On the other hand, oppositor (Rizal Cement Company) claims to be the owner
of the subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have been in
continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate this
claim, petitioner submitted documentary evidence, one of which is a tax declaration
of the said lots.
The Court of First Instance denied the application for registration of
respondents and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in the name of
Rizal Cement Co., after finality of said decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents had been in actual possession of the land in
question.
HELD:
Yes. The CA gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents.
As a general rule, it is provided in the Civil Code that possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts or legal formalities established
for acquiring such right. Petitioners evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax
declaration and survey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of ones
ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of
title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon defendant.

Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation and which
is from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was
executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00. Then, in 1973, William Giger
again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00 from plaintiff and so he required
William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale. In 1972, plaintiff began
harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Giger.
He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any
person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is
a businessman and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he
put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession. He knew defendants'
laborers were in the land in suit as early as August, 1976 and that they have a hut
there but he did not do anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there
were people and a hut on the land in suit.
Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to
find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner
and he found none. So, in July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of
land in litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela. Ignacio Wong
then asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession TCT
No. (T-4244) T-974 in the name of William Giger. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit
for taxation purposes in his name. He tried to register the pacto de retro sale with
the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee but due to some technicalities,
the pacto de retro sale could not be registered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD:
It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation
of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of
our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." And
that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because
such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been
effected. Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that
possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado

by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of
petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in
possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.